. Enfin, Deeley (2014) a en effet déterminé que les coopérations peuvent être fortes, lorsque les étudiants et les enseignants conviennent d'une règle d'évaluation et/ou réalisent conjointement l'évaluation, ou faibles, lorsque les critères d'examen ne sont pas coconstruits et/ou que l'évaluation n'est pas conduite par les deux parties, une limite de cette recherche tient à la nature des partenariats offerts aux étudiants

, L'engagement des étudiants n'allait donc pas au-delà de la participation à la discussion et à la formalisation des critères de notation. De plus, la négociation n'a pas concerné les examens de contrôle des connaissances, pour lesquels les enjeux sont plus importants : ils structurent

, Les indicateurs les plus révélateurs du phénomène de la réussite sont inscrits dans le tableau A1. Ces indicateurs n'offrent qu'une vision partielle de la réussite à l'université parce que d'une part, ils ne tiennent compte que des seules réorientations au sein de l'université et d'autre part, ils sont calculés sur la base des inscriptions administratives. Par conséquent, les réorientations vers des filières autres qu'universitaires (paramédicale ou sociale, école d'ingénieurs?) et la présence effective des étudiants en cours de formation ne sont pas utilisées. De plus, chaque université possède sa propre population étudiante, c'est-à-dire que les caractéristiques sociodémographiques et les parcours scolaires antérieurs des étudiants diffèrent selon les établissements. Or, la probabilité de réussite (ou de passage) apparaît corrélée avec des caractéristiques telles que l'origine sociale et le parcours scolaire antérieur (série du baccalauréat, âge au moment de son obtention, ancienneté de son obtention, la mention obtenue). Les caractéristiques non observables de chaque établissement, Nous avons compilé plusieurs rapports d'information du Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur pour dresser l'évolution du taux de diplomation en trois années en licence, depuis la généralisation du diplôme en 2004. Les dernières statistiques descriptives disponibles correspondent à la promotion d'étudiants de l'année 2012-2013 pour laquelle il est possible de déterminer son devenir trois années ou quatre années après la première inscription

A. Tableau, Indicateurs de réussite d'obtention de la licence en trois ans Promotion, 2004.

S. Fouquet, Parcours et réussite en licence et en master à l'université, Note d'information n°13-02, MESR-DGESIP-DGRI, Service d'information et études statistiques (SIES), 2013.

S. Fouquet, Parcours et réussite aux diplômes universitaires : les indicateurs de la session 2012, Service d'information et études statistiques (SIES), 2014.

I. Maetz, Parcours et réussite aux diplômes universitaires : les indicateurs de la session 2013, Note Flash n°07-05, MENESR DGESIP/DGRI -SCSESR -Service d'information et études statistiques (SIES), 2015.

I. Maetz, Parcours et réussite aux diplômes universitaires : les indicateurs de la session, MENESR DGESIP/DGRI -SCSESR -Service d'information et études statistiques (SIES), 2014.

I. Maetz, Parcours et réussite aux diplômes universitaires : les indicateurs de la session 2015, Note Flash n°11-15, MENESR DGESIP/DGRI -SCSESR -Service d'information et études statistiques (SIES), 2016.

I. Maetz, Parcours et réussite en licence et en Paces : les résultats de la session 2016, Note Flash n°11-18, MESRI -Service d'information et études statistiques (SIES), 2017.

D. Prouteau, Parcours et réussite en licence des inscrits en L1 en 2004, Note d'information n°09-23, MESR-DGESIP-DGRI, Service d'information et études statistiques (SIES), 2009.

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