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L'horizon comme problème. Contribution à une histoire plurielle de la phénoménologie

Abstract : My work aims at proposing a cartography of the phenomenological uses of the concept of horizon in the 20th century, as well as justifying the idea of a plural history of phenomenology itself. In fact, both issues are intimately related for the main goal is to show the existence of (at least) two alternative versions of phenomenology in the 20th, defined by two radically different conceptual and problematic frames determining two different way of using the term « horizon », and two different histories of this notion. Thus, each version — Heidegger-inspired hermeneutical phenomenology, including Heidegger himself at his « first » and « second » stage, Gadamer, Levinas, Henry, Marion vs. Husserlian phenomenology — is based on a very distinctive conception of what a « phenomenon » is — what is structurally concealed, unconstituted, and founds what structurally shows up, reason why it has to be made hermeneutically manifest (Leben an und für sich, Sein des Seiendes, Sein als Lichtung, life, the Other, giveness) vs. any possible meaningful object constituted as a unity in a multiplicity of any possible consciousness, constitutive correlation whose character of possibility must be grasped as that of an eidetic structure the phenomenologist has to describe — which define the kind of problems and uses of the « horizon » that will be at stake: as for hermeneutical phenomenology, it all starts with Heidegger’s explicitation of the horizon of Leben an und für sich and being and ends up with the further rejection of such a concept, considered as connected to modern metaphysics of subjectivity, by the second Heidegger, Levinas, Henry and Marion, through Gadamer’s attempt to combine the use of the term of « horizon » and a renewed critic of metaphysics; on the other hand, as for Husserl’s phenomenology, the horizon is first considered in Thing and Space as a temporal and intentional synthetic function in virtue of which the unity of the thing is made out of a multiplicity of external perceptions, before its synthetic function is generalized in Ideen I to the constitution of each and every transcendant and immanent objectivity. Then it is precisely such a generalization which, as it defines Husserl’s concept of « phenomenon » itself as a unity constituted in a multiplicity synthesized through an horizon, implies theoretical developments related to phenomenology’s methodical operations — épochè, eidetic reduction and intentional analysis, phenomenological reflexion — in virtue of which such phenomena can be studied, developments we try to follow in the second part of this work. At this point, we are finally led to two main results: first, we’re from now on able to value the differentiated significance of the concept of « horizon » in both versions of phenomenology; secondly, and more importantly, by radically distinguishing those two ways of doing phenomenology, we pave the way to (and justify theoretically) a further appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology that, more than a century after the publication of Ideen I, is still to be carried out.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, October 3, 2018 - 11:19:17 AM
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Aurelien Djian. L'horizon comme problème. Contribution à une histoire plurielle de la phénoménologie. Philosophie. Université Charles de Gaulle - Lille III, 2017. Français. ⟨NNT : 2017LIL30042⟩. ⟨tel-01882692v2⟩



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