Model-Based Testing for IoT Systems: Methods and tools
Abbas Ahmad

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PREPAREE A EASY GLOBAL MARKET

Ecole doctorale n°37
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Doctorat d'I informatique

Par
Abbas AHMAD

Model-Based Testing for IoT Systems - Methods and Tools

Thèse présentée et soutenue à Besançon, le 01/06/2018

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Thank you from the bottom of my heart.
# Table of Contents

## 1 Thesis presentation

1 Overview of Thesis Research
   1.1 The Internet of Things Era ................................................. 4
   1.2 Model-Based Testing for IoT Systems: Motivation & Research scope ... 4
   1.3 Contribution of the Thesis .............................................. 7
   1.4 Thesis outline .............................................................. 9

## 2 Context

2.1 IoT Systems ........................................................................... 11
2.2 Explored IoT Systems ............................................................ 12
   2.2.1 FIWARE ................................................................. 12
   2.2.2 oneM2M ................................................................. 14
2.3 Model-Based Testing (MBT) .................................................... 17

## 3 Research challenges

3.1 Testing for standardized IoT platforms .................................... 21
   3.1.1 Testing the conformance of one component .......................... 22
   3.1.2 Testing for Integration ...................................................... 22
     3.1.2.1 Integration testing of pair components .......................... 23
     3.1.2.2 Integration testing of multi-components ....................... 24
   3.2 Security Testing of IoT systems ............................................ 24
     3.2.1 Vulnerability testing ...................................................... 25
     3.2.2 End-to-End security testing ........................................... 25
   3.3 Robustness Testing for IoT Systems ....................................... 26
     3.3.1 Robustness testing for one component ............................. 26
     3.3.2 Robustness testing for large scale IoT system .................. 27

## 4 State Of The Art

4.1 IoT testing ................................................................. 30
   4.1.1 Conformance Testing ...................................................... 30
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

4.1.2 Security Testing ................................................. 31
4.1.3 Robustness Testing ............................................. 32
4.2 Model-Based Testing for IoT ........................................ 33
4.3 Languages and Tools for Testing ................................... 35
4.3.1 TTCN-3 ......................................................... 35
   4.3.1.1 TTCN-3 Language history ................................. 35
   4.3.1.2 Language specifics ....................................... 36
4.3.2 CertifyIt .......................................................... 39
4.3.3 MBeeTle .......................................................... 39

5 Contribution Summary ................................................. 43
5.1 Methods for MBT of IoT systems .................................... 43
   5.1.1 MBT behavioral modeling for standardized IoT platforms 44
   5.1.2 Pattern-driven and model-based security testing .............. 44
   5.1.3 Behavioral fuzzing for IoT systems ............................ 45
5.2 Tooling ............................................................... 47
   5.2.1 Around CertifyIt ............................................... 47
   5.2.2 MBTAAS: Integrated Framework ............................... 48

II Technical contributions ............................................... 49

6 MBT behavioral modeling for standardized IoT platforms ............ 51
6.1 MBT Behavioral Model Process ..................................... 52
6.2 Test Objectives ..................................................... 53
6.3 MBT Behavioral Test Generation ..................................... 55

7 Pattern-driven and model-based security testing ....................... 61
7.1 Expressing Test scenarios From Test Patterns ....................... 61
7.2 Test Generation ..................................................... 63
7.3 Using TP for MBS Functional and Vulnerability Testing ............ 65

8 Model Based-Testing As A Service ..................................... 69
8.1 Architecture ......................................................... 69
8.2 MBTAAS main services .............................................. 70
   8.2.1 Customization Service ....................................... 70
   8.2.2 Publication service ........................................... 71
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.2.3</td>
<td>Execution service</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.4</td>
<td>Reporting service</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Approach synthesis</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Behavioral fuzzing for IoT systems</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>MBT specificities for the IoT behavioral fuzzing testing</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>MBT Model</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>Test generation</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>Behavioral fuzzing approach synthesis</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Experimentations</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Experiments</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Guideline for Experimentation’s</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.1</td>
<td>MBT for IoT systems</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.2</td>
<td>Model-based security testing for IoT</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1.3</td>
<td>MBT for large scale IoT systems</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>FIWARE Testing Process using MBT</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.1</td>
<td>MBT Model</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.2</td>
<td>Test case generation</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.3</td>
<td>Test case reification &amp; execution</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2.4</td>
<td>Experimentation synthesis</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>oneM2M Testing Process using MBT</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3.1</td>
<td>Requirements and Test Purposes</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3.2</td>
<td>Model-Based Testing modelisation</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3.3</td>
<td>Generating TTCN-3 tests</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3.4</td>
<td>Execution and Reporting</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>Access Control Policies (ACP) testing in oneM2M IoT standard</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>ARMOUR Large scale end-to-end security</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5.1</td>
<td>MBT Model</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5.2</td>
<td>Test case generation</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5.3</td>
<td>Test case reification</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5.4</td>
<td>Test case execution</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5.5</td>
<td>Experimentation &amp; Results</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>ARMOUR Behavioral Fuzzing</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10.6.1 Synergies between ARMOUR experiment 5 & 6 .................. 106
10.6.2 MBT Model ................................................. 107
10.7 Test generation .............................................. 108
10.8 Experimentation results summary ................................ 110
  10.8.1 MBT behavioral modeling ................................. 110
  10.8.2 Pattern-driven and model-based security testing analysis ... 110
  10.8.3 Behavioral fuzzing results ............................... 111

11 Conclusion and future work .................................... 113
  11.1 Summary .................................................... 113
  11.2 Future work ............................................... 115

IV Appendix ....................................................... 127
  A ARMOUR Security Vulnerabilities tables ....................... 129
  B Example of single TTCN-3 fuzzing Test case with 20 steps .... 137
I

THESIS PRESENTATION
# Overview of Thesis Research

This PhD is a Conventions Industrielles de Formation par la Recherche (CIFRE) thesis. It was conducted within the Département Informatique des Système Complexes (DISC) of the Institut Femto-ST\(^1\) of the Université de Franche-Comté (Besançon - France) and Easy Global Market\(^2\) (EGM) company (Sophia-Antipolis - France), between 2015 and 2018. A CIFRE thesis aims to strengthen the exchanges between public research laboratories and socio-economic circles, encouraging the employment of doctors in companies and contributing to the process of innovation of companies in France. This is the vocation of the CIFRE, financed by the National Association of Research and Technology\(^3\) (ANRT). The ANRT brings together public and private research stakeholder by funding the thesis where a contract of collaboration is established between the company and the laboratory specifying the conditions of conduct of the research and the ownership clauses of the results obtained by the doctoral student.

Based in Sophia-Antipolis - France, first science and technology park in Europe, EGM is strongly active in the major technology clusters, innovation networks and is a pioneer in IoT systems deployment, testing and validation. Easy Global Market SAS provides solutions and services to develop market confidence in technologies making the global market “easy” for companies looking for globalisation. EGM developed experience and core competences in validation, interoperability, certification and label programmes, working with state of the art tools and validation approaches such as TTCN-3, Verification and Validation (V&V), Model Based Testing (MBT) techniques. EGM is also member of key clusters, standard bodies and alliances such as ETSI \(^59\) and oneM2M \(^37\), A\(\text{IOTI}\) \(^57\), french Mov’eo \(^64\), SCS cluster \(^65\). This thesis fits in EGMs ambition towards holding state of the art innovation and on studying solutions to the key challenges of the emerging IoT adoption.

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\(^1\)http://www.femto-st.fr/ [Last visited October 2017]
\(^2\)http://www.eglobalmark.com [Last visited October 2017]
\(^3\)http://www.anrt.asso.fr/fr [Last visited October 2017]

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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>The Internet of Things Era</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Model-Based Testing for IoT Systems: Motivation &amp; Research Scope</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Contribution of the Thesis</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Thesis outline</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.1 The Internet of Things Era

It has been over a decade since the term Internet of Things (IoT) was first introduced to the public. Making its way to the spotlight, it has now become mainstream. Prudently, leading companies are adopting the term vigorously into their most advanced products and services [32]. It is in vogue and reflects state-of-the-art. However, as the term is widely used, its interpretations become more diverse. Some would call any connected device an IoT solution, while others will only refer to big data analytics as the IoT aspect of a product.

The IoT is already changing how the industry operates at almost every level of their business and in their interactions with clients and personnel. Gartner Group estimates an increase up to 21 billion connected things by 2020. By then, the number of IoT devices in use will surpass the number of smartphones, tablets and PCs combined. This represents a major opportunity for companies since the most valuable IoT applications will almost certainly be used by enterprises [55].

The traditional way, where discrete products were developed behind the doors of R&D labs has been superseded by a much more dynamic and open approach to innovation. Every industry, no matter how traditional — agriculture, automotive, aviation, energy — is being overturned by the addition of sensors, internet connectivity, and software. Manufacturers often already have the supply chain in place, the brand recognition and a reputation in their respective marketplaces. However, this doesn’t mean that suddenly connecting everything up to the Internet and tying customers to new services is easy.

Success in this environment will depend on more than just creating better digital-enabled products. We are in an era where it is possible to collect data from everywhere in our environment, infrastructures, businesses and even ourselves. This massive amount of information is creating a new ecosystem of opportunities for the industry around its storage, analysis and accessibility. The IoT is becoming the next technological revolution that we will all participate in one way or another. We are all headed toward a future when practically everything will be connected and available to us. The Internet of Things is here to stay.

Building confidence in IoT by responding to its key challenges, foregrounds the motivation of the thesis. The next session states the thesis research objectives and questions that comes along.

1.2 Model-Based Testing for IoT Systems: Motivation & Research Scope

The Internet of Things inter-connects people, objects and complex systems. While this is as vast as it sounds, spanning all industries, enterprises, and consumers - testing IoT devices, which range from refrigerators that automatically place orders to the supermarket to self-driving cars, will be one of the biggest challenges encountered by the device manufacturers and integrators in the coming years. Their real use case environment: service based and large scale deployments - poses scalability issues in ensuring quality over time. At its most basic level, the Internet of Things is all about connecting various devices and sensors to the Internet. Device-to-device communication represents two or more
devices that directly connect and communicate between one another. Device-to-cloud communication involves an IoT device connecting directly to an Internet cloud service like an application service provider to exchange data and control message traffic. The Device-to-Gateway model is where IoT devices connect to an intermediary device to access a cloud service. One of the challenges facing the IoT is the enablement of seamless interoperability between each connection. The massive scale of recent Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks (October 2016) on DYN’s servers [49] that brought down many popular online services in the US, gives us just a glimpse of what is possible when security is not ensured. When attackers can leverage up to 100,000 unsecured IoT devices as malicious endpoints, some effort in security testing is unarguably required.

Model-Based Testing (MBT) is a software testing approach in which both test cases and expected results are automatically derived from an abstract model of the System Under Test (SUT). More precisely, MBT techniques derive abstract test cases from an MBT model, which formalizes the behavioral aspects of the SUT in the context of its environment and at a given level of abstraction. The test cases generated from such models allow the validation of the functional aspects of the system by comparing back-to-back the results observed on it with those specified by the MBT model. MBT is usually performed to automate functional black-box testing. It is a widely-used approach that has gained much interest in recent years, from academic as well as from industrial domains.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate solutions to the challenges carried by the fast adoption of IoT systems and the need to ensure user’s and data security and privacy. In a first step, it implies to evaluate how relevant is the application of MBT in the IoT framework, to calculate its effectiveness in error detection over existing methods. To be adopted by the industry, MBT has to prove its capability of providing significant advantages in tackling the key challenges in verification and validation of the IoT systems. This translates in the following research questions (RQ).

**RQ.1: To what extent MBT modeling can represent the behaviour of an IoT system?**

Two core concepts of Model Based-Testing, namely abstraction and automation, are together the best solution to the key challenges of the IoT. Abstraction facilitates the specification and design of complex IoT systems through the activity of modeling. Connected IoT devices rely on fast communication. Consequently, network status can have a significant effect on device performance. Smart devices often experience problems with network infrastructure, such as overburdened Wi-Fi channels, unreliable network hardware, and slow or inconsistent Internet connections. The IoT devices and applications must be tested across these different conditions to ensure that they respond correctly without losing data. The determination of the modeling scope and its feasibility is important as it gives an insight to what can be tested within the targeted infrastructure. Can an MBT model represent a standard in order to validate its conformance? Determining if representing the behavioral aspects of an IoT system through a MBT model is enough to validate its conformance is one of the research question tackled by this thesis. Furthermore, the research objective leads towards another question on how can an MBT model can be reused to test security and robustness. Can an MBT model used for conformance validation be used for security testing? Evaluating the feasibility and cost of this approach is tackled in this thesis.
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF THESIS RESEARCH

RQ.2: HOW EFFECTIVE IS AN MBT MODEL IN REPRESENTING THE BEHAVIOURAL ASPECTS OF AN IOT SYSTEM?

Determining the percentage of specifications covered by the model and ensuring a high coverage is a measure for MBT adoption for IoT systems testing. As stated in the previous paragraph, one of the core concepts of Model-Based-Testing is automation. Automation in MBT is not only present at the execution level. We find automation at test case generation level. **Through the automation and traceability process of MBT test cases generation, can we evaluate the effective behavioral coverage of the intended IoT system targeted?** Unprecedented levels of systems understanding can be achieved through MBT, and we further investigate the research questions that have been risen by this research objective.

RQ.3: HOW CAN MBT IMPROVE IOT TESTING WHILE REDUCING ITS COST?

Currently, the verification & validation process for the IoT having no systematic or automatic process is often outsourced to reduce costs as testing is a difficult and time-consuming activity [6]. All these factors affect the quality of current products. Indeed, it is not possible to test everything because the quantity of test cases to be applied could be potentially infinite for the majority of modern systems. The difficulty of testing lies in the selection of relevant test cases for each phase of validation. It also lies in the absence of a true reflection of test optimization guided by the maintenance of the final quality while minimizing costs. **How can MBT improve IoT testing while reducing its cost?** Each IoT device has its own hardware and relies on software to drive it. Application software will also integrate with the IoT devices, issuing commands to the device and analysing data gathered by the device. Connecting "things" as devices requires one to overcome a set of problems arising in the different layers of the communication model. Using device data or responding to a device’s requests requires an IoT deployment to interact with a heterogeneous and distributed environment. Indeed, devices are most likely to be running several protocols (such as HTTP, MQTT, COAP), through multiple wireless technologies. Devices have many particularities and it is not feasible to provide a testing solution where one size fits all. Some devices are resource constrained and cannot use full standard protocol stacks because they cannot transmit information too frequently due to battery drainage; they are not always reachable due to the wireless connection based on low duty-cycles, their communication protocols are IoT-specific, lack an integrated approach, and use different data encoding languages. A global IoT platform deployment is difficult to foresee as a direct result of these limitations. Developers face complex scenarios where merging the information is a real challenge.

RQ.4: DOES AN MBT APPROACH PROVIDE ENOUGH AUTOMATION AND QUALITY FOR IOT SECURITY CERTIFICATION?

Securing an entire "classical" infrastructure is a challenge in itself, but the IoT demands an even larger security approach to keep endpoints and networks protected against more sophisticated cyber-crime techniques and tools, such as sniffer attacks, DoS attacks, compromised-key attacks, password-based attacks, and man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks. Furthermore, security certification is needed to ensure that a product satisfies the
required security requirements, which can be both proprietary requirements (i.e., defined by a company for their specific products) and market requirements (i.e., defined in procurement specifications or market standards). The main interrogations is in exploring how MBT can be applied to increase security and user’s trust in IoT systems.

The next section gives an overview of the contribution of the thesis, where we provide some answers on the risen research questions.

1.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS

This thesis provides the following contributions:

- **C1**: Model-Based Testing for IoT standard conformance
- **C2**: Model-Based Testing As A Service
- **C3**: Model-Based Testing for IoT security testing

The IoT has a bull’s-eye on its back, and it is easy to see why: With no central IoT standards and no real oversight over development, the nearly five billion smart devices Gartner estimates will be in use by the end of 2017 are an enticing target for hackers. IoT standards talks began in early 2013, but by that point it might have already been too late. The tech industry is not one to sit idle while standards are developed. Too many technological battles are won or lost before standards are ever close to being adopted. As is often the case when standards talks gets started, various alliances have been formed. By 2014, a handful of these standards were maturing, and today a few have even begun certifying products. That said, just about everyone agrees that we are still a long way from a universal IoT standard, and in fact few hold out hope that a single standard will ever become dominant in the way standards like Wi-Fi and DVD have. Nevertheless, an IoT standard success depends on its degree of trust. Thus, testing is an essential, but time and resource consuming activity in the IoT development process. Generating a short, but effective test suite usually needs a lot of manual work and expert knowledge. In a model-based process, among other subtasks, test construction and test execution can be partially automated. It is this automation process that we wanted to introduce to the IoT testing world. The thesis shows how behavioral modeling of an IoT standard can be used to validate the standard compliance implementations (C1). The process of developing a standard is typically facilitated by a Standards Development Organization (SDO), which adheres to fair and equitable processes that ensure the highest quality outputs and reinforce the market relevance of standards. SDOs, such as IEEE, IEC, ISO, and others, offer time-tested platforms, rules, governance, methodologies and even facilitation services that objectively address the standards development lifecycle, and facilitate the development, distribution and maintenance of standards. We introduce MBT behavioral modeling for IoT standardized IoT platforms by defining a modeling process and all the steps following a practical Model-Based Testing approach (see Section 4 for further details). The thesis contributed to the automation of model test generation and test execution for standard implementations. The MBT method reveals itself to be a catalyst for a standard adoption with long and expensive task of traditional testing are minimized and made accessible. Furthermore, we investigated on how reusable the new approach is when dealing with testing security of IoT systems. We reveal how we can, starting from
a behavioral model, use MBT tools to enhance it for security testing: a behavioral model is modified in a relatively short amount of time in order to be fit for security testing. The integration of pattern-driven and model-based security testing to MBT behavioral testing is a novelty in the security testing domain as well as it lowers the efforts required for ensuring not only the standard compliance of an IoT system but its security as well. The thesis takes a logical lead into testing robustness and security features with innovative model based Behavioral fuzzing. Behavioral fuzzing gives an extensive amount of depth in the testing process of a product, and shows how the reusability of a behavioral model can be used to deeply test robustness aspect of the IoT system. We introduced in the same principles for security testing the behavioral testing for IoT systems. We provide answers on how a behavioral model that is adapted to security testing, can be used for behavioral fuzzing. We introduce the term MBT behavioural security fuzzing and the groundbreaking advances made in the field as applied to a real use case in IoT large scale security testing.

By nature IoT services are presented and offered as services to its end user. Internet of Things-as-a-Service (IoTaaS) is one of the latest iterations in the "as-a-Service" model that has become so common in today's commoditized IT world. But there is some debate over how well IoT can translate into a service. That is partly because the term itself is not always used in the same way across the technology ecosystem or in the commercial world. If IoT is considered to be simply the edge devices that are deployed to sense information, that's a very limited definition. Some technologists claim that IoT really describes sensors, the process by which they communicate information to the network, the cloud layer itself, and the various tools that are used to analyze the data once it is collected. We investigated in a new way of providing IoT testing for test engineers that are as close as possible to the reality of the IoT nature: "as-a-Service". Model Based Testing As A Service (MBTAAS)(C2) is the result of our combined will of making IoT testing as user friendly as it can be and real life look alike testing experiment. The new state of the art technique is presented in section 8 and it shows the benefits of MBTAAS by providing simplicity to IoT conformance and security testers.

All of the approaches mentioned above are validated in European H2020 projects. The thesis contributions are as a matter of fact responding to industrial needs that come with the rapidly growing IoT industry needs. Chapter 10 gives more details on how the research is applied in order to respond to the challenges faced when testing IoT platforms with the explanations and discussion over different experiments.

The initial results where obtained in the context of the FP7 FIWARE [51] European (EU) commission funded project. The goal of the FIWARE project is to advance the global competitiveness of the EU economy by introducing an innovative IoT infrastructure for cost-effective creation and delivery of services, providing high quality of service (QoS) and security guarantees. FIWARE has a community of over 1,000 start-ups and is being adopted in over 80 cities mainly in Europe, but also around the world. Ensuring the interoperability to such a large number of companies using the FIWARE standard is primordial to its successful adoption. We depict in further details the architecture of FIWARE in section 2.2.1. FIWARE was an ongoing project facing testing problems when we decided to introduce MBT to its community. The introduction required to adapt the existing FIWARE testing process. It has also served as a starting point in order to investigate if MBT was indeed suitable for IoT systems. The work contributed in the FIWARE project validated the MBT approach for modeling IoT systems.
The work on mbt security testing and behavioural fuzzing is made in the Horizon 2020 ARMOUR project. The ARMOUR project aims to provide duly tested, bench-marked and certified security and trust technological solutions for IoT and especially for large scale IoT deployments. Suitable duly tested solutions are needed to cope with security, privacy and safety in the large scale IoT deployments, because uncertainty is intrinsic in IoT Systems due to novel interactions of embedded systems, networking equipment, smart sensors, cloud infrastructures, and humans. Unfortunately, considering market pressure, security and privacy issues are not considered as a main goal and are usually not properly addressed. A clear evidence of this fact is the Mirai IoT Botnet [63], which infected tens of millions of vulnerable IoT devices that were used in a DDOS Attack. This attack affected major websites including Amazon, Spotify, and Twitter. Motivated by this kind of attacks, the thesis contribution is to go one step further, and to propose an integrated approach allowing not only the certification of IoT devices already in the market, but also to improve the devices’ certification level in an after market fashion. In the certification process proposed in ARMOUR [48], the security functional behavior is tested using test cases derived automatically using a model-based approach (C3). The work accomplished in ARMOUR allowed to investigate on the reusability of previous conformance models for security testing on a first step using the FIWARE standard. We then investigated the reusability of the research on other standard such as oneM2M [37]. The purpose and goal of oneM2M is to develop technical specifications which address the need for a common machine to machine (M2M) Service Layer that can be readily embedded within various hardware and software, and relied upon to connect the myriad of devices in the field with M2M application servers worldwide.

The next section presents the thesis outline.

1.4 THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis dissertation is organized into three parts as follows.

Part I (I Thesis presentation) presents the thesis, and is composed of five chapters: Chapter 1 introduces the overview of the thesis research. As we explain why nowadays we are entering in the IoT era, we state our research scope over three research objectives and introduce the contributions of the thesis. Chapter 2 defines the context of the thesis and the motivation that led to this thesis in exploring the needs for IoT Testing, we also introduce the explored IoT systems and define the fundamental Model-Base Testing process. Chapter 3 presents the research challenges in testing for standardized IoT platforms, security testing of IoT systems and robustness testing for IoT systems. We explore the specificities in testing with the different processes for one component and for multi-component systems. Chapter 4 defines the state of the art in IoT testing for IoT systems. We present solutions in conformance testing for standards, security testing and robustness testing. We also present the related work on MBT for IoT and the tools that we used to apply our own MBT methodology for IoT systems testing. Chapter 5 describes in more details the contributions of the thesis previously introduced in section 1.3.
The second part (II Technical contribution) present in details all the technical contributions of the thesis, it is composed of four chapters:

**Chapter 6** presents the MBT behavioural modeling for standardized IoT platform contribution, this chapter defines the vocabulary and methodology for test generation, test implementation and test execution.

**Chapter 7** presents the pattern-driven and model-based security testing contribution, where we explore the specific aspects of model-based security testing and the methodology behind the introduction of test purposes into the fundamental MBT process for security testing.

**Chapter 8** presents the Model-Based Testing As A Service (MBTAAS) contribution. We show in details how MBTAAS brings MBT to IoT systems testing.

**Chapter 9** presents the behavioral fuzzing for IoT systems contribution, where we see the details and specificities of its MBT model and test generation process.

The third and last part of this thesis (III Experimentation and synthesis) presents the experiments and synthesis, it is composed of two chapters:

**Chapter 10** gives a guideline for our experimentation's, raised questions give an insight on how our experiment validates our technical contributions

**Chapter 11** concludes the thesis with a synthesis and exploration of future work.

**Appendix A** defines a series of ARMOUR Security vulnerability tables.

**Appendix B** presents a behavioral fuzzing TTCN-3 test case example.
This chapter provides the context of the thesis. An introductory explanation of the composition of an IoT System is given in order to fully understand its different layers. We then introduce two standardized IoT systems explored throughout the thesis and we finish with a detailed explanation of the Model-Based Testing (MBT) process.

### 2.1 IoT Systems

The Internet of Things refers to the networking of physical objects [60] through the use of embedded sensors, actuators, and other devices that can collect or transmit information about objects. Examples in the consumer market include smart watches, fitness bands, and home-security systems. There are four major layers in an IoT system, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

The *sensor layer* uses and produces data. Thus, the IoT devices, at this layer, can behave differently whether their purpose is to generate data (a *data producer*), or to use produced
data (a data consumer). For example, a Complex Event Processing (CEP) application is a data consumer application within the application layer. Its purpose is to read input data and produce output data depending on a defined rule. An example of a rule defined in a CEP application: *if the data of two temperature sensors in the same room exceeds a certain value, then an alert is triggered. The produced data is in this case the generated alert.*

The service connectivity and network layers, are represented by the sensors, actuators, tags (which include Radio Frequency ID s (RFID) and barcodes), and other types of data producers/consumers. At the gateway and network layer, wide area networks, mobile communication networks, Wi-Fi, Ethernet, gateway control, etc. are considered. Then, in the management service layer, device modelling configuration and management is a major focus. Data-flow management and security control need to be provided at the management service layer. Finally, the overall application layer is where the applications dedicated to energy, environment, healthcare, transportation, supply chain, retail, people tracking, surveillance, and many other endless applications are located.

The different layers of the IoT bring a new level of complexity to performance monitoring and conformance testing in terms of scalability, interoperability, and security. Testers must adapt to new platforms and techniques to ensure that they can address the challenges of testing IoT devices and applications to deliver the best experience to the end user. With large numbers of devices involved when talking about the IoT and the mass of different devices that the IoT introduces, each with different protocols, brings along all the perks of a heterogeneous environment: scalability issues and interoperability. With many different devices and the amount of generated data in the IoT infrastructure, it is difficult to keep track of the privacy and confidentiality of the produced data. Security is a major challenge for the success of the IoT adoption.

We introduce in the next section the explored IoT systems that allowed us to respond to the research questions and obtain our research objectives.

### 2.2 Explored IoT Systems

In this thesis, we explored the previously introduced IoT systems: FIWARE and oneM2M. A detailed description of their infrastructure and standard is explained.

#### 2.2.1 FIWARE

FIWARE provides an enhanced Open Stack-based cloud environment including a rich set of open standard Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that make it easier to connect to the heterogeneous IoTs, process and analyse Big Data and real-time media or incorporate advanced features for user’s interaction. The FIWARE platform eases the development of smart applications in multiple vertical sectors. The specifications of these APIs are public and royalty-free. Besides, an open source reference implementation “Generic Enabler implementation” (GEi) of each of the FIWARE components is publicly available so that multiple FIWARE providers can emerge faster in the market with a low-cost proposition. Generic Enablers offer a number of general-purpose functions and provide high-level APIs in:
2.2. EXPLORED IOT SYSTEMS

- Cloud Hosting
- Data/Context Management
- Internet of Things Services Enablement
- Applications, Services and Data Delivery
- Security of data
- Interface to Networks and Devices (I2ND)
- Advanced Web-based User Interface

IoT systems are spread in two different domains: Gateway and Backend. While IoT Gateway GEs provide inter-networking and protocol conversion functionalities between devices and the IoT Backend GEs, the IoT Backend GEs provide management functionalities for the devices and IoT domain-specific support for the applications. Figure 2.3 exposes the FIWARE architecture that deals with all these specific elements, which remain a challenge when testing them in a real situation. More specifically, the figure illustrates a connector (IoT Agent) solving the issues of heterogeneous environments where devices with different protocols are translated into a common data format: Next Generation Services Interface (NGSI). While several enablers are improving the capacities of the platform to manage stored information (security tools, advanced data store models, historical retrieval of information, linkage to third party applications...), a core component known as Context Broker allows for the gathering and managing of context information between data producers and data consumers at large scale.
FIWARE has defined its own standard starting from the Open Mobile Alliance NGSI-9/10 standard [17] in order to make the development of future internet applications easier and interoperable. This standard is used as part of general-purpose platform functions available through APIs, each being implemented on the platform, noted as Generic Enabler Implementation (GEi). The FIWARE version of the OMA NGSI-9/10 interfaces are RESTful APIs. RESTful systems communicate over the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) with the same HTTP verbs (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc.), which web browsers use to retrieve web pages and to send data to remote servers. Their purpose is to exchange information about the availability of context information. The three main interaction types for the NGSI-9 are:

- one-time queries for discovering hosts where certain context information is available
- subscriptions for context availability information updates (and corresponding notifications)
- registration of context information, i.e. announcements that certain context information is available (invoked by context providers)

The three main interaction types for the NGSI-10 are:

- one-time queries for context information
- subscriptions for context information updates (and the corresponding notifications)
- unsolicited updates (invoked by context providers)

It is often assumed that the GEi’s are correctly implemented and are used or are part of services provided by FIWARE, non-compliance to FIWARE specifications may lead to a number of dysfunctional interoperability issues. To ensure the interoperability, GEs should be thoroughly tested to assess their compliance to these specifications.

2.2.2 ONE M2M
2.2. EXPLORED IOT SYSTEMS

The Internet of Things revolves around increased machine-to-machine communication; it's built on cloud computing and networks of data-gathering sensors. But a machine is an instrument, it's a tool, it's something that's physically doing something. When we talk about making machines "smart", we are not referring strictly to M2M. We are talking about sensors. All the information gathered by all the sensors in the world isn't worth very much if there isn't an infrastructure in place to analyse it in real time.

Usually, the infrastructure is vendor-specific thing and every manufacturer develops its own infrastructure that connects the IoT in between, the sensors to the cloud, and then to the end user. But when all the manufacturers produce their own infrastructures that can be used only with their devices, the IoT sector becomes chaos where only vendor or vendor-friendly devices work on one type of infrastructure. This is where the oneM2M[37] standard wants to put pressure and unify the existing infrastructure into one standard that can be used by everyone.

oneM2M is the global standards initiative for Machine to Machine Communications and the Internet of Things. It was formed in 2012 and consists of eight of the world's pre-eminent standards development organizations, notably: ARIB (Japan), ATIS (USA), CCSA (China), ETSI (Europe), TIA (USA), TSDSI (India), TTA (Korea) and TTC (Japan). These partners collaborate with industry fora or consortia and over 200 member organizations (and one of them is EGM) to produce and maintain globally applicable technical specifications for a common M2M/IoT Service Layer, which provides functions that M2M applications across different industry segments commonly need and are exposed via APIs. The service layer is developing into a critical component of future IoT architectures.

As shown in figure 2.5, the oneM2M standard employs a simple horizontal platform architecture that fits within a three layer model comprising applications, services and networks.

On the top layer, Application Entities (AEs) reside within individual device and sensor applications. They provide a standardized interface to manage and interact with applications. Common Services Entities (CSEs) play a similar role in the service layer which resides between the application layer (where data processing occurs) and the in the network layer (where communications hardware resides). The network layer ensures that
devices and sensors and applications are able to function in a network-agnostic manner. This horizontal platform strategy is critical in two aspects. Firstly, it aims to create economies of scale by encouraging application re-use and a competitive ecosystem for developers and suppliers. Secondly, it enables economies of scope by encouraging platforms that are applicable across a broad range of vertical-market use-cases. One of the features of this architecture is to connect information producers and information consumers in a secure manner regardless of underlying transport technologies. This relies on a configurable policy manager to define which applications and users can access which devices and sensors. oneM2M specifications provide a framework to support a wide range of applications and services such as smart cities, smart grid, connected car, home automation, public safety, and health.

The management organization of oneM2M organisation is quite complex, consisting of a Steering Committee, Technical Plenary and multiple Working Groups. The Steering Committee has overall responsibility for providing strategic direction and management to oneM2M, and it is composed of all partners and members of oneM2M. The Technical Plenary has total responsibility for the oneM2M technical activities. It is also responsible for the organization of the technical work and it can autonomously create sub groups. The plenary is composed of all partners and members too, but only the members have right to vote.

There are 6 Working Groups inside oneM2M: REQ, ARC, PRO, SEC, MAS and TST. The REQ working group works on identifying and documenting use cases and requirements. ARC develops and specifies an architecture for an M2M system. The working group PRO specifies the protocols, APIs and message formats used in oneM2M. The security and privacy requirements are specified by the working group SEC. The working group MAS, Management, Abstraction and Semantics deals with the management of M2M entities and functions. The last group, TST, defines the test requirements for the oneM2M system and develops sets of specifications for conformance and interoperability testing. The work that we realised during this thesis was related to the group TST, where the generated TTCN-3 tests were used.

The usual work flow inside the TST group is described in the figure 2.6. The working group uses the requirements defined by other working groups to produce Test Purposes (TPs). The notion of TPs is explained in section 10.3.1. Those TPs are used as basis to write TTCN-3 tests, which are compiled with at least two different compilers and executed. The work on TPs is shared between the participants of TST group, and for the TTCN-3 tests, a Task Force (TF) is created. The TF is composed of 4 working group members: ETSI, KETI, Fraunhofer Group and EGM, where we represented EGM. The generation of TTCN-3 test cases is inside this group, where we introduced the usage of Model Based-Testing approach to generate test cases instead of writing code manually.
2.3 MODEL-BASED TESTING (MBT)

Models are described in many ways, depending on the discipline. They can be described by use of diagrams, tables, text, or other kinds of notations. They might be expressed in a mathematical formalism or informally, where the meaning is derived by convention. Although computing equipment and software plays an important role for the application of modeling in science and engineering, modeling is not as ubiquitous in software engineering as it is in other engineering disciplines. However, formal methods is one discipline where modeling has been applied in the areas of safety- and security-critical software systems. Test phases are the last stages of system development. They are therefore strongly constrained by delivery periods. In general, they are subject to all of the delays accumulated during the overall project. Currently, test phases still correspond to 30% or even to 50% of the total cost of system development and thus represent an important point for possible improvements.

We present hereafter a technology which is more and more used in industry to avoid bugs, to improve quality and reduce costs: Model-Based Testing (MBT). MBT is the automatic generation of software test procedures, using models of system requirements and behavior. Although this type of testing requires more up-front effort in building the model, it offers substantial advantages over traditional software testing methods:

- Rules are specified once.
- Project maintenance is lower. There is no need to write new tests for each new feature. Once we have a model it is easier to generate and re-generate test cases than it is with hand-coded test cases.
- Design is fluid. When a new feature is added, a new action is added to the model to run in combination with existing actions. A simple change can automatically ripple through the entire suite of test cases.
- Design more and code less.
- High coverage. Tests continue to find bugs, not just regressions due to changes in the code path or dependencies.
- Model authoring is independent of implementation and actual testing so that these activities can be carried out by different members of a team concurrently.

Model-Based Testing - Importance:

- Unit testing won’t be sufficient to check the functionalities
- To ensure that the system is behaving in the same sequence of actions.
- Model-based testing techniques are adopted as an integrated part of the testing process.
- Commercial tools are developed to support model-based testing.

Model-Based Testing (MBT) is considered to be a lightweight formal method to validate software systems. It is formal because it works out of a formal (that is, machine-readable)
specification (or model) of the software system one intends to test (usually called the implementation or System Under Test, SUT). It is lightweight because, contrary to other formal methods, MBT does not aim at mathematically proving that the implementation matches the specifications under all possible circumstances. What MBT does is to systematically generate from the model a collection of tests (a “test suite”) that, when run against the SUT, will provide sufficient confidence that it behaves as the model predicted it would. The difference between lightweight and heavyweight formal methods is basically about sufficient confidence vs. complete certainty. Now, the price to pay for absolute certainty is not low, which results in heavyweight formal methods being very hard (sometimes prohibitively hard) to apply to real-life projects. MBT on the other hand scales much better and has been used to test life-size systems in large scale projects [9].

The fundamental MBT process [9] includes activities such as test planning and controls, test analysis and design (which includes MBT modeling, choosing suitable test selection criteria), test generation, test implementation and execution [41].

Figure 2.7: Fundamental MBT Process

Figure 2.7 illustrates the fundamental MBT process. The test analyst takes requirements and defines tests objectives as input to model the System Under Test (SUT) (step ①). This MBT model contains static and dynamic views of the system. Hence, to benefit as much as possible from the MBT technology, we consider an automated process, where the test model is sent as an input to the test generator that automatically produces abstract test cases and a coverage matrix, relating the tests to the covered model elements or according to another test selection criteria (step ②). These tests are further exported, automatically (step ③), in a test repository to which test scripts can be associated. The automated test scripts in combination with an adaptation layer link each step from the abstract test to a concrete command of the SUT and automate the test execution (step ④). In addition, after the test execution, tests results and metrics are collected (step ⑤) and feedback is sent to the user.

From one MBT model various test selection criteria can be applied, as shown in Figure 2.7 and used by our chosen MBT tool CertifyIT that is introduced in section 4.3.2. For our study we used coverage-based test selection criteria. This approach considers a subset of Unified Modeling Language (UML) to develop MBT models, composed from two types of diagrams for the structural modeling:

- Class diagrams
- Object diagrams
Each type has a separate role in the test generation process. The class diagram describes the system’s structure, namely the set of classes that represents the static view of the system:

- Its entities, with their attributes
- Operations that model the API of the SUT
- Observations that serve as oracles (for instance an observation returns the current state of the user’s connection to a web site)

Next, this static view, given by the class diagram, is instantiated by an object diagram. The object diagrams provides the initial state of the system and also all objects that will be used in the test input data as parameters for the operations in the generated tests. Finally, the dynamic view of the system or its behaviors are described by Objective Constraint Language (OCL) constraints written as pre/postcondition in operations in a class of a class diagram. The test generation engine sees these behavior objects as test targets. The operations can have several behaviors, identified by the presence of the conditional operator if-then-else. The precondition is the union of the operation’s precondition and the conditions of a path that is necessary to traverse for reaching the behavior’s postcondition. The postcondition corresponds to the behavior described by the action in the “then” or “else” clause of the conditional operator. Finally, each behavior is identified by a set of tags (as initially defined in the Test Objective Charter(TOC)), which refers to a requirement covered by the behavior. For each requirement, two types of tags exists:

- @REQ - a high-level requirement
- @AIM - the refinement of a high-level requirement

Here is a simple example of OCL containing the two types of tags:

```
−−−@REQ:ESTABLISHES_SECURE_CONNECTION
if p_Encryption_key = ENCRYPTION_KEY::KEY then
    −−−@AIM:SECURE_CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED
    self.secure_connection = true
else
    −−−@AIM:SECURE_CONNECTION_FAILED
    true
endif and
    self.sniffer.message_interception()
```

This example show a high level requirement "ESTABLISHES_SECURE_CONNECTION" which is self explanatory as it is expressing the requirement of establishing a secure connection of a device onto an IoT platform. The refinement of the high level requirement are the following @AIM tags which describe the different status tested for the fulfillment of the requirement "SECURE_CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED" or its error state "SECURE_CONNECTION_FAILED".

Both tags are followed by an identifier. Finally, one major advantage of the coverage-based test selection criteria approach is the possibility to automatically deduce the test oracle. A specific type of operations, called observations, define the test oracles. The
tester with these special operations can define the system points or variables to observe, for instance a function return code. Thus, based on these observations, the test oracle is automatically generated for each test step.

There is two main approaches to Model-Based Testing: online and offline. Offline MBT is as presented in Figure 10.7. Offline MBT means generation a finite set of test in order to execute those later. This allows automatic test execution in third party test execution platform.

On the other hand, online MBT test case generation and execution are in motion, each new test step generated takes into consideration the result of the previous one. Online MBT is suited to test non deterministic systems and enables an infinite test suite execution. The main difference is that we do not have a test repository and the execution of a step is executed right after its creation.

The next section presents the research challenges of the thesis.
The main work we want to tackle is to validate IoT systems. The complexity of the system is marked by its composition of several elements with many interactions (as presented in previous section). In order to bring trust and validation in the IoT there must be a friendly approach to testing things in IoT systems, thus keeping low testing costs and providing a higher accessibility by the means of easy to use testing tools. In the several approaches to depict the IoT some standards are defined. We can use it to realize the validation of the system. So, in complementary of the functional and security aspects, we can also validate the conformance of the system's elements in regards of this standards. In the next sections, we detail the research challenges associated with several aspects of validation.

### 3.1 Testing for standardized IoT platforms

The IoT is a jungle where major electronic actors (as Apple, Google, Microsoft...) can propose proprietary format and consortium try to share their format. In regards of those shared formats, some standards are defined. We are speaking about testing for standardized IoT platforms and not IoT systems because as much as we would like to have a whole IoT system standardized, reality begs to differs. IoT platforms are in most cases standardized and we will focus on two of them. An IoT system is composed of many object interacting together, and each object has the possibility to implement a different standard. They communicate with each other by means of interworking proxy in the case of oneM2M and IoT Agent in the case of FIWARE. We will describe those process in more details in their respective sections further. As much as we would like to test the
standardization of an IoT systems, the reality is that we have to test the standardization of all IoT platforms that combined end up building the IoT system. During this PhD, we worked on two standard: oneM2M and FIWARE. The validation process is to validate individually each component and then validate the integration of the components. The process is repeated until the system is totally integrated. We present in the next section the challenges associated with this process.

3.1.1 Testing the Conformance of One Component

The IoT is a growing trend in the software industry. With a combination of software and hardware/sensor devices, both individuals and enterprise consumers want to be able to monitor, activate and control their devices from the comfort of their homes and offices. This is feasible through the advancements of embedded systems into the Internet of Things (IoT). The quality and performance of such systems still require the improvement of existing testing methods to ensure quality while taking into consideration speed and scalability. Embedded systems have been around for decades now, while the IoT is still in its initial phase. The difference between the two is that embedded systems are self-contained and isolated, while IoT are in permanent communication with the server and with each other. Such a degree of integration and interoperability poses significant problems regarding testing due to differences in protocols. There are no generally accepted standards when it comes to IoT, and this impacts security and large-scale adoption. Both established organizations such as the IEEE and other alliances or even independent companies have designed attempts to define a single standard with no success. The huge number of sensors deployed annually (about 35 Billion in 2016 alone) means that if 99% of the sensor work as intended, 350 million will either fail or report inaccurate data. Conceptualize the waste a smart city would experience if 1% of its traffic, parking, smoke and hazardous chemical sensors either failed or delivered wrong information.

Conformance testing is a functional test that verifies whether the behaviour satisfy defined requirements. The requirements or criteria for conformance must be specified in the standard or specification, usually in a conformance clause or conformance statement. Some standards have subsequent standards for the test methodology and assertions to be tested. If the criteria or requirements for conformance are not specified there can be no conformance testing [68]. With any standards or specification project, eventually the discussion turns to “how will we know if an application/device conforms to our standard or specification?” Thus begins the discussion on conformance testing. Although this type of testing has been done for a long time there is still usually some confusion about what is involved. There are many types of conformance testing like performance, security and robustness. We consider here the functional and interoperability aspects of tests. The other types will be then presented in their specific sections.

3.1.2 Testing for Integration

Traditional testing methods take time, which is no longer a viable option. The entire development process needs to be agile, detecting problems as early as possible. The new slogan is “test early, test often” and the result is continuous integration, which is even more important in an IoT environment. Sensors, communication channels, protocols, software-hardware interactions, and configurations determine an unprecedented magni-
3.1. TESTING FOR STANDARDIZED IOT PLATFORMS

tude of complexity. As far as it goes for the cost in component testing methods for IoT, traditional methods are not pro-efficient. This is why a more automated approach is necessary.

Before integration testing, it is required to test each component individually. Once all the components have been tested in isolation, they are combined (i.e. integrated) and the next phase of the testing process is to validate their correct interaction, hence integration testing. The meaning of Integration testing is quite straightforward- Integrate/combine the unit tested module one by one and test the behaviour as a combined unit. Integration testing checks the interactions between the combination of behaviours, and validate whether the requirements are implemented correctly or not. Here we should understand that Integration testing does not happen at the end of the cycle, rather it is conducted simultaneously with the development. In most cases, all the modules are not actually available for testing and this is where the challenge lies, testing something which does not exist.

What is the purpose of integrating Integration testing in the testing strategy?

- In the real world, when applications are developed, the process is broken down into smaller modules and individual developers are assigned one module. The logic being implemented may vary significantly from one developer to another, so it becomes important to check its integrity e.g., it renders the correct output in accordance to the standards.

- The structure of data changes when it travels from one module to another. Some values are appended or removed along the way, which may causes issues in the subsequent modules.

- Modules also interact with multiple third party tools or APIs which also need to be tested, typically to make sure that the data accepted by that API / tool is correct and that the generated output is also as expected.

- A very common problem in testing – Frequently requirements change often. Developers often deploy changes without prior validation through unit testing. Integration testing becomes important at that time to ensure that each component has been fully unit tested as the two approaches are complementary.

The next sessions present the challenges encountered when testing integration respectively between two components and between all the components covering a specific standard.

3.1.2.1 INTEGRATION TESTING OF PAIR COMPONENTS

By nature IoT systems are not designed to be built upon one atomic solution that envelops all of the components required for a proper execution. An IoT system is divided into many components that interact together to bring alive the system. Let us take the example of a temperature sensor whose purpose is to send measured values each time the temperature changes. The sensor communicates the measured value to an IoT platform through a local gateway. The gateway is the middle node that receives the sensor value in his own protocol and then send the data in a standardized manner to the IoT platform. Making sure that each component of the system is working individually is a matter
of conformance testing covered in the previous section. Interactions between the components (gateway-platform) require the ability for each part to be able to communicate together. The communication must be understood by both sides so it has to be standardized. Standards describe interfaces that each component need to implement in order to communicate with the rest of the system.

3.1.2.2 INTEGRATION TESTING OF MULTI-COMPONENTS

The previous section covers the topic of a standalone component and pairwise components. As these methods can surely reveal some errors, they do not cover all the defaults that can occur during a real life deployment. As a matter of fact, real life IoT systems are rarely limited to the integration of one or two components. At the worst case scenario a full application integrates more then half a dozen of components that are communicating with each other to fulfill their purpose, e.g., transmit a sensed value, standardizing data, storing data for big data or even displaying the sensed data on a screen in real time. The advantages of starting with pair components testing is that we already have the tools in orders to start the integration testing of multi-components. The same model is reusable for test generation and execution. The principle differences are the interpretation of the results. In a multi-component environment are large scale IoT deployments for a smart city, the results are not proof of default in one component in particular but in the integration of the whole system and pin pointing where an error has occurred can sometimes be difficult. MBT has strong traceability capabilities, and the challenge is to see how it can make the correction less costly and give a fast view on the requirement that is making a test fail.

3.2 SECURITY TESTING OF IoT SYSTEMS

Manufacturers of every kind of electronic or electrical devices are rushing to add features which require connection to the internet. In their rush to market these companies many of which have no prior experience with networked devices are bound to overlook the complications of hardware and software security design and construction in the haste to get the newest function working at the lowest cost. For a start, there is no graphical user interface (GUI) to test IoT instances. Consumers of parts of an IoT system may be non-human and wireless connections create more attack vectors, therefore more security challenges. To tackle these challenges, testers of IoT need to have a better understanding of basic electronics and network systems. The GUI is no longer king; APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) are becoming the de facto standard for connecting IoT modules, thus, for better or worse, API testing is becoming a must-have skill for the average tester. Security and penetration testing have to become part of the testing regime. The biggest concerns related to IoT are security and privacy. Without properly defined standards, hackers can hijack the devices linked to a network – many of which owner have paid for – and transform them into listening or monitoring tools. Moreover, since an IoT device consists of several layers and operates at a low network level, general Internet security rules designed for apps and browsers are not enough. Security must be tested after every update in a continuous approach.
3.2. SECURITY TESTING OF IOT SYSTEMS

3.2.1 Vulnerability testing

As a critical tool for information security management, a vulnerability testing campaign can spot weaknesses in an IoT platform’s security defenses before an attacker can exploit them. Hackers are constantly innovating their methods as they look for new ways to breach defenses. A regular vulnerability testing campaign can help uncovering and addressing security flaws and improving the cyber security strategy of a deployment to limit the breaches. But a vulnerability testing campaign is only as good as the security experts who design and execute it. An effective vulnerability testing campaign requires proven methodologies created by security professionals with extensive knowledge of the latest threats and technology available to mitigate them. This process provides guidelines for the development of countermeasures to prevent a genuine attack.

3.2.2 End-to-end security testing

End-to-end security is used successfully today, for example, in online banking applications. Correct and complete end-to-end security in the growing IoT is required to ensure data privacy, integrity, etc. Introducing MBT to this problem may raise certain questions on the feasibility of the models being generic enough to withstand the wide range of IoT applications. It is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of all application domains of the IoT. The IoT components involved in a solution have in most common cases, a wide range of different components, such as Hardware (devices, sensors, actuators . . . ), software and network protocols. Security on their endpoints (client-server, or client-client for peer-to-peer) is an absolute requirement for secure communications. Such a solution contains the following components:

- Identity: This component encompasses the known and verifiable entity identities on both ends.

- Protocols (for example, TLS): Protocols are used to dynamically negotiate the session keys, and to provide the required security functions (for example, encryption and integrity verification) for a connection. Protocols use cryptographic algorithms used to implement these functions.

- Cryptographic algorithms (for example, Advanced Encryption Standard [AES] and Secure Hash Algorithm [SHA-1]): These algorithms use the previously mentioned session keys to protect the data in transit, for example, through encryption or integrity checks.

- Secure implementation: The endpoint (client or server) that runs one of the aforementioned protocols must be free of bugs that could compromise security.

- Secure operations: Users and operators must understand the security mechanisms, and how to manage exceptions. For example, web browsers warn about invalid server certificates, but users can override the warning and still make the connection. This concern is a non-technical one, but is of critical concern today.

In addition, for full end-to-end security, all these components should be seen globally to ensure their security. For instance, in networks with end-to-end security, both ends
can typically (depending on the protocols and algorithms used) rely on the fact that their communication is not visible to anyone else, and that no one else can modify the data in transit.

In the next section we talk about the research challenges of robustness testing for IoT Systems.

3.3 Robustness Testing for IoT Systems

The term "robust" is synonymous with strength. So robustness testing consists of assessing the quality of an IoT system deployment. It is the process of verifying whether system components perform well under stress conditions or not. Robustness testing has also been used to describe the process of verifying the robustness (i.e. correctness) of test cases in a test process. ANSI and IEEE have defined robustness as the degree to which a system or component can function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental conditions. Robustness testing is carried out in those steps: a combination of valid and invalid inputs is passed to the system component, the behavior of the system checked and how it reacts over long testing traces. Hence a system is tested and validated under different conditions.

This section explains how the objective of robustness testing for IoT systems differs when doing Robustness testing for one component or for multi-components also know as large scale deployment. We explore how the challenges differs when taking different point of views (one component/multi component) in the IoT system.

3.3.1 Robustness testing for one component

When speaking about robustness testing for one component in IoT services, the point of view is very important. If we take the example of robustness testing of an IoT platform in the IoT system, robustness testing may be compared to a platform having a high number of devices that are sending data. The test objectives in this case are to analyze how the platform reacts in stress conditions and if it is put in an unexpected error state. When taking a device point of view, the same problems are faced. By nature, IoT platforms and gateways are more robust having larger infrastructures. IoT devices like energy harvesting temperature sensor are harder to test in an effective way with robustness testing. All devices are not eligible to robustness testing as this method requires being able to send a command to the device and therefore it is limited to actuators or sensing device that can be interrogated about their data. In some cases this challenge can be lifted with the implementation of a upper tester module that comes along the device for testing purposes only. The upper tester allows a tester to put a device into testing mode and gives him access to stimulate it, for example asking a temperature sensor to send its data. Upper tester are still uncommon, and a relatively low number of device manufacturer are implementing them.

Knowing that, it is much easier to execute a robustness testing campaign on a single device as it would imply low effort in developing the upper tester. The next step is using robustness testing in a large scale point of view.
3.3.2 Robustness testing for large scale IoT system

When speaking about large scale robustness testing in IoT system, one must first consider defining the term large scale. Indeed, the test objectives are widely different when considering a smart-city with millions of devices or a smart home with a few dozen of sensing devices. Either way, large scale can be seen as an IoT deployment involving up to about hundreds devices. The limit is mainly testing hardware dependent. As a matter of fact, large scale tests are not different than the single component tests. The challenge is on running in parallel hundreds of instances of the same test case over an IoT deployment. The success of robustness testing a large scale IoT system depends on the infrastructure, large amount of data are transmitted into the infrastructure and an even larger amount of data needs to be collected. The testing equipment also need to be fit to analyze testing results and give a final verdict on the test result in real time.

The next chapter presents the state of the art of IoT testing, Model-Based Testing and the tools available that where used as is or augmented in order to respond to our research challenges.
4
STATE OF THE ART

In this section, we review work related to our proposed approach in the area of MBT for Internet of things systems, more specifically mobile and cloud testing, and MBT as a service. MBT has been extensively studied in the literature [25], however, the majority of existing approaches in connexion to the IoT domain are mostly designed for mobile application. For instance, authors in [22] propose a state machine models of Graphical User Interface (GUI) approach for testing Android applications. Another instance in [43], say that one of the main domains to use this approach is web-based applications. But such test sequences are very low-level and fragile, so it is desirable to have higher-level approaches to generating the test sequences, which is an area where MBT can contribute. Other work concentrates on vulnerability testing of mobile applications based on models, for instance authors in [29] propose an MBT approach to generate automatically test cases using vulnerability patterns, that target specifically the Android Intent Messaging mechanism.

In addition, a recent survey by Incki et al. [23] reports on the work done on testing in the cloud, including mobile, cloud applications and infrastructures, testing the migration of applications in the cloud. They report a categorization of the literature on cloud testing based on several elements among which: test level and type, as well as contribution in terms of test execution, generation and testing framework. They report that testing as a service for the interoperability for cloud infrastructures today still remains a challenge. Authors in [15] propose a MBT approach based on graph modeling for system and functional testing in cloud computing. Hence, contrary to these approaches that refer to testing approaches of the different layers of the cloud (Software as a service, Platform as a service and Infrastructure as a service), our approach proposes MBT as a service for compliance and security testing of IoT systems, were the cloud is one element of it.
CHAPTER 4. STATE OF THE ART

Testing services provided to cloud consumers as well as cloud providers are generally called Testing as Service (TaaS) [19]. Previous work on testing as a service, to the best of our knowledge, specifically relates to web services and cloud computing. Zech et al. in [26] propose a model-based approach using risk analysis to generate test cases to ensure the security of a Cloud computing environment when outsourcing IT landscapes. More recently Zech et al. [38] proposed a model-based approach to evaluate the security of the cloud environment by means of negative testing based on the Telling Test Stories Framework. MBT provides the benefit of being implementation independent. In this thesis we propose MBT as service to the Internet of Things, thus making the test cases available for any platform implementation of the specification. Our model-based test generation takes into account risk analysis elements and security requirements and it is an extension of this module of our Model-Based Testing for IoT systems.

4.1 IoT TESTING

This section addresses the panel of existing MBT approaches with a view on the IoT systems. The MBT can be offline, whereby the test cases are generated in a repository for future execution or online, whereby the test cases are automatically generated and executed [44]. In this chapter, we discuss both: offline MBT techniques with respect to functional and security testing and online MBT techniques. Nevertheless, recent studies show that current MBT approaches, although they can be suitable for testing the IoT systems, need to be adapted [42].

4.1.1 Conformance Testing

Standards are a well-known methods used to increase the user’s confidence and trust in a product. MBT approaches supporting conformance testing to standards have been applied to different domains, such as electronic transactions and notably for Common Criteria (CC) certifications, for instance, on the Global Platform (GP). Authors in [42] propose a testing framework for IoT services, which has been evaluated on IoT test bed, for test design using behavioural modelling, based on state machines and test execution in TTCN-3. In addition, IoT Behavioral models (IoTBM) represent a chosen explicit model, describing the service logic, used protocols, and interfaces as well as the interactions with the connected services. IBM reports as well on the application of MBT for compliance to standards based on the IBM tool suite (Rhapsody and Jazz) [47].

Conformance test suites increase the probability that software products are conform to their specification. Correct implementation and utilization of standards lead to portability and interoperability. Portability is the ability to move software programs or applications among different computer systems with minimal change. Interoperability is defined as the capability of two or more systems to exchange and use information. Although conformance testing is not a guarantee for interoperability, it is an essential step towards it. Conformance testing provides software developers and users with assurance and confidence that the conforming product behaves as expected, performs functions in a known manner, or possesses a prescribed interface or format.

In order to test that a specification is faithfully adhered to, one must carefully examine the specification and compare the implementation’s result against the syntax and semantics
contained in the specification. Oftentimes, errors or ambiguities in the specification are
discovered. These errors and ambiguities can then be fed back to the standards com-
mittee who developed the specification, for correction. For software developers, using
conformance test suites early-on in the development process can help improve the qual-
ity of their implementations by identifying areas in which they conform as well as those
areas in which they do not.

4.1.2 Security Testing

Mode-Based Security Testing (MBST) is a Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)
approach consisting of dynamically checking the security of the systems’s security
requirements [69]. Furthermore, MBST has recently gained relative importance in
academia as well as in the industry, as it allows for systematic and efficient specifica-
tion and documentation of security test objectives, security test cases and test suites,
and automated or semi-automated test generation [24]. Existing work in MBST focuses
mainly on functional security and vulnerability testing. Functional security testing aims
at ensuring the correct implementation of the security requirements. Vulnerability testing
is based on risk assessment analysis, aiming to discover potential vulnerabilities. Au-
thors in [44] discuss extensively the existing approaches on both aspects of MBST. Exis-
ting approaches address various domains, such as electronic transactions, cryptographic
components, but not directly the IoT domain.

A security certification is needed to ensure that a product satisfies the required security
requirements, which can be both proprietary requirements (i.e., defined by a company
for their specific products) and market requirements (i.e., defined in procurement spec-
fications or market standards). The process for certification of a product is generally
summarized in four phases [45]:

1. Application. A company submits a product for evaluation to obtain certification.

2. An evaluation is performed to obtain certification. The evaluation can be done in
three ways:
   • It can be conducted internally to support self-certification.
   • It can be performed by a testing company, who legally belongs to the product
     company.
   • It can be a third-party certification where the company asks a third-party com-
     pany to perform the evaluation of its product.

3. In the case of an internal company or a third-party company evaluation, the evalua-
tion company provides a decision on the evaluation.

4. Surveillance. This is a periodic check on the product to ensure that the certification
is still valid or it requires a new certification.

In the market requirements case, the requirements are also defined to support security
interoperability. For example, to ensure that two products are able to mutually authenti-
cate or to exchange secure messages. Security certifications are needed to ensure that
products are secure against specific security attacks or that they have specific security
properties, such as:
• **Authentication**: Data sender and receiver can always be verified.

• **Resistance to replay attacks**: Intermediate nodes can store a data packet and replay it at a later stage. Thus, mechanisms are needed to detect duplicate or replayed messages.

• **Resistance to dictionary attacks**: An intermediate node can store some data packets and decipher them by performing a dictionary attack if the key used to cipher them is a dictionary word.

• **Resistance to DoS attacks**: Several nodes can access the server at the same time to collapse it. For this reason, the server must have DoS protection or a fast recovery after this attack.

• **Integrity**: Received data are not tampered with during transmission; if this does not happen, then any change can be detected.

• **Confidentiality**: Transmitted data can be read only by the communication endpoints.

• **Resistance to MITM attacks**: The attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communications.

• **Authorization**: Services should be accessible to users who have the right to access them.

• **Availability**: The communication endpoints can always be reached and cannot be made inaccessible.

• **Fault tolerance**: The overall service can be delivered even when a number of atomic services are faulty.

• **Anonymization**: If proper countermeasures are not taken, even users employing pseudonyms could be tracked by their network locator.

Nevertheless, in the IoT domain, initiatives exist for security certification, such as the Alliance for IoT Innovation (AIOTI) [57] through its standardization and policy working groups that complement the existing certifications, such as the Common Criteria (CC). However, enabling technologies that help to formally address the specific testing challenges and that enable the IoT certification today are lacking [39].

4.1.3 **Robustness Testing**

Online techniques can indeed address the uncertain behavior of IoT systems, but lack in application and maturity for the IoT domain, as current techniques mostly address a testbed set-up for execution in a real-life environment, without dealing with the test cases conception.

Several online tools exist in the MBT literature. For instance, UPPAAL for Testing Real-time systems Online (UPPAAL TRON) [7] supports the generation of test cases from models and their online execution on the SUT.
Authors in [35] express the system and its properties as Boolean equations, and then used an equation library to check the equations on-the-fly. A model-checker is used on a model with faults produces counter examples, seen as negative abstract test cases.

Shieferdecker et al. designed a mutation-based fuzzing approach that uses fuzzing operators on scenario models specified by sequence diagrams. A set of fuzzing operators mutate the diagrams resulting in an invalid sequence. Shieferdecker et al. use on-line behavioral fuzzing which generates tests at run-time [30].

4.2 MODEL-BASED TESTING FOR IOT

The key challenges in testing for scalability, interoperability, and security of the IoT have proven to be problematic when trying to resolve them with traditional testing methods, which is a strong roadblock for wide adoption of this innovative technology. This section aims to describe how the MBT has addressed this problem through IoT testing.

MBT designates any type of “testing based on or involving models” [41]. Models represent the SUT, its environment, or the test itself, which directly supports test analysis, planning, control, implementation, execution, and reporting activities. According to the World Quality Report 2016 [40], the future testing technologies require agile development operations for more intelligence-led testing to meet speed, quality, and cost imperatives. Hence, MBT, as a promising solution, aims to formalize and automate as many activities related to testing as possible and thereby increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of testing. Following the progress of Model-Based Engineering [1] technologies, MBT has increasingly attracted research attention. Many MBT tools are developed to support the practice and utilization of MBT approaches in real cases. They provide functions that cover three MBT aspects i.e., generation of test cases, generation of test data, and generation of test scripts [9], and are used to conduct different types of testing, such as functional, performance, and usability testing [31].

Nevertheless, functions of MBT tools vary largely from one to another. Users without prior knowledge struggle to choose appropriate tools corresponding to their testing needs among the wide list. MBT tools require input in terms of different models (e.g., UML, PetriNet, BPMN, etc.) and focus on different MBT aspects with different generation strategies for data, test cases, and test scripts. Moreover, most of the existing MBT tools support mainly automatic test case generation rather than test data generation and test script generation due to two reasons: first, test case generation requires complicated strategies involving various test selection criteria from MBT models, and the generation results highly reply on the selected criteria and strategies; second, test case generation brings many more testing benefits, as the main efforts spent on traditional testing lie in manual preparation of test cases. To provide users with a common understanding and systematic comparison, this chapter reviews the identified set of MBT tools, focusing on the test case generation aspect. MBT tools have been previously reported and compared in several surveys: the first report is presented in [5] in 2002 to illustrate the basic principles of test case generation and relevant tools; a later comparison is made in [46] from perspectives of modeling, test case generation, and tool extensibility; since more and more MBT tools rely on state-based models, the review in [18] illustrates the state-based MBT tools following criteria of test coverage, automation level, and test construction. The most recent work [36] presents an overview of MBT tools focusing on requirement-based
designs and also illustrates an example by use of the representative tools. Due to the increasing popularity of MBT, existing MBT tools have rapidly evolved and new available tools have emerged every year and MBT as a Service (MBTaaS) is one of these tools.

MBT is an application of model-based design for generating test cases and executing them against the SUT for testing purpose. The MBT process can be generally divided into five steps [25]

- **Step 1: Model Design.** In the first step, users create MBT models from requirement/system specifications. The specification defines the testing requirements or the aspects to test of the SUT (e.g., functions, behaviors, and performances). The created MBT models usually represent high-level abstractions of the SUT and are described by formal languages or notations (e.g., UML, PetriNet, and BMPN). The formats of the MBT models depend on the characteristics of the SUT (e.g., function-driven or data-driven system, deterministic or stochastic system) and the required input formats of the MBT tools.

- **Step 2: Test Cases Generation.** In the second step, abstract test cases from the MBT models are generated automatically, based on test selection criteria. Test selection criteria guide the generation process by indicating the interesting points to be tested, such as certain functions of the SUT or coverage of the MBT model (e.g., state coverage, transition coverage, and data flow coverage). Applying different criteria to the same MBT model will generate different sets of test cases, that could be complementary. Abstract test cases without implementation details of the SUT are generated from the MBT models.

- **Step 3: Concretization of the Test Cases.** In the third step, abstract test cases (produced in step 2) are concretized into executable test cases with the help of mappings between the abstraction in the MBT models and the system implementation details. Executable test cases contain low-level implementation details and can be directly executed on the SUT.

- **Step 4: Execution of the Test Cases.** The executable test cases are executed on the SUT either manually or within an automated test execution environment. To automate the test execution, system adapters are required to provide channels
4.3. LANGUAGES AND TOOLS FOR TESTING

This section revolves around the tools and main testing languages used in the rest of this thesis. We will present the main test execution language, the main modeling tool used for test case generation and the tool used for behavioral fuzzing testing.

4.3.1 TTCN-3

The Testing and Test Control Notation version 3 (TTCN-3) is an standardized language designed for testing and certification. It is developed and maintained by the European Telecommunication Standardization Institute (ETSI) and also is adopted by the International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T).

TTCN-3 is a widely used language, well established in the telecommunication, automotive and medical domains, with intentions to expand to the banking sector. For example, TTCN-3 is the language of choice of the third Generation Partnership Program (3GPP) [56] for all their test suites, including the prestigious test suite for Long Term Evolution (LTE)/4G terminals. The WiMax Forum used TTCN-3 for certifying the conformance of terminals and the interoperability of terminals and network elements. Also, ETSI is using it in all of its projects, including electronic passport and Next Generation Networks (NGNs). The success of the language can be noticed in the annual international TTCN-3 User Conference, where the future development of the language is discussed[20].

As TTCN-3 is a key test language to this thesis and its specificities are extremely important to understand, in this section we will start with a brief of the language's history and continue with its characteristics, its similarities and differences from other programming languages.

4.3.1.1 TTCN-3 LANGUAGE HISTORY

The work on the Tree and Tabular Combined Notation (TTCN) first started in 1983 in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and was published in 1992, after 9
years of development. It was first developed as an international standard as part 3 of
the ISO 9646 Methodology and Framework for Conformance Testing. This first version of
TTCN had some interesting characteristics that contributed to its wide acceptance, as its
tabular notation and its verdict system.

The second version addressed some design faults of the first version, like the difficulty to
describe the concurrent behaviours in the tests. This was soon recognized and in the new
version was added the parallelism and the concepts of modules to increase re-usability.
This extended TTCN was named TTCN version 2 (TTCN-2) in ISO and in ITU-T in 1998.
After the release, there were reported some defects in TTCN-2. The experts working on
ETSI projects found and corrected them. The release of this revised version of TTCN-2
was published in ETSI technical report TR 101 666. But because ISO did not publish
this version of TTCN, it became known as TTCN-2++. This version of the language
was designed for conformance protocol testing (used for OSI-based protocol testing), but
was not appropriate for other testing paradigms like interoperability, robustness, system,
regression and load. Also, there was no language support for API/platform testing.

In the meantime, ISO transferred the responsibility for the TTCN standard to ETSI. Hav-
ing these limitations in mind, ETSI created the Special Task Force (STF) 133 and 156
and started working on a new version of TTCN in 1998 and completed it in October 2000.
Among the other things, this new version had entirely new name, so since then, TTCN
means "Testing and Test Control Notation" instead of "Tree and Tabular Combined Nota-
tion".

There are a lot of changes in this version: The tabular notation is replaced by a usual
programming language-like notation. This greatly improves the language because the
new version has a well-defined syntax, static semantic and precise execution algorithm.
The old tabular presentation format is not anymore preserved in a legacy form (the last
versions of the documents describing tabular and graphical presentation formats are from
February 2007). The language now supports dynamic concurrent testing configurations,
operations for synchronous and asynchronous communications, ability to specify encoding
information and other attributes, data and signature templates with powerful matching
mechanisms, type and value parametrization, assignment and handling of test verdict,
test suite parameterization and test case selection mechanisms\[4\], making it a language
of choice for testing purposes.

4.3.1.2 LANGUAGE SPECIFICS

The last version of TTCN-3 has introduced a wide range of changes to the language, min-
imizing the efforts needed by a user, already familiar with other programming languages,
to learn and use TTCN-3.

A TTCN-3 test suite consists of one or more modules. A module is identified by a name
and may contain type, port and component declarations and definitions, templates, func-
tions, test cases and control part for executing test cases. The control part can be seen
as the main function in other programming languages as C or Java.

All code must be inside a module. A module can import definitions (types, templates,
ports, components, functions, testcases and altsteps) from other modules and use them
in its own definitions or control parts. Also, using the visibility flags public, friend and
private we can manage the visibility of an element. Public is the visibility by default. We
can see an element "friend" when two modules in-between are declared as "friends and
the private elements aren't visible outside the module. Inside a module, we can group
certain elements with the definition of a group. The group is visible by default, but the
members of the group follow their visibility parameters inside of the group. For example,
when a private element is declared inside of a group that contains two other elements,
the two public elements in the group are visible, but not the third element with "private"
scope.

Compared to the "traditional" programming languages, TTCN-3 has much larger range
of data types. This way, TTCN-3 allows creating a close correspondence between the
data types in the SUT and the testbed. The standard data types that we can find in other
programming languages are also present (integer, float, boolean, (universal) charstring).
There are some data types that are unique to TTCN-3 that allows managing the test case
result verdicttype and reflect its usage as a test scripting language with a protocol testing
background (bitstring, hexstring, octetstring). Every user-defined type is a subtype of
an already defined type because it restricts the range of the root type. In order to call
two types compatible one with the other, they have to share the same root type. There
is one special type, called anytype, which is an union of all the types that are visible in
the module. Anytype is always defined in each module and is a different type for each
module. The name for each variant of the anytype is the name of the type of that variant.

Because TTCN-3 is a statically typed language, each entity is declared along with its
type. A variable has its type to describe which values can be stored inside, a function has
its types to describe the structure of the parameters and the return value, and a port has
its types to describe which values can be sent and received thorough the port.

Test cases produced by TTCN-3 is abstract, because it does not know how or where to
send the content, it only knows that it has to send it. This is where the TTCN-3 Control
Interface (TCI) and the TTCN-3 Runtime Interface (TRI) get into the process. The TCI
is composed of Test Management (TM) module, Test Logging (TL) module, Coding and
Decoding (CD/CoDec) module and Component Handling (CH) module. The TRI is Sys-
tem Adapter (SA) and Platform Adapter (PA) modules, as shown on the figure 4.3. All of
these modules are already provided by most TTCN-3 tools, except the CoDec and the SA
modules. The first is needed to convert TTCN-3 structures to a binary, text, XML, JSON
or some other serializable format, and the latter is needed in order to communicate with
the SUT, because it implements the protocols that specify how the converted data from
the codec can be sent or received from the SUT (for example convert the structure to a
HTTP request or response, if the protocol used is HTTP).

TTCN-3 is a language constructed for protocol testing. In order to make sure that the
messages sent and received in the communication with the SUT are correct, we need to
validate the data inside. This is made possible with a language structure called template
that is closely related to the data type. In a template, for example, we can specify the
values needed to be sent to the SUT. But the real benefit of the templates comes when we
use them for checking the received value. Instead of checking for one concrete value, we
can specify multiple values, intervals, or simply check if that data structure is received (for
example, a HTTP request) without verifying its content. This check is made by a powerful
matching mechanism that works on per-field basis. If there is at least one field that does
not match the value with the template, the result is failed. To allow more flexibility, the
templates can be parameterized like a function. In the parameters one can specify the
parameters (or even other templates) to be used as reference values in the template.
Also, there is a possibility to derive a template from another using the keyword “modifies” and specify only the fields to verify that are different from the source template.

The TTCN-3 functions are virtually the same as the functions in other languages. We can specify the function’s name, its input parameters and return type/value. The parameters are configurable in a way that we can set the dataflow for each one and there are three possibilities: in, out or inout. The in parameter, activated by default, is used as any normal parameter that has to pass values from the function’s caller. The out and inout parameters are the inverse of in, passing the parameter by reference. We write into the parameter variable and the last value at the end of the function will be transferred back to the caller.

A test case is the main structure in TTCN-3. Its syntax is the same as a function, with the only difference that here after the parameters we have to specify which component the test case is running on, with the clause “runs on”. Inside we assign a verdict (pass, inconc, fail) depending on the state of the test case. An example of a test case is provided in the Annex.

Alternatives (alt) are structures used inside a function or test case. When we use operations like timeout or receive, because these are blocking operations, the execution will not proceed before a matching message is received or the timer has expired. The alt statement allows several blocking statements to be regrouped, and the first blocking operation that will finish its execution will unblock the whole group and the test or function can continue with the execution.

Timers are defined using the timer keyword at any place where variable definitions are permitted. They measure time in seconds, but their resolution is platform dependent.
Timers are useful in the communication phase of a test case combined with an alternative, to "fire" a time-out when there is no response from the SUT after a certain time.

In order to specify how the test system will communicate with the SUT, in TTCN-3 one use the notion of ports and components. A TTCN-3 port is specified with the type of messages it can send and receive. In an implementation of a port, there can be practical limits of the number of messages a port can hold in its queue. The behaviour of a test case is executed in one or more test components composed from one or more ports that describe its interface. Every port in the component has its own message queue to store received messages. The component can have its own state with local variables, constants and timers.

TTCN-3 is a language that is created with the idea of testing. A maturity proof for the language is that it's developed and used extensively in the international standardisation bodies like ITU-T and ETSI for nearly all new standards produced by them. It contains all the features needed to write and execute a lot of test types and can be used to test the SUT from different perspectives in the same time. A number of research projects and initiatives are exploring different areas of application but it still remains to be seen to what extent industry and ETSI will see a need and use it for such an extension.

### 4.3.2 CertifyIt

CertifyIt [53] is a modeling tool proposed by Smartesting Solution & Services [66]. The CertifyIt tool supports the modeling of application behaviour as well as business processes and rules to control the automatic generation and maintenance of test cases. Traceability is managed automatically and the produced test cases are published and maintained in the form of manual tests or automatic scripts composed of keywords to be implemented. CertifyIt helps to industrialize and optimizes test process: the test model makes it possible to master the functional complexity and to generate the most effective tests by ensuring the traceability links. It is also the single point of maintenance facilitating the update of test cases when specifications change. The various publications modules accelerate the production of reporting documents, for example for security assessments. The tool comes with many optional modules that are used in this thesis in order to take full advantages of it. Here are a couple of used optional modules:

- **Test Purpose**: The "Test Purpose" module provides a dedicated language that enables the representation of test patterns and generate tests that are variations of it.

- **MBeeTle** is a module dedicated to automated exploratory testing for robustness purposes; more precisely, MBeeTle implements intelligent exploratory testing because exploration is guided by the test model. This will be further detailed in section 4.3.3.

CertifyIt is a test generation tool and the target is to execute them.

### 4.3.3 MBeeTle

Behavioral fuzzing aims at verifying the robustness of the systems to ensure that they will not enter in an unpredictable state where the system is vulnerable and for instance that
confidential information might be disclosed. Current research results on fuzzing show that it is very effective in finding security vulnerabilities, due to its stochastic nature, nevertheless results are dependent on the initial systems configuration. The approach is complementary to other MBT testing approaches and can reveal unexpected behaviors due to its random nature.

In Figure 4.4 we depict the behavioral fuzzing process, using the approach on-the-fly [3]. It is based on the same MBT models [9] used for security, functional and vulnerability testing; it generates test cases using behavioral fuzzing, implemented in the tool that is presented hereafter: MBeeTle. MBeeTle is based on the CertifIt technology [13] and its fundamentals: Graphical User Interface (GUI), heuristics and algorithms. Contrary to the previous two approaches where the test case generation aims to cover a standard or the security test objectives produced from the test purposes, MBeeTle generates test cases to cover the test objectives based on the expected behavior of the system. The tool relies on the principle of rapidly generating as high as possible many fuzzed tests with a high number of steps in each period using a weighted random algorithm that can be configured with different strategies. It explores the system states on different uncommon contexts, which may potentially put the system into a vulnerable state. Then the vulnerable state might be exploited to disclose confidential information. The generated tests are valid with respect to the constraints in the MBT model. Thus, the produced test cases are syntactically correct with respect to the systems inputs.

![Figure 4.4: MBeeTle - Behavioral Fuzzing Process](image)

In addition, as illustrated in Figure 4.4, the fuzzing process is defined as follows: the tool's algorithm produces a test step, which could be either exported for later execution (offline testing) either simultaneously executed on the system under test (online testing). In the case of online test execution, if no discrepancy is detected between the expected and the actual result, the tool generates another step. This generation process stops when the stop conditions are reached. The test generation algorithms are weighted-random. They have several parameters which allow to configure different heuristics with respect to the testing strategy token in the project. For instance, the parameters that can be configured are: the number of test cases, the length (number of test steps) of the test case, the time spent for searching the next steps, coverage of test objectives (REQs/AIMs) etc, allowing a large panel of parameters to impact its effectiveness and efficiency. Based on the parameters used to pre-configure the test generation with MBeeTle, the tool chooses its next step and stops the generation when the stop conditions are reached or if a user stops the generation manually. A test step is generated randomly by choosing the available states possibly leading to an error from a given context of the system (for instance, start
exploring the systems behavior when administrator operations are called from normal user connection). At each test step, the tool based on the model calculates the expected state of the system. Then, based on this expected state and the chosen heuristics and algorithm, it chooses the next step. The generation of the test case stops either if the pre-configured conditions are reached or if a discrepancy between the expected and the actual result is detected.

The next section presents with more details the contributions of the thesis previously introduced in Section 1.3.
In this chapter we talk about the contributions of the thesis. Starting with the methods for Model-Based Testing of IoT systems where we discuss how to apply MBT on the different points expressed in section 1.3 of the introduction. We also see the contribution tool wise, how we used existing tools that are introduced in the state of the art and what are the modifications and the specificities that we applied in order to respond to our research challenges.

5.1 METHODS FOR MBT OF IoT SYSTEMS

The implementation process of IoT involves the sum of all activities of handling, processing and storing the data collected from sensors. This aggregation increases the value of data by increasing the scale, scope, and frequency of data available for analysis. But aggregation can only be achieved through the use of various standards depending on the IoT application in use.

There are two types of standards relevant for the aggregation process; technology standards (including network protocols, communication protocols, and data-aggregation standards) and regulatory standards (related to security and privacy of data, among other issues). Challenges facing the adoption of standards within IoT are: standards for handling unstructured data, security and privacy issues in addition to regulatory standards for data markets.
5.1.1 MBT BEHAVIORAL MODELING FOR STANDARDIZED IOT PLATFORMS

FIWARE uses the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) NGSI-9/10 standardized RESTful interfaces [21]. This standardized interface is evolving in parallel with the IoT technology, to be able to take into consideration its novelties. For instance, the OMA released the NGSI interfaces - version 1 (NGSI v1) and FIWARE is aiming to contribute to the standard to release NGSI v2. Thus, it needs to be easy to perform regression testing when the standard evolves. MBT offers a relatively safe, effective, and systematic way to create regression test suites and new test suites to cover new functionalities, based on models [34].

In addition, RESTful systems communicate over the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) with the same HTTP verbs (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc.) that web browsers use to retrieve web pages and to send data to remote servers. Their purpose is to exchange information about the availability of contextual information.

In our context of testing the implementation of the data handling GE, we are interested in applying conformance testing on NGSI-9/10. Moreover, although it is often assumed that GEs are correctly implemented and are used by or are part of the services provided by FIWARE, non-compliance to the FIWARE specifications may lead to several dysfunctional interoperability issues. To ensure the interoperability, the GEs should be thoroughly tested to assess their compliance to these specifications. Model-Based Testing (MBT) is considered to be a lightweight formal method to validate software systems. It is formal because it works of formal (that is, machine-readable) specifications (or models) of the software SUT (usually called the implementation or just SUT). It is lightweight because, contrary to other formal methods, such as B and Z notation, MBT does not aim at mathematically proving that the implementation matches the specifications, under all possible circumstances, by refinement process from model to code. In MBT, the model is an abstraction of the SUT and represents the tested perimeter based on the specifications, which is not necessarily the entire system. As such, it allows to systematically generate from the model a collection of tests (a “test suite”) that, when run against the SUT, will provide sufficient confidence that the system behaves accordingly to the specification. Testing follows the paradigm of not proving the absence of errors, but showing their presence [2]. MBT, on the other hand, scales much better and has been used to test life-size systems in very large projects [9].

In FIWARE, we show that MBT conformance model is a representation of the standard. Model includes all the behaviours of the NGSI-v1 and generates the complete suite of test cases that are needed to test for implementation compliance to that standard. Changing an MBT model designed for conformance testing implies that the standard has changed.

5.1.2 PATTERN-DRIVEN AND MODEL-BASED SECURITY TESTING

The notion of test pattern is widely known and it is an effective and an efficient possibility to capitalize the knowledge on testing solutions addressing vulnerabilities testing [8]. A security test pattern is defined as a solution to describe the testing procedure for each vulnerability. oneM2M IoT vulnerabilities where identified and enhanced to target a wider range of IoT systems in the H2020 ARMOUR project (Appendix A) as part of the thesis research work. Vulnerability testing (pattern driven) aims to identify and discover potential vulnerabilities based on risk and threat analysis. Security test patterns are used to derive accurate test cases focused on the security threats formalized by the targeted test pattern.
5.1. METHODS FOR MBT OF IOT SYSTEMS

We propose a security framework based on risk and threat analysis that defines a list of potential vulnerabilities shown in Appendix A for the different IoT layers. Figure 5.1 illustrates the methodology applied for the definition of generalized security test patterns and towards the conception of security test cases. Each vulnerability is associated to a test pattern. To assign a test pattern to a vulnerability, a set of test procedures have been conceived for verifying the system resistance to the vulnerabilities. Based on these test procedures specific for our experiments that are introduced in chapter 10, we have created a library of test patterns generalized to the four IoT layers (Figure 2.1).

![Figure 5.1: Security Test Patterns definition methodology](image)

Security test patterns define test procedures for verifying security threats of IoT systems, representatives of different IoT levels, thus facilitating the reuse of known test solutions to typical threats in such systems. Table 5.1 presents the test patterns and gives an overview of the vulnerabilities that they cover. With the vulnerabilities and test patterns defined, a set of test cases is generated for test execution.

The first step after vulnerability and test pattern identification is to build a model representing the behavior of the System Under Test (SUT). The model takes as input a set of security test patterns in order to generate security tests in TTCN-3 format. Next, the tests are compiled and produces an Abstract Test Suite (ATS) in TTCN-3 format to be compiled and executed. In the scope of the thesis, TITAN [67] test case execution tool was used. The goal of the testing process is to execute the MBT-generated tests on the SUT.

5.1.3 Behavioral fuzzing for IoT systems

Behavioral fuzzing provides many diverse types of valid and invalid input to software to make it enter an unpredictable state or disclose confidential information. It works by automatically generating input values and feeding them to the software. Fuzzing can use different input sources. The developer running the tests can supply a long- or short-list of input values or can write a script that generates the input values. Also, fuzz testing software can generate input values randomly or from a specification; this is known as...
Table 5.1: Vulnerabilities overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Pattern ID</th>
<th>Test Pattern Name</th>
<th>Related Vulnerabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TP ID1</td>
<td>Resistance to an unauthorized access, modification or deletion of keys</td>
<td>V1, V2, V3, V4, V5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID2</td>
<td>Resistance to the discovery of sensitive data</td>
<td>V6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID3</td>
<td>Resistance to software messaging eavesdropping</td>
<td>V7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID4</td>
<td>Resistance to alteration of requests</td>
<td>V8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID5</td>
<td>Resistance to replay of requests</td>
<td>V9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID6</td>
<td>Run unauthorized software</td>
<td>V10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID7</td>
<td>Identifying security needs depending on the M2M operational context awareness</td>
<td>V12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID8</td>
<td>Resistance to eaves dropping and man in the middle</td>
<td>V13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID9</td>
<td>Resistance to transfer of keys via the security element</td>
<td>V14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID10</td>
<td>Resistance to Injection Attacks</td>
<td>V16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID11</td>
<td>Detection of flaws in the authentication and in the session management</td>
<td>V17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID12</td>
<td>Detection of architectural security flaws</td>
<td>V18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP ID13</td>
<td>Detection of insecure encryption and storage of information</td>
<td>V19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

generation fuzzing. Traditionally, fuzzing is used and the results show that it is very effective at finding security vulnerabilities, but because of its inherently stochastic nature, the results can be highly dependent on the initial configuration of the fuzzing system.

"Practical Model-Based Testing: A tools approach" [9], defines Model-Based Testing as follows: We define model-based testing as the automation of the design of black-box tests. The difference from the usual black-box testing is that rather than manually writing tests based on the requirements documentation, we instead create a model of the expected SUT behavior, which captures some of the requirements. Then the model based testing tools are used to automatically generate tests from that model.

Figure 5.2 describes the online generation methodology.

![Online behavioral fuzzing generation methodology](image)

To communicate with the SUT in its own language and protocol, the online test generator sends its generated test steps to an adaptation layer that will translate the tests into executable steps. The result of each action taken on the SUT is traced back to the generator to decide if it should continue the test generation by exploring the model or to interrupt the process depending on the status of the last step result. MBeeTle also offers
offline behavioral fuzzing test generation service that we opted to use and the process is further described in figure 5.3.

![Figure 5.3: Offline behavioral fuzzing generation methodology](image)

After creating the model we generate an offline behavioral fuzzing test repository containing long test traces and ready to be executed against the SUT. We explore in more details this process in chapter 9.

## 5.2 Tooling

For any testing program to be successful it must meet the specific goals of the conformity assessment program. Usually a conformity assessment program must be efficient, effective and repeatable. Efficient enough to minimize costs of testing by testing faster. Effective test tools must be optimized to maximize automation and minimize human intervention. A repeatable conformity assessment is primordial in many practical situations, where there is no time or resources to repeat measurements more than just a few times. Critical areas need to be identified for testing. Other areas that are not critical and require less testing also need to be identified. It is too expensive to “just test everything.”

Testing procedures and procedures for processing test results need to be automated where possible. The testing program must be effective. It must test the critical areas required by the specification or standard to meet the requirements. It must provide the desired level of assurance for its customer base. To meet international guidelines test results must be repeatable and reproducible. Repeatable results mean that different testers, following the same procedures and test methodology, should be able to get the same results on the same platform. Some testing programs require reproducibility, that different testers, following the same procedures and test methodology, should be able to repeat the results on different platforms. This section shows how our tools enable to respect those requirements.

The next section proposes to give an overview around the test generation and execution tools.

### 5.2.1 Around CertifyIt

The MBT process as we described it previously is obtained with the help of the Smartesting CertifyIt tool. In a first step, a tester takes into consideration all the requirement from the specification in order to create the model of the System Under Test (SUT). This model is defined by a combination of a subset of precise UML and OCL [12]. Then the model
is given to the CertifyIt test generation tool who will automatically generate the tests case repository. The test case generator emphasizes on covering all the test objectives [16]. The CertifyIt tool provides an API that enables its users to customize its usage through the use of plugins. We explore two different types of plugins. The first type of plugin is the CertifyIt publisher. The publisher enables generated tests to be exported into targeted executable scripts for test execution and result analysis. The CertifyIt tool has default publishers embedded (HTML, JUnit, XML...). The CertifyIt publisher are modules that can be developed and added to the tool. A CertifyIt publisher API is given to testers for custom publisher implementation. We developed in this thesis a SoapUI and a TTCN-3 publisher for our test executions. More details on this are given in the Chapter 7.

The second type of plugins enable to drive the test generation. We use CertifyIT test purpose module to drive our test generation in the case of pattern-driven and model-based security testing. We explore in details the usage of this module in section 7. We also use as described previously, the MBeetle module for behavioral fuzzing test generation. In parallel of test generation, a requirement matrix between each test generated and its requirement is created thus enabling the traceability of each test case and giving a global report on specification coverage.

5.2.2 MBTAAS: INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

The Internet of Things (IoT) market has quickly evolved and new ways of delivering IoT solutions for service providers have to be designed. IoT as a service is an easy to consume solution with remastered design that offers a multitude of solutions over traditional IoT services:

- Offer new IoT connectivity services to support rapidly growing IoT data and application needs
- Service large geographic areas (no deployment effort for the user)
- Create added value through automation, monitoring and analytics
- Ensure secure and high quality edge-to-cloud computing environments

Microsoft says that IoT as a service "has a history of simplifying complicated technologies and bringing them to the masses [62]. Model-Based Testing As A Service (MBTAAS) is a new integrated framework where we bring testing solutions for IoT systems in the same way new IoT services are being proposed. Our solution has the ambition to assist IoT system developers with the deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) tests without the need for in-house expertise. All the details of MBTAAS framework are detailed in further in Section 8.

The next chapter is the first chapter of the second part of this thesis. We provide detailed contributions of the thesis.
II

TECHNICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
This chapter defines the vocabulary and methodology for test generation, test implementation and test execution. **Test generation** includes automated activities for deriving test-relevant artefacts such as test cases, test data, test oracle and test code. **Test implementation** describes the steps to be performed for transforming test cases, often described in an abstract form, into test suites executed onto the SUT. This requires, in particular, the development of adaptation layers between the test system (the Tester) and the System Under Test. **Test Execution** is about configuring, executing in the targeted environment and reporting test results of experiments. Results can be stored and exploited in contexts such as labeling and certification.

To execute a test, 2 parts are needed:

1. **The System Under Test** (SUT), which is the part one want to test and seen as a black box
2. **The Tester** (human or an automated service or process) that executes tests by interacting with the SUT

In an IoT deployment, the SUT usually consists of the following three types of nodes:

1. **Server nodes** (SN): most often referred to as Server. It provides advanced services and is most of the time located in the cloud
2. **Client nodes** (EN for End Node): these include in particular all sensors and actuators deployed. These can be associated with more or less communicating and computing capabilities but are in general rather constraints. These could also be applications such as mobile one.
3. **Middle nodes** (MN): this includes all gateways, router, etc. used

Nodes can have different roles as they can be exclusively or both at the same time:
• **Requestor**: they initiate the connection by sending a request

• **Responder**: they respond to a request

These roles are immutable as nodes can play both. However, for sake of simplicity, we make the following assumption in the remaining of this thesis:

• Server nodes are responders

• Client nodes are requestors

• Middle Nodes can play both roles

Two test configurations can be identified: server side testing and client side testing. The server side testing proposes test as a service and is detailed in chapter 8.

### 6.1 MBT Behavioral Model Process

A test is a procedure for verifying a system. It examines an hypothesis based on three elements: the input data, the object to test, and the expected answer. The object to be tested is called the SUT, while the expected answer is called the test oracle. It is by comparing the oracle with the actual result of the system that can be established a test verdict: pass, inconclusive or fail [16]. The testing activity is multi-dimensional. It is based on three classification criteria that defines the tests that we will be performed: accessibility, the type of test and the level of detail. Accessibility defines if one has access to the SUT code or not (black box or white box). The type of test defines what are the tests intended to test: functional to verify the operation of an application, robustness to check the robustness of the application against failures. The level of detail qualifies the granularity that we wish: unitary to test just pieces of code, integration to test the good functioning of an application within other applications. Conformance tests or validation tests are intended to test if an application respects expected specifications.

Model-based testing allows from the modeling of the system under test to automatically generate tests. A model is an abstract representation of a system. Based on this model, one are able to generate test cases in the form of test suites. Once the test cases are executed, it is possible to compare automatically the actual behavior of the system with its expected behavior (as described in the system's model). The detailed technique of MBT for IoT is described in Section 4.2. MBT also avoids poorly designed test cases and improves the quality of the test process. On the other hand, it requires a certain amount of efforts for putting in place the necessary tools and new skills for users, since modeling, although derived from UML, is not straightforward and requires a learning curve [9].

A model can be described with different languages, provided that the test generation engine understand it. The model is described directly from the test objectives to limit as much as possible having a model too important and model elements that will not be used.

The process of behavioral modeling to test conformance and interoperability has only one major difference from the traditional MBT process. This difference is represented in Figure 6.1.

In traditional MBT, a behavioral model is built upon a list of requirement as show in Figure 4.1. The model represents the requirements of the SUT and therefore, any change in
the implementation must be reflected in the model. This is true in agile working environments where requirements may rapidly evolve over different sprints in development cycle. On the other hand, a behavioral model for a standardized IoT platform takes the requirements of the specific standard to be tested. The model represents the standard itself and any evolution of the standard has to be reflected by the test analysts in the requirements then the model in order to keep coherence in the generated tests. The model validates any SUT for its conformance to the standard it represents and is not tied in any way to the SUT implementation.

6.2 TEST OBJECTIVES

In an MBT approach, it is a good practice to define the perimeter and from it, identify the test objectives to be covered. In this way, the test objectives delimit the model subject and focus. Espr4FastData is a FIWARE Data Handling Generic Enabler (GE) that addresses the need to process data in real time. Frequently implemented features include filtering, aggregating and merging real-time data from different sources. Thanks to Complex Event Processing (CEP), it is easy for applications to only subscribe to value-added data which is relevant to them. CEP technology is sometimes also referred to as event stream analysis, or real time event correlation. Figure 6.2 shows in general the event processing of Espr4FastData, it aggregates multi incoming events and produce a lower number of event as a result of its processing depending on its configured rules.

Espr4FastData is NGSI9/10 compliant, this means that all of its implementations, called Generic Enabler implementation (GEi) are supposed to be NGSI9/10 compliant. We say ”supposed” on purpose as the compliance of an implementation needs to be tested before validating it. The validation process start with studying the tests objectives.

Table 6.1 shows an excerpt of Espr4FastData test objectives. In the test objectives and for each function of the generic enabler, we define a set of test objectives. Each test objective is composed of a high level requirement, which is the function name denoted
as @REQ, and its refinement, which is an expected behavior of the function, denoted as @AIM. In our excerpt we represented the requirements "RESET_GE" and "REGISTER_CONTEXT". Each requirement are thoroughly described in the test objective and the requirement refinement (#AIM) act as test oracles to be achieved.

Table 6.1: Excerpt of Espr4FastData Test Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>@REQ</th>
<th>Requirement description</th>
<th>#AIM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RESET_GE</td>
<td>This operation completely destroy the CEP threads, the CEP data, and all the application level data. It can be used whether the application is running or not. It leaves the application clean and ready to start. EXAMPLE: <a href="http://localhost/EspR4FastData-3.3.3/admin/espr4fastdata">http://localhost/EspR4FastData-3.3.3/admin/espr4fastdata</a> (queried with HTTP Delete method)</td>
<td>Success, Error, Invalid URL, Success and is EMPTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGISTER_CONTEXT</td>
<td>This operation registers a NGSI context within EspR4FastData. This makes an input event type and related entities to be known from an EspR4FastData perspective. An event is characterized by the involved entities (eg: Van1, Van2, Plane), its type, and properties that related to the type. For an event to be processed, it is mandatory to be &quot;known&quot; by the application. Otherwise it would be rejected.</td>
<td>Success, Error, Invalid URL, Context Already exist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the MBT model is based on these test objectives, by linking each requirement/behavior in the function with the corresponding @REQ and @AIM, thus ensuring the bi-directional traceability between the requirements and the generated tests. Section 10.2 describes the real case study of developing a MBT behavioral model and test execution over the Espr4FastData GEI.
6.3 MBT Behavioral Test Generation

The test generation goal is to automatically generate test cases. There are different notions of test cases. There are the general notions of a test case, of abstract and concrete test cases. A test case is a sequence of input stimuli to be fed into a system and expected behavior of the system. A test case can exist at many different levels of abstraction. The most important distinction is among abstract and concrete test cases. An abstract test case consists of abstract information about the sequence of input and output. The missing information is often concrete parameter values or function names. Abstract test cases are the first step in test case creation. They are used to get an idea of the test case structure or to get information about satisfied coverage criteria. For concrete test cases, the missing information is added. A concrete test case is an abstract test case plus all the concrete information that is missing to execute the test case. Concrete test cases comprise the complete test information and can be executed on the SUT. A test suite is a set of test cases. An oracle is an artifact that comprises the knowledge about the expected behavior of the SUT. Each test case must have some oracle information to compare observed and expected SUT behavior. Without it, no test is able to detect a failure. Typical oracles are user expectations, comparable products, past versions of the same program (e.g. regression testing), given standards or test specifications.

As explained previously, models are written in Unified Modeling Language (UML). UML is a standardized general-purpose modeling language. UML includes a set of graphic notation techniques to create visual models of that can describe very complicated behavior of the system. It is a standardized, graphical “modeling language” for communicating software design. It allows implementation-independent specification of:

- user/system interactions (required behaviors)
- partitioning of responsibility
- integration with larger or existing systems
- data flow and dependency
- operation orderings (algorithms)
- concurrent operations

UML is a fusion of ideas from several precursor modeling languages and it is developed according to the needs to help develop efficient, effective and correct designs, particularly Object Oriented designs. And also to communicate clearly with project stakeholders (concerned parties: developers, customers, etc). There are different types of UML diagram, each with slightly different syntax rules:

- **Use Cases diagrams.** Use case diagrams are usually referred to as behavior diagrams used to describe a set of actions (use cases) that some system or systems (subject) should or can perform in collaboration with one or more external users of the system (actors).

- **Class diagrams.** A class diagram is a type of static structure diagram that describes the structure of a system by showing the system’s classes, their attributes, operations (or methods), and the relationships among objects.
• **Sequence diagrams.** A sequence diagram shows object interactions arranged in time sequences. It depicts the objects and classes involved in the scenario and the sequence of messages exchanged between the objects needed to carry out the functionality of the scenario.

• **State diagrams.** A state diagram describe the behavior of systems. State diagrams require that the system described is composed of a finite number of states; sometimes, this is indeed the case, while at other times this is a reasonable abstraction.

• **Activity diagrams.** An activity diagram describes the dynamic aspects of the system, it is basically a flowchart to represent the flow from one activity to another activity. The activity can be described as an operation of the system. The control flow is drawn from one operation to another.

• **Deployment diagrams.** Deployment diagram is a structure diagram which shows architecture of the system as deployment (distribution) of software artifacts to deployment targets. Artifacts represent concrete elements in the physical world that are the result of a development process.

In this thesis we focus in a first step on class diagrams. Class diagrams are motivated by Object-Oriented design and programming (OOD, OOP). A class diagram partitions the system into areas of responsibility (classes), and shows "associations" (dependencies) between them. Attributes (data), operations (methods), constraints (OCL), part-of (navigability) and type-of (inheritance) relationships, access, and cardinality (1 to many) may all be noted. Class diagrams are relevant at three distinct levels, or perspectives:

1. **Conceptual:** the diagram represents the concepts in the project domain. That is, it is a partitioning of the relevant roles and responsibilities in the domain.

2. **Specification:** shows interfaces between components in the software. Interfaces are independent of implementation.

3. **Implementation:** shows classes that correspond directly to computer code (often Java or C++ classes). Serves as a blueprint for an actual realization of the software in code.

Figure 6.3 represent the different notations of a class diagram that are approached now. A class diagram is a viewpoint of the static structure of a system and a model can contain many class diagrams. A class diagrams contain: packages, classes, interfaces, and relationships.

Relationship of a class diagram my contain the following: Association, aggregation, dependency, realize, and inheritance. Each end of an association or aggregation contains a multiplicity indicator that indicates the number of objects participating in the relationship. Figure 10.1 showcases a class diagram for Espr4fastData example.

UML is a language, with a (reasonably) rigorous syntax and accepted semantics. Thus one have to be careful that the meaning of our diagrams is what we intended. However, the semantics of UML are less well-defined than a programming language (where the semantics are defined by the compiler). Thus there is some flexibility to use UML in your own way, but one must be consistent in modelling and make it accessible. And for that, UML has also notations such as Business Process Model Notation (BPMN).
A standard BPMN provides businesses with the capability of understanding their internal business procedures in a graphical notation and gives organizations the ability to communicate and optimize these procedures in a standard manner. The Object Management Group (OMG), a non-profit technology standards consortium, governs and maintains BPMN. The language is not owned by any commercial enterprise. BPMN was originally a modeling notation that was meant to give all stakeholders, from high-level decision makers to technical staff, a standardized language for diagrams. With the release of newer versions however, BPMN became about models and notation. The difference is that instead of just standardized models, there is a standardized XML schema that can map between software tools. At this time, more than 80 tools support BPMN including the Smartesting CertifyIt tool.

Elements in a business process model in BPMN are kept to a minimum. This is to keep the look and feel of the diagram as consistent as possible. There are two types of elements: descriptive and analytic. Descriptive elements were developed for business analysts to model processes as documentation, and analytic elements were developed for technical staff to model executable processes within the software.

The five basic categories of elements are:

1. **Flow objects**: These define the behavior of business processes. They include:
   - Events: what happens during a process. There are three main ones: Start, Intermediate, and End. An event is also what is happening during a process.
   - Tasks: work performed in a process. Also known as activities.
   - Gateways: these determine the sequence flow path in a process. Gateways have internal markers to show how the flow is controlled. These are decision points in a process. For example, if a condition is true then processing continues one way and if false, another way.
2. **Data**: information about the activities is called out with these elements. Data is either provided or stored for the activity. These include: data objects, data inputs, data outputs and data stores.

3. **Connecting objects**: these connect the flow objects together. They include:
   - Sequence flows: this element shows the order that activities are performed.
   - Message flows: this displays the messages and the order of flow between participants.
   - Associations: this element is used to link information and artifacts (see below).
   - Data associations - These have an arrowhead to indicate direction of flow in an association.

4. **Swimlanes**: broken down into pools and lanes, a swimlane in BPMN is an element that shows where the responsibility for the process lies. These pools may represent the participant. Lanes break apart the pool as a partition of responsibility, showing the location of activities. Lanes can also be used for other purposes, like to delineate phases (first phase, second phase, etc.). In other words, a pool is a container for a single process, and a lane is a way to classify the activity within it.

5. **Artifacts**: these are used to give extra detail about the process. The two standardized artifacts are:
   1. Groups: This is a hatched box around a group of elements to designate visually that they are somehow related. This does not affect sequence flows.
   2. Text Annotations: Extra text, attached with an association, that gives additional information. Also known as a comment.

---

**Figure 6.4: BPMN model example**

Figure 6.4 shows an example of a BPMN model where we take into consideration the requirement "REGISTER_CONTEXT" of Table 6.1. We represented on the model the different structures that where presented previously. The model depicts a start event connected to a task "Register Context". This task is then connected to a gateway flow object directing the path to take in case of "success" or error "Context already exist".

This test generation method is used further in the large scale end to end experiment in section 10.5.
The next section introduces the specifics of pattern-driven and model-based security testing. We will also see how we can evolve from an behavioral model for conformance testing to security testing by introducing test purposes to the model conception in MBT.
7

PATTERN-DRIVEN AND MODEL-BASED SECURITY TESTING

Security, confidentiality and trust are critical elements of the IoT landscape where inadequacy of these is a barrier to the deployment of IoT systems and to broad adoption of IoT technologies. Some of the more frightening vulnerabilities found on IoT devices have brought IoT security into the daylight of issues that need to be addressed quickly. In mid 2015, researchers found critical vulnerabilities in a wide range of IoT baby monitors [58], which could be used by hackers to carry out a number of unwanted activities, including spying on live feeds and authorizing other users to remotely access the monitor. The article quotes: “Internet of Things security still isn’t ready for prime time.” and states “The Internet of insecure things”. In another development, it is demonstrated that connected cars can be compromised [61] as well, and hackers can carry out dangerous malicious activities, including taking control of the entertainment system, unlocking the doors or even shutting down the car mid highway. Authors is [27] proposes to use a trusted Third Party, tasked with assuring specific security characteristics within a cloud environment. The solution presents a horizontal level of service, available to all implicated entities, that realizes a security mesh, within which essential trust is maintained. We propose in this section to address IoT systems security issues with MBT and test purposes.

7.1 Expressing Test scenarios From Test Patterns

A test purpose in Test Purpose Language (hereafter denoted as TPLan) [11] is a standardized and structured notation developed by ETSI for concise and unambiguous description of what is to be tested rather than how the testing is performed. It is an abstract test scenario derived from one or more requirements, defining the steps needed to be tested if the SUT respects the corresponding requirement. More concretely, it is a structured natural language that defines a minimal set of keywords for use in the TPLan combined natural language or even graphical representations. Although it is minimal, it is generic and if there is a need, the user can define his own extensions to the notation spe-
specific to his application's domain. Usually, in its simplest form, it consists of few headers, like "TP id", "Summary", "REQ ref." and other details specified by the user. Then, its main part is composed of three parts: precondition, stimuli and response. They are defined in three different sections that start with "with . . . " – for the preamble and "ensure that . . . " for the test body. The test body is composed of two parts: "when . . . " – for the main part of the test (the stimuli), and "then . . . " – for the response of the stimuli. The post condition usually is omitted because its function is to revert the test case to the initial conditions, before the test case. Inside the brackets, in prosaic form are described all conditions and information needed for the TPLan. TPLan which helps to write test scenarios in a consistent way brings considerable benefits, for instance:

- it removes possibilities for free interpretation of the test procedure
- it brings easy differentiation of the precondition, the stimuli and the response
- it is a basis for a representation in the test tools

In the standardisation process of oneM2M, the Test Working Group adopted the use of TPLan for their test scenarios, but with minor modifications. Namely, the sections "when" and "then" are extended with the notation of the data flow, from which to which entity the data is transferred. Also, the test scenario is put in a table, so every block and every header is separated in a different cell. This eases the visual representation for the users. The postamble is not defined neither in ETSI TPLan nor in oneM2M TPLans because in the majority of test cases, it should simply revert the system to its initial state, which means to delete added elements and the modified variables to be reverted back to their initial values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TP Id</th>
<th>TPLoneM2M/CSE/OMN/001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Test objective</td>
<td>Check that the IUT returns successfully an empty content of TARGET_RESOURCE_ADDRESS resource when the ResultContent set to 0 (Nothing).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>TS-0001 10.1.3 &amp; TS-0004 6.3.3.2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Config Id</td>
<td>CF01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICS Selection</td>
<td>PICS_CSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Initial conditions | with {
the IUT being in the "initial state"
and the IUT having registered the AE
and the IUT having created a resource TARGET_RESOURCE_ADDRESS of type RESOURCE_TYPE
and the AE having privileges to perform RETRIEVE operation on the resource TARGET_RESOURCE_ADDRESS
} |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected behaviour</th>
<th>Test events</th>
<th>Direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>when {</td>
<td>the IUT receives a valid RETRIEVE request from AE containing To set to TARGET_RESOURCE_ADDRESS and From set to AE_IDENTIFIER and ResultContent set to 0 (Nothing)</td>
<td>IUT ← AE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>}</td>
<td>then {</td>
<td>IUT → AE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the IUT sends a Response message containing Response Status Code set to 2000 (OK) and no Content attribute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.1: TPLan example

An example of TPLan, taken from oneM2M document "oneM2M-TS-0018 Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes", is given in Figure 7.1. From the example, we can understand what is the goal of this TPLan, from which requirements it is derived, and the
7.2. TEST GENERATION

M2M existing standards as well as emerging standards, such as oneM2M, put extreme importance into the definition of security requirements related to security functions in addition to functional requirements. Moreover, our experience in testing and analysis of IoT systems, showed that the IoT system’s Security and Trust will depend on the resistance of the system with respect to:

- misuses of the security functions
- security threats and vulnerabilities
- intensive interactions with other users/systems

We have identified four IoT segments that cover different aspects of IoT security testing: Availability, Security, Privacy and Integrity. Based on the work performed and the testing needs of each segment, we have identified a set of security requirements and vulnerabilities that must be fulfilled by the developed systems. In order to validate them with respect to the set of requirements, we have identified three test strategies:

**Security Functional testing** (compliance with agreed standards/specification): aims to verify that system behavior complies with the targeted specification, which enables to detect possible security misuses and that the security functions are implemented correctly.

**Vulnerability testing** (pattern driven): aims to identify and discover potential vulnerabilities based on risk and threat analysis. Security test patterns are used as a starting point, which enable to derive accurate test cases focused on the security threats formalized by the targeted test pattern.
Security robustness testing (behavioral fuzzing): compute invalid message sequences by generating (weighted) random test steps. It enables to tackle the unexpected behavior regarding the security of large and heterogeneous IoT systems.

These test strategies may by applied in combination or individually.

Model-Based Testing (MBT) approaches have shown their benefits and usefulness for systematic compliance testing of systems that undergo specific standards that define the functional and security requirements of the system.

We propose a tailored MBT automated approach based on standards and specifications that combines the above-mentioned three test strategies built upon the existing CertifyIt technology [10] and TTCN-3 for test execution on the system under test (SUT) into one MBT IoT Security Testing Framework. On the one hand, the CertifyIt technology has already proven its usefulness for standard compliance. Thus, building the IoT security testing approaches upon CertifyIt will allow to get the benefits of a proven technology for conformance testing and introducing and improving it in the domain of IoT security. On the other hand, Testing and Test Control Notation version 3 (TTCN-3) is a test scripting language widely known in the telecommunication sector. It is used by the third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) for interoperability and certification testing, including the prestigious test suite for Long Term Evolution (LTE)/4G terminals. Also, the European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI), the language's maintainer, is using it in all of its projects and standards' initiatives, like oneM2M.

We have identified three possible levels of automation: the IoT security MBT approach with automated test conception and execution based on TPLan tests and TTCN-3 scripts, manual TPLan and TTCN-3 conception and their automated execution on the SUT and finally in-house approaches for testing.

As illustrated in Figure 7.2, the MBT approach, relies on MBT models, which represent the structural and the behavioral part of the system. The structure of the system is modeled by UML class diagrams, while the systems behavior is expressed in Object...
Constraint Language (OCL) pre- and postconditions. Functional tests are obtained by applying a structural coverage of the OCL code describing the operations of the SUT (functional requirements). This approach in the context of security testing is complemented by dynamic test selection criteria called Test Purposes that make it possible to generate additional tests that would not be produced by a structural test selection criteria, for instance misuse of the system (Model-Based Security Functional Testing) and vulnerability tests, trying to bypass existing security mechanisms (Model-Based Vulnerability Testing). These two approaches generate a set of test cases that is stored into a database and then executed on the system; To the difference of them, robustness testing in our context, based on the same model, will generate randomly a test steps based on the same MBT model by exercising different and unusual corner cases on the system in a highly intensive way, thus potentially activating an unexpected behavior in the system. More on this subject in section 9. In the following section we will describe in more details the IoT security testing approaches using pattern-driven and MBT security testing technology.

7.3 Using Test Purposes for Model-Based Security Functional and Vulnerability Testing

Within the scope of this thesis we proposed a Model-Based Testing process for security testing in IoT systems using the MBT tool CertifyIt from Smartesting and its extension Test Purpose Language [28].

The CertifyIt tool accepts as input an MBT model, represented by a class diagram, to model the structure of the system under test, and an MBT behavioural modelling language, such as simplified OCL expressions. Based on predefined testing requirements, different test selection criteria could be applied to guide the test generation. The Test Purpose Language is a test selection criterion that captures the test procedure expressed in the security test patterns (defined in Section 5.1.2). The Test Purpose Language has shown its expression power for vulnerability testing of web applications [33]. The experimentations (Section 10), for instance, on security IoT platforms, will further help to assess its effectiveness and capacity to cover the security test patterns.

Figure 7.3 describes the proposed MBT process for an standardized IoT platform security testing. We are using oneM2M IoT standard in this section to discuss the process. The proposed process starts from the security framework and the library of general vulnerabilities for the four IoT segments.

Based on the database of vulnerabilities (appendix A) and the oneM2M standard's security documents, oneM2M security test purposes are defined. These test purposes play the role of test patterns. In a second step based on the CertifyIt technology an MBT model for oneM2M is created and the oneM2M security Test Purposes are implemented in the Smartesting Test Purpose Language to drive the test case generation. In order to obtain executable test cases, the generated abstract test cases needs to be published in an executable format, for instance HTTP requests or in a form of TTCN-3 test cases, as it is the formats retained by oneM2M standard organization. Based on the CertifyIt technology it is possible then to create documents in different formats (Word, PDF . . .) for audits purposes.

To illustrate the proof of concept, consider for instance the Injection vulnerability (V16) and its corresponding the test pattern TP ID 10 from Table 5.1. The test purposes created
CHAPTER 7. PATTERN-DRIVEN AND MODEL-BASED SECURITY TESTING

Figure 7.3: Model-Based Security Testing Process for standardized IoT platform

with CertifyIt will represent the various types of Injection (SQL, LDAP, XPATH etc) and their subtypes.

Figure 7.4: Test Pattern Formalisation with Smartesting CertifyIt for TP ID 10

In Figure 7.4, the “for_each” structure allows iterating over each element, and produces the corresponding test cases. The test purpose language is easy to understand and yet a very powerful tool in test generation. Each literal (Keyword in CertifyIt tool) from a type of vulnerability is refined into a list of literals that are looped upon in order to have a full coverage of the vulnerability. The test pattern in Figure 7.4 describes the usage of a SQL injection type enumerated as “ErrorBased”, “BooleanBased”, “NONE”, “Stacked”, “TimeBased” and “Union” in combination of an operation (OP) to produce an SQL injection test. The test generation engine will produce one test case for each sub-type. For instance, for the considered types and sub-types of Injection we generate 85 test cases, as depicted in Figure 7.5.
7.3. USING TP FOR MBS FUNCTIONAL AND VULNERABILITY TESTING

Figure 7.5: Test Purpose ID 10 test cases generated by CertifyIt

Figure 7.5 shows the outcome of the test generation using a test purpose. The test purpose allowing to cover more traces while keeping traceability of the requirement over a test case is a major advantage over manual testing where human error (forgetting a combination for example) in test writing often occurs.

The benefits of this technical contribution are twofold. In a first step it offers general guidelines for testing any element of the four IoT layers. On second hand, the customization of the patterns gives specific guidelines on how to prevent or address the testing procedure specifically for each segment. In addition, the work also gave a proof of concept for test case conception within next experiments, which goal is security compliance for IoT systems. In IoT platform testing we proposed a formalization of the test patterns into the Smartesting Test Purpose Language, a machine readable formal language for test case generation. Its textual representation is easy to read and map to the test patterns. Finally, we will further work on the formalization of the test patterns and possibly the evolution of the security test patterns into usage for security behavioral fuzzing.

We have seen how we used MBT for conformance and security testing in IoT systems. The next section introduces the details of Model-Based Testing As A Service (MBTAAS) and how the two approaches are fit to be proposed in a "As A Service" environment.
The last decade was dedicated to people who communicate with each other via social life applications such as Facebook, skype, Twitter. The next decade is for Machine to Machine (M2M) communication with devices in automobiles, planes, homes, smart cities. Internet of thing as a service is the key for IoT to become a reality and improve the quality of our daily lives. IoT platforms offer themselves as services to applications users and machines. The question of conformance testing and security validation of IoT platforms can be tackled with the same “as a service” approach. This section presents the general architecture of our Model Based Testing As A Service (MBTAAS). We then present in more details, how each service works individually in order to publish, execute and present the tests/results.

8.1 Architecture

An overview of the general architecture can be found in figure 8.1. In this figure we find the four main steps of the MBT approach (MBT modeling, test generation, test implementation and execution).

However, in contrast with classical MBT process, MBTAAS implements several web-services, which communicate with each other in order to realize testing steps. A web-service uses web technology such as HTTP for machine-to-machine communication, more specifically for transferring machine readable file formats such as XML \(^1\) and JSON \(^2\).

\(^1\)https://www.w3.org/XML/
\(^2\)http://www.json.org
In addition to the classical MBT process, the central piece of the architecture is the database service that is used by all the other services. We will see its involvement as we describe each service individually. Nevertheless, the database service can be separated from all the other services, it can be running in the cloud where it is accessible. The database stores important information such as test data (input data for test execution) and test results. The entry point of the system is the web-front end service (customization service). This service takes a user input to customize a testing session and it communicates it to a Publication service. The purpose of the publisher service is to gather the MBT results file and user custom data in order to produce a customized test description file (EGM_TAAS file). This file is then sent to an Execution service which takes in charge the execution of the customized tests. It stimulates the SUT with input data in order to get response as SUT output data. The execution service then finally builds a result response and sends it to a last service, the Reporting service. The reporting service is configured to feed the database service with the test results. These test results are used by the web-front end service in order to submit them to the end-user.

8.2 MBTAAS MAIN SERVICES

The MBTAAS architecture is taken to a modular level in order to respond to the heterogeneity of an IoT platform. In the following subsections, a detailed description of each services composing the MBTAAS architecture is provided.

8.2.1 CUSTOMIZATION SERVICE

In order to provide a user friendly testing as a service environment, we created a graphical web-front end service to configure and launch test campaigns. The customization service is a web site where identified users have a private dashboard. The service offers a pre-configured test environment. The user input can be reduced to the minimum, that is: defining an SUT endpoint (URL). User specific test customization offers a wide range of adjustments to the test campaign. The web-service enables:
8.2. MBTAAS MAIN SERVICES

- **Test selection**: from the proposed test cases, a user can choose to execute only a part of them.

- **Test Data**: pre-configured data are used for the tests. The user is able to add his own specific test data to the database and choose it for a test. It is a test per test configurable feature.

- **Reporting**: by default the reporting service will store the result report in the web-front end service database (more details on this in Sec. 8.2.4). The default behaviour can be changed to fit the user needs for example, having the results in another database, tool, etc.

After completion of the test configuration and having the *launch tests* button pressed, a configuration file is constructed. The configuration file as can be seen in Fig. 8.2: *Configuration File excerpt*, defines a set of `{key = value}`. This file is constructed with default values that can be overwritten with user defined values.

![Figure 8.2: Configuration File excerpt](image)

The configuration file is one of three components that the publisher service needs to generate the test campaign. The next section describes the publication process in more details.

8.2.2 **Publication Service**

The publisher service, as it name states, publishes the abstract tests generated from the model into concrete test description file. It requires three different inputs (Fig. 8.1 step ②) for completion of its task: the model, the configuration file and test data. The model provides test suites containing abstract tests. The concretization of abstract tests is made with the help of the database and configuration file. For example, the abstract value `ENDPOINT_URL` taken from the model, is collected from the configuration file and `PAYLOAD_TYPE` parameter is gathered from the database service ⑤.

The concrete test description file is for our use case, an XML file that instantiates the abstract tests. The test description file has two main parts, general informations and at least one test suite (Fig. 8.3). A test suite is composed by one or more test cases.

![Figure 8.3: Published file parts](image)
and a test case itself is composed of one or more test steps. This hierarchy respects the IEEE 829-2008, Standard for Software and System Test Documentation.

The general information part of the file is useful to execute the tests (Sec. 8.2.3) and report the results. Here are some of the most important parameters that can be found in that part:

- **owner**: used for traceability purposes. It allows to know who is the detainer of the test in order to present it in his personal cloud dashboard.

- **sut_endpoint**: the hostname/ip address of the System Under Test. This address should be reachable from the execution service point of view.

- **location**: the hostname/ip address of the reporting service (Sec. 8.2.4).

The test suites contain all useful test information. In our case, for FIWARE, the applications are HTTP-based RESTful applications. The mandatory informations required to succeed a RESTful query are: the URL (SUT endpoint) and the HTTP method (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE). The Test suite and test cases purpose is the ordering and naming of the test but the test information and test data are stored in the test steps. Each test step have its own configuration. Once the file published, it is sent to the execution service in order to execute the tests.

### 8.2.3 Execution service

The execution service is the functional core of the MBTAAS architecture. The execution service will run the test and collect results depending on the configuration of the received test description file. FIWARE RESTful interface tests are executed with the REST execution module. Each test is run against the SUT and a result report (Listing 8.1) is constructed on test step completion. The result report contains information on date-time of execution, time spent executing the step and some other test specific values. The "endpoint" represent the URL value and validity of where the step should be run. An invalid endpoint would allow to skip the type check on the endpoint value and thus allowing to gather an execution error. The response of each step is validated within the "assertion_list" tags (test oracle). It validates each assertion depending on the assertion type and values with the response received.

**Listing 8.1 – Test step result report**

```xml
<teststep name="UpdateEntity1">
  <executionResults>
    <timestamp>{TIMESTAMP}</timestamp>
    <executionTimeMs>22</executionTimeMs>
  </executionResults>
  <endpoint>
    <value>{IP}:{PORT}/upContext</value>
    <isInvalid>false</isInvalid>
  </endpoint>
  <method>POST</method>
  <headers>{HEADERS}</headers>
  <payload>{PAYLOAD}</payload>
  <assertion_list>
    <assertion>
      <type>JSON</type>
      <key>code</key>
      <value>404</value>
      <result>false</result>
    </assertion>
    <response>
      "errorCode": {
        "code": "400",
        "reasonPhrase": "Bad Request",
        "details": "JSON Parse Error"
      }
    </response>
  </assertion_list>
</teststep>
```
Figure 8.4 shows an excerpt of the execution service log. In order to execute one test step, the endpoint (URL) must be validated. Then a REST request is created and executed. A response is expected for the assertions to be evaluated. At the end, an overall test result is computed. The overall assertion evaluation algorithm is as simple as: "All test assertions have to be true", that implies if one assertion is false, the step is marked as failed.

Once the execution service has finished all test steps, their results are gathered within one file, we call this file Test Results, and it is sent to the reporting service.

### 8.2.4 Reporting service

After executing the test, a file containing the test description alongside their results are sent to and received by the reporting service. The reporting service configuration is made in the web front-end service. The configuration is passed with the test configuration file where the publisher service re-transcribes that information to the file sent to the execution service. The execution service then includes the reporting configuration in the report file where it is used in the reporting service once it receives it. By default the reporting service will save the results in the database service. For our use case, the database is implemented as a MySQL database. This database is afterwards used by the web front-end service to present the test results to the user.

### 8.3 Approach synthesis

We presented an MBT approach with a service oriented solution. We believe that this approach can be generally applied on a wide range of IoT systems testing. Within the FIWARE context, the created MBT model, NGSI compliant, that can be reused for testing any range of enablers respecting that specification. New developments focus on the test configuration layer which is made in the front-end service, in order to make the tests compatible with the System Under Test. Furthermore, one of our concerns was to provide the
IoT platform tests to the community in the easiest way possible, including the possibility to choose the version of standard compliance only by model selection. This is done with the service oriented approach, providing to all involved stakeholders (not only testers) the capacity to test their IoT system remotely. The MBTAAS approach is suitable for testing both approaches introduced previously: behavioral (Chapter 6) and Security (Chapter 7) testing. Using a behavioral model in an MBTAAS approach, the proposed tests result will reflect on the conformance of the SUT to the standard represented by the model. On the other hand, and with the same principles, if a security model is used in combination of test purposes, the result will reflect the level of resistance of the SUT over the tested vulnerabilities. MBTAAS is a test synchronization element, a proxy for test execution. It brings the transition from modelling and test generation to test execution directly without worrying about test adaptation for test execution. As a matter of fact, with standard IoT platforms and standarized IoT systems, the standard describes an interface that all implementation are required to develop. This enables to have a common adaptation layer to test all systems under tests implementing a modelized standard.

That being said, the drawbacks of this approach are observed when approaching immature IoT systems or implementation that are still under development. Those systems are often developed internally and are not deployed on an accessible internet environment to the public. The MBTAAS approach rely on its SUT being available through a public IP address in order to reach it and execute the tests. This approach show that it is somewhat not so straightforward in testing less mature systems but it is more adapted to deployed IoT systems that require constant validation over it's lifetime. The need of validation can be a result of system patching after deployment or the implementation of new security features after a zero day attack.

The next session presents the behavioral fuzzing for IoT systems and its capabilities to detect errors that cannot be detected with the behavioral and security MBT approaches.
9

BEHAVIORAL FUZZING FOR IoT SYSTEMS

Contents

9.1 MBT specificities for the IoT behavioral fuzzing testing ........ 75
9.2 MBT Model ................................................................. 76
9.3 Test generation .............................................................. 77
9.4 Behavioral fuzzing approach synthesis ................................ 79

The MBT for the IoT behavioral fuzzing testing model is based on the same MBT models used for security functional and vulnerability testing; it generates test cases using behavioral fuzzing. Contrary to the previous two approaches where the test case generation aims to cover the test objectives produced from the test purposes, the MBeeTle fuzzing tool generates weighted random test cases to cover the test objectives based on the expected behavior of the system. The tool relies on the principle to rapidly generate as high as possible many fuzzed tests with a substantial number of steps in each period using a weighted random algorithm. The generated tests are valid with respect to the constraints in the MBT model. Thus, contrary to most fuzzers, the produced test cases on the one hand are syntactically correct with respect to the systems inputs. On the other hand, since it uses a weighted random algorithm and measures the coverage of the behaviors, it avoids duplication of the generated tests, which makes the test evaluation and assessment easier. This section introduces in a first place the MBT specificities for the IoT behavioral fuzzing testing and show how the model is designed to obtain test case generation and execution.

9.1 MBT SPECIFICITIES FOR THE IoT BEHAVIORAL FUZZING TESTING

The rapidity of MBT behavioral fuzzing is an asset for the methodology and contrary to classical functional testing approach, it explores the system states in various uncommon contexts and potentially placing the system into a failed state. Figure 9.1 depicts at a high level the test generation algorithm. Each step covers a test objective, which corresponds to one behavior of the system identified in the model in the OCL expression in an operation with specific pre-existing tags @REQ/@AIM (illustrated in the figure). A step is generated by randomly choosing the available states possibly leading to an error from a
given context of the system (for instance, start exploring the systems behavior when administrator operations are called from normal user connection). More specifically, a test step is selected only if it activates a new behavior (tag), otherwise the algorithm continues the exploration to conceive a test step that activates a new tag. The test generation stops either when the test generation time allocated to the generation engine has elapsed or by fulfilling the user conditions (for instance, all tags in the model are covered, or a stop is signaled).

Moreover, MBT fuzzing is a complementary approach to functional and security (functional and vulnerability) testing, offering multi-fold benefits:

- it activates behaviors in uncommon contexts that potentially lead to system failures, unknown by domain experts.
- it rapidly generates tests, and since the algorithms are random, they are extremely quick and feedback to the user is sent rapidly (hundreds of tests in a few minutes).
- it re-uses the same MBT model used for functional and security testing.
- it re-uses the same adaptation layer, thus no extra effort is needed for executing the test cases.

Nevertheless, the random algorithms lack power in constructing complex contexts of the system, which is bypassed using existing valid test sequences produced using functional and security testing, as a preamble of the test case. Thus, it lowers its impact on the quality of the test cases.

9.2 MBT Model

With the same principles as pattern-driven and model-based security testing, the behavioral fuzzing for IoT systems testing in the scope of the thesis was realized using Model-Based Testing for test case generation and TTCN-3 for test case execution. TTCN-3 in its core architecture is a language that has a high level of abstraction that needs to be concretized by means of adaptation when compiling it or with the help of configuration files during execution with module parameter definition. These two layers of abstraction found in the MBT fuzzing and TTCN-3 execution, poses a problem for executing online
behavioral fuzzing. Indeed, MBT models define behavioral aspect of a System Under Test (SUT) by using equivalence classes. An equivalent class in MBT modeling is for example when representing a person's age we give the literals "Minor", "Major" and "Senior". Those literals have then to be specified when executing the test, taking real value from a test data database. As explained previously, TTCN-3 also contains an abstraction layer where our example would be represented as the parameter: "Age". It is only on execution that this abstraction is concretized. The adaptation of real time generated test steps in an online manner is time consuming and does not fit the purpose of behavioral fuzzing testing on real time IoT systems. We propose the most effective way in using the offline test generation service offered by MBeeTle (Behavioral Fuzzing tool). In this way, the adaptation layers created when applying the previous approach on Model-Based Security and Vulnerability Testing are reused, without requiring extra effort. The behavioral fuzzing approach is depicted in Figure 9.2, which consists of generating the test cases and their storage into a test repository, before their execution on the system under test.

![Figure 9.2: MBT Fuzzing with TTCN3](image)

MBeeTle takes the same model used for security testing, it then generates test case repository using its algorithms and heuristics. This allows the generation of large-scale security tests, and minimize cost of MBT fuzzing with the reuse of previous MBT behavioral and security models.

### 9.3 TEST GENERATION

In MBeeTle behavioral fuzzing tool, different heuristics are available that could be parametrized for test generation. The test generation for behavioral fuzzing takes into account many parameters described later in this section. One of them is the test generation strategy, who is an heuristic on witch the behavioral fuzzing will base on for model exploration in the test generation task. We have chosen two strategies to explore in this thesis. The **Coverage-based** heuristic will choose a test step only if a new set of tags
(REQ /AIM identifying a behavior of the system) is covered by the generated step. Its goal is to increase the coverage of the tags by the tests. The required parameters for this heuristic are identical to the list of parameter required for test generation and are detailed in section 9.4. Defining the parameter for maximum time spent to search a new valid test step is mandatory for this heuristic. When this condition is reached than the generation engine accepts the next step, even though the coverage of the tags remains the same.

The heuristic Flower is based on the capability to recognize nominal and error cases in the system under test. A nominal case is a state of the system activated by a normal usage of the system. On the contrary, an error case corresponds to a state of the systems compromised by an abnormal usage for instance, triggering an exception or an error message. The "Flower" heuristic is inspired from the representation of the test case in the shape of a flower. A flower is hold by the "steam of a flower" composed by several nominal cases (defining the length of the steam) and ends with a flower "corolla" with "petals", each petal being an error case. Thus, a test case produced within this behavioral fuzzing algorithm is illustrated in Figure 9.3.

![Figure 9.3: Behavioral fuzzing strategy - Flower](image)

The Flower strategy defines a set of parameters to be taken into consideration:

- **Nominal cases**: definition of a list of tags identifying the nominal cases.
- **Error cases**: definition of a list of tags identifying the error cases.
- **Steam length**: number of nominal cases for a steam of the flower.
- **Number of petals**: number of successive error cases constructing the flower corolla
- **Timeout for the steam**: maximum time spent for searching a set of nominal cases for constructing the steam. When this condition is reached the generated test step is automatically accepted and the steam is generated.
- **Timeout for the flower corolla**: maximum time spent for searching the set of error case constructing the corolla. When this condition is reached, the generated test step is automatically accepted and the corolla is generated.
9.4 Behavior Fuzzing Approach Synthesis

The behavioral fuzzing tool uses the following fields allowing to parameterize the test generation and define the conditions of when it should stop generating them.

![Behavioral fuzzing tool, test generation parameters](image)

Figure 9.4: Behavioral fuzzing tool, test generation parameters

As shown in figure 9.4, here is the detailed list of parameter required for test generation:

- **Number of generated test cases**.
- **Length of a test case** (mandatory): the number of steps to be generated for each step. In Flower heuristic, it is the sum of its nominal and error cases.
- **Generation time**: the maximum generation time. In Flower heuristic it is the sum of its timeout for the steam and timeout for the flower corolla.
- **Strategy**: the test generation heuristic (i.e; Coverage-Based, Flower).
- **Seed**: a random seed is a number allowing to guide the random test step generation, thus for two generations having the same input elements the tool produces the same output. This being extremely important to reproduce the test cases.
- **Completion of the test**: this parameter, if selected, allows to start the test generation with existing test scenarios, for instance already produced with the CertifTy approach, for instance Test Purposes. Thus, MBeeTle completes each of the
test cases according to the parametrized strategy. This allows to bypass classical
difficulties of random algorithms to reach complex behaviors in an IoT system.

The number of test cases and the maximum length allow to determine the test generation
stop conditions. If none of the conditions is reached than the test generation could be
stopped only manually, using the stop button available in the tool. Section 10.6 propose
a real use case visiting the implementation of the behavioral fuzzing methodology.

Powered by its powerful generation strategies, MBeeTle behavioral fuzzing tool, offers a
complementary approach to functional and security (functional and vulnerability) testing,
with multi-fold benefits:

- it activates behaviors in uncommon contexts that potentially lead to system failures,
  unknown by domain experts.
- it rapidly generates tests, and since the algorithms are random, they are extremely
  quick and feedback to the user is sent rapidly (hundreds of tests in a few minutes).
- it re-uses the same MBT model used for behavioral and security testing.
- it re-uses the same adaptation layer, thus no extra effort is needed for executing the
  test cases.

The next part of the thesis explore the experimentation realized by restating the re-
searches question and gives a synthesis of the results obtained.
III

EXPERIMENTATIONS
10

EXPERIMENTS

Contents

10.1 Guideline for Experimentation’s ................................................. 84
  10.1.1 MBT for IoT systems ....................................................... 84
  10.1.2 Model-based security testing for IoT ............................... 84
  10.1.3 MBT for large scale IoT systems ................................. 85
10.2 FIWARE Testing Process using MBT ........................................ 85
  10.2.1 MBT Model .............................................................. 85
  10.2.2 Test case generation .................................................. 87
  10.2.3 Test case reification & execution ................................. 89
  10.2.4 Experimentation synthesis ......................................... 89
10.3 oneM2M Testing Process using MBT ...................................... 91
  10.3.1 Requirements and Test Purposes .................................. 91
  10.3.2 Model-Based Testing modelisation .................................. 92
  10.3.3 Generating TTCN-3 tests ............................................ 93
  10.3.4 Execution and Reporting ............................................ 94
10.4 Access Control Policies (ACP) testing in oneM2M IoT standard ... 96
10.5 ARMOUR Large scale end-to-end security ................................ 97
  10.5.1 MBT Model .............................................................. 99
  10.5.2 Test case generation .................................................. 102
  10.5.3 Test case reification .................................................. 103
  10.5.4 Test case execution .................................................. 104
  10.5.5 Experimentation & Results ......................................... 105
10.6 ARMOUR Behavioral Fuzzing ................................................ 106
  10.6.1 Synergies between ARMOUR experiment 5 & 6 ................ 106
  10.6.2 MBT Model .............................................................. 107
10.7 Test generation ............................................................... 108
10.8 Experimentation results summary ......................................... 110
  10.8.1 MBT behavioral modeling ............................................ 110
  10.8.2 Pattern-driven and model-based security testing analysis .... 110
  10.8.3 Behavioral fuzzing results ........................................... 111
CHAPTER 10. EXPERIMENTS

This chapter describes the experiments of the thesis. We show case our real use-cases of the different approaches expressed in the second part of the thesis on technical contributions. We show how we applied MBT behavioral approach on a standardized IoT platform, how we made usage of the pattern-driven and model-based security testing in order to assess the security risks in a IoT platform and on a large scale IoT system. We then show the first steps realized in the behavioral fuzzing approach.

10.1 GUIDELINE FOR EXPERIMENTATION’S

This section introduces the experimentation and synthesis part of the thesis. We discuss the interrogations that lead us from theoretical work to experiments. Questions such as why have we done those experiments and how they validate our research objectives.

10.1.1 MBT FOR IoT SYSTEMS

For most IoT system that hit the market, they are tested against their specification for validation. Hence, it is possible to find possible failures in a semi-automatic way without prior modeling. The beginning point of the thesis was to assess how we can fully automatize the test procedure and reduce cost of testing for better testing coverage and adoption. Model-Based testing approach is based on building a behavioral model of the system under test in order to test its validity over its specification. We decided to investigate if MBT is a suitable solution in testing IoT system and started with exploring MBT behavioral modeling for IoT platforms. In conformance testing, the goal is to gain knowledge about the behaviour of a black-box system, by executing tests. We are interested in the synthesis aspect of testing where we perform an analysis task, i.e. we check conformance to a given model of the IoT platform. By means of a case study, we wanted to show how effective this approach is. We carried out experiments in which we implemented different models of two IoT standard implementations of FIWARE (section 10.2) and oneM2M (section 10.3) widely used in the Internet of Things.

10.1.2 MODEL-BASED SECURITY TESTING FOR IoT

With more and more objects connected these days, it is time to investigate how they can be secured in an efficient way. The biggest concern, is that the users of IoT devices will not regard the security of the devices they are connecting. IoT will likely create unique and in some cases complex security challenges. As machines become autonomous they are able to interact with other machines and make decisions which impact upon the physical world. The systems may have fail-safes built in, but these are coded by humans who are fallible. Minimizing time to test without neglecting testing quality is primordial. From the principle that we have validated an MBT approach for an IoT system we investigated on how we can respond to the need of better security testing in the domain. A methodology based on pattern-driven and model-based security testing emerged as we want to demonstrate the flexibility of MBT in testing IoT systems in general. As a matter of fact, we show in our experiments on the oneM2M standard (section 10.4) how a conformance
10.1.3 MBT for Large Scale IoT Systems

A botnet is a collection of internet-connected devices, which may include PCs, servers, mobile devices and internet of things devices that are infected and controlled by a common type of malware. Users are often unaware of a botnet infecting their system. Preventing botnet attacks has been complicated by the emergence of malware like Mirai [63], which targets routers and internet of things devices that have weak or factory default passwords, and which can be easily compromised. As botnet malware has become more sophisticated, and communications have become decentralized (i.e., cloud), testing efforts have shifted away from single component testing to other large scale approaches. These approaches include identifying malware infections at the source devices, identifying and replicating the large scale communication methods. We investigated on tools of behavioral fuzzing enabling to test extensively IoT systems and provide security breaches that are not detectable by the other approaches. We propose a case study (section 10.6) using the CertifyIt MbeeTle module. We want to show that Behavioral Fuzzing for large scale IoT can be achieved with minimal cost without compromising the quality of the test by reusing already provided conformance/security model.

The next section presents the FIWARE use case realized to validate our MBT approach for IoT Systems.

10.2 FIWARE Testing Process Using MBT

This approach considers a subset of the UML to develop the MBT models, composed of two types of diagrams for the structural modelling: class diagrams and object diagrams, and OCL to represent the system’s behavior. From one MBT model, various test selection criteria can be applied, as shown in Figure 4.1. For FIWARE conformance testing, we used the Smartesting MBT approach and its test generation tool - CertifyIt, which uses the coverage-based test selection criteria.

Tested requirements are manually extracted from the specification in order to assess an SUT conformance against the standard it implements. Each of the requirements is then tagged into the model, which serves as a basis to maintain traceability to the specification. Based on the specification information and tested requirements perimeter, the structure of the system is represented in a class diagram, which is a static view of the system limited to elements used for test generation.

10.2.1 MBT Model

The FIWARE class diagram (Fig. 10.1) is an abstraction of the IoT system:

- Its entities, with their attributes. The class Sut represents the system under test where things can register to it. The Complex Event Processing statement Cep-
Statement can also be registered to the Sut and the Sut supports Subscription to its registered things.

- Operations that model the API of the SUT. The operation names give a self-explanation of their action, for example, the class registerContext enables a sensor to register itself in the IoT platform.

- Points of observations that may serve as oracles are explained in the following paragraphs (for instance, an observation returns the current state of the user’s connection to a website).

The class diagram, providing a static view of the SUT, is instantiated by an object diagram. The object diagram provides the initial state of the system and also all objects that will be used in the test input data as parameters for the operations in the generated tests.

It contains the input data based on the partition equivalence principle. The input data are instances of the classes and they are represented in the form of objects, as introduced previously. Each input data is identified by an enumeration, representing an equivalent partition of data from which the test could be derived. For instance, from Figure 10.2, to test the Espr4FastData API, we may consider an initial state of the system with a SUT having nothing connected to it and some entities to be used for registering, creating the CEP statements, subscriptions, etc.

Finally, the dynamic view of the system or its behaviors are described by the Object
Constraint Language (OCL) constraints written as pre/postconditions in the operations in a class within a class diagram, as depicted in Fig 10.3. The test generation engine sees these behavioral objects as test targets. The operations can have several behaviors, identified by the presence of the conditional operator, if-then-else. The precondition is the union of the operation’s precondition and the conditions of a path that is necessary to traverse for reaching the behavior’s postcondition. The postcondition corresponds to the behavior described by the action in the “then” or “else” clause of the conditional operator.

A specific type of operation, called observation, defines the test oracle. The tester with these special operations can define the system points or variables to observe, for instance, a function returns a code. Thus, based on these observations, the test oracle is automatically generated for each test step. The next section provides us an inside view on the test case generation process.

### 10.2.2 Test case generation

Based on the chosen test selection criteria, CertifyIt extracts the test objectives into a test suite, called with the CertifyIt terminology a **smartsuite**.

In our case study, two smartsuites named **EspR4FastData_GETestSuite** and **UserTestScenarios** were created (see Figure 10.4). The **EspR4FastData_GETestSuite** test suite indicates that the generation should be done for all defined test objectives whereas for the **UserTestScenarios_SmartSuite**, they are user-defined scenarios of tests to define some very specific cases with the help of the MBT model. Based on the object diagram and the OCL postcondition, the CertifyIt tool automatically extracts a set of test targets, which is the tool comprehensible form of a test. The test targets are used to drive the test generation. As discussed previously, each test has a set of tags associated with it, which ensures the coverage and traceability to the specification. Figure 10.4 gives a snapshot of a test in the CertifyIt tool. On the left side, the tool lists all generated tests clustered per covered requirement. On the right side, the test case can be visualized and for each step a test oracle is generated. As discussed, the tester with the observation manually defines the system points to observe when calling any function. Figure,
checkResult observes the return code of each function with respect to the activated requirement. In addition, on the bottom-right of the figure for each test case and test step, it is possible to observe the test targets (set of tags).

In addition, Figure 10.5 illustrates the generated tests with CertifyIt, in exported HTML. More specifically, the shown test covers the behavior that resets the GE implementation using the resetGE function. As discussed previously, each test has a set of associated tags for which it ensures the coverage. The export of this test, as illustrated in Figure 10.5, in the rightmost column, maps to each step the covered requirements or more precisely the test objective tagged by @REQ and @AIM in the model. The export, as shown in the middle column of the figure, contains guidelines for test reification, giving directions on how the abstract test case should be adapted into a concrete script, which is described in the next section.

Within the considered limits of the implementation, the tool extracted 26 “test targets” and generated 22 tests in around 10 s to cover the test targets. Each story in the CertifyIt tool corresponds to one test target. However, one test covers one or more test targets. Moreover, the tool’s engine generates fewer tests than test targets, because it uses the "light merge" of test methods, which considers that one test covers one or more test objectives (all test objectives that have been triggered by the test steps). For instance,
10.2. FIWARE TESTING PROCESS USING MBT

The test shown in Figure 10.4 covers two test objectives. The "light merge" of the tests shortly and on a high-level means that the generator will not produce separate tests for the previously reached test targets.

The generated tests are abstract and to execute them on the SUT, they should be further adapted. For our study, a SoapUI exporter was created, which publishes tests into SoapUI XML projects using the SoapUI library.

10.2.3 TEST CASE REIFICATION & EXECUTION

In the used MBT approach, to execute tests on the system under test, the activity of test cases reification, also named test case adaptation, is performed first; it consists of creating an adaptation layer to fulfil the gap between the abstract test case generated from the MBT model, the concrete interface, and the initial set of test data of the system under test. As classically required for the test adaptation activities, exporting the Abstract Test Cases (ATS) into executable scripts is the first step to perform, in this case, the ATS are exported into XML files which can be imported and executed on the SoapUI. To illustrate the test adaptation activities, let us consider the following simple test case given in Figure 10.5:

\[
\text{sut.resetGE(\text{INVALIDURL})} \\
\quad \rightarrow \text{sut.checkErrorCode}() = \text{URL\_ERROR}
\]

This test has one step that calls the function to reset the data with a URL set to "INVALIDURL". CertifyIt automatically generates the test oracle, by using an observation operation defined in the model, in our example, it is called "checkErrorCode". For instance, the expected result of the test is the error \text{URL\_ERROR}. Further, we created a SoapUI exporter, which from the CertifyIt tool publishes the abstract test cases into concrete SoapUI projects. These projects can be imported and executed on SoapUI. Figure 10.6 shows an example of four executed test cases after importing the SoapUI project. On the left side, the test cases are illustrated. On the right side, it is possible to observe the test case execution status for each step. The green color on a test step represents its successful execution status while the red color represents a failed test step. On the top, a global test pass/fail result is summarized.

10.2.4 EXPERIMENTATION SYNTHESIS

In order to test the NGSI interfaces of FIWARE Generic Enablers implementations, as described by the experimentation in section 10.2, we used a Model-Based Testing as a service execution approach. Execution of each test case produces a result log that were compiled into one testing report. As an illustration, the following XML code provide execution result as obtained from the execution of test cases obtained from the NGSI9/10 model.
This shows that from the 22 generated test cases 18 passed whereas 4 failed. The causes have been identified and illustrate the impacts of functional testing:

- Increase specification robustness: in several point, the specification (being under development at time of test execution) is not clear enough, as it does not define the errors to be generated on each NGSI operation

- Pinpoint implementation issue: in the above example, the tested implementation was not respecting the specification in respect with specified MIME types required in the FIWARE IoT standard

Figure 10.6: SoapUI Test case launch example with result status
Next section introduce the same principles in MBT for conformance testing to the oneM2M standard.

10.3 oneM2M Testing Process using MBT

This section presents the process that we used to validate oneM2M implementation using the MBT approach. The approach normally used by oneM2M is to manually write Test Purposes, which are used to write TTCN-3 abstract test cases. Later, these tests would be verified by at least two different TTCN-3 tools (in order to check the TTCN-3 compliance to standards) on different oneM2M implementations. This process is described on figure 2.6. We altered the process by introducing MBT generated tests from the requirements and Test Purposes, as shown on figure 10.7. We created a UML model that expresses the requirements defined by oneM2M Working Groups, and added the Test Purposes in order to guide the test generation. These tests are generated by CertifyIt, a software for generating tests with MBT approach made by Smartesting. Then, using the CertifyIt API, we created a publisher that publishes these abstract tests into the TTCN-3 language. The publisher was modified to use the Abstract Test Suite (ATS) created by ETSI, in order to keep the compatibility with the already produced test cases. From this step to the end, the process remains the same as defined by oneM2M.

10.3.1 Requirements and Test Purposes

The requirements describe how the system is structured internally and the internal and external communication. Derived from one or more requirements, the Test Purpose (TP) defines the steps needed to test if the SUT respects the corresponding requirement.

Requirement is a singular documented need that a particular product must be able to perform. There are different types of requirements: Architecture requirements that explain what has to be done to integrate the system’s structure and behaviour. Business requirements explain the needs of the organisation to be fulfilled by the system. A special case of this requirement is the stakeholders requirement, that defines how the users want to interact with the solution. There are also the functional and the quality-of-service (non-functional) requirements: The first defines all the capabilities, behaviours and informations that the solution needs, and the second defines the constraints that the system needs to support, like reliability, availability and maintainability. Every requirement should address only one thing, fully stated with no missing information. It should express objective facts by using clear wording without technical jargon or acronyms and it should be verifiable.

The TPs are concise and unambiguous description of what is to be tested rather than how the testing is performed. They are described in a language called TPLan [11] that is
developed as a standard by ETSI Technical Committee Methods for Testing and Specification (TC-MTS). The development of Test Purposes inside the oneM2M project is shared between the members of the Working Group TST.

The tests that we want to produce from the requirements and TPs are in the category of black box conformance testing: black box because we don’t use the source code to produce tests and conformance to verify that the SUT is conforming to the specifications and requirements defined by the oneM2M Working Groups. In the time of writing this thesis, there are 57 different TPs, or in total of 168 possible test cases (some TPs have value variations and this way there are 4 or 6 different cases for the same TP).

10.3.2 Model-Based Testing modelisation

Model-Based Testing (MBT) [25] is a particular test technique which consist in creating a behavioural model of the System Under Test (SUT) based on a list of functional requirements in order to generate a suite of test cases. The documents produced in the oneM2M Working Groups specifying the functional requirements and the already prepared Test Purposes in a specified format, are the basis for developing the MBT model.

The MBT model is different than normal development model. Depending on the types of test that we want to produce, we create the model from different views. For example, if we want to produce tests covering the operations and communications of one or more components, we modelise them as different entities. If we want to generate conformance tests, we need a model that represents the system as a whole and the environment that surrounds it (data structures used for communication, other systems), not its internal structure.

We first created a model that represents the two main parts of oneM2M: the AE (Application Entity) and CSE (Common Services Entity) alongside the data structures that are used by these two entities.

![Model-Based Testing Class diagram](image)

The diagram (Figure 10.8), depicts two main classes: IUT and AE. The SUT, in fact, is the CSE that we intend to test. In our configuration, the AE will send requests to the CSE.
and the CSE will respond to the AE’s requests. All test cases will be based on the same communication scheme. The underlying communication protocol (HTTP, CoAP, MQTT) will be defined by the TTCN-3 test port, which is different for every TTCN-3 tool.

CertifyIt uses different technologies and criteria to control the test generation. It uses the model structure as a criteria, the input data space (splitting the data space into equivalence classes or using the Pairwise method to define couples of data) and uses the described requirements as criteria to control the tests. Also, one can use the stochastic criteria to drive the test generation. From the model and the specifications, the test cases can be generated manually. But the benefits of MBT is in the automation of the process. A test suite can be generated automatically by means of algorithms based on different techniques: random generation, graph and metaheuristic search algorithms and constraint resolution with symbolic execution.

10.3.3 Generating TTCN-3 tests

At the moment we successfully generate all possible tests in CertifyIt, we have to convert (or, in the CertifyIt terminology - publish) them in a target language. The default publishers in CertifyIt are XML, JUnit and HTML. The XML publisher is the base publisher that will convert all test cases and other model data to a XML file that then can be used by other publishers to generate tests in other formats. The publisher in JUnit generates tests that can be executed in Java with a glue code i.e. a code that will be an adapter between the SUT and the JUnit tests converting the abstract values into concrete ones. The HTML publisher serves mostly as documentation because its output is simply a web page where all steps for every test case are shown. A matrix between requirements and test cases can be included in the document too.

Because we need our tests in TTCN-3 format, we have to use the Smartesting CertifyIt API in order to create a custom publisher for our needs. Our situation is somewhat unique: on one side we have the model and the generated tests; on the other we have the Abstract Test Suite (ATS) written by ETSI that contains TTCN-3 test cases, templates and components. They use already defined types by the XSD documents that are converted to TTCN-3 types automatically. So, our publisher has to write TTCN-3 tests adapted to the ATS. In a normal case, it’s the publisher that will generate the skeleton of the adapter. That is the case, for example, with the JUnit publisher: every test case is generated in its own file, and all the test cases (grouped in folders by test suite) share the same Adapter. This adapter usually consists of more files, some for the operations needed by the tests (construct a request, send a request or receive response) and some for data structures. In our case, we need to make modifications to the publisher in order to adapt the model to the ATS. We need to adapt the model’s operations and data types to the ATS operations and data types. That means that the object-oriented nature of the MBT process should be transformed to a procedural type of language. Also, TTCN-3 supports structures that don’t exist in other programming languages. For example we need to decide when to use the TTCN-3 send or receive function, or when and which templates to use. Usually, the publisher takes all the informations from the model, that is, the model structure (types, instances, operations, values) and the test cases. It uses that information to “translate” the test cases in the target language, TTCN-3. In this process, all structures remain with their names as they are created in the model.

The test structure inside the CertifyIt publisher is organised like this: Inside a project (that
is, the model), there is a collection of test suites (defined by the tester) and every one of them contains generated test cases. A test case is ordered list of test steps, that basically are the model's operations. We have access to these elements from the Smartesting API using a loop mechanism, for each test suite we create a separate file, inside which we write the corresponding test cases. TTCN-3 needs a control structure, and it implies two options: either write the control structure in each test suite file for the test cases inside the suite, or make a separate file that imports all test suites and has a control structure that executes all tests. In the loop of a test case, we have access to the test case meta data, but also it is in this process we export the static parts, like the test case postamble. The published tests cases have to use the created ATS, therefore, the publisher need to be configured to use ATS types, functions and data. Two different methods are used: hard-coding values and a mapping file. The mapping file is a clean solution because in the event of changes, we don’t have to make changes inside the publisher in order to produce TTCN-3 tests aligned with the existing ATS, but we don’t have the flexibility that has the method of hard-coded values. Thus, we use the mapping files for values that don’t change thorough all of the test cases, like port names and timer timeouts, type or value conversion and renaming variables. The changes that has to be bound inside a test case must be hard-coded. This, for example, is used to differentiate between the test preamble and the test body (usually the last operation in a test case is the test body, and all other operations are preambles) while the postamble is static. The difference between the preamble and the test body is that in the body, being the main part of the test) we manually prepare the data to be send and insert send/receive function calls directly in the test case, instead of calling another function to do it. The send/receive part is one of the instances where we had a lot of problems to synchronise the model data with the ATS. Namely, the model uses descriptive names for status codes that we expect to be returned from the SUT instead of numeric ones, for example, instead of using status code 4004, we use "NOT_FOUND". The descriptive names are used in order to avoid changing the model if the oneM2M standard changes, because the meaning will be the same, but the value can change. In the beginning, in the model there was only a subset of values used for status code, so implementing the translation to their numeric value was simple in the mapping file. But to avoid making a long “dictionary” of names and values, we started to search for alternative where to insert the data in the model so we don’t have to add it manually in the mapping file. In the end, the solution was found: adding numeric values in the description field for every text value in the status code (to clarify, the status code was implemented as enumeration class in the model, see Figure 10.8).

Other changes to the publisher linking it closely to the model and ATS, as already mentioned, was separating the preamble from the test body. Every TP in the model was implemented as few requests that are created and sent, and thorough the observer functions we wait for the response. The ATS is implemented otherwise: the preamble is separated in functions that contain at least one send/receive call, and the test body send/receive calls are implemented directly in the test case. Because the test structure in the model and the ATS is different, the publisher’s role is to find a way to transform the first type of test to the other.

10.3.4 Execution and Reporting

TTCN-3 is an abstract language and it does not manage communication with the SUT. In order to do that, we need few things: A compiler/executor for TTCN-3 code and codec/
port implementation to communicate with the SUT. This is entirely compiler dependent because the codec and the port are only declared in TTCN-3. Usually, all of the compilers follow this procedure: compile TTCN-3 to a target language (TITAN\textsuperscript{1} uses C++, TTWorkbench\textsuperscript{2} uses Java), then add the Codec and System Adapter (SA) written in the target language. In the case of TITAN, the SA and the Codec are added as additional C++ files that are compiled together, but in the TTWorkbench case, the SA and the Codec use an API and compile separately from the tests and are added to the test executable as plugins and executed.

In our case, we used the open source tool TITAN as platform to compile and execute TTCN-3 tests. It’s based on Eclipse, and as of 2015 is a open source project supported by the Eclipse Foundation and developed primarily by Ericsson. It has three major roles:

- The TTCN-3 design environment provides an efficient way to create the TTCN-3 test suites. It’s built on the Eclipse Platform and has editors that provide the usual IDE features for TTCN-3 and the TITAN configuration file. Also, it allows generating C++ code from TTCN-3 code and uses the built-in makefile generator to produce GCC makes to build the C++ code to an executable.

- The compiler compiles the TTCN-3 ATS tests and the TITAN runtime to an executable. Usually it needs a configuration file in order to be executed, because one has to specify a lot of parameters, like IP address and port of the SUT. In this way flexible execution scenarios can be created without re-building the ATS.

- TITAN runtime control, controls the execution of test cases in a distributed multi-platform environment. This control part produces logs in different format thorough its logging API, and the logging is done via plugins. Several logging mechanisms may be activated at the same time. Logging can be configured by verbosity and by event types. Logs can be written into files or be send to another process or via a network connection to a 3rd party tool.

In a MBT scenario, the test cases generated from the model are necessarily abstract, as the model itself does not contain low level information. Therefore the abstract test cases has to be completed by a test harness, to become executable test cases. In order to send and receive the data to and from the SUT we have to create the codec that will convert the TTCN-3 structures to real data and send it through the specified port, be it the network, or simple USB, serial port, radio signals, etc. oneM2M supports three different protocols, HTTP, CoAP and MQTT, the TITAN SA supports all of them. TITAN’s developer, Ericsson, has made SAs for every protocol, but it isn’t really useful to recompile every time when the SUT is tested with HTTP, MQTT and CoAP, but more than that, every protocol should support XML and JSON formatting. As a result, we have 6 different combinations. To solve this problem, we created a oneM2M SA that unifies all of these together.

\textsuperscript{1}https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/tools.titan
\textsuperscript{2}http://www.spirent.com/Products/TTworkbench
10.4 Access Control Policies (ACP) testing in oneM2M IoT standard

The Authorization function is responsible for authorizing services and data access to authenticated entities according to provisioned Access Control Policies (ACPs) and assigned roles. Access control policy is defined as sets of conditions that define whether entities are permitted access to a protected resource. The authorization function can support different authorization mechanisms, such as Access Control List (ACL), Role Based Access Control (RBAC), etc. The Authorization function could need to evaluate multiple access control policies in an authorization process in order to get a final access control decision. oneM2M is the leading global standardisation body for Machine to Machine (M2M) and the IoT. The purpose and goal of oneM2M is to develop technical specifications which address the need for a common M2M Service Layer that can be readily embedded within various hardware and software, and relied upon to connect the myriad of devices in the field with M2M application servers worldwide. The oneM2M standard defines ACP for Application Entities resources operations such as create, update, delete... Our test case uses a MBT model to represent the oneM2M standard and generate test cases related to its ACP operations.

![Figure 10.9: oneM2M standard MBT model](image)

Figure 10.9 represents in class diagrams of a part of the oneM2M standard which is significant for the Access Control Policy testing. An Application Entity (AE) in oneM2M detains a set of privileges to its resources: "AccessControlOperation" class. The ACP of an AE purpose is to set the rules on the Operation (OP class) that it can perform on the IoT platform. The Access Control Policies test generation from the MBT model are driven by an embedded Test Purpose (TP). The following figure represent the TP definition. The TP name: "TP/oneM2M/CSE/DMR/CRE/BV/004" describes its nature, CSE: Common...
10.5. ARMOUR LARGE SCALE END-TO-END SECURITY

Service Entity, DMR: Data Management Repository, CRE: CREate, BV: Behavior Value.

Figure 10.10: ACP Test Purpose definition

The Access Control Policy Test Purpose presented defines the behavior of an AE where its creation rights are removed. In more details, the TP asks, for each resource type defined in the “ReourceTypes” list of integers to first create an AE and then update its ACP in order to disable its rights to create new resources (second boolean to false in the "AE.SendACPUpdateRequest" function. Finally the AE is asked to create a resource. Note that the TP also contains the assertion of the test. “ACCESS DENIED” is the expected behavior in our case when an Application Entity tries to create a resource and has no rights. Any other result confirms that the tested application has a security vulnerability.

In the MBT model, the TP is still at a higher level of abstraction. The next step after TP definition is to generate concrete test cases for test execution. A test case is usually composed of one or more test steps. For our selected TP, we have published it into HTML format. This format is appropriated for manual testing. Our test case is composed of three steps.

The test steps regroups the actions described in the TP definition. The resource type to be created is specified for test concretization.

10.5 ARMOUR LARGE SCALE END-TO-END SECURITY

For a real use case, we use the steps taken by ARMOUR [48], the H2020 European project. The project introduces different experiences to test the different components. More specifically, each experience proposes individual security tests covering different vulnerability patterns for one or more involved components. In ARMOUR, experience 1 (Exp1: Bootstrapping and group sharing procedures) covers the security algorithms for encryption/decryption and protocols to secure communication. Experience 7 (Exp7: Secure IoT platforms) covers the IoT data storage and retrieval in an IoT platform. Both
Figure 10.11: ACP test steps

experiences can wisely be integrated together. Indeed, it makes sense to pair the secure transfer and storage of data within an IoT platform, thus ensuring that the confidentiality and integrity of the data is maintained from the moment it is produced by a device, until it is read by a data consumer.

Figure 10.12: Large scale end-to-end security scenario

Figure 10.12 depicts the E2ES scenario which combines Exp1 & Exp7. The IoT platform used in this particular scenario by Exp7 is the oneM2M standard implementation. Both
data consumers/producers retrieve keys from a credential manager (CM) and the IoT platform role is to support the data storage/retrieval. However, a single security problem in any of the components involved in this scenario can compromise the overall security.

One specificity of testing such a security scenario, MBT-wise, is that each experience has its own MBT model and the E2ES MBT model is a combination of the Exp1 and Exp7 models.

A wise integration of the experiments is made from each experience model. We call it an integration model which is used by a Business Process Model Notation (BPMN) model to generate the Abstract Test Cases as shown in Figure 10.13. The test cases then follow the normal MBT procedure, that is, test generation and then publication. In this use case, the published tests are written as TTCN-3 [54] executables for test automation and can be exported as documentation for manual testing.

### 10.5.1 MBT Model

Each of the IoT systems are composed of producers, consumers, an IoT platform, and eventually a security service, gateways and/or sniffer. The entities communicate through message requests (of different types) and respond to messages through message responses. This generic model, which we call the IoT MBT Generic Model (Figure 10.14) can be created automatically from the MBT tool (CertifityIt). This model can then be customized with respect to the IoT system under test, for instance, choosing suitable names, add different types of message exchanges, configure response status codes, test patterns, delete unnecessary model elements, etc...

Specifically, oneM2M is a global organization that creates requirements, architecture, API specifications, security solutions, and interoperability for Machine-to-Machine (M2M) and
the IoT technologies. It was established through an alliance of standards organizations to develop a single horizontal platform for the exchange and sharing of data among all applications and provides functions that M2M applications across different industry segments commonly need.

In the same way that consumers want to ensure that their personal and usage data are not misused, any number of stakeholders will also want to ensure that their data is protected and the services are securely delivered. Unlike the traditional internet, a typical IoT system:

- Inputs information about our behaviors, thus it directly exposes our privacy.
- Outputs adaptations to our environment, thus it potentially affects our safety.

Security is a chain that is only as strong as its weakest link; hence, all stages of a device’s/service’s lifecycle need to be properly secured throughout its lifetime. In oneM2M, there are three layers of protection for the communications:

- End-to-End Security of Data (ESData): Data producer to data consumer.

We used in our use case, a oneM2M compliant platform (OM2M [52]) to test the end-to-end security with the MBT approach introduced by figure 10.13, and as a security service,
we will be using a “Credential Manager” (CM). The CM oversees establishing a secure channel with the smart object to deliver the group key in a secure way. Figure 10.15 shows the modifications made to the generic MBT model to represent the wise integration between Exp1 & Exp7.

Here is an enumeration of the behaviors emerging from the Exp1 & Exp7 integration and that the model implements:

1. The smart object requests its group key to the CM.
2. The CM extracts the set of attributes of the entity from the request payload and it generates the group key associated with such a set.
3. The CM sends to the smart object its group key.
4. The sniffer intercepts the messages exchanged between the smart object and the CM and tries to read the group key.

The model also includes test oracles. For example: If the sniffer cannot read the group key, the test will be satisfactory. Otherwise, the test will be unsatisfactory.

To drive the test generation, a BPMN model (Figure 10.16) is created.

The BPMN model drives the test generation by giving some guidelines to the MBT tool for test coverage. The BPMN will ensure to test the business scenario required: test the end-to-end security of the process from key retrieval to secure encrypted data in the IoT platform.

Once all the MBT material described is in place, we proceed to the test case generation step.
10.5.2 Test case generation

Section 10.2.2 gave us some initial insight of the test case generation from the model perspective. The generation process for MBT the IoT security uses the same principles and we will extend the use case approach to the generation within the CertifyIt tool. The BPMN model 10.16 allows one to generate one test case related to the end-to-end security scenario. The generated test case is shown in figure 10.17. Figure 10.17 shows the test case details on its right-hand side. We recognize the steps introduced in the BPMN model as:

1. The sensor sends a request to the CM asking for a KEY.
2. The CM receives the request.
3. The CM generates a KEY and sends it to the sensor.
4. The sensor receives the KEY.

5. The sensor encrypts its data with the received KEY.

6. The sensor sends the key to the oneM2M implementation.

7. The oneM2M implementation receives the encrypted value.

The generated test case is still an abstract test as the enumerated values taken from the model are present. For example, the test oracle for the fourth test step is the "KEY_GENERATION_SUCCESS" code. All enumerated values need to be adapted to obtain a concrete executable test. The next section shows how this process is conducted.

10.5.3 Test case reification

After successfully generating the tests, a conversion (or, in the CertifyIt terminology — publish) into a target language is needed. The default publishers in CertifyIt are XML, Junit, and HTML. The XML publisher is the base publisher that will convert all test cases and other model data to an XML file that then can be used by other publishers to generate tests in other formats. The publisher in JUnit generates tests that can be executed in Java with a glue code, i.e., a code that will be an adapter between the SUT and the JUnit tests converting the abstract values into concrete ones. The HTML publisher serves mainly for documentation purposes because its output is simply a webpage where all steps for every test case are shown. The TTCN-3 publisher works on the same principle: the TTCN-3 generated tests are joined with an adapter file where all types, templates, functions, and components are defined. Then, we proceed to the next phase of test compilation. The TTCN-3 example generated from the model is shown in Figure 10.18. It follows the same structure as that generated from the model. The TTCN-3 tests start with the variables declaration. Then, the static part of the preamble is used to configure the test component. The second part of the preamble and the test body is derived from the abstract test case. The send/receive instructions are part of the test body and are detected by the naming convention that they are in fact templates, not functions. The messages used in the receive part are taken from the "observer" functions in the model.

Once the Abstract Test Suite (ATS) in the TTCN-3 format is obtained, executing it is the next step. To achieve this, a compiler transforming the TTCN-3 code into an intermediate language, like C++ or Java is needed. The TTCN-3 code is abstract in a sense that it does not define the way to communicate with the SUT, or how the TTCN-3 structures will be transformed into a real format. This is a task for the System Adapter (SA) and the Codec. There are few commercial and non-commercial compilers that are available for download from the official TTCN-3 webpage [54]. Usually, all the compilers follow this procedure:

- Compile TTCN-3 to a target language (Titan uses C++, TTWorkbench uses Java).
- Add the Codec and SA written in the target language.

In the scope of this use case, we show the Titan test case execution tool as it is an open-source project.
TEST CASE EXECUTION

The goal of the testing process, as described in Figure 10.13 is to execute the MBT-generated tests on the SUT.

As described in Figure 10.19, after the publication of our tests in TTCN-3, we use the Titan compiler to compile them to C/C++ code. To this code, we add the C/C++ code of the SA and the Codec. Using a makefile generated by Titan, we can compile the complete suite into a test executable. Its execution can be controlled by Titan via a configuration file. At the end of the execution, we obtain a log of the execution, with a status for every test case executed. The test cases results can be traced back to their test purposes and test patterns.
Module parameters, abbreviated as modulepars, are a feature of TTCN-3 described in its specification. They are similar to constants and are used to define the parameters of a test suite. These parameters can be, for example, the address of the SUT, the timeout period, or some details of the SUT that can be chosen depending on the SUT implementation. These parameters also are called Protocol Implementation eXtra Information for Testing (PIXIT). Titan can use these module parameters inside its configuration file to provide configuration of the ATS without the need to recompile it. In the same file the user can configure the SA, for example, if it uses a UDP test port, through which system port of the test system it should send or receive the data.

TTCN-3 provides a whole structure inside a module to control the execution order of the test cases. Inside the control part, the tester has full control over the execution. He can create and start one or more components that can run the tests in parallel, and can use conditions and loops to create an execution of the test suite that is closely adapted to the needs of the SUT or the tester itself. Also, Titan widens this control by implementing a higher-level of control inside the configuration file. Here, the user can specify, if there is more than one module with control parts, which module will be first to execute, which will be last, and the exact order of the test cases, etc.

Every TTCN-3 compiler has the right to implement its own method to store the test execution results in the form of a logging file. The Titan open-source compiler uses a proprietary log format from Ericsson by default, but its logging interface is very rich and thus it is not difficult to create new logging formats adapted to a user’s needs. The logging facility in Titan can produce logs with various levels of details to manage different requirements for the console log and log file. The logging parameters can be configured in Titan’s configuration file by setting the ConsoleMask and FileMask options, respectively, for the level of information that should be shown on the console and saved in the log file. TTCN-3 has strict control of a test case status. The five different values for test statuses are: "none", "pass", "inconc" (short of inconclusive), "fail", and "error". Every time a test case is started, its status is automatically assigned to "none". The tester, through the test case, can change it to "pass", "inconc" or "fail", depending on the conditions that are defined in the test case. To prevent a failed test becoming valid, when the test case is executing and the status is set to "fail", it cannot be reverted to "pass" or "inconc". The same is true for "inconc", it cannot revert to "pass". A special status is the "error" status and it is reserved for any runtime errors to distinguish them from SUT errors.

10.5.5 EXPERIMENTATION & RESULTS

To test the end-to-end security scenario efficiently, the need for a large-scale test framework is a primordial factor as it emulates a real implementation of an IoT service. The MBT Testing Framework for Large-Scale IoT Security Testing (Figure 10.20) consists of 7 modules from three tool suites: CertifyIt tool suite, Titan, and FIT IoT-LAB[50]. The FIT IoT-LAB is part of the Future Internet of Things (FIT) that has received 5.8 million Euros in funding from the French Equipex research grant program. FIT IoT offers the large-scale testbed on which the test cases are executed. The test configuration is considered in the modelling and the test execution environment in the FIT IoT-LAB by the test engineers.

After the MBT generated test cases and their publication in the TTCN-3 test scripts, they are deployed in the FIT IoT-LAB ready to be executed by Titan. Titan will first compile, then adapt, and finally execute the test cases on a SUT within the FIT IoT-LAB. Results of the
feasibility of the demonstrated approach have been achieved and the large-scale scenario could be demonstrated through the ARMOUR experiments. We could test the complete chain of events described in the BPMN scenario and record the messages exchanged in the testbed through the use of its integrated sniffer. The sniffer revealed that substantial portions of the messages exchanged (92%) were not ciphered. This result can further be used to benchmark the security of an IoT deployment. Our experiments can safely assess that the data transiting between the sensor and the IoT platform is ciphered. This is far from optimal to conclude that the deployment is secure.

10.6 ARMOUR BEHAVIORAL FUZZING

The development and validation of ARMOUR Security Tool Suite, to test and evaluate security on Internet of Things scenarios, is supported by the execution of several security experiments defined and executed by ARMOUR consortium members. There is 7 experiments defined in ARMOUR and we have already seen the synergies between experiment 1 and 7 in section 10.5. For this section, we will take a deeper look into the experiment 5 (EXP5) and experiment 6 (EXP6) of the ARMOUR project.

10.6.1 SYNERGIES BETWEEN ARMOUR EXPERIMENT 5 & 6

Experiment 5 - Trust aware wireless sensors networks routing, aims at evaluating the performance of distributed trust-aware Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)-based solutions in real large-scale deployments, under the presence of malicious nodes or under adverse conditions. Experiment 6 - Se-
cure IoT Service Discovery deals with the execution of a set of experiments proving the robustness and efficiency of secure service discovery achieved by a group-based solution combining Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) over Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP). These two experiments possess the following diverse characteristics and requirements:

1. Experiment 5 deals with vulnerabilities and security attacks on networking (RPL) layer, while experiment 6 is concerned with issues related to transport (DTLS) and application (COAP) layer

2. Experiment 5 requires multi-hop routing, while this is not a mandatory condition in experiment 6

3. Experiment 5 is implemented on TinyOS, while experiment 6 algorithms are developed in ContikiOS

4. Experiments 5 and 6 are addressing different vulnerabilities

Setting up a wireless sensors network and doing a secure service discovery on the network is an example of use case synergy between the two experiments. In order to test the synergies of the experiments a controller was implemented for their execution. The controllers purpose is to execute the different experiment functionalities that are described further in section 10.6.2. The specificities for execution of experiments 5 & 6 introduce specific challenges:

- The conception of the MBT model, to be able to integrate the specific behaviour of the controller for deploying a large-scale IoT system

- The conception of the test scripts; the format of the TTCN3 scripts and thus the TTCN3 publisher

10.6.2 MBT MODEL

We illustrate in Figure 10.21 one part of the MBT Model formalizing the behaviour of the Controller.

![Figure 10.21: Excerpt of EXP 5 & 6 MBT model](image)

The model represent two entities present in the joint experiment, a sniffer that interact with a controller in order to intercept all communication emerging. The controller has a number
of operation as depicted: "updateFirmware", "generate_traffic", "stop_traffic", "check_connectivity", "service_discovery", "establish_secure_connection" and "check_insecure_connection". The operation names are self explanatory, for example "updateFirmware" is an operation that the controller will execute to update the firmware of a device in an IoT deployment. It is possible to generate a traffic between the IoT nodes using the function "generate_traffic", and we take a deeper look in the modelisation of this operation in Figure 10.22, which represent the dynamic properties of the operation in the MBT model.

As illustrated, the operation will take into consideration in an abstract manner input parameters of execution and large-scale constraints, for a deployment on multiple nodes in a test lab. The test lab that is used for this use-case is the same one used for the large scale end-to-end security testing in section 10.5 (IoT-Lab).

10.7 TEST GENERATION

The test case generation process for the ARMOUR behavioral process is the same as the previous security test case generation process involving test purposes. Figure 10.23 illustrates the Test Pattern ID 5 on Resistance to replay attacks, proposing the usage of different keys when the security critical function of service discovery is called.

Figure 10.23: ARMOUR Experiment 5 & 6 TP ID 5 - Resistance to replay attacks

Figure 10.24 ARMOUR Experiment 5 & 6 CertifyIt Abstract Test Case illustrates the steps generated for the test pattern ID 5. It is composed of 4 different steps with observations enabling to make assertions on the steps (pass/fail).

The steps are composed of controller operation ("controller.updateFirmware"...) with sniffer interaction for the observation purposes ("sniffer.message_interception"...
10.7. **TEST GENERATION**

![ARMOUR Experiment 5 & 6 - CertifyIt Abstract Test Case](image)

**Figure 10.24:** ARMOUR Experiment 5 & 6 - CertifyIt Abstract Test Case

Figure 10.25 illustrates the GUI of the behavioral fuzzing tool used for test generation. On the main panel, the left part sets the main inputs: the model, the test suite (as different test objectives could be given to the tool), the test parameters, the strategy or heuristic, the test publisher. The specific configurations for each heuristic and the publisher could be configured on separate panels. On the right part, the coverage of the tags, the operations and the generated tests could be monitored.

![MBeeTle, MBT Fuzzing Tool](image)

**Figure 10.25:** MBeeTle, MBT Fuzzing Tool

After test cases generation, the publication is made in TTCN3 for execution. Appendix B shows the generated TTCN-3 corresponding to the test purpose.

The next section expresses the research result summary, where we discuss the lessons learn of this thesis.
10.8 **EXPERIMENTATION RESULTS SUMMARY**

In this thesis experimentation part, we have show how we use our three methodologies to cover model-based testing for IoT systems. We will now make a summary of our technical contribution based on the experimentation that where presented in order to asses the strong and weak points of each methodology.

10.8.1 **MBT BEHAVIORAL MODELING**

The use case on FIWARE standard showed the feasibility of the MBT behavioral modeling solution for the IoT conformance testing and we could show the benefits of applying the MBT approach in terms of improving the API’s interoperability, thus ensuring the conformance to the specifications. In terms of project planning, it takes 16 person-hours to create a MBT model. More specifically, it takes 4 person-hours to model the static view of the system (the class diagram) suitable for testing and 12 person-hours to model the dynamic view of the system (to write the OCL postconditions). These metrics abstract the domain knowledge from the FIWARE standards and the implementation of the specification itself. If the MBT approach is integrated within the project, the testing teams already possess this knowledge. In addition, the time spent to create the adaptation layer is linked to the developers/testers experience and it is considered as negligible. One major advantage in applying the MBT approach on the FIWARE data enabler implementation is that the test repository remains stable, while the project requirements and specification may evolve over time. Another advantage concerns the testing exhaustiveness. It is indeed impossible to test any system exhaustively. Nevertheless, it is possible, as we did, to generate a test suite that covers the test objectives in an automated and systematic way. The CertifIt tool further allows generating reports to justify the test objective coverage, which can be easily used for auditing. This couple of examples shows the usefulness of an automated and systematic use of an MBT approach on the IoT applications that should comply to specific standards. On the other hand, this approach showed a lack of flexibility when it comes to testing a system that is under development. In agile projects for example, using the MBT behavioral modeling to test the conformance of a system under development against a standard will raise false errors as not all the functionalities are implemented. Other problems are observed in complex IoT systems regrouping components that have more than one standard implemented. We can with this approach assess the conformance of different parts of the system individually but the approach is not able to assess on the interoperability of the system as a whole.

10.8.2 **PATTERN-DRIVEN AND MODEL-BASED SECURITY TESTING ANALYSIS**

The experiments concluded within ARMOUR have as one of the main objectives to define an approach for benchmarking security & trust technologies for experimentation on large-scale IoT deployments. In this respect, it is a major necessity to provide tools for the IoT stakeholders to evaluate the level of preparedness of their system to the IoT security threats. Several dimensions are to be considered including:

- Security attacks detection
- Defense against attacks and misbehavior
10.8. EXPERIMENTATION RESULTS SUMMARY

- Ability to use trusted sources and channels
- Levels of security & trust conformity, etc.

Additional benchmarks of reference secure & trusted IoT solutions are performed to establish a baseline ground-proof for the ARMOUR experiments but also to create a proper benchmarking database of secure & trusted solutions appropriate for the large-scale IoT. To define this methodology and the different dimensions to be considered for benchmarking, ARMOUR will:

- Consider the methodology defined for generic test patterns and test models based on the threats and vulnerability identified for the IoT
- Identify metrics per functional block (authentication, data security, etc.) to perform various micro- and macro-benchmarking scenarios on the target deployments
- Collect metrics from the evaluation and then use the metrics to categorize them (taxonomy) into different functional aspects, and based on this, provide a label approach to the security assessment.

Micro-benchmarks provide useful information to understand the performance of subsystems associated with a smart object. Micro-benchmarks are useful to identify possible performance bottlenecks at the architectural level and allow embedded hardware and software engineers to compare and assess the various design trade-offs associated with component level design. Macro-benchmarks provide statistics relating to a specific function at the application level and may consist of multiple component level elements working together to perform an application layer task.

Pattern-driven and model-based security testing has showed its efficiency in terms of reusability of conformance models, in addition with test purposes for security test case generation. The automation of test case generation and the ability of adding new vulnerabilities (Zero day attacks or new system functionalities) in the model, enables keeping the security test updated faster thus providing constant thrust in the system. The complication that face this approach are located on the test execution level. Security test execution are strongly linked to the SUT. We have to first assess the vulnerabilities that are specifically applicable to our SUT and then develop for each SUT an adaptation layer in order to execute the test. Depending on the complexity of the system tested, the effort in executing a security test campaign are proportional.

10.8.3 BEHAVIORAL FUZZING RESULTS

We have introduced the model-based methodology on implementing behavioral fuzzing testing of IoT Systems. Our method is kept generic in a sense that indeed it requires a custom Model (i.e., security Vulnerability knowledge of attacks and their enabling vulnerabilities). In addition, the security risk analysis and its generation of abstract test cases are generic as well as its execution on different large scale testbeds. Our analysis, showed that some changes are expected to be done with respect to the test scripts in the adaptation layer, requiring more robustness. For example, if the SUT was not designed to run multiple requests over long period of time.

Our experience in using a Fuzzing approach based on models with a tool such as MBee-Tle, showed several advantages, such as:
• Minimal initial configuration is required to start a fuzzing campaign.
• Minimal supervision of the fuzzing campaign is required.
• Uniqueness determination is handled through an intelligent backtrace analysis.
• Automated test-case minimization reduces the effort required to analyze the results.

The approach is complementary to other MBT testing approaches and can reveal unexpected behavior due to its random nature. We observe also that the IoT system, because it integrates complex and unexpected reactions, lacks observation points to test the desired vulnerabilities. Thus, the experiment should allow artificially observations, for instance through sniffers as one of the simplest. Further, the MBT Model used for fuzzing should not be permissive and allow the generation of test steps that are not executable. Otherwise the execution result of many tests will be false positive, which will increase the effort required for analysis of the failed tests.

The next section is the last one of this thesis. It aims to conclude by giving a synthesis of the work done and explore future work on IoT certification and benchmarking.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Contents

11.1 Summary .................................................. 113
11.2 Future work ............................................. 115

This last chapter makes a summary of the works presented in this thesis. We state our feelings on MBT role in testing IoT and how it will continue to be as important as it is now. We strongly believe that MBT is one of the new techniques that will need to be more and more developed to handle verification and validation in the domain of IoT because it introduces an ease of access to conformance, security and behavioral fuzzing testing. We then conclude this thesis by having an overview of the future works related to IoT systems certification. The idea is to push our testing approaches for IoT certification and labeling.

11.1 SUMMARY

This thesis addresses the problematic of the validation of the Internet of Things (IoT). More specifically, it provides answers that address the key challenges of scalability, interoperability, and security of the IoT with real use cases. The solutions that we propose have a common execution approach: Model Based Testing As A Service (MBTAAS). The MBT used for the IoT conformance testing shows that the specificities in generating test cases to validate the correct behavior of an SUT with respect to its standard lies in the model creation. In this case, the model is a representation of the standard. Any test executed on the SUT that fails could represent a gap between the specification and implementation, or a compliance from the SUT towards the standard it is implementing. The MBT used for the IoT security testing diverted from the traditional MBT setup with its specific test case reification environment. Finally, we have a first view on the specificities of an MBT for the IoT robustness testing approach. It illustrates how MBT fuzzing could be applied to the IoT systems. The tooling we presented gives the possibility to re-use already created model during the functional/security testing phase; thus, no additional time is spent for modeling. This approach is considered as complimentary to security or conformance testing, as we expect that the detected inconstancies will differ from the others.

The standardization institutes and certification entities that make available tomorrow’s standards have the process of testing as the highest importance. They provide standard
implementers a set of test cases to assess the conformance, scalability, and security of their products. Test cases traceability after execution is also a major factor as it is used to benchmark the test results. With security threats constantly evolving, and to maintain high confidence and trust, the proposed test cases must be continuously maintained. This is where MBT finds its interest and added value. The traceability starts with the specification, then the requirements, and finally to the test cases which are an embedded feature to that of the classical MBT approach. The test case traceability provided by MBT gives the possibility to implement test generation strategies which aim to cover a maximum of the specification. The automated test generation is low time-consuming comparing to hand written tests, and thus makes the maintenance of generated test cases cheaper. MBT has major advantages in terms of test coverage, test maintenance, etc. Those advantages are accelerating the adoption of MBT over time.

The MBT approach for test case generation and execution in the IoT domain is relatively new. Nowadays, it is becoming more and more visible and accepted compared to a couple of years ago. The approach was previously reserved for a smaller number of use cases due to the high difficulty of taking in hand the modeling. Modeling requires highly-skilled testers and the profession is not common in the software industry. Only highly critical companies have the privilege of modeling their concepts to test them. The IoT sector is reaching this critical level nowadays. Security intrusions are more sophisticated than ever and occur more frequently then we realize. The need for quality assurance in the field of the IoT testing is essential to accompany its growth. With MBT, the evolution of the security threads is added into the model and they are by this process considered in the test generation process. The process saves time when it is not started from scratch. The models for conformance testing are reusable and adapted to security testing. Model-Based Testing (MBT) shows its benefits in the medium to long term as it has a high initial cost and it has been one of the strongest roadblocks for MBT adoption. The MBT approach requires highly-skilled testers and it is complicated to change the daily habits of testers in the field. It requires a significant time investment that most are not willing to partake. One other roadblock for the MBT approach adoption is the complexity of the existing tools. Nevertheless, MBT is still relatively new and we see more and more tools emerging. However, these tools require a high degree of formation and skill for practical usage. The test generation tools are complicated and the complexity of test generation can take a significant amount of time (NP-complete problems). In the future, the MBT approach requires significant evolution to survive and show a rise in its adoption. New techniques have already been developed by tool makers, MBeeTle is one of the emerging tools for behavioral fuzzing testing that responds to the need for a real-time analysis of the test cases on the IoT deployments. This new tool allows for a loss of non-determinism in a real-time system.

The technology for automated model-based test case generation has matured to the point where the large-scale deployments of this technology are becoming commonplace. The prerequisites for success, such as qualification of the test team, integrated tools chain availability and methods are now identified, and a wide range of commercial and open-source tools are available, as introduced in this thesis. Although MBT will not solve all testing problems in the IoT systems domain, it is extremely useful and brings considerable progress within the state of the practice for functional software testing effectiveness, increasing productivity, and improving functional coverage. Moreover, the MBT approach has shown its importance in the IoT by introducing an ease of access to conformance, security, and behavioral fuzzing testing. The technology is constantly evolving, making
it tester friendly and considerably reducing the high initial cost that is typically the case. Because of its easier accessibility for testers, as well as more fine-grained integration with the large-scale IoT testbeds, MBT should expect a larger approval rate.

This thesis is emphasized with a strong practical approach through a heavy investment in experimentation. We had the chance to be involved in many European projects that required not only theoretical solutions for testing the IoT but also to provide concrete working solutions. A lot of resources were spent on experimentation in order to validate proposed methodologies and solutions. More notably, after validating MBT capabilities to test IoT standards with FIWARE, we worked on the oneM2M standard. With oneM2M standard validation, we explored deeply its security features. This lead us to have a first hand on developing a methodology and tools for the IoT security certification.

The next and last section, propose to explore the future work of this thesis taking into consideration the lessons learned.

11.2 Future work

Putting into perspective the work done in this thesis, we find two interesting paths of continuity. The first path relates to the amelioration's in the problematics faced with respect to our experimentation's. With behavioral modeling for conformance testing, our main challenge is faced during the execution phase. We propose a MBTAAS approach in order to bring accessible tests to IoT system developers. This approach reveals to be less adapted to IoT systems that are not mature enough to be deployed and therefore tested in a “as a service” environment. Our approach lacks of flexibility to test systems that are in early stage development. The solution resides in proposing testing solution in the development environment of the IoT system. Even if that means losing the notion of “as a service” execution, the tests can be delivered to the users own test bed for later execution. This raises many issues that have to be taken into consideration such as for example the need of development of a system adapter for test execution and the delivery of a reporting tool to assess the testing results and keep their traceability to ensure non regression.

The second path of continuity relates to the outcome of our pattern-driven and model-based security testing approach. We investigate how to use the approach in cybersecurity evaluation and certification. In the certification process, electronic products are evaluated against a set of requirements and using a process usually based on well-defined standards like Common Criteria (CC). Cybersecurity certification can be a quite comprehensive process but it may have limitations, which must be taken in consideration. To address the limitations of cybersecurity certification, this thesis explores complementary approaches, which aim to support parts of the product lifecycle on the different phases (e.g., IoT device): requirements collection, testing/security evaluation. The final objective is to provide the security benchmarking and assurance that should include a measure of our level of confidence in the tested IoT system. As an example of such a measure of confidence used to evaluate the security of an IoT product or system, we mention the Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) from the Common Criteria (CC). The EAL is a discrete numerical grade (from EAL1 through EAL7) assigned to the IoT product or system following the completion of a CC security evaluation, which is an international standard in effect since 1999. These increasing levels of assurance reflect the fact that incremental assurance requirements must be met to achieve CC certification. The intent of the higher
assurance levels is a higher level of confidence that the systems security features have been reliably implemented. The EAL level does not measure the security of the system; it rather simply states at what level the system was tested. The EAL's include the following:

- EAL 1 Functionally Tested
- EAL 2 Structurally Tested
- EAL 3 Methodically Tested and Checked
- EAL 4 Methodically Designed, Tested and Reviewed
- EAL 5 Semi-formally Designed and Tested
- EAL 6 Semi-formally Verified Design and Tested
- EAL 7 Formally Verified Design and Tested

Security certification is needed to ensure that a product satisfies the required security requirements, which can be both proprietary requirements (i.e., defined by a company for their specific products) and market requirements (i.e., defined in procurement specifications or market standards). In the market case, these requirements are also defined to support security interoperability. For example, to ensure that two products are able to mutually authenticate or to exchange secure messages. Security certification is needed to ensure that products are secure against specific security attacks or that they have specific security properties.

The process for certification of a product is generally summed up in four phases:

1. **Application**: A company applies a product for evaluation to obtain a certification.

2. **An evaluation** is performed to obtain certification. The evaluation can be mostly done in three ways: a) the evaluation can be done internally to support self-certification. b) The evaluation can be performed by a testing company, which is legally belonging to the product company. c) It can be third party certification where the company asks a third party company to perform the evaluation of its product.

3. **Internal company or third party company evaluation**: the evaluation company provides a decision on the evaluation.

4. **Surveillance**: It is a periodic check on the product to ensure that the certification is still valid or it requires a new certification.

As described in [14], the initial efforts to define a security testing and certification framework for products originated in the defense domain. An obvious reason was that the military systems are designed to operate in a hostile environment and must be protected against security threats, which are more likely to appear than with those systems that belong to a commercial domain. That being said, with the development of IoT, new threats have emerged and the consequences are far from benign. The huge scale some IoT system, having so many devices interconnected can be convenient, if not tested and certified before deployment. This is where we propose to set foot in our future works. Bringing the adoption of MBT to support a formal definition of the tests and the security requirements for IoT systems, which drives the certification. In addition, they can be used to support harmonization of the tests for security certification.


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LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 IoT layers ........................................... 11
2.2 Schematic depiction of the FIWARE platform with all major chapters .... 13
2.3 FIWARE IoT Platform Architecture ........................................ 14
2.4 oneM2M logo ........................................... 15
2.5 oneM2M Architecture ........................................... 15
2.6 oneM2M defined work process ........................................... 16
2.7 Fundamental MBT Process ........................................... 18

4.1 The MBT Workflow ........................................... 34
4.2 TTCN-3 logo ........................................... 35
4.3 TTCN-3 architecture ........................................... 38
4.4 MBeeTle - Behavioral Fuzzing Process ........................................... 40

5.1 Security Test Patterns definition methodology ........................................... 45
5.2 Online behavioral fuzzing generation methodology ........................................... 46
5.3 Offline behavioral fuzzing generation methodology ........................................... 47

6.1 Traditional vs Standardized MBT Process ........................................... 53
6.2 Complex Event Processing Espr4FastData ........................................... 54
6.3 Class Diagram Notations ........................................... 57
6.4 BPMN model example ........................................... 58

7.1 TPLan example ........................................... 62
7.2 MBT Security Testing Framework ........................................... 64
7.3 Model-Based Security Testing Process for standardized IoT platform .... 66
7.4 Test Pattern Formalisation with Smartesting CertifyIt for TP ID 10 ........ 66
7.5 Test Purpose ID 10 test cases generated by CertifyIt ........................................... 67

8.1 MBTAAS architecture ........................................... 70
8.2 Configuration File excerpt ........................................... 71
8.3 Published file parts ........................................... 71
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Execution snapshot</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Behavioral Fuzzing Test Step Selection</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>MBT Fuzzing with TTCN3</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>Behavioral fuzzing strategy - Flower</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>Behavioral fuzzing tool, test generation parameters</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Data handling GE class diagram</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>Excerpt of the Data handling object diagram</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>Object Constraint Language (OCL) example</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>CertifyIt test case view</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>Implementation Abstract Test Case (HTML export)</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>SoapUI Test case launch example with result status</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>The altered work process</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>Model-Based Testing Class diagram</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>oneM2M standard MBT model</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>ACP Test Purpose definition</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>ACP test steps</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>Large scale end-to-end security scenario</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>End to End security MBT description</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.14</td>
<td>IoT MBT generic model</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.15</td>
<td>Integration of the MBT model</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>BPMN model</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>Test case generation with the MBT tool</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.18</td>
<td>TTCN-3 Abstract Test Suite example</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.19</td>
<td>Test execution</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>MBT Testing Framework for Large-Scale IoT Security Testing</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>Excerpt of EXP 5 &amp; 6 MBT model</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.22</td>
<td>Operation &quot;generate_traffic&quot;</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>ARMOUR Experiment 5 &amp; 6 TP ID 5 - Resistance to replay attacks</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.24</td>
<td>ARMOUR Experiment 5 &amp; 6 - CertifyIt Abstract Test Case</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.25</td>
<td>MBeeTle, MBT Fuzzing Tool</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

5.1 Vulnerabilities overview ......................................................... 46
6.1 Excerpt of Espr4FastData Test Objectives .............................. 54
IV

APPENDIX
A

ARMOUR SECURITY
VULNERABILITIES TABLES
### Discovery of Long-Term Service-Layer Keys Stored in M2M Devices or M2M Gateways  
**V1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability pattern summary</th>
<th>Long-term service-layer keys are discovered while they are stored in M2M Devices or M2M Gateways and are copied.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>Long-term service-layer keys are stored within the M2M Device or M2M Gateway. Those keys are discovered and copied by unauthorized entities and used for illegitimate purposes. Discovery of stored long term service-layer keys may be achieved e.g. by monitoring internal processes (e.g. by Differential Power Analysis) or by reading the contents of memory of the M2M Device or M2M Gateway (by hardware probing or by use of local management commands).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</td>
<td>Devices and gateways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td>Discovery of stored keys may be achieved by monitoring internal processes (e.g. by Differential Power Analysis) or by reading the contents of memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Copying keys to impersonate devices, gateways or M2M infrastructure equipment (discovery), denial of service attack (deletion) or allowing illegitimate operation (replacement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>V13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Deletion of Long-Term Service-Layer Keys stored in M2M Devices or M2M Gateways  
**V2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability pattern summary</th>
<th>Long-term service-layer keys are deleted or deprecated while they are stored in M2M Devices or M2M Gateways</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>Long-term service-layer keys are deleted or deprecated. This may be achieved by use of management commands (including impersonation of a system Manager) or by removal of the HSM if present and if removable. This attack may be perpetrated against the key-storage functions of M2M Devices or M2M Gateways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</td>
<td>Devices and gateways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td>Deletion of stored keys may be achieved by use of management commands (including impersonation of a system manager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Copying keys to impersonate devices, gateways or M2M infrastructure equipment (discovery), denial of service attack (deletion) or allowing illegitimate operation (replacement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>V13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Replacement of Long-Term Service-Layer Keys stored in M2M Devices or M2M Gateways  
**V3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability pattern summary</th>
<th>Long-term service-layer keys are replaced while they are stored in M2M Devices or M2M Gateways</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>Long-term service-layer keys are replaced while they are stored in M2M Devices or M2M Gateways, in order to modify its operation. The attack may be achieved by use of management commands (including impersonation of a system manager) or by removal of the HSM if present and if removable. This attack may be perpetrated against the key-storage functions of M2M Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</td>
<td>Devices and gateways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td>Replacement of stored keys may be achieved by use of management commands (including impersonation of a system manager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Copying keys to impersonate sensors, gateways or M2M infrastructure equipment (discovery), denial of service attack (deletion) or allowing illegitimate operation (replacement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>V13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery of Long-Term Service-Layer Keys stored in M2M Infrastructure</td>
<td>V4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern summary</td>
<td>Long-term service-layer keys are discovered while they are stored in the M2M infrastructure equipment (e.g. equipment holding network CSE or security server) and are copied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>Discovery may be achieved e.g. by the monitoring of internal processes, or by reading the contents of memory locations. The methods of attack include remote hacking and illicit use of management or maintenance interfaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</td>
<td>Any component of the infrastructure (AAA server, Attribute Authority, Capability Manager, PDP and Pub/Sub server)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td>Replacement of stored keys may be achieved by use of management commands (including impersonation of a system manager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Copied keys may be used to impersonate M2M infrastructure equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>V13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deletion of Long-Term Service-Layer Keys stored in M2M Infrastructure equipment</th>
<th>V5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern summary</td>
<td>Long-term service-layer keys are deleted or deprecated while they are stored in the M2M infrastructure equipment (e.g. equipment holding network CSE or security server).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>Long-term service-layer keys may be deleted or deprecated by use of management commands (including impersonation of a System Administrator).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</td>
<td>Any component of the infrastructure (AAA server, Attribute Authority, Capability Manager, PDP and Pub/Sub server)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td>Replacement of stored keys may be achieved by use of management commands (including impersonation of a system manager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Deletion of keys in the infrastructure equipment prevents proper operation and may lead to denial of service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>V13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discovery of sensitive Data in M2M Devices or M2M Gateways</th>
<th>V6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern summary</td>
<td>Sensitive data is discovered while used during the execution of sensitive functions in M2M Devices or M2M Gateways and are copied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>Sensitive data such as long-term service-layer keys are used during the execution of sensitive function within the M2M Device or M2M Gateway and exposed. Sensitive data is then copied by unauthorized entities and used for illegitimate purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Copied sensitive data such as key material may be used to compromise M2M System security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### General Eavesdropping on M2M Service-Layer Messaging between Entities  
**V7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability pattern summary</th>
<th>General Eavesdropping on M2M Service-Layer Messaging Between Entities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>By eavesdropping on M2M Service Layer messages between components in the M2M Service Provider's Domain, M2M Devices and M2M Gateways, confidential or private information may be discovered. This excludes the use of eavesdropping to discover or infer the value of keys, which is covered elsewhere in the present document.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timing of introduction</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consequences</strong></td>
<td>Effect on stakeholders(s): significant effect upon the M2M Service Provider if the users find out about the loss of privacy and if it can be blamed on this attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Alteration of M2M Service-Layer Messaging between Entities  
**V8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability pattern summary</th>
<th>Alteration of M2M Service-Layer Messaging Between Entities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>By altering M2M Service Layer messages between components in the M2M Service Provider's Domain, M2M Devices and M2M Gateways, the attacker may deceive or defraud the M2M Service Provider or other stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</th>
<th>Devices, gateways and any component of infrastructure (AAA server, Attribute Authority, Capability Manager, PDP and Pub/Sub server)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timing of introduction</strong></td>
<td>At any time of communication, the attacker may deceive or defraud the service provider or other stakeholders by altering messages between devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consequences</strong></td>
<td>Effect on stakeholders(s): could cause a wide-scale attack against Devices or Gateway communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Example**

A legitimate wireless communication module with unique id (e.g. MAC address) is used by attacker

### Replay of M2M Service-Layer Messaging between Entities  
**V9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability pattern summary</th>
<th>Replay of M2M Service-Layer Messaging Between Entities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>By repeating all or portions of previous M2M Service Layer messages between components in the M2M Service Provider's Domain, M2M Devices and M2M Gateways, the attacker may deceive or defraud the M2M Service Provider or other stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</th>
<th>Devices, gateways and any component of infrastructure (AAA server, Attribute Authority, Capability Manager, PDP and Pub/Sub server)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timing of introduction</strong></td>
<td>At any time of communication, the attacker may deceive or defraud the service provider or other stakeholders by repeating all or portions of previous messages between devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consequences</strong></td>
<td>Effect on stakeholders(s): could cause a wide-scale attack against Devices or Gateway communications.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Example**

**Relationships**
### Unauthorized or corrupted Applications or Software in M2M Devices/Gateways

**Vulnerability pattern summary**

Unauthorized or Corrupted Application and Service-Layer Software in M2M Devices/Gateways

**Vulnerability pattern description**

This attack may be used to:
- commit fraud, e.g. by the incorrect reporting of energy consumption;
- cause a breach of privacy by obtaining and reporting confidential information to the attacker;
- cause the disclosure of sensitive data such as cryptographic keys or other credentials;
- prevent operation of the affected M2M Devices/Gateways.

The attack may be perpetrated locally or by illicit use of remote management functions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable systems/devices/platforms</th>
<th>Devices and gateways</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td>The attack may be perpetrated locally or by illicit use of remote management functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>An attacker installs unauthorised M2M Service-layer software or modifies authorised software functions in M2M Devices or M2M Gateways</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### M2M System Interdependencies Threats and cascading Impacts

**Vulnerability pattern summary**

M2M System interdependencies threats and cascading impacts

**Vulnerability pattern description**

While M2M endpoints and M2M Gateways might be dedicated to specific M2M Services, M2M Systems as a whole will frequently share resources with a variety of other un-related systems and applications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable systems/devices/platforms</th>
<th>Devices and gateways</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td>The attack may be perpetrated locally or by illicit use of remote management functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Underlying systems and resources may impose many forms of interdependency with the M2M Application, M2M Device / Gateway or M2M Infrastructure which is not apparent during period of normal operation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### M2M Security Context Awareness

**Vulnerability pattern summary**

Context-awareness

**Vulnerability pattern description**

If the provided Security Level is sufficient and appropriate depends on the use case and the context of the operation. Keeping the security level static for all use cases may lead to inefficient usage of resources (in terms or processor, memory, network, operationally and financially).

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td>The attack may be perpetrated locally or by illicit use of remote management functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>A lack of context awareness for M2M endpoints, gateways and applications may increase the risks associated with resource exhaustion and under provisioning, triggering service impacts or outages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Example

Relationships
### Eaves Dropping/Man in the Middle Attack

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability pattern summary</th>
<th>Eaves Dropping/Man in the Middle Attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>The primary difficulty lies in monitoring the proper network's traffic while users are accessing the vulnerable site. Detecting basic flaws is easy. Just observe the site’s network traffic. More subtle flaws require inspecting the design of the application and the server configuration. The attack exploits lack of security protection while data is in transit, or vulnerabilities in the protocol that was chosen to protect the communication pipe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Applicable systems/devices/platforms | Devices, gateways and any component of infrastructure (AAA server, Attribute Authority, Capability Manager, PDP and Pub/Sub server) |

| Timing of introduction | The attack exploits lack of security protection while data is in transit, or vulnerabilities in the protocol that was chosen to protect the communication pipe |

| Consequences | Eaves Dropping/Man In the Middle Attack: keys and other sensitive information can be discovered by eavesdropping on messages at the transport layer |

| Example |

| Relationships | V13, V4 |

### Transfer of keys via independent security element

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability pattern summary</th>
<th>Transfer of keys via independent security element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>The attack is carried out by an attacker who gains unauthorized possession of a set of viable keys and credentials by removing them from a legitimate M2M Device. The attacker will then use the removed keys and credentials in different, possibly unauthorized M2M Devices. The M2M Devices may attach to a network and consume non M2M network services, in which the charge will be passed to a legitimate M2M User. Additionally, a denial of service to the legitimate user may occur when the unauthorized M2M Device is online, the unauthorized M2M Device may use legitimate M2M Services, though the cost is passed on to the legitimate user.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Applicable systems/devices/platforms | Devices, Provisioning servers |

| Timing of introduction | Devices can be subject to physical exploitation at any time |

| Consequences | The attack is carried out by an attacker who gains unauthorized possession of a set of viable keys and credentials by removing them from a legitimate M2M Device. |

| Example | A legitimate wireless communication module with unique id (e.g. MAC address) is used by attacker |

| Relationships | V14 |

### Buffer Overflow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability pattern summary</th>
<th>Buffer Overflow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>Buffers of data + ‘N’ are passed through an API where it is known that the API is designed to have length constraints. The N bytes overflow into an area that was being utilized by other storage (heap overflow) or precipitates the return address to be corrupt (stack overflow). Stack overflows are indicated by the return code jumping to a random location, and as a consequence, incorrect code is executed and may change local data (rights of code or a file)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Applicable systems/devices/platforms |

| Timing of introduction |

| Consequences | Buffers of data + ‘N’ are passed through an API where it is known that the API is designed to have length constraints. The N bytes overflow into an area that was being utilized by other storage (heap overflow) or precipitates the return address to be corrupt (stack overflow). Stack overflows are indicated by the return code jumping to a random location, and as a consequence, incorrect code is executed and may change local data (rights of code or a file) |

| Example |

| Relationships | V15 |
### Injection  
**Vulnerability pattern summary**
Injection

**Vulnerability pattern description**
Attacker sends simple text-based attacks that exploit the syntax of the targeted interpreter. Almost any source of data can be an injection vector, including internal sources. Injection flaws occur when an application sends untrusted data to an interpreter. Injection flaws are very prevalent, particularly in legacy code, often found in SQL queries, LDAP queries, XPath queries, OS commands, program arguments, etc. Injection flaws are easy to discover when examining code, but more difficult via testing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</th>
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</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing of introduction</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Consequences | Send inappropriate queries to the application-level server that will exploit vulnerabilities of the query interpreter in order to gain unauthorized access. |

#### Example

#### Relationships

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### Session Management and Broken Authentication  
**Vulnerability pattern summary**
Session Management and Broken Authentication

**Vulnerability pattern description**
Consider anonymous external attackers, as well as users with their own accounts, who may attempt to steal accounts from others. Also consider insiders wanting to disguise their actions. Exploitation spoof this type is of average difficulty, Attacker uses leaks or flaws in the authentication or session management functions (e.g., exposed accounts, passwords, session IDs) to impersonate users.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</th>
<th>Devices and gateways</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Timing of introduction | The attacker uses leaks or flaws in the authentication or session management functions (e.g., exposed accounts, passwords, session IDs) to impersonate users |

| Consequences | Custom session and authentication schemes frequently have flaws in areas such as logout, password management, timeouts, remember me, secret question and account update allowing the attacker to impersonate other entity |

#### Example

#### Relationships

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### Security Misconfiguration  
**Vulnerability pattern summary**
Security Misconfiguration

**Vulnerability pattern description**
Consider anonymous external attackers as well as users with their own accounts that may attempt to compromise the M2M System. Also consider insiders wanting to disguise their actions. Easy to exploit, attacker accesses default accounts, unused pages, un-patched flaws, unprotected files and directories, etc. to gain unauthorized access to or knowledge of the M2M System.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicable systems/devices /platforms</th>
<th>Devices, gateways and any component of infrastructure (AAA server, Attribute Authority, Capability Manager, PDP and Pub/Sub server)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Timing of introduction | The attacker decides to access default accounts, unused pages, unpatched flaws, unprotected files and directories, etc. |

| Consequences | Attacker accesses default accounts, unused pages, un-patched flaws, unprotected files and directories, etc. to gain unauthorized access to or knowledge of the M2M System |

#### Example

#### Relationships

---
**Insecure Cryptographic Storage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability pattern summary</th>
<th>Insecure Cryptographic Storage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>Attackers typically don’t break the cryptography. They break something else, such as find keys, get cleartext copies of data, or access data via channels that automatically decrypt. The most common flaw in this area is simply not encrypting data that deserves encryption. When encryption is employed, unsafe key generation and storage, not rotating keys, and weak algorithm usage is common. Use of weak or unsalted hashes to protect passwords is also common. External attackers have difficulty detecting such flaws due to limited access. They usually must exploit something else first to gain the needed access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable systems/devices/platforms</td>
<td>Devices, gateways and any component of infrastructure (AAA server, Attribute Authority, Capability Manager, PDP and Pub/Sub server)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td>At any time of communication, the attacker decides to break something, such as find keys, get cleartext copies of data, or access data via channels that automatically decrypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>The most common flaw in this area is simply not encrypting data that deserves encryption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Invalid Input Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Invalid Input Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>Attackers can inject specific exploits, including buffer overflows, SQL injection attacks, and cross site scripting code to gain control over vulnerable machines. An attacker may be able to impose a Denial of Service, bypass authentication, access unintended functionality, execute remote code, steal data and escalate privileges. While some input validation vulnerabilities may not allow exploitation for remote access, they might still be exploited to cause a crash or a DoS attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable systems/devices/platforms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Input data validation is used to ensure that the content provided to an application does not grant an attacker access to unintended functionality or privilege escalation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cross Scripting**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability pattern description</td>
<td>Cross-site scripting takes advantage of Web servers that return dynamically generated Web pages or allow users to post viewable content to execute arbitrary HTML and active content such as JavaScript, ActiveX, and VBScript on a remote machine that is browsing the site within the context of a client-server session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable systems/devices/platforms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Cross Scripting allows attackers to inject code into the Web pages generated by the vulnerable Web application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXAMPLE OF SINGLE TTCN-3 FUZZING TEST CASE WITH 20 STEPS

```
module Fuzzing_testsuite {
    import from ARMOUR_Adapter_HTTP all;
    import from ARMOUR_PIXIT all;

testcase ARMOUR_message_interception4fc780() runs on ARMOURComponent {
    f_c01Up();
    generate_traffic(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM);
    check_connectivity(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME);
    check_packet_loss(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM);
    message_interception();
    establish_secure_connection(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM, PX KEY);
    message_interception();
    stop_traffic();
    message_interception();
    message_interception();
    service_discovery(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM, PX KEY);
    check_security_key(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM, PX KEY);
    generate_traffic(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM);
    check_connectivity(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME);
    check_packet_loss(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM);
    stop_traffic();
    message_interception();
    service_discovery(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM, PX KEY);
    check_security_key(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM, PX KEY);
    updateFirmware(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM, PX_NUM_MALICIOUS);
    message_interception();
    establish_secure_connection(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM, PX KEY_INVALID);
    generate_traffic(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM);
    check_connectivity(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME);
    check_packet_loss(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM);
    stop_traffic();
    stop_traffic();
    generate_traffic(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM);
    check_connectivity(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME);
    check_packet_loss(PX_EXPERIMENT_ID, PX BORDER_ROUTER, PX_NODE_NAME, PX_NUM);
    message_interception();
}
```
Abstract:

The Internet of Things (IoT) is nowadays globally a mean of innovation and transformation for many companies. Applications extend to a large number of domains, such as smart cities, smart homes, healthcare, etc. The Gartner Group estimates an increase up to 21 billion connected things by 2020. The large span of "things" introduces problematic aspects, such as conformance and interoperability due to the heterogeneity of communication protocols and the lack of a globally-accepted standard. The large span of usages introduces problems regarding secure deployments and scalability of the network over large-scale infrastructures. This thesis deals with the problem of the validation of the Internet of Things to meet the challenges of IoT systems. For that, we propose an approach using the generation of tests from models (MBT). We have confronted this approach through multiple experiments using real systems thanks to our participation in international projects. The important effort which is needed to be placed on the testing aspects reminds every IoT system developer that doing nothing is more expensive later on than doing it on the go.

Keywords: Internet of Things, Model-Based Testing, Test, Security, Conformity, Behavioral Fuzzing

Résumé :

L’internet des objets (IoT) est aujourd’hui un moyen d’innovation et de transformation pour de nombreuses entreprises. Les applications s’étendent à un grand nombre de domaines, tels que les villes intelligentes, les maisons intelligentes, la santé, etc. Le Groupe Gartner estime à 21 milliards le nombre d’objets connectés d’ici 2020. Le grand nombre d’objets connectés introduit des problèmes, tels que la conformité et l’interopérabilité en raison de l’hétérogénéité des protocoles de communication et de l’absence d’une norme mondialement acceptée. Le grand nombre d’utilisations introduit des problèmes de déploiement sécurisé et d’évolution du réseau des IoT pour former des infrastructures de grande taille. Cette thèse aborde la problématique de la validation de l’Internet des objets pour répondre aux défis des systèmes IoT. Pour cela, nous proposons une approche utilisant la génération de tests à partir de modèles (MBT). Nous avons confronté cette approche à travers de multiples expérimentations utilisant des systèmes réels grâce à notre participation à des projets internationaux. L’effort important qui doit être fait sur les aspects du test rappelle à tout développeur de système IoT que: ne rien faire est plus cher que de faire au fur et à mesure.

Mots-clés : Internet des Objets, Tests basés sur des modèles, Test, Conformité, Sécurité, Exploration comportementale