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L'encadrement juridique de la libre disposition de soi

Abstract : Must free self-determination accept limits imposed by law? A first approach, instinctive, is to answer in the negative because the Law would not have vocation to interfere in the intimate relations that one maintains with oneself and which consequently does not concern the society. However, we must face the obvious: the law is legitimate to intervene in the free disposition of oneself because the intimacy is porous, and leaves between the meshes the presence of others, which authorizes the public authorities to intervene punctually in this area a priori dedicated to privacy. It is on the basis of public order that the legislator or judges determine whether free self-determination can flourish without danger for others or for the general interest. This public order, in its classical components ofleadership and protection, nevertheless appears to be struggling to contain the individual wishes that express themselves with conviction. Both the judge and the legislator have accordingly turned to another legal instrument ofa nature to regulate the free disposition of oneself. More recent, the dignity of the human person comes to protect thefree disposition of individuals in situation of weakness; or on the contrary, to limit the free disposition of oneself,protecting the person against his will. The second meaning of dignity is the one that predominates in the hands of thelegislator and the judges, leaving the free disposition of oneself at the mercy of a little nuanced instrument. We musttherefore look for a legal instrument that will ensure social cohesion without extinguishing individual aspirations. Itis a particularly delicate balance to find in that these two objectives are most often diametrically opposed. Research must be oriented towards public order because it is an eminently evolving concept. It is a public order that must beof direction, given the facts that it accompanies, with all the firmness required, individuals in the discovery of the options that are most favorable to them and that it is not intended to to protect at all costs the free disposition ofoneself. Its adaptability to the circumstances of the case is made possible by the application of the principle of proportionality in concreto. This new public order would finally be nothing but an empty shell, without the objectiveof the common good, which makes it possible to discriminate between the licit and unlawful uses of free self determination.Framed by the public order of direction of the person, the latter can express himself without endangering the individual or the society.
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Maia Gouguet. L'encadrement juridique de la libre disposition de soi. Droit. Université de Limoges, 2019. Français. ⟨NNT : 2019LIMO0015⟩. ⟨tel-02349021⟩

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