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Challenges for Macroprudential Policy in the Euro Area : Cross-Border Spillovers and Governance Issues

Abstract : Given the fragilities of a heterogenous monetary union and the inability of the single monetary policy to lean against the wind of national financial cycles, new policies to defend financial stability in the European Monetary Union (EMU) are of the upmost importance. In response global financial crisis, advanced economies have supplemented their policy arsenal with a macroprudential approach to financial regulation, the practice of using prudential regulation to protect the health of the financial system and the economy as a whole, rather than just the health of individual institutions. Policymakers have unambiguously placed the task of containing systemic financial risk on the shoulders of macroprudential policy, but the national heterogeneities that characterize the Euro area pose significant challenges. The purpose of this thesis dissertation is to enrich the debate surrounding Euro area macroprudential policy by exploring how macrofinancial and institutional heterogeneity can condition its proper conduct. Macroprudential policy is a popular subject in post-crisis macroeconomics, but analysis is often built on premises that fail to acknowledge the complexities inherent to its most basic concepts, such as financial stability itself. Rather than building ever-more complex models that aim to incorporate all the dimensions of the phenomenon, the problem can be addressed by conducting a critical reflection on the field’s conceptual bases before formulating a model’s assumptions. In the first chapter, we conduct a critical review of the literature and identify several points of tension, interpreting their implications for the Euro area case. Based on the insights of chapter I, chapter II revisits the question of whether it is ideal for regulators to keep a narrow focus on national financial stabilization in the presence of cross-border spillovers, as is currently done. To do so, we build a static two-country New-Keynesian model where countercyclical capital regulation in the core affects financial stability in the periphery through the interbank market. By comparing national stabilization rules to a regime where the core regulator internalizes the spillover, we identify scenarios where the status quo is suboptimal. Finally, chapter III examines the significant institutional differences that exist among EMU national regulators. By reviewing official information , as well as assessment reports from the IMF and the FSB; we map the qualitative differences of national governance frameworks across six dimensions: presence of coordination mechanisms, completeness of instruments, independence, decision-making expeditiousness, strength of the legal mandate, use of communication and transparency. Given that institutional characteristics influence reactivity, we aim to quantify how this institutional heterogeneity affects the vulnerability to inaction bias through a comparative synthetic index. We find that countries are unequally protected against inaction bias, but there are several possible approaches to building robust governance frameworks.
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Marcos Carias Flores. Challenges for Macroprudential Policy in the Euro Area : Cross-Border Spillovers and Governance Issues. Economics and Finance. Université de Bordeaux, 2019. English. ⟨NNT : 2019BORD0067⟩. ⟨tel-02724821⟩



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