Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation

Essays on macroeconomic theory

Abstract : This thesis is made of three independent chapters. The first chapter contributes to the literature on expectations. I argue that they may learn a misspecified model instead of learning the rational expectation model. I consider a simple economy with two types of agents. Rational learners learn the true model of the economy whereas consistent learners learn an autoregressive model. I show that a long run equilibrium exists in which consistent learners dominate. Simulations show that the economy may converge towards it. The second chapter deals with the intertemporal choice. I consider a model with wealth in the utility. I study the case of nonseparability. This disentangles between the income effect on labor supply and the intertemporal substitution effect. I derive several implications for economic policy. Then, I estimate the two new parameters introduced in the paper. I find large and positive values for both. The third chapter builds a model of corporate investment under adverse selection. My contribution is to provide a tractable model easy to embed into a macroeconomic model. Borrowers differs by the riskiness of their investment project like in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). They have infinite horizon and signal their type by borrowing a fraction of their retained earnings. I get an analytic solution for the incentive constraint. I integrate the relation into a dynamic model and derive some implications.
Document type :
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [108 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Abes Star :  Contact
Submitted on : Tuesday, January 8, 2019 - 9:35:08 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 19, 2021 - 11:09:03 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, April 9, 2019 - 4:43:15 PM


Version validated by the jury (STAR)


  • HAL Id : tel-01972942, version 1


Elliot Aurissergues. Essays on macroeconomic theory. Economics and Finance. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2018. English. ⟨NNT : 2018PA01E029⟩. ⟨tel-01972942⟩



Record views


Files downloads