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Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Secure Computation

Geoffroy Couteau 1, 2
2 CASCADE - Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities
DI-ENS - Département d'informatique - ENS Paris, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique : UMR 8548, Inria de Paris
Abstract : In this thesis, we study zero-knowledge proofs, a cryptographic primitive that allows to prove a statement while yielding nothing beyond its truth, and their applications to secure computation. Specifically, we first introduce a new type of zero-knowledge proofs, called implicit zero-knowledge arguments, that stands between two existing notions, interactive zero-knowledge proofs and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Our new notion provides the same efficiency benefits as the latter when used to design round-efficient secure computation protocols, but it can be built from essentially the same cryptographic assumptions as the former, which leads to improved efficiency and security guarantees. Second, we revisit a zero-knowledge proof system that is particularly useful for secure computation protocols manipulating integers, and show that the known security analysis can be improved to base the proof system on a more well-studied assumption. Eventually, we introduce a new method to build zero-knowledge proof systems over the integers, which particularly improves over existing methods in a client-server model, where a weak client executes a secure computation protocol with a powerful server.
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https://hal.inria.fr/tel-01668125
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Submitted on : Tuesday, December 19, 2017 - 5:53:37 PM
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  • HAL Id : tel-01668125, version 1

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Geoffroy Couteau. Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Secure Computation. Cryptography and Security [cs.CR]. PSL research University, 2017. English. ⟨tel-01668125v1⟩

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