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L'ego, son expression, sa vie, sa naturalisation : une crise des sciences de la subjectivité

Abstract : This thematic and historical work aims to highlight the difficulties that can be encountered when we try to grasp what the egological life means from a phenomenological and scientific point of view. The questions that animate us are the following and rhythm the present work: what exactly does it mean to say "I"? ; What is the characterization of the egological life in Husserlian phenomenology? To what extent can the egological life be naturalized?Our path follows the Husserlian corpus for we consider that it is first necessary to clarify the meaning of the term “ego” in the perspective of an “analytic phenomenology”. This allowed us to understand that the indexical “I” can be the mark of a “descriptive ingenuity” which consists in an inability to fully describe a situation or a subjectivity expressing itself. Only a phenomenological understanding of the “I” may modify this conception by inducing that the presence of a subjectivity made of flesh and bones is an irreducible Nullpunkt. The phenomenological language, in addition to valuing the subjective part of live experience (Ichrede), also allows to modify our ontic conception of the meaning of termes used in order to describe a state of things from an eidetic point of view – a thing as correlate.By taking up this cardinal idea, we have subsequently attempted to solve the enigma around the I from a historical point of view on the basis a comparative study between Husserlian phenomenology and what critics made by Husserls disciples such as Reinach, Ingarden and Sartre. From then on, we were able to grasp the depth and validity of some critics made against the transcendental turn of phenomenology. Yet, these critics cannot go beyond or compromise Husserl'sthinking for this latter one overflows in our view the formal and sterile framework of an idealistic-realistic binarity. In this way, we wanted to highlight the renewal of phenomenology from the genetic point of view, starting with what we call the “phenomenological naturalism”, especially in regard to the treatment Husserl accorded to subjects such as birth, death, a(b)no(r)mality and animality. In doing so, we had the evidence to show that Husserl was only apparently an idealist and that his work contains the seeds of the naturalistic enterprise under developent for some decades.It was therefore necessary to show the correlations between the “classical” phenomenology and the naturalization of phenomenology through a study of contempory texts presented by authors such as F. Varela, N. Depraz or J-L Petit. It appeared to us that naturalization was still embryonic, but that it may in the near future, through researches on agentivity, depression or phenophysics, illuminate cognitive sciences from the perspective of a cogenerative and fertile study for it joins the first and third person perspectives. However, it seems to us that the naturalization of phenomenology remains more asubjective, in the sense given by Patocka, than fully phenomenological. In conclusion, we affirm that two types of phenomenology must be distinguished, as well as two types of naturalization, while arguing that it would be also wise to take into consideration the role of the enteric nervous system, in addition to the brain, in the characterization of subjective life.
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Jean-Daniel Thumser. L'ego, son expression, sa vie, sa naturalisation : une crise des sciences de la subjectivité. Philosophie. Université Paris sciences et lettres, 2017. Français. ⟨NNT : 2017PSLEE086⟩. ⟨tel-02070593⟩



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