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Essays on Allocation Procedures of Indivisibles

Abstract : This thesis focuses on the allocation of indivisible goods in presence of externality in individual preferences. This externality creates a difficulty with collecting full information about preferences. Therefore, conducting a normative analysis of allocation mechanisms requires assumptions on how reported preferences can be extended to preferences over outcomes. This approach is in line with the literature on preference domain restriction well-known in Social Choice theory. The first three chapters focus on Shapley-Scarf markets where trades are organized among coalitions. Coalitional trade generates externalities in individual valuations of allocations. Chapters 1 and 2 investigate domain restrictions ensuring the existence of various types of competitive equilibrium. Chapter 3 endows the set of goods with a geographical structure and considers distance to partners as a source of externality in preference. We identify domains of preference extensions which guarantee the existence of various types of core allocations. Chapter 4 focuses the case of pure public indivisible goods, which is formally identical to choosing a committee formed by several members, each selected from a specific set. We characterize preference domains over committees for which a well-defined seat-wise choice procedure based on majority voting is consistent with choosing a committee at once from majority voting.
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Submitted on : Friday, August 30, 2019 - 9:26:07 AM
Last modification on : Sunday, September 1, 2019 - 1:14:37 AM


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  • HAL Id : tel-02274556, version 1



Fatma Aslan. Essays on Allocation Procedures of Indivisibles. Economics and Finance. Conservatoire national des arts et metiers - CNAM; Istanbul Bilgi University (Turquie), 2019. English. ⟨NNT : 2019CNAM1240⟩. ⟨tel-02274556⟩



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