, Les 20 jetons restant (de vos 60 initiaux) sont automatiquement investis dans le compte F. Donc: · Votre investissement de 20 jetons dans le compte F vous rapporte: 20 * 10 = 200 points

. Au-total, votre gain sera donc

, Lors de chacune des 10 périodes, vous allez collecter des points. A la fin de l'expérience, l'ensemble de vos points sera converti en euros. Le taux appliqué sera de 1? pour 1000 points

, Avant le début de l'expérience des questions vous seront posées afin de vérifier votre bonne compréhension des instructions

, A la fin de l'expérience, l'ensemble de vos points sera converti en euros. Le taux appliqué sera de 1? pour 1000 points. Bonne chance à tous! Les 20 jetons restant (de vos 60 initiaux) sont automatiquement investis dans le compte F. Donc: · Votre, Lors de chacune des 10 périodes, vous allez collecter des points

. Au-total, votre gain sera donc

, Lors de chacune des 10 périodes, vous allez collecter des points. A la fin de l'expérience, l'ensemble de vos points sera converti en euros. Le taux appliqué sera de 1? pour 1000 points

, Avant de commencer l'expérience, vous procéderez à une période d'essai. L'objectif est de vous familiariser avec l'interface graphique de l'ordinateur

, Avant le début de l'expérience des questions vous seront posées afin de vérifier votre bonne compréhension des instructions

, Lors de chacune des 10 périodes, vous allez collecter des points. A la fin de l'expérience, l'ensemble de vos points sera converti en euros. Le taux appliqué sera de 1? pour 1000 points

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