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On the practical security of white-box cryptography

Abstract : Cryptography studies how to secure communications and information. The security of a cryptosystem depends on the secrecy of the underlying key. White-box cryptography explores methods to hide a cryptographic key into some software deployed in the real world. Classical cryptography only assumes that the adversary accesses the target cryptographic primitive in a black-box manner in which she can only observe or manipulate the input and output of the primitive, but cannot know or tamper with its internal details. The gray-box model further allows an adversary to exploit key- dependent sensitive information leaked from the execution of physical implementations. All sorts of side-channel attacks exploit some physical information leakage, such as the power consumption of the device. The white-box model considers the worst-case scenario in which the adversary has complete control over the software and its execution environment. The goal of white-box cryptography is to securely implement a cryptographic primitive against such a powerful adversary. Although the scientific community has proposed some candidate solutions to build white-box cryptography, all have proven ineffective. Consequently, this problem has remained open for almost two decades since the concept was introduced. The continuous growth in market demand and the emerging potential applications have driven the industry to deploy secretly-designed proprietary solutions. Al- though this paradigm of achieving security through obscurity contradicts the widely accepted Kerckhoffs' principle in cryptography, this is currently the only option for white-box cryptography. Security experts have reported how gray-box attacks could be used to extract keys from several publicly available white-box implementations. In a gray-box attack, the adversary adapts side-channel analysis techniques to the white-box context, i.e., to target computation traces made of noise-free run-time information instead of the noisy physical leakage. Gray-box attacks are generic since they do not require any a priori knowledge of the implementation and hence avoid costly reverse engineering. Some non-publicly scrutinized industrial white-box schemes in the market are believed to be under the threat of gray-box attacks. This thesis focuses on the analysis and improvement of gray-box attacks and the associated countermeasures for white-box cryptography. We first provide an in- depth analysis of why gray-box attacks are capable of breaking the classical white-box design which is based on table encodings. Next, we introduce a new gray-box attack named linear decoding analysis and show that linearly encoding sensitive information is insufficient to protect the cryptographic software. Afterward, we describe how to combine state-of-the-art countermeasures to resist gray-box attacks and comprehensively elaborate on the (in)effectiveness of these combined countermeasures in terms of computation complexity. Finally, we introduce a new attack technique that exploits the data-dependency of the targeted implementation to substantially lower the complexity of the existing gray-box attacks on white-box cryptography. In addition to the theoretical analyses and new attack techniques introduced in this thesis, we report some attack experiments against practical white-box implementations. In particular, we could break the winning implementations of two consecutive editions of the well-known WhibOx white-box cryptography competition.
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  • HAL Id : tel-02953586, version 1

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Junwei Wang. On the practical security of white-box cryptography. Cryptography and Security [cs.CR]. University of Luxembourg; Université Paris 8, 2020. English. ⟨tel-02953586⟩

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