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Vérification formelle de protocoles basés sur de courtes chaines authentifiées

Ludovic Robin 1
1 PESTO - Proof techniques for security protocols
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : Modern security protocols may involve humans in order to compare or copy short strings betweendifferent devices. Multi-factor authentication protocols, such as Google 2-factor or 3D-Secure are typical examplesof such protocols. However, such short strings may be subject to brute force attacks. In this thesis we propose asymbolic model which includes attacker capabilities for both guessing short strings, and producing collisions whenshort strings result from an application of weak hash functions. We propose a new decision procedure for analyzing(a bounded number of sessions of) protocols that rely on short strings. The procedure has been integrated in theAKISS tool and tested protocols from the ISO/IEC 9798-6:2010 standard
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Submitted on : Monday, April 16, 2018 - 6:24:06 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, December 18, 2018 - 4:38:25 PM


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  • HAL Id : tel-01767989, version 1



Ludovic Robin. Vérification formelle de protocoles basés sur de courtes chaines authentifiées. Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]. Université de Lorraine, 2018. Français. ⟨NNT : 2018LORR0019⟩. ⟨tel-01767989⟩



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