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Essais sur l'analyse économique de la négociation

Abstract : In civil liability actions, the proportion of cases that are settled through conciliation remains very low in some countries. Negotiation failures lead to trials, the cost of which is high for both the state and the parties involved in litigation. in this thesis, we use a wide range of empirical tools to investigate the determinants that contribute to the success or failure of settlement between two parties involved in a legal action. We contribute to this topic through four original studies. We first investigate the rationality of players in one of the most simple bargaining games : the ultimatum game. For that purpose, we perform a metaanalysis of the three last decades of experimental research. Proposers’ choices, that do no match the theoretical equilibrium of the game, are found to be rationalegiven the observed behavior of responders. Subsequently, we perform a comparative meta-analysis of the ultimatum and the dictator game to investigate the “fairness hypothesis” according to which off ers in these two games are not significantly different. We find that the more developed a country, the more likely the “fairness hypothesis” is to be rejected. In a third place, we aim to identify the forces that shape decision-making in the pretrial conciliation phase of French labor courts. The results are twofold. First, conciliation is less likely when plaintiff s are assisted by a lawyer. Second, we find that the likelihood of settlement decreases as the amount at stake increases. Finally, through an original experiment, we empirically investigate the behavior of individuals who do not want to bargain, but are forced to do so. We show that individuals who are forced to bargain make less generous offers and are less likely to conciliate.
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  • HAL Id : tel-01727076, version 1



Jean-Christian Tisserand. Essais sur l'analyse économique de la négociation. Economies et finances. Université de Franche-Comté, 2016. Français. ⟨NNT : 2016BESA0003⟩. ⟨tel-01727076⟩



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