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Theses

Cryptanalysis of symmetric encryption algorithms

Abstract : Nowadays, cryptology is heavily used to protect stored and transmitted data against malicious attacks, by means of security algorithms. Cryptology comprises cryptography, the design of these algorithms, and cryptanalysis, the analysis of their security.In this thesis, we focus on the cryptanalysis of symmetric encryption algorithms, that is cryptographic algorithms that rely on a secret value shared beforehand between two parties to ensure both encryption and decryption. We present three attacks against symmetric encryption algorithms. The first two cryptanalyses target two high profile candidates of the CAESAR cryptographic competition, the AEZ and NORX algorithms, while the last one targets the Kravatte algorithm, an instance of the Farfalle construction based on the Keccak permutation. Farfalle is multipurpose a pseudo-random function (PRF) developed by the same designers' team as the permutation Keccak used in the SHA-3 hash function.The CAESAR competition, that began in 2015, aims at selecting a portfolio of algorithms recommended for authenticated encryption. The two candidates analysed, AEZ and NORX, reached the third round of the CAESAR competition but were not selected to be part of the finalists. These two results contributed to the cryptanalysis effort required in such a competition. This effort did not establish enough confidence to justify that AEZ and NORX accede to the final round of the competition.AEZ is a construction based on the AES primitive, that aims at offering an optimal resistance against more permissive attack scenarios than those usually considered for authenticated encryption algorithms. We show here that one can recover all the secret material used in AEZ with an abnormal success probability.NORX is an authenticated encryption algorithm based on a variant of the so-called sponge construction used for instance in the SHA-3 hash function. The internal permutation is inspired from the one of BLAKE and ChaCha. We show that one can leverage a strong structural property of this permutation to recover the secret key, thanks to the designers' non-conservative choice of reducing the security margin in the sponge construction.Finally, the last cryptanalysis reconsiders the robustness of the Kravatte algorithm. Kravatte is an efficient and parallelizable PRF with input and output of variable length. In this analysis, we exploit the low algebraic degree of the permutation Keccak used in Kravatte to mount three key-recovery attacks targeting different parts of the construction: a higher order differential attack, an algebraic meet-in-the-middle attack and an attack based on a linear recurrence distinguisher.
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  • HAL Id : tel-02012149, version 1

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Colin Chaigneau. Cryptanalysis of symmetric encryption algorithms. Cryptography and Security [cs.CR]. Université Paris-Saclay, 2018. English. ⟨NNT : 2018SACLV086⟩. ⟨tel-02012149⟩

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