Interactions spatiales et énergie

Abstract : In the light of environmental damage in recent years, it is important to implement effective environmental policies to combat climate change, preserve biodiversity, and reduce water and air pollution. The energy sector is one of the main contributors to the deterioration of the environment. Thus, in order to achieve environmental objectives, establishing effective energy policies is paramount. To this end, it seems essential to carry out an inclusive and transversal approach by involving all actors at different levels (local, regional, national, international, etc.). Therefore, identifying the optimal step is crucial for effective energy policy development. The thesis focuses on clarifying the issues related to energy taxation. Thus, the main objective of this thesis is to analyze the nature of environmental interactions, be they between regions or states, in terms of taxation or environmental expenses. The contributions of this are both theoretical and empirical.From an empirical point of view, this thesis first focuses on the study of energy taxation from the perspective of spatial interactions. In particular, Chapter 1 tests the presence of spatial interactions of French departments via the car sticker. This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the reaction of the tax policy of a French department following a change in the tax policy of these neighbors. First, by using a spatial econometric panel approach, the results show evidence of spatial dependence, suggesting the existence of a mimetic behavior of French departments when determining the rates of the car sticker. Next, this chapter also highlights a relationship between local direct taxes and indirect local taxes. In particular, the results of the estimates show that the rate of the business tax (or the tax on undeveloped land) and the road tax sticker are substitutes, whereas the residential tax rate (or the tax rate on developed land) are complements to the road tax sticker. Finally, the results show that departments with larger, younger and older populations are setting higher amounts of the car sticker.From a theoretical point of view, the purpose of Chapter 2 is to analyze the tax interactions between several levels of government (in particular two levels of decision-making), in which there are several jurisdictions of similar lower levels, such as local authorities, and a single leading jurisdiction, such as the federal state, a country or a community union, all of which can tax two tax bases, namely, capital and energy resources. Through theoretical formalization, we determine the implications in terms of tax distortions of tax architecture in the context of an energy policy. In particular, using the Nash game, our results show, on the one hand, a substitution between federal and local taxes on energy, implying that local governments increase their energy tax rates in response to a fall in the rate of energy. of the federal energy tax, all other things being equal. On the other hand, we find that local taxes on energy have a positive impact on the quality of the environment, suggesting that decentralization of energy policy can play a crucial role in mitigating environmental damage.Finally, in Chapter 3, we empirically test the existence of spatial interdependence among OECD countries through environmental spending. To this end, we use data from 30 OECD countries for the period 1994-2014 and a wide range of economic and political control variables.
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Youba Ndiaye. Interactions spatiales et énergie. Economies et finances. Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2018. Français. ⟨NNT : 2018UBFCG007⟩. ⟨tel-02166975⟩

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