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Primitive introspection

Abstract : This dissertation focuses on an introspective phenomenon that I call primitive introspection. Primitive introspection is a non-classificatory kind of phenomenal-state introspection: it is a kind of phenomenal-state introspection that does not involve recognizing the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of any experience type. I defend three main claims about primitive introspection. First, it exists: there is a mental phenomenon that has the features I attribute to primitive introspection and such a phenomenon is a fullfledged introspective process. Second, its nature is best accounted for by a version of the acquaintance theory—what I call the integration account. Third, it has a distinct epistemic value: it provides the subject with knowledge of their phenomenal states. Such knowledge is a sui generis kind of knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance displays a distinctive epistemic property which is somewhat analogous to infallibility: it provides the subject with a complete and perfect grasp of the phenomenology of their experience.
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Submitted on : Monday, May 20, 2019 - 10:40:44 AM
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Anna Giustina. Primitive introspection. Philosophy. Université Paris sciences et lettres, 2018. English. ⟨NNT : 2018PSLEE033⟩. ⟨tel-02133944⟩



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