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Trois essais sur le capital-investissement

Abstract : This PhD thesis addresses the effects of private equity on corporate governance (Chapter 1 and 2) and the determinants of Venture Capital (VC) investments (Chapter 3). The first two chapters examine the changes that private equity investors introduce in the governance of their portfolio companies (in terms of CEO turnover) after a Public-to-Private (PTP) operation. Our empirical results show that (i) PE-backed companies exert a more active monitoring, and are more likely to dismiss their CEO than public firms (Chapter 1) (ii) PE-backed companies with more specialized investors are less likely to dismiss their CEO than other PE-backed companies (Chapter 2). From a theory perspective, the findings that CEO turnover rate and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity are higher in PE-backed companies comparing with public firms (Chapter 1) seem to support the ‘control hypothesis’, i.e., the contention that the concentrated (and illiquid) ownership structure of PE-backed companies provides stronger shareholder monitoring and a tighter control for poor performance than the dispersed ownership structure of public firms. For companies with similar concentrated ownership structures (i.e., our sample of PE-backed companies in Chapter 2), our results rather support the ‘inside information hypothesis’ of boards advanced by Cornelli and Karakas (2015). This theory suggests that sophisticated investors (e.g. specialized PE firms) are more likely to use ‘soft’ (inside) information when they evaluate the CEO’s competence and the decision to dismiss the CEO. In contrast, less sophisticated investors are more likely to base their decision on ‘hard’ information, e.g., the firm’s performance relative to its peers. Finally, Chapter 3 is related to debate on the determinants of venture capital development. We try to assess how particular mechanisms of governmental support to innovation impact VC investments, and whether the institutional environment moderates the relationship between governmental R&D and VC investments. Our results show that higher level of governmental R&D expenditures lead to higher level of VC investments. We found also that higher quality of formal institutions is associated with higher level of early stage VC activity. Contrary to what was expected, the quality of the institutional environment has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between governmental R&D expenditures and VC activity. A possible interpretation of this result is that in the presence of highly developed formal institutions the technological opportunities measured by governmental R&D expenditures have no stimulating effect on venture capital development.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, July 3, 2018 - 1:49:07 PM
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  • HAL Id : tel-01828766, version 1


Andrey Astashov. Trois essais sur le capital-investissement. Gestion et management. Université de Lyon, 2017. Français. ⟨NNT : 2017LYSE2143⟩. ⟨tel-01828766⟩



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