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Trois essais sur la composition des conseils d'administration et la gouvernance d'entreprise efficace.

Abstract : The target of this thesis is to examine two mechanisms to promote good corporate governance in banking firms, including employee ownership and the presence of bondholder representatives in a bank's board. In Chapter 1, we examine whether a greater level of employee ownership leads to lower bank risk. Using a sample of European banks, we find that the total employee ownership, as well as each of its components (executive and non-executive ownership), significantly reduce banks’ risk. Our study is the first to investigate whether non-executive ownership, in addition to executive ownership, has an impact on bank risk-taking. Moreover, our results shed light on the channels through which employee ownership affects a bank’s risk. We demonstrate that not only executive ownership, but also non-executive ownership leads to a lower level of non-performing loans ratio. Chapter 2 complements Chapter 1 by examining whether the national supportive policy suggested by the European Commission is effective to promote employee share ownership programs (ESOP) in European banks. We find that supportive measures are effective to promote ESOP in widely-held banks independently of bank opacity and shareholder protection, but they are only effective to promote ESOP in closely-held banks if banks are transparent or located in countries with stronger shareholder protection. Our finding suggests that authorities should improve shareholder protection and bank transparency to enhance the effectiveness of supportive measures for employee ownership programs. In Chapter 3, we examine whether the influence of bondholder representatives on the board of directors of banks is an effective market discipline mechanism to reduce bank risk-taking. Our empirical results provide evidence that the influence of bondholder representatives significantly reduces all dimensions of bank risk without reducing profitability. Our study is the first to consider bondholder representatives as a market discipline device to limit excessive firm risk-taking. We contribute to the corporate governance literature for banks by highlighting the potentially important role of bondholder representatives in addressing the complex interplay of agency problems faced by the many stakeholders relevant to banks. Our finding has significant implications for regulators and corporate governance reform proponents promoting the role of market discipline and boards in controlling bank risk-taking.
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Submitted on : Friday, January 7, 2022 - 10:17:08 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, February 22, 2022 - 9:00:02 AM
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  • HAL Id : tel-03516272, version 1



Phan Huy Hieu Tran. Trois essais sur la composition des conseils d'administration et la gouvernance d'entreprise efficace.. Economies et finances. Université de Limoges, 2021. Français. ⟨NNT : 2021LIMO0083⟩. ⟨tel-03516272⟩



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