Countermeasures to side-channel attacks and secure multi-party computation

Abstract : Cryptosystems are present in a lot of everyday life devices, such as smart cards, smartphones, set-topboxes or passports. The security of these devices is threatened by side-channel attacks, where an attacker observes their physical behavior to learn information about the manipulated secrets. The evaluation of the resilience of products against such attacks is mandatory to ensure the robustness of the embedded cryptography. In this thesis, we exhibit a methodology to efficiently evaluate the success rate of side-channel attacks, without the need to actually perform them. In particular, we build upon a paper written by Rivainin 2009, and exhibit explicit formulaes allowing to accurately compute the success rate of high-order side-channel attacks. We compare this theoretical approach against practical experiments. This approach allows for a quick assessment of the probability of success of any attack based on an additive distinguisher. We then tackle the issue of countermeasures against side- channel attacks. To the best of our knowledge, we study for the first time since the seminal paper of Ishai, Sahai and Wagner in 2003 the issue of the amount of randomness in those countermeasures. We improve the state of the art constructions and show several constructions and bounds on the number of random bits needed to securely perform the multiplication of two bits. We provide specific constructions for practical orders of masking, and prove their security and optimality. Finally, we propose a protocolallowing for the private computation of a secure veto among an arbitrary large number of players, while using a constant number of random bits. Our construction also allows for the secure multiplication of any number of elements of a finite field.
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Adrian Thillard. Countermeasures to side-channel attacks and secure multi-party computation. Cryptography and Security [cs.CR]. PSL Research University, 2016. English. ⟨NNT : 2016PSLEE053⟩. ⟨tel-01764625⟩

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