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Zero-knowledge proofs for secure computation

Abstract : In this thesis, we study zero-knowledge proofs, a cryptographic primitive that allows to prove a statement while yielding nothing beyond its truth, and their applications to secure computation. Specifically, we first introduce a new type of zero-knowledge proofs, called implicit zero-knowledge arguments, that stands between two existing notions, interactive zeroknowledge proofs and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Our new notion provides the same efficiency benefits than the latter when used to design roundefficient secure computation protocols, but it can be built from essentially the same cryptographic assumptions than the former, which allows to get improved efficiency and security guarantees. Second, we revisit a zero-knowledge proof system that is particularly useful for secure computation protocols manipulating integers, and show that the known security analysis can be improved to base the proof system on a more wellstudied assumption. Eventually, we introduce a new method to build zero-knowledge proof systems over the integers, which particularly improves over existing methods in a client-server model, where a weak client executes a secure computation protocol with a powerful server.
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Submitted on : Friday, July 13, 2018 - 11:24:47 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, November 17, 2021 - 12:31:05 PM


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  • HAL Id : tel-01668125, version 2



Geoffroy Couteau. Zero-knowledge proofs for secure computation. Cryptography and Security [cs.CR]. Université Paris sciences et lettres, 2017. English. ⟨NNT : 2017PSLEE065⟩. ⟨tel-01668125v2⟩



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