, Pour ce premier profil, nous allons distinguer huit cas

, ? ? (d, a, ?) ? V a 1 (?), ? (d, b, ?) ? V b 1 (?) et ? (d, c, ?) ? V c 1 (?)

, ? ? (d, a, ?) ? V a 1 (?), ? (d, b, ?) ? V b 1 (?) et ? (d, c, ?) > V c 1 (?)

?. ,

, ? ? (d, a, ?) ? V a 1 (?), ? (d, b, ?) > V b 1 (?) et ? (d, c, ?) > V c 1 (?)

, ? ? (d, a, ?) > V a 1 (?), ? (d, b, ?) ? V b 1 (?) et ? (d, c, ?) > V c 1 (?)

, ? ? (d, a, ?) > V a 1 (?), ? (d, b, ?) > V b 1 (?) et ? (d, c, ?) ? V c 1 (?)

?. , V a 1 (?), ? (d, b, ?) > V b 1 (?) et ? (d, c, ?) > V c 1 (?)

. Références,

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. .. Les-quatre-ordres-de-préférence-possibles, , p.155

. , Les deux ordres de préférence possibles

L. .. Dix-huit-ordres-de-préférence-possibles, , p.160

. .. Les-douze-ordres-de-préférence-possibles, , p.165

. , Les six ordres de préférence possibles

, 10 Les fréquences de violation de l'homogénéité par la règle de Dodgson, p.177

. Le-score-de-dodgson,