Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation

Compilation vérifiée et sécurisée contre les canaux cachés temporels

Abstract : Our society is increasingly dependent on computer systems. Ensuring their security is essential to avoid the dramatic consequences of attacks against these systems. In this thesis, we focus on a class of attacks called timing sidechannel attacks. We study existing protections against these attacks, such as the constant-time and the constant-resource policies, and focus on their interaction with compilation. Compilation is the process of transforming a program written by a human in a source language, into machine code executable by a computer. Our goal is to ensure that compilation does not introduce any vulnerability in the compiled code, with respect to the security policies we focus on; this is called secure compilation. Our work also relies on formal methods to give formal guarantees on the results we present. One of our contribution relies on the formally verified CompCert compiler. All the results presented in this thesis are mechanically verified using the Coq proof assistant.
Document type :
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : ABES STAR :  Contact
Submitted on : Tuesday, March 22, 2022 - 3:15:10 PM
Last modification on : Friday, August 5, 2022 - 2:54:52 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, June 23, 2022 - 7:32:31 PM


Version validated by the jury (STAR)


  • HAL Id : tel-03616445, version 1


Rémi Hutin. Compilation vérifiée et sécurisée contre les canaux cachés temporels. Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]. École normale supérieure de Rennes, 2021. Français. ⟨NNT : 2021ENSR0029⟩. ⟨tel-03616445⟩



Record views


Files downloads