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L’économie des dispositifs de vérification de l’information : une approche expérimentale

Abstract : Economics of complete contracts foresees that within an agency relationship of a productive organization, in the presence of moral hazard, an information check device can address both a problem of cooperation between individuals and a problem of coordination of activities. However, instead of disciplining opportunistic behaviours, this device can generate hidden costs and reduce the intrinsic motivation of agents to perform an activity that has been assigned to them. Under certain conditions, it generates a reduction of the outcome, and a loss in terms of allocation, which is detrimental to efficiency.In this Ph.D. thesis, we conducted three randomized controlled field trials that aimed at modifying the configurations of the information check device to solve an organizational problem specific to three specific agency relationships.In our first chapter, we tested the effect of varying the amount of information held by contributors on the social reporting verification device through targeted messages containing explanations of the control power of the Agence centrale des organisations de sécurité sociale (Acoss) in order to reduce social fraud.In our second chapter, we tested the reduction in the intensity of the electronic monitoring of the performance of advisors of an outsourced call centre in order to improve their quality of life at work.Finally, in our third chapter, we tested the effect of the contractual negotiation of the device which evaluate the participation of undergraduate students during the tutorials in order to improve their success at the university.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, June 11, 2019 - 1:48:14 PM
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  • HAL Id : tel-02152377, version 1



Rémi Le Gall. L’économie des dispositifs de vérification de l’information : une approche expérimentale. Economies et finances. Université Paris-Est, 2018. Français. ⟨NNT : 2018PESC0014⟩. ⟨tel-02152377⟩



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