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# Emotions in legal fiction: conceptual metaphors and cross-domain mapping with ATLAS.ti

Alena Soloshenko

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**UNIVERSITÉ DE STRASBOURG**



**ÉCOLE DOCTORALE 520 « Humanités »**  
**UR 1339 LiLPa (*Linguistique, Langues, Parole*)**

**THÈSE** présentée par :

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Discipline/ Spécialité : **Sciences du Langage (*Linguistique anglaise*)**

**Emotions in Legal Fiction:  
Conceptual Metaphors and Cross-Domain Mapping with  
ATLAS.ti**

***La conceptualisation des émotions dans la fiction juridique :  
Métaphores conceptuelles et mises en correspondance  
croisée avec l'outil ATLAS.ti***

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## INTRODUCTION

Emotions are central to human experience, and conspicuous in daily language. Psychologists have long been interested in emotions, but it is only relatively recently that linguists have started exploring this field from the cognitive linguistics perspective within specialized legal discourse. This is what prompted this present research and this thesis hopes to contribute to a greater visibility of this particularly rich linguistic area.

The choice has been made to study legal fiction and therefore this thesis is dedicated to the cognitive study of emotions in the language of legal fiction. The main aim of the research is to show how and for what purposes emotions lexicalize and conceptualize, taking legal fiction as a reliable source of examples close enough to “real” life.

In legal discourse, the debate is centred around the status of emotions in opposition to logic and reason, while it is commonly held in (cognitive) psychology that emotions can be successfully applied as a tool of interpretation on many levels, including social behavior and communication. The starting point for the present study is to emphasize that emotions, contrary to popular belief, are very present in specialized legal discourse, which is perceived more like a discourse of reason, rather than of passion. The latter has already been stated by Aristotle: “The law is reason unaffected by desire.”<sup>1</sup> The expression of emotions in written legal texts in different genres and various time periods is a fact, as is demonstrated in the following examples:

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle. *Politics*, Book III, 1287.a32, trans. Bolland.

- (1) “Parker looked **distressed**. He had confidence in Wimsey’s judgement, and, in spite of his own interior certainty, he **felt shaken**.” (*Strong Poison*, Dorothy Sayers, 1930, 33);
- (2) “Venetia **had enjoyed** her cross-examination of Stephen Wright...” (*A Certain Justice*, P.D. James, 1997, 9);
- (3) “In this case the appellant was found **guilty** of a charge that about 11.50 P. M. on 29<sup>th</sup> September last he conducted himself in **a disorderly manner** by peering in at a lighted window of a dwelling-house; put residents in the street of that dwelling-house in **a state of fear and alarm** and did commit a breach of peace.” (Scottish High Court of Justiciary, February 9, 1949)

From a historical perspective, few discussions have been initiated regarding the role of emotions in legal discourse; however, the last two decades have shown favorable changes regarding the analysis of emotions and the law (Nussbaum, 1999; Bandes, 2001; Karstedt, 2002; Bornstein & Wiener, 2010; Bandes & Blumenthal, 2012), and this has helped scholars embrace the idea that emotions are not “contaminators” to legal thought but significant in legal discourse. For example, the emotion of disgust is considered to be the “primary or even sole justification for making some acts illegal” (Nussbaum, 1999: 20-21), especially as disgust relates to the law of obscenity. Similarly, emotions are taken into account as extenuating circumstances in order to render “the crime of passion” as “less aggravated” (*The Dictionary of Law*, 2015). Nonetheless, to the best of my knowledge, hardly any of the previous studies on law and literature take into account the role of emotions as expressed in the language of legal fiction. Psychological studies on emotions have been mainly interested in practical domains rather than fiction (Bandes, 2001), and these studies would only benefit from the cognitive perspective on language, cognition, and emotions.

The investigation of emotions in academic literature has often concerned other genres and types of discourse than legal discourse proper. On the one hand, some research has been done into the linguistic expression of emotions and their conceptualization in language. This research area is rather developed, which is supported by the studies of emotions as concepts in small and big corpora and the way language influences the quality of our emotional experience, including cultural variations (Wallbott & Scherer, 1995; Athanasiadou & Tabakowska, 1998; Oster, 2010; Glynn, 2014; Ogarkova & Soriano, 2014). On the other hand, linguistic problems within legal theory and practice have stimulated the research into “legalese” as an overcomplicated and highly formalized language (Tiersma, 1999). Despite the evident existence of emotions in legal discourse, most studies focus on the strictly traditional notions to legal thought—e.g. argument, decision-making, or studies of court trials. The dilemmas encountered by judges and other legal professionals between reason and emotion have been addressed in a limited number of sparse articles (Posner, 2000; Karstedt, 2002) while the attention is mostly drawn to the intellectual work of legal professionals (as portrayed both in real life and fictional worlds). So, in order to draw more attention to the combined research into language, emotions, and the law, the present study has been designed to investigate emotions in legal discourse through their linguistic and conceptual representations. Emotional understanding, or empathy, and emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990) as the ability to use emotional information to monitor thinking and behavior, are two main capabilities of a human being. Using these capabilities, we can recognize our own emotions and the emotions of others. Emotions are featured in language in many forms; they are structured to create an effect and are expected to

have “levels of vividness” (Ortony & Fainsilber, 1987: 181)—that is, the intensity of their expression. Furthermore, provided that emotions are part of any human activity, cognitive theories (Arnold, 1960; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Scherer, 1982; Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1993) postulate that emotions are present in cognitive processing. However, the following questions are still poorly addressed from the cognitive linguistics perspective, especially concerning questions as to what extent and what emotions are utilized in legal discourse.

The cognitive approach to language suggests new perspectives of how people create conceptual categories (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Talmy, 1988; Kövecses, 2004). The Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) provides a way to analyze stereotypes within language because the conceptual mapping between the target and the source domains reveal patterns behind them. The metaphoric architecture of language forms part of information processing by transforming simple structures into conceptual domains (Vinje, 2011: 43). Since the publication of Lakoff and Johnson’s book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), the cognitive analysis has undergone changes. The past decade has shown that traditional conceptual mapping between the target and the source domains and the application of the Metaphor Identification Procedure (Pragglejaz Group, 2007) are still successfully applied in the field. Some internationally recognized projects—e.g. *MetaphorLab* of the University of Amsterdam or *MetaNet* that combines the research of Lakoff, Feldman, and Narayanan (*AI Group*)—investigate metaphor on linguistic and cognitive levels. But it is important to add that with the boost of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), the strategies of the cross-domain mapping evolved due to the qualitative annotation in CAQDAS. As a result of these quickly evolving

software developments, researchers began to adapt their focus of investigation in accordance to what this new framework suggests (Friese, 2011; Kimmel, 2012). These strategies aim at highlighting the complexity of conceptual structures of emotions.

The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the peculiarities of lexicalization and conceptualization of emotions in legal fiction from the cognitive linguistic perspective. In order to achieve this, the following research objectives have been set:

- (1) Reviewing the literature on the subject and examining theories at stake in order to decide on the framework of the present study;
- (2) Collecting source data for the analysis; extracting and categorizing emotion keywords from the source data to provide qualitative metaphor analyses;<sup>2</sup>
- (3) Determining variations used in conceptualizations of emotion keywords in legal fiction;
- (4) Developing an explanatory theory that associates lexicalization of emotions with their conceptual representation.

In the present study, legal fiction is used as the source data. The advantage of fiction over official legal documentation is that it contextualizes emotion in situations that are fictitious but plausible and are comprehended by lay people—in other words, no professional legal knowledge is required to process these texts. Since the dissertation proposal, this thesis has undergone some changes that make up its

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<sup>2</sup> *Qualitative metaphor analysis* – a combination of *qualitative data analysis* (QDA) with *conceptual metaphor theory* (CMT), which is helpful for the systematic analysis of the linguistic expression of emotions. The term *qualitative metaphor analysis* is used by Kimmel (2012).

final version. The changes concern the source data: despite the two blocks of source data—literary fiction and legal documentation—I have only used one legal fiction. The motivation behind this choice is twofold. Firstly, the cognitive approach to emotions is prioritized, which focuses on “affective” processing of text and less on its genre-specific characteristics. Secondly, from a practical point of view, the amount of material and the written analysis would have gone beyond the standard limits of a PhD thesis. Thus, legal documentation as source data will be used in a separate study of emotions in my future research.

The legal system is, obviously, an integral part of British culture and it is vividly portrayed in literary texts. Certain periods of time are specifically significant in the British literary tradition, which has been considered in the choice of the source data for the analysis. Thus, four novels have been selected to represent three periods of time or *time-frames*.<sup>3</sup> The first is literature of the Victorian period represented by the novel *Bleak House* by Charles Dickens, which was published in 1853. The second period is one of the most significant periods—the Golden Age of detective fiction, represented here by two novels—*Strong Poison* by Dorothy Sayers (1930) and *Sad Cypress* by Agatha Christie (1940). Lastly, the third time-frame is a relatively recent one, represented by legal thrillers, such as the novel selected for the present study—*A Certain Justice* by P. D. James, published in 1997.

A total of 900 emotion keywords have been extracted from the source data for the analysis. They represent the five preselected emotions: *fear*, *guilt*, *surprise*, *happiness*, and *interest*. The choice is based on the psychological classification of emotions as “basic” or “universal” (Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; Ekman, 1999a) and

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<sup>3</sup> The term *time-frame* is used in reference to the three periods of time that have been chosen to represent the source data for the analysis in this thesis.

takes into account the differences with what emotion is not in reference to the notions of *feeling*, *affect*, and *mood*. Since the source data for the analysis is legal fiction, basic emotions that seem to be of consequence and highly present in legal discourse proper have been taken into consideration in a final cut of five emotions for the analysis.

The methodological basis of this study is designed to examine lexical and cognitive levels of emotion expression in language, which is provided by the qualitative metaphor analysis (Kimmel, 2012). The cross-domain mapping is central to this analysis but the traditional one-source-one-target-domain mapping is enhanced with *two-tier coding strategy* (Kimmel, 2012). The term pertains to the traditional cross-domain mapping but it presupposes the existence of multiple source domains for a single target domain. Over the past thirty years, the application of metaphor logic has revealed a variety of conceptualizations and numerous source domains of different notions. Some conceptual metaphors are common and have one source domain, but there are complex metaphors, which indicate that one source domain is not sufficient for the interpretation of this kind of conceptual metaphors. In this regard, the choice of legal fiction is particularly relevant as examples extracted from corpus are context-based and bring to light unique conceptualizations.

The qualitative approach to the source data has resulted in the exhaustive process of coding, which aims at extracting and categorizing linguistic information about emotions that is “grounded” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) in the source data.

The analysis as a process has several phases: First, emotion keywords are selected and extracted from the source data. Then, with the assistance of CAQDAS ATLAS.ti, they are assigned with codes. The procedure of coding of each emotion

keyword can be roughly divided into two parts: (1) I first provide the traditional cross-domain mapping but enhanced with two-tier strategy for the source domains. (2) Then, I look for information that could reveal more about the emotion word—in other words, (i) evaluating emotion on the parameters of intensity, quality, duration, and proximity with other notions, and (ii) examining the types of force-dynamic in accordance with the principles suggested by Talmy (1988) and further developed by Kövecses (2004), who suggested understanding the force-dynamic interaction between the force entities (*Agonist* and *Antagonist*), but in relation to emotion and self.

The present thesis comprises six chapters, a conclusion, a reference section, and appendices. The latter includes the full cross-domain mapping of 900 emotion keywords (Appendix 4: see accompanying CD-rom).

The first chapter is devoted to the review of the literature and gathers sufficient theoretical background to support further empirical study as well as determine the limitations of the approaches concerned. In this thesis, the essential approach to the study of emotions in language and cognition is the cognitive linguistics approach. The fundamental tenets of this approach are discussed in the first chapter and supported by new tendencies in the empirical approach to the study of language and cognition which have been partially motivated by the criticism of cognitive linguistics over the last ten to fifteen years. Since emotions are a “natural” ground for psychologists, the chapter goes on to provide historical insight into the fundamental theories of emotions in psychology that contributed to the boost of emotion research from a cognitive perspective. In the study of emotions as expressed in language, it has been necessary to limit the number of emotions for the analysis, which is carried

out in the first section of Chapter 2. The focus of the following two sections of the second chapter is on the topics of emotions and law and the ways legal topics are represented in fiction literature. Consequently, text comprehension is discussed in the aspect of how the process of reading aimed at provoking emotional response is related to language, emotion, and memory.

Chapter 3 explains the choice of the source data for the analysis and this is followed by the description of the methodological framework illustrated by one example of metaphor analysis making use of the software ATLAS.ti whose benefits are brought to light. This software, which was developed by *Scientific Software Development GmbH*, and has so far been mainly used in social sciences projects in Germany, Great Britain, and Canada, is particularly useful to facilitate collecting, categorizing, and interpreting the source data. Following from this, the third section of this chapter provides a detailed description of the software and discusses its compatibility with cross-domain mapping.

In Chapters 4 and 5, the qualitative metaphor analysis is conducted along the same procedure for the five emotion keywords selected. The aim is to uncover lexicalization patterns and a variety of conceptualizations of the emotional experiences conveyed through language in the hope that this procedure can be generalized. Chapter 6 sums up what has been learned from the study of the keywords selected regarding the more general problem of how emotions are verbalized. It also suggests the avenues opened for future research. The main results of the research are discussed in the conclusion.

Appendix 1 provides a glossary of specialized terms that are used throughout the thesis. Appendix 2 lists the classification of emotions as concepts. This is

followed by Appendix 3 that combines the tables with codes developed in the analysis. The findings of the cross-domain mapping of 900 emotion keywords are represented in exhaustive Table 17 (Appendix 4), which is supported by a demonstrative flowchart (Figure 21) of one of the analyzed quotations in order to provide a visualized example of the qualitative metaphor analysis as a process.

The main research question underlying this study is concerned with the broad issue of emotions and cognition in legal discourse, and this research hopes to demonstrate that the use of words denoting emotions in legal fiction is motivated by particular kinds of conceptual metaphors. If different types of emotions are represented in the language of legal fiction through their strongest/weakest conceptualizations and specific patterns of lexicalization, then the knowledge that the conceptual metaphor holds about these emotions reveals the reason behind the use of emotion words in a certain context.

### EMOTIONS IN LANGUAGE AND COGNITION

*Language offers a window into cognitive function, providing insights into the nature, structure and organization of thoughts and ideas.*  
– Evans & Green, 2006

Many studies (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Talmy, 1988; Wierzbicka, 1999; Kövecses, 2000a, 2004; Barcelona & Soriano, 2004) have shown that the cognitive and affective processes in language are often approached as correlated notions. Since these seminal works, knowledge has been expanding regarding the integration of cognitive appraisals to emotional experience, the emotive function of language, and language as a tool to explore emotions. In particular, a number of recent studies (e.g. Oster, 2010; Ogarkova & Soriano, 2014) have focused on the cognitive assessment of emotion concepts in large corpora. However, to the best of my knowledge, no research has been conducted to link emotions and the language of legal discourse, despite empirical evidence that such a link exists. Thus, this study is designed to explore the strategies by which emotions lexicalize and conceptualize in legal discourse.

The problem of investigating emotions is probably one of the most arduous in linguistics. Various theories on and countless approaches to the study of this phenomenon are driven by the complexity of emotional states and their expression in language.<sup>4</sup> To avoid eclecticism in the study of emotions, I focus on fields relevant to

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<sup>4</sup>For example, Jakobson (1960) examines the emotive function of language as one of its six communicative functions. Emotions as “semantic domains” and “universals of the conceptual nature” are investigated by Wierzbicka (1995) in her cultural-semantic approach to language. The “emotional sound-symbolic associations” is one of the main concerns for Sauter *et al.* (2010), who conducted a

the topic of this thesis: cognitive linguistics, and more specifically, cognitive semantics, and psychology. Consequently, a cross-disciplinary approach to the study of emotions in language is supported by psychological theories, which form the backdrop of the approaches used in this thesis. As its object is to study the linguistic expressions of emotions, specific attention is paid to how people conceptualize emotions and the language they use to talk about emotions.

Cognitive linguistics is now more than a cluster of approaches, as is reflected by the overwhelming amount of information available. The past three decades have shown the growing dominance of cognitive science in the research areas of semantics, grammar, and cognitive structure as “an entity that represents the way in which properties of elements human cognition deals with are organized, with respect to each other, in terms of what is relevant for a task the individual performs” (Verhoef, 2007: 118). Perceived as “an enterprise” and “a modern school of linguistic thought and practice” (Evans, Bergen & Zinken, 2007: 2), the use of cognitive linguistics’ methods and techniques has spread beyond the boundaries of academia.

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cross-cultural analysis of how people evaluate poems on emotional parameters of “happiness” and “aggression.”

# 1. MULTI-COMPLEX APPROACHES TO EMOTIONS

## 1.1 Emotion in Language Science

The relationship between language and emotions may prove challenging. The relevance of emotion in language has been established from various angles. Various collections of articles (e.g. Bamberg, 1997; Majid, 2012; Foolen, 2012) provide a description of research into emotions in language, including cognitive, cultural, psycholinguistic, and other approaches. Besides extensive psychological, social, and neurobiological approaches to the analysis of emotions, previous research in linguistics has documented that emotions are the subject of comparative language-dependent conceptualizations (e.g. Wierzbicka, 1999). Attention has been paid by researchers to how emotions are linguistically represented in languages and for what purposes. Research has focused on the emotive function of language (e.g. Jakobson, 1960), which plays a significant role in classifying various lexical areas, such as argumentation or insults employed in the process of reasoning. Jakobson developed six functions of language, including the abovementioned emotive or “expressive” functions, which were described in his fundamental work *Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics* (1960). Here the author points out that “Language must be investigated in all the variety of its functions” (1960: 353), and that “all words are symbolic,” which he also emphasized in his later works (1990: 25). Often referred to as “a founding father of formalism” (Galan, 2014), Jakobson can also be named a “precursor” of the Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphors (1980). Jakobson examined the notions of *similarity* and *contiguity* as significant for

metonymy and metaphor much earlier than 1980—to be more precise, in 1956. In his work *Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances* (1956), the author suggests understanding these devices not only as rhetorical, but also as two modes of mental processes—when metaphor is seen as a link between two unrelated domains.

Fairly recently, considerable effort has been devoted to studying how emotions are conveyed through language, by involving cognitive processes (e.g. Talmy, 1988; Kövecses, 2004). Previous investigation in cognitive linguistics has shown that the language used to express emotions is largely metaphorical and the notion of *emotion* is “inherently metaphorical” itself (Kövecses, 2004: 86).

In recent years, many studies on cognitive and corpus linguistics, as well as cross-cultural studies on language, have followed a cognitive approach to investigate the level of thinking (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) in order to explain the mental capacity of human beings to create novel lexical constructions in language. A comparison of the lexical concepts of emotions and their semantics in cognitive (Kövecses, 2004), corpus-based, and cognitive-semantic studies (Stefanowitsch, 2003; Oster, 2010; Glynn, 2014) has become more important in the research on conceptual knowledge via language. To appreciate the diversity in approaches, the different methodologies that have been used to investigate this topic must be addressed.

### 1.1.1 Culture and emotion

Now, if turning to the cultural-semantic approach, language is understood as “a means of making sense of emotions” that offers “immediate access to conceptualization and understanding of emotions” (Bamberg, 1997: 309). For example, the way Wierzbicka and Goddard (1997) analyze emotions as semantic domains using the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) perfectly accounts for the meaning of emotion categories. The theoretical base and extensive long-term empirical experiments of NSM, developed initially by Wierzbicka (1972) and elaborated later by Goddard (1998) and Peeters *et al.* (1999), justifies its strong position in cross-linguistic semantics and lexical typology in general. The *systematic reductive paraphrase* it offers aims to explain the complex concepts in terms of simpler concepts or *semantic primes*.

The basic principles of NSM are suitable for both linguistic and conceptual analysis, which is what I aim to provide when studying how emotions are lexically coded in language. The procedure of breaking down the non-prime concepts into prime ones is called *explication* and takes the following form:

*X felt something like this because X thought something like this:*  
*X felt guilty =*  
*sometimes a person thinks something like this:*  
*I did something*  
*because of this, something had happened*  
*because of this, the person feels something bad*  
*X felt like this*  
(Wierzbicka, 1995, 293)

Similar to the work of Wierzbicka, the approach to language as a tool for exploring emotions is used by the followers of *emotionology*. Harré and Gillett specifically suggested that emotions should be studied “the way people use their emotion vocabulary” (Harré & Gillett, 1994: 148). Research into emotions as expressions of attitudes has drawn on Stearns and Stearns’s (1985) notion of *emotionology*, which is claimed to play an important role in the social and cognitive aspects of emotions (Sarbin, 1952; Lutz, 1986; Harré & Gillett, 1994). According to the developers of emotionology, the working definition of the term is as follows:

*[Emotionology refers to] the attitudes or standards that society, or a definable group within a society, maintains towards basic emotions and their appropriate expression; ways that institutions reflect and encourage these attitudes in human conduct, e.g., courtship practices as expressing the valuation of affect in marriage, or personnel workshops as reflecting the valuation of anger in job relationships.*  
(Stearns & Stearns, 1985, 813)

When analyzing this definition closely, several points can be separated:

- the existence of socially-marked attitudes toward (i) emotions and (ii) their expression;
- how societies deal with these attitudes.

Thus, the term *emotionology* refers to the way societies deal with the *emotions* of their members involved in various situations. According to Stearns and Stearns, emotion tends to be a more complex group of factors, described as follows:

*[Emotion is] a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, mediated through neural and/or hormonal systems, which gives rise to feelings (effective experiences as of pleasure or displeasure) and also general cognitive processes toward appraising the experience; emotions in this sense lead to physiological adjustments to the conditions that aroused response, and often to expressive and adaptive behavior.*  
(*id.*, 813)

As seen from the definitions above, emotion can be approached differently on the cognitive and physiological levels. While Wierzbicka studies emotions as universal entities, followers of the theory of emotionology aim less at universal theories and more at local ones. When Harré and Gillett understand emotions as “discursive acts”<sup>5</sup> (1994: 153), they consider Wierzbicka’s cultural viewpoint but go further in investigating emotions as displays of judgments and acts to be accomplished using the “emotion vocabulary” of a particular culture (*id.*, 154).

Inevitably, cultural and contrastive approaches to the study of emotions in language have spread from researching local languages to the study of current global issues, including bilingualism, second language acquisition and translation studies (e.g. Lehr, 2014). For example, the emphasis falls on the lexical and syntactic studies of emotions in language and literature, using two or more languages, for a contrastive linguistic study. Researchers examine emotion keywords in two or more languages, such as *fear* and *surprise* (Valetopoulos, 2013; Dumais-Turpin, 2013), *anger* (Ogarkova & Soriano, 2014), or the verbs denoting feelings (Mérillou, 2013; Lamprou, 2013).

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<sup>5</sup> The progressive ways of understanding psychology has resulted in looking at emotions as *socially* constructed and *culturally* marked. According to Harré and Gillett, when performing social acts, the vocabulary of emotion displays is seen as “discursive acts,” which is marked by “the discursive interactions of members of a particular cultures” (1994: 52).

Alongside the studies mentioned above, there is a range of empirical examinations to measure the universality of certain emotions by vocalizing them in dissimilar languages and cultures. It is believed in Western thought that certain human emotions remain universal or basic (Plutchik, 1991; Tomkins *et al.*, 1995; Ekman, 1999a). In recent years, a combined attempt of linguists and neuroscientists has endeavored to reveal emotions that are basic to humans of various cultures, including, among others, fear, disgust, and joy. The emphasis of research shifted then toward cultural and ethnic diversity. The goal was to determine whether sounds associated with emotions are shared amongst different cultures. Consequently, a series of tests conducted among groups of people in Britain and Namibia reported that the most easily recognizable emotions, of anger, fear, disgust, amusement, sadness, and surprise, were similar in both cultures, including in the way people vocalize them (Sauter *et al.*, 2010).

### **1.1.2 Expression and emotion**

When talking about language and emotion in this study, the reference is made to words denoting emotions, such as *happiness* or *anger*, or the process of experiencing emotions, such as *being happy* or *angry*, as well as emphatic descriptions of how our body reacts, such as *I feel happiness in my veins* or *His nostrils flared with anger*. Under certain circumstances, we may also use interjections to express both positive and negative emotional states (*Oh!*, *Wow!*, *Ah!*). Often, interjections are compact but are “explosive” reactions to unexpected, overwhelming or surprising information and responses to it. Although they have not yet received significant attention from

linguistics and psychology, there is interesting cross-cultural research on the topic. For example, Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, and Scott (2010) analyze English interjections in the extremely different cultures of Himba and Namibia.

However, emotions in language are not only “a collection of literal words” aimed to categorize and refer to “preexisting emotional reality,” which is emphasized by Kövecses (2004: xii). Arguing about language as figurative, he pointed out that it “can define and even create emotional experiences for us” (*ibid.*). A language-as-context hypothesis is also supported by successful empirical tests in neuroimaging (Wagner *et al.*, 2008), stating that emotion words can cause what is called “a perception shift” (Barrett *et al.*, 2007). This term refers to our ability to recognize emotion in other people’s faces, highlighting that this process is not independent from language. Halberstadt and Niedenthal report the following (2001: 589-595):

*Specifically, participants viewed photographs of female faces expressing emotion blends [angry-happy] [...] and were provided with a label for the expression. [...] it is clear that perceivers' perceptual memory for emotional expressions was not purely a function of the physical configurations of the target faces. Instead, memory depended on how the expression was conceptualized by the perceiver, particularly when the concept was invoked as part of an explanation of the target face's emotional expression.*

Studies that blend the somatic and cognitive abilities of a human being to recognize emotions are becoming increasingly popular. The influence of emotions on the language people use when they hear (or read) about them is of great interest to many researchers. But how do emotions achieve this? The answer to this question requires attention to emotions as “forces,” as influential experiences capable of changing humans’ behavior and communication. Emotions as “forces” are a subject of great interest to many linguists and psychologists, especially those who examine

the facial expressions of emotions (Ekman, 2003). The cognitive approach to emotions as “forces” is crucial for understanding how emotions are conceptualized in language (Kövecses, 2004). Before I delve into this topic from the cognitive perspective (see section 3 of this chapter), it is important to draw attention to some psychological research in this regard.

### 1.1.3 Experience and emotion

When psychologist Goleman interviewed the Dalai Lama for his book *A Force for Good* (2015), they talked about emotions as forces and how to “get a better grip” on them using various techniques, including emotion mapping as suggested by Ekman (*The Paul Ekman Group*, 2015). The Dalai Lama calls negative emotions “the enemies of our well-being,” “destructive,” or “afflictive,” and he urges to train oneself in order to cope with these just as we cope, for example, with a certain virus—i.e. to use an appropriate “hygiene of emotions:”

*If we hear disturbing news but do not have a calm and clear mind [...] then our initial reaction may be, ‘Oh, I must do something, this is very bad.’ But if at a deeper level we stay calm and lucid, then we will make a better response.*  
(Goleman, 2015, 26)

A “deeper level” (a reference to the conscious control of emotional balance) was also discussed by the Dalai Lama and Paul Ekman earlier in 2009. This discussion has resulted in their book entitled *Emotional Awareness*. In this book, the Dalai Lama emphasizes the necessity of paying more attention to emotions, which he ultimately links with the “compassion” of humanity (2009: 2):

*[...] Science and technology are concerned, basically, with physical comfort. When it comes to difficulties or problems with emotions, then, technology cannot do much [...] So now the time has come to explore the trouble, which is faced by our emotional mind, the method or means to tackle this wicked mischievous nature of mind.*

The problems that the Dalai Lama pinpoints in his book can be more easily solved nowadays with the Facial Action Coding System (FACTS) developed by the *Paul Ekman Group*. Ekman, with his major interest in facial expressions, developed an anatomically based system “useful for measuring any facial expression a human being can make” (*The Paul Ekman Group*, 2015). Emotional awareness is one of the keys in coping with emotions. According to Ekman, improving emotional awareness and intelligence means to develop “skills which help you recognize feelings in others and, at the same time, you will likely become more aware of your own feelings” (*ibid.*).

The problem of control over emotions is one of the most important in psychology because when people experience emotions, they often want to control them. The main theoretical framework devoted to this topic concerns the idea that our response to emotions is determined by emotional behaviors like “motivational states” (Frijda, 1988: 351) and that the “quality” of our response is determined by the level of emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990a). The term *emotional intelligence* is defined as one’s “ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (1990a: 189). From the perspective of emotion and mental processing relationships, the notion of *emotional intelligence* is one of the most interesting to use. This is addressed in Chapter 4.

From a psychological point of view, “to get a grip” on emotion, means to assess the cause or reason for the emotion and try to control it or, at least, lower its impact. From a cognitive linguistic point of view, to help get “a better grip” on emotion refers to the ability to describe the emotional state, and be able to talk about it and understand it in order to cope with it. If we look at emotions as influential forms of interaction, we may find that they are detectable and may leave “traces” both on the body and in the way people use language under emotional impact. The speech rate can slow down or become faster under the influence of strong emotions; however, the choice of words tends to be limited, as the speaker would use his/her own basic vocabulary to convey his/her emotional state.

There are traceable similarities in referring to emotions as “forces” in conceptual metaphor logic (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). This logic refers to the understanding of one idea or “domain” in term of another. Thus, “anger” can be understood as “fire,” as shown in the sentence *His face flared up with anger*. Cognitive linguistics investigates emotions via metaphoric domains. Emotions are concepts mediated through “forces” and described by Talmy (1988) as the best representation of force dynamics in the conceptualization of space in so far as they display certain tendencies toward inaction and action (Kövecses, 2004). The force dynamic of emotions is discussed in detail in section 2 of Chapter 3. Nevertheless, to get the main idea on the topic, it is necessary to provide some explanation in this section.

Force-dynamic interpretation of emotional experiences is based on the conceptualization explained by Langacker’s “transfer of energy” (1991: 309-311), as well as on Talmy’s theory of force dynamics and Wildgen’s generic space as the

space of force (see in Kövecses, 2004: 85). Both Talmy and Kövecses are concerned with the influence of emotions in language and cognition. Talmy in his force-dynamic theory (1988) investigates in detail “a previously neglected semantic category—how entities interact with respect to force” (1988: 49). The author first scrutinizes the notion of *physical force* in relation to the notions of *exertion of force*, *resistance*, and the *overcoming* of it, as well as *blockage of force* and its *removal* (*ibid.*). However, generalizing the traditional linguistic notion of *causality*, the author extends a purely physical force-dynamic to the “semantic treatment of *psychological* elements and interactions” (*ibid.*). Similar to psychologist Frijda, who studied emotions as “responses” to stimuli, Talmy’s methodology regards generalized notions of “physical pushing, blocking” as psychological wanting and refraining (e.g. *I held myself back from responding*). The psychological actions of wanting, refraining, pushing, *etc.*, are psychological pressures on an individual (1988: 69). In his theory, Frijda also calls emotions “awareness of the state of action readiness,” which means the readiness to action/inaction toward the stimuli. In this regard, Frijda states (1988: 351):

*All emotions involve some change in action readiness: (a) in readiness to go at it or away from it or to shift attention; (b) in sheer excitement which can be understood as being ready for action but not knowing what action; or (c) in being stopped in one’s tracks or in loss of interest.*

Later, Kövecses (2004) blended Talmy’s force-dynamic regarding emotions. Looking at emotion as “a cause that has a ‘force’ to effect some response (physiological, behavioural, expressive)” (2004: 134), Kövecses demonstrates how major force entities—*Agonist* (inaction) and *Antagonist* (action)—can be employed

to study emotions. In this sense, emotion is “pressure” or “burden,” which can be “internal” (e.g. *I forced myself to do this*) or “external” (e.g. *He made me do it*) (2004: 63-64). Taking into account Kövecses’ extensive work in the field of emotions, I revisit the author’s approach, specifically regarding to the qualitative study of emotions in language further on.<sup>6</sup>

To summarize, approaches toward the study of emotions and language are diverse. My point of view does not take a position on whether cognitive or any other approach to emotions in language is too localized in a particular niche of a particular field of study. In contrast, the complexity and diversity of the ways researchers treat emotions *a priori* impose multiple ways for their investigation. Consequently, I think that nowadays researchers tend to carefully select the most appropriate framework to study the emotions indicated by the source data and research questions. In a qualitative study, such as the present one, the focus is on emotions as keywords expressed in the language of legal discourse, particularly as represented in legal fiction. Therefore, the framework requires such an approach that would justify emotions as entities pertaining both to language and cognition to reveal the ways people perceive emotions and understand their functions through their linguistic expression. The theoretical backdrop for this study is derived from cognitive linguistics and partially cognitive psychology, while a new qualitative approach is added to the practical part of the study. It benefits empirical analysis of the corpus when discovering metaphors via the bottom-up approach to data, or as qualitative researchers put it, the “grounded theory method” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This is addressed in Chapter 3, section 3. Furthermore, in the current chapter, I show how a

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<sup>6</sup> See Chapter 3, section 2.4.

blend of different disciplines can be successfully applied to the study of emotions in language.

Having observed the research into emotions in language science, it seems clear that the ways of interconnection between language and emotions are different. It is, therefore, required to give an insight into the dynamics of language-cognition-emotion relationships, which is discussed in the following section.

## **1.2 Research dynamic between language and emotion**

As seen in section 2, complex approaches to the study of emotions in language promote an interconnection between language itself and emotion, language being a major tool to express emotions and talk about them. From the perspective of linguistics, language plays a central role in how people talk about emotions, how we describe them, and how we perceive them. On the other hand, emotions as fundamental features of human behavior are expressed through verbal and non-verbal language. Using this language they “elicit” reactions, which can be roughly divided into action-prone or inaction-prone responses. Considering this, one important question arises: does language construct emotions or is it used as a tool to express emotions? The answer to this question cannot be one-sided.

As a cognitive linguist, I address how emotions are portrayed in language. The focus is on lexical patterns used to describe emotions in the written language and how cognitive linguistics’ principles are applied in reasoning about emotions as concepts. As discussed in the previous sub-sections, language can be both a tool for provoking emotions and a source of emotional presence. To extend the answer, it can

also be said that language is a tool for exploring emotions, as demonstrated by Wierzbicka via NSM. When referring to psychology, I understand emotions as subjective psychological states. Referring to linguistics, I understand language as a means of examining and expressing emotions. In this thesis, the complex relationship between language and emotions as a synthesis is viewed to provide a detailed account of this phenomenon.

When thinking of this synthesis, language and emotions are understood as two “concurrent, parallel systems in use,” where one system affects the other (Bamberg, 1997: 309). In this thesis, I examine how emotions are expressed in the written language in legal fiction over the given periods of time or time-frames. I draw attention to the lexicalization and conceptualizations of emotions and, thus, inevitably connect emotions with cognition and the notion of *worldview* (e.g. Whorf, 1956). The latter is defined as a comprehensive notion referring to a “fundamental cognitive orientation of an individual,” including emotions along with values, normative postulates, and beliefs, that are “encoded” and “stored” in language and culture (Palmer, 1996: 113). Therefore, my primary task is to examine how emotions as psychological states or processes are used in language and for what purposes. To proceed with this task, a brief overview of the main tenets of cognitive linguistics is required, which will lead to an understanding of how language and emotions help us to understand the world around us.

### 1.3 Language, cognition and emotions

A new school of linguistics emerged in the 1980s—cognitive linguistics. It rejected a modular view of language and cognition, such as Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar (1965), which understood language, especially syntax, as an autonomous faculty and grammar as “autonomous and independent of meaning” (1957: 17). In contrast, cognitive linguistics denies an autonomous linguistic faculty, understands grammar in terms of conceptualization and postulates that knowledge of language arises from language use (e.g. Evans & Green, 2006). This is a crucial point to consider. In my view, the study of language and cognition should be integrated as both phenomena interact closely, as was emphasized by Evans (2007), Fillmore (2007), Cragg & Nation (2010) *et al.* Moreover, the notions of *emotion* and *cognition* are also integrated (Schachter & Singer, 1962; Lazarus, 1993), as is demonstrated in this very section. I argue against the assumption that language is a separate mental faculty in the brain and that emotion is independent from cognition. I start this discussion with the basic principles of cognitive linguistics.

The realm of cognitive linguistics is guided by two commitments and four assumptions to orientate the practice of cognitive linguistics. The two key commitments of cognitive linguistics are the *Generalization Commitment* and *Cognitive Commitment*. The Generalization Commitment argues that “modules” or “subfields” of language (phonology, semantics, syntax, morphology and so on) are not organized in significantly different ways. It emphasizes “common structuring principles that hold across different aspects of language,” which is not common in formal approaches (Evans & Green, 2006: 28). The Cognitive Commitment states

that “principles of linguistic structure should reflect what is known about human cognition from other disciplines,” including psychology, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience (*id.*, 40-41). One can add here that all these subfields of linguistics employ cognitive linguistics’ principles and tools (in particular, conceptual metaphor) in up-to-date research into language, cognition, and emotions. For example, considerable attention has been paid to a cross-disciplinary study of metaphors and computational modelling. Here, within a cognitive framework, Lakoff, Feldman, and Narayanan argue that computer systems are “capable of understanding metaphors used in English, Persian, Russian and Spanish” (*MetaNet*, 2015).<sup>7</sup>

Evans and Green propose approaching the following four central assumptions as outcomes of these two central commitments of cognitive linguistics (adapted from Evans & Green, 2006: 157-163):

1. Conceptual structure is embodied (the “embodied cognition thesis”).
2. Semantic structure is conceptual structure.
3. Meaning representation is encyclopedic.
4. Meaning construction is conceptualization.

The first assumption is associated with an important notion in cognitive linguistics, the embodied cognition thesis, which reveals “the nature of the relationship between conceptual structure and the external world of sensory experience” (*ibid.*). It means that our conceptual system emerges from our bodily

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<sup>7</sup> The reference is done to the official webpage, and therefore, no page number is indicated. Similar examples are represented throughout this thesis.

experience with the world. This assumption is considered fundamental in almost every approach of cognitive linguistics to language and cognition.

The second assumption states that “language refers to concepts in the minds of the speaker rather than to objects in the external world.” Therefore, “semantic structure [...] can be equated with concepts” (*id.*, 158).

The third assumption holds that words are not “neatly packaged bundles of meaning [...] but serve as ‘points of access’ to vast repositories of knowledge relating to a practical concept or conceptual domain” (*id.*, 160). A single word can have a wide range of meaning depending on the context in which it is used. To understand the meaning of an utterance, people as speakers refer to their encyclopedic knowledge of words and situations in specific context.

Lastly, the fourth assumption associates with the idea that language does not code meaning but rather sees words and other linguistic units as “‘prompts’ for the construction of meaning.” Following this view, I deal with the conceptual level of meaning construction, where meaning construction is “equated with conceptualization.” The latter is defined in cognitive linguistics as “a dynamic process whereby linguistic units serve as prompts for an array of conceptual operations.” It means that “meaning is a process rather than a discrete ‘thing’ that can be ‘packaged’ by language” (*id.*, 162).

After reviewing the basic assumptions, it is necessary to provide a summary of the most important issues investigated under these assumptions: conceptual metaphor, image-schema and embodied cognition thesis.

## 2. COGNITIVE APPROACH TO EMOTIONS


### 2.1 Conceptual metaphor, language and cognition

Following the central assumptions and principles of cognitive linguistics, metaphorical profiles of emotion words in legal fiction are analyzed with respect to time-frames. In other words, I examine the lexicalization and conceptualization patterns of emotions in written language. To do this, I employ cross-domain mapping—*conceptual metaphor*—which is a fundamental cognitive tool developed in revolutionary conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) conceived in the 1980s by Lakoff (2007: 270).

The CMT is associated with Lakoff and Johnson's approach to language and developed in their popular book, *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). In this book, the authors hypothesize the existence of a special knowledge structure that shapes our communication and the way we think. They explain their specific vision on conceptual metaphors and how they influence our everyday life. Over the past few decades, the world of science has seen the stunning transformation of attitudes toward the notion of conceptual metaphor. In cognitive linguistics, the conceptual metaphor is understood in terms of two main conceptual domains: the source domain and the target domain. Cross-domain mapping is performed between these domains. The source domain is the conceptual domain from which metaphorical expressions are extracted. The target domain is the conceptual domain that we try to understand by means of the source domain. In other words, we try to understand the target

domain in terms of the structure of the source domain. The source domain is more concrete while the target domain is more abstract.

For example, in the conceptual metaphor RAGE IS FIRE, “rage” is a target domain and “fire” a source domain. As follows from Figure 1 below, such characteristics of fire as explosiveness, danger, and hot temperature are mapped on the target domain of “rage:”



**Figure 1.** Cross-domain mapping of *rage* (author’s example)

What do conceptual metaphors tell us about emotion? The motivation behind the choice of cross-domain mapping as one of the main strategies to research into emotions in language is twofold. First, conceptual metaphors allow us to broaden the scope of knowledge of a target domain—in my case *emotion*—in an unconventional way by identifying a large number of subtle meaning differences (Kövecses, 2004). Second, as my aim is to reveal patterns of emotion conceptualization in legal fiction, I need to examine whether there are specific, context-based meanings of emotions in such texts. In addition, the research is done with respect to three time-frames or specific periods of time, which should reveal whether the universality or typology of emotion conceptualization emerges in the written language over time. In what

follows, I illustrate the kind of information cross-domain mapping can reveal about the emotion of anger.

First of all, anger is a strong negative emotion that is hard to control and normally pointed at someone (or the self) or something (*to be angry with something/somebody*). When performing cross-domain mapping, the aim is to bring to light new characteristics of *anger*. Thus, in the sentence *He is burning with anger*, the emotion of anger is understood as something that can be of high temperature, which forms the metaphor ANGER IS HEAT. Conceptualization of anger as a powerful force can be represented via the metaphor ANGER IS PRESSURE, as in *Anger made him do this*. Another example of anger reveals characteristics of a liquid, as in *He was filled with anger*, which creates the metaphor ANGER IS A FLUID IN CONTAINER.

As seen from the example above, *anger* has diverse metaphorical profiles, which is often the case with strong affective states, such as rage or fright. Although I have mentioned only a few examples of cross-domain mappings, certain metaphoric profiles of emotion words can be foreseen. For cognitive linguists, it became obvious rather quickly that certain target domains tend to “magnet” certain source domains. The specifics of emotion conceptualization are discussed further in this thesis, but it should be mentioned that such source domains as “a force,” “an entity located inside the body,” and “a container” are closely related to emotions (Kövecses, 2004).

## 2.2 Embodied cognition and schematic system of knowledge

Other phenomena that have received great attention within Cognitive Linguistics are image-schema and the embodied cognition thesis. In his book *The Body in the Mind: the Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason* (1987), philosopher and cognitivist Mark Johnson addresses the notion of *image schema*. He argues that our conceptual structure is dependent on the way our bodies function. In his words, “image schema is a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience” (1987: xiv).

The term *schema* pertains to psychology, cognitive science and psycholinguistics and can be defined as “the organization of experience in the mind or brain that includes a particular organized way of perceiving cognitively and responding to a complex situation or set of stimuli” (*Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, 2015).<sup>8</sup> Consequently, a great deal of research has focused on image schema as perceptual experience of the world (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Gibbs, 2005; Grady, 2005; Mandler & Canovas, 2014).

Starting from Bonnier (1905), the term *schema* was used in reference to the spatial organization of bodily experiences. Studies in psychology have shown that schemas are “dynamic analogue representations, consisting of a schematic version of spatial information and movements in space” (Mandler, 2005: 147). What is more, cognitive science emphasizes that “image-schematic reasoning [...] involves the embodied simulation of events [...] [it] does not simply mean doing something with one’s mind, but constructing a simulation of experience using one’s body” (Gibbs,

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<sup>8</sup> The reference is done to the online version of the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, and therefore, no page number is indicated. Similar examples are represented in this thesis with other dictionaries.

2005: 115). Image schema, in the view of developmental psychologist Jean Piaget, also refers to the fundamental blocks of intelligent behavior (Singer & Revenson, 1997) with Anderson's (1978) further application of the schema theory in the schema-directed processes in language comprehension. Besides, the term was advanced by psychologist Frederic Bartlett, who suggested an understanding of schema as a basis for the theory of remembering. He emphasized the social significance of schema (Bartlett, 1932).

Johnson himself refers to the schematic systems as pertaining to the conceptual structure of knowledge representation, emphasizing image schema as “a key part of our explanation of the embodied origins of human meaning and thought” (2005: 15). Consequently, there are two major points related to image-schemas to be considered in cognitive linguistics: (i) the relation of image-schemas with the perception system and (ii) the relation of image schemas with embodied experience. While the image schema differentiates the human architecture of the mind into certain categories, the sensory-motor experiences orientate humans in their interaction with the world. Theorists in cognitive and non-cognitive approaches to emotions converge here: emotions are bound by physiological changes (e.g. Schachter & Singer, 1962). By focusing on the spatial orientation of the body and the changes it undergoes, cognitive linguists place particular emphasis on the ways in which the nature of our bodies mediate our “construal of reality” (Evans & Green, 2006: 74). In the same way, cognitive appraisal theorist Scherer claims that each appraisal element of emotion experience directs specific bodily changes (Scherer, 2005). This claim correlates with the notion of unique *bodily responses* to emotions (e.g. facial expressions) developed by Griffiths (1997) and Ekman (1999b). Complementary to

this, neuroscientists confirm the essential role of the embodied architecture of human beings. For example, Damasio specifically points out that “the background body sense is continuous, although one may hardly notice it since it represents not a specific part of anything in the body but an overall state of most everything in it” (1994: 152). Such an approach is intrinsically tied to the CMT and is linked with the basic spatial concepts humans have, including UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, FRONT-BACK, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, VERTICAL-HORIZONTAL, and BALANCE.

The following example shows how our basic image schema UP-DOWN emerges out of our spatial experience. This schema is active in our everyday physical experience. Lakoff states that “almost every movement we make involves a motor program that either changes our UP-DOWN orientation, maintains it, presupposes it, or takes it into account in some way” (2003: 53). The author adds that humans’ “collection of constantly performed motor functions” is linked to our erect position, which is “relative to the gravitational field we live in” (*id.*, 57).

However, not only do people constantly perform physical movements like *looking up* and *looking down*, we also psychologically evaluate our everyday experiences on an emotional level as good (UP) or bad (DOWN). We can *cheer up!*, *be up*, or *be at the top of the ladder* but we can also experience the schema BAD IS DOWN, as in *being down*, *being down and out* or *being down in the dumps*. Consequently, when talking about emotions, the UP-DOWN schema works, as in the example HAPPY IS UP, SAD IS DOWN.

One of the most frequently used image schemas applicable to emotion concepts are CONTAINER—and more specifically in the context of emotions—BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS. We may think of our bodies as containers for

food, water, air, blood, or figuratively speaking, for thoughts and ideas. The recurrent spatial structure of the CONTAINER schema suggests the following: We think of a container as something with boundaries, in the shape of a box, a vessel or something else. We can look inside it or take something out of it. The image schema CONTAINER arises from embodied experience, and according to Evans and Green, is “more than simply a spatio-geometric representation. It is a ‘theory’ about a particular kind of configuration in which one entity is supported by another entity that contains it [...]. In other words, the CONTAINER schema is meaningful because containers are meaningful in our everyday experience” (2006: 47).

### **2.3 Cognitive linguistics: Criticism and recent developments**

In this section, I turn first to the shortcomings in cognitive linguistics’ research, which has been discussed over the past two decades, and then show ways to overcome these shortcomings by referring to up-to-date research in the field. This should facilitate the understanding of the practical part of this thesis (see Chapter 4 and 5), which employs Lakoff and Johnson’s typology of metaphors to demonstrate how this typology can be successfully embedded in the code system of the annotation software ATLAS.ti to assist the qualitative analysis of language.

#### **2.3.1 Shortcomings in cognitive linguistics and responses**

Despite an influential position of the CMT and general metaphor logic in research into language and cognition, cognitive linguistics is not immune from criticism.

General criticism comes from some opposition to its methodology, where metaphor is studied more as a concept rather than a word, direction of analysis (top-down or bottom-up), and level of schematicity. The relationship of metaphor to culture has also been criticized given that the CMT emphasizes universal bodily experiences rather than culturally marked ones.<sup>9</sup> According to Kövecses, the approach to bodily experiences as “(near)-universal,” such as spatial relations, where head means “up” and feet means “down,” plays an important role in establishing “potential universal” metaphors (2010: 202). However, some researchers voice contradictions of the way that cognitive linguistics approaches embodied experience as simultaneously universal but also culturally influenced (e.g. Rakova, 2002). To meet this challenge, Kövecses (2010) suggests changing our view of embodiment as on “a homogeneous and unchanging factor” and instead approach it as “a complex set of factors” (*id.*, 204). The latter was demonstrated by the author in his investigation of the concept of *anger* in different cultures.<sup>10</sup> Thus, my claim is that embodiment, which is supported by our gestalt-like experiences, such as UP-DOWN and other basic ones, can be approached universally. However, it is important to examine with caution those embodied components of emotional concepts that are peculiar to a given culture.

To meet these and other challenges successfully, Kövecses (2008b) offers an alternative proposal to how one should approach the conceptual metaphor in cognitive linguistics. The CMT is bound to get reactions, but sometimes criticism is based on “systematic misreadings” (Johnson & Lakoff, 2002: 260). Thus, objections that relate to not entirely reliable methodology to identify metaphorical expressions (Pragglejaz Group, 2007) or not paying attention to actual expressions used for the

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<sup>9</sup> More on this topic in Kövecses, Z. (2008b).

<sup>10</sup> See Kövecses, Z. (2000b).

target domain mapping, are misplaced in terms of levels of metaphor analysis. Kövecses explains that “in a cognitive linguistic approach, three levels of the existence of metaphors can be distinguished: the supra individual, the individual and the sub individual levels” (2008b: 169). The author adds the following (*ibid.*):

*The systematic identification of linguistic metaphors in natural discourse is a goal that is connected with what I call the individual level. For this reason, the objections do not invalidate the goals of the supra individual level: to propose conceptual metaphors on the basis of linguistic expressions that researchers intuitively take to be metaphorical.*

Another contradictory issue concerns the level of schematicity of metaphors. The main criticism comes from Clausner and Croft (1997) who challenge the properties of the source and target conceptual domains, particularly semantic schematicity (in line with productivity as researched by Langacker, 1991) and its degree. The authors favor more accurate establishing of the “appropriate level of schematicity” (Clausner and Croft, 1997) to understand “which elements of the source domain are mapped onto the target, and which ones are not” (Kövecses, 2008b: 175). Kövecses emphasizes that focusing on this question one should account for “the phenomenon in a different way if we assume that particular physical force domains may have different meaning foci,” as in the example with the CONTAINER domain, which can have both “pressure” and “quantity” meaning foci. Therefore, “the concepts belonging to these source domains may participate in different mappings” (*id.*, 182).

More recently, publications in lexicography (Dobrovolskij & Piranien, 2005) and cognitive corpus-linguistics (Stefanowitsch & Gries, 2007) have shown that there is a debate over whether the CMT postulates on the analysis of metaphor are

consistent with linguistic data. The disagreement is driven by the fact that cognitive linguistics “considers itself to be a nonobjectivist theory of language, whereas the use of corpus materials involves an attempt to maximize the objective basis of linguistic descriptions” (Geeraerts & Cuyckens, 2006: 18). In this sense, it is important to address this concern in the context of the goal-oriented approach, as proposed by Kövecses. Thus, the author explains that “if the goal of conceptual metaphor analysis is to reveal the nature and structure of abstract concepts in as much detail and depth as possible,” then the merging of two approaches—quantitative and qualitative analyses—will benefit both sides (2008b: 182). However, it seems that the criticism of the abstractedness of CMT is less and less pertinent in quantitative-driven analyses because of very recent and rather extensive research into emotions in corpus-based studies, with the use of principles of cognitive linguistics in categorizing emotions (Oster, 2010; Glynn, 2014). For example, Oster in her corpus analysis of the emotion of fear in English and German, also employs CMT to categorize these emotions on various parameters, including intensity and quality. Similarly, Glynn (2002) is concerned with the conceptual structure of the emotion words of *happiness*, *anger*, and *love* in British, American, and Australian English. The author employs a usage-based approach and emphasizes grammatical analysis as a significant addition to the common lexical approaches in the study of conceptual metaphors. The discussion about the weaknesses of the cognitive linguistics approach often concerns the means by which one can verify cross-domain mapping. In this context, Glynn states that “the various levels of language structure such as lexical, morphological, and syntax, can only be arbitrarily

separated,” which suggests that syntactic forms in expressions are important when “establishing and verifying source domain membership” (2002: 6).

Regarding data analysis however, there is one particular shortcoming that has long been hampering progress in the approach of cognitive linguistics to the study of language, that is to say—a solid empirical analysis of metaphors within the framework of CMT, as is discussed in the following section.

#### **2.4 Empirically driven metaphor research: Qualitative metaphor analysis**

Access to conceptual knowledge via conceptual domain mapping has become a technique for explaining the mental capacity of human beings to create lexical constructions. Over the last two decades, researchers have proposed qualitative and corpus-based approaches to data in cross-cultural studies that follow a cognitive approach. For example, the lexical level of language structure is one of the main research interests of Deignan, who uses a corpus-based approach to investigate meaning extensions by stating that “the notion of metaphorical mapping could be a powerful tool in describing semantic relations across the lexicon” (2005: 169). The author specifies that “this would be of use for descriptions of vocabulary in language, and specifically helpful for lexicographers, thesaurus-writers and other compilers of reference works, along with language teachers” (*ibid.*). For example, in language teaching “the lexical level is at least as important as the grammatical level” and “the discovery of underlying systems of lexis could help to refocus classroom priorities away from grammar, as many teachers would wish” (*ibid.*).

Concerning the studies of large corpora, Kövecses emphasizes that “quantitative metaphor analysis needs to be more supplemented by intuitive qualitative analysis if the goal of conceptual metaphor analysis is to reveal the nature and structure of abstract concepts in as much detail and depth as possible” (2008b: 182). Consequently, comparison of the lexical concepts and their semantics in cognitive (e.g. Wierzbicka, 1995) and corpus-based studies (e.g. Stefanowitsch, 2010) has become more relevant to the study of conceptual knowledge via language.

Despite having a substantial theoretical and methodological basis, it seems that cognitive linguistics needs to take into account novel analytical approaches and strategies in data research. In this case, the lack of (i) systematic, (ii) empirically driven qualitative analysis with (iii) falsifiable results is an urgent topic that needs to be discussed in order to provide a practical orientation for scholars in cognitive linguistics and related disciplines. These points are promoted by Cameron (1999), Arppe, Gilquin, Glynn *et al.* (2010), Gibbs (2012), and by Kimmel (2012). For example, Glynn (2009, 2014) combines both quantitative and qualitative approaches for the data analysis and provides examples of how “multivariate usage-feature analysis<sup>11</sup> can be used to describe the conceptual structure of emotion concepts” (Glynn, 2014: 78). For example, the author employs usage-based techniques “to capture semantic relations between near-synonymous words” (Glynn, 2009: 2) or demonstrates how such an approach can benefit “a socially sensitive event-based description,” for example, the emotion of anger (2014: 78).

Different approaches to research into language are also supported today by modern software, which provides a platform to assist researchers in their analysis of

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<sup>11</sup> E.g. correspondence analysis of the semantic variables relative to lemmata or hierarchical cluster analysis.

notions pertaining to the realm of cognitive linguistics. In this regard, Kimmel specifically emphasizes the role of CAQDAS in qualitative metaphor analyses, which primarily aims at using CMT methods to reconstruct models of thought and explore conceptualization of various notions (e.g. *emotion*) in language and thought. The current tendency in cognitive linguistics is not to debate the external validity of the drawbacks mentioned earlier but to explicitly pinpoint internal challenges—in other words, a lack of systematically reliable methodology. For example, Kimmel draws the attention of metaphor scholars “to measure up against the best practice of qualitative research at large,” which is “their explicit procedures” and “being transparent about the way theorizing is rooted in data” (2012: 4).

Researchers have long raised the question of strengthening cognitive analysis by an empirically oriented approach (e.g. Fielding & Lee, 1998; Low, 1999; Gibbs, 2012). For example, Gibbs favors the “skilful intuition” of cognitive linguists but also urges researchers to “fully explain the methods they use in analyzing linguistic phenomena and in making claims about human conceptual systems” (2012: 2). What seemed to be lacking a few years ago in cognitive linguistics is, in the words of Gibbs, “a practical bridge between theoretical and empirical work” (*id.*, xxii). However, researchers have already contributed to the “construction” of this “bridge” by converging evidence from other disciplines to make cognitive analysis empirically driven and more convincing. Consequently, one observes how statistical methods and analytical tools help to understand the practical solutions for data gathering and their further interpretation.

Although many cognitive scientists emphasize that empirical research is central to the study of language and cognition, it is not always clear how to incorporate

abstract cognitive categories within data analysis. However, there is progress in this area, more significantly in the past six to eight years. The situation with the systematic empirical research on conceptual categories and metaphors has drastically changed since Lakoff and Johnson introduced the concept of *cross-domain mapping* in 1980. Although metaphor logic developed gradually over the past three decades, there was still no established procedure and software package to provide systematic qualitative metaphor analysis in the 1980s and early 1990s. Cognitive linguistics' scholars today are in an advantageous position: Metaphor Theories are now more coherent with deeper insights and better methods to perform experiments. Qualitative data analysis (QDA) is also enhanced with up-to-date software to facilitate research. For a detailed discussion about QDA, the reader is referred to Chapter 3, sections 3 and 4. In this section, I provide an introduction to this analysis.

Thus, QDA was originally developed in the social sciences and can be generally defined as the following:

*[Qualitative data analysis is] the classification and interpretation of linguistic (or visual) material to make statements about implicit and explicit dimensions and structures of meaning-making in the material and what is represented in it. Meaning-making can refer to subjective or social meanings.*  
(Flick, 2013, 5)

The essence of qualitative analysis is characterized by in-depth explanation of qualitative data, which refers to the “information gathered in non-numeric and often textual form about meanings, intentions, actions, behaviours and events” (Gibbs, Clarke *et al.*, 2015). The common strategy of this type of analysis is a constant comparison of data, which aims at generating theory “grounded” in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Without interfering with the context of data, the QDA aims at its

illustration and interpretation, rather than numerical aggregation, as is employed in quantitative analysis.

The corpus or data sampling of QDA are usually limited. It can be linked with the manual coding procedure, which is time-consuming. However, recently there has been increased research that uses larger bodies of textual or other data in QDA (Friese, 2011; Wiedermann, 2013). It can be partially explained by an extensive application of CAQDAS (Friese, 2014), which assists in the analyzing of unstructured data.

Over the past few years, conceptual metaphors have received new attention in qualitative analysis. Qualitative research, which assembles pieces of information from data, successfully employs metaphors to balance this process of assembling to clearly structured patterns (e.g. Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Inspired by Lakoff and Johnson's central assumptions, the ongoing dynamics of qualitative methods in cognitive linguistics prove that language can be both a tool in research and the object of research. In one way, language is conceptualized as “a living organism” that influences the way people perceive the world and interact with it. One could add that language is shaped by the environment in which it functions.

The discussion on qualitative analysis is often opposed to quantitative analysis, which I believe is an oversimplified approach. When taking this approach, the statistical frequency and the in-depth contextual observations are addressed in one analysis and excluded from the other. However, the main idea here is the right choice of analysis, depending on research questions. Considering this, Griffin asserts the following about this view in social sciences (2002: 5):

*A particular strength of quantitative research lies in its capacity to provide a broad analysis of phenomena, whilst qualitative research can focus on the operation of social processes in greater depth.*

The systematic analysis of emotions as expressed in language can reveal both frequent conceptualizations and a few salient but not frequent ones. In the context of the lexico-grammatical structure of conceptual metaphors, it is important to understand the value of what is frequent and what is salient, which has been pinpointed by Glynn (2009: 1):

*Although frequency represents an important factor in determining salience, a one-to-one relationship between relative frequency and relative salience does not exist. Various cultural and perceptual factors can make relatively infrequent concepts salient and vice versa.*

The qualitative strategies that have been mentioned earlier are practically fulfilled via manual coding; in spite of being time consuming, it remains plausible and, in many cases, necessary. The manual procedure remains “context sensitive” (Kimmel, 2012: 10), whereas in quantitative or corpus-based analyses a researcher can miss metaphors, as software does not identify figurative expressions. In contrast, manual coding is performed in a bottom-up fashion, as I extract and code what is in my source data. More importantly, “manual identification remains the only way to be comprehensive” (*id.*, 10). Manually, I gather (i) a diversity of metaphors and categorize them so that (ii) no metaphors are excluded.

Qualitative analysis aims at a complete and detailed description of conceptual metaphors without assigning frequencies to linguistic data. However, one must add that nowadays CAQDAS includes statistical methods to provide frequency output if

needed. Just like in corpus-based software, CAQDAS can be used to search for words, phrases, and collocations. An overview of up-to-date qualitative approaches to data analysis has shown that not only are quantitative methods like frequency surveys and multivariate statistics extensively used in cognitive semantics (e.g. Glynn, 2014), but also, Boolean logic derived from mathematics is now an inbuilt tool in CAQDAS. Besides, sociology-based, theory-building coding strategies are applied in the software-aided analysis, which blends qualitative and cognitive approaches to benefit the study of metaphors. All the abovementioned tools aim to reduce one of the most common shortcomings of cognitive research—the bias of an individual introspection of linguistics matters. One should add that using software, “it is easier to be exhaustive in analysis and to check for negative cases” (Gibbs, Friese & Mangabeira; 2002).

On the whole, the blend of qualitative and quantitative approaches in the cognitive study of language with the use of CAQDAS is relatively new. Consequently, the shortage of practical empirical strategies for qualitative metaphor analysis is noticeable. Although the software is now used all over the globe, the implementation of qualitative strategies is historically established in America (e.g. Glaser & Strauss, 1999) and German-speaking countries (e.g. Schütze, 1983), especially in the psychological, social, and economic sciences. The state of affairs predetermined, in some way, the extensive use of CAQDAS in Germany (e.g. Friese, 2011), Austria (e.g. Kimmel, 2012), the UK (e.g. Fielding & Lee, 1998), and America (e.g. Maxwell, 2012).

One of the main practical aims of this thesis is to propose the qualitative metaphor analysis of emotions as expressed in the language of legal fiction, which is

rare in the research field. Quite recently, when it comes to the analysis of emotions, there is either corpus-based (e.g. Strapparava & Valitutti, 2004) or corpus-based cognitive-semantic analysis (e.g. Oster, 2010) of certain emotion words and expressions. What I would like to stress is that there also should be more research into a *specific corpus* related to a particular discourse—in my case—the use of legal fiction as “an extension” of legal discourse. In sum, there is still insufficient evidence of (i) a qualitative metaphor research into emotions in (ii) the language of legal fiction with (iii) elaborated qualitative analysis strategies. All of these aspects are presented in this thesis.

In my qualitative research, I aim to investigate a specifically compiled corpus that meets genre requirements and that will provide the relevant source material to meet research aims. To “handle” this source material, special software is required to organize the project. We may think of such software as a “workplace” designed to aid the laborious work of a qualitative researcher or, in Kimmel’s words, “shopping-carts for text units that are used while running through a text” (2012: 13).

Metaphor analysis that is traditionally rooted in cognitive linguistics is now more developed toward empirical data processing and interpretation. The kind of methods CMT applies in the study of emotion concepts—i.e. cross-domain mapping with the source and target domains—has been discussed earlier in this chapter (see section 2). However, new dynamics to empirically oriented research in the field requires new strategies. It is better to say that the qualitative approach to metaphors has offered an opportunity to provide a more complex analysis of cross-domain mapping.

In a systematic approach to coding, I refer to the coding strategy employed by Kimmel (2012). He suggests a *compositional coding* procedure and a *two-tier coding strategy* in the qualitative metaphor analysis. Compositional coding corresponds to traditional conceptual mapping, including the target and the source domain. What is important here is that these domains are assigned in CAQDAS separately to create “a more precise ontological identity” to every metaphor and “to describe metaphor appropriately” (Kimmel, 2012: 14).<sup>12</sup> Therefore, performing conceptual mapping within CAQDAS ATLAS.ti, I present cases where conceptual metaphors are used as a powerful tool to reveal the strongest and weakest conceptualizations of emotions, as expressed in the language of legal fiction. The motivation behind this is to reveal the dependency between source domains and the types of emotions as expressed in language—positive and negative. Besides, I aim to trace the dependency between conceptualizations of emotions and parts of speech.

Considering all the above, it seems that a systematic reconstruction of metaphorical models requires attention to several issues vital for the empirically driven research to be successful in the field. In the practical part of this thesis, I provide analyses that shows how the abovementioned requisites for a qualitative metaphor analysis can be fulfilled using CAQDAS ATLAS.ti.<sup>13</sup>

This section provides an introduction to the interrelations between language, cognition, and emotions. To complete this, an overview of the relevance for this thesis of psychological approaches to emotions, particularly cognitive theories, is

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<sup>12</sup> See further discussion in Chapter 3, section 4.2.

<sup>13</sup> Choosing an appropriate computer software package is important, but it is not the primary task of this work to provide this guidance. However, for more information on up-to-date software, the reader is referred to the web page of *The CAQDAS Networking Project* on the website of the University of Surrey.

necessary as far as psychology can be considered as a “natural” discipline for studying emotions. The main aim here is to show how a cognitive approach to emotions establishes emotion as a sequential process including physiological and cognitive elements.

### **3. THEORIES OF EMOTION**

#### **3.1 Physiological and cognitive theories of emotion**

As a “psychological state or process” (Oatley, 1999: 273), emotion is a “subjective experience” assessed by an individual as positive or negative (Ekman, 1999a: 55). American psychologist Neisser emphasizes that “every psychological phenomenon is a cognitive phenomenon [...] and cognition involves all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used” (1967: 4). Starting from the fourth century BC, Aristotle reflects on emotions in rhetoric, judgment, and the art of persuasion.<sup>14</sup> The philosopher approached emotions as forces that alter judgments and “accompaniments” to pleasure and pain (Leighton, 1982: 144). Such a viewpoint is supported by cognitive psychologists who have long claimed that “the philosophical history of the emotions has been essentially cognitive from ancient times to the present” (Lazarus, 1993: 17).

Emotional involvement in mental processing can be named a highlight of the era of the cognitive approach to emotions in the 1960s and early 1970s (Arnold, 1960; Scherer, 1982; Frijda, 1988). However, there was not an instant acceptance of

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<sup>14</sup> See Aristotle (2004). *Aristotle Rhetoric* (W. R. Roberts, Trans.).  
Aristotle (2011). *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. (S. Bartlett & D. Collins, Trans.).

emotions as involved in cognitive processes. Starting from Darwin's (1872) pioneering work on the origin of emotions, examination of emotions was conducted via the observation of physiological changes and their link to emotional arousal<sup>15</sup> without considering cognitive involvement. In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it became evident that emotions were never supposed to be approached via only observations of bodily changes. The mental dynamics of personality and norms of social interaction revealed the interconnection between the human body and emotional states. As this present study examines the relationships between language and emotions in a cognitive framework, a psychological approach to emotions will help to understand the ideas behind the cognitive approach to emotions as part of mental processing better without excluding physiological changes.

### **3.2 The survival-driven theories of emotion**


Given the pivotal role that emotions play in human behavior, it is important to assert that the very early theories of emotions constitute the physiological basis for other theories, including cognitive ones. Bodily changes that people feel while experiencing emotions have been studied for centuries. The first serious discussions of the phenomenon of emotions emerged when Charles Darwin published his work *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animal* (1872). In his evolutionary theory, Darwin tried to explain the biological origin of expressive movements during various emotional states. He suggested three general principles that “account for most of the expressions and gestures involuntarily used by man and the lower

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<sup>15</sup> In psychology, the term *arousal* refers to “a state of physiological alertness and readiness for action” (*Psychology Dictionary*, 2015).

animals, under the influence of various emotions and sensations” (Darwin, 1872: 51). With the first *principle of serviceable associated Habits*, Darwin emphasizes that certain actions are habitual and are connected with “certain states of mind” (*id.*, 53). Darwin provided as an example opening the eyes in affirmation, or closing the eyes when describing something horrid, looking suddenly and raising eyebrows. He stated that “these organs [the eyes] are especially liable to be acted on through association under various states of the mind, although there is manifestly nothing to be seen” (*id.*, 61). The first principle pinpoints the habitual nature of some expressions; the second principle—the *principle of Antithesis*—states that there is an opposition to such states. Darwin explained that “when a directly opposite state of mind is induced,” the body reacts in “performing movements of a directly opposite nature” (*id.*, 54). The third *principle of the direct actions of the Nervous System* focuses on the Nervous Systems as “strongly excited” so the “nerve-force” generates an excess of excitement, such as spastic laughter (*ibid.*).

Later, the survival-driven theory faced rather negative criticism from various researchers, such as William James (1884). In contrast to what Darwin suggested, James emphasized that bodily activities cause emotions (see Figure 2 below) and Carl Lange (1884) argued that emotions occur as a result of physiological reactions to certain events. Proposed independently by two psychologists, William James and Carl Lange, the James-Lange theory states that our emotions are caused by the way we perceive physiological responses to stimuli.



**Figure 2.** James-Lange theory of emotion<sup>16</sup> (adapted from Minter *et al.*, 2011)

According to this theory, for example, people are shaking not because they feel fear. Rather, people feel fear because they are shaking (see Figure 2). Later, Walter Cannon and Philip Bard disagreed with the theory proposed by James and Lange. What is known as the Cannon-Bard thalamic theory of emotions (1927),<sup>17</sup> argues that people experience emotions and physiological changes *simultaneously*. This theory directly challenges previous theories of emotions by stating the reverse experience of emotions. It is explained in terms of neurology; for example a person experiences the emotion of fear, the thalamus sends a signal to the brain and the person receives a response to this stimulus as a physiological reaction, such as muscle tension or trembling.

Cannon also stressed that emotions play a significant role in the mobilizing of body forces (Cannon & Britton, 1926). For example, people suppose that the emotion of fear is usually linked with stressful situations involving threat, uncertainty or worry. However, fear should not be regarded only as a negative emotion. Cacioppo and Freberg (2012) explain that stress and fear appear in difficult situations with stimuli (stressors), which induces a reaction in the brain (stress

<sup>16</sup> ANS stands for Autonomic Nervous System.

<sup>17</sup> See Cannon, W. B. (1927).

perception). Such reactions work as survival mechanisms helping to overcome such situations and cope with them.

It can be observed that the first theories of emotions were focused on physiological changes in the body, the sequence, and the cause of such reactions to stimuli. These theories address basic emotions, meaning that they can be observed with a naked eye, such as fear or joy. Even though scientists in psychology and related disciplines now provide us with far more elaborate theories of emotions, survival-driven theories still help us to understand the nature of emotions and the related bodily experiences. Figurative language abounds in idiomatic expressions and phraseological units mentioning bodily changes under the influence of emotions. Some examples can include expressions of anger or irritation, as in *for crying out loud!*, *foam at the mouth* or *make one's hackles rise*. Furthermore, such expressions are culturally marked, which makes them “cultural luggage” (Wierzbicka, 2006)—in other words, values, myths, beliefs and stereotypes as significant items of any culture.

Although Darwin and his followers did not fully explain the nature of emotions, it was his work that drew attention to the questions of specific forms of mimics and muscle movements to express emotions. This aspect was thoroughly researched by behaviorist scientists at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (e.g. Watson, 1919; Skinner, 1953). Later on, neuroscientists tried to identify a connection between emotions and the brain via, for example, the “bio-regulatory reactions,” which are reactions that connect our bodily changes and emotions (Damasio, 2004: 50). Starting from the 1970s and gaining force in the late 1990s, research into the field of emotion has been central to the study of facial expression of emotions. It was

popularized in the works of Ekman on non-verbal behavior and the so-called *Atlas of emotions* (Ekman, 2003), and in the *Facial Action Coding System* introduced by Hjortsjö, but thoroughly developed by Ekman and Friesen only in 1978.

I have illustrated that the survival-driven theories of emotions are concerned with the physiological element of emotions, which remains a central assumption in cognitive linguistics, especially in the embodied cognition thesis (Johnson, 1987). Without engaging in a lengthy discussion on a historical study of emotions, which is a prerogative of psychology, the following section focuses on the dynamic of cognitive theories to emotions.

### **3.3 Cognitive theories of emotion**


#### **3.3.1 Cognitive appraisal process in emotion**

When we think of emotions, we think of them not only as objects or things (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2004) but also as structured scenarios. They can be “temporally organized sequences of events” (Swanepoel, 1992: 423) or a prototypical sequence of events (Shaver *et al.*, 1987; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 2014). The sequencing of the emotional process has been central in very early survival-driven emotion theories, such as the James-Lange theory (1884), which proposed that “bodily responses preceded subjective feelings” (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2002: 575) as mentioned earlier. According to Scherer, emotions with their “dynamic of architecture” (2009: 1307) are very subtle “moment-to-moment changes” connected to the system of language (Moors & Scherer, 2013: 108). A multi-level analysis of

emotions in language (e.g. Scherer & Wallbott, 1994) asserts that emotion processes are embedded and patterned in the linguistic expression of emotions (e.g. our responses to emotions). Therefore, it is of crucial importance to study how emotions are expressed linguistically to reveal the dynamic of this complex process, which is called emotion. Here, emotion as a dynamic process is “based on an individual’s subjective appraisal of significant events” (Scherer, 2009: 1307).

Beginning with appraisal theorists, Arnold, Lazarus, Singer and Schachter, new cognitive approaches were undertaken to provide a clear insight into what people *think* about emotions and how they can *manage* them with regard to *appraisals*. The notion of *appraisal* is central to cognitive theories of emotion. In psychology, appraisals are “determinants of emotional experience, since they influence the perception of the event” (*Psychology Dictionary*, 2015).

Lazarus observed that traditional behavioral theories at the time were “old epistemologies” and were “swept away” by the cognitive approach, which aimed to “explain human [...] action and reactions in terms of thought process” (1993: 6). Arnold made a significant contribution to developing the notion of *appraisal* so as to examine emotions as consequences of our comprehension. The motivation behind this was to emphasize cognitive assessment of situations before emotional response. According to Arnold, emotions are generated by the appraisal process (1960). Figure 3 below illustrates the basic step of the cognitive appraisal theory.



**Figure 3.** Arnold’s Cognitive appraisal theory


As seen from the figure above, a series of sequential events explains how people perceive and appraise a situation. The theory of appraisal favors relations between emotions and cognition, and states that emotions are products of cognitive processes. *Perception* and *appraisal* are key words in this conception. The author understands perception as a simple apprehension of an object. Izard mentions here that to apprehend something means to know what the object is without consideration of how it influences an individual (1991: 36). Consequently, an object has to be perceived and appraised by an individual and only after that does he/she experience emotion, which is a response to the object.

Thus, we are afraid because we have *decided* to be afraid. It means that something/somebody is threatening us and, therefore, is perceived as dangerous. In Arnold's sequence *perception>appraisal>emotion*, the author mentions that "our everyday experience is never the strictly objective knowledge of a thing; it is always knowing-and-liking, or knowing-and-disliking" (Arnold, 1960: 177).

### **3.3.2 Lazarus' approach to appraisals**

From a historical perspective, Arnold's theory paved the way for other researchers to continue the study of emotions and cognitive processing. If Arnold draws attention to the notion of *appraisal* as the trigger for an emotion sequence, Lazarus (1982) is concerned with the nature of these appraisals and the conditions for them. His cognitive-mediational theory of emotion asserts that the cognitive appraisal of a situation determines what kind of emotions we will potentially experience. The author emphasizes the determinative function of emotions in how people perceive

the world. Following such an approach, a cognitive appraisal is a necessary condition for triggering emotion. When an individual perceives a stimulus, he/she understands it, and this is then followed by the response of emotion associated with that stimulus. Particularly in Lazarus's research, the emphasis is on the role of appraisal in stress reactions (Lazarus, 1966). Figure 4 below shows the sequence of emotion appraisal, as suggested in the cognitive-mediational theory:



**Figure 4.** Lazarus's cognitive-mediational theory (adapted from Minter *et al.*, 2011)

As can be observed, the emotion process is as follows: A stimulus leads to appraisal, which emerges out of using personal cognitive abilities. Only after that does appraisal of the situation lead to an emotional response followed by a bodily response. So far, within this framework, the emotional experience can be explained as a sequential process where appraisal comes before the experience of emotions and its response via bodily changes. However, this view raises one question: is the nature of appraisal causative (cause for emotion) or should the appraisal phase be considered as a component of emotion? Many theorists in the field have similar opinions here: appraisals are components of emotions (e.g. Schachter & Singer, 1962).<sup>18</sup> Besides, appraisals can be "added" or "revised" and there is no such thing as

<sup>18</sup> Cognitive appraisal theories prioritize the role of cognition in the experience of emotions but this does not mean that they contradict with the earlier theories of emotion. For example, Schachter and Singer's theory and the Cannon-Bard theory show similarities in describing the patterns of

an isolated or single emotion. Taking as an example the emotion of anger, Ellsworth and Scherer argue that there can be an “‘almost-anger’ and many nuances of the anger experience” (2002: 575):

*If someone else causes something negative—but not very negative—to happen to me, I may feel irritation. If my sense of control is very high, and I feel that the person has broken a social or moral norm I care about, I may feel a rather pleasurable righteous indignation. If [the] intensity is very high, and I am losing control, I may feel a desperate rage.*

Rather than understanding appraisals only as causes for emotion, I suggest that it is best to apprehend them as components of emotion, especially considering that the process of emotional experience is complex. In connection to this, Schachter and Singer in their two-factor theory of emotion tackle another important issue—the role of the physiological element in the sequential experience of emotion.

### **3.3.3 Schachter and Singer’s approach to appraisals**

Much like the James-Lange approach, Schachter and Singer built their theory around the notion of *physical arousal* adding the cognitive element. In contrast, Schachter and Singer point out that physical arousal alone is not responsible for emotional responses. According to Schachter and Singer, an individual would not appraise a direct physiological arousal but the reason behind it. This is precisely the point that Schachter and Singer emphasized in their research: an emotional state is the result of


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physiological arousal; both theories agree that the same pattern of physiological arousal can lead to the experience of different emotions.

two necessary factors—i.e. a state of physiological arousal and cognitive labeling of that state, which leads to emotion (1962: 380-381):

*The cognition, in a sense, exerts a steering function [...] Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation, he will “label” this state and describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him.*

Similar to Cannon-Bard, the physiological arousal emerges first and only after that an individual understands the reason for it. Figure 5 below illustrates the sequence of the two-factor theory:



**Figure 5.** Schachter and Singer’s two-factor theory (adapted from Minter *et al.*, 2011)

As seen in Figure 5, “a snarling dog” acting as a stimulus is appraised as dangerous and that makes a person tremble or shake, increasing the heart rate. These physiological changes are then cognitively interpreted as fear. This example is one of many illustrations of the experience of emotion seen as a sequence of stimuli and emotional responses. Other prototypical examples may include the sound of a gunshot, a man rapidly walking down a dark alley or a criminal walking into the bank to rob it.

The main idea behind the appraisal theories suggests that the appraisal of the situation occurs at the cognitive level, leading to the emotional response. Although the process may seem simple or basic, the theories themselves are not simple. For example, apart from sharing similarities, the Lazarus theory and the Schachter and Singer theory have one significant difference. Again, the key point here is a cognitive element. Lazarus suggests that cognitive appraisal occurs first and only then is the emotion experienced, which is followed by a physiological response. In contrast, Schachter and Singer emphasize that physiological arousal occurs first and only then does an individual cognitively assess the reason for this arousal that leads to the emotion. This is an interesting point to consider: should physiological elements be considered the basis for a cognitive theory of emotion?

If observing theories of emotions from the survival-driven point of view addressed earlier in this section, one notices that the physiological element is essential. However, considering the conscious cognitive function of a human, I support the view that when we primarily take into consideration conscious cognitive processes, then it might not be entirely correct to take physiological elements as central for further cognitive appraisal. Such direction of thought seems to work well in psychology. For example, according to Power and Dalgleish, the “key role” of undifferentiated physiological arousal in Schachter and Singer’s theory “seems to be in error” (2015: 102-103). The points made by Power and Dalgleish are plausible because many researchers assert that there is no shared undifferentiated physiological arousal for all emotions (e.g. Plutchik & Ax, 1962; Izard, 1977; Ekman, 1999a). In contrast, in their experiments, Schacher and Singer state that “it is cognition which determines whether the state of physiological arousal will be labelled as ‘anger,’

‘joy,’ ‘fear’ or whatever” (1962: 380). The physiological factor in Schacher and Singer’s theory is not questioned because it is significant to emotion. The objection concerns the idea that “all emotional states are physiologically identical” (Plutchik & Ax, 1962: 81). Plutchik’s criticism also addresses the way these physiological differentiations were described. Normally, the results are verbalized by the subject, which according to Plutchik, is “the naive notion” as “the whole history of clinical psychology indicates that a person’s verbalization can be markedly influenced by overt or subtle suggestions” (*ibid.*).

## **Summary**

The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the prevalent tendencies in the cognitive approaches in linguistics and psychology to the study of emotions in language and cognition over the past sixty years and see how the cognitive linguistics approach has changed and is still changing. It is clear from the research reviewed that the study of lexicalization and conceptualization of emotions is the object of qualitative and quantitative research worldwide. These two kinds of approaches—qualitative vs. quantitative—are still being debated; however, current empirical-driven research shows a significant shift toward the usage of the principles of cognitive linguistics in both qualitative and corpus-based data analyses. With psychological insight into the cognitive element of emotions, I have defined the notion of *appraisal* and shown the use of the notion of *emotion* as a process, which appears to be largely based on the way people understand emotion and decide on responses to emotion. More linguistic research and empirical analysis are required to

gain a better understanding of how these processes are encoded in language—and for what purposes. Given that the corpus for the analysis in this thesis is a compilation of texts from legal fiction, a discussion on emotion and the law is required, considering that this topic has been surprisingly neglected for many years. Therefore, the main concern of the next chapter is the expression of emotions in legal discourse, especially in the processing of literary texts.

### EMOTION AND THE LAW IN A LEGAL CONTEXT

The aim of this chapter is twofold. As a continuation of Chapter 1, in the first part of the current chapter, I focus on the notion of *emotion* and its categorization. To understand the differences between such notions, as *emotion*, *feeling*, *affect*, and *mood*, it is necessary to provide a working definition of *emotion* suitable for a study in cognitive linguistics. The topic of categorization has always been a key issue in linguistics and psychology (e.g. Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1977; Rosch, 1978; Plutchik, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Ekman, 1999b). One could add that this topic is also considered as one of the most important when studying emotions as expressed in language. When discussing types of emotions, I draw attention to what psychologists call “basic” emotions (Ekman, 1999b) because each basic emotion has its typical response and motivation for action/inaction, which is also expressed linguistically. To be aware of such information is to understand emotion as a process more thoroughly, therefore helping to create a more structured metaphorical profile of emotions as “forces” or “effects” linked to somebody/something.<sup>19</sup>

Knowledge of emotions discussed in the first part of this chapter will contribute to a better understanding of emotion as a category rather than as an elusive entity and facilitate the connection of *emotion* to the notions of *law* and *reason*. Then, in the second part of this chapter, the focus shifts to the place of emotions in legal discourse, which is still vastly determined by the opposition of emotion vs.

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<sup>19</sup> The conceptualization of emotions as “effects on a state linked to somebody/something” indicates emotion as a response to somebody’s actions.

reason. Not only will I discuss how emotions are represented in legal fiction, but I will also address the topic of text processing from the affective aspect, often overlooked in literary studies. As far as I can tell, there has not been any study on the representation of emotion in legal discourse compared to fiction. Moreover, literary studies have not paid much attention to the specificities of legal discourse in fiction.

## **1. OPTIONS FOR THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTION**

### **1.1 Toward a definition of emotion**

*Emotions* are ubiquitous notions, and there is no monosemantic definition of them because “no consensus” about the definition of emotion exists (Frijda, 1988: 350). When looking at a dictionary or thesaurus, the articles on emotion are often lengthy, as they cover various aspects of the word *emotion*. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), the word *emotion* was used in 1550 meaning “agitation of mind” or *emotion mentis*, a classical Latin *ēmōt-* past participial stem of *ēmōvĕre* meaning “to remove, expel, to banish from the mind, to shift, displace.” As from 1580, the word “emotion” was then used in the sense of “strong feeling, passion” (OED, 2015).

In everyday life, emotions are so obvious and “natural” for humans that we do not see how we can differentiate them or even “start thinking about them” (Minsky, 2006: 2). The related notions to *emotion*—*feeling*, *affect* and *mood*—have always played a significant role in the way people experience emotional states. Often, the definition of emotion includes such words as *feeling* and *affect*, which describe an overwhelming emotional experience. The interchangeable use of these four notions

had been recorded since the 1990s (Batson, Shawn & Oleson, 1992: 295). Such similarities arise from the way people *experience* emotions. In the next section, I attempt to clarify how emotion can be distinguished from *feeling*, *affect*, and *mood*. As all these notions denote experiences with specific characteristics, I suggest using (especially in the current chapter) the more general term *emotional experience* to refer to and to describe the four experiences—i.e. *emotion*, *feeling*, *affect*, and *mood*. It is interesting to note that the very word *experience* is also used in one of the examples from the corpus compiled for the analysis of the emotion keywords (Example 131, p. 271), when the emotion of love is described as an experience. Although these terms (*emotion*, *feeling*, *affect*, and *mood*) refer to the emotional experiences, there are some distinctions to be made. As an illustration, the dynamic of duration often indicates that a long-lasting emotional experience, such as sadness, tends to be identified as a feeling rather than an emotion because it is not an immediate type of experience, and it can last for days. In contrast, the emotional experience of anger is more likely an affect, rather than a feeling, because of its intensity and quick culmination. However, it does not mean that, for example, *fear* is only an *emotion* because it can also be experienced as an *affect*, which is a strong negative emotional experience. On the other hand, for example, *guilt* is not only an *emotion* but also a *feeling* because guilt is a self-conscious emotional experience that usually lasts a long time when we *feel* guilty. Therefore, when giving the characteristics of the notions of *emotion*, *feeling*, *affect*, and *mood*, I do not try to place these notions in isolated categories. Instead, I dwell on their qualities, including their intensity and duration for a clearer picture of each emotional experience and its dynamics.

Given these points, the following section provides the specifics of each emotional experience mentioned above in order to state that emotion is not a feeling, nor an affect, nor a mood.

## 1.2 Definition and specifications: Emotion and feeling

Ever since ancient times, people have debated the nature, types, and connections between emotions and feelings. Aristotle argued that there were as many feelings as kinds of activities.<sup>20</sup> In its general sense, a “feeling” is “a physical sensation or perception (as of touch, heat, cold, pain, motion, etc.) experienced through this capacity” (OED, 2015). Such a definition is supported by linguistic anthropologists. An interesting point about this topic has led to split opinions. If some researchers tend to link feelings to what people experience through their bodies, such as flushing of the face or gut feeling referring to trust (Rosaldo, 1984), other researchers argue that feeling is linked to the process of thinking and not necessarily with “bodily feeling” (e.g. Wierzbicka, 1999). The example below from my corpus shows that the feeling or experience of emotions is linked with bodily changes:<sup>21</sup>

*Such crowding reflections, increasing the **distress and fear I always felt** when the name was mentioned, made me so agitated that **I could scarcely hold my place at the table.***  
(Charles Dickens, *Bleak House*, 1:89)

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<sup>20</sup> See e.g. Aristotle (2011). *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. (S. Bartlett & D. Collins, Trans.).

<sup>21</sup> This is an example from the corpus for the analysis. The number of each example is generated by CAQDAS ATLAS.ti while performing manual coding of text. The number is original: “1” indicates that the time-frame is number one (Charles Dickens), “89” is a number of the example (also known as *quotation* in ATLAS.ti terminology).

However, cases—like the one given below—have also been found in which bodily changes are not directly linked with the experiencing of emotions:

*The **knowledge** that she hadn't fought for him, hadn't defended him with vigour, let alone passion, that she had **felt** more **shame** for herself and **fear** of her father than she had felt compassion, stayed with her to taint the **memory** of those evenings together.*  
(P. D. James, *A Certain Justice*, 4:34)

In this case, even though the author uses emotion keywords, such as *shame* and *fear*, the link between the emotions is established through “knowledge” and “memory.” Regarding this subtle topic, Wierzbicka provides interesting examples of the subject, arguing that people can feel “abandoned” or “lost,” which does not necessarily refer to “anything that happens in the body” (1999: 2). According to the author, “[...] the English word *emotion* combines in its meaning a reference to ‘feeling,’ a reference to ‘thinking,’ and a reference to a person’s body” (*id.*). Consequently, the words derived from the verb (*to feel*) are used to describe what people experience as emotion. Wierzbicka elaborates on this point saying (1999: 2):

*[...] One can also talk about a “feeling of loneliness” or a “feeling of alienation,” but not an “emotion of loneliness” or an “emotion of alienation,” because while these feelings are clearly related to thoughts [...] they do not suggest any associated bodily events or processes (such as rising blood pressure, a rush of blood to the head, tears, and so on).*

Damasio supports this point by stating that feelings are “mental representations of the physiological change” and stresses that with “the perception of a certain mode of thinking,” people experience bodily changes when they feel an emotion (2003: 86). Thus, anger leads to shaking or trembling, and joy can cause facial changes or

accelerated heartbeat. According to Damasio, feelings do not have a direct connection to physical changes—they originate in our mental experience of physiological changes and are, what the author calls, “direct consequences of emotions” (2001: 781). On the basis of Damasio’s view, I associate feelings with senses that relate “to mental sensitivity or awareness” (OED, 2015), because apart from physical experiences and tactile perception of things, feelings are also linked with the thought process. Keeping that in mind, feelings could be viewed as emotional reflections of socially significant occurrences coherent with morality and consciousness that allows people to differentiate between moral, esthetic, cognitive, and intellectual feelings. This is one way of looking at the notion of *feeling*.

Another key point that differentiates emotion from feeling is based upon parameters of intensity and duration, which are essential to emotional experience. If knowing (even approximately), whether what people are experiencing is very intense or something very light but lasts for a long time, people may be able to establish a difference between experiences. For example, a gunshot as stimulus will likely trigger such emotion as fright, which is a very quick, survival-driven response to danger or threat. On the other hand, for example, sadness is far from what is called fright. Sadness can last for hours or days; it is not an immediate or intense type of emotional experience, but rather lasting with much less intensity.

That is to say, the characteristics of emotional duration and intensity are some of the most important factors for emotional experiences (e.g. Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 2005; Brans & Verduyn, 2014). In the next section, I show how the characteristic of intensity is important in differentiating of *emotion* from another emotional experience: *affect*.

### 1.3 Definition and specifications: Emotion and affect

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word *affect* is closely related to body senses and is defined as “the outward display of emotion or mood as manifested by facial expression, posture, gestures, tone of voice” (OED, 2015). In affective states, as understood by psychologists, people experience quick bodily changes, temporary memory loss or “blackout,” changes in speech and behavior (Scherer, 2009). For example, in a state of rage or euphoria, speech becomes fast, the choice of words is limited to those that reflect the essence of the meaning, without detailed descriptions.

The etymology of the word *affect* can be traced back to 1531, designating “a quality or manner of behaving,” its etymon being the classical Latin *affectāre*, meaning “to strive after” (OED, 2015). In post-classical Latin, *affect* also means “to register emotion.” The verb (*to*) *affect* is derived from the Anglo-Norman *affeeter*, meaning “(to) affect, change” (late 13<sup>th</sup> century), and Middle-French *affecter*—to “have a physical or moral effect on” (15<sup>th</sup> century). The etymology of the verb (*to*) *affect* refer to the notion as something that produces a harmful effect, causing suffering; however, there are also entries of that same verb suggesting motivational forces, such as “to make substantial progress with” or, in post-classical Latin (12<sup>th</sup> century), “to strive after” and “to be well disposed” (*id.*). In the latter context, the word *affect* is closely related to the word *effect*. It can be slightly confusing in so far as the difference between these notions is subtle. The word *affect* is usually used as a verb meaning “to influence or cause someone or something to change,” whereas the

word *an effect* is used to indicate the achievement of something, “the result of a particular influence” (CED, 2015).

The psycho-physiological characteristics of *affects* are central to these emotional experiences. Considering this, affects such as rage or anger, often conceptualize as “forces” within the sub-categories of “transformative force,” “uncontrollable force,” “explosive force” (*I can barely control my anger*) or “container” (*I am in a rage*). The bodily changes are attributes of affective states, often conceptualized as “entities located in the body” (*to have one’s heart in one’s mouth, to break out in a cold sweat, to shake like a leaf*). Besides, the image-schematic structure of “change” supported by various bodily changes (*His face turned red with rage*) is frequent, as in the cross-domain mapping “states are a part of EVENT STRUCTURE because events often involve entities changing from one state to another” (Kövecses, 2004: 52). In addition, affects often conceptualize via the gestalt-like experiences of metaphors, such as “depth” or “height,” and find their practical importance via the conceptual mapping ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL (*He unleashed his anger*), ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (*He was boiling with anger*) or INTENSITY OF HAPPINESS IS DEPTH (*deep joy*).

So far, affects have been discussed from one point of view—disturbance and vivid kinesthetic experiences. Besides visually detectable characteristics, affective state does not necessarily have to be “explosive” or “uncontrollable.” Without delving too much into psychiatry, I would only state that there are cases in which affects are experienced silently, considered as being more severe cases, including such disturbances, as blunted affect meaning “severe reduction in the intensity of

affective expression” or, in contrast, labile affect, which indicates “abnormal variability, with repeated, rapid, and abrupt shifts in affective expression” (Shachrokh, Hales *et al.*, 2011: 7-8).

It should also be mentioned that the description of affects is largely encoded in linguistic expressions. Often we hear people complain about difficult problems or no way-out situations. In such cases, affect is a powerful emotional stroke. The cases of such a state can vary, as shown in the following phrases: *one’s back is against the wall, carry the weight of the world on one’s shoulders, break in a cold sweat, a bundle of nerves, I was so mad I couldn’t see through, jump down someone’s throat*—i.e. to become very angry.

The duration dynamic of affect can vary from a very short-lived violent reaction like an outburst of anger (e.g. *to break into tears, to burst with anger, burst into tears*) or pseudo-positive bursts of laughter in a euphoric state, to a continuing period of a constant affective attitude toward something or somebody. Thus, a short-period affect forms quickly and reaches culmination within seconds. Usually, it is unexpected for a person and people around. In this short span of time a person’s physiological qualities are intensified, so much so that it can sometimes lead to partial loss of memory or amnesia.

The long-term affect is important in socialization and a person’s subjective attitude toward other people. Such dynamics link affects with feelings. Sometimes feelings are seen as affective states lasting over a long period of time. They are formed on the basis of an established attitude toward somebody or something. For example, if someone is scared stiff of a gunshot, he/she experiences a strong negative affect (like fear) that lasts for a relatively short period of time. But when a person

experiences a series of similar emotional situations, the emotional experience is more likely to become a feeling of worry, anxiety, discomfort or awe that can last for some period of time or even turn into phobia. In this view, the emotional experience of affective states contrasts with *mood*.

#### **1.4 Definition and specifications: Emotion and mood**

Among the emotional experiences discussed in this chapter, mood is probably the vaguest emotional experience. A significant feature of mood is its close connection with causes because there can usually be several causes for a bad or good mood. Attention, perception, and mental processing have always been the focal aspects in the study of mood (Dalgleish, 2004; Chepenik *et al.*, 2007), which are also fixed in dictionaries. The very first entries in the definition of the word *mood* in the Oxford English Dictionary state that *mood* is “mind, thought, will,” and also “heart, feeling” (OED, 2015). Etymological entries show that *mood* relates with Old Frisian *mōd* (neuter) meaning “feeling, mind, courage, will, intention,” with Old Dutch *muod* meaning “passion, arrogance, courage, disposition, conviction, consent, mind, heart” (*id.*). Besides, the origin of the word *mood* dates back to Old English *mod* and, interestingly, means “heart, frame of mind, spirit” (*id.*). As for up-to-date definitions, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (M-WD) describes *mood* as “a conscious state of mind,” which supports the theory that emotional experiences have a cognitive base (M-WD, 2015). Moreover, *mood* is defined as “a receptive state of mind

predisposing to action” (*id.*), which is also argued by Frijda’s thesis on “awareness of state of action readiness.”<sup>22</sup>

A substantial body of evidence has documented a contrastive study between mood and other emotional experiences, especially emotions (Tomkins, 1962; Plutchik, 1980; Izard, 1991). Many researchers converge: Mood is less specific in external expression (e.g. bodily changes or speech dynamics) with less immediate impact on a person. According to Ekman, mood can be distinguished from emotion or affect in terms of its durations (1994: 56):

*Moods can be distinguished from emotions in terms of their time course [...] What we call moods last much longer than emotion.*

At the same time, Watson states that moods are “transient episodes of feeling or affect” (2000: 4) that make cyclical patterns as emotional states. This point is important to consider. In this regard, Izard emphasizes the difference between non-cyclical emotions and moods (1977: 50):

*All emotions as contrasted with drives, are non-cyclical. One does not become interested or disgusted or ashamed two or three times a day in rhythm with ingestion, digestion and metabolic processes. Emotions have virtually unlimited generality and flexibility as motivational factors. While only food and drink will satisfy the hunger and thirst drives, a person can learn to be joyful or contemptuous or afraid in response to a seemingly infinite variety of things.*

An interesting question arises from this: if mood as a transient but yet cyclical emotional experience is quite difficult to “detect,” are there any peculiarities in the way mood is linguistically represented in texts? The answer is, mood is approached

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<sup>22</sup> See previous discussion in Chapter 1, section 1.1.3.

through the description of psychological states and tone of characters (in fiction narratives). As a keyword used in texts, it can be positively or negatively described by adjectives, such as *good*, *bad*, *joyful*, *sullen* or *sarcastic*. However, in Ekman's view, what is important in the study of mood is to "use language precisely," so as not to confuse what is called mood with what might be called an emotion. The following is Ekman's example to illustrate the point (1994: 56):

*While the term 'irritable' may refer to a long-lasting mood as distinct from the related but brief emotion of anger, it is not always used in that fashion. Irritable may also be used to refer to low-intensity anger or to the beginning of an anger episode.*

As can be seen, emotional experiences are not only cyclical and non-cyclical but also transient, where one emotional experience can become another. Such complexity has been discussed by a number of researchers in psychology, especially those who attempt to classify emotions. This issue is addressed in the next section (section 1.5.).

On the whole, it can be concluded that characteristically mood lasts a long time. It is greatly different from affect and emotion in terms of duration and intensity but shows similarities with feeling by way of experiencing something over a long period. Someone can say *I am in a good/bad mood*, which involves various conditions that have led him/her to be in this particular state. Consequently, in cross-domain mapping, mood might demonstrate frequent conceptualizations, as "a container" or gestalt-like experiences "up-down," "light-dark;" but less as "a burden" and almost never as "insanity." Affect may then be viewed in sharp contrast to mood. Affect has vivid characteristics of very strong emotions experienced through bodily changes. The degree of intensity is one of the main differences between affect and

feeling, the former accompanies immediate bodily changes and explosive short-term reaction to stimuli.

It has now become clear that emotions are elusive states. As a rule, the differences between them are carefully established on the parameters of their intensity and duration. But even in the view of this differentiation, emotions have a broad distinction between “basic” and “complex.” Considering this, a discussion on possible classification of emotions might be complex. In the next section, I demonstrate that the current state of knowledge in psychology and linguistics allows clear classification of emotions.

### **1.5 The classification of Emotion**

The notion of *category* is important both in the study of emotions as psychological experiences and as words expressed in language. From the cognitive linguistics’ perspective, categorization is an essential part of the human conceptual system, in which categories are *prototypes* (Rosch, 1978; Fodor, 1989; Taylor, 2008). By prototypes of categorization Rosch means “the clearest cases of pry membership defined operationally by people’s judgments of goodness of membership in the category” (1978: 36). In this sense, categorization is an essential part of the human conceptual system, which focuses on our cognitive ability to simplify, organize and store our experiences “within the network of encyclopaedic knowledge” (Evans & Green, 2006: 248). This has important implications because the issue of the expression of emotion in language is central to this thesis.

The various emotional experiences discussed in the previous section are bipolar: emotions, feelings, affects and moods can be positive or negative. It should be mentioned that some emotions, such as surprise, can be both positive and negative. In other words, they are *dual-nature emotions*. Usually, such duality depends on the stimuli. In the case of surprise, its type is dependent on what causes it: there can be both good and bad surprises and, consequently, good and bad reactions to them.

Apart from recognizing positive, negative, and dual-nature emotions, there is a debate about the universality of emotions. A hallmark of categorization of emotions is to create a theory powerful enough to make strong ground for the *basic* emotions—in other words, to single out “distinct universal signals” (Ekman, 1992: 47) for the basic emotions. These are also called primary, fundamental, and universal (James, 1884; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; Tomkins, 1984; Ekman, 1999). There have been significant discussions about basic emotions for more than a century and this topic is of increasing importance in the field. By classifying emotions as basic, they are selected on a common basis in accordance with similar physiological observations—i.e. bodily changes, especially focusing on facial expressions (Darwin, 1872; Plutchik, 1980; Ekman, 1999b). Secondly, apart from physiological elements, there are also psychological similarities (Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1988; Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1990) when experiencing emotions. Besides, there is a cultural element to emotions (Rosaldo, 1984; Lutz, 1986; Scherer, 1994; Wierzbicka, 1999), which is of great significance especially for cross-cultural linguistics studies.

As it happens, the abovementioned approaches to basic emotions are not separated from one another. For example, Ekman not only advocates both

physiological elements to basic emotions but also states that facial expressions are cross-cultural (1999b). Similarly, Wierzbicka's semantic approach promotes cultural differences in the way people understand emotional concepts. As an example, the German word *Angst* (fear) is identified by Wierzbicka as "a peculiarly German concept," while *Angstzustand* (a state of *Angst*) is identified as a state of depression. According to the author, fear is "not a 'state' it is either a feeling, or disposition to a feeling, linked with thought about someone or something" (1999: 124). When Germans say *Ich habe Angst* (literally *I have fear*), they usually do not specify the cause or nature of this emotion or reasons for being afraid or "having fear." It is a "nameless *Angst*." This can be identified as the main difference between *Angst* and another German word that is used to express the emotion of fear—*Furcht*. According to Wierzbicka's case study, *Furcht* is closer to the English *fear* than *Angst*, but the latter is more common in German speech (*id.*).


Instead of delving too much into the psychological aspect of the classification of emotion, I would rather provide a list of the most complete classifications of basic emotions done by various researchers, as illustrated by Ortony and Turner (1990).

<b>Reference</b>	<b>Fundamental emotion</b>	<b>Basis for inclusion</b>
Arnold (1960)	Anger, aversion, courage, dejection, desire, despair, fear, hate, hope, love, sadness	Relation to action tendencies
Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth (1982)	Anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise	Universal facial expressions
Frijda (personal communication, September 8, 1986)	Desire, happiness, interest, surprise, wonder, sorrow	Forms of action readiness
Gray (1982)	Rage and terror, anxiety, joy	Hardwired
Izard (1971)	Anger, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, guilt, interest, joy, shame, surprise	Hardwired
James (1884)	Fear, grief, love, rage	Bodily involvement
McDougall (1926)	Anger, disgust, elation, fear, subjection, tender-emotion, wonder	Relation to instincts
Mowrer (1960)	Pain, pleasure	Unlearned emotional states
Oatley & Johnson-Liard (1987)	Anger, disgust, anxiety, happiness, sadness	Do not require propositional content
Panksepp (1982)	Expectancy, fear, rage, panic	Hardwired
Plutchik (1980)	Acceptance, anger, anticipation, disgust, joy, fear, sadness, surprise	Relation to adaptive biological process
Tomkins (1984)	Anger, interest, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, joy, shame, surprise	Density of neural firing
Watson (1930)	Fear, love, rage	Hardwired
Weiner & Graham (1984)	Happiness, sadness	Attribution independent

**Table 1.** The list of classifications of emotion (Ortony & Turner, 1990, 316)

Table 1 shows that even in the absence of any single theory on the universal nature of emotion, most psychologists agree that some basic emotions are common to almost all cultures. Nevertheless, some studies have pointed out the lack of agreement on the number of basic emotions. For this part, Plutchik (1980) distinguishes eight basic emotions, whereas, Ekman (1990) records six emotions, and Mowrer (1960), Weiner and Graham (1984) only two.

So far, I have discussed how emotions can be positive, negative and dual, cyclical and non-cyclical, as well as transient. One could also add that basic emotions have further expansion. In this regard, a number of interesting studies have been done on complex-structured emotions (Johnson-Laird & Oatly, 1989; Damasio, 1994), including *the wheel of emotions* developed by Plutchik in 1980 (see Figure 6 below) mentioned earlier.



**Figure 6.** Plutchik's three-dimensional circumplex model of emotions (1980)

According to Plutchik, there are eight basic emotions: fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, anticipation, joy, and trust. On the basis of this classification, one can go into finer detail of the complexity of emotions. The eight sectors are eight primary and biologically primitive emotions. Plutchik's three-dimensional circumplex model accounts for the relationships among them. The vertical dimension represents

intensity, while emotions without color represent a mix of two basic emotions. For example, aggressiveness would be a mix of anger and anticipation, and the blend of fear and surprise might result in awe. Such mixed emotional states have been debated by researchers in the field, including Tomkins (1962) or Ekman and Friesen (1975). The main idea is to use the term *basic* to “postulate that other non-basic emotions are combinations of basic emotions, which may be called blends or mixed emotional states” (Ekman, 1992: 170).

I share the opinion that a study of emotions should not be limited to the study of the types of emotions (Schachter & Singer, 1962; Plutchik, 1980). In my view, emotions should be approached from the angle of people’s perception of the world around them. In this sense, emotions can “explain how people’s perceptions of the world—their construals—cause them to experience emotions” (Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1990: 12). Approaching this task from the perspective of cognitive linguistics, it seems that research into emotions represented in speech by keywords should be oriented toward the cognitive reasoning accounting for these emotions. Hence, the main priority is to examine the cognitive structure of emotion keywords as represented in texts. The term *cognitive structure* is used in the sense it is used by Ortony—i.e. cognitive structure of emotions as a “logical description” of people “reacting to the world” (1990: 19). According to Ortony’s theory, people have emotions as “valenced reactions” to three kinds of “things” or “branches” to be reacted to: agents, objects, and events (*id.*, 20). These three “branches” can be viewed in their general sense: objects are things, agents are mainly people, and events are different situations.

In order to carry out a qualitative metaphor analysis of emotion in language, it has been necessary to select emotions of various kinds and explore diverse metaphorical profiles. To complete this task, existing categories of emotions have had to be addressed. Table 1 shows that the set of basic emotions is almost similar among researchers. As can be seen, there are certain emotions that are used in several classifications. Therefore, the first task is to select such emotions for this study that belong to these classifications done by prominent psychologists (see Table 1). Another crucial point is that the research involving the cognitive approach to emotions seeks to group them in accordance with their functions, and it is assumed that emotions are appraised responses to the stimuli that produce effects on people. It may, therefore, be advantageous to also investigate the function of emotions—i.e. what kind of effects various emotions have on bodily changes and by what means these effects are expressed in the language of legal fiction. Lastly, the significance of emotions for the analysis has to be highly stressed both by legal professionals (e.g. Bandes, 2001; Karstedt, 2002) and (legal) psychologists (e.g. Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Bornstein & Wiener, 2010). All things considered, the basic emotions, as keywords selected for the analysis, are the following: *fear*, *guilt*, *surprise*, *happiness*, and *interest*.

As mentioned earlier, diversity was the main criterion in choosing emotions; therefore, the selected emotions represent various emotional experiences. The emotion of guilt has a specialized meaning in the system of justice via the correlation with the notion of *punishment* and the general feeling of being guilty of something and having *guilty conscience*. The experience of guilt is accompanied with the emotion of fear, as the survival-driven emotion influential in stressful situations. The

experience of this negative emotion is close to an affective state, common in dangerous and stressful situations, and as a consequence, the depiction of such situation through language is expressive (e.g., witness examination in courtroom trial). The similar expressive depiction can also be the case when experiencing surprise, which is both a positive and negative experience, depending on the expectations prior to the emotional response. In contrast, the emotion of happiness is a classical positive emotion, often interpreted in its general sense of triumph, justice, and goodness—both in everyday life and in legal circumstances. The emotion of interest has slightly less positive connotations in legal contexts. Often, interests are largely based on personal attention and the benefit/profit that one expects to get from something. They do not always bring positive emotional experiences, in that in order to acquire something desired or wished one sacrifices something else or is forced to adjust to the situation.

On the whole, it is rather difficult to give a simple definition of the notion of *emotion*, considering that there are other emotional experiences to take into account. Nevertheless, on the basis of categorizations of emotions discussed in this section, five emotions have been selected for the analysis. In order to select these emotions, different notions have been cross-examined to distinguish both similarities between emotions and other notions that represent emotional experiences and differences, indicating that emotion is not a feeling, affect, or mood. American psychologist and creator of *the wheel of emotions* and psychoevolutionary theory of emotions, Robert Plutchik (1991: 21-22), points out that “an ideal definition of emotion requires a statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the term.” Given that the present study is conducted within the framework of cognitive linguistics, the

definition of emotion, which is examined in the following section, is provided in this context.

### **1.6 Defining “emotion” in view of a cognitive linguistics study**

For a cognitive linguist, emotions are analyzed as expressed in language via keywords. For example, the emotions of anger, happiness, or guilt are analyzed according to nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. I argue that emotions should be viewed from both a linguistic and cognitive perspectives. In this regard, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary provides one of the most inclusive definitions of the notion of *emotion* with crucial points to consider. The definition is as follows (M-W, 2015):

*[Emotion is] a conscious mental reaction subjectively experienced as a strong feeling usually directed toward a specific object and typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body.*

Following Plutchik’s guidance in defining emotions and keeping in mind central assumptions of cognitive linguistics, four important points when studying emotions in language via a cognitive-oriented approach can be highlighted:

- Firstly, *emotions* are complex notions with a cognitive aspect to them. I do not tend to focus on emotions in isolation from thought, but rather emphasize their interrelation with cognition. According to cognitive theories of emotions, cognition not only constitutes emotional states, but often drives them (Arnold, 1960). This means conditions for triggering emotions are threefold: stimuli, cognitive appraisal

of the situation that elicited the arousal of emotion, and physiological arousal (Schachter & Singer, 1962).<sup>23</sup>

- Secondly, emotions evoke bodily changes (e.g. *to be paralyzed with fear*). In cognitive research, this function of emotions links them with the embodied cognition thesis (Johnson, 1987). When people feel emotionally, they also feel physically. The metaphor BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS stands for various effects that emotions have on the human body, such as filling the body with emotions (e.g. *He was filled with rage*) or changing the color of the face (e.g. *Her face turned red with shame*).

- Thirdly, emotions as affective states can take control of people and it may be difficult to get over them without a deliberate effort. In this context, the word *affective* means “strong and captivating,” and qualifies emotions as powerful “forces” that influence the body and alter one’s behavior. Expressions like *He couldn’t get rid of anxiety* or *She couldn’t stop shaking with fear* indicate a force-dynamics between a person (*Agonist*) and an emotion (*Antagonist*),<sup>24</sup> where the prevalence of the latter is clearly observed. Such expressions are motivated by the conceptual metaphor EMOTIONS ARE FORCES.

- Fourthly, emotions as responses to stimuli (both external and internal), orient or make people “aware” (Frijda, 1988: 279) of further action. They play the role of “impulses to act” or “instant plans for handling life that evolution instilled in us” (Goleman, 1995: 6). Considering this, emotions are regarded as psychological states in managing goals, which Oatley explains as follows (1999: 273):

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<sup>23</sup> See previous chapter for a more extensive account of this.

<sup>24</sup> I refer to Talmy’s notion of *force-dynamics* (1988) and later elaborated on by Kövecses (2004) specifically for the study of emotional concepts.

*An emotion is a psychological state or process that functions in the management of goals. It is typically elicited by evaluating an event as relevant to a goal; it is positive when the goal is advanced, negative when the goal is impeded.*

The fourth point is particularly interesting. If emotion as a response to stimuli “behaves” negatively in one situation, it does not imply that it will have the same effect in another situation. On the one hand, different emotions can cause the same behavior, and, on the other hand, different behaviors can be caused by the same emotion. For instance, the emotion of fear triggers bodily changes, such as a state of paralysis or shivering, as described by the phrase *to be paralyzed with fear*. The reverse emotion of surprise creates a similar *unable-to-move* situation, as in *rooted to the spot*, meaning that a person is amazed, surprised, and cannot move.

By and large, based on psychological and cognitive linguistics theories of emotion, this definition of emotion has been suggested in view of a cognitive linguistic study. The next and following sections are concerned with the linguistic representation of emotions in legal discourse. I examine how and for what purposes emotions are represented in this context in order to verify the role of emotions in legal discourse.

## **2. EMOTION AND LITERATURE**

Literary works are a first-hand source for the linguistic representation of emotions, and as such, they are particularly apt at showing the “real world,” being specifically concerned with the law, justice, and crime. In a fairly recent past, law has been approached from a literary perspective and considered by some prominent legal professionals as reflecting true experiences and helping to provide an insight into

those experiences. In this section, not only do I emphasize that fiction literature is important for legal scholars via the notion of *worldview*, but I also address one of the most interesting issues of fiction literature—the affective aspect involved in literary text processing (Burke, 2010). As a fundamental concept, the term *worldview* encompasses “cultural baggage” (Wierzbicka, 2006) that includes beliefs, values, stereotypes, and emotional evaluation of the world around us. Through literary texts read as a “map” of reality, people learn about certain views of the world. In this light, literary texts appear to be assessed both cognitively and emotionally.

## **2.1 Law and literature**

The discussion about the place of legal fiction in the realm of law became so popular that, by the 1980s, there was a *law-and-literature* movement (e.g. Dolin, 2007; Carpi & Gaakeer, 2013). This movement could be roughly divided into two branches: law in literature and law as literature. The first branch promotes a reading of legal fiction in order to become familiar with legal situations presented in texts—with social, political, and cultural situations that could be helpful for legal practice. From this perspective, the focus is on the relatedness to legal situations (e.g. Weisberg, 1989). This point has been slightly abandoned by the representatives of the second branch (e.g. White, 1973; Dworkin, 1982), who emphasize that legal fiction improves legal understanding and critical thinking. The O. M. Vicars Professor of Law and Barron F. Black Research Professor, Anne Coughlin, says the following about the complexity of law and interaction with literature (cited in Forster, 2005):

*Lawyers and law professors almost have to turn to narratives to understand how our system is functioning [...] We're bringing into the Law School a text that's unconventional in the sense that it doesn't purport to be doctrinal, it doesn't purport to be written from the perspective of a legal academic or a legal practitioner. But it does fill in the blanks.*

Although there is no non-debatable agreement among legal professionals about the usefulness of fiction literature in the law (Fuller, 1967), the idea of using legal fiction in the practice of legal professionals or in the studies of future legal professionals has proved beneficial. Regarding this, Seaton asserts that “Literature’s importance to judges, lawyers, and law professors follows from its importance to human beings in general” (1999: 505). The quotation above states the importance of reading and telling stories in legal science. Here, Weisberg argues for a “specific linkage of law and literature” (1989: 4) and Schauer emphasizes that legal fiction is fundamental to “the language of the linguistic community in which the legal system exists” (2015: 127). In this context, Schauer explains that “if law is to serve its function of guiding ordinary folk, the meaning of some or most of its terms must be in the language that such folk use and understand” (*ibid.*).

What is noticeable is that the discussions about fiction literature and law are inevitably linked with society, language, and the understanding of the world around us. When talking about communities, people, and social accounts on the topic, the aspect of *worldview* is inevitable, as I explain in greater detail in the next section.

### 2.1.1 The notion of *worldview*

The term *worldview* pertains to several disciplines, including linguistics, cultural anthropology, and sociology. The topic of worldview concerns the analysis conducted in this study. Although the analysis covers the fictional portrayal of real-world situations in novels with a legal theme, it does not necessarily mean that what is portrayed in fiction is not a product of how people perceive the world. The nature of the legal world (including language, social, and behavioral norms) is highly symbolic (Cassirer, 1965). When lay people read fiction novels about legal-related topics (e.g. courtroom trial sequence, inheritance disputes), they understand what an author is trying to convey because, in their worldview, people already have a representation of the legal world. I refer to a *worldview* (German word “Weltanschauung”) as a “comprehensive conception or apprehension of the world especially from a specific standpoint” (M-WD, 2015). A worldview is what can be called a “fundamental cognitive orientation” of an individual or society, encompassing natural philosophy, existential and normative postulates, values, emotions, and ethics (Palmer, 1996: 113-114).

As an illustration, when thinking of a lawyer, not only do people already have a stereotypical portrait of a person possessing a certain set of professional skills (as, for instance, the ability to conduct a successful argumentation, the ability to persuade an audience), but they also “attach” an emotional profile to a lawyer, based on their attitudes toward this profession. It is generally accepted that people’s perception of lawyers bear more negative connotations than positive. One can add that over the years there have been no particular shifts on how lawyers are perceived (e.g.

Baldwin, 2000). Anecdotes, jokes, and colloquialisms represent numerous examples of greedy or mean lawyers ready to “rip off” their clients. Consequently, the majority of remarks about lawyers are negative. Dark humor is very specific in emphasizing the negative side of this profession, which is demonstrated in the following examples:

*Q: Why won't sharks attack lawyers?*

*A: Professional courtesy.*

(Kasper, 2013, 101-102)

*Q: What's the difference between a lawyer and a leech?*

*A: When you die, a leech will stop sucking your blood and drop off.*

(Price, 2011, 119)

The abovementioned examples are part of a standard representation of lawyers or a concept of a typical lawyer. Often lawyers are compared to “cold-blooded” animals, as can be seen from the examples above. In this case, when using cross-domain mapping, the metaphors LAWYERS ARE SHARKS or LAWYERS ARE SNAKES are typical examples. Not only do these two nouns have negative connotations linked with the fear for life but they also contain an element of danger, which is mapped on the target domain “lawyer” from the source domains “shark” or “snake.” For example, the phrase a *cold-blooded lawyer* refers to a *cold-blooded snake*, the same, as *quirky snake* may be used for describing a lawyer as a deceitful and quirky person. Nonetheless, there are also positive characteristics of lawyers, such as “smart,” “respectable,” and “highly professional,” but rarely “kind” or “merciful.” Even if one imagines a good lawyer, almost all positive connotations would probably be based on power, respect, and fear toward such “legal eagle.”

In the event that legal fiction has proved important for both legal scholars and lay people, the topic of emotional or affective experience in the process of reading has drawn specific attention. Via the perception of legally oriented “reality” represented in legal fiction, the readers of this fiction adopt and relive various experiences, which are “fixed” or “placed” in the text, including emotional ones, provided that “stories can elicit powerful emotions” (Lehne *et al.*, 2015). The mechanism of evoking such emotions includes cognitive and emotional levels, which are addressed in the following section.

## 2.2 Literary text processing: affective aspect

P. D. James, the author of *A Certain Justice*,<sup>25</sup> describes a situation that one of the characters experiences when remembering something (1997: 52):

*Was it really possible that that **appalling moment** over the road in Court Twelve only three weeks earlier could have robbed him of so much in one moment? The **memory** of it, the **agony** of it, was with him almost every waking minute. Now his **body became stiff** with **remembered terror**.*

Having gone through this extract, one can realize that a character experienced an “appalling moment,” and the memory of it is so strong that he describes it as an “agony.” Even as he *remembers* the incident, the character physically relives the negative emotional experience, as is evident from the phrase “body became stiff.” There are significant aspects to be considered. First, not only does our memory hold information about past events or people, but also about the *emotional* information

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<sup>25</sup> *A Certain Justice* is one of four novels in the corpus for the qualitative metaphor analysis.

attached to the experience. Second, the emotional information about events is so strong that it evokes bodily changes without any physical contact but simply via the act of recollection. What is more interesting is that this is an example from a literary text belonging to the genre of legal fiction, in which an author describes a fictional character who experiences certain feelings. Nonetheless, as readers, we can perfectly relate to everything that is described. This is what can be called *mental imagery*—the relationship between emotion, memory, and language.

The previous section explained how people’s perceptions of the world around them depends on the way they think about things, objects, or processes. In this section, I focus on the recent results of cognitive studies concerning text comprehension. The topic of text comprehension brings up two significant notions—*image-schema* and *mental imagery*. The first was discussed in Chapter 1, as image-schema is an increasingly important notion in cognitive linguistics. The second notion, too, pertains to cognitive linguistics and cognitive sciences, as well as philosophy, and especially neuroscience. Therefore, I start with the notion of *mental image*.

In its specialized sense, as defined by the Cambridge English Dictionary (CED), the word *image* refers to a “mental picture or idea that forms in a reader’s or listener’s mind from the words that they read or hear” (CED, 2015). This definition may well represent a fundamental understanding of a mental image. However, psychological understanding of what a “mental image” covers includes visual, auditory, and tactile experiences. McKellar argues that these mental images heavily depend on *recollection*, meaning they are linked with memory (1957: 19). An example of this can be any emotionally attached situation. Memory encodes and

stores such events with the emotions experienced (as shown in the literary example at the beginning of this section) and later, in a similar situation, retrieves that information. In this sense, many researchers agree that emotions are one of the most powerful stimuli for triggering memories:

*Even if a memory is inaccurate in its details, the strong memory for the gist of an emotional event may be sufficient to enhance the vividness and confidence of memory and allow for fast action in a similar circumstance in the future.*  
(Berntson & Cacioppo, 2009, 836)

First, memory, in its oversimplified sense, is stored information. All emotional experiences that people have had during their lifetimes are stored in an *archive* of emotionally marked information. In this respect, Burke says different kinds of images are formed in our brains: simple visual images (tree), esthetic images (sculpture), and complex mental images of “thinking and reflection,” which are largely conscious (2010: 58). Second, memory is also a *process* divided roughly into encoding, consolidation, and retrieval of information (e.g. Baddeley & Hirsch, 1974). Accordingly, people gather both event structures and emotional experiences associated with them.

The term *mental imagery* dates back to ancient Greek and Chinese philosophers. For example, *mental imagery* was debated in the times of Plato and Aristotle, when people were making attempts to understand their cognitive processes better. The Greek word for “[mental] image” is “phantasma” (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2015). It was used by Plato with regard to “reflections in mirrors or pools” (*ibid.*). But Aristotle described it as “a residue of the actual [sense]

impression” (*ibid.*)<sup>26</sup> In the pre-scientific view, Plato regarded “image” as “irremediably deceptive,” whereas Aristotle recognized their “essential and central role in human cognition,” in what is called “mental representation” in modern cognitive science (*ibid.*). In its current understanding, the term *imagery* means “descriptive representation of ideas” (OED, 2015) or, as Langacker calls it, “construal” operations of imagery (2008: 32). It should be mentioned that the term *construal* is used by many linguists, including Talmy (1978), Clausner and Croft (1999). It can be called a “cover term” that refers to “various types of conceptualizations” (Clausner & Croft, 1999: 3). This is a case of terminological variation. What Talmy calls “imaging systems,” Langacker calls “focal adjustment,” “construal” or “conceptualization” (*id.*, 4). Lakoff, on the other hand, not only uses the term “conceptualization,” but describes “metaphor,” “metonymy,” and “image schema transformations” as types of conceptualizations (*id.*, 3). Croft and Cruse approach mental images as “representations of specific embodied experiences” (2004: 44), as is shown by the example at the beginning of the section. What is interesting is that when reading some negative description or negative information, the reader is likely to frown if he/she runs into something disagreeable or something serious that requires attention. In contrast, one would probably see a smile on a reader’s face when he/she reads something funny or enjoyable.

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<sup>26</sup> De *Insomniis* 461b; cf. *Rhetorica* 137a 28.

### 2.2.1 Emotional attention in narratives

Carol and Gibson<sup>27</sup> describe the inclusion of emotional responses and cognitive evaluation in narrative as “one of the liveliest and most productive areas of research in literary theory,” and also as “the object of emotional and cognitive attention” (2011). Palmer supports this view by emphasizing the importance of emotions in the study of fictional minds,<sup>28</sup> especially by focusing on how the narrator and the reader construct the fictional minds of characters. The author states the following (2004: 15):

*Readers create a continuing consciousness out of the isolated passages of text that relate to a particular character. In this way, we assemble what I call an embedded narrative: the whole of a character's various perceptual and conceptual viewpoints, ideological worldviews, and plans for the future considered as an individual narrative that is embedded in the whole fictional text.*

In the context of the legal world, legal and social issues are relevant for the stylistic categories of fiction narrative, because even fictionalized accounts of imaginary or historical events are parts of human interaction with the world. In the case of fiction narrative, legal, social or other principles are “mapped” in the narrative, giving an idea of how society might look under such principles. In view of this, Weisberg states that “Law and literature are two parallel cultural phenomena; they are both attempts to shape reality through language, and are both concerned with matters of ambiguity, interpretation, abstraction, and humanistic judgment” (1989: 6). Magliano *et al.* support this view in their situational approach to narrative

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<sup>27</sup> See a collection of essays N. Carroll and J. Gibson (Eds.). (2011). *Narrative, Emotion, and Insight*.

<sup>28</sup> See Palmer's fundamental work, *Fictional Minds* (2004).

construction, in which they study a “verisimilitude between the real world and the story world” (1999: 197).

Legal fiction not only portrays the legal world and related topics but writers also try to “bring” emotions to readers (e.g. via foregrounding). Seaton rightfully points out that “Courtroom dramas are popular because, among other reasons, non-jurists are curious about what it feels like to take part in a trial” (1999: 479). In the light of this idea, two examples<sup>29</sup> are considered from legal fiction that are a part of my corpus for the analysis. Both examples depict court situations but there are differences in the emotions intended to be conveyed:

*Fog everywhere [...]. And hard by Temple Bar, in Lincoln's Inn Hall, at the very heart of the fog, sits the Lord High Chancellor in his **High Court of Chancery**. Never can there come **fog too thick**, never can there come **mud and mire too deep**, to assort with the groping and floundering condition which this High Court of Chancery, most **pestilent of hoary sinners**, holds this day in the sight of heaven and earth.*  
(Charles Dickens, 1853, 12)

And the second one is as follows:

*[...] **Court Number One had laid its spell on her** since she had first entered it as a pupil. She had always tried to discipline that part of her mind which she suspected could be **seduced** by tradition or history, yet she responded to this elegant wood-panelled theatre with an **aesthetic satisfaction** and a **lifting of the spirit** which was one of **the keenest pleasures** of her professional life... And now she was once more in **the place where she belonged**.*  
(P. D. James, 1997, 3)

In the first example, Dickens, in his classic manner, satirically depicts the real object—the Court of Chancery—as a symbol of formalism, bureaucracy, and

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<sup>29</sup> The first example is from *Bleak House* by Charles Dickens, and the second example is from *A Certain Justice* by P. D. James.

injustice. Through another powerful culturally marked symbol of fog, the author draws on a negative element in the conceptualization of the court perceived as “a sinner” or “an object located at the heart of the fog.” Quite an opposite description is found in the second example in which the Court Number One—in this novel, the Old Bailey—is represented as an (elegant) “object” that brings positive emotions to the character (a defense lawyer) describing it. Besides, in both examples, the court conceptualizes as “a living creature.” In the first example, the court has negative connotations as “a sinner,” whereas in the second example, the court lays its “spell” on the character and brings “aesthetic satisfaction.”

On the whole, the role of emotions when reading narrative fiction has been found to be an influential one, in which emotions “back up” (Kneepkens & Zwaan, 1994: 129) cognitive processes when the reader forms a representation of the text. The validity of emotions and cognition in reading is assessed on the levels of all cognitive processes, where—in the words of Danes—“cognition evokes emotion (‘it is emotiogenic’) and emotion affects cognition” (2004: 25). The experience of reading has been discussed as a cognitive process. But do readers read in the same way? This question brings up an interesting point about individual differences that might reveal differences in the way people “decode” emotions in language.

### **2.2.2 Types of readers**

The topic of the reader’s experience of literary texts has gained significance in the 1960s-1970s (Holland, 1968; Iser, 1972; Fisch, 1980; Rosenblatt, 1988) with the development of the reader-response theory, initially proposed by Purves and Beach

(1972), in contrast to the studies that focused on the role of the author. Literary text processing is concerned with the description of the ways in which literary texts are processed by the reader—in other words, how the reader understands texts, which involves cognitive and emotional assessment of the text. Fisch emphasizes the following (1980: 70):

*No one would argue that the act of reading can take place in the absence of someone who reads—how can you tell the dance from the dancer?—but curiously enough when it comes time to make analytical statements about the end product of reading (meaning and understanding), the reader is usually forgotten or ignored.*

For example, Iser in his reader-response theory emphasizes the role of readers via the structure of a text by stating that “[...] the structure of a text brings about expectations, which are interrupted by surprising unfulfillment, producing gaps, which require filling by the reader to create a coherent flow of the text” (1972: 298). Similarly, Averill emphasized the emotional creativity as revealed by readers through “individual differences in the ability to experience and express emotions” (2001: 331). The topic of individual differences to experience emotions is closely related to the types of readers that were studied by Eco (1985). In the context of emotions, narrative composition refers to the psychological (emotional) relationships between characters in the narrative. Starting from Peirce’s notion of *unlimited semiosis* in 1931, Eco (1995) developed an engaging insight into a reader’s role in the process of making meaning from texts. According to his theory, a model reader actualizes various meanings and contents to decode the narrative. For a reader to acquire awareness on topics “encoded” in text, one needs to actualize the meaning and content of the text. Here the notions developed by Eco—*the empirical reader*

and *the model reader*—find their application in answering the question about the extent of encyclopedic knowledge, attitudes regarding and evaluation of the subject.

One way of understanding the role of these two types of readers is to look at a text as the “producer” of the reader (Eco, 1990: 180). According to Eco, the empirical reader is “only an actor who makes conjectures about the kind of model reader postulated by the text,” whereas the initiative of the empirical reader is “figuring out a model author that is not the empirical one and that, in the end, coincides with the intention of the text” (*ibid.*). This idea gives us the author’s perspective of the text, which “has thus to foresee a model of the possible reader [...] supposedly able to deal interpretatively with the expressions in the same way as the author deals generatively with them” (Eco, 1995: 7).

A few things should finally be said about the stages of reading. Apart from an interaction between the reader, author, and the narrative at the time of reading, we may also experience what is called an *after reading* effect (Mar, Oatley, Djikic & Mullin, 2011). In other words, emotional and narrative fiction have been studied to understand the literary appeal to emotions, how emotions are evoked by the story and what the consequences of emotional experience are after reading. This aspect of emotion and fiction narration can be further expanded to the dependency between the mood of a person and the choice of book, which is usually linked to the current emotional state or goal-oriented emotional state.

Having discussed the interconnection between imagery, memory, and literary reading, it can be concluded that emotions stored in our memory are summoned while reading, especially if texts are “emotionally charged,” which is applicable to

legal fiction as well. What is more, emotions can linger long after readers close their books.

Given that the source data for the analysis in this thesis is fiction literature and the framework for the analysis is a cognitive one, the topic of text comprehension needs some elaboration in order to establish the structure of narration from the cognitive perspective. In the following section, I continue with the topic of text comprehension, shifting focus from mental images to image schemas and their role in the structure of narration.

### **2.3 Text comprehension: Narratives via image-schematic logic**

*Comprehension often requires us to make images out of languages.*  
- Zull, 2002

The experience of reading via mental images means that while reading, the reader chooses a particular image within a set of alternative images and extracts the conceptual content from it in order to structure the reading experience. The research in this direction was developed in the works of Block (1983) and Kosslyn (2006), where Kosslyn notes that the term *mental imagery* refers to “seeing with the mind’s eye,” “hearing with the mind’s ear,” and “feeling with the mind’s skin” (Kosslyn *et al.*, 2006: 4). Up to now, it has been established that mental images “activate” while reading and readers structure their reading experience. From this perspective, the focus is on the reader and his/her experiences of a text. From another perspective, the structure of narratives is addressed in relation to human beings’ cognitive and

perceptive experiences. In this regard, it seems possible to draw some attention to image-schema in narratives.

When talking about narration, *image-schema* might not be the first notion that comes to mind. However, it becomes evident when analyzing texts that the structures of texts are represented greatly via image-schematic logic. From being successfully employed in cognitive linguistics, image schemas are important tools in modeling narrative plot macrostructure. Macrostructures are text structures that create a text's global meaning<sup>30</sup> and representations of the meaning in memory (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). Macro rules as generalization, construction, and deletion create macrostructure (Kintsch, 2002: 158). Introduced by van Dijk in 1972, the term *macrostructure* was later developed as a psychological notion in discourses by van Dijk and Kintsch (1983).

Before addressing image-schematic logic in narratives, it is necessary to underline the differences between mental image and image-schema. Gibbs perfectly sums up the differences between the notions, the most important of which are the following. First, mental images are “temporary representations, while image schemas are permanent properties of embodied experience” (2006: 139). The author adds that “image schemas are emergent properties of unreflective bodily experience, while mental images are the result of more effortful cognitive processes” (*id.*).

Again, the narrative structure involves not only sentence structure but also a plot, theme, and storyline which, in turn are used for the structural analysis to specify a narrative's macrostructure. Further, according to van Dijk and Kintsch, there is a psychological property to macrostructure, as well as human beings' cognitive

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<sup>30</sup> In the text comprehension model (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978), there are also microstructures, which form text locally, e.g. connections between sentences, etc.

abilities to sum up the story (1983). In this context, Kimmel mentions that “the main purpose of successful macrostructures is that they condense the possible inferences readers may make about a story” (2008b: 3). Kimmel also states that cognitive functions in story comprehension (i) “let readers represent the theme of a story and its storyline as a more or less coherent meaning structure and allow creating explicit verbal summarisations of a story’s gist” (*id.*). Moreover, “readers recognize familiar story models [...] and guided by both world knowledge and implicit contextual expectations in their strategy of fitting incoming text into an expected macrostructure” (*ibid.*).

What Kimmel refers to as “world knowledge” is people’s “view” of the real world as it is and as portrayed in literary fiction. In reference to van Dijk and Kintsch, Magliano *et al.* point out that readers use their “general knowledge of the real world to construct a mental model of the events depicted in the narrative world” (1999: 196). When talking about the “real world” as portrayed in fiction, the dimensions of this portrayal are emphasized. Therefore, the situational model includes such dimensions, as temporality, spatiality, causality, and intentionality. Based on van Dijk and Kintsch’s study of the issue, Magnialo, Zwaan, and Graesser focus on specifying the extent to which readers construct these models (1999). In this sense, the emphasis shifts to the *event indexing model* (Zwaan, Langston & Graesser, 1995). This model was created to monitor different kinds of information in narratives, including “what characters are involved in a story, what is happening to them, what their goals are,” so the reader not only comprehends, but also monitors changes according to the dimension mentioned above (Magnialo, Zwaan, & Graesser, 1999: 197).

On the whole, the model encompasses dimensions “to monitor” (Zwaan *et al.*, 1995) the reader’s experience of the story. From the cognitive viewpoint, image schemas serve as a specific tool that guides the reader while reading and helps monitor narratives. In this context, Kimmel states the following (2009b: 172):

*In monitoring of the story, image schemas are a major avenue towards explaining how readers go about the necessary task of conceptualizing time-flow and breakpoints, how scenes, as well as main story goals and their subgoals are interrelated in narrative comprehension.*

As can be understood, the task of monitoring a story can be accomplished via image-schematic logic, when the reader monitors the storyline. However, Magliano, Taylor and Joyce-Kim (2005) suggest monitoring characters, and more so the goals of characters, or, in the words of Magliano, the “conflicting goals” of multiple characters (2005: 1357). These conflicting goals encompass various dimensions for monitoring, including, among others, emotional and intentional (Kimmel, 2008b: 8). In this context, emotions are parts of an event structure with the character at its center. It can be (i) a situation with emotional interaction between people, such as dialogue or conversation; physical interaction that evokes emotional responses or (ii) a situation of inner interaction with oneself—in other words, personal emotional experiences of self-centered emotion, such as guilt. Naturally, when thinking of a goal-oriented event structure, image schema SOURCE-PATH-GOAL comes to mind. What is interesting about this schema is that it is close to gestalts—i.e. the inner structure of image schemas is complex but at the same time they are considered as a whole. Thus, the complex image schema SOURCE-PATH-GOAL can be

studied as a whole and partially, but only as PATH or SOURCE schemas. Evans and Green illustrate this point in the example below (2006: 185):

*SOURCE: John left (England).*  
*GOAL: John travelled (to France).*  
*SOURCE-GOAL: (from England) (to France).*  
*PATH-GOAL: John travelled (through the Chunnel) (to France).*  
*SOURCE-PATH-GOAL: John travelled (from England) (through the Chunnel) (to France)*

As discussed in Chapter 1, section 2, there are other gestalt-like image schemas that are usually represented as one word, such as, CONTACT, CONTAINER, OBJECT; or the ones represented in a dichotomic order, including FORCE-PENETRATION or UP-DOWN. For example, in the novels of Agatha Christie (particularly in the Hercule Poirot series), Dorothy Sayers or P. D. James, the image-schematic event are structured with the image schemas, as IN-OUT, OBJECT or CONTAINER, where emotions are crucial for readers in solving mysterious murder cases. Consider the following examples:

- (a) *To be sure, he **has** not a vital **interest in the suit** in question (1:710).*  
(Charles Dickens, *Bleak House*, 1853)
- (b) *One can't help **taking an interest in people** when one knows something that nobody else does about them (4:133).*  
(P.D. James, *A Certain Justice*, 1997)

In the examples above, the emotion keyword of *interest* is “a possession” or “an object” inside non-physical objects, such as “in the suit” in example (a), and inside the human body, as illustrated in example (b)—“in people.” Interestingly, as will be demonstrated later, such multiple conceptualization of *interest* is rather stable

in all time-frames of the corpus. On the one hand, people “have” *interest* or “take” *interest* as “an object” or “a possession”; and on the other, *interest* as “an object” is located inside something or somebody.

Having approached image schemas as cognitive tools to construe our reading experience, I explain reading as a process of constant interaction between the reader and the story. It seems that image schema is a kind of mental pattern that provides structural understanding of events, situations, locations, intentions; in other words, human experiences as expressed in narratives, including emotional.

As stated at the beginning of this section, it is common practice today for legal scholars and legal professionals to approach the law and the system of justice through a literary perspective in order to reflect on experiences—e.g. court trials, the decision-making of juries and judges, perspective of the witness, and many other aspects. In the real world of law, crime, and justice, language is a vector of emotions in a supposedly objective context in which reason has the upper hand over feeling and emotion. The last two decades have shown changes regarding the role of emotions in relation to the law, which shifted the perspective on emotions as “contaminators” to legal thought (Nussbaum, 1999: 20-21) toward the reassessment of their significance. I elaborate on this topic in the following section and show that most of this redetermination of value is connected to a cognitive view on the notions of *emotion*, the *law*, and *legal discourse*.

### 3. EMOTION IN LEGAL DISCOURSE

*Emotion pervades the law.*  
- Bandes, 2001

For many years, the research connecting the issues of emotion and that of the law has suffered from the opposition *emotions vs. reason* that has hampered the progress in this specific field of study. Today, it is rather common that psychology (e.g. Moser, 2000), economics (e.g. Herrera-Soler *et al.*, 2012) and politics (e.g. Mio, 1997) routinely incorporate conceptual metaphors to explore emotions in the process of thought construction and categorization. However, there are very few empirically driven works on emotions in legal discourse, especially from the perspective of language and cognition (e.g. Schane, 2006).

The isolation of emotions from the law can be partially explained by insufficient integration of these notions in order to make the use of emotions in the language of the law. I disagree with those research frameworks that try to examine emotions in isolation from the law and legal discourse. In sharp contrast, I argue for an integrated approach to the study of emotions as expressed in legal language. To advocate such an approach, I have shown in the previous sections how emotions are interrelated with the law and literary text processing. Following Anne Coughlin, I have also shown why the law as a legal discipline needs legal fiction and metaphors. In this section, I now turn to emotions and the system of justice, particularly their function in court proceedings, with examples of official legal documents.

### 3.1 The law, legal discourse and emotion

The relationships between emotions and the law are inevitably linked with two notions: *law* and *legal discourse*. Therefore, the aim of the present sub-section is to establish the working definitions of these notions, which are complex and usually context-dependent. As a consequence of such complexity, a variety of definitions can be used to describe *law*. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, *law* is “a rule of conduct or action prescribed or formally recognized as binding or enforced by a controlling authority” (M-WD, 2015). From this perspective, law is also a set of rules to obey or “the department of knowledge or study of which laws are the subject matter” (OED, 2015). From the perspective of legal professionals, the term *law* is highly complex. For example, it can be a *statute*, which is “a particular law enacted and established by the will of the legislative department of government” (*The Black’s Law Dictionary*, 1968: 1581), or it can represent branches of law, such as common law, family law, or criminal law, which “treats of crimes and their punishments” (*id.*, 449) and many other divisions of law created by the legislature. In this thesis, I have opt in favor of *law* in its generalized accumulative sense referring to the way people think about rules, restrictions, principles and regulations. Here, the term *law* is connected with the notions of *control* and *authority*. However, considering that the corpus for the analysis is related to legal themes, such as inheritance disputes, crime (murder through poisoning), court proceedings, I use the term *law* with regard to the legal context.

The other significant term discussed in this section is *legal discourse*. The term *discourse* is common to many disciplines, including sociology, philosophy, and

linguistics. Its use is so frequent that sometimes it is taken to be common knowledge. Various disciplines have their own understanding of the term but generally such understanding concerns language, communication, and social norms. Rather than following only linguistic, cultural or social aspects of *discourse*, this notion is examined within the frames of the present study. Therefore, three definitions of *discourse* are considered as presented by three researchers. Leech and Short suggest the following definition of *discourse* (1981: 209):

*Discourse is linguistic communication seen as a transaction between speaker and hearer, as an interpersonal activity whose form is determined by its social purpose. Text is linguistic communication (either spoken or written) seen simply as a message coded in its auditory or visual medium.*

I agree that *discourse* as an act of communication is determined by its social purpose. In this case, *legal discourse* would suggest that the purpose of such activity is done with respect to legal themes or legal communication. In stylistics, the debate about text and discourse centers around the distinction between these two notions. The modern approach to a text contrasts the traditional view of the text as “a particular choice” of style made by the author (Leech *et al.*, 1982: 158) and sees the text like something dynamic, being interpreted in the process of reading. Fowler defines *discourse* as follows (1990: 54):

*Discourse is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies; these beliefs etc. constitute a way of looking at the world, an organization or representation of experience – ‘ideology’ in the neutral non-pejorative sense. Different modes of discourse encode different representations of experience; and the source of these representations is the communicative context within which the discourse is embedded.*

In my view, this definition has one specific point to consider: discourse as a conceptual generalization of speech (spoken or written). What the author calls “beliefs” and “values” are focal elements in the notion of a *worldview* (e.g. Whorf, 1956), which is addressed in section 2 of this chapter. One of the main propositions related to this notion is that what people perceive and understand is inevitably encoded in the language they use. The information coded in language is often context-dependent. Consequently, there are various types of discourses, including legal discourse, academic discourse, and others. To emphasize this point, the third definition of discourse is addressed, which is suggested by Halliday and Hasan and which is generally accepted in discourse analysis (1990: 41):

*Discourse is a unit of language larger than a sentence and which is firmly rooted in a specific context.*

By and large, discourse is approached in this thesis as a unit of language within a certain context, which embodies the values and categories fundamental to its context. As stated before, I argue for the cognitive take on the study of emotions and the law. The previous two sections of this chapter discuss the correlation between language, emotion, and the law. In the following section, I highlight the correlation between cognitive linguistics and the law.

### **3.2 Legal discourse and cognitive linguistics**

The development of cognitive linguistics in the last four decades and a recent boost in cognitive approaches in psychology have introduced a new dimension in the

understanding of human emotions. According to Gibbons, “Present day legal discourse retains its identity as a highly specialized and distinctive discourse type of genre of English (2014: 13). Persuasion, intimidation, and inspiration included in utterances are not always explicit. The cognitive approach to the study of the language of legal discourse seems more than relevant as the nature of legalese involves not only context and function, but also extra-linguistic factors that are part of cognition. The latter aspect is still not properly addressed by legal science, especially from the linguistic point of view. I propose to take into consideration major concepts of cognitive linguistics and show their relevance to legal discourse in terms of the following aspects:

- *Experience*. Although legal language is formulaic in nature, there is always a window for linguistic creativity due to obsolescent concepts with no references. For example, new and specialized terms are part of jargon, argot, and legal slang. Besides, it has been noted over time that legal reasoning does not function in isolation from human nature (imperfections, doubts), emotions and attitudes (in decision-making), and psychological techniques in court trials (intimidation, persuasion). Prominent jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: “The life of the law has not been logic [...] it has been experience” (1923: 1).

- *Categorization*. Legal language is highly categorized. There are operative legal documents (pleadings, petitions), expository documents (judicial opinions that are usually stylistically free, client letters) or persuasive documents (briefs). The legal system itself is highly categorized in nature (systems of law with divisions, categories of statute law, legal institutions); legal discourse has an internal diversity of various genres.

- *Conceptualization.* The conservative characteristics of legal language preserve the tradition of discourse. Legal thought is highly conceptualized: concepts of morality, justice, and punishment are basically historical phenomena are part of legal thought. Moreover, according to Johnson, examining legal reasoning via new cognitive research has resulted in understanding “legal reasoning as embodied, situated, and imaginative” (2002: 951).

- *Context.* Legal language can vary substantially “depending on the place where it is used, whether it is written or spoken, the level of formality [...] and other factors” (Tiersma, 1999: 4). It has a unique terminology that is understood within a certain legal context. Legal discourse is a text functioning within a certain context; “Context informs the meaning [...] people can shift or manipulate context” (Lindstrom, 1992: 108).

- *Symbolic Form.* Legal language possesses a certain degree of terminological complexity and is distinguished by its symbolic structure. Back in 1946, Cassirer and Hendel argued in support of the symbolic nature of man and language. They described law as a symbolic form in terms of its reflection in people’s minds (1946: 15):

*[There is] the desire of human nature to come to terms with reality, to live in an ordered universe, and to overcome the chaotic state in which things and thoughts have not yet assumed a definitive shape and structure.*

Similarly, Coskun emphasizes that “Language, as a general form of intellectual expression or symbolic form, is a *conditio sine qua non* for law if it wishes to distinguish itself from mere habit or custom” (2007: 259). This viewpoint is especially evident in legal language, which is marked by the in-group jargon,

negation, *shall* as “obligation,” conjoint phrases for emphatic/ambiguous effects, impersonal constructions used by judges to create authority and objectivity.

As a rule, the study of language and legal discourse encompasses research into the utmost complexity of legalese and the ways to overcome misunderstandings of such blunt formality and ambiguity (Butt & Castle, 2006; Haig, 2012). However, given the abovementioned points, a cognitive approach to emotions in legal discourse is suitable and this is demonstrated in the next section.

### **3.3 Reassessment of emotions and the law**

The study of emotions and the law has now reached a critical stage in its history and has become a dynamic body of work, bringing together a cross-disciplinary understanding to analyze the range of emotions that influence the law and legal science. The research into conceptual metaphor in the language of legal discourse is moderately expanding (Berger, 2004; Tsai, 2004; Winter, 2008). However, in the study of legal discourse via conceptual metaphoric logic the target domains are usually the domains of “war,” “combat,” “sport,” “attack” or “construction.” They constitute such metaphors as COURTROOM TRIAL IS A BATTLEFIELD, CROSS-EXAMINATION IS A FIGHT or LAWYERS ARE ASSASSINS. One may ask: If the domain of “law” and the domain of “emotions” are generally perceived as opposites, then why study emotions in legal discourse? This simple question arises from the way people are conditioned to think about the domain of “law” and “emotion” as rivals, even though many researchers argue the opposite (Kahan & Nussbaum, 1996; Posner, 2000; Bandes & Blumenthal, 2012). The answer to this

seemingly simple question requires complex ground to cover. In the next sections, I will try to answer it with actual examples.

Although the history of *emotions* and the *law* goes back approximately four centuries, these two notions seem to be so mutually exclusive that no progress has been made on the subject for a long period of time. For example, Bandes and Blumenthal point out (2012: 181):

*[...] we celebrate more than four centuries of law and emotion: In the late sixteenth century the common law began to recognize the offense of manslaughter, where a killing occurred in a course of a brawl or a “chance [chance] medley”, reflecting the passion or emotional state of those engaged in fighting.*

Yet, according to traditional legal thought, emotions must be “turned off,” a point once stated by Aristotle: “The law is reason unaffected by desire.”<sup>31</sup> This statement has remained quite influential in the legal system to this day. From this perspective, the Aristotelian view on the issue could be seen from the vantage point of members of the profession, when, in the words of Bornstein and Wiener, “jurors and other legal decision makers are rational actors” (2010: 2). Nonetheless, numerous precedents from legal practice prove otherwise. For example, Hutton points out that there are the so-called “hard cases,” in which law in effect runs out,” and the judge has “to resort to extra-legal means to resolve the dispute” (2009: 149). Although I do not argue for a complete and total presence of linguistic expression of emotions in the language of legal documentation, it is impossible not to notice that expression of emotional experiences is present in official legal documents. The following examples present excerpts from a transcript of oral argumentations in the

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<sup>31</sup> Aristotle. *Politics*, Book III, 1287.a32, trans. Bolland.

U. S. Supreme Court, dated November 3, 2015 (Supreme Court of the United States, Argument Transcripts, 2015):

*JUSTICE SCALIA: I agree. And what **I worry**□**about** is the rule of lenity. You have these dueling canons, and you have a rule that when the government sends somebody to jail for ten years, it has to turn sharp corners. It has to dot every I and cross every T. It has to be clear.*

(Argument Session, 03.11.2015, No. 14-8358. Avondale Lockhart, Petitioner v. United States, p. 32)

As can be seen in the excerpt above, even though Justice Scalia is talking about the notions of *clarity*, *rule*, and *government*, he also expresses “worry” about the subject. Using cross-domain mapping, the emotional state of “worry” as the target domain conceptualizes in this example as “an existence of emotion is presence here,” meaning simply *experience* of the state and “an effect on a state linked to something,” in this case, channelizing “worry” at “the rule of lenity.” Thus, with more examples like the one above, the measure of “worry” or other emotional experiences as processes is possible; in addition, it possible to reveal what categories people have in their minds, what “image” people have when using a particular emotion word or expression in a particular legal document. Similarly, in the next example of the same oral argument, Justice Kagan reasons about the possibility of experiencing worry:

*JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, could I ask about your -- your basic theory as to that, which, if I understand it, says the reason why **we shouldn't worry about** redundancy you create is because Congress just wanted to make absolutely clear that the sexual abuse was also sexual abuse involving somebody who couldn't consent. That's basically your theory.*

(Argument Session, 03.11.2015, No. 14-8358. Avondale Lockhart, Petitioner v. United States, p. 33)

What is more, the next example illustrates the use of the slang word “gee.” In the example below, it is an interjection, an urban colloquialism indicating “surprise, enthusiasm, or disappointment” (M-WD, 2015):

*JUSTICE SCALIA: What – what happened to “concrete and particularized” ?*

*MR. STEWART: Well, particularized --*

*JUSTICE SCALIA: We -- we say that in -- in -- in, gee, a whole lot of cases. And -- and that didn't appear in that quote you gave?*

*MR. STEWART: It did. It's --*

*JUSTICE SCALIA: Say it again.*

*MR. STEWART: -- “actual or eminent” -- well, “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.*

(Argument Session, 02.11.2015, No. 13-1339. Spokeo, Inc., Petitioner v. Thomas Robins, p. 51)

Like the U. S. Supreme Court Oral Argumentations, an open access is granted to those interested in the court proceedings of the Old Bailey, which is also known as the Central Criminal Court of England and Wales (*The Proceeding of the Old Bailey*, 2015).<sup>32</sup> The following example is an excerpt from the court proceedings of the year 1853, which is the period of one of the novels used for analysis in this thesis:

*MR. BODKIN. Q. You say your daughter was of a **happy disposition**? A. Yes; that was so after she was separated from the prisoner—she still **seemed happy**, but **on the worrit**, for **fear** she should meet him, for **fear** he should molest her—**she seemed as happy as usual** when she went out that morning; **she seemed very happy**.*

(The Old Bailey Proceedings, Killing: murder, 04.04.1853, Trial of Thomas Mackett)

It can be seen from the above example that cross-examination has a surfeit of emotion keywords and emphatic description (*as happy as usual, very happy*) that

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<sup>32</sup> This database is one of the few archives that I plan to use in future research on emotions as expressed in the language of official legal documentation.

describe someone's emotional state or appearance. One also notices that the description seems to be based on personal attitudes or presumptions (*seemed happy, seemed as happy as usual*), rather than on facts or objective observations. This example is just one of many court proceedings of that time. As can be seen from all above examples, both very recent and dated legal documents are rich in emotional expressions by judges, witnesses, and other "actors" in court trials.

Having established the extensive use of emotion words in legal discourse, it is interesting to analyze why certain emotions are used more often than others and their impact on the system of justice. As stated earlier, the analysis of legal documents is beyond the scope assigned to this study; however, it seems appropriate to give some information on the research into the field.

While some legal professionals or legal scholars are known for their work on certain emotions in courtroom discourse (Nussbaum, 1999; Bandes, 2001; Karstedt, 2002), others contribute to the topic of emotions in decision-making and "emotional profiles" of legal professionals (Posner, 2000; Maroney, 2012). Bandes,<sup>33</sup> in particular, raises questions of the role of frequently used emotions of disgust and compassion in court trials in *The Passions of Law* (1999). The author insists that the polarity of reason and emotions be reconsidered and that people should understand that emotions not only belong to the legal context but also influence mental processes (decision-making, argumentation, persuasion) implied in the legal system. On her part, Karstedt<sup>34</sup> emphasizes that "the recent discourse about law and emotions has been dominated by three emotions—disgust, anger and shame" (2002:

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<sup>34</sup> Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Griffith University

311). Nussbaum<sup>35</sup> insists that *disgust* in law should be examined as a “primary or even the sole justification for making some acts illegal,” especially in the “law of obscenity,” in which the disgust of the judge or the jury is “relevant to the assessment of a homicide where potentially aggravating factors are under consideration” (1999: 21-22).

On the whole, one of the main reasons for cognitive linguistics researchers to try and work on the function of emotions as expressed in the language of legal discourse is to uncover the dependency between the frequency of emotions and their conceptualizations. More importantly, such insight would reveal the role emotions play in the construction of meaning. Another reason is that such knowledge would be helpful for legal professionals, who would be aware of what to expect from emotions as “causes,” “forces” or “effects” and therefore, prepare their responses to them. The implication of conceptual metaphors in legal discourse is gaining popularity among legal professionals. Thus, according to Berger, “for lawyers, the cognitive theory of metaphor promise to make law shaping more imaginative, more human, and more flexible” (2004: 178). The author continues saying that a metaphor is no longer perceived by legal professionals as only “an indirect way of presenting an intended literal meaning” (*ibid.*). She asserts that “Cognitive theory can help lawyers re-focus on the interaction between two components of judicial decision making: creation of categories and interpretation of rules” (*ibid.*).

Keeping this idea in mind, I would like to cite Johnson explaining what “humanizing law” means to him (2002: 952). The author is referring to the Professor of Constitutional Law, Stephen Winter’s work *A Clearing in the Forest* (2001):

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<sup>35</sup> Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago

*When I say that Winter's work "humanizes" law, what I mean is that, by showing how law is the result of ordinary human processes of conceptualization and reasoning [...] we discover both why law is so important for us (why it can work the way it does) and also what its limitations are.*  
(Johnson, 2002, 952)

The excerpt above is important, as it shows that law is dependent on our experiences as humans. Processes of conceptualization, categorization, and reasoning are products of cognition (as well as partially unconscious). Here, Johnson tries to explain the application of the embodied cognition thesis to law (*id.*):<sup>36</sup>

*The application of cognitive science to law rests on the following assumption: Law is a human creation of human minds dwelling in human bodies, in human societies, operating within human cultural practices. And so, to understand how law works, one must know how all these aspects of human experience and thought work. To oversimplify, we have got to know how the "mind" works, and that is precisely the focus of the cognitive sciences. Hence, the cognitive sciences are indispensable for a comprehensive and deep understanding of law.*

I agree with Johnson that sometimes people think of law as something concrete, highly formal, and objective; people might forget that law is actually a human creation. Human beings as creators would create those things and think those thoughts that are products of our embodied experience with the world, our experience as individuals in a society, with our cultural and other differences.

## **Summary**

In this chapter, I have explored two issues—the classification of emotions and the role of emotions in legal discourse—in order to reveal how different types of

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<sup>36</sup> See previous discussion in Chapter 1, section 2.2.

emotional experiences function in legal discourse, specifically in legal fiction. Over the past three decades there has been a growing academic and public interest in the categorization of emotions. At the heart of this examination is the common approach to emotions as something ambiguous with “fuzzy” boundaries. The diversity of emotional experiences is, in fact, so vast that it has been necessary to provide some insight into the related notions of *feeling*, *affect*, and *mood*. The sustainable classification of “basic” or “universal” emotions overviewed in this chapter suggests the significance of certain emotions to the majority of cultures. I, therefore, have identified five basic emotions, which are used in the practical part of this thesis devoted to the qualitative metaphor analysis. In order to understand emotions from the point of view of categorization, they have been discussed in relation to legal discourse, law, and literary text processing. Thus, in the second part of this chapter, I have argued that a reassessment of the role of emotions in legal documentation is an urgent topic both in legal science and linguistics. In this way, I hope to develop a strong inclusive—rather than intrusive—perspective of looking at emotions in correlation to the law. With the examples from official legal documents and legal fiction, I hope to have briefly illustrated how emotions as keywords are included in different texts. Moreover, several significant cognitive linguistics notions (*mental image*, *image schema*, and *memory*) have been introduced to establish that the reading process is both highly cognitive and emotional. In the next chapter, I propose to describe the methodology used for the qualitative analysis of emotions as expressed in language and demonstrate the empirical procedure adopted for the analysis.

## CHAPTER 3

### QUALITATIVE METAPHOR ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY AND PROCESSING

The previous chapter examined the expression of emotions in the language of law and in literary fiction, arguing that not only emotions are part of this discourse but they intertwine with mental processes. The present study of emotions in language and cognition has been conducted in connection with cross-disciplinary models and approaches to the study of emotions. This third chapter turns to the empirical aspect of the study of the relationship between emotions, language, and cognition. The three purposes of this chapter are to (i) explain the source data selection and collection, (ii) describe the research methodology of this study, and (iii) describe the procedure used in designing the qualitative metaphor analysis.

The chapter begins by presenting the source data, its specifics, and the choice related to it. Some known methods of metaphor identification are also discussed in relation to emotions as keywords in the texts under scrutiny. I then review theoretical and empirical models in the second section of the chapter, both of which are relevant to the topic of linguistic expression of emotions and conceptualization of emotions in language, starting with the central features of these models. Then, in the light of my hypothesis, I offer a revision of these features considering the aim of this research, which is to focus on the qualitative approach to the analysis of the data. I specifically show the strategies relevant for a qualitative analysis of conceptual metaphors and, in particular, emotion keywords as target domains while providing some background

information about CAQDAS ATLAS.ti, the software I use in the present study in order to show the ways in which it facilitates qualitative research.

In the fourth part of the chapter, I introduce an example of the intended strategy for data analysis. Consequently, it is necessary to explain how the merger of qualitative data analysis with the conceptual metaphor theory benefits a systematic analysis of the linguistic expression of emotions. This is what is called *qualitative metaphor analysis*. I demonstrate the design of the analysis and coding strategy I have developed, including the system of coding and categorization of coded information in relation to the research question of this thesis.

## **1. SOURCE DATA SPECIFICS**

### **1.1 Source data for the analysis: Legal fiction**

In seeking to investigate emotion keywords and their metaphorical representation in legal fiction, it is first necessary to overview the linguistic material. The following novels correspond to three time-frames that have been chosen for the source data of the analysis:

Time-frame 1: Charles Dickens, *Bleak House* (1853);

Time-frame 2: Dorothy Sayers, *Strong Poison* (1930), Agatha Christie, *Sad Cypress* (1940);

Time-frame 3: P. D. James, *A Certain Justice* (1997).

Significant contributor to QDA, Susanne Friese, suggests looking at the data “like a landscape to be explored” (2014: 37). In the search for the right source literature, several points have been considered. The authors of all novels are recognized British writers. Their novels depict the British reality, with court sequences. What is more, as stated on the official webpage of Courts and Tribunals Judiciary of the UK, the judiciary of the UK is “an ancient system:” “When you see a judge or magistrate sitting in court, you are actually looking at the result of 1,000 years of legal evolution” (2015). British fiction literature often refers to various real courts, as was done more than a century ago in *Bleak House* with the Court of Chancery, which can be considered a character itself; and relatively recently, in 1997, with the Central Criminal Court of England and Wales (Old Bailey) in *A Certain Justice*. This is what was considered initially when searching for the source data. But can this really be enough? What I am trying to convey is that in a qualitative research, not only each period of time should be significant for the linguistic culture that represents legal, political, social, and other issues of the society, but also that each period of time should be significant for the literary genre of crime fiction. Provided that literary fiction has witnessed changes in the genre of crime fiction, mystery fiction, and the sub-genre of legal thriller over approximately the past 150 years, it is necessary to label each time-frame separately in order to establish cultural and temporal peculiarities of each time span.

### 1.1.1 Legal documentation as the source data for the analysis

Before discussing three time-frames in detail in the next three sub-sections, it is necessary to explain the choice of the source data. As mentioned in the introduction, when selecting the source data for the analysis, legal texts have also been considered, but owing to the scope of this thesis, I concentrated on legal fiction only.

Yet, it is important to note that having thoroughly examined official legal documentation, a sufficient number of emotion keywords have been traced and extracted from this specific corpus. Contrary to what is usually expected from legal texts, emotion keywords are widely represented in various legal texts (judicial opinions, decisions, proceedings of court trials, etc.), especially in the time span that covers the year 1853 (time-frame 1).

Although it is possible to make an analysis of official legal documentation, legal fiction has several significant advantages. Firstly, legal fiction has the advantage of using ordinary language as opposed to what specialized legal documentation represents. Secondly, works of fiction are important because not only do they narrate about the system of justice, social and other inequalities, moral statements, but they also convey the stories of a person's experience of the judicial system, which often goes far beyond a simple description of the organization of this system (e.g. Silbey & Ewick, 2003). When dealing with the lives of families caught up in the legal system (*Bleak House*), the mysteries of the murder cases (*Strong Poison*, *Sad Cypress*), or the world of torts and trials (*A Certain Justice*), legal fiction brings up fundamental topics of an individual and society in the legal system.

In the course of the abovementioned events, the emotional experience is supposed to vary greatly from being simply upset about bad news to be terrified by a negative jury verdict.

### **1.1.2 Time-frame 1: Victorian literature**

Legal historian and a Professor of Law at Oxford, Sir William Holdsworth, in his work *Charles Dickens as a Legal Historian* (1928) did not exaggerate when stating that the novels of Dickens should be *the* source on history of English law. The pervasiveness of law in Victorian literature is largely characterized by the social and moral situation of that era. Written during the reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901), literature of that time reflected, among other issues, the poor condition of the working class, the struggle between right and wrong, and the changing worldview about major developments in technology and science (e.g. Darwin's theory on evolution).

*Bleak House*, as an example of literary fiction of the Victorian era, has drawn attention to legal theorists and has become the subject of a critical study for many researchers of law and literature (e.g. Krueger, 2010). For example, Dickens's works are used by Rorty and Nussbaum to demonstrate the role that emotions play in decision-making. Rorty states that with his novels, Dickens "gives us the details about kinds of suffering being endured by people to whom we had previously not attended" (1989: xvi). On the one hand, Victorian morality—as a fundamental notion of the 19<sup>th</sup> century—is a set of values on low tolerance of crime, justice and promotion of social ethics, prudery and repression. On the other hand, the duality of

good and evil was a topic of criticism, harshly coming from Dickens. Inequality, hunger, and poverty were indictments of Victorian society, which Dickens successfully portrayed in his works and it can be suggested that his works contributed to changing the mindset of people toward these problems. All these themes are reflected in Dickens's novel *Bleak House*.

*Bleak House* describes all levels of society of Victorian Britain, from aristocracy to the working classes. The main focus of the novel is the Jarndyce and Jarndyce fictional court case, a long never-ending case concerning a large inheritance and involving generations claiming this inheritance. The Court of Chancery was one of the two main courts in Britain at that time alongside the Common Law Courts. It is a court of "equity under the Lord High Chancellor that began to develop in the 15th century" (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2015); however, it is satirized in the novel.

### **1.1.3 Time-frame 2: The Golden Age of detective fiction**

If, in the first time-frame, the focus is on the literary depiction of social and moral problems pertaining to law and illustrated in court trials, the period of the second time-frame represents the apex of detective fiction as a genre, which is known as the Golden Age of detective fiction. It is the era of classical murder cases written between the First World War and the Second World War. During that period of time, the plot of detective stories became more complex, with unexpected twists and turns and surprising denouement. What distinguishes this period of time is that a classic murder mystery novel is developed along with several important notions. For example, with the rules of *fair play*, the reader unravels the murder mystery with the

writer; reading the *puzzle novel* (Molinaro, 2015: 15), the term used by writers, critics, and researchers, the focus of the reader would be placed on puzzling circumstances rather than a murder itself. One can add that in the English country house mystery, a house becomes a beloved crime scene, a character itself. Yet, the idea of poisoning was so ingrained in writers of crime fiction of the Golden Age, that its significance is appreciated by modern forensic science, as follows from research on “criminal poisoning” (Trestrail, 2007: 97). As an illustration, Trestrail—in a case study of 187 literary works related to the topic of poisoning—distinguishes 73 types of poisoning, including arsenic and morphine (*id.*, 98-99). These poisons are the main elements in two novels of the second time-frame—*Strong Poison* and *Sad Cypress*. The word *poison* is in the title of Sayers’ novel, in which significant attention is paid to the detailed description of how, when, and in what quantities poisons create lethal effect. As in numerous other novels of Christie, *Sad Cypress* also includes the topic of poisoning.

The second time-frame is represented by two novels. When thinking about that time span, it is impossible not to think of Agatha Christie, who was named “the Queen of Mystery.” Moreover, owing to its high popularity at that time and appreciation today, it seems plausible to use more than one novel as the source data. Both works are mystery murder novels with court sequences, involving the topic of poisoning, and introducing famous fictional detectives—Hercule Poirot and Lord Peter Wimsey. In particular, *Strong Poison* depicts a conflict between good and evil, fulfilled in the detection of a crime. From the beginning of the novel, the reader is drawn into a British courtroom. Its main character, Harriet Vane, has been accused of a murder. This novel introduces Harriet Vane to Lord Peter Wimsey, a character who

is known as the British gentleman detective and one of the most famous characters that Sayers created. The precision and authenticity in the depiction of psychological portraits of characters is Sayers's trademark, as well as a captivating storyline of her mysteries. With its clue-puzzle subgenre of murder mysteries, the author creates uncertain situations, starting from the trial described in the novel to the circumstances of the murder and the process of solving the case.

*Sad Cypress* is an example of a courtroom drama with the sub-topics of murder (poisoning as a trade mark of Christie's detective novels) and a matter of inheritance. The novel is divided into three parts. In the first part, the main character—Elinor Carlisle—receives an anonymous letter with news about her being the only one heir at law. The second part is focused on the investigation of a crime by a private detective, Hercule Poirot. The third part depicts a court trial of Elinor Carlisle.

#### **1.1.4 Time-frame 3: Modern legal thriller**

As time went by, the focus shifted from the narration of the story to the more complex and deeper psychological portrait of characters. From 1918 to 1938, the types of British detectives continued their development: from aristocratic (Lord Peter Wimsey), amateur sleuths (Miss Marple) and brilliant investigators (Hercule Poirot) to female detectives (Harriet Vane). The fictional detectives, as protagonists, have undergone personal and psychological changes as the series of stories continued their course. The authors of novels themselves often took the psychological journeys with their characters as they evolved. For example, P. D. James talks about the fiction

commander Lord Peter Wimsey, who is a leading detective in time-frame 3 of my analysis (*National Public Radio*, 2015):<sup>37</sup>

*I think I understand him more and more as the years go by [...] I think he realizes increasingly how much harm a murder investigation can do to the innocent. He's more compassionate. I think he's more aware [of] the imperfections of the law.*

In the history of crime fiction, there is a term that has come to mean a certain style of writing, including also the depiction of detectives—“cozy” crime fiction. The reference is to the Golden Age of British detective crimes mysteries, and loosely refers to the sub-genre of mystery fiction known as “cozy mystery.” Charles *et al.* explain that the term “cozy” was first traced to a mystery review published in 1958, meaning that in such novels, “the murder either takes place offstage or is handled in such a way that the reader does not receive graphic details about the crime” (2002: 56). Later on, in contrast to the “cozy” British sleuth, emerged the American “hardboiled” or “noir detective,” the so-called “tough loner” (*id.*, 57). Action-packed scenes, urban settings, and violence significantly changed the atmosphere of novels and, consequently, influenced the tone toward the cynical attitude to compassion or any positive emotional experience.<sup>38</sup>

Realistic depiction of crime scenes, bluntly cynical characters, and moral ambiguity of legal professionals are the main themes of James’ novel *A Certain*

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<sup>37</sup> *National Public Radio*. An interview with P. D. James (2014). *P. D. James believed mysteries were made of clues, not coincidences*.

<sup>38</sup> Early 20<sup>th</sup> century American “hard-boiled” crime fiction is associated primarily with James M. Cain, Dashiell Hammett, and Raymond Chandler, whose works are considered to be classic in this genre. Cain was one of the creators of “roman noir.” The main characters of these violent novels with urban settings (e.g. impression of Southern California in the novels of Raymond Chandler) often involve victims or suspects with self-destructive qualities, such as hard-drinking men. The leading detectives of “roman noir” are “hard-talkers” with their own understanding of what justice is. For example, Hammett’s central character in *The Maltese Falcon* (1930) is a private detective Sam Spade, who knows how to get what he wants from both criminals and innocent clients.

*Justice*, which represents the third time-frame of the corpus. The author vividly describes death and bodies in the crime scenes. P. D. James herself explains in an interview (*National Public Radio*, 2015):

*In Agatha Christie, there's hardly any description of the corpse at all [...] almost as if she really couldn't face the actual description of the body [...] I think I'm trying to write a realistic novel and murder is uniquely horrible, and I think this shock of finding the bodies is important, really. The reader should feel it.*

Similar to the realistic depiction of crime scenes, *A Certain Justice* brings up questions of the criminal justice system, especially the moral principles of a defense lawyer, Venetia Aldridge, murdered in her Chambers after a trial. This novel is a part of the Adam Dalgliesh Mystery Series. It not only depicts details of the crime and investigation of a murder, but also dives into the emotional and psychological state of a criminal, as well as the moral dilemmas of a defense lawyer.

To summarize, with the increase of available information, in many cases, the data needed for the analysis comes from different sources. There are several reasons why I combine similar information—i.e. emotion keywords—from these four novels. First, a major reason is that using different time spans is beneficial for the quality of sampling. As explained in detail earlier, the three time-frames selected for the analysis are emblematic of British culture at three different periods and, more particularly, highlight the evolution of criminal fiction. From this point of advantage, the emotion keywords extracted from the texts should be typical examples of the key periods for legal fiction. The second reason is to increase sample size, which is a regular requirement for the analysis. This point is important to uncover differences in metaphorical patterns of emotion keywords in legal fiction. Besides, the four novels

represent different authors and writing styles, which account for variations in the use of emotion keywords in context. Lastly, it should be mentioned that the overall period starting from 1853 until 1997, which spans almost a century and a half, is probably not long enough to exhibit significant diachronic changes and the analysis does not take into account the historical factor. However, whenever differences in the way emotions are expressed are spotted, this is indicated.

## **1.2 Extraction of emotion keywords from the corpus**

### **1.2.1 Preliminary steps**

The source data presented in the previous section have been meticulously searched for emotion keywords of the target domain of *emotion*, represented by five emotion keywords: *fear*, *guilt*, *surprise*, *happiness*, and *interest*. The process of reading four novels has shown that the description of emotional states is important in all books. In addition to the emotion keywords selected for the analysis, the novels contain a variety of words and emphatic phrases representing other emotions, feelings, affects, and moods. The description of emotional experiences is part of a rich depiction of events, characters' temperaments, their behaviors, thoughts, as well as their actions and consequences of these actions. At this stage, the aim is to tag and extract emotion keywords under scrutiny, which has been done with the electronic versions of four novels. As is discussed in section 3.3 of this chapter, the tool *auto-coding* in ATLAS.ti is used to search for emotion keywords. Once the needed emotion keyword is traced in the text, I tag the quotation that this keyword represents. As a

whole, 900 emotion keywords have been extracted from the source data for the analysis, which represent 900 “quotations”<sup>39</sup> or “examples.” Of the five emotion keywords, the emotion keyword of *guilt* has the smallest number of quotations (84), whereas the emotion of *interest* has the biggest number (299).

The careful consideration of each quotation has shown that the occurrence of the keywords as linguistic items is majorly represented by adjectives and less by nouns and verbs. The dependence has been traced between parts of speech and the source domains attached to these parts of speech. More important, certain patterns of the cross-domain mapping have been revealed, which are linked to certain emotion keywords. All cross-domain patterns are examined in Chapters 4 and 5 in detail, but specifically, the following two stood out: “a possession”/“an object” + “an entity located inside something” with the emotion keyword of *interest* and “an effect on a state linked to somebody” + “an effect on action” with the keyword *fear*.

By investigating 900 examples with the given emotion keywords, it has been brought to light that they are frequently used in dialogues (e.g. arguing about something, explaining something) and monologues (e.g. contemplating about something), in the description of people, things, events and actions (mental and physical). Numerous examples from the corpus show that the emotion keywords tend to co-occur with other emotion words and/or emotion-related words and phrases that indicate feelings or passionate attitude toward somebody or something. Based on the distributional approach to words’ meanings, the co-occurrence of the given emotion keywords with other words in the same context accounts for building up the similar meanings (Firth, 1957; Deerwester *et al.*, 1990; Turney & Pantel, 2010). Firth stated

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<sup>39</sup> See a detailed discussion about “quotations” in sub-section 3.3.2 of this chapter.

back in 1957: “You shall know a word by the company it keeps” (1957: 11), which echoes what Deerwester *et al.* say on the topic: “the meaning of a word may be conditioned by other words” (1990: 21). The analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 represent these co-occurrences for each emotion keyword and examine them in detail. Besides, the dependency between the type of emotion keyword and the type of co-occurred word has been traced: positive emotion keywords tend to co-occur with other positive words and phrases, etc.

It should be reminded that the choice of these five emotion words is not random. Firstly, as explained in Chapter 2, section 1, the aim is to encompass those emotions labeled “basic” by psychologists, as well as to consider emotions that are fundamental for humans. Secondly, selected emotions have their value in the legal world.<sup>40</sup>

### **1.2.2 Part-of-speech tagging**

As noted in the previous section, regular connections between source domains and parts of speech have been established. For example, such sources as “an object” and “a possession” are normally represented by nouns, whereas the source “an existence of emotion is presence here” is structured by verbs. In the present study, part-of-speech tagging is used to reveal the distribution of emotion keywords between word classes. Each emotion keyword is associated to part of speech: nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. As a consequence, not only the dynamic between parts of speech and the source domains of the emotion keyword is revealed, but I also

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<sup>40</sup> See previous discussion in Chapter 2, section 1.5.

disclose which parts of speech tend to have a complex metaphorical structure—i.e. have more than one source domain. It is important to add that while analyzing parts of speech, I move from the conceptual to the linguistic levels of emotion metaphors. To elaborate on this topic, I turn to the linguistic structure of metaphors (Goatly, 1997).

If Lakoff and Johnson understand metaphor through metaphorical mapping between conceptual domains, Goatly adds linguistics into the conceptual mapping (1997). In metaphor structure, the author uses terms like *Vehicle*, *Topic*, and *Ground*, and explains them in the following manner (1997: 8):

*The conventional referent of the unit is the Vehicle.*  
*The actual unconventional referent is the Topic.*  
*The similarities and/or analogies, involved are the Grounds.*

Following Goatly, in the conceptual metaphor RAGE IS FIRE, “fire” is the vehicle, “rage” is the topic, and the likeness between “fire” and “rage” is the ground. Here, the structure of the vehicle term is linked with word class. In the example above, the vehicle is a noun, and what is associated with this noun is what the reader perceives as metaphorical. From this point of view, substituting the names of syntactic categories to the terms used in the cognitive approach are useful to show that there are different levels of analysis.

Nouns and verbs condense meaning in conceptual mapping and are considered as the strongest parts of speech, especially nouns, which intuitively are “felt to construe portions of information as stable autonomous entities” (Mihatsch, 2009: 78). As for verbs, not only they are used to describe physical actions, but also mental processes. Besides, in the words of Chapetón-Castro and Verdaguer-Clavera, “verbs

that refer to physical activity frequently metaphorically extend their meaning to refer to abstract or mental activity” (2012: 168). For example, the verb (*to hold*) can be metaphorically used by the speaker expressing *fear* as “an attacker that blocks action,” as in *Fear holds me back*. Adjectives and adverbs, on the other hand, bear expressive element to the object they denote—in other words, they establish characteristics of quality (*widespread joy*), intensity (*horrible fear*), and measure (*an enormous amount of trust*).

### 1.2.3 Metaphor signaling: Metaphorical markers

Initially, I search for a word denoting emotion and then perform cross-domain mapping specifically designed for the analysis.<sup>41</sup> In addition to that, I apply methods to identify metaphors. By using the comprehensive notion of *metaphor*, attention has been drawn to procedures of metaphor identification. Although not fully applied in the analysis of the present study, the Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP) has gained popularity and validity as a step-by-step strategy to identify, extract, and interpret metaphors in texts. The procedure identifies a core meaning out of context with a reference to dictionaries and thesauruses, which helps to spot if each word in a sentence is metaphorically marked or not (Pragglejaz Group, 2007: 1). In spite of its time-consuming nature, this approach is still applied by many scholars who research discourse for metaphorically used words both in small and large corpora (Chapetón-Castro & Verdaguer-Clavera, 2012; Pichter, 2013). For example, a refined version of MIP called the MIPVU protocol<sup>42</sup> is currently employed by an international expertise

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<sup>41</sup> See more on this topic in section 4 of this chapter.

<sup>42</sup> MIPVU stands for Metaphor Identification Procedure VU University of Amsterdam.

center for metaphor studies—Metaphor Lab Amsterdam. The BNC-Baby corpus was fully annotated with this protocol (*MetaphorLab*, 2015). What is considered important in this procedure for the present study is that Pragglejaz Group has drawn attention to the importance of dictionaries that are constantly used to verify the context of words. Although I do not verify each word in a sentence or a phrase for its metaphorical content, four dictionaries are used in the analyses as references to structure the semantic fields of the five selected emotion keywords.

In the present study, the use of dictionaries is required—these would include British English entries (as the source data is written in British English) with etymological information, rich and precise in definition of words both modern and obsolete, which I sometimes detect in time-frame 1. Therefore, I refer to *the Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) as a reliable source of information with the rich etymological content. In addition, I also refer to *the Collins English Dictionary* (CoED) and *the Cambridge English Dictionary* (CED), which are the corpus-based, modern, informative dictionaries with historical outlines of words and their phraseological input. I also refer to *the Visual Thesaurus*, which is an interactive dictionary and thesaurus, that uses the principle of relating words based on likeness of their meaning or semantic content.

Continuing the discussion on metaphor extraction from data, I return again to Goatly, who advocates the method of extracting metaphors from the text (1997). The table of metaphorical markers that he developed represents 20 markers grouped in accordance with different criteria, as seen in the table below (Goatly, 1997: 174-175):

Marker categories	Metaphorical markers
1. Explicit marker	metaphor/-ically, figurative/-ly, trope
2. Intensifiers	literally, really, actually, in fact, simply, fairly, just, absolutely, fully, completely, quite, utterly
3. Hedges and downtoners	in a/one way, a bit of, half-..., practically, almost, not exactly, not so
4. Semantic metalanguage	in both/more than one sense/s, mean(ing), import
5. Mimetic terms	image, likeness, picture, parody, caricature, modal, plan, effigy, imitation, artificial, mock
6. Symbolism terms	symbol(-ic/-ically), sign, type, token, instance, example
7. Superordinate terms	(some) (curious, strange, odd, peculiar, special) sort of, kind of
8. Copular similes	like, as
9. Precision similes and other comparisons	material verb + like x, the y of a x, y's x; noun-adj., the x equivalent of
10. Clausal similes	as if, as though
11. Perceptual processes	seemed, sounded, looked, felt, tasted, + like/as though, as if
12. Misperception terms	delusion, illusion, hallucination, mirage, phantom, fantasy, unreal
13. Cognitive processes	believe, think, regard, unbelievable, incredible
14. Verbal processes	say, call, refer to, swear
15. So to speak	
16. Orthography “ “ . ! white space	
17. Modals + Verbal Processes	could say, might say
18. Modals	must, certainly, surely, would, probabl/-ly, may, might, could, possibl/-ly, perhaps, impossible/-bility
19. Conditionals	if...could, would, might, imagine, suppose
20. As it were	

**Table 2.** Metaphorical markers by Goatly

Indeed, extraction of metaphorical information from text in a manner suggested by Goatly is one of the most convenient, detailed methods, one which can also be readily used. In particular, such a method is more suitable for large corpora of a corpus-based analysis. However, as can be observed, the complexity of groups is not always equal in their consistency, which is also the main concern of researchers who work with a corpus-based approach to data (e.g. Stefanowitsch & Gries, 2007). Thus,

Goatley's table of metaphorical markers is used in the present study, but only those marker categories that are suitable for the study, such as explicit markers, intensifiers, hedges, and downtoners.

The source data and approach to extraction of emotions from texts have led me to the methodological framework for the study, which is the main focus of the next section.

## **2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR QUALITATIVE METAPHOR ANALYSIS**

From the beginning of this thesis, I have chosen to develop a strong empirically driven research that would account for the study of emotion metaphors in legal discourse. The cognitive approach has been selected for the study of emotions, which I have further advanced with some psychological insight that supports claims of the cognitive nature of emotions. The analysis of the source data is performed via blended qualitative data analysis with conceptual cross-domain mapping, and is called *qualitative metaphor analysis* (Kimmel, 2012). To continue with the practical procedures for the analysis, it is essential to know the models that are used for the analysis. Therefore, in the next sub-sections, I explain the kind of cognitive linguistics' methods and approaches that have been adopted, and why they are essential for the linguistic study of emotions. The background information on the topic has already been discussed in the previous two chapters since it is crucial to the whole cognitive linguistic enterprise. Nonetheless, not repeating what has been

already discussed, I also emphasize major points that are significant for the qualitative metaphor analysis.

## **2.1 Cross-domain mapping**

The methodology chosen for the present study looks both ways in so far as it derives from the type of corpus selected but that it is also influenced by the specific theoretical approaches that have been chosen. In the framework of a cognitive theory of metaphor, *emotion* is to be understood as a “target” domain. Thus, the group of five “targets” corresponds to the five emotions selected for the study. Conceptual metaphor is a complex phenomenon hidden in data. The metaphorical understanding of emotions requires understanding of their source domains. The source domains of emotions vary (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2004). Earlier, I made the point that some source domains are “natural” for emotions, including “a force,” “a container,” and “an attacker.” It is expected that since the 1980s, the cognitive linguistic enterprise must have gathered some kind of list of categories essential to CMT, and particularly to the investigation of emotions. In the current study, I rely on classification of the most comprehensive resource of metaphorical mappings—Master Metaphor List (MML) (Lakoff, Espenson & Schwarz, 1991). MML is used as a background for categorizing emotion keywords, as it represents the traditional approach to conceptualizations of various notions. Apart from major categories of “event structure,” “mental events,” and “other,” MML includes the category of *emotion*. It is not practical to observe all types and sub-types of emotion concepts represented in MML but it should be pointed out that each group mentioned above

has the image-schematic sources applicable to the concepts of emotions. As illustrated in Table 3 below, several examples have been compiled out of four major categories in MML, which are supported with examples from the present study.

<b>Group</b>	<b>Sub-group</b>	<b>Example</b>
EMOTIONS	“Emotional self is a brittle object”	There is a <b>wild disturbance – is it fear or anger?</b> – in her eyes [...] (1:39)
EVENT STRUCTURE	“States are locations”	Caddy had ever been <b>happy in her life</b> (1:538) There had been general <b>surprise in Chambers.</b> (4:281)
MENTAL EVENTS	“Looking at something on purpose is touching it with eyes or glance”	Sir Leicester hears this tribute with so much surprise <b>and stares about him in such a confused way that Mrs. Rouncewell feels it necessary to explain.</b> (1:464)
OTHER	“Light moves from light source”	[...] and all this <b>happiness shone like a light</b> from one central figure...(1:570)

**Table 3.** Conceptualization of emotions in various groups in Master Metaphor List (selected)

As can be seen from the table above, emotions are prevalent in all groups. For example, concerning the sub-group “States are locations” in Table 3 above, the preliminary observations of the corpus have shown that only certain emotion keywords tend to conceptualize as “entities” located inside the body and also inside various things, which can be both something material (*table*) and non-material (*trial*). Therefore, when performing cross-domain mapping of emotion in the current study, not only do I consider traditional source domains for emotions, such as “a force,” but I also attempt to reveal more complex conceptualizations, because the source data include such examples. Even preliminary observations indicated several frequent conceptualizations. It should be mentioned that I also search carefully for less frequent conceptualizations, which represent unique and valuable cases of cross-domain mapping.

As emotions are integral parts of human experience in the world and with the world around us, I propose to approach them as part of our universal experiences, including concepts of *things*, *time*, *space*, and *energy*. Centuries ago, in 1781, Kant reasoned that “we cannot actually experience the world itself as it is, but only an internal perception replica of the world” (Lehar, 1999: 123). Consequently, when talking about experience of the world via things, time, space, and energy, it means that people experience the world as “external to our bodies” (*id.*). Keeping that in mind, in the next few sub-sections I explain how these categories are applied to emotion metaphors.

## **2.2 Embodied cognition thesis**

Metaphors that structure our understanding of emotions are highly dependent on the structure of human bodies. This hypothesis is central for the embodied cognition thesis (Johnson, 1987), which in turn is fundamental for the present study of interconnections between cognitive and emotional processes as expressed in language. In this context, the method of a cross-domain mapping is used to explain that cognition is “deeply dependent upon features of the physical body” (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2016). The cross-domain mappings that involve physical sensations of emotional experiences are quite numerous, and it is important to understand how these experiences are represented in language and in what context. For example, when Lakoff and Johnson describe conceptual metaphors HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN, they explain our emotional states through “physical basis,” stating that “drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and

depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state” (1980: 462). Thus, apart from structural metaphors, such as RAGE IS FIRE (e.g. RAGE is structured in terms of FIRE), there is also the *orientational* type of metaphors.

The basic gestalt-like experiences—UP-DOWN, CENTRAL-PERIPHERAL, FRONT-BACK, ON-OFF, IN-OUT, and DEEP-SHALLOW—are essential for human experiences, including emotions. Such type of conventional metaphors is called orientational. These orientational metaphors “guide” our lives in many ways. It is important to remember that metaphors are products of our cognition and, therefore, our emotional (and any other) experience is not governed by something external. That is why these types of metaphors not only “structure one concept in terms of another, but instead organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 462). When developing the following four categories for metaphor study, I link potential emotional experience as reflected in the language of legal fiction with four fundamental universal categories of things, time, space, and energy.

### **2.2.1. Metaphors and things: Objectification and personification**

The bottom-up approach<sup>43</sup> that is used when extracting and interpreting data reveals interesting cases, where emotions conceptualize as “objects” or “personified forces.” When objectifying emotion, they are grouped into “objects,” somebody’s “possessions” or “things,” as in *That’s her guilt* (4:360). Concerning the topic of categorization, Hader states the following (2010: 51):

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<sup>43</sup> See previous discussion in Chapter 1, section 2.4.

*Abstractions in the cognitive view do not arise out of thin air but from acts of categorization applied to concrete items. [...] the formation of categories in language itself depends on the formation of abstractions. Saliently, the kind of meanings associated with grammatical items would not be feasible without the formation of very abstract schematic categories.*

Indeed, building the categories of emotions from the emotion keywords in context with the bottom-up approach brings to light other interesting conceptualizations. For example, based on the tradition in the cognitive linguistics method of categorizing emotions as “objects,” the evidence from the corpus shows several context-based cases, where the emotion keywords as “objects” are represented by their peculiarities, including “hidden objects,” “desired objects,” or “shared objects.” Apart from emotions as “objects,” there are also conceptualizations “an attacker” or “an opposing force.” This is what can be called “personified forces,” meaning that emotions as “objects” possessing human characteristics, such as *‘Whew!’ said Miss Murchison. She darted to her desk. Her fears had deceived her.* (2:12). The next two universal experiences in relation to emotions—space and energy—belong to our bodily experience with the world and are addressed in the next sub-section.

### **2.2.2 Metaphor and energy: Kinesics**

Kinetic energy is the energy of motion. In relation to bodily experiences, kinaesthesia means “the sense of muscular effort that accompanies a voluntary motion of the body” (OED, 2015). In this context, the principles of the embodied cognition thesis are used to solve the task of how the emotion keywords under scrutiny are linked to behavior of a human body, specifically its movement/motion. Emotional

experiences, as described by the means of language, are often accompanied with movements of the body or body language: we nod when they approve of something positive, we jump from happiness, we raise arms in surprise, our hands shake when we are in fright. Hence, in the source data, I search for kinaesthetic experiences of that kind. Not only it helps understand what kind of bodily experiences accompany an emotional state, but what type of emotion is linked to what type of kinaesthetic experience.

When looking for emotional experiences, I aim to examine the intensity of these experiences. Based on the preliminary observations, all emotion keywords show their intensity, which can be both increasing (*having **great fears*** [1:44]) and decreasing, as in *Dalgliesh was standing in front of the window, apparently in thought, and taking **little interest** in the details of the room* (4:498). In the present analysis, if there is any indication of the types of emotional experience in language (*strong, weak, great, little*), this information is extracted and grouped.

### **2.2.3 Metaphor and space: Proxemics and containment**

Ever since ancient times, philosophers have struggled to comprehend the interconnection between the fundamental concepts of motion and space.<sup>44</sup> However, if kinaesthetic experiences indicate humans' movements as movements of their bodies, the movements of the bodies in space and between other objects in space are the topic of proxemics (Hall, 1966). The term proxemics refers to "physical

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<sup>44</sup> For example, in Descartes's physics, the philosopher defined the property of material substance with three-dimensional spatial extension: "the extension in length, breadth, and depth which constitutes the space occupied by a body, is exactly the same as that which constitutes the body" (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2015).

proximity between people in various situations; the ways in which people interact spatially” (OED, 2015). Concerning this, I refer to distancing and “maintaining a certain amount of space between them [people]” and approaching objects (*id.*). I also refer to the requirements of less or more space under emotional influence or the so-called “body buffer zone” and “personal space” (Horowitz, Duff & Stratton, 1964). In the source data for the analysis, I search for connection between emotion and spatial orientation of a person in relation to it.

I approach the notion of *space* from a slightly different angle. If in “spacing” of our emotional experiences, language reflects our position as “near,” “close,” or “approaching” to something or somebody, then will this positioning be the same if *emotions* are seen as “entities located inside the body?” Previous research into metaphors (e.g. Kövecses, 2004) has shown that numerous emotions conceptualize as “entities located inside the body,” including emotion metaphors of *fear* or *anger*. Our bodies react to emotions and certain parts of our bodies do so more specifically than others, for example, gut and fear, but also heart and vocal cords and fear, which implies that several parts of our bodies can concomitantly be affected by an emotion stimulus. In the analysis, it is expected to bring to light the conceptualization of emotions as “entities located inside the body” in various parts of the body, especially with the emotion keywords of *fear* and *surprise*, which are strongly linked to expressiveness.

#### 2.2.4 Metaphor and time: Importance and flexibility

The correlation between the notions of *emotion* and *time* is an interesting topic but has not often drawn much attention. How do emotions connect with the notion of *time*? The answer can be the following—through memory. As has been suggested by my discussion of memory (see Chapter 2, section 3), time is a significant element in the experience of an emotional state. Its flexibility and malleability are integral parts of the qualification of emotionally marked events and speed and duration are parameters to be taken into account. Consequently, when extracting emotion keywords from the source data, I search for the emotional description of events and objects, as in the example with the duration of *happiness* measured in days: *Lovely, laughing, happy days* (3:50) or *fear* measured in seconds, as in *Then there came a second of fear* (4:72).

So far, the types of emotion source domains that I expect to extract from the source data have only been outlined. As mentioned earlier, there are traditional cross-domain mappings of emotions and those related to our vast bodily experiences. Another question that needs to be addressed concerns the possibility to generalize the relations between types of source domains and emotions: are there types of source domains that apply to all emotions? I answer this question by addressing Kövecses's typology of emotion concepts in the next sub-section.

### 2.3 Emotion concepts

As noted in Chapter 1, Kövecses has done an impressive amount of work on emotions. Apart from relying on MML, I also follow Kövecses's typology of emotion concepts, which I use as a theoretical background for my study of emotions because his findings represent an original, stimulating, and reliable classification on which I base my own observations. Following Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphors, Kövecses develops the study of metaphors in relation to the concepts of "a relationship," "a force," "events," and "culture" (2000a, 2004, 2008a). One question that the author asks seems especially relevant to the present study (2004: 35):

*Are there any metaphorical source domains that are specific, or unique, to the emotions? In other words, the question is whether the source domains of emotion metaphors have application outside the concept of emotion or only inside it.*

Taken from his fundamental work *Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling* (2004: 35-50), the categories of emotion metaphors outline boundaries between what the "traditional" conceptualizations of emotion in language are, and what is more "particularized" about them; what may look unfamiliar at first sight. The complete categorization can be found in Appendix 2. However, to orientate the reader on the subject, a few examples from Kövecses's work are given below.

*(1) Source domains that apply to all emotion concepts*

Some emotional experiences are simple processes—i.e. when people state that they are happy or they feel sad. To describe those, the conceptual metaphor EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE is used (*All feelings are gone*).

*(2) Source domains that apply to most emotion concepts*

Kövecses argues that the metaphorical source domain CONTAINER with an “inside-outside” perspective is “the major” domain for emotion (2004: 37). One of the reasons why this source domain is almost universal to all emotions is that, according to Kövecses, “emotions in many cultures throughout the world are seen as occurrences inside the body” (*id.*).

*(3) Source domains that apply to some emotions*

Obviously, not all emotions can conceptualize, for example as “hot fluids.” The conceptual metaphors HEAT/FIRE combined with a FLUID/HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER usually link “explosive” emotions of anger, rage, or fear with hot liquid substances, as the latter would probably be aimed at inflicting PHYSICAL DAMAGE on humans.

*(4) Source domains that apply to one emotion*

Having summarized the research on metaphors that was investigated by different researchers, Kövecses concludes that there are certain conceptualizations applicable to certain emotions, including those in the following examples: ANGER as

TRESPASSING and PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE and HAPPINESS as BEING OFF THE GROUND.

As stated before, the conceptual metaphor EMOTIONS ARE FORCES, governed by the “force” schema, is considered one of the basic image schemas of our conceptual system. The “force” conceptualization is part of the second group as proposed by Kövecses. How it is applied to emotional experiences is the focus of the next sub-section.

#### **2.4 Force dynamics revisited: Psychological perspective**


In the study of emotions in language from a cognitive linguistics perspective, researchers generally accept emotions as “forces.” As seen in the previous chapters, emotions can be “causes” for behavior, bodily changes, or “responses” to stimuli. Consequently, “forces” represent preventive motion, such as containment, support, resisting, and blockage and cause motion. In the analysis, I aim to show different types of the “force” source domain, and, therefore, it is necessary to give some structure to the discussion of emotions as “forces.” A force-dynamics as a schematic system pertains to the linguistic representation of interactions between emotions as forces, causes, and responses.

One of the strongest accounts for the connection between forces, causes, and responses grounded in language and cognition is provided by Leonard Talmy, who developed the force-dynamic theory on the basis of interaction between force and its causes. Starting from 1988, the author’s objective was to identify “conceptual structures” in language, which led to the development of a complex system of factors and relations between factors in the “force” schema. When illustrating the force-

dynamic category, Talmy identifies two forces, *Agonist* and *Antagonist*, as stated in the quotation below (2000: 413-414):

*Borrowing the terms from physiology where they refer to the opposing members of certain muscle pairs, I call the focal force entity the Agonist and the force element that opposes it the Antagonist.*

The author then continues to elaborate on their relationship. First, the force entities Agonist (*Ago*) and Antagonist (*Ant*) have intrinsic force tendencies: toward action or toward rest. Second, force entities are conceptualized as strong or weak. Third, the outcome of such interaction can either be action or rest. Figure 7 visualizes the force-dynamic category (Talmy, 2000: 414):




**Figure 7.** Talmy's force-dynamic framework

Talmy calls force-dynamics a fundamental semantic category (1988), which not only applies to physical forces, but is also extended to psychological reference, as stated by the author himself. In light of Talmy's theory, this study applies the

force-dynamic framework in relation to how selected emotion keywords conceptualize and lexicalize in language. With the cross-domain mapping, I trace examples of the “force” schema, and then such examples are further analyzed from the perspective of the force-dynamic relations.

This topic is of great importance because it not only displays the force-dynamic relations of emotional experience as expressed in language, but also refines the force-dynamic schema proposed by Talmy via different types of emotion keywords selected for the study. It comes as no surprise that since 1988, there has been some elaboration on the topic from the psychological perspective. A successful development was made by Kövecses (2004) who applied Talmy’s theory to the domain of emotion. In his account, as mentioned earlier, Kövecses suggests understanding the force-dynamic interaction between the same force entities (*Agonist* and *Antagonist*), but in relation to *emotion* and *self*, and—in the words of Kövecses—between (i) a cause that leads to emotion and (ii) emotion that leads to some response (*id.*, 64). Adopting Kövecses’s take on the force-dynamic framework, emotion keywords are considered as “physical agitation” of the two types shown below:



**Figure 8.** Types of physical agitation (Kövecses, 2004, 63)

As an illustration, via the first type, bodily agitation is revealed, which is evoked by emotion, as in *We were all assembled shortly before dinner [...] when a card was brought in and my guardian **read aloud in a surprised voice**, "Sir Leicester Dedlock!"* (1:441). In this example, it is assumed that the “passive” Agonist (body) is “disturbed” by Antagonist (emotion), which results in the voice being “surprised.” The aim of the second type of the force-dynamic interaction is to reveal the internal psychological relationship between self and emotion. My aim is to show such examples, where Agonist (self) is trying to remain calm or unchanged but, nonetheless, is changed by Antagonist (cause of emotion), as in *Pardon me, sir, Hannah was so much surprised by the episode that she mentioned it to Mrs Pettican* (2:46). In this example, the emphasis falls on the emotional experience as a whole and on the changes it brings, without specifying any bodily changes.

Thus, the complexity of the emotion question and analysis of emotion keywords require the combination of several methods and theoretical approaches:

- the categorization of emotions metaphors represented in MML as well as guided by Kövecses’s typology in order to provide conceptual cross-domain mapping in accordance with the principles of CMT;
- the inclusion of the time and space parameters, objects and motion features in order to map emotion keywords in correlation with these four extra-linguistic aspects;
- the force-dynamic framework adapted to suit the needs of the analysis of the emotion keywords that conceptualize via the “force” image-schema.

This mixed methodological and theoretical approach is complemented by the use of a software (ATLAS.ti) so that a systematic qualitative metaphor analysis be formed. I argue that the traditional cross-domain mapping with one source domain and one target domain can be further advanced with *multiple* source domains (Kimmel, 2012). In order to support this claim, it is necessary to provide a theoretical foundation that establishes the role of a metaphor within modern qualitative data analysis.

### **3. QUALITATIVE APPROACH TO METAPHOR STUDY**

#### **3.1 Qualitative approach to data analysis**

Strict cognitive or cultural approaches are not sufficient to account for a complex study of the emotional phenomenon as expressed in language. Therefore, several approaches and techniques should be applied to investigate emotions in legal fiction. First of all, I argue that the cognitive approach should use more empirically driven research and, secondly, that these empirical results should be falsifiable.

In the last decade research in psychology (social, clinical) that uses conceptual metaphor as a tool to investigate psychological notion of *self* (e.g. Moser, 2000) or to analyze patients' interviews (e.g. Schmitt, 2005) has gradually developed. The recognition of conceptual metaphors echoes Carpenter who sees them as “an opportunity to examine phenomena from a unique and creative perspective” (2008: 274). He points out that “metaphors can be used to provide structure to the data; to understand a familiar process in a new light [...] to evoke emotion” (*ibid.*). Moser

also talks about these advantages, in particular using both CMT and Qualitative Data Analysis (2000: 17):

*As research about the self [in social psychology] shows (MOSER 1998), it is possible to combine a cognitive understanding of metaphor with a research scope in individual, social and cultural differences in metaphor use and mental models of the self. At the same time, it proved to be very useful to combine qualitative as well as quantitative approaches to metaphor analysis.*

Indeed, there is research on emotions via metaphors in linguistics. However, in spite of diverse approaches to emotions in language, this research is done without actually engaging into the qualitative approach to data. Originally used in social sciences, the term *qualitative approach* refers to techniques for analyzing data, in my case, textual data extracted from four novels. The techniques used in qualitative research are non-numerical in nature, as the main aim of a researcher does not imply collecting numerical data from a large corpus and transform it into useable statistics. The main aims include “reflecting on the data,” “sequential data interpretation,” and “coding” (*ATLAS.ti*, 2015).<sup>45</sup> In contrast, as established in Chapter 1, there has been increasing interest toward blending metaphor logic with corpus-based techniques (e.g. Oster, 2010) but more research is required from the qualitative perspective. Concerning this, Kimmel explicitly argues for a metaphor analysis and qualitative content, which he emphasizes as “efficient” and “complementary” in discourse and content analyses. In his work on the conceptualization of the EU Constitution in British newspapers, Kimmel advocates for metaphor analysis and qualitative content analysis as is represented in the following extract (2012: 120):

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<sup>45</sup> See more on the topic further in this section.

*Qualitative content analysis and metaphor analysis were concurrently applied to the same data. [...] Content analysis captures units of discourse that we may here, for the sake of convenience, call argument. Typically, the units of interest are between a sentence and a whole passage and reflect recurrent topoi lines of argumentation that belong to a specific field [...] Metaphor analysis in the tradition of conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson 1999), by contrast, captures units as small as single words or phrases like collocations that are identifiable metaphors following a linguistic definition.*

Some interesting discourse and/or content analyses have been conducted with CAQDAS as a platform,<sup>46</sup> whether it is research into a phrase like “smoking gun” and its progression from metaphor to idiom (MacMillan, 2005), or a qualitative content analysis on how New Zealand is represented in the international press, in correlation to climate change and carbon emissions (Kaefer, Roper & Sinha, 2015). Nonetheless, more research is needed to advocate the practice of blending CMT and QDA and the use of CAQDAS to facilitate such research. This was done, for example, by Kaló on linguistics patterns of drug takers’ narratives (2012) or Kimmel’s cognitive stylistics, political discourse, and metaphor clusters (2008a, 2008b, 2009a).

The disciplines pertaining to the humanities intersected with computing long ago. What the research community calls “digital humanities,” “humanities computing,” or “eHumanities” is not a simple “digitization” (Kirschenbaum, 2010: 3).<sup>47</sup> Its definition is actually rather elusive, as the field of study is vast. Nonetheless, as suggested by Burdick *et al.*, digital humanities originally refer to “collaborative, trans-disciplinary, computationally engaged research” (2012: 2). However, “Digital

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<sup>46</sup> I have already started the discussion on the empirical basis for metaphor analysis in Chapter 1, section 2.4 pointing out that qualitative data analysis could be beneficial for metaphor study, as well. I will deal with this topic at a greater length in the next subsection of this chapter.

<sup>47</sup> John Unsworth’s (the founding director of the Institute for Advanced Technology in the Humanities at the University of Virginia) email message is included in Kirschenbaum (2010).

is less a unified field than an array of convergent practices that explore a universe in which print is not longer the primary medium in which knowledge is produced and disseminated” (*id.*). Starting with “the pioneer of the digital humanities” (Bonzio, 2011), Italian theologian Robert Busa,<sup>48</sup> digital humanities have progressed within the qualitative research in the 1980s. According to Wiedermann, “the digitalization of the humanities” has boosted “digital language resources and corresponding technologies” (2013: 5).

The boost to CAQDAS in linguistic research that has been witnessed over the past ten to fifteen years, has provided researchers with a platform for a complex linguistic and discourse analyses (Fielding & Lee, 1998; Kimmel, 2012). Originally, CAQDAS was used in social and psychological sciences, which are qualitative in their core. The term *qualitative data* refers to the “information gathered in non-numeric and often textual form about meanings, intentions, action, behaviors, and events” (Gibbs, Clarke et al., 2015). By *qualitative data analysis*, is meant a non-statistical approach to data, where “its methodological approach is primarily guided by the concrete material at hand” (*ATLAS.ti*, 2015). What is important in this definition is that emphasis falls on the “concrete material” as the source of information. Similarly, cognitive linguists approach data in the bottom-up fashion. On a qualitative level, such an approach is part of what is called the “grounded theory.” Introduced by Glaser and Strauss in 1967, the grounded theory method is qualitative research “where data collection and analysis are conducted together” and where “constant comparison and theoretical sampling are used to support the systematic discovery of theory from the data” (Gibbs, Clarke et al., 2015).

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<sup>48</sup> Busa’s indexing of the works of Thomas Aquinas.

These points are essential in qualitative metaphor analysis. First, when building a theory on emotions, as expressed in the language of legal fiction, I do not generate abstract concepts—on the contrary, categories are generated from the source data. Glaser puts it this way (1967: 23):

*In discovering theory, one generates conceptual categories or their properties from evidence; then the evidence from which the category emerges is used to illustrate the concept.*

Second, various procedures are implemented to ensure the validity of the findings and the transparency of the research. Thus, I constantly compare my cross-domain mapping of emotions with the models of cognitive linguistics described in the previous sub-section. When it comes to coding metaphors with CAQDAS, I refer to the specifically designed strategies developed by researchers who blend CMT and QDA (Kimmel, 2012). I elaborate on these in the next section. The reliability of findings is ensured by providing detailed guidelines at all stages of data collection, data analysis, and writing. To enhance reliability, the processes of data collection and analysis are represented explicitly in figures, diagrams, flowcharts, and tables.<sup>49</sup>

In this type of qualitative linguistic study, the grounded theory approach to data is supported by a computer-assisted software that is used to assist the analysis. In the next section, I describe and see how this software ATLAS.ti can aid my analysis.

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<sup>49</sup> See Appendix 4 for the complete qualitative metaphor analysis with full conceptual mapping.

### 3.2 ATLAS.ti: Software for qualitative metaphor analysis

For the qualitative metaphor analysis, I use CAQDAS ATLAS.ti (Mac version). It should be pointed out from the start that essentially, CAQDAS was not created to analyze the data but rather to assist the researcher in analyzing data (Gibbs, Clarke *et al.*, 2015). The choice of this particular software lies in the set of tools used to carry out the qualitative analysis, a user-friendly interface and an easy access to coded data. The very first steps in engineering ATLAS.ti were taken at the Technical University of Berlin by Thomas Muhr between 1989 and 1992. Later on, the commercial version of ATLAS.ti appeared in 1993. Nowadays, the software qualifies as one of the most powerful software solutions that allow researchers to work with various data, including text, audio, video, and visual materials. One of the tasks that this software helps carry out is coding, one of the most significant task of qualitative metaphor analysis. It is necessary to provide the working definition of *code* in the qualitative metaphor analysis.

Coding itself can be perceived as analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 56), but generally it is understood as the most significant part of analysis in performing theory building (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). In a more practical way, code is “often a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based data” (Saldaña, 2009: 3). In coding that involves metaphor logic, codes are “tags attached to several text units, which later function as data containers to retrieve theoretically equivalent expressions” (Kimmel, 2012: 13). To illustrate this with a simple example, when I find the keyword *happy* in the text, I assign to it a code <target emotion: positive:

happy>. Information on codes and coding can be found further in this section and in more detail in section 4 of this chapter.

Working with ATLAS.ti means assigning codes. The process of code assignment and its multiple revisions is a laborious stage as researchers aim to get the best results and representation of data. The software I use is designed to limit this drawback via various features available. It assists in (i) organizing the workspace in a structured manner with a friendly interface for easier retrieval of any information at any time, (ii) providing statistical, comparative, and analytical tools, and (iii) reducing the amount of work on data output. The statistical and analytical tools of ATLAS.ti are supported by visual diagrams that the researcher can create when organizing coded data. They can be used as an output option.

Although the analysis provided in this study is a qualitative one, I cannot say that modern CAQDAS is performed without any statistical analysis. On the contrary, the software I use gives me an opportunity to create quantitative surveys at any stage of the analysis. In the beginning, it can be a statistical overview, including but not limited to word count, words per document, coded metaphors, metaphor density or co-occurrences of source domains. The first two can be performed with the tool *word cruncher*. The emotion keywords are coded with the tool *auto-coding* designed to search and instantly code any segments in the text.

The procedure of QDA is manual, but the aid that comes from CAQDAS significantly improves the processes of analysis and interpretation. Since I started working on this study, there have been slight changes in the terminology of the software, which is partially connected with the launch of its Mac version in September 2014, the version used for this study.

### 3.3 Terminological apparatus of ATLAS.ti

The “web” of terms used by ATLAS.ti is rather complex, but I address only those crucial to the study. All definitions are taken from the ATLAS.ti Mac User Manual,<sup>50</sup> which starts by saying that in order to work with this software, one should be aware of its fundamental concepts of *primary documents*, *quotations*, and *codes* (2015: 6), which I explain specifically including the concept of *group*.

#### 3.3.1 Project and primary document

Three time-frames have been established in accordance with three time spans. However, the corpus includes four novels, and this implies four separate projects in ATLAS.ti named as follows:

Project 1: time-frame 1 (1853)

Project 2: time-frame 2 (1930)

Project 3: time-frame 2 (1940)

Project 4: time-frame 3 (1997)

The reason for creating four separate projects is not to mix coded segments of texts between projects in order to make it easier to access information later and provide clear output and write-up.

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<sup>50</sup> As all definitions are borrowed from the software manual, each of them is indicated by brackets but without additional reference to ATLAS.ti. Only the year (2015) and the page referred to are mentioned.

Each project is a “highly connected entity, a dense web of primary data [...] and codes” (2015: 6). To each project is added a “primary document,” which is the data added to ATLAS.ti. As there are four separate projects, there are four separate textual documents.

### 3.3.2 Quotation

Generally speaking, a *quotation* is “a segment/portion of a document that is deemed interesting or important by the user” (2015: 7). In textual documents, a quotation is “an arbitrary sequence of characters ranging in length from a single character to a word, a sentence, or a paragraph” (*id.*, 7). So quotations are what is called *examples* in traditional methods. Quotations are created manually, although the software also provides “free quotations” by using the *auto-coding tool*, as was mentioned earlier. The auto-coding tool is used to search for emotion keywords. A length of a quotation varies from one sentence to approximately seven sentences. Not to confuse between *code* and *quotation*, consider the following example, in which the whole sentence is a quotation:

*Naughton looked for a moment as guilty as if he had been  
accused of the murder. (4:352)*

The highlighted segment in this quotation is what specifically interests me, as it contains the emotion keyword *guilty* plus other information, to which codes are subsequently assigned. As a rule, there are one up to four codes assigned to a single quotation. The unique number of each quotation is generated by ATLAS.ti while

performing manual coding of text. Consequently, four projects equal to four novels, the first number in a quotation is the number of the project. The second number is the number of a quotation. In the quotation 4:352 above, “4” indicates that the quotation is taken from time-frame 3, project 4 (P. D. James), and “352” indicates the number generated for this quotation.

### 3.3.3 Code

As a reminder, a *code* is a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns “a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based data” (Saldaña, 2009: 3).<sup>51</sup> The important point is that codes “capture meaning in the data” and are used as “classification devices at different levels of abstraction in order to create sets of related information units for the purpose of comparison” (2015: 8). Similarly, Strauss emphasizes that “coding is the pivotal operation for moving toward the discovery of a core category or categories” (1987: 55-56). On the one hand, the CMT principles are applied with the source domain and the target domain, which are parts of conceptual cross-domain mapping. On the other hand, the coding procedure is used, in which a *code* is an essential term in QDA that refers to the theme, idea, or characteristic of the data (Gibbs, Clarke et al., 2015). Hence, one question arises: What should be coded in a quotation when employing CMT? To answer this question, which is crucial for the practical procedure of coding, consider the quotation mentioned earlier (*Naughton looked for a moment as guilty as if he had been accused of the murder* [4:352]). First, in this quotation, I

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<sup>51</sup> See sub-section 3.2 in this section.

assign a code to the emotion keyword *guilty*, which reads as <target emotion: negative: guilty>. Second, I assign a source domain to the target domain, which reads as <source: entity visible on the body>. Third, the duration of the emotional experience is indicated by the phrase “for a moment.” Therefore, I add another code—<time marker>. It is not the source domain but an additional characteristic of the emotion keyword under scrutiny.

### 3.3.4 Group

*Categorization* is an important notion in the present study, as it is in linguistics, generally speaking. In coding with the software, I categorize or group information extracted from the source data. The notion of *group* is thus approached on the conceptual level. Groups are “a way to form clusters” of codes for “easier handling” (2015: 9). In the present study, the group of target domains called “target emotion,” which includes sub-groups “target emotion: positive,” “target emotion: negative,” and “target emotion: dual-nature.” The same concerns other types of linguistic information retrieved from the source data, such as source domains, parameters of evaluation of emotion (*quality, intensity, time marker*) and conceptual proximity between emotion keywords (*link, anti-link*). In the next section, I illustrate how the terminology and method are used with an example of coding and grouping based on the coding.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> The complete list of all codes and group of codes can be found in Appendix 3.

## 4. A PRACTICAL PROCEDURE FOR THE ANALYSIS

### 4.1 Correlation between research questions and codes

There is a total of 98 codes in four projects, of which 122 represent source domains. When coding, not only do I aim to gather information grounded in the source data, but I also link codes to research questions. Each code assigned to a quotation is connected with the emotion keyword. As stated before, normally there is more than one code to each quotation and, therefore, there is more than one code to the emotion keyword under scrutiny. In what follows, I demonstrate which codes are linked to which research questions and for what purpose.

#### 4.1.1 Target and source domains

**Question 1:** *What are the patterns of emotion lexicalization in legal fiction? Is there any overlap of source domains in the cross-domain mapping of emotions? Is there dependency between emotion keywords and the number of source domains that it has?*

The most important research question relates to the most important entities—the target and the source domains and, consequently, the codes <target emotion> and <source>. The coding procedure employed in this analysis suggests that each emotion keyword can potentially have more than one source domain. In this study, the target domain is only one domain—i.e. *emotion*. Each emotion keyword is

assigned with a separate code. For example, <target emotion: positive: happiness>, <target emotion: positive: happy> and so on. The analysis of metaphor patterns is dependent on the information that is mapped from the source domain to the target domain. As a consequence, source domains are prioritized.

#### 4.1.2 Types of emotions

**Question 2:** *Which emotion metaphors have the strongest/weakest association with which emotion keywords? How do types of emotion keywords (positive, negative, and dual-nature) correlate with the distribution of source domains?*

To answer these questions, I have created codes to gather information on the types of emotion keywords. These are the following:

1. <target emotion: positive>, including the emotion keywords of *happiness* and *interest*;
2. <target emotion: negative>, including the emotion keywords of *guilt* and *fear*;
3. <target emotion: dual>, including the emotion keyword of *surprise*.

Furthermore, each code includes an emotion keyword as part of speech, such as <target emotion: positive: happy> or <target emotion: negative: fearfully>. Such exclusive coding allows me to collect information on each emotion keyword (including part of speech) separately.

### 4.1.3 Parameters of emotional expression

**Question 3:** *What is the dependency of the parameters of emotion expression in the language of legal fiction on source domains?*

To answer this question, I address significant parameters of emotion expression—quality, intensity, duration, and proximity to other words. The following codes have been created:

1. <emotion: parameters: quality>;
2. <emotion: parameters: intensity>;
3. <emotion: parameters: time marker>;
4. <emotion: parameters: link>;
5. <emotion: parameters: anti-link>.

When providing cross-domain mapping for each emotion keyword, I also search for information that could indicate these three parameters. The motivation behind this is to cross-compare source domains and parameters to check which source domain tend to have which parameter. For example, I know which degree adverbs and/or adjectives (e.g. *great*, *little*) are used to describe which emotions. But I also want to know the dynamic of intensity—is it increasing, or—contrariwise—decreasing? Consequently, further division is required for the code <emotion parameters: intensity>:

1. <degree indicator: increase> (e.g. *great, very, quite*);
2. <degree indicator: decrease> (e.g. *slight, little*);
3. <emphatic: do/does/did>;
4. <emphatic: so>;
5. <emphatic: too>.

Apart from the properties coded as *intensity*, *quality*, and *time marker* of emotion expression in language, the analysis brings to light interesting cases, in which one emotion keyword was used to describe another, or when the word *feel* was used to describe emotional experiences. The following examples illustrate what I have just reported:

(a) ***I fear I surprised you**, mademoiselle, on the day of the storm?" she said with a parting curtsy. (1:487)*

(b) *But they never would meet again, and what **she was feeling now was not affection but fear and shame**. (4:44)*

Therefore, two additional codes have been created to collect such examples, which I named <special case: emotion describes emotion> and <special case: feeling emotion>.

#### 4.1.4 Kinesics and proxemics of emotional experience

**Question 4:** *What is the dependency between emotion keywords and the way they represent the spatial orientation and bodily movement of a person as expressed in the language of legal fiction?*

To elaborate on this topic, the relationship between metaphor and bodily changes needs to be addressed, which are expressed by kinesics and proxemics—in other words, spatial orientation of the body caused by emotional influence. There are various types of movements, gestures, and facial expressions that can be altered, or emerge because of the impact of emotion. Consequently, several codes are required in this context, including two main codes: <source: effect on bodily movement> and <source: spatial orientation of the body>. If the first code has been created to gather information that indicates movements of the body parts, gestures, general movements, such as standing up or sitting down, the second code indicates movements of the body in space—i.e. in a room, going from Point A to Point B, and others.

However, in addition to movements of body parts and movements of the body in space influenced by emotion, the latter tend to conceptualize as “forces” and “entities located inside the body.” Consequently, a group of codes representing source domains should be created, which would trace how emotions affect voice and tone of voice, movement of eyes and brows, and others, as shown as the following selection:

<source: an effect on the face>, <source: an effect on the eyes>, <source: an effect on the lips/mouth>, <source: an effect on the voice>, <source: an effect on the speech>, <source: an effect on tone of the voice>; <source: an entity located in the eyes>, <source: an entity located inside something>.


Most of the cross-domain mapping with the source domains, such as “an effect on the face” mentioned above represents the “force” schema. Here, it is important to establish the force-dynamics of emotion keywords, as explained in section 2 of the

present chapter. Two codes have been created in accordance with two types of force dynamics. Firstly, the code <force dynamics Type 1: Agonist = body> reveals examples, in which emotion is Antagonist and the body is Agonist. Secondly, the code <force dynamics Type 2: Agonist = self> reveals examples, in which cause of emotion is Antagonist and the self is Agonist.

The various codes just described are applied in qualitative metaphor analysis of my data. However, coding strategies can be more complex to account for complex expressions and in the next section, I introduce and illustrate Kimmel's compositional coding and two-tier coding strategy that I use to complement my system adopted from ATLAS.ti.

#### **4.2 Coding strategies: Compositional coding and two-tier coding**

When coding with ATLAS.ti, I use the coding strategy employed by Kimmel, who developed a *compositional coding procedure* and a *two-tier coding strategy* in the analysis of metaphors. As mentioned in Chapter 1, section 2.4, compositional coding corresponds to traditional conceptual mapping, which has the target and the source domain assigned in CAQDAS separately. Following a two-tier coding, I identify (i) a wider source domain of metaphor, (ii) a wider target domain (when needed) and (iii) “the specific amount of information that actually gets mapped between them” (*ibid.*). An example below shows the total six codes assigned to a single quotation number 1:39. It includes two target domains and four source domains assigned separately to a single quotation:



Picture 1. Multiple codes attached to a single quotation<sup>53</sup>

The following quotation 1:39 is particularly interesting:

*There is a wild disturbance - is it **fear** or **anger**? - in her eyes.*

In the example above, one of two target domains is coded <target emotion: negative: fear>. It has two main source domains coded as <source: an attacker> and <source: an entity located in the eyes>. This example is rather complex, as it has two negative emotion keywords and, consequently, two codes for each emotion: <fear> and <anger>. Here, the conceptual metaphors FEAR IS AN ATTACKER and FEAR IS AN ENTITY LOCATED IN THE EYES are both relevant because information in this mapping signifies that *fear* can be something highly disturbing (*a wild disturbance*) and that it is located in the eyes (*in her eyes*). In addition, emotions play a significant role in bodily experiences. Consequently, I often deal with the conceptual metaphor BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS. Apart from two target domains and three source domains, *fear* can also be evaluated with regard to the parameter of proximity because, as can be seen, *fear* co-occurs with another

<sup>53</sup> This picture illustrates one quotation and several codes, as represented in ATLAS.ti.

negative emotion keyword—*anger*—coordinated through the conjunction *or*. That is why, another code has been assigned to this quotation—<emotion: parameters: link>.

This is an example of a qualitative metaphor analysis with which shows how each emotion keyword is approached in the present study, and what kind of linguistic and conceptual information is to be analyzed.

As discussed in section 2 of this chapter, a set of source domains for emotions is “rich and diverse” (Kövecses, 2004: 109), which is appreciated in two-tier coding. When coding target and source domains separately, I preserve transparency and flexibility (Kimmel, 2012), which benefits both the analytical and technical levels of the analysis. It means that I can provide a more detailed study of the information mapped between the source domains by comparing the kinds of source domains that relate to the different kinds of target domains.

In this section, I have explained coding of emotion keywords and the types of codes in qualitative metaphor analysis. The two-tier coding strategy allows me to approach cross-domain mapping beyond the one-target-one-source-domain scheme, and instead look for additional information that can be mapped onto the target domain of emotion. This implies complex coding. Codes serve as handles for specific occurrences in the data that cannot be found by simple text-based search techniques.

## **Summary**

It has been my aim in this chapter of the thesis to introduce and explain all the methods and tools necessary for a qualitative approach to the study of emotions as

expressed in language. With the increasingly predominant empirically-driven approach of cognitive linguistics in the latest qualitative metaphor research, the study of emotions—as expressed in language—has developed into an integrated model to test how language accumulates knowledge for the purpose of identifying its variations. Some improvements have been made to benefit the traditional cross-domain mapping in a qualitative data research. First, I suggest looking a bit further than the traditional cross-domain mapping and employing a two-tier strategy to appreciate the complexity of metaphors. Second, I emphasize that in a qualitative metaphor analysis, not only should emotions be studied as concepts, but also as the lexico-grammatical forms of emotion metaphors, in order to understand better the role of parts of speech in thought processing. Third, with the software used to aid the analysis, I have developed a ready-to-use coding system that facilitates collection of sufficient linguistic information for the study of emotions in the language of legal fiction. In the next two chapters, I turn to a qualitative metaphor analysis.

## CHAPTER 4

### QUALITATIVE METAPHOR ANALYSIS: NEGATIVE AND DUAL EMOTIONS

In this and the following chapter, I conduct a qualitative metaphor analysis of the emotion keywords *fear*, *guilt*, *surprise*, *happiness*, and *interest* in order to establish the linguistic and cognitive profiles for these emotions, as expressed in legal fiction. Each emotion keyword is analyzed separately. Out of 900 examples of the emotion keywords, I collect all the examples that represent each of the five emotion keywords separately, and I address these examples as a group. As an illustration, the emotion keyword *happiness* is represented by 233 examples, including nouns and mainly adjectives, which I examine separately from other emotion keywords.

Both meanings of words and their definitions are prone to change. Meanings of words can stay relatively constant, whereas words' definitions may vary. Some preliminary observations indicate slight semantic changes of certain emotion keywords, when the word meaning extends to a specific use, such as the use of *guilt* in legal context, or the use of the word *interest* when referring to things of a material value, etc. Besides, the etymology of certain emotion keywords is relevant in the modern meaning of emotions. As dictionaries "aim to provide definitions that contain sufficient information to impart an understanding of the term" (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2015), dictionary definitions of the emotion keywords and their etymology are examined in the present study. The vocabulary entries are retrieved from four British-English dictionaries and thesauruses mentioned in section

1 of the previous chapter. Then, the keywords are checked for any kind of semantic correlation between the elements of their respective semantic fields.

After the semantic field of an emotion keyword is established, I move forward with the analysis of information collected employing two-tier cross-domain mapping. Starting from the analysis of the parameters determining emotional expression in language, including quality and intensity, I elaborate on the topic of the force-dynamic of emotion, as well as identify the peculiarities of source domains that have been found in the corpus. The qualitative analysis is supported by quantitative surveys.

## **1. LAW AND EMBODIMENT: FEAR**

### **1.1 Law and embodiment: Fear**

As a strong negative emotion, fear can be described as a state of being afraid, a strong force that is hard to control or withstand. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, *fear* is “the emotion of pain or uneasiness caused by the sense of impending danger, or by the prospect of some possible evil” (OED, 2015). This is not new and was already stated by Socrates who defined *fear* as the “expectation of evil” (mentioned by Horwitz & Wakefield, 2012: 20). Fear, as a survival mechanism in dangerous situations, is what people experience when they are faced with any kind of danger or threat. Thus, the fact that there is a certain positive element to fear should not be overlooked. Cognitively assessed, this emotion can be experienced both as a direct response to a stimulus, such as physical threat as mentioned above,

or as a response to what *might* happen, as “when you think that you are in danger” (CoED, 2015).

Significant attention has been given to this emotion in philosophy, which perhaps calls for separate research into *fear*, as the ground to cover is rather extensive. Nevertheless, it is important to mention briefly Aristotle who talks about “three things that are present in the soul” referring to “passions, capacities and characteristics” where passions include fear alongside with desire, anger, and joy (Bartlett & Collins, 2011: 32). He regards fear in respect to confidence and courage as “the anticipation of a bad thing” (*id.*, 55). Many centuries later, in his philosophical work *Trembling and Fear* (1863), Danish philosopher Kierkegaard, a “father of existentialism,” addresses fear in relation to free will, conflict, and sin.<sup>54</sup>

The etymological values still remain present in the current meanings of *fear* and are not at odds with what people feel about the emotion of fear. Derived from Old English *fêr*, the meaning of *fear* as “strong masculine, sudden calamity, danger” corresponds to the Old Saxon *fâr*, which means “ambush,” similar to what the Old High German *fâra* means—i.e. “ambush,” “stratagem,” and “danger” (OED, 2015). Derived from *fêran* of Old English, which means “(to) terrify,” the verb (*to*) *fear* has parallels in other Germanic languages referring to such actions, as “to plot against, to lie in wait, to endeavour after” (OED, 2015).

As can be seen from the abovementioned, the emphasis lies on fear as a strong negative emotion, terrifying, and dangerous, but at the same time, one that causes people to think ahead, to be skilful, and protection-prone.

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<sup>54</sup> See also Heidegger’s *Being and Time* [*Sein und Zeit*] (2008 [1962]), Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* [*L’Être et le Néant*], (1993 [1943]), Camus, A. (1989 [1946]) *The Stranger* [*L’Étranger*], in which the discussion goes on about questions of religion and fear, fear in aspects of life such as when life is being changed, the fear of being poor, or the meaning of *being* itself.

The characteristics are, for the most part, negative and this is also suggested by the analysis of the semantic field of *fear* in the following section. But before that, a few words should be said about the notion of *semantic field*.

## **1.2 The semantic field of *fear***

The capacity of humans to generalize and form categories is linked with similarity. Saussure initiated the investigation of lexical systems many decades ago, and he emphasized the role of relations that each word is associated with. Semantic Field Theory, as many other developments in linguistics, has its roots in the works of Saussure. For example, Trier in his semantic field theory (1931) claims that the lexicon is structured into semantic fields or semantic domains (Brinton & Brinton, 2000: 112). According to Brinton, a semantic field “denotes a segment of reality symbolized by a set of related words. The words in a semantic field share a common semantic property” (*ibid.*) and, as a rule, different words have different relations. According to this assumption, when the semantic relations between words are dense, the relations of one semantic field do not tend to coincide with the relations of other semantic fields.

The structure of a semantic field can vary at many levels, including the cultural (Andersen, 1990), anthropological (Ingold, 1996), and social (Pelt & Poncelet, 2012) levels. In providing a semantic analysis of English words that denote emotions, I refer to the approach suggested by Johnson-Laird and Oatley and what they call a “communicative function” of emotion (1989: 84), which works “both within the

brain and within the social group” (*ibid.*). Following this approach, “[...] words referring to emotions will reflect the structure of emotional experience” (*id.*, 87).

I suggest a twofold structure of a semantic field: First, it includes lexico-semantic information about each emotion keyword gathered in dictionaries and thesauruses. Second, it includes the lexico-semantic information collected from the analysis. Both parts of a semantic field for each emotion keyword are represented separately but in reference to the same figure. Lexical entries from dictionaries exhibit general definitions of the emotion keywords—that is, a common knowledge, which is then followed by the findings collected from the analysis of the context-dependent source data.

There should be no confusion with the first part of the semantic field. As a reminder, when I created codes in ATLAS.ti, among other codes, I created those that represent linguistic information related to the parameters of emotion expression in language—in other words, the parameters of evaluation, including *quality*, *intensity*, and *time marker*; and the conceptual proximity of emotion, including codes <link> and <anti-link>. These five groups are included in the semantic field of each emotion keyword. The last two codes represent words that are used in a very close proximity to the emotion keywords in a phrase or a sentence, or so-called *anti-links* or words used as contrast to the emotion keyword in a phrase or a sentence (see Chapter 3, section 4).

The analysis of nouns, verbs, and adjectives that denote each emotion keyword demands discrete studies because it might represent unique lexical entries. The distribution of information in the way I have suggested accounts for a complex semantic structure of emotion. For that purpose, I follow three steps: (i) I manually

search for exhaustive definitions of emotion keywords in four British dictionaries, (ii) I subdivide emotion keywords into semantic groups—i.e. grouping the words that have a close meaning in categories, or as Coseriu called “Kategorienwörter” (words with categorical meaning) (Coseriu, 1973: 80), (iii) I include the five parameters of emotional evaluation, as examined in the corpus, and (iv) I reveal semantic peculiarities of each emotion keyword. A detailed schema of the semantic field *fear* is illustrated in Figures 9a and 9b below.

After carefully examining dictionary and thesaurus entries, the lexemes of nouns and verbs that represent synonymic relations have been collected, as can be visualized in Figure 9a. The synonymic relations are prioritized in order to identify variations within the semantic field of each emotion keyword, rather than, for example, semantic antonymic relations that the given emotion keywords have with other notions. Consequently, for example, lexemes *dread*, *horror*, and *awe* represent synonymic relations. The semantic field of *fear* displays four semantic groups. Each group is represented by a set of words grouped semantically: *dread*, *worry*, *reverence* and *possibility* for the noun (*a*) *fear*. The analysis shows that the verb (*to*) *fear* is also represented by the same semantic group, though with one difference: there is no semantic group *possibility* for the verb (*to*) *fear*; instead, I have traced the group that designates hesitation, including such verbs, as “(to) doubt” or “(to) distrust.”



On this level, some specifics of *fear*, which are reflected in its intersection between peoples' physiological and mental abilities can be observed. Naturally, the experience of horror, as "a shuddering or shivering" (OED, 2015), is accompanied by instant bodily changes. Similarly, a more psychologically inclined state of anxiety, as "trouble of mind about some uncertain event" (*ibid.*), is accompanied by "agitation," "a sensation of tightness" (*ibid.*), as well as a "shaking, intense feeling in the gut" (CoED, 2015). The latter—*feeling in the gut*—is connected with the group of semantically related experiences of doubt or hesitation that can be expressed in such phrases, as "to have a sneaking suspicion," "to have a hunch," or in sentences, as "I fear that a land war now looks probable" (*id.*). Quite interesting is the fact that lexemes *respect*, *worship*, and even *inspire* are part of the definitions of *fear*. This may be attributed to the significant role of religion. Thus, the phrases "to put the fear of God into," "to rub the fear of God into" (rare) meaning "to put in fear" or "to frighten," have been frequently used especially since 1890s (OED, 2015). *Fear* has also a positive meaning denoted by the nouns "(a) possibility," "likelihood," and "(a) chance." Such examples signify probable absence of fear or the potential experience of such, as in "There is no fear of that happening," as indicated in the Collins English Dictionary, rather than the positive experience of fear whatsoever (CoED, 2015).

So far, I have examined lexemes of *fear* from dictionaries. The next step is to check the parameters of *fear*, as has been revealed from the analysis of legal fiction. The analysis of the parameters of *fear* is represented by five slots—*quality*, *intensity*, *time marker*, *link*, and *anti-link* with a total number of 54 words and phrases. For a more rigorous analysis, the attention is drawn to each slot.

In Figure 9b, the slot *link* includes examples of close proximity of *fear* to other words. It is called *link* because its examples have been chosen on the basis of the criterion that every case has either conjunctions (*and*, *or*) that can connect other words with *fear*, or the punctuation mark that indicates a pause between parts—that is, comma (sometimes both conjunctions and punctuation marks are present). It should be mentioned that the evidence from the corpus brings to light one example, in which *fear* is linked to the word *terror*: *What was he feeling now but a **fear close to terror**?* (4:60). As can be seen in Figure 9b, the slot *link* comprises more examples than any other slot. The words and/or phrases vary from words denoting emotions, as “guilt,” “shame,” and “anger;” other words that relate to the intensity of *fear*, as “weakness” or “terror;” and also “surge” and “self-importance;” as shown in the following examples:

(1) *In her carriage and all else she looks as she looked downstairs two hours ago. **Is it fear or is it anger now?** He cannot be sure. **Both might be as pale, both as intent.*** (1:91)

(2) *Horror, shock, disgust, astonishment, regret; those were the emotions common enough after the murder of a colleague. But grief? Who would feel genuine pain for the death of Venetia Aldridge? What was he feeling now but a **fear close to terror**?* (4:60)

(3) *When the news did break, the response would be as varied as it always was: **fear, pity, fascinated interest, self-importance**; a **surge** of heightened energy at being alive; the **pleasure** of sharing the news at work, among friends; the **half-shameful excitement** of blood spilt which was not one’s own.* (4:63)

As seen from the examples above, *fear* tends to co-occur with other notions, mainly of the same negative type, but also of a positive one, such as “fascinated interest” and “self-importance;” especially illustrated by the list of emotions in the

third example. However, examples, such as (3), are relatively rare. Although the parameter *link* is the most frequent among other parameters, it is not distributed in all word classes but is mainly shown by nouns, once by a verb “(to) expect,” and never by adjectives or adverbs. As for the correlation between the source domains and the parameter *link*, the analysis shows that *fear* conceptualizes differently with different words, as is represented in Figure 9a. The parameter that determines the connection between *fear* and other words has been traced in 23 examples out of a total of 106. The most frequent correlations between *link* have been traced with the specific source domain “an entity located in the eyes.” Source domains “an object” and “a possession,” and various sources that indicate bodily changes (facial expression, etc.) also show correlations with the parameter *link*. There are several examples of “link” with *fear* as “an effect,” indicating that somebody and/or something causes emotional responses.

In contrast to the parameter *link*, *anti-link* provides only two examples with the words “affection” and “astonishment,” which are contrasted through the grammatical marker *but* or a diminisher *rather than*:

(4) *But they never would meet again, and what she was feeling now was **not affection but fear and shame**.* (4:44)

(5) *He seized the dagger, rushed at her and struck. It must, I think, have been an amazement to him that he was capable of the deed, that the dagger went in so cleanly, so easily, that he had actually killed a human being. **Astonishment rather than horror or fear** would have been **the first emotion**.* (4:77)

The parameter that has been coded <anti-link> refers to those cases wherein *fear* is contrasted with other notions. Clearly, contraposition is not recurrent with

*fear*: instead the words are coordinated to *fear*. Besides, the analysis makes clear that the parameters of *quality* and *link* can be used together:

(6) *Gentlemen of the green-baize road who could discourse from personal experience of foreign galleys and home treadmills; spies of strong governments that eternally **quake with weakness and miserable fear**, broken traitors, cowards, bullies, gamesters, shufflers, swindlers, and false witnesses; some not unmarked by the branding-iron beneath their dirty braid; all with more cruelty in them than was in Nero, and more crime than is in Newgate.* (1:17)

(7) *There are some horrors, and the murder of a child is one, which probe our **deepest fears**, fears we hardly dare acknowledge in case a malignant fate senses the depths of our imagined horror and strikes triumphantly to make it real.* (4:67)

Another aspect revealed by Figure 9b is that the quality, understood as “a distinguishing characteristic” (CoED, 2015), of *fear* not only refers to negative evaluations, as “miserable,” or “worst;” and downward dimensions, as “deepest,” or “terrible,” but also as something “well-founded,” or “half-formulated,” both of which are context-dependent, as shown by the examples below:

(8) *"And I go into the business with you—very pleasant we are over it; and I confirm you in your **well-founded fears** that you will get yourself into a most precious line if you don't come out with that there will," said Mr. Bucket emphatically [...]* (1:202);

(9) *He needed time to think, needed, too, the physical release of walking while he tried to make sense of this muddle of anxiety, hope, guilt and **half-formulated fears**. If the offer to stay on were made, should he accept it?* (4:54)

As can be seen from the examples above, *fear* is evaluated differently. Example 8 represents an interesting case when *fear* is “well-founded,” which is contradictory to *fear* described as “miserable” in Example 6. As a rule, *fear* is “the emotion of pain or uneasiness” (OED, 2015), which makes people feel miserable.

However, different contexts of the experiences of this emotion show different points of view on fear. In Example 8, *fear* is justified to be “well-founded,” as it is “based on good evidence or reason” concerning business decision (OED, 2015) and not, for example, on an immediate fear as a response to something physically harmful or dangerous.

The fifth parameter of the emotional evaluation of *fear* is *time marker*. As stated in Chapter 3, section 2, the notion of *time* is rarely correlated with emotions. However, if turning to the discussion on the duration of *emotion* and *feeling*, one recalls that it is the time course that helps us establish differences between the notions. The evidence from the corpus suggests three examples of the correlation between *fear* and the parameter, which indicates the duration of the given emotion keyword. Two of these examples indicate *fear*, which is quick, and one example that showcases *fear* as linked to the long-term memory of something negative, which brings up the emotion of fear every time certain information is mentioned. The cases described above are explicated by certain lexical units in the following examples: *Then there came a **second** of fear* (4:72), *I felt a **momentary** fear* (4:69) and *I have **always feared** that I should tell it to you in vain* (1:199).

So far, the characteristics of *fear* that have been highlighted suggest that this emotion is a strong negative emotion and it generally correlates with negative notions. The degree adverbs or adjectives linked to *fear* (e.g. *great* or *strongly*) indicate that the intensity of this emotion keyword is increased rather than decreased, and its qualities indicate that *fear* has a sufficient impact on somebody or something. Some peculiarities in its conceptualization could be detected in the cross-domain mapping, which is discussed in the following section.

### 1.3 Analysis based on affinities between source domains of *fear*

#### 1.3.1 Quantitative and qualitative overview

The specifics in lexicalization and conceptualization of the keyword *fear* in legal fiction have been revealed through a qualitative metaphor analysis as presented in the preceding section. As some quantitative observations emerged during the analysis of *fear*, it will be helpful to address these before proceeding with the cross-domain mapping of *fear*.

The analysis shows 106 quotations with the emotion keyword *fear*, as illustrated in Table 4 below.

	Noun (a) fear	Verb (to) fear	Adjective fearful	Adjective feariocious	Adverb fearfully	Total
Time-frame 1	23	25	5	1	2	56
Time-frame 2	5	4	1	-	5	15
Time-frame 3	27	8	-	-	-	36
						106

**Table 4.** Word-class distribution of *fear*

Dickens's linguistic creativity resulted in many neologisms used in his works, including the word indicated in Table 4 above (*feariocious*). It is a unique occurrence of the word among the three time-frames used only in the following quotation:

(10) *Mrs. Piper lives in the court (which her husband is a cabinet-maker), and it has long been well beknown among the neighbours [...] as the plaintive—so Mrs. Piper insists on calling the deceased—was reported to have sold himself. Thinks it was the plaintive's air in which that report originatinin. See the plaintive often and considered as his air was feariocious and not to be allowed to go about some children being timid [...] Has seen the plaintive wexed and worried by the children [...]. On accounts of this and his dark looks has often dreamed as she see him take a pick-axe from his pocket and split Johnny's head [...] (1:4)*

The word *feariocious* coined by Dickens is not the only word of this type created by this prolific author, including coined names of such characters from *Bleak House* as Mrs. Jellyby, Mrs. Partiggle, or Mr. Turveydrop, to name but a few. Elements in the context of this long quotation above has led to the creation of a new word that delineate certain characteristics of a given character. The word *feariocious* is linked to the words *ferocity* and *ferocious*, with the latter meaning “fierce,” “savage,” or “cruel,” and “destructive” and referring to actions of animals or people (OED, 2015). As a blend of *fear* and *ferocious*, the adjective *feariocious* is used by Dickens to describe a man who terrifies somebody to the point that he seems savage. This is supported by the description of the character having “dark looks,” and actions, such as “waxed and worried by the children,” and the sentence “[...] as she see him take a pick-axe from his pocket and split Johnny’s head.”

As can be seen from the Table 4 above, the word class distribution shows a higher frequency of nominal and verbal expressions in contrast to adjectival ones. Each of 106 quotations has been manually coded in ATLAS.ti, which has resulted in a total of 37 codes, 27<sup>55</sup> of which represent different source domains, while 9 codes are related to the following segments:

1. Parameters of emotion evaluation of *fear*, including codes <quality>, <intensity>, <time marker>;
2. Parameters that relate to conceptual proximity of *fear*, including codes <link> and <anti-link>;

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<sup>55</sup> See Appendix 3 for a complete list of source domains.

3. One code that indicates the correlation of *fear* with other emotion words in a sentence, specifically when this other emotion word is used to describe *fear*—<special case: emotion describes emotion>;

4. One code that indicates the correlation of *fear* with lexemes denoting the *feeling* of emotion—<special case: feeling emotion>;

5. Two codes that indicate two types of the force-dynamic relations of *fear* as physical agitation, when *fear* as “a force” impacts bodily changes—<force dynamics Type 1: Agonist = body>; and when *fear* as a cause of “a force” impacts the self/the person—<force dynamics Type 2: Agonist = self>. The analysis of *fear* also shows one additional parameter—*measure*—which is represented with one example. This parameter has been coded <measure>.

These nine codes make up a constant part of the qualitative metaphor analysis. The first and the second segments have been discussed earlier (see Figure 9b). The rest of the segments are examined further in this section.

	Time-frame 1	Time-frame 2	Time-frame 3
AN EFFECT ON ACTION	22	4	7
AN EFFECT ON A STATE LINKED TO SOMEBODY	20	2	8
POSSESSION	12	1	6
AN EFFECT ON A STATE LINKED TO SOMETHING	5	3	6
AN ENTITY THAT CHARACTERISES SOMETHING	6	1	1

**Table 5.** Distribution of the most frequent source domains of *fear* in all time-frames

As follows from the table above, there is an overlap of the source domains that represent “effects.” They prevail in all time frames, separately and in combination. There are no salient differences between the three time-frames in the way *fear* is conceptualized, except for the three unique context-based conceptualizations:

(11) *Elinor Carlisle had reason to fear that she might be disinherited in favour of an outsider. The letter has warned her – her aunt’s broken murmurings confirm that fear.* (3:8)

(12) *The woman’s hands were shaking, her eyes looked into Kate’s with a mixture of fear and appeal which was all too familiar.* (4:57)

(9)<sup>56</sup> *He needed time to think, needed, too, the physical release of walking while he tried to make sense of this muddle of anxiety, hope, guilt and half-formulated fears. If the offer to stay on were made, should he accept it?* (4:54)

One of these conceptualizations has been traced in the second time-frame—“an entity pending confirmation,” and two others are from the third time-frame and refer to the same thing—an ingredient or component, as “a component in a mixture” and “a component in a muddle.”

*Fear* is the emotion keyword that has been used to test the coding and proceedings. The procedure is applied to other emotion keywords in the same way. A two-tier strategy is employed for coding metaphors, which has resulted in two types of source domains: traditional *single source domain* and *multiple source domain*. The statistical survey shows a slight overlap of the single source domains: 58 single and 48 multiple source domains. Such kind of almost balanced distribution accounts for a relatively complex conceptual structure of *fear* with the solid source domains. As a rule, these source domains need no further clarification. This is partly explained by the dependency between the source domain and that which the word class *fear* represents. As for the distribution of single sources among word classes, it shows predominance among nouns. For example, the corpus reveals the most frequent source domains for nouns—“a possession” and “an object”—which represent things without any additional information, whereas it is not the case with verbs. Here,

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<sup>56</sup> This example represents different conceptualizations, and it has already been used on p. 193 but in different context.

*fear*—as represented by verbs—usually has two sources as a pattern, which indicates the object of *fear* and something fearful about the actions of this object. There are some important points to note concerning the source domains that are being discussed—“an effect on a state linked to somebody” and “an effect on a state linked to something.” These source domains are rather complex. In relation to *fear*, the source “an effect on a state linked to somebody” indicates that somebody fears that somebody else can be dangerous or do harm. This harm and/or danger can be both physical, when somebody is afraid or scared of physical injuries, but the harm and/or danger can also be of a mental character. The latter suggests, for example, that somebody can be afraid that somebody else would think something negative, or consider something negative, judge negatively, etc.<sup>57</sup> Hence, in the following example there is a character—Mr. Turveydrop—and an action that he might take—that is, *(to) consider*—which worries or scares another character:<sup>58</sup>

(13) *He feared old Mr. Turveydrop might consider it undutiful and might receive too great a shock.* (1:14)

As can be seen from Example 13, the verb *(to) fear* does not refer to what is generally perceived as “physical” fear that threatens or frightens people. The evidence from the corpus provides examples, when *fear* is described as something that threatens people or something that makes them scared. Because *fear* has a modal value in the discussed example, the verb *(to) consider* is used in the sentence as a possibility or as “thinking about a possibility or making a decision” (CED, 2015). As

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<sup>57</sup> See Figure 10, p. 209

<sup>58</sup> For the complete results of a full conceptual mapping in a qualitative metaphor analysis, the reader is referred to Appendix 4. Not only do I provide full mapping of each emotion word separately, this appendix also includes all quotations with all codes assigned during coding with ATLAS.ti.

can be seen, the verb (*to*) *consider* does not denote physical process of doing something but is referred to the mental activity of “thinking carefully” or “pondering” over something (CoED, 2015).

### 1.3.2 Metaphorical patterns of *fear*

Kövecses claims that “fear appears to be characterized by both very general emotion metaphors, such as FLUID IN A CONTAINER, OPPONENT, BURDEN, and very specific metaphors [such as] HIDDEN ENEMY and SUPERNATURAL BEING” (2004: 23). Indeed, the analysis brings to light the traditional conceptualization of *fear* in the corpus as “a container” and in greater number, the conceptualization as “a possession.” However, there are also less anticipated source domains, such as “a component in a muddle” and “a living creature.” These metaphors are illustrated in the following examples:

(9)<sup>59</sup> *He needed time to think, needed, too, the physical release of walking while he tried to make sense of this muddle of anxiety, hope, guilt and half-formulated fears. If the offer to stay on were made, should he accept it?* (4:54)

(15) *Her fears had deceived her.* (2:12)

As a variation, the corpus also includes expressions that illustrate *fear* as a component of mixed emotions, as can be seen from the following example:

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<sup>59</sup> This example represents different conceptualizations and it has already been used on p. 193 and p. 198 but in different contexts.

(16) *She was aware of **her own quickened breathing, of a mixture of fear and excitement**, and something else which was as exhilarating as it was shameful.* (4:51)

Examples 9 and 16 reflect the physiological effect of *fear*. As Kövecses points out, “The physiological aspect of the concept [of fear] is greatly elaborated in language,” including changes in body temperature or increasing heartbeat (2004: 24). If, in Example 9, the general movement of the body is represented as influenced by the emotional state, Example 16 specifically describes the effect of *fear* on breathing. Effects on internal organs (heart) and the system of blood circulation have been found in the corpus and are delineated in the following example:

(17) *Octavia gazed down at it while he waited for her response, and then she **shivered** and **caught her breath** as if the air had become icy cold. Her **veins** and **muscles tightened with fear**, and she could **hear the thud of her heart**.* (4:52)

In the abovementioned example, the highlighted words and phrases reflect the conceptualizations of *fear* as “an effect on body movement,” “an effect on breathing,” “an effect on blood circulation,” “an effect on muscles,” and “an effect on heart beating.” Indeed, the evidence from the corpus shows the conceptualizations of *fear* mentioned above, but rarely can they be observed as occurring together. Fehr and Russel best describe *fear* relating to such a number of events happening at one time (1984: 482):

*A dangerous situation occurs suddenly. You are startled, and you scream. You try to focus all your attention on the danger, try to figure a way out, but you feel your heart pounding and your limbs trembling. Thoughts race through your mind. Your palms feel cold and wet. There are butterflies in your stomach. You turn and flee.*

The physiological element involved in the conceptualization of emotions is the topic of the embodied cognition thesis.<sup>60</sup> Evans summarizes the essence of this thesis by stating the following (2012):

*The subthesis of embodied experience maintains that due to the nature of our bodies, including our neuroanatomical architecture, we have a species-specific view of the world.*

The human nervous system is an integral system that interconnects perceptibility, motor activity, and the work of different systems of the human body, including the system of internal organs. In the corpus, the conceptualization of *fear* can be roughly divided into two groups: First, influence on the face (lips and eyes), and actions of breathing and seeing; secondly, influence on the whole body, often exemplified via kinaesthetic experiences of shaking hands and head; or bodily movement, as tapping on the arm, nodding, or running. The following examples show how *fear* is applied in this group as a metaphor:

(18) *"Ah, but I don't know," replies Jo, **shaking his head fearfully***  
(1:43)

(19) *And when I had turned, **I was in such fear** of the coach coming up behind me [...] **that I ran** the greater part of the way to avoid being overtaken.* (1:33)

(20) *Such crowding reflections, **increasing the distress and fear** I always felt when the name was mentioned, **made me so agitated that I could scarcely hold my place at the table.*** (1:89)

As can be clearly seen in the abovementioned examples, *fear* is perceived as “a force” or “an effect” on the body (or even more strongly—an *affect*). Interestingly,

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<sup>60</sup> See previous discussion in Chapter 1, Section 2.2.

strong negative emotions, such as fear or anger, can also be conceptualized as “a weapon” that can be triggered, and “be directed against some target,” and even against oneself (Beger & Flensburg, 2009: 94). The conceptualizations of *fear* or other emotion keywords that have been examined over the last ten to fifteen years by cognitive linguistics’ researchers have been largely based on observations of certain examples and interpretation of the data found in corpora. This in turn has enriched the general knowledge about the conceptualization of emotions in language over time. For example, Beger and Flensburg have supported their research into the emotions of anger, love, and sadness with evidence from the corpus they compiled. Their corpus includes English psychology guides that comprise information on counselling (in relation to emotional problems) and take into account the preconceptions both experts and laypersons have about anger, love, and sadness. Beger and Flensburg state that the emotion of anger is closely associated with the emotion of fear because it seems that anger covers or hides “real problems,” which are often fear, frustration, or sadness (Beger & Flensburg, 2009: 94). The researchers report that in many cases *anger* is perceived as “a weapon,” and what is interesting is that anger has some positive meaning in this context. This means that a person is capable of controlling anger because a weapon is something that people can control (*ibid.*).

Context-based examples are important in the study of emotion metaphors because these examples offer unique cases of the ways emotions conceptualize in language. Legal fiction as a corpus does not provide the exact cases of *fear* as closely related emotion keyword to anger as “a weapon” to be used, for example, when fighting fear. Instead the analysis shows that the most frequent source domains of

*fear* indicate “effects” influencing somebody or something and engaging action. These have the following source domains: “an effect on a state linked to something/somebody,” “an effect coming from somebody/something,” and “an effect on action.” In cases when *fear* is a response to the stimuli, the source domains “an effect on a state linked to somebody” and “an effect on a state linked to something” are applied. The sources that denote “effects” coming from somebody or something are applied in those cases, when *fear* makes or forces somebody to do something, makes somebody fear somebody else (Example 21), and also when *fear* is a threat to somebody or something, as is shown in the examples below:

(21) *My master will be against it, and he'll be beat, and see me beat, and made to fear his home, and perhaps to stray wild.* (1:11)

(22) *We're on the same side. These pompous men don't frighten us. You've nothing to fear from me.* (4:8)

Through these patterns *fear* is understood as a response to something that threatens or scares people. More likely, *fear* is something dangerous when it influences our body as “an attacker,” “pain,” (Examples 23 and 24), or “illness,” which are shown in the following examples from the corpus:

(23) *Fear was like a pain. It swept over her, receded into a few minutes of blessed peace, then returned stronger and more terrible than before.* (4:75)

(24) *She was sick with fear of him.* (4:45)

Returning to the sources as “effects,” the analysis shows that *fear* is taken into account when a person thinks about further action or actions of others. According to Horwitz and Wakefield, bodily changes serve “to prepare the individual for quick and vigorous action to elude the danger,” which is accompanied by “the mind’s

attention on the perceived danger” (2012: 20). This influence of emotion on action/inaction is what psychologists call *awareness of action readiness* (Frijda, 1986).<sup>61</sup> This notion, developed by Frijda, states that this awareness is “awareness of its sense” and is not necessarily awareness of “momentary state only” (1986: 239). This means that the readiness for action/inaction can be long anticipated or thought of, and, at the same time, under certain circumstances, this “action readiness” can be momentary. Considering this, the author emphasizes that: “The future is evidently present in the sense of readiness itself, and in the anticipations, uncertainties, thwartings, incompletenesses that constitute major readiness modes and their monitoring” (*id.*). Examples of such “awareness” have been traced in the corpus. They represent actions under the influence of emotions (Examples 25 and 26) and probability of actions (Example 27):

(25) *"I fear I surprised you, mademoiselle, on the day of the storm?" she said with a parting curtsy. (1:487)*

(26) *His emotions were, he feared, clouding his judgement a little. (2:10)*

(27) *What was AD trying to do? Spare her embarrassment? Was it as simple as that? Or had he feared to reactivate a memory, which he knew was painful, and by reactivating it, load it with additional trauma. (4:76)*

As can be seen in the examples above, the use of *fear* is not associated with physical responses. Instead, the word *fear* is used to convey the meaning of “being sorry” for something or “to lessen the effect of an unpleasant situation” (CoED, 2015). A total of 22 examples of *fear* as a type of phatic marker have been extracted from the corpus. Although no physical sensation is described in such cases, the

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<sup>61</sup> See previous discussion in chapter 1, section 1.1.3.

negative characteristics linked to *fear* exist because the use of *fear* in these sentences refers to giving someone “news of something *bad* that has happened or might happen” (CED, 2015).

In addition to the polite way of introducing negative information with the phrase *I fear* in Example 25, two words that denote emotions are used to express the emotional experiences of fear and surprise. I call such cases “special cases” and assign to them the code <special case: emotion describes emotion>. Although not frequently traced, five similar examples can potentially form metaphor patterns of this kind that will be interesting to examine. These examples point out infrequent though salient conceptualizations. In two out of five cases, the word *fear* is used with the word *jealous*—as characterizing *fear*—which is shown in the example below:

(28) *I have discovered," whispering mysteriously, "that her natural cruelty is sharpened by a jealous fear of their regaining their liberty. (1:3)*

Example 28 shows that the state of being cruel has been transformed by *fear* to some extent to a more distinct cruelty. In addition to that, *fear* is also evaluated as “jealous.” As a variation, the code <special case: feeling emotion> has been assigned to examples, when emotion is experienced as a state—i.e. when there are lexemes *(to) feel*, *(a) feeling*. The analysis shows six examples of this kind, in which *fear* is felt, as has been illustrated at the beginning of this section, in Example 2 (*What was he **feeling** now but a **fear** close to terror? [4:60]*) and Example 4 (*But they never would meet again, and what **she was feeling** now was not affection but **fear** and **shame**. [4:44]*).

If “special cases” of *fear* show less frequency, examples pertaining to *fear* as “an effect” that is linked to something or somebody, as well as “an effect” on action that someone intends to do or thinks that he/she or another person will do, show predominance. Here, the combination of two sources prevail: “an effect on a state linked to somebody/something” + “an effect on action,” which is represented in a series of similar examples, as the one below:

(29) *Seeming to fear that she had been too gloomy, and seeming also to lose the connexion in her mind, she said politely as she sipped her glass of wine, "Yes, my dear, as I was saying, I expect a judgment shortly. (1:28)*

In relation to this, it is important to draw attention to the source domain as “an entity that characterises something” as related to the same type of linguistic information—i.e. something influenced by *fear*. Only in the case of *fear* as “an entity,” does “something” state the characteristics “fearful” or “fearfully,” as is shown in the following examples:


(30) *His passion was fearful. I could not have believed in such rage without seeing it. (1:8)*

(31) *She has a fearfully tough conscience – she may stick it out yet.’ (2:4)*

As a variation, the analysis shows one example, when *fear* is attributed some property, instead of the reverse, which is rare:

(32) *Has it ever occurred to you that a woman, when she is powerful, is more powerful than a man?’ ‘Powerful in a different way, perhaps.’ Laud said: ‘It’s a power partly based on fear. Perhaps the fear is atavistic, memories of babyhood. Women change the nappy, give the breast or withhold it.’ (4:37/1)*

According to the evidence from the corpus, source domains representing mental actions and non-material objects—i.e. relating to mental activity—are rather developed, especially when “something” is characterized as *fearful*, etc., and also when *fear* is mentioned when talking about “something.” In contrast, Figure 10 below displays an unstable distribution of examples of the source domains “an effect on a state linked to something” and “an entity that characterises something:” there are fewer examples in each that represent material objects. The lack of description of something material but instead describing something non-material can be explained by the following: Apart from bodily changes that fear “brings,” this emotion is also “deep-seated” in our brain, as people can fear all the things they can think of, if these things threaten them, or even if people *think* that they threaten them. Besides, it is generally assumed that fear has an object (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2012: 20): people fear different things.



**Figure 10.** Distribution of the conceptualizations “effects” and “entity” of *fear*

One could also add that there are typical patterns in the way people “feed” fears. To put it another way, when coping with fear, psychologists often give advice on how to recognize what makes a person be afraid. Thus, to take control over worst-case scenarios and colorful visualizations of fear, one needs to make an effort to stop it gaining control over mind. On this account, “popular wisdom” suggests one proverb that perfectly relates to the point: The Devil is not so black as he is painted.

The experience of coping with fear is directly correlated to the notion of *emotional intelligence* (EI). The main theoretical framework devoted to this notion concerns the idea that our response to emotions is determined by emotions as “motivational states” (Frijda, 1988: 351), and that the “quality” of our response is determined by the level of emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990a). There

are several rather similar definitions of EI. However, it was not until 1990 that major models of EI were proposed by the American psychologists Salovey and Mayer. They define EI as “[...] the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (2004: 5).

The evidence from the corpus does not reveal source domains that would account for successful coping with fear. There is one example of the source “counterforce,” reproduced below, but even in this example, there is a certain deliberate “willingness” to contain this emotion:

(33) *She was **holding herself** with a **controlled stillness**, **willing herself to contain the fear** and distress which momentarily he saw in her eyes. (4:26)*

The last example pertains to the notion of *force dynamics*. As has already been explained, one of my aims is to examine the dynamic of *fear* as “a force” that influences the body (code <force dynamics Type 1: Agonist = body>) and “a force” that influences the self, without any bodily changes (code <force dynamics Type 1: Agonist = self>). The analysis shows 66 examples of force dynamic of both types among 106 quotations. There is an overlap of Type 2 with 52 examples, whereas Type 1 is represented by 14 examples. I have already exemplified some of them in this section (see Examples 12, 17, 33).

In Example 33 above, Type 1 of physical agitation is observed, which represents one of the strongest cases of the dynamic of force for *fear*. It is generally assumed that the conceptualization of *fear* includes an elaborated physiological aspect (Kövecses, 2004: 23-24). This means that the description of situations with

*fear*, or people's reaction to fear, is anticipated to have the force-dynamic of Type 1. Quite interestingly, the evidence from the analysis proves otherwise—physiological agitation is less frequent than mental agitation. This means that not only bodily changes are “forced” by *fear* but even more, the dynamic of *fear* is understood as the dynamic of “forces” that cause emotion. The causes of emotional response come from three sources: Somebody causes fear, something causes fear, and somebody's action causes fear. All these sources and their variations are illustrated in Figure 10 (p. 209) in the slot *an effect*.

From this analysis, it can be seen that *fear* has numerous conceptualizations—both with traditional source domains, such as “a possession” and “a container,” and unique ones, such as “a component in a muddle.” The conceptualization of *fear* as “an effect” is linguistically realized via the description of a response to somebody or something, which is both probable and immediate. I came across numerous cases referring to *fear* as “an effect” as linked to the object and the actions of the object. When conceptualized as “a force,” *fear* is revealed as affecting the whole body. Nevertheless, the prevalence of the source domains that indicate the correlation of *fear* with actions and mental processes (*to think, to consider*) has resulted in predominance of the force-dynamic type of *fear*, when a person (self) experiences the emotional disturbance caused by *fear* but without bodily changes.

## 2. LAW AND PUNISHMENT: GUILT

### 2.1 Law and punishment: Guilt

In the same fashion as the emotion of *fear*, the emotion of guilt is important in psychology and plays a fundamental role in our life. Fear and guilt can be connected with each other via, for example, the association that fear of not living up to expectations may lead to guilt. Plutchik (1991) explains that in the case of expectation or anticipation “guilt is a result of anticipated pleasure being fused or mixed with anticipated fear” (1991: 162).

Various psychological dictionaries show that the emotion word *guilt* has close conceptual proximity to *shame*, *innocence*, and *suffering*. For example, as part of Freud’s psychoanalysis, guilt is linked with remorse and “uncommitted aggression,” which explains why people feel guilty when they think they have done something wrong or sinful (Freud, 1929).

The definitions of *guilt*, as provided by several dictionaries, are consistent. The Collins English Dictionary defines *guilt* as “the fact or a state of having done wrong or committed an offence” (CoED, 2015). This definition implies that guilt is attached to some wrong deed or action. However, such definition is not complete. That is why, to account for the complexity of this emotion, dictionaries include further entries for *guilt*: the state of “responsibility” (OED, 2015), “worry,” or “unhappiness” because “you have done something wrong, such as causing harm to another person” (CoED, 2015). Cognitively assessed, guilt is one of a few emotions that has a direct influence on cultural mentality and is connected with national

identity (Scherer & Wallbott, 1995). Thus, Japanese culture is more of a *shame culture*, when American and British (Judeo-Christian theism) are *guilt cultures*. Social relationships are fundamental in Japan, something that was stressed by Nakane (1970). The author examines the so-called “frames” (e.g. an institution) and “attributes” (e.g. a member of a certain group). In this regard, Benedict states that an individual is secondary to the group (2006: 273):

*'If you do this, if you do that,' their [children's] elders say, the world will laugh at you.' 'The rules are particularistic and situational [...]. They require subordinating one's own will to the ever-increasing duties to neighbours, to family and to country.*

Both notions of *guilt culture* and *shame culture* were applied by anthropologist Ruth Benedict when she studied Japanese and American cultures in contrast, which fuelled some criticism (e.g. LeVine, 2010). In the modern approach, researchers move away from contrasting cultural models of shame and guilt and the ways these models are embedded in Western cultural practices. For example, LeVine proposes to approach Japanese culture not as strictly a shame culture, but rather describing that “Japanese tend to be more aware of others than, for instance, those who have been socialized in the Judeo-Christian theistic tradition” (2010: 102).

Guilt as an emotion of self-assessment (Taylor, 1989) varies significantly in an intersubjective context (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994) due to the defence mechanisms against guilt, such as repression or self-harm. On the other hand, guilt has a strong collective bond, which is reflected in the culturally marked notion of *collective guilt* (Branscombe, 2004). One can add that guilt is tied to the religious concept of *sin* and often perceived in the context of morality. Plutchik supports this

claim by stating that “guilt is born of the interaction of pleasure and fear” and is connected to “forbidden joys” (1991: 161).

The emotion of guilt has a particular meaning in the system of justice, especially in criminal law. O’Hear observes that the features of broken law, relevant authority, and liability to punishment “are [...] present in the Judaeo-Christian ethic, in which law, authority and punishment are all prominent, and morality itself has a legalistic face” (1976: 73). Similarly, the Black’s Law Dictionary (1968) defines *guilt* and *guilty* as words that convey significance to the concepts of *committing a crime* and *punishment*. Thus, *guilt* is defined as “that quality which imparts criminality to a motive or act, and renders the person amenable to punishment by the law;” and *guilty* is understood as “having committed a crime or tort” (1968: 836). Quite interesting is the fact that the continuation of the entry *guilty* in such legal-oriented dictionary as the Black’s Law Dictionary includes such words as *evil* and *sin* to describe what *guilty* means: “responsible for a delinquency, crime, or sin, and the connotation of such word is ‘evil,’ ‘wrongdoing’” (*ibid.*).

As can be seen, guilt is perceived as a feeling that everyone can experience, a fact that has drawn the attention of psychologists. Besides, it plays one of the most central roles in the law/legal justice. Considering this, a closer look at the etymology of the word *guilt* is useful to establish an historical interpretation.

The etymological entries of the word *guilt* are distanced from what is generally thought of as *guilt* today—i.e. *(to) pay* and *(a) debt*. The Oxford English Dictionary states that there are no equivalent forms of *guilt* in other Germanic languages, other than the Old English *gylt* (OED, 2015). What is interesting here is that *guilt* has a connection with the Old Germanic root *\*deld, gald, guld-*, which means “to pay”


(*id.*). Also, the etymology of *guilt* may refer to the noun *debt*, but as stated in the dictionary, “there seems to be no real evidence.” Nevertheless, Old English *scyld* and German *schuld* “have developed the sense of ‘guilt’ from that of ‘debt’” (*id.*).

At first, the notions of *debt* and *payment* do not seem to have any relation with the emotion of guilt; however, examples showing a relation between the two are found in the legal context. A common practice of many legal systems implies that when someone has committed a crime, the accused after paying his/her debt to society, is discharged from his/her debt.


## **2.2 The semantic field of *guilt***

When looking at the entries of *guilt* and *guilty* in various dictionaries and thesauruses, one salient feature emerges: *guilt* or *guilty* are correlated to moral judgment. As can be seen from Figure 11a below, the analysis shows four groups of words semantically related to the noun *guilt* and the adjective *guilty*. The semantic groups for *guilt* include the following slots: *morality*, *wrongdoing*, *conscious responsibility*, and also the *consequences* of wrongdoing. In the same way, the adjective *guilty* applies to an individual who feels shameful or guilty as a result of wrongdoing. According to O’Hear, “A man is said to be guilty when he has broken some law or code by which he is bound, as a result of which he incurs a liability to punishment” (1976: 73). If *guilt* as a noun is defined to emphatically refer to all the wrong (criminal) actions that someone does consciously, then the adjective *guilty* is especially rich with examples of a person who deserves punishment. These examples are placed into the semantic group *deserve punishment* in Figure 11a (see below).

What is also noticeable is that when defining a person as *guilty*, dictionaries suggest a significant number of entries including shameful feelings that someone has when guilty, which is less frequent with the entries of the noun.



Figures 11a. The semantic field of *guilt*



Figures 11b. The extra-linguistic parameters of *guilt*

The noun *guilt* includes entries related to feelings, such as “worry” and “unhappiness” (CED, 2015); however, none of such have been found with the adjective *guilty*. This can be explained by the fact that the state of guilt is based on “current or recent transgressions” (Kugler & Jones, 1992: 319). Therefore, instead of *unhappy*, there are adjectives *ashamed*, *shamed*, and *guilt-ridden*. These examples point out that the emotion of guilt as “a burden,” expressed by the noun *guilt*, signifies the possibility of a prolonged guilt as a result of worrying. On the other hand, when someone feels guilty, the feeling might be connected with a shameful action that has taken place a little while back and makes person feel guilt-ridden.

The temporal aspect is connected with the essence of *guilt* as a heavy weight. Often, guilt is symbolized as a heavy weight, which can be exemplified by situations when guilt is a pressure on a person, when guilt feels heavy, as in *Guilt is a heavy burden*, *Guilt was lifted from his shoulders*, or *The weight of his guilt grew heavier*. In this context, O’Hear suggests that “Guilt itself is like a burden or a pollution which can be removed only by undergoing the appropriate punishment or by being forgiven by the appropriate authority” (1976: 73). Although dictionary entries do not explicitly provide the definitions of weight or heaviness in relation to *guilt*, the semantic group *deserve punishment* contains few terms implying that *guilt* is placed on somebody. The examples of this kind of guilt are numerous in various cultures, including *to put/lay a guilt trip on somebody*, *to send somebody on a guilt trip*, or *to lay a heavy trip on someone*.

What is specific about *guilt* in correlation with weight and burden is that it is often used with particular body parts—e.g. shoulders and chest. Common expressions, such as *to have a weight on the shoulders* and *to get something off one’s*

*chest* reflect these properties attached to *guilt*. Expressions like these are linked to the notion of *freedom*, as people want to be guilt-free. Moreover, not only people can have *guilt* as a weight on their shoulders, but they may also relocate the weight onto the shoulders of someone else, as in *to put the guilt on somebody else's shoulders*.

In addition to the moral weight induced by the emotion of *guilt*, the salient feature of this emotion—as represented in dictionaries—is the awareness of being guilty for committing something wrong. In this connection, the analysis shows such examples, as “wilfully committed crime/heinous moral offence,” or being “responsible for misdeed” (OED, 2015). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the interrelation of “the conscious mind” with the sense of guilt, as in the expression “to laden with guilt” or “haunted by the recollection of crime,” can be traced back to Shakespeare’s *Henry VI*:<sup>62</sup> “Suspition always haunts a guiltie mind” (OED, 2015). The correlation of *guilt* with mental processing has also been traced in the source data.

The emotion keyword of *guilt* is recurrent in court sequences in the source data more than any other emotion keyword. Consequently, the analysis brings to light examples of sequences when the jury (or other legal actors) have to make a decision (*to prove guilty, to find guilty*), or have to pronounce a verdict on whether the accused is guilty or not, such as in the following example:

(34) *It is not necessary for him, or her, to prove innocence; it is, in the modern slang phrase, “up to” the Crown to prove guilt, and unless you are quite satisfied that the Crown has done this beyond all reasonable doubt, it is your duty to return a verdict of “Not guilty.”* (2:166)

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<sup>62</sup> Part. 3, v, vi, p. 11.

Besides, the slot *quality* includes an example of subconscious *guilt*, as is shown below:

(35) *In her more analytical moments she wondered whether **she might not be harbouring a subconscious guilt which** after a victory, and particularly a victory against the odds, **transferred itself into resentment** of the client. (4:32)*

It is noticeable that Figure 11b has only one example of the parameter *intensity*. As a rule, the parameter *anti-link* is scantily represented among all emotion keywords, but usually, it is not the case with the parameter that measures intensity. The absence can be explained by the strong cognitive nature of this emotion. The dictionary entries consulted also relate to the notion of *sense of responsibility* linked to *guilt*. The same relation has been established in the corpus. Quotations that include examples of bodily changes under the influence of *guilt* as “a force” with which people struggle or cope are scant in the corpus. Only one example describes the dynamic of intensity of *guilt* as “overwhelming,” which contrasts with the emotion keyword of *fear* examined earlier:

(36) *He was taking her somewhere private, somewhere special, somewhere only he knew about where they could be together, away from Mrs Buckley’s accusing, worried eyes, away from that basement flat which had never really been hers, had always been grudged, away from death and murder and inquests, insincere condolences and **her own overwhelming sense of guilt**, the feeling that everything, including her mother’s murder, was her fault and always had been. (4:377)*

Interestingly, it is generally accepted that *guilt* is a (heavy) burden, but there is no indication of the intensity of weight, only of the power of *guilt* as

“overwhelming.” It can be partially explained by the presupposition of *guilt* being heavy; there is no such thing as “light guilt.”

As is generally acknowledged, temporality is important for the conceptualization of *guilt*: it can be both a fleeting moment of *guilt* often accompanied by shame; or people can experience the state of so-called “trait guilt,” which is “a continuing sense of guilt beyond immediate circumstances” (Kugler & Jones, 1992: 319). The term *trait* refers to the trait theory in psychology, which has as its main focus the investigation of human personality. The traits of people shape their behavior and emotional states. One of the main tasks of trait theory is to measure these trait personalities,<sup>63</sup> which can be roughly divided into dimensional extraversion vs. introversion. For example, one person is shy by nature, whereas the other is outgoing. Within the frames of trait theory, the emotion of guilt can be defined “in terms of an individual’s guilt threshold or his or her generalized expectancy of self-mediated punishment for violating or anticipating the violation of internalized standards of proper behaviour or codes of conduct” (Izard, 1991: 388). The expression of the possibility of this kind of guilt has been traced in the corpus, including Example 39 below, when *guilt* is long-lasting and also when *guilt* is quick, as is demonstrated in Examples 37 and 38:

(37) *Naughton looked for a moment as guilty as if he had been accused of the murder.* (4:352)

(38) *Lacking a paper-knife, Dalgliesh insinuated his thumb under the flap and felt an irrational second of mixed guilt and irritation as the paper split into a jagged edge.* (4:374)

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<sup>63</sup> There are several tests in the form of self-questionnaires that measure personality traits. Two of the most popular tests (factor analyses) are Big Five Personality Trait and Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. The first one suggests five factors to identify personality, whereas the second one insists on three factors.

(39) *‘My turn to continue this interesting fabrication. So let us suppose that all the suppressed emotions of an essentially private man come together. **Long years of guilt**, disgust with himself, anger that this woman whose family have already harmed him so irrevocably should be planning more destruction. (4:247)<sup>64</sup>*

It is common for guilt to correlate with an equally important emotion of the same type—shame. When structuring the conceptual metaphor of *shame* as “a burden,” Kövecses exemplifies it using the word *guilt*, as in “Guilt was weighing him down” (2004: 32). Tangney and Dearing describe these two emotions as follows (2003: 2):

*Shame and guilt are rich human emotions that serve important functions at both the individual and relationship levels. On the one hand, as moral emotions, shame and guilt are among our most private, intimate experiences. In the face of transgression or error, the self turns toward the self—evaluating and rendering judgment. [...] On the other hand, shame and guilt are inextricably linked to the self in relationship with others.*

The observation of the source data brings to light cases with *shame* in the group of evaluation on the parameter *link*. As with the examination of *fear* in the previous section, the parameter *link* shows more examples with *guilt* than any other parameter. Returning to Figure 11b, most of these examples have direct negative connotations, including the emotions of disgust, anger, or shame, or negative emotional states of anxiety and resentment. Some of them are illustrated below:

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<sup>64</sup> Detective Adam Dalgleish and a member of Chambers, Desmond Ulrick, suggest their versions of a murder of the main character, criminal lawyer, Venetia Aldridge in her chambers. This quotation represents the emotional description of a potential killer and possible motives to commit a murder.

(9)<sup>65</sup> *He needed time to think, needed, too, the physical release of walking while he tried to make sense of this **muddle of anxiety, hope, guilt and half-formulated fears**. If the offer to stay on were made, should he accept it?* (4:54)

As follows from the example above, apart from negative connotations, *guilt* is also associated with a positive feeling represented by the word *hope*. In the following two examples (40 and 41), the positive notion of *innocence* co-occurs with *guilt*:

(40) *Dear, dear, to think how much time we passed alone together afterwards, and how often I repeated to the doll the story of my birthday and confided to her that I would try as hard as ever I could to repair the **fault** I had been born with (**of which I confessedly felt guilty and yet innocent**) [...]* (1:682)

The notions of *guilt* and *innocence* pertain to moral dilemmas and retributive justice. In the following example, the relation of *guilt* is saliently opposed to *innocence*, which is slightly different from what is illustrated by Example 40 above:

(41) *Taking hopeless cases to court wastes time and money.’  
‘So sometimes the police can be sure that they’ve got the right man and still aren’t able to take him to court?’  
‘That happens quite often. It’s frustrating when it does. But it’s not for the police, it’s for the court to **decide guilt or innocence.**’*  
(4:380)

Examples 40 and 41 above illustrate different values of the keyword considered—the legal context in Example 41 and absence of such in Example 40—but nonetheless, there is a basic meaning common to both uses. In Example 40, the conjunction *and* coordinates two predicative relations (*I felt guilty* and *I felt*

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<sup>65</sup> This example represents different conceptualizations and it has already been used on p. 193, p. 198, and p. 200 but in different contexts.

*innocent*), but the second predicative relation is modified by the adverb *yet*. In example 41, the conjunction *or* coordinates two nouns.

The notions of *guilt* and *innocence* are significant to legal philosophy, and they are linked to legal term *presumption of innocence*, meaning “conclusion drawn by law in favor of one brought to trial on criminal charge, requiring acquittal unless guilt is established by sufficient evidence” (*The Black’s Law Dictionary*, 1968: 1350). This phrase is recognized universally in legal context, and interestingly, it also implies some negative connotations in relation to the topic of human rights. As an example, the authors of the book *Presumption of Guilt* (2014), Schönteich *et al.*, raise the issue of “excessive use of pretrial detention,” which differs from the cases when a person is found guilty, convicted by a court, and sentenced to prison (2014: 95):

*Because of the presumption of innocence, the law views prisoners awaiting trial (or awaiting the outcome of a trial) differently from those found guilty. The presumption of innocence is universal, and to treat a detainee as anything other than presumed-innocent is to violate international human rights norms.*

The problem of the innocent client, a pre-trial detention (especially in time-frame 3) and personal emotional experiences has been found in the source data, which is represented by the examples similar to the following one:

(42) *There’s no triumph in **defending the innocent**. **She doesn’t love her daughter, that’s her guilt**. How do you think she’ll feel if Octavia gets engaged to someone her mother believes is a killer, someone she defended? (4:360)*

One of the advantages of the parameter *link* is that it reveals more context-based evidence about the emotion keyword. Consider the example below:

(43) *But I can't think of Emily's death without guilt and agony. I can't live with that imagined horror, with that pain, for the rest of my life. Forgive me. (4:125)*

It is interesting to note that *guilt* co-occurs once with the word *agony* as “an extreme physical or mental suffering” (CED, 2015). In Example 43, mental suffering is understood as a process involving thinking and imagining, whereas in Example 44, the state of being guilty is intensified by the state of being furtive, meaning “behaving secretly and often dishonestly” (CED, 2015). Such behavior—as doing something wrong “with the hope of escaping observation” (OED, 2015)—presupposes the experience of guilt to some extent:

(44) *After what appeared to be an hour, but was actually about seven minutes, Miss Climpson, guilty and furtive, was holding the flap of the envelope before the scalding steam. (2:173)*

The state of being guilty as a result of wrongdoing is also vividly represented in the corpus—even if this wrongdoing needs to be proved in the court trial—which is discussed in the following section.

## 2.3 Analysis based on affinities between source domains of *guilt*

### 2.3.1 Quantitative and qualitative overview

The analysis shows 84 quotations with the emotion keyword of *guilt*, as illustrated in Table 6 below.

	Noun	Adjective	Total
	<i>guilt</i>	<i>guilty</i>	
Time-frame 1	11	4	15
Time-frame 2	1	28	29
Time-frame 3	17	23	40
			84

**Table 6.** Word-class distribution of *guilt*

From the statistical survey, it follows that the linguistic expression of the emotion of guilt is, for the most part, expressed by the adjective *guilty*, especially in the second and the third time-frames. There is only one occurrence of *guilt* as a noun in comparison to 28 examples of *guilt* as an adjective in time-frame 2.

The coding has resulted in a total number of 27 codes, 8 of which are constant codes and 19 are codes that represent the source domains. The analysis shows an overlap of some source domains, as was the case with the emotion keyword *fear*. The prevalent conceptualizations are represented in Table 7 below.

	Time-frame 1	Time-frame 2	Time-frame 3
AN EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE	3	16	14
AN EFFECT ON A STATE LINKED TO SOMETHING	4	6	7
AN ENTITY THAT CHARACTERISES SOMETHING	4	3	8
AN EFFECT ON ACTION	4	3	3
POSSESSION	2	1	6

**Table 7.** Distribution of the most frequent source domains of *guilt* in all time-frames

The findings from the cross-domain mapping of *guilt* show predominance of one of the most basic source domains for any emotion—“an existence of emotion is presence here.” Although it is not represented in the first time-frame, the second and third time-frames display more cases of this conceptualization than any other conceptualization. It should be mentioned that the evidence from the corpus does not reveal the source domains of *guilt* that are unique. Most conceptualizations remain traditional, as one that has been mentioned earlier. In addition, the single source domains mapping overlaps multiple source domains with 60 against 24 examples. This may indicate that the experience of *guilt* is simply an experience, as in *I feel guilty* or a state, as in *She is guilty*. No additional information is mapped in this kind of examples, which is reflected in the predominant conceptualization from Table 7. Nonetheless, the analysis highlights three interesting examples that represent conceptualizations of *guilt* as “a component in a muddle,” “an entity to be proved,” and “a possession located beyond doubt.” The latter source domain would probably refer to the notion of *reasonable doubt*, which seems simple but needs specification. It is explained by the Black’s Law Dictionary as follows (1968: 579):

*[Reasonable doubt is] that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.*

As for the distribution of single source domains among word classes, it shows prevalence among both nouns and adjectives. Besides, the expected patterns among nouns have been traced including the sources “a possession,” “an object,” or “an entity that characterises something.” Almost all these patterns are represented by single source domains. The same prevalence of single source domains over multiple

ones has been identified with *guilt* represented by adjectives. No significant predominance has been detected among multiple sources, apart from the following three combinations that show stability: “an existence of emotion is presence here” + “an effect on action,” “an existence of emotion is presence here” + “an effect on a state linked to something,” and “an effect on a state linked to somebody” + “an effect on action.” The emotion keyword of *guilt* reveals interesting twists on the traditional conceptualizations, which are discussed in the following section.

### **2.3.2 Metaphorical patterns of *guilt***

In the previous section, it has been established that most examples of *guilt* conceptualized as “an existence of emotion is presence here.” The evidence from the corpus shows a majority of cases of feeling guilty in the context of court trials, decisions that the jury has to make about the defendant, or opinions about whether the person is guilty (of murder) or not. For example, if *fear* has such conceptualizations, it means that the person is simply feeling afraid or fears something. No additional mapping is usually revealed in this basic cross-domain mapping of *fear*, which is not the case with *guilt*. Here, in addition to the source “an existence of emotion is presence here,” the source “a hidden existence of emotion is presence here” has been highlighted. It is linguistically realized by the common phrase used in court trials: “to find guilty,” which means that a person “has been accused” and deemed guilty (*The Law Dictionary*, 2015). The following are examples of two variations of the conceptualization discussed above:

(45) ‘*Poor misguided girl! I assure you, I have no vindictive feelings—that is to say, nobody would be more happy than myself to know that she was innocent of this dreadful thing. Indeed, Lord Peter, **even if she were guilty**, it would give me great pain to see her suffer the penalty.* (2:64)

(46) *As far as Miss Vane’s honour and happiness are concerned, **she might as well be found guilty** as acquitted on a mere element of doubt.* (2:159)

In Example 45, the simple fact of the possibility of finding somebody guilty (“even if she were guilty”) is demonstrated via the source “an existence of emotion is present here.” Although one character—Mr. Boyes—tends to believe that another character—Harriet Vane—is accused of a murder, he discusses the possibility of her being guilty (even if it is not so) and what consequences the verdict that pronounces her guilty might have. Example 46 needs additional clarification: the person has to be *found* guilty before being declared one, which makes this “existence” not visible, or “hidden.” The important point in Example 46 is that the notion of *doubt*, or more precisely a “mere element of doubt,” is a crucial factor that determines the verdict and further life of the accused. As stated earlier, the notion of *doubt* is interconnected with *guilt* in its legal context via the phrase *reasonable doubt* (Example 34). The examples discussed above are also bound by the so-called *presumption of innocence*, which is a system where “a defendant who enters trial is presumed to be innocent of the crime” (*The Law Dictionary*, 2015).

By the same token, the example of *guilt* as “a hidden possession” has been found. In this case, somebody’s *guilt* is hidden, being kept from disclosure, or it has not yet appeared:

(47) *"And I am to hide my guilt, as I have done so many years?"*  
(1:689)

(48) *He prepared me, on that fatal night, for his disclosure of my guilt to you.* (1:693)

(49) *An accused man, however obvious his guilt may appear to be before the facts are known, however heinous the crime, however unprepossessing his appearance or repellent his character, is entitled to a defence.* (4:375)

As discussed earlier in this section, the notion of *guilt* is important in many cultures as it can represent a state of being guilty as a collective feeling. However, Examples 47, 48 and 49 show that the emotion keyword of *guilt* can be somebody's personal possession (*my guilt* or *his guilt*) or an object. Besides, in Examples 47 and 48, *guilt* has been "hidden," evidently for a long time, which normally makes *guilt* a burden for a person who is carrying it. In relation to this, the corpus includes examples when *guilt* is conceptualized as "an undesired object" or "a painful possession"—in other words, those possessions that the owner does not intend to show and those that linger constantly harassing their owner. Consider the following examples:

(50) *I have no purpose but to die. When I left, I had a worse, but I am saved from adding that guilt to the rest.* (1:695)

(51) *And then at school it had seemed that every emotional crisis had been deliberately timed to make Venetia's professional life more difficult. Every speech day, every school play had been arranged on a day when it was impossible for her to get away, increasing Octavia's resentment, her own nagging guilt.* (4:372)

The conceptualization of *guilt* as "an experience" shows prevalence but the analysis does not reveal a sufficient number of examples of *guilt* that would indicate an effect on parts of the body or bodily movement. The absence of strong

conceptualizations of bodily changes can be explained by the nature of guilt as a complex self-assessed emotion. Besides, it is quite common that a person does not often *tremble with guilt*, but most likely *suffers from guilt*. Nevertheless, a limited number of cases that represent bodily changes under the influence of *guilt* could be traced in the source data. One of these is illustrated below:

(52) *This was really such a confusing question that Ada looked at me in perfect dismay. As to **the guilty nature of my own consciousness** after what I had been thinking, **it must have been expressed in the colour of my cheeks.*** (1:683)

Considering the limited number of source domains that indicate bodily changes or those that represent the body as “a container for emotions,” it was expected that there would be a lack of the force-dynamics of the first type. Thus, out of a total 27 examples of force dynamic, the analysis shows 7 cases of force-dynamic of Type 1 and 20 cases of force-dynamic of Type 2. Example 52 above illustrates the first type, where physical agitation is saliently expressed in how *guilt* has an effect on the color of the cheeks. One of the most expressive examples of Type 1 has been found in time-frame 4. This example indicates a look at somebody and expressing “the anxiety of a guilty child:” *Mrs Scully looked at him with the anxiety of a guilty child who knows that she has disappointed the grown-ups* (4:13). The second type of force-dynamic indicates the state of being guilty of murdering someone, of crime, or simply *feeling* guilty about something, as can be seen from the examples below:

(53) *‘Garry, did you love your aunt?’ The question brought to mind a similar question asked – when? – eighty-four years earlier, in March 1912, when Frederick Henry Seddon had been found **guilty of the murder** of his lodger, Miss Eliza Barrow.* (4:345)

(54) *‘From the moment that I started my investigations there was always the strong possibility that **Elinor Carlisle was guilty of the crime** of which she was accused. (3:170)*

(55) *After the door closed behind her, Costello said: ‘**She’s feeling guilty**, I suppose, because of that business with her brother. (4:353)*

Following Frijda’s viewpoint on emotions as “sequences” (1986), Johnson-Laird and Oatley argue that these sequences include “an eliciting condition, a cognitive evaluation, physiological activation, a change of action readiness, and finally an action” (1989: 82). Considering that the conceptualization as “an effect on action” is recurrent in the corpus, a flowchart based on the evidence from the corpus—as presented in Figure 12 below—has been designed to illustrate actions involving guilt.




Figure 12. Distribution of the conceptualizations “effect” and “entity” of *guilt*

On the whole, conceptualizations as “an effect,” “an entity,” and “an effect on action” are almost entirely devoted to something of a non-material nature. When the analysis of *guilt* is compared to that of *fear* one can observe some similarities particularly in the frequent use of the verbs that represent mental actions, rather than those that represent physical ones, as is shown in the examples below:

(56) *Mr. Woodcourt then told us that the trooper's man had been with him before day, after wondering about the streets all night like a distracted creature. That one of the trooper's first anxieties was that **we should not suppose him guilty**. That he had charged his messenger to represent his perfect innocence with every solemn assurance he could send us. (1:690)*

(57) *Say I am innocent and I get a lawyer. He would be as likely **to believe me guilty as not**; perhaps more. (1:691)*

The prevalence of *guilt* conceptualized as “an effect on a state linked to something” has been traced only among something non-material, including “carelessness” and especially “murder.” Some examples are provided below:

(58) *You have had an example of both types of labels submitted to you. In my view, **the police were guilty of gross carelessness** in not checking the original fragment more closely and in jumping to the conclusion that it was a morphine label. (3:164)*

(59) *Kate said: 'But people don't always behave rationally. And why pick on him? **Are you saying that you can't believe a senior barrister would be guilty of murder?**'  
'Of course I'm not, Kate. That's bloody silly.' (4:355)*

Not only is *guilt* linked to the actions and objects that relate to something of a non-material nature; it is also used to describe notions of a non-material nature, mainly through adjectives, as presented below:

(60) *They were the first words he had spoken in court except for that plea of not guilty spoken in a firm low voice. The court was absolutely silent.* (4:342)

(61) *If you are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that my client murdered his aunt, then your verdict must be one of guilty.* (4:343)

The characteristic of *guilty* is applied to the notions pertaining to legal discourse, as a *verdict*, *plea*, and *party* as “the person or persons taking part in legal proceedings” (CoED, 2015).

By and large, *guilt* is surprisingly simply represented by the source domain common for all emotions—“an existence of emotion is presence here.” And yet, this basic conceptualization has its peculiarity via the feature of being “hidden” from people. The evidence from the corpus suggests that somebody has to be “found guilty” before stating the fact of guilt. The analysis does not reveal the explicit expression of *guilt* via bodily changes, which is considered normal for this emotion as a cognitively assessed one. Even with a limited number of examples of *guilt*, the corpus includes instances that show the connection of *guilt* to the fundamental notions of *shame* and *innocence*, as well as to the notions pertaining to the legal context, such as *presumption of innocence* and *reasonable doubt*.

### **3. LAW AND EXPECTATION: SURPRISE**

#### **3.1 Law and expectation: Surprise**

The emotion of surprise differs from the previously analyzed emotions of fear and guilt in the sense that surprise is described through its function. Such an approach to the study of this emotion has been stressed by Izard who stated that “it [surprise] has

some very useful functions” (1977: 277). Contrary to the emotions of fear and guilt, which are generally assessed as negative ones, bringing pain or suffering, surprise appears as a result of a change of stimuli. Following Reisenzein, I argue that the emotion keyword of *surprise* is linked with events called by the author “the surprise-eliciting events” (2002: 264). The majority of these events are unexpected and on rare occasions partially expected, which I illustrate in sub-section 3.2 of this chapter.

The dictionary definitions of *surprise* include variations of this emotion as “unexpected”. According to the Collins English Dictionary, *(to) surprise* is “to cause to feel amazement or wonder” (CoED, 2015). As a noun, *surprise* is defined as an “unexpected event” (CED, 2015), an “instance” (CoED, 2015), or “occurrence” (OED, 2015). When something surprising happens or when somebody is being surprised, these situations are often linked to some action. The action of causing surprise can be pre-planned by someone who wants to surprise and/or attack someone else, which implies that surprise can be both negative—“the act of assailing or attacking unexpectedly” (*ibid.*), and positive—“the act of taking unawares” (CoED, 2015).

The emotion of surprise is important in different theories in psychology and social sciences, which has resulted in the investigation of unexpectedness that this emotion brings, especially through vivid bodily changes. In this context, the emotion of surprise is central to sensory processing (e.g. Reisenzein, 2002) and adaptation (e.g. Charlesworth, 1964; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 2001). For example, Plutchik (2001) states the following about cognition, emotions, and the process of adaptation in its general sense (2001: 120):

*In the most basic sense, any organism must predict on the basis of limited information whether there is food, a mate or danger in its environment. Depending on the prediction made, the organism makes a decision to escape, to attack, to eat, or to mate.*

Plutchik provides a table with the sequential nature of emotions, which is shown below, with the emotion of surprise in the last row.

<b>Stimulus event</b>	<b>Cognition</b>	<b>Feeling state</b>	<b>Overt behaviour</b>	<b>Effect</b>
Threat	'Danger'	Fear	Escape	Safety
Obstacle	'Enemy'	Anger	Attack	Destroy obstacle
Gain of valued object	'Possess'	Joy	Retain or retreat	Gain resources or new genes
Loss of valued object	'Abandonment'	Sadness	Cry	Reattach with lost object
Member of one's group	'Friend'	Acceptance	Groom	Mutual support
Unpalatable object	'Poison'	Disgust	Vomit	Eject poison
New territory	'Examine'	Expectation	Map	Knowledge of territory
Unexpected event	'What is it?'	Surprise	Stop	Gain time to orient

**Table 8.** Key elements in the emotion sequence (Plutchik, 2001, 121)

As follows from Table 8, the way humans adapt to different events varies depending on the emotion they experience as responses to “stimulus events.” Thus, threatening events are common for experiencing fear, appraisal of danger, and consequently searching for escape and/or safety. Unexpected events, on the other hand, are linked to the experience of surprise, which is connected to uncertainty and stopping actions and gaining time to adapt to a new situation. As a rule, the use of the word *surprise* refers to some unexpected act, which can be traced back to the 12<sup>th</sup> century. Derived from the Anglo-Norman *surprise*, the Middle French *suppris* means “taken aback, astonished” and “to deceive” (OED, 2015). The characteristics are

both positive and negative, which is also suggested by the analysis of the semantic field of *surprise*.

### 3.2 The semantic field of *surprise*

The dual nature of the emotion of surprise is grounded in its unexpectedness. The analysis of dictionary entries for *surprise* shows its divided characteristic: it is of a dual nature and is always unexpected. It should be noted that positive connotations to *surprise* are less expressive than negative. The etymological entries suggest that the word *surprise* has rather strong negative meaning. Likewise connotations are also traceable in the general comprehension of *surprise*. As is shown in Figure 13a below, negative connotations are present both in the noun (*a*) *surprise* and in the verb (*to*) *surprise*.

Both positive and negative representations of this emotion keyword bear the element of unexpectedness. When *surprise* is assessed as relatively positive, it is the state of being “astonished” or “unprepared.” But when the emotion of surprise is experienced negatively, it projects rather strong correlations with harm, including such lexemes as *assailing*, *attacking*, and *capture* (via nouns), and (*to*) *strike*, (*to*) *storm*, (*to*) *overpower*, and (*to*) *take possession by force* (via verbs).

The Visual Thesaurus of the English Language (2015) displays interesting instances of *surprise* as “modification,” “alternation,” and “change” that make up the semantic group named *change*. Interestingly, dictionaries include entries with the element of something unexpected, but only a few examples indicate the state of change.



The evidence from the corpus also shows the duality of the emotion keyword of *surprise*, especially with the slot *link*, in contrast to the slot *anti-link* with only one example. As can be seen in Figure 13b, the slot *link* includes examples of *surprise* in correlation with positive words, such as *beauty*, *pleasure*, and *gratification*. Nevertheless, there are more examples of *surprise* that show connotation with negative notions. The negative aspect is marked by some gradation, which is delineated in the examples below:

(62) *And Robbins, what was your impression of Mrs Carpenter's reaction when she first heard the news?' Robbins took his time; he always did. 'Surprise and shock, sir.' He paused. (4:299)*

(63) *Now Mr Vaughan had been greatly distressed and surprised by Philip Boyes's death [...] (2:26)*

(64) *'As you say, Mrs Welman was much respected in Maidensford.' The conversation had taken an unexpected turn, but his face expressed no surprise or puzzlement. (3:78)*

Thus, there are strong negative notions, as *terror* and *deeply-shocked*, less negative ones, such as *distress*, and the state of being *upset*, and borderline notions, including *puzzled* and *startle*, which are semantically very close to *surprise*, especially *startle* as its synonym.

These examples indicate the intensity of *surprise*. As a result, a person is not just surprised but “greatly surprised,” or in contrast, “slightly surprised” or not surprised at all (*showed no surprise*). Thus the analysis also shows different levels of intensity of this emotion keyword. Most of these represent intense experience of this emotion linguistically marked by intensifiers, such as *very*, *considerable*, or *much*, which is the most frequently used of all degree expressions. However, some

downtoners show decrease, which indicates only *slight* or *little surprise*. Two types of the intensity of *surprise* are shown below, one of them includes a combination of two intensifiers (Example 65):

(65) *Dr Weare was naturally **very much surprised** and upset to hear what was being said [...]* (2:29)

(66) *Harold Skimpole had found himself, to his **considerable surprise**, when he first made his own acquaintance [...]* (1:428)

(67) *Neville Saunders, **a little surprised** but setting his features into the gravity appropriate to taking a more active part in the proceedings, got up from his seat and began his slow game of grandmother's footsteps.* (4:277)

The different examples grouped under the slot *link* include, among others, emotional experiences of *satisfaction* or *contempt*. The distribution of various emotion keywords in proximity to *surprise* shows that such emotion or emotion-related words as *happy*, *pleasure*, or *fear* are used to describe *surprise*. It can be seen in the following examples, which represent the code <special case: emotion describes emotion>:

(68) *"It's like you, guardian," said I, "to have been taking that into consideration **for a happy surprise** to both of us."* (1:466)

(69) *"Well, well," said he. "I am delighted that you approve. I thought you would. I meant **it as a pleasant surprise** for the little mistress of Bleak House."* (1:472)

(70) *Nurse Hopkins **said in pleased surprise**:  
'Well, I must say, Miss Carlisle, that's extremely thoughtful of you.*  
(3:64)

As a variation, the code <special case: emotion describes emotion> has been assigned to the cases when *surprise* is used in the sentence with another emotion keyword, such as in the example with *anger*:

(71) *She had spoken as she always did, without apparent resentment, but there had been something close to it **in her voice and he had detected a note of suppressed anger which surprised him.*** (4:240)

In the example above, the emotions of surprise and anger are not experienced by the same character, but the association between these emotion keywords is achieved through the narrator's description of a character, to be more precise, by stating the control the character has over the emotion of anger (*suppressed anger*).

As can be seen in Examples 65, 66 and 67, the emotion keyword of *surprise* shows different levels of intensity. In contrast, there are only three examples of *surprise* that indicate the frequency of this emotion with the adverbs *always* and *occasionally*. Consider the following examples:

(72) *Dalgliesh was capable of a patience which **occasionally surprised his subordinates**, except with the arrogant, the incompetent or the wilfully obtuse.* (4:317)

(73) *'Very. I felt the usual emotions – horror, shock, grief at the death of someone who'd been close to me. But yes, I was surprised. **It's always a surprise when something bizarre and horrible happens to someone you know.***' (4:304/1)

As mentioned earlier, the emotion of surprise is commonly an immediate type of emotion but the analysis does not show any indication of a short time course, apart from one example that indicates frequency of the keyword *surprise* as *occasionally*

(see Example 72). Instead, the corpus includes examples in which the frequency adverb *always* is “fixed” in memory and attached to a certain recurring event or experience. In such cases, even when the event recurs, the emotion of surprise can be experienced as if the event was unexpected, which is not common for this emotion.

So far, the characteristics of *surprise* suggest that this emotion keyword is stable as a dual nature emotion and is more inclined toward negative connotations. However, some peculiarities in its conceptualization have been detected in the cross-domain mapping; these are discussed in the following section.

### 3.3 Analysis based on affinities between source domains of *surprise*

#### 3.3.1 Quantitative and qualitative overview

The qualitative metaphor analysis has helped determine the specifics in the lexicalization and conceptualization of *surprise* in legal fiction. As some quantitative observations emerged during the analysis of the emotion keyword, it will be helpful to address them before proceeding with the cross-domain mapping.

The analysis shows 178 quotations with the emotion keyword of *surprise*, as is illustrated in Table 9 below.

	Noun	Verb	Adjective	Adjective	Total
	(a) surprise	(to) surprise	surprising	(to be) surprised	
Time-frame 1	36	12	-	36	84
Time-frame 2	13	3	1	19	36
Time-frame 3	14	8	3	33	58
					178

**Table 9.** Word-class distribution of *surprise*

It appears from Table 9 that *surprise* is mainly represented by nouns, especially in the first time-frame, and also by the adjective *surprised*, which is predominant in the first and third time-frames. The adjective *surprising* is poorly represented in the source data with its absence<sup>66</sup> in the first time-frame.

The coding has resulted in a total number of 44 codes, 9 of which are constant codes and 34 are codes that represent the source domains. The analysis of *surprise* brings to light one additional parameter—*measure*—which is represented by three examples. This parameter has been coded <measure>. The analysis also shows an overlap of some source domains, as with the emotion keyword *fear*. The predominant conceptualizations are presented in Table 10 below.

	Time-frame 1	Time-frame 2	Time-frame 3
AN EFFECT ON A STATE LINKED TO SOMEBODY	38	9	24
EFFECT ON THE BODY <sup>67</sup>	34	13	16
AN EFFECT ON ACTION	25	5	25
AN EFFECT ON A STATE LINKED TO SOMETHING	17	10	16
EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE	3	5	8

**Table 10.** Distribution of the most frequent source domains of *surprise* in all time-frames

The source domains in the group of “effects” on a state that are linked to somebody show frequency in all time-frames. As the Table 10 shows, most conceptualizations are addressed toward somebody/something, or they relate to actions. Such dynamics are stable among all emotion keywords.

On the whole, the analysis does not reveal unique or unusual conceptualizations, apart from the following two examples, where *surprise*

<sup>66</sup> There is a limited number of examples with the emotion keyword *surprising* in the first time-frame, but these examples are not used in the corpus for the reason that they lack legal or social context (e.g. describing birds, digestion of food).

<sup>67</sup> This is a combined source domain of all types of “effects” on the body.

conceptualized as “a reward” and via the gestalt-like experience “up” in relation to facial expression, specifically eyebrows, as shown in the following examples:

(74) *"One more last word. When Allan Woodcourt spoke to you, my dear, he spoke with my knowledge and consent—but I gave him no encouragement, not I, for **these surprises were my great reward**, and I was too miserly to part with a scrap of it. (1:473)*

(75) *But on impulse Elinor decided differently. She said: 'Perhaps, though, you'd better read it first. Then we'll burn it. It's about Aunt Laura.'*  
**Roddy's eyebrows rose in surprise. (3:65)**

(76) *Peter Lord said: 'When did you go to your dinner?' 'One o'clock, sir.' 'And you didn't see anything – any man hanging about – or a car outside – anything like that?'*  
**The man's eyebrows rose in slight surprise.**  
*'Outside the back gate, sir? There was your car there – nobody else's.'* (3:80)

The statistical survey indicates a slight overlap of the multiple source domains: 102 multiple and 79 single source domains. Such distribution between the types of sources can be accounted for by the predominance of the sources in the group of “effects” on the body and the way this source is represented. As a rule, such a source is focused only on one part of the body, whether it is lips or eyebrows, and rarely as a combination of these. The distribution of the multiple source domains shows more examples with adjectives and verbs rather than nouns. The conceptualizations traditionally linked to nouns—“a possession” and “an object”—are limited in comparison to those linked to verbs and adjectives. These two categories (verbs and adjectives) make up the recurrent combination of sources, as “an effect on a state linked to something/somebody” + “an effect on action,” as illustrated below:

(77) *'In my last **letter** I explained the plan I had in mind, so you will know what to do about the Will itself, which was duly despatched by Registered Post this morning under cover to Mr Norman Urquhart. **How surprised he will be to get it!!*** (2:44)

(78) *As soon as Richard and I had held the conversation of which I have given an account, Richard communicated the state of his mind to Mr. Jarndyce. **I doubt if my guardian were altogether taken by surprise when he received the representation, though it caused him much uneasiness and disappointment.*** (1:150)

In Example 78, the source “an attacker” can be added to the conceptualizations “an effect on a state linked to something” and “an effect on action” (*to get*) because the guardians are “taken by” it. The source “an attacker” is limited among all emotion keywords under scrutiny, but it is important to realize that this source domain is represented by several examples in time-frame 1, all only with *surprise*, which are linguistically represented by the same phrase as in Example 78—“to be taken by surprise.”

### 3.3.2 Metaphorical patterns of *surprise*

As stated earlier, due to the unexpected nature of the emotion of surprise, it is often experienced via bodily changes. The source domains that represent bodily changes caused by *surprise* include a variety of sources as “an effect visible on the body,” “an effect visible on the face,” “an effect not visible on the face,” and the general “an effect on the body.” Two of these are represented in the examples below—i.e. “an effect on the voice” and “an effect not visible on the face:”

(79) *So he was going, he'd actually made up his mind at last. **Laud carefully kept from his voice either surprise or regret.** He said: 'This place is going to miss you.'* (4:279)

(80) *It was Enid who had opened the door, **her broad face showing neither welcome nor surprise.*** (4:308)

As “an effect,” not only does *surprise* has an effect on parts of the body, such as lips, eyes, eyebrows, the vocal chords (the voice), the tone of voice, and body-related actions of breathing, speaking, and hearing. In this sense, *surprise* also affects perception. The following examples delineate these conceptualizations, where Example 81 has two effects of *surprise* at once:

(81) *There was a half-minute when it seemed that **every breath was stilled, every eye in the court was bent on him with surprise, contempt or curiosity.*** (4:282)

(82) *Phil, by the by, said as much **in a tone of surprise** as he scrambled out of bed.* (1:422)

The higher the degree of *surprise*, the more expressive the reaction is. Reisenzein observes that “the experience of surprise and the intensity of felt surprise increases monotonically with the degree of unexpectedness” (2002: 268). The author highlights “many salient features [of surprise] with prototypical emotions, such as anger or fear” (*id.*, 263). To put it another way, for example, the responses to *fear* vary from very active to significantly delayed, depending on the situation, the intensity of *fear*, and personal characteristics. Likewise, these characteristics can be applied to the emotion of surprise, especially instant bodily changes. The bodily changes caused by surprise vary; however, some are common to this emotion. Concerning this, Izard states the following (1977: 277):

*The look of surprise [...] is easy to recognize. The brow is lifted [...] the eyebrows are raised, giving the eyes a large, rounded appearance. The mouth is opened in an oval shape.*

Ekman also emphasizes one significant attribute to *surprise*, saying that the raising of the eyebrows is “the full display of surprise” (2004: 40). In the light of this, Examples 75 and 76 illustrate cases of raising up eyebrows in *surprise*. Interestingly, there is one example, in which the eyebrows did not rise in *surprise* but “climbed” right up the forehead:

(83) *Dr Lord raised himself up on his toes. His sandy eyebrows climbed right up his forehead till they nearly got merged in his hair.*  
**He said in surprise:**  
*‘So she’s conked out – eh?’*  
*‘Yes, Doctor.’ (3:67)*

This example is one of a few that have several conceptualizations of *surprise* at once. This has resulted in the multiple source domains: the source “an effect on bodily movement” (*raised himself up*) is followed by the source “an effect on the eyebrows” (*eyebrows climbed right up his forehead*), and by the source that indicates “an effect on speech” (*He said in surprise*). Furthermore, *surprise* conceptualizes in Example 83 as “a container,” which is indicated by the use of the preposition *in*—“in surprise.” On the whole, the source domain “a container” is limited in all time-frames and is not represented significantly among all emotion keywords.

Equally important, one of the main characteristics of the emotion of surprise is to prepare a person for an effective response to an unexpected or new event. According to Charlesworth, surprise is connected with “the violation of expectancy” and “maintenance of curiosity” (1964: 1169). The examples of the violation of

expectancy are represented in the corpus through examples of an immediate *surprise*. This representation can be explained by the fact that surprise cannot motivate people for a long time. In the next example, the actions are swift (*staggered up instantly, his actions was so quick*):

(84) *The boy **staggered up instantly** and stared at me with a remarkable expression of **surprise and terror**. His **action was so quick** and my being the cause of it was so evident that I stood still instead of advancing nearer.* (1:427)

Not only is *surprise* approached from the aspect of its duration and instant bodily changes but equally important, it is also approached from the perspective of mental processing. Regarding this, Izard argues the following (1977: 277-278):

*[...] the feeling [of surprise] does not last very long. However, the most important reason is because the mind seems to be blank in the moment of surprise. It is as though ordinary thought processes are stopped.*

The evidence from the corpus shows examples close to what Izard describes, although the linguistic realization of a “blank” mind when surprised, is not salient. Consider the following example, where the gradual sequence of changing facial expression caused by an unexpected appearance (*seeing how serious my Lady is*) makes the face look “puzzled” and “surprised:”

(85) *The pretty village **face** looks brightly up. Then, seeing how serious my Lady is, **looks puzzled and surprised**.* (1:446)

As follows from Figure 14 (see below), *surprise* as “an effect” influences actions or is a cause for actions. In contrast to *fear* and *guilt*, the analysis of *surprise*

reveals an overlap of actions caused by this emotion, which refer more to the physical activities and less to mental ones. The overlap is not absolute though, in many cases, it is supported by bodily changes, including altering the voice, as is shown below:

(86) *We were all assembled shortly before dinner, [...] when a card was brought in and my guardian **read aloud in a surprised voice**, "Sir Leicester Dedlock!"* (1:441)

(87) *I was not so easy now during any reference to the name but that I felt it a relief when Richard, **with an exclamation of surprise, hurried away to meet a stranger** whom he first descried coming slowly towards us.* (1:435)




Figure 14. Distribution of the conceptualizations “effect” and “entity” of *surprise*

The physiological element accompanying *surprise* is rather stable, so that the list of physical actions include such verbs, as *(to) cry and (to) laugh*:

(88) *But, when I went upstairs to my own room, I surprised myself by beginning to laugh about it and then surprised myself still more by beginning to cry about it. (1:118, 1:118/1)*

Despite having numerous conceptualizations of bodily changes, the force dynamic shows more cases of the second type, which indicates emotional disturbance of self without directly affecting the body. The analysis displays a total of 155 cases of force dynamics, and 59 of them are Type 1 and 96 Type 2.

In the centre of the Type 2 force-dynamic is *surprise* as an emotion caused by somebody (i.e. the attention is drawn toward somebody) or somebody's actions. Two of these examples are shown below:

(89) *Mr. Kenge expressed the surprise and gratification he felt at the unusual sight of Mr. Jarndyce in his office. (1:469)*

(90) *I should have been surprised if those two could have thought very highly of one another, Mr. Boythorn attaching so much importance to many things and Mr. Skimpole caring so little for anything. (1:141)*

When conceptualizing as “an effect on action,” *surprise* is shown as a response to actions caused by both people and inanimate objects but with the predominance of people being the cause of *surprise*. Both types are indicated in the examples below:

(91) *So you will not be surprised if I am away from Town for, say, another week! (2:45)*

(92) *I had not once looked up. I had not seen the visitor and had not even appeared to myself to hear the **conversation**. **It surprises me to find that I can recall it**, for it seemed to make no impression on me as it passed. (1:443)*

In connection to this, there are cases of *surprise* as a response (or the absence of such) to various emotion-related experiences, including *to be in low spirits*, or *to be appalled*, and also one example of a surprising response to the state of not being surprised. The examples are shown below:

(93) *I was **not surprised by Caddy's being in low spirits** when we went downstairs [...](1:149)*

(94) *I'm **not surprised that she was appalled by the engagement between Ashe and her daughter**; she knew too much about that young man for any mother's peace of mind. (4:306)*

(95) *Ha ha ha ha! **I have no doubt he is surprised that I don't**. For he is, by heaven, the most self-satisfied, and the shallowest, and the most coxcombical and utterly brainless ass!" (1:145)*

Quite interestingly, *surprise* is represented as “a reversed effect” in Example 95, which is the only one example of such kind. This means that the state of being surprised at somebody or somebody's actions can be anticipated to some extent, as was discussed earlier. In such situations, the emotion of surprise is anticipated by the person who is causing it or thinking about doing so.

All things considered, the emotion keyword *surprise* shows strong conceptualizations related to different bodily changes. The force-dynamic of Type 1 is consistent in the corpus, more than the previous emotion keywords of *fear* and *guilt*. However, the analysis brings to light more examples of the second type of force- dynamic, which represents *surprise* as the experience of self. This type of force- dynamic is supported by the conceptualizations “an effect on a state linked to

somebody/something” and “an effect on action,” which often go hand in hand and make up the multiple source domain for a single target domain of *surprise*.

## Summary

This chapter has presented the first part of the qualitative metaphor analysis of the emotion keywords in legal fiction. The findings from the analysis of negative and dual-nature emotion keywords allows me to report on the emotion keywords of *fear*, *guilt*, and *surprise* as complex emotions with the specifics of their conceptualization. For the purpose of revealing the historical and current meaning of the given emotion keywords generally and in context, and to formulate emotional expression in language, the present analysis has explored the semantic fields referring to dictionaries and thesauruses, as well as to the five extra-linguistic parameters.

The etymological entries from dictionaries and thesauruses bring to light interesting cases with the emotion keyword *guilt*. It appears that this word is related to Old English *debt* and *(to) pay*, which in turn is close to the modern meaning of *guilt* in relation to current legal systems. However, not only does the insight into dictionary and thesaurus’s entries disclose the specifics of each emotion, but the evidence from the corpus shows interesting examples. One of the most interesting cases has been found with the emotion keyword *fear* via the coined word *feariocious* exclusively used in the novel *Bleak House*. Among the five parameters, the parameter that determines the link of the emotion keywords with other notions has proved be more numerous than others. The tendency remains the same between *fear*,

*guilt*, and *surprise*: each emotion keyword is “linked” mainly to emotion-related words and/or emotion words of the same type.

Having evaluated the given emotion keywords on the five parameters, I have continued with the cross-domain mapping in order to identify the ways the emotion keywords selected conceptualize in the language of legal fiction. All emotion keywords display traditional and unique conceptualizations. This is especially relevant for *fear* and *guilt*. *Fear* is identified as a component of mixed emotions along with *excitement*, whereas *guilt* shows a characteristic of being hidden, owing to the fact that one must be “found guilty” in order to proceed with verdict and punishment. *Fear* and *surprise* show numerous conceptualizations related to bodily changes, especially *surprise*, which has been anticipated because this emotion is connected to unexpectedness or to something that happens suddenly. As a consequence, responses to this emotion are usually linked to the often involuntary movement of the body.

Having provided the analysis of negative and dual-nature emotions, the following chapter continues with the analysis of positive emotions.

QUALITATIVE METAPHOR ANALYSIS: POSITIVE EMOTIONS

1. LAW AND JUSTICE: HAPPINESS

1.1 Law and justice: Happiness

With universally accepted, positive characteristics, the emotion of happiness is defined as “the quality of condition of being happy” (OED, 2016), which is the state of mind that is often described as being “pleased,” “in a good mood,” or “joyful” (CED, 2016). Despite the consistency of its positive meaning, happiness is a complex emotion and is used in a variety of theories.<sup>68</sup>

The emotion of happiness was fundamental for many ancient philosophers in various corners of the globe (e.g. Aristotle, Socrates, Seneca, or Buddha), who tried to explain the nature of this emotion and the ways of obtaining it. In this sense, happiness is closely linked to people’s well-being. It is generally accepted that in order to obtain happiness, one has two options that are represented by two “happiness hypotheses” (Haidt, 2006: xii). The first option states that happiness comes when one gets what he/she desired, whereas the second way of obtaining happiness has no connection with material things whatsoever or anything that is

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<sup>68</sup> See e.g. Whole-Life Satisfaction Theories (e.g. Telfer 1980, Kekes 1982, Feldman 2008), which generally suggest that for an individual to be happy, one has to be satisfied with his/her life as a whole. This implies, for example, satisfaction not only with the past and the “current segment” of life, but as well as with the future life that one plans (Tatarkiwicz, 1966). However, a Whole-Life Satisfaction Theory also emphasizes that happiness is dependent on “the state of being pleased with one’s life as a whole” (Telfer, 1980: 8-9).

desired to be possessed in order to be happy—in other words, happiness “comes from within” (*id.*). One could also add that happiness is something that is not given but can be obtained with an effort. This is the way Socrates approached happiness—as the state that requires certain effort. For Seneca, “health and wealth do not contribute to our happiness” but “virtue alone is sufficient for happiness” (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2016).

Ancient wisdom flourishes with phrases about happiness, the meaning of life, and people’s well-being. This topic is the main goal of positive psychology (e.g. Seligman, 2004), which is a discipline that concerns itself with the study of a person’s optimal well-being, as well as trying to find what motivates people toward a positive perception of the world. The interest toward positive psychology emerged in psychiatry, but positive psychology as a movement was formed in America in the 1990s. It included psychologist Martin Seligman, and his colleagues Vaillant (2000) and Csikszentmihalyi (1990). Psychologists believe that it is important to focus on the positive relationships in a society to develop the “bright” aspects of life and to understand how they work, rather than to focus on people’s shortcomings or weaknesses (Sheldon & King, 2001: 216). As is seen from the semantic field of *happiness* in the following section, the definition of this emotion is affluently represented through various emotional experiences, such as *satisfaction*, *joy*, *pleasure*, and *content*. All these states are often the basis of the theories of happiness. As an illustration, the notions of *satisfaction* and *pleasure* are the main concerns of Whole-Life Satisfaction Theories mentioned earlier (see footnote 68). In these theories, hedonism is the main doctrine, meaning that “pleasure is regarded as the chief good, or the proper end of action” (OED, 2016). However, happiness, as a

psychological state, does not necessarily include pleasure or satisfaction as its main element. This means that “a person can be ‘happy’ [...] at a time even though he is not actually satisfied with his life as a whole at that time” (Feldman, 2008: 219).

The perspective on happiness as a person’s well-being is connected to the way the emotion of happiness is perceived in the system of justice. In this view, this emotion is evaluated via the effects of punishment—in other words, the degree of suffering of the offender should be the same as the victim (Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, 2008: 42). Following the study conducted by Bronsteen *et al.*, the authors conclude that “[...] felons, who have been convicted and imprisoned at least once already face severely diminished happiness outside of prison due to the social and economic dislocations caused by their prior stints behind bars” (*id.*, 31).

The etymological entries of *happiness* and *happy* are rather limited. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, *happiness* and *happy* were formed within English, by derivation (by *-ness* and *-y* suffixes respectively), which date back to the 14<sup>th</sup> century (OED, 2016). Despite rather little etymological information for the words *happiness* and *happy*, these lexical items are interesting in terms of a semantic analysis. I elaborate on the topic in the following section that is devoted to the analysis of the semantic field of *happiness*.

## **1.2 The semantic field of *happiness***

After examining dictionary and thesaurus entries, it appears that the keywords *happiness* and *happy* show almost identical definitions in all four dictionaries, in a sense that they almost always refer to the same words and meanings. For example,

the word *happiness* is represented with such lexemes as *felicity* and *joy*, the same as the word *happy* that includes in its definition such adjectives as *felicitous* and *joyful*. Besides, the definition of *happiness* is often represented as “the feeling of being happy” (CED, 2016), which implies further description of a person as happy by means of different adjectives, including *elated*, *cheerful* and others. Therefore, I decided to group both the noun *happiness* and the adjective *happy* in a combined semantic field, which is presented in Figure 15a below.

As follows from Figure 15a, the analysis of the semantic field of *happiness* has revealed five semantic groups, including groups that are titled *luck*, *joy*, *bliss*, *success*, and *actions*. The first three are especially rich on examples. Interestingly, all dictionaries, except for The Visual Thesaurus, include the lexemes that define *happiness* as *lucky* or *fortunate*, in other words, senses relating to “good fortune or good luck in life generally or in a particular affair” (OED, 2016). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, this definition is “now rare” (*id.*). An element of luck to happiness is not considered as major, especially in positive psychology. In contrast, happiness is understood from the perspective of a person, who shapes happiness or builds it, as in making an effort to be happy without having a chance in life or a good fortune.

Apart from the definition of *happiness* that includes the element of *luck*, the semantic group *bliss* indicates the quality of *happiness* as “serene joy” or “perfect happiness” (CoED, 2016), which refers to the intensity of happiness, as “deep pleasure” (OED, 2016).



actions, people, and even plants, in the meaning that the plant is “healthy” and “flourishing” (OED, 2016). In this regard, the group *action* seems specifically interesting with lexemes representing actions that are linked to *happiness*. The analysis shows that not only can one “experience” or “feel” *happiness*, and “show” it to others but they can also “cause” it. In the latter case, *happiness* is “an effect” that comes from somebody or something, as in *He made me happy*. Such conceptualizations of *happiness* have also been revealed in the analysis of the source domains, which is discussed further in the sub-section 1.3 of this section.

The actions that are linked to *happiness* have positive connotations, as bringing something good and making someone happy, successful or “propitious,” meaning “presenting favourable conditions” for success (OED, 2016). In this sense, the group *action* is linked with the group *success*. The latter is represented by lexemes, such as *appropriateness*, *aptly expressed* or *auspicious* meaning *betokening success* (OED, 2016).

All things considered, the semantic field of *happiness* is represented by a variety of components, which have strong positive connotations. The state of being happy can be attached to various aspects of life, such as being successful, being cheerful about the success or other things or events, and also being lucky, which brings joy or satisfaction. Similar connotations have also been found among the five parameters of *happiness* based on evidence from the corpus. As follows from Figure 15b, the parameter *link* is consistent with different positive notions. This echoes the semantic groups from the analysis of dictionary entries *joy* and *bliss* (Example 96), *luck* (Example 97), and *success* (Example 98):

(96) *What happiness was ours that day, what joy, what rest, what hope, what gratitude, what bliss!* (1:371)

(97) *"Mr. Woodcourt," said I, "you will be glad to know from my lips before I say good night that in the future, which is clear and bright before me, I am most happy, most fortunate, have nothing to regret or desire."* (1:602)

(98) *I am on unaltered terms with her, and I recall—having the full power to do it if I were so disposed, as you see—no act I have done for her advantage and happiness.*" (1:631)

Quite interestingly, the parameter *anti-link* is also represented by two positive adjectives (*contented, satisfied*). As can be observed from Example 99 below, the difference between being happy and being contented is in their intensity—being contented refers to satisfaction rather than deep happiness, as it means “desiring nothing more or nothing different” and “limiting one’s desires” (OED, 2016):

(99) *He asked: ‘You have been happy here?’  
‘Contented rather than happy. I had hopes of evening classes, but it isn’t really possible for an elderly woman to go out alone at night.* (4:113/1)

The parameter *intensity* is specifically rich with degree modifiers that signify an absolute increase of *happiness*. The adverb *so* overlaps other degree modifiers with 19 examples, which include the phrases “so happy” or “so happily,” as is shown in the following examples:

(100) *Everybody in the house, from the lowest to the highest, showed me such a bright face of welcome, and spoke so cheerily, and was so happy to do anything for me, that I suppose there never was such a fortunate little creature in the world.* (1:1074)

(101) *I had never been **so happy** as in hearing of my progress, began to understand the mixture of good and evil in the world now [...]* (1:896)

As most examples with *happiness* bear the element of intensity, the parameter *quality* is represented only by eleven words that describe this emotion rather differently. On the one hand, *happiness* is evaluated as “perfect” or “high.” One could also add that most examples tend to decrease quality of *happiness*, as being “half so happy,” not sufficient “almost” happy or by the very peculiar example of “imbecile happiness,” as is illustrated below:

(102) *"When I married Richard I was not insensible to what was before him. I had been **perfectly happy** for a long time with you, and I had never known any trouble or anxiety, so loved and cared for, but I understood the danger he was in, dear Esther."* (1:599)

(103) *The thin knowing **face**, which could so easily assume a look of fatuous slyness or mutinous resentment, now **looked** peaceful, **almost happy**, and for the first time in years she looked steadily at her mother with the rich deep-brown eyes which were the only feature they shared in common.* (4:106)

(104) *An enforced inactivity will produce irritable symptoms in the best of men. Nor did **the imbecile happiness of Chief Inspector Parker** and Lady Mary Wimsey tend to soothe him, accompanied as it was by tedious demonstrations of affection for himself.* (2:161)

One of the most interesting parameters that evaluates emotion keywords is the parameter *time marker*. As a general rule, this parameter is scantily represented among the whole section of emotion keywords. Nevertheless, the evidence from the corpus shows 16 examples that indicate not only the time periods of being happy but also a variety of duration. That is to say, these periods range from a quarter of an hour, hours, days, years, and also the frequency of *happiness* as “always” and “for ever.” Some of these are illustrated below:

(105) *But in a few minutes he would recklessly conjure up some undefinable means by which they were both to be made rich and **happy for ever**, and would become as gay as possible. (1:536)*

(106) *I passed at Greenleaf **six happy, quiet years**. I never saw in any face there, thank heaven, on my birthday, that it would have been better if I had never been born. (1:492)*

(107) *This, sir, I take the opportunity of stating openly to you as the friend of Mr. C. Without funds **I shall always be happy to appear and act for Mr. C.** to the extent of all such costs as are safe to be allowed out of the estate, not beyond that. (1:589)*

As can be seen, it is common for *happiness* to co-occur with other words that describe positive events, things, and people that bring happiness, which can be measured by hours, days, or eternity. In this view, *happiness* can be perceived in its broad sense as the state of being satisfied with life. In the following analysis of the source domains, I demonstrate that not only *happiness* is characterized by traditional conceptualizations but can also be viewed in more peculiar ways.

### 1.3 Analysis based on affinities between source domains of *happiness*

#### 1.3.1 Quantitative and qualitative overview

The analysis shows 233 quotations with the emotion keyword *happiness*, as is illustrated in Table 11.

	Noun	Adjective	Adverb	Total
	happiness	happy	happily	
Time-frame 1	28	109	18	155
Time-frame 2	5	22	2	29
Time-frame 3	7	36	6	49
				233

**Table 11.** Word-class distribution of *happiness*

From Table 11, it follows that there is prevalence in the use of *happiness* by the adjective *happy*, especially in time-frame 1. The overall distribution of emotion keywords is the same among all time-frames, with the predominance of adjectives. The coding has resulted in a total number of 43 codes, 9 of which are constant codes and 33 represent the source domains. The cross-domain mapping of *happiness* demonstrates one additional parameter that represents a single example when one emotion keyword is “located” inside the other. This case has been coded <special case: emotion inside emotion>. Similar to the emotion keywords of *fear*, *guilt*, and *surprise*, the analysis brings to light an overlap of several source domains, which is illustrated in Table 12.

	Time-frame 1	Time-frame 2	Time-frame 3
AN EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE	45	5	8
AN EFFECT ON ACTION	36	8	13
AN EFFECT ON A STATE LINKED TO SOMEBODY	32	5	8
EFFECT ON THE BODY <sup>69</sup>	24	2	7
AN ENTITY THAT CHARACTERISES SOMETHING	17	7	6

**Table 12.** Distribution of the most frequent source domains of *happiness* in all time-frames

The results from the cross-domain mapping of *happiness* show prevalence of one of the most basic source domains for any emotion, which is “an existence of emotion is presence here.” It is represented in all time-frames, especially by the adjective *happy*, as in *I am happy*. Apart from linguistically representing the conceptualization “an existence of emotion is presence here,” the predominance of the adjectives boosted the number of the source domain “an entity that characterises

<sup>69</sup> This is a combined source domain of all types of “effects” on the body, bodily movements (kinaesthetic experience) and spatial orientation of the body (proxemics).

something.” However, an overlap of adjectives is not the only factor of the presentation of the source domain “an entity that characterises something.” In fact, the previously discussed emotion keywords of *fear*, *guilt*, and *surprise* show few examples of this conceptualization.<sup>70</sup> In this light, the adjective *happy* is common when describing people, events, and various kinds of things and states, especially something non-material, such as “thoughts,” “life” or “state of things.”

If the adjective *happy* is used to describe things or people, the noun *happiness* accounts for some examples of *happiness* as “a possession.” As for the distribution of this source, it does not show prevalence among all emotion keywords, but due to the presence of nouns in time-frame 1, it reveals interesting conceptualizations. Some of these are single source domains, but with parameters of *intensity* and/or *link*. Fewer examples have been found when *happiness* conceptualized as “a possession” linked to source domains, such as “an effect on action,” as is shown in the following example:

(108) *And to both of you, my children, I would merely observe, in the spirit of a sainted woman on whose path **I had the happiness of casting**, I believe, **SOME ray of light**, take care of the establishment, take care of my simple wants, and bless you both!"*  
(1:620)

A combination of the sources “an effect on a state linked to somebody” + “an effect on action” shows the prevalence among the multiple source domains, whereas the source “an effect on a state linked to something” demonstrates less evidence with *happiness*, in contrast to *fear* and *surprise*. The single source domains mapping overlaps multiple source domains with 158 out of total 233 cases. Such a strong

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<sup>70</sup> See Appendix 4.

presence of single sources is the highest among all of the emotion keywords. Despite having the basic and most frequent conceptualization “an existence of emotion is presence here,” the emotion keyword *happiness* also shows several unique conceptualizations, which are discussed in the following section.

### 1.3.2 Metaphorical patterns of *happiness*

The cross-domain mapping of *happiness* is represented by conceptualizations referring to this emotion as essential for people’s well-being and success. According to Kövecses (2004), the cross-domain mapping of *happiness* includes numerous source domains, such as traditional “captive animal” or “insanity,” more specific “up,” “light,” and “warmth,” and even “health” and “vitality” (2004: 24). The evidence from the corpus suggests both traditional types of sources for *happiness*, as well as more specific, but they are not numerous. Consequently, the predominance of the basic conceptualization “an existence of emotion is presence here” indicates that *happiness* is a general state of well-being, whether one is feeling happy or someone wants somebody else to be happy:

(109) *Elinor said gravely:  
‘I care for Roddy enough and not too much.’  
Mrs Welman nodded approval.  
‘I think, then, you’ll be happy. Roddy needs love – but he doesn’t  
like violent emotion. He’d shy off from possessiveness.’ (3:30)*

(110) *‘Peter – do please be happy. I mean, you’ve always been the  
comfortable sort of person that  
nothing could touch. Don’t alter, will you?’ (2:69)*

(111) *"We must not say so, Dame Durden," he cheerfully replied; "Ada is the happier, I hope, and that is much. I did think that I and both these young creatures might be friends instead of distrustful foes and that we might so far counter-act the suit and prove too strong for it. (1:261)*

It should be mentioned that not only do people feel happy about themselves, something, or somebody but the emotion of happiness is also expressed through a variety of actions, which represent the source "an effect on action." In this case, *happiness* affects different actions, including "to meet," "to work," "to know," "to have the honour," "to appear in courts" with the predominant number of cases, when *happiness* is conceptualized as "an effect on physical action." The physical actions are scattered with no specific overlap of a certain type of action, which can be seen in Figure 16 further down and in several examples below:

(112) *You surprise me, Simon. I didn't realize you were so **happy to appear in the lower courts**. A pity you didn't suggest it at the time.'* (4:110)

(113) *"You see again, Miss Summerson," observed Mrs. Jellyby serenely, "**what a happiness it is to be so much occupied as I am and to have this necessity for self-concentration that I have.**" (1:621)*

(114) *'A murderess might make quite a good wife,' said Harringay. 'There was Madeleine Smith, you know – she used arsenic too, by the way – **she married somebody and lived happily to a respectable old age.**' (2:162)*



When conceptualized as “an effect,” *happiness* shows more elaborated structure, which is indicated not only in examples of “an effect” that points at somebody or something but also as “an effect” that comes from somebody and something. In the first case, *happiness* is mainly linked to the words of a non-material nature, including “case,” “verdict,” and “curiosity:”

(116) *Sir Leicester is particularly complacent because he has found in his newspaper some congenial remarks bearing directly on the floodgates and the framework of society. **They apply so happily to the late case** that Sir Leicester has come from the library to my Lady's room expressly to read them aloud.* (1:646)

(117) *A court attendant had come up. He said: 'There's quite a crowd of anti-hunt saboteurs outside. **They're not happy with the verdict.** It might be wise to leave by the other door.'* (4:105)

In the semantic field of *happiness*, there is a slot *action* with the lexeme (*to*) *cause*. Often, somebody's happiness is dependent on somebody or something. Conceptualizations of this kind—“an effect coming from somebody” and “an effect coming from something”—show several interesting examples. Linguistic realization of these sources is used via the words indicating “an effect” of making somebody happy or wishing to make somebody happy, as follows from the examples:

(118) *Neither of us spoke after that, until he said with a sigh, "Well, well, my dear! Bleak House is thinning fast."  
"But its mistress remains, guardian." Though I was timid about saying it, I ventured because of the sorrowful tone in which he had spoken. "**She will do all she can to make it happy,**" said I.  
"She will succeed, my love!"* (1:591)

(119) *You can do nothing for my sake that will make me half so happy as for ever turning your back upon the shadow in which we both were born.* (1:563)

As a variation, almost all of the examples indicate “an effect” that comes from something of a non-material nature, such as “conspiracy” or “everything:”

(120) *It was heaven's mercy we were at home, or she would have walked back again." **The old conspiracy to make me happy!** Everybody seemed to be in it!* (1:551)

(121) *At any rate, I made up my mind to be so dreadfully industrious that I would leave myself not a moment's leisure to be low-spirited. For I naturally said, "Esther! You to be low-spirited. YOU!" And it really was time to say so, for I—yes, I really did see myself in the glass, almost crying. "As if you had anything to make you unhappy, **instead of everything to make you happy**, you ungrateful heart!" said I.* (1:522)

Not only can *happiness* be the cause of actions or be dependent on somebody or something but *happiness* also has characteristics of something “located” inside something else. As is well-known, among the sources that are traditional for emotions is the source “a container.” However, what is interesting is that instead *happiness* is represented via the source domain—“an entity located inside something.” In other words, *happiness* is not “a container” but something inside it. It should be mentioned that only the emotion keywords of *happiness* and *interest* reveal such conceptualizations. Concerning *happiness*, this unique characteristic is seen in examples in which this emotion is located inside things, majorly of a non-material nature:

(122) *"My dear friend! **So happy in this meeting!** And this is your establishment? It's a delightful place. It's a picture! You never find that anything goes off here accidentally, do you, my dear friend?"* (1:18)

(123) *I could understand the stillness in the house and the thoughtfulness it expressed on the part of all those who had always been so good to me. I could weep in the exquisite felicity of my heart and be as **happy in my weakness** as ever I had been **in my strength**.* (1:550)

(124) *I went on with my hair now, quite comfortably. I sobbed a little still, but that was because I had been crying, not because I was crying then. "And so Esther, my dear, you are happy for life. Happy with your best friends, happy in your old home, **happy in the power of doing a great deal of good**, and happy in the undeserved love of the best of men."* (1:572/4)

In essence, the conceptualization of *happiness* is developed via different cases of "an effect." In this regard, it should be mentioned that not only *happiness* is represented via "effects," which disturb the self (the second type of force dynamic); this emotion keyword is also represented linguistically via the sources that indicate various changes of bodily movement, which constitute the first type of force dynamic. As a combined number of conceptualizations, these sources indicate bodily changes of the following types: "an effect on bodily movement," "spatial orientation of the body," "an effect" on the lips, eyes, and the face. The analysis especially demonstrates conceptualizations of *happiness* as an effect on seeing somebody, as in *I am happy to see you*, and also an effect on hearing something positive, as in *I am happy to hear it* and an effect on saying something, as in *I'm happy to say*. The latter is represented with the source domain "an effect on speech," which is shown below:

(125) *The African project at present employs my whole time. It involves me in correspondence with public bodies and with private individuals anxious for the welfare of their species all over the country. **I am happy to say** it is advancing.* (1:499)

(126) *'Are people put in the cell today?' He had stared at the two window slits, imagining that he could see desperate eyes peering down.*

*'Not today. The Templars Order was dissolved in 1312.'*

*'But what about the lawyers?'*

*'I'm happy to say that the Lord Chancellor is satisfied with less Draconian measures.'* (4:104)

The types of force dynamic mentioned earlier (Type 1 and 2) are represented with a total of 134 examples: 105 of them are force dynamic Type 2 and 29 of force dynamic Type 1. The dynamic of an overlap of the second type remains stable among all emotions keywords. As can be seen from two examples above, the person experiences the positive feeling of saying something via the adjective *happy*. In addition to representing “an effect” of this positive emotion on the speech or voice, the description of various things and states as *happy* is specifically predominant. These cases are expressed by the conceptualization “an entity that characterises something.” As follows from Figure 16, what is generally referred to as “non-material objects” vary from the states of “being conscious” or “ignorant” to the description of having a particular idea or “thoughts” about “life” and “living,” which ends up with contemplating about happy “hours,” “days,” or “years.” Some of them are illustrated below:

(127) *So young, so beautiful, so full of hope and promise, they went on lightly through the sunlight as their own happy thoughts might then be traversing the years to come and making them all years of brightness.* (1:513)

(128) *Still gently jumping he spread his arms and she saw again that happy transforming smile. He said:*

*'We'll unpack and carry our stuff across. Then I'll come back for the bike. The bridge should hold.'* (4:133)

(129) *'Our putative Desmond is happily ignorant of the minutiae of the criminal law but he does know that malefactors find it convenient to supply the police with an alibi. 'I'm happy to say that the Lord Chancellor is satisfied with less Draconian measures.'* (4:341)

Example 128 is specifically rich with sources and this has resulted in multiple conceptualizations of the type “an effect on bodily movement” (*gently jumping, spread his arms*), “an effect on lips” (*transformative smile*), and “an entity that characterises something” (*transformative smile*). A specific way of perceiving happiness in relation to the state of being ignorant is demonstrated in Example 129. Collocation *blissful ignorance* as “unawareness or inexperience of something unpleasant” (CoED, 2016) can be a way to mean “happy” in certain circumstances, as is demonstrated by another phrase—“happily ignorant”—in Example 129. It should also be noted that the emotion keyword *happiness* shows interesting cases, especially so when the adjective *happy* is used to describe other emotions, such as satisfaction and love. These cases have been assigned with the code <special case: emotion describes emotion>:

(130) *Poirot murmured deprecatingly:  
'No, no. A little curiosity on my part, that is all.'  
'Only too happy to satisfy it. Which case is it?'  
'Elinor Carlisle.'  
'Oh, yes, girl who poisoned Mary Gerrard. Coming up for trial in two weeks' time. Interesting case. (3:52)*

(131) *Aunt Laura, tell me, honestly, do you think love is ever a happy thing?'*  
*Mrs Welman's face became grave.  
'In the sense you mean, Elinor – no, probably not...To care passionately for another human creature brings always more sorrow than joy; but all the same, Elinor, one would not be without that experience. (3:2)*

A certain connection has been traced with the emotion keyword *happiness* and the emotion keyword *love*. As shown in Example 131 above, *love* is described as “a thing” by means of the adjective *happy*. Dictionary entries for the word (*a*) *thing* imply that this word is “used to refer in an approximate way to an object or to avoid naming it” (CED, 2015). The adjective *approximate* and the verb (*to*) *avoid* both suit the description of love. This emotion is often interpreted in relation to interpersonal experiences linked with the past. That is why it is difficult to describe or assess love in one particular way, as the understanding will vary from person to person. However, the general perception of love normally includes the state of being happy, which is supported by the following example:

(124)<sup>71</sup> *I went on with my hair now, quite comfortably. I sobbed a little still, but that was because I had been crying, not because I was crying then. "And so Esther, my dear, you are happy for life. Happy with your best friends, happy in your old home, happy in the power of doing a great deal of good, and **happy in the undeserved love of the best of men.**" (1:572/5)*

In the example above, *love* conceptualizes as “a container” for *happiness*, which is the only case of this kind found in the corpus. The use of the source “a container” in relation to emotions often implies that this emotion is strong, which was stated, for example, by Radden (1998: 276):

*Due to its surrounding boundaries, a container exhibits the property of retaining whatever is inside it [...] The container schema conceptualises intense emotions which overpower a person to the extent that he is no longer in control of his free actions. As a result, the preposition **in** is used in expressions that denote very intense states.*

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<sup>71</sup> This example has already been used on p. 269 but in different context.

The peculiarity of Example 124 is that not only *love* conceptualizes as “a container,” but this “container” is meant for experiencing another emotion: happiness.

Examples like 130 and 131 are rare but they bring to light unique conceptualizations, the same as the context-dependent conceptualizations of *happiness*, including “parental care,” “parental work,” “destination,” and “fire.” The last one is rare among the very limited set of emotions and is rather an exception to the rule governing the conceptualization of the emotional experience of *happiness*:

(132) *He was looking towards it and it seemed to her that **his face was alight with happiness**. She couldn't ever remember seeing him like this. He was like a child who knows at last that the longed-for present is within his grasp. (4:204)*

(133) *“My children,” said Mr. Turveydrop, paternally encircling Caddy with his left arm as she sat beside him, and putting his right hand gracefully on his hip. “My son and daughter, **your happiness shall be my care**. (1:619)*

The conceptualization “destination” has been traced three times with the same meaning of a favorable outcome of a certain situation. Especially interesting is Example 134, where one can see the link between two emotions—love and happiness:

(134) *I enjoyed it too much myself—and then we gradually fell to considering how young they were, and how there must be a lapse of several years before this early **love** could come to anything, and **how it could come to happiness** only if it were real and lasting and inspired them with a steady resolution to do their duty to each other, with constancy, fortitude, and perseverance, each always for the other's sake. (1:615)*

(135) *She said, “You should avoid **living too much in the real world, young man. It isn't conducive to happiness.**” (4:200)*

From the analysis, it can be observed that *happiness* shows numerous conceptualizations as “an effect,” which accounts for this emotion to be influential on the general state of things, on bodily changes, and on actions, which are physical in nature rather than mental. As demonstrated, the corpus includes examples of *happiness* as “an entity” located inside something. This shows that *happiness* is represented in different events and states that people experience. In this regard, it should be noted that *happiness* does not belong to those emotion keywords that tend to describe only one thing or only one event. In contrast, it appears to be actively used when describing a variety of things, events, people, and states. The positive nature of happiness as emotion is clearly represented linguistically—the absolute majority of examples are positive, with only two examples in the parameter *anti-link*. Even this parameter is positively represented by the difference between the intensity of being *happy* and the intensity of being *contented*.

## **2. LAW AND ATTENTION: INTEREST**

### **2.1 Law and attention: Interest**

The emotion keyword of *interest* is the last to be analyzed and is also one of the most unusual among the “basic” type of emotions. Like happiness, the emotion of interest does not necessarily possess characteristics that can be instantly traced, for example, via bodily changes. The emotion of interest can be seen more as “a facet of human motivation” (Silvia, 2008: 57), which is also fixed in its dictionary definitions. According to the Cambridge English Dictionary, *interest* is “the feeling of wanting to

give your attention to something or of wanting to be involved with and to discover more about something” (CED, 2016). This definition includes two important notions related to interest: *curiosity* and *attention*. In this context, the notion of *appraisal*<sup>72</sup> plays a significant role in identifying what is important for people or a person, and what is not. In his research, Silvia (2008) examines different appraisals that cause interest. The author specifically suggests considering two appraisals that are important to the emotion of interest—(i) the “evaluation of an event’s *novelty—complexity*,” and less obvious appraisals of (ii) “the evaluation of an event’s *comprehensibility*” (Silvia, 2008: 60). The first appraisal is rather predictable; it is generally accepted among psychologists that the correlation to new or complex events can cause interest (e.g. Berlyne, 1960), while the second appraisal is further elaborated and is referred to as a  *coping-potential appraisal* (Berlyne, 1960; Lazarus, 1966). This type of appraisal refers to a person’s potential to cope with different new, uncertain, complex, and difficult events in terms of whether one has the ability or potential to deal with certain events or not. One could also add that the appraisal of comprehensibility is also linked to the notion of *motivation* not only as a “force” to cope with something, but as a motivation for evolving. The function of interest as a motivation in learning and developing abilities is one of the most fundamental in psychology because interest is linked to the notion of *attention*. In this regard, Silvia emphasizes that “[...] interest ensures that people will develop a broad set of knowledge, skills, and experience” (2008: 58). For Berlyne (1960), who studied the emotion of interest alongside with the notion of *attention*, “interest in attention and

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<sup>72</sup> See previous discussion in Chapter 1, section 3.3.1 and glossary.

exploratory behaviour is bound up by “explaining and predicting behaviour” (1960: 1).

When somebody is interested in somebody or something else, this means that attention as “the concentrated direction of the mind” (CoED, 2016) is given to somebody or something. In this case, the emotion of interest is strongly linked to the characteristic of something or somebody as being of interest. This characteristic is connected to curiosity. In this context, dictionary entries for *interest* define it as “the sense of curiosity about or concern with something or someone” (CoED, 2016). As is widely known, some things can be interesting for some people, whereas the same things can have no interest whatsoever for other people. Consequently, *interest* is assessed on the basis of personal (subjective) evaluation of things, events, and people. Usually, such personal assessment is motivated by potential advantages or benefits that a person can get from somebody or something. This characteristic is linked to the notion of *benefit*, especially in business and/or legal contexts. In a legal context, *interest* can be defined as “an involvement or a legal right, usually relating to a business or possessions” (CED, 2016) or “something that brings advantages to or affects someone or something” (CoED, 2016).

When examining the etymological entry for the word (*an*) *interest*, the Oxford English Dictionary refers to the history of this word as “obscure” and “far from clear” (OED, 2016). According to the OED, “There is much that is obscure in the history of this word, first as to the adoption of Latin *interest* as a noun, and secondary as to the history of the Old French sense ‘damage, loss’” (*id.*). The noun (*an*) *interest* traces back to the earlier *interest*, after the cognate French *interest*, modern *intérêt*, which derived from Latin *interest* meaning “difference, concern, matters” (*id.*). The

OED also indicates that “no other sense ['damage, loss'] is recorded in French until the 16<sup>th</sup> century” (*id.*).

On the basis of the definitions from dictionaries as well as on evidence from the qualitative metaphor analysis discussed in section 2.3, the cases of *interest* as *damage* or *loss* can be applied to the emotion keyword of *interest* as notions pertaining to business or legal matters. These matters usually include having claims upon something or being an interested party in something, such as inheritance that one does not want to lose.

## 2.2 The semantic field of *interest*

Silvia states that interest is “the curious emotion” (2008: 57). It is so, as the discussion of the emotion of interest is often linked to curiosity. The use of the words *curious* or *curiosity* can often be found as part of the definition of *interest*. When examining dictionary entries for the word (*an*) *interest*, definitions that include the words *curious* or *curiosity* as a description of *interest* as in “the sense of curiosity about something or someone” have been traced (CoED, 2016). What is more, the evidence from the corpus shows that the lexemes *curiosity* and *curious* are also present in the parameters of *link* and *anti-link*, the latter is shown in the example below and in Figures 17a and 17b below:

(136) *I felt, from my guardian's manner, that beyond this point I could not pursue the subject without changing the wind. I therefore forbore to ask any further questions. I was interested, but not curious.* (1:729)

The states of being *curious* and *interested* are two different states. When “naming emotion mixtures,” Plutchik suggests that *curiosity* is a combination of *acceptance* and *surprise* (1991: 118). In this regard, curiosity is related to the desire to learn and to investigate, to explore new and unknown things, as being “inquisitive” or “prying” (CoED, 2016), when interest is focused on deliberately paying attention to an object because this object has a personal value.

The semantic field of *interest* is the most complex among all emotion keywords, and this is especially noticeable with the noun (*an*) *interest*. The definition of the noun (*an*) *interest* has significantly more entries in dictionaries than the verb or the adjective. Similarly to the emotion keyword of *happiness*, *interest* is closely attached to events, things, and people. All the abovementioned is also reflected in its definitions in dictionaries. As follows from Figure 17a below, the analysis of dictionaries reveals four semantic groups for the noun (*an*) *interest*, which are titled *curiosity*, *benefit*, *professionalllegal*, and *share*. The verb (*to*) *interest* shows fewer semantic groups, representing three types of actions related to *sharing*, being *curious*, and *concern*.

One of the most important groups is the group *curiosity*, which includes lexemes representing the power of *interest* that stimulates the sense of being interested or interesting. The influential aspect to *interest* is reflected via the examples when one gives *attention* to something or has *concern* with something.



(137) *The trooper stands in the doorway, still and silent. Phil has stopped in a low clinking noise, with his little hammer in his hand. Mr. Woodcourt looks round with that grave professional interest and attention on his face, and glancing significantly at the trooper, signs to Phil to carry his table out.* (1:826)

One could also add that in the group *curiosity, interest* has examples of the *fact* or *quality of mattering*, as well as the quality of being of *importance*. In this sense, curiosity is linked to something of an influence as a powerful motivational force. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, curiosity is related to the state of wanting to learn something, to know more, to discover. On this level, two important components have been brought to light. First, the act of provoking an interest, and secondly, sufficient importance of the subject (event, person) in order to discover more about it. Consequently, the verb (*to*) *interest* reveals lexemes in the group *curiosity* that account for such actions that refer to eliciting *interest*, such as (*to*) *stimulate*, (*to*) *excite*, (*to*) *provoke*.

The second group titled *concern* includes lexemes (*to*) *give attention*, (*to*) *concern*, (*to*) *engage*, (*to*) *discover* more about something or somebody and others. As a rule, when something or somebody is a subject of somebody's interest, one expects to get benefits from it. The group *benefit* includes more examples of *interest* that accounts for benefit with the noun (*an*) *interest* rather than the verb (*to*) *interest*. This group includes lexemes *good*, *profit*, *advantage* and others, indicating "the selfish pursuit of one's own welfare" or "regard to one's own profit or advantage" (OED, 2016). It is important to note that the analysis shows that the benefit and advantage can be personal goals of both an individual and a group of people. In this context, *interest* can be defined as a "section of a community, whose members have common aims" (CoED, 2016). Several lexemes indicating a *shared interest* have

been found both with the noun and the verb and are presented in Figure 17a within the groups *share* and *(to) share*. The analysis brings to light more examples with the noun *(an) interest*, including *common interest*, *involvement*, or *interest group*.

The theme of benefit and profit is continued through another semantic group *professional/legal*, which has been traced only with the noun *(an) interest*. According to dictionaries, *interest* can be “an involvement or a legal right, usually related to a business or possessions” (CED, 2016). Therefore, the examples in this group are the expressions *legal concern*, *claim upon something*, *right to something*, and also financially related words and phrases *fixed costs*, *money*, and *charge*.

The indication of any kind of enjoyment, pleasure, or other positive states is poorly represented in dictionary entries of *interest*. Only one definition of *(an) interest* referring to “activities one enjoys” (CED, 2016) could be found. Such distribution can be explained by the characteristic of *interest* as emotion correlated with curiosity and attention, rather than the pleasure or enjoyment that can be gained from this. However, the evidence from the corpus shows that the parameters *quality* and especially *link* include positive emotional states.

As can be seen from Figure 17b, *interest* is significantly represented among the parameters *quality*, *intensity*, and *link*. It should also be noted, that the specific parameter *anti-link* is represented with more examples than the same parameters of any other emotion keyword. The evaluation of *interest* on the parameter of *quality* does not show any overlap among the words used to describe *interest*. It is also clear that there are cases of positive or negative characteristics of *interest* because the range of qualities of *interest* is wide. On the one hand, *interest* is both “professional” and “personal”. On the other hand, *interest* is represented in the corpus both as

something “horrific” and something “compassionate.” Some examples state that *interest* is “compelling” and “paramount” but some present cases when *interest* is “casual:”

(138) *He was obsessed with the criminal law, nothing seemed more natural to him than that I should share this compelling interest.* (4:534)

(139) *He switched on the desk lamp and unwrapped and opened Edmund Froggett’s scrap-book, turning the pages at first with casual interest, and then with a more deliberate attention.* (4:522)

As can be seen in Example 138, not only *interest* has the quality of “compelling” but it also is something that requires to be shared, which echoes the semantic group *share* discussed earlier. In Example 139, *interest* is described as “casual” as the way of pointing back to subject’s careful “staging” of his attitude.

Then again, the qualities of *interest* vary, which can be partially explained by the high dependency of *interest* on the context in which it is used. The same can be applied to another parameter of *interest*: *link*. The words that co-occur with *interest* vary from very different words and phrases, such as “memory,” “personality,” and “curiosity” to emotionally charged “pity” and “sympathetic,” and to the emotions of fear, satisfaction, and the state of being happy. The following examples illustrate this diversity:

(140) *But when I came to myself and saw how shocked my guardian was and found that they were earnestly speaking of the suspected man and recalling every favourable impression we had formed of him out of the good we had known of him, my interest and my fears were so strongly aroused in his behalf that I was quite set up again.* (1:93)

(141) *It was as if they needed a respite even from their colleagues' interest or curiosity. But with Monday the calm was broken.*  
(4:513)

Example 140 indicates *interest* as a highly emotional response. The dynamic of strong or heightened *interest* is stable among all examples. The parameter *intensity* is mainly marked by the degree modifiers that indicate increase of *interest*, such as *more*, *very*, and *so*, and fewer examples showing decrease by means of *little* and *the slightest*. The analysis demonstrates an overlap of degree modifiers of the “more” type in 11 examples, which is the biggest number among all emotion keywords. *Interest* shows rather different qualities and contexts of experiencing this emotion, but the intensity of *interest* is stable.

In the next section, the cross-domain mapping of *interest* shows which source domains are typically used with this emotion keyword and how the parameters discussed in this section are distributed among the source domains of *interest*.

## 2.3 Analysis based on affinities between source domains of *interest*

### 2.3.1 Quantitative and qualitative overview

The analysis shows 299 quotations with the emotion keyword *interest*, as illustrated in Table 13 below.

	Noun (an) interest	Verb (to) interest	Adjective (to be) interested	Adjective interesting	Total
Time-frame 1	102	7	26	7	142
Time-frame 2	21	4	10	26	61
Time-frame 3	56	3	20	17	96
					299

**Table 13.** Word-class distribution of *interest*

The coding has resulted in a total number of 53 codes, 9 of which are constant codes, and 43 are codes that represent the source domains. The analysis of *interest* also shows one additional parameter—*measure*—which is represented by three examples. This parameter has been coded <measure> and it indicates cases when *interest* is measured, as “a bit of” *interest* and two examples of “some” *interest*. The overall distribution of the source domains is not stable with an overlap of certain source domains, which are represented in Table 14 below.

	Time-frame 1	Time-frame 2	Time-frame 3
POSSESSION	55	8	25
AN ENTITY LOCATED INSIDE SOMETHING	26	6	27
AN ENTITY THAT CHARACTERISES SOMETHING	12	21	23
OBJECT	27	8	13
AN EFFECT ON A STATE LINKED TO SOMEBODY	11	10	3

**Table 14.** Distribution of the most frequent source domains of *interest* in all time-frames

As can be seen from the Table 14 above, there is no prevalence of the source domain “an existence of emotion is presence here,” which shows frequency among the emotion keywords *guilt* and *happiness*. What is also noticeable is a smaller number of examples of other source domains that demonstrate frequency among the emotion keywords *fear* and *surprise* —“an effect on a state linked to something” and “an effect on action.” The results from the cross-domain mapping of *interest* reveal predominance of the conceptualization “a possession” and the conceptualization of the same kind—“an object.” The distribution of these two sources shows such frequency only with the emotion keyword *interest*. This can be partially explained by an overlap of the noun (*an*) *interest*, especially in the first and the third time-frames. It is important to mention that the multiple source domain mapping has resulted in

the pattern “a possession”/ “an object” + “an entity located inside something,” which is linguistically represented mainly by nouns and the preposition *in*. The example below illustrates this case:

(142) *Old Bailey? Had there been another **trial** on that day **in which she had a personal interest**? Or was this tied up with her interest in Aldridge?* (4:525)

In Example 142, *interest* is “personal” and, therefore, conceptualized as “a possession.” In addition, the object of *interest* is “trial,” in which one is interested. Consequently, the second source domain assigned in this example is “an entity located inside something.” Although this pattern exists among the multiple source mapping, the single source domain mapping prevails with 163 out of 299 examples. Besides, the analysis brings to light a greater number of examples with single source domains and one or two parameters attached to the emotion keyword of *interest*, rather than two or more source domains with no evaluation parameters. The same patterns have also been traced with the parameter that accounts for the use of *interest* with another emotion or emotion-related keyword, or when emotion keyword describes *interest* which is called *special case*. These examples show the correlation of *interest* with both positive and negative emotional experiences, including “curiosity,” “compassion,” and “horror,” as illustrated below:

(143) *"Do you think he did it on purpose?" asks Krook.  
"Took the over-dose?"  
"Yes!" Krook almost smacks his lips with the unction of a  
horrible interest.* (1:733)

(144) *Nor is he merely curious, for **in his bright dark eye there is compassionate interest**; and as he looks here and there, he seems to understand such wretchedness and to have studied it before.* (1:818)

The emotion keyword *interest* displays more specific patterns than other emotion keywords under scrutiny. More on various conceptualizations is discussed in the following section.

### 2.3.2 Metaphorical patterns of *interest*

The most frequent conceptualizations that have been brought to light by the analysis characterize *interest* as somebody's "possession," "an object," and "an entity located inside something." Although the first two conceptualizations are traditional in metaphor mapping, the evidence from the corpus interestingly shows that *interest* varies as "an object" or "a possession." This emotional experience can conceptualize as "a heavy object," (Example 145), "a desired object" (Example 146), or "a hidden object" (Example 147):

(145) *When Mr. Bucket has **a matter of this pressing interest** under his consideration, the fat forefinger seems to rise, to the dignity of a familiar demon. He puts it to his ears, and it whispers information; he puts it to his lips, and it enjoins him to secrecy; he rubs it over his nose, and it sharpens his scent; he shakes it before a guilty man, and it charms him to his destruction.* (1:692)

(146) *They wanted everything. They wanted wearing apparel, they wanted linen **rags**, they wanted **money**, they wanted **coals**, they wanted **soup**, **they wanted interest**, they wanted **autographs**, they wanted flannel, they wanted whatever Mr. Jarndyce had—or had not. Their objects were as various as their demands.* (1:725)

(147) *As expected, Gran took the news of the murder in her stride. She seldom showed interest in people she hadn't met, and had long decided that Pawlet Court was her granddaughter's world, too remote from her life to be of interest.* (4:495)

Similarly, the conceptualization “a possession” shows variations, including “a possession to look after” or “a possession that requires explanation.” The examples below illustrate these cases:

(148) *I also want Ada to know that if I see her seldom just now, I am looking after her interests as well as my own—we two being in the same boat exactly—and that I hope she will not suppose from any flying rumours she may hear that I am at all light-headed or imprudent [...]* (1:785)

(149) *He said: 'You have been told, Commander, that I have come about the murder of Miss Venetia Aldridge, QC. I should explain my interest in this matter, but I expect you will first need my name and address.'*  
*'Thank you,' said Dalgliesh, 'that would be helpful.'* (4:514)

(150) *Froggett had spoken with a dignified regret that could be covering a more personal loss, but Dalgliesh suspected that the reality of Aldridge's death had yet to hit him. At present he was caught up in the excitement of it, the self-importance of bringing his record to the police, the sense that he still had a part to play. Or was his interest more in the criminal law than in the lawyer?* (4:523)

Some peculiar examples could be traced, in which *interest* conceptualized both as “a container” and “a possession.” Twelve examples of this kind have been traced specifically with the emotion keyword *interest* and only once with *fear*:

(151) *You are separately represented, and no longer hidden and lost in the interests of others. THAT'S something. The suit does not sleep; we wake it up, we air it, we walk it about.* (1:795)

In Examples 147, 149, and 150, not only does *interest* conceptualize as “an object” or “a possession,” but it also has a “location” because it is present inside

somebody and/or inside something. As mentioned earlier, the conceptualizations “an entity located inside something” and “an entity located inside somebody” usually attach “an object” and/or “a possession” to the sources. On the one hand, *interest* is “located” inside people or a person (Example 147); on the other hand, *interest* is “located” inside material and non-material objects with the predominance of the latter, including “suit,” “case,” “trial,” and “criminal law” (see Figure 18 below):

(152) *"Oh! His interests, Mr. Vholes!"*  
*"Pardon me," returned Mr. Vholes, going on in exactly the same inward and dispassionate manner. "Mr. C. takes certain interests under certain wills disputed in the suit. It is a term we use.* (1:850/2)

(153) *Mrs Carpenter might have had a sudden wish to experience a trial. She might have had some interest in the case.* (4:524)

As follows from Figure 18, the conceptualization “an entity” prevails with examples in which *interest* is “located” inside objects of a non-material nature. In this context, it is important to mention that the analysis shows a few examples, in which *interest* is “located” inside a potential action:

(154) *'Venetia? This is the first I've heard of it. She's never shown the slightest interest in becoming Head of Chambers.'* (4:454)



nature, such as “career,” “thought,” or “financial activities.” The selected examples illustrate this point:

(155) [...] in Miss Barbary stating Miss Summerson's real name to be Hawdon; in your ladyship's knowing both these names VERY WELL; and in Hawdon's dying as he did—to give your ladyship a family interest in going further into the case, I will bring these papers here. (1:768)

(156) 'I know. Being a writer of detective stories, I have naturally studied your career with interest.' (2:230)

(157) 'But there's just one thing. I fancy it would be interesting to investigate his financial activities. I've done a good bit one way and another with stockbroking, you know, and yesterday in his absence I took a call for him which I wasn't meant to hear. (2:240)

So far, I have established that the sources “effects” on actions and “effects” linked to things are of a non-material nature. Similarly, the conceptualization “an entity that characterises something” prevails with examples in which *interest* is used to describe “question,” “conversation,” “case,” “power,” and also the state of being curious, as can be seen in Examples 158 and 159 below:

(158) Not looking at him, I made my voice steady, **the question no more than one of casual interest.** (4:535)

(159) And he thinks, **with the interest of attentive curiosity,** as he watches the struggle in her breast, "The power and force of this woman are astonishing!" (1:805)

Example 159 is especially relevant as the notions *attention* and *curiosity* are important to the emotion of interest and are often used in its definition. Besides, the mental processing involved is expressed by the verb (*to*) *think*, which implies that *interest* pertains to mental processing. Apart from the noun (*an*) *interest*, most cases similar to Example 160 include the adjective *interesting*, which is almost always

used to characterize something or for a great part, various non-material objects, as can be seen in the following example:

(160) *Mr. Guppy, who has an inquiring mind in matters of evidence and who has been suffering severely from the lassitude of the long vacation, takes that interest in the case that he enters on a **regular cross-examination of the witness, which is found so interesting by the ladies** that Mrs. Snagsby politely invites him to step upstairs and drink a cup of tea, if he will excuse the disarranged state of the tea-table, consequent on their previous exertions. (1:752/1)*

The major conceptualizations of *interest*, including “an object,” “a possession,” “an effect,” or “an entity” have proved the context-dependent aspect of this emotion keyword and less physical agitation linked to *interest*. When *interest* is unrelated to the second type of force dynamic, it shows more qualities and less intensity. The overall force dynamic of *interest* has been traced among 152 examples out of total 299 quotations: 37 of these represent the first type of force dynamic; the second type of force dynamic covers 115 examples. The evidence from the corpus demonstrates a limited number of examples of the influence of *interest* on the body. As a rule, the description of something or somebody as *interesting* or *interested* is context dependent and linked to the event or potential benefit from the event without specifically indicating *interest* via bodily changes. Nevertheless, the analysis shows a few “effects” on bodily changes, including “an effect” on the face, voice, speech, lips, hearing or looking, as is shown in the selected examples below:

(161) *Dalgliesh, who was beginning to **get up, sat down** again and **said in a voice of calm interest**: ‘Wouldn’t you? Why is that, Miss Cummins?’ (4:491)*

(162) *Hercule Poirot was looking at Peter Lord with some interest. He said gently: 'I think, mon cher, there is something else – something that you have not yet told me.'* (3:130)

As a variation, examples of spatial orientation of the body have been traced when something interesting has drawn the attention of the audience, as is illustrated below:

(163) *Worse than that, we found such an unusual crowd in the Court of Chancery that it was full to the door, and we could neither see nor hear what was passing within. It appeared to be something droll, for occasionally there was a laugh and a cry of "Silence!" **It appeared to be something interesting, for every one was pushing and striving to get nearer [...]** We asked a gentleman by us if he knew what cause was on. He told us Jarndyce and Jarndyce.* (1:861)

All things considered, the emotion keyword *interest* shows the conceptualization “a possession,” as being the most frequent. In many cases, *interest* also shows the conceptualization of “an entity” that is “located” inside various non-material objects. The linguistic representation of these non-material objects varies from trials, suits, cases, to power and business. What is more, *interest* also conceptualizes as “an entity” inside actions. Motivationally driven, not only people are interested in somebody or something but their attention and/or benefits are directed toward actions, both potential and already realized, such as the ambition to become head of Chambers. Partially because *interest* is linked to goals and benefits, the conceptualizations of bodily changes are limited: people do not tend to express their interest actively by gestures or alternations of facial expressions. The evidence from the corpus suggests that sometimes people tend not to show their interest for reasons linked to self-interest or benefit.

## Summary

The analysis of the emotion keywords of *happiness* and *interest* presented in this chapter provides insight into how these positive emotions lexicalize and conceptualize in the language of legal fiction. Starting with the etymological entries for the given emotion words, it becomes clear that both words *happiness* and *interest* has their peculiarities. *Happiness* is often linked with the notions of *joy* and *bliss*, but also with the notions of *success* and *action*, which generally indicate the pursuit of happiness in life. The word *happiness* shows quite stable definitions over the centuries with a constant positive evaluation of this emotion. In contrast, the word *interest* varies in its definitions, especially ambiguous in its meaning of *damage* and *loss*. As it appears from modern dictionary entries, these two words (*damage* and *loss*) are relevant in so far as they connect *interest* with the notions of *benefit*, *share*, and *professional concern*. However, the main characteristic of *interest* in dictionaries remains stable; it is prevalently described via the word *curiosity*. Silvia named interest “the curious emotion” (2008: 57) and also linked it with *attention* because what is interesting for people is usually important for them.

The analysis of dictionary entries brings to light the connection of *happiness* and *interest* with a certain set of related words via which they can be described. In this context, the parameters *link* and *quality* are specifically important. Both emotion keywords (*happiness* and *interest*) demonstrate numerous examples for these parameters: *happiness* has prevalent positive words used to describe emotional situation, and/or person. *Interest* varies in both very positive and negative words that co-occurs with this emotion keyword, including *fear*, *regret*, *happiness*, *satisfaction*,

or *curiosity*. It should be noted that the parameter *quality* is especially diverse with the emotion keyword of *interest*. The findings suggest that *interest* tends to be personal (or shared but important as a whole for a group of people), which results in a wide range of qualities for *interest*: *vital*, *personal*, *mysterious*, or *intellectual*. What is also noticeable is that the extra-linguistic parameter—*time marker*—is represented with the absolute predominant number of entries among all emotion keywords with the emotion of *happiness*. The tendency is that the emotional experience of being happy seems to be often calculated in minutes, hours, days, or “forever,” especially in those sentences when characters are reminiscing about being happy in the past.

Having evaluated the given emotion keywords on the extra-linguistic parameters, the analysis continues with the identification of the strongest and weakest source domains for *happiness* and *interest*. *Happiness* conceptualizes mainly as “an effect” or “an entity that characterises somebody/something,” which is explained by the predominant number of adjectives used to describe people and things, including the “state of things” or “thoughts.” The findings show that the conceptualization as “an effect” emphasizes bodily changes when one is happy, which is represented mainly via bodily changes and/or movement and much less with examples describing mental actions, such as *(to) know*. In contrast to *happiness*, *interest* prevails in the conceptualization “a possession,” mainly owing to the predominance of nouns rather than adjectives representing *interest*. A specific use of the word *interest* as “an object” has been traced when *interest* is “located” inside different non-material things, such as “case” or “power;” this is mainly indicated by

the use of the preposition *in*. This type of conceptualization is unique only for this emotions keyword and one time for *happiness*.

In the next chapter, I review the results from the qualitative metaphor analysis and explore possible ways in which the cognitive linguistics' theory can be taken forward in the study of emotions as expressed in language.



### EMOTIONS IN THE LANGUAGE OF LEGAL FICTION

The discussion about the findings of the analysis in the previous two chapters has been provided separately for each emotion keyword under scrutiny. The aim of this chapter is to make a synthesis of those findings and discuss the possible avenues for future research into emotions as expressed in language. When performing qualitative metaphor analysis, several benefits have been highlighted that helped boost the traditional cross-domain mapping from both theoretical and practical points of view. However, some shortcomings have also been recognized during the process, which are discussed in section 3 of this chapter.

The aim of this chapter is to overview the main findings, including the source domain variations and the parameters of emotional expression in legal fiction, which proved to be the source of the efficient extra-linguistic information.<sup>73</sup> The parameters of emotional expression in language have been identified on the basis of the findings obtained from the analysis. In this regard, this chapter also specifies possibilities for potential further research later in this chapter.

The framework created for the analysis of the five emotion keywords is suitable for the study of *emotion* as a target domain while examining literary texts of a certain genre. However, some prospects need to be addressed concerning the use of the same framework for the notion of *emotion* in other contexts and with other source data. The findings from the analysis suggest a possibility of studying emotion

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<sup>73</sup> The summary of the results from the analysis discussed in this chapter is represented in Appendices 3 and 4, which include a tabular output of codes and a full cross-domain mapping of 900 emotion keywords.

keywords in relation to mental processes, which is examined in this chapter and is represented as a direction for future research.

## **1. EMOTION METAPHORS IN LEGAL FICTION**

### **1.1 A complex approach to the study of emotional expression in language**

In Chapters 4 and 5, an experimental investigation on how the emotion keywords lexicalize and conceptualize in the language of legal fiction has been described. The qualitative metaphor analysis employed in the present study is structured in such a way that it allows (i) “to reconstruct models [...] through a collection, categorization, and analysis of metaphors in a corpus,” (ii) to “provide checks and keep the moorings of the analysis in the data backwards traceable,” and (iii) to “reflexively explicate all strategic choices and the possible bias that results from it” (Kimmel, 2012: 4). When describing these important points, Kimmel also emphasizes the following (*id.*):

*The aforementioned hermeneutic nature of the applied art of metaphor analysis is certainly not a license for an “anything goes” or reliance on intuition. It is **because** the qualitative research community recognizes interpretive expertise as something irreducible that readers of a study should be able to reconstruct how claims came about.*


As can be seen from Chapters 4 and 5, categorizing is an important part of the analysis, where the emotion keywords under scrutiny are complex linguistic items with a compound structure. The qualitative metaphor analysis of the emotion keywords shows that emotions in legal fiction are significant as “effects” on a state

linked to somebody or something, as well as “entities” located inside a person or a non-material thing. When emotions affect people, they are associated to someone or something who/which is the stimulus of emotional response. Such response can be mild or very expressive; even the emotional response can only be thought of in the mind, meaning that a person can think of potential emotional response to the stimuli. Besides, the evidence from the corpus suggests that the emotion keywords categorize further on the parameters of *quality*, *intensity*, *time marker*, and their opposition (*anti-link*) and association with other words (*link*), including emotion-related ones, which are generally of the same type (e.g. positive emotion keywords with positive notions, etc.).

To visualize the process of the analysis, the flowchart in Figure 19 below represents the structure of the analysis with its major components.



When dealing with a significant amount of linguistic data and especially when analyzing each item—that is, each emotion keyword—from a qualitative perspective, such an approach implies that various characteristics belong to a single item. In the case of qualitative approach to linguistic data, a systematic approach is needed in order not to omit important details. As an example, Figure 20 below represents a single quotation with different linguistic and extra-linguistic information.



**Figure 20.** Quotation 1:33 diagram

Figure 20 shows two significant domains—the target domain and the source domain—that represent parts of the cross-domain mapping. Two-tier strategy employed in the cross-domain mapping brings to light two different source domains for a single quotation: “a container” and “an effect.” One could also add that quotation 1:33 shows (i) the force dynamic of the emotion keyword of *fear*, which is of Type 1 (physical agitation as a response to emotion), and (ii) parameter of

emotional expression, which is *intensity*. When the amount of linguistic and extra-linguistic information for a single example is quite rich as is shown in Figure 20, the use of ATLAS.ti is convenient to give some structure to the analysis. The software has helped to build-up a framework for coding, which is easily accessible and well-ordered. For example, during coding with ATLAS.ti, certain codes have shown variations, which in turn has led to the predominance of certain source domains over the others, and/or to dissimilarity of certain source domains, as well as frequent examples of certain parameters that evaluate the emotion keywords.

In what follows, the categories of the emotion keywords that have been elicited through the analysis are observed.

## **1.2 The target domains of the emotion keywords**

The main target domain in the analysis is *emotion* but it has variations depending on the part of speech that represents it—i.e. (*a*) *surprise*, (*to*) *surprise*, *surprising*, etc. The target domains are pre-selected and include the variations of five emotion keywords of *fear*, *guilt*, *surprise*, *happiness*, and *interest*. Having performed the qualitative metaphor analysis, it seems that the choice of the emotion keywords is justified in terms of a variety of parts of speech, the types of emotions, and their diverse conceptualizations that have been brought to light. The combination of these factors has helped to examine the linguistic expression of emotions in legal fiction in greater detail. Each emotion keyword mentioned above is represented whether by nouns, verbs, adjectives, or adverbs. Besides, the pre-selection process has taken into

account a variety of emotional experiences, and this has resulted in positive, negative, and dual-nature emotion keywords.

It should be mentioned that the source data is rich in other emotion keywords represented by different parts of speech. Further research into emotions in legal fiction would benefit from an exhaustive analysis when including all emotion keywords traced in texts. One could also add that four novels include various phraseological units with emotional or sentimental content. The inclusion of this category of linguistic information can be used in further analysis—for example, in order to check the representation of emotions in such constant units as idioms. This step could be specifically advantageous in cross-cultural studies because the phraseological units that contain different lexical elements but one meaning are often culture-specific.

### **1.3 The source domains of the emotion keywords**

In contrast to a single target domain/a group of target domains of *emotion*, which was also preselected for the analysis, the source domains are the most significant domains for the analysis because they disclose variations in the way emotions conceptualize in the language of legal fiction.

On the ground of a generally accepted knowledge about conceptualizations of emotions from previous research (Kövecses, 2004; Evans *et al.*, 2007; Beger & Flensburg, 2009; Oster, 2010), there has been some anticipation to trace certain source domains in the corpus. However, each source data has their peculiarities, which have resulted in infrequent but salient source domains. Such examples belong

to the group *Miscellaneous*, with a small but significant number of examples since most of the conceptualizations are unique or rare. The analysis shows the following groups,<sup>74</sup> which represent the strongest conceptualizations of the emotion keywords in legal fiction:

- Proxemics and containment
- Importance and flexibility
- Effects on the body
- Objectification, possession, and personification
- Miscellaneous

The groups *Effects on the body* and *Objectification, possession, and personification* mentioned above show variations of source domains, the majority of which belong to the so-called “traditional” source domains for emotion concepts, such as “an object” and “a possession.” Some interesting variations have also been detected among the source “a living creature,” which belong to the group *Objectification, possession, and personification*. The group *Proxemics and containment* comprises the traditional cases of conceptualization of emotions as “containers,” but more importantly, also as “entities located inside something.” The context-oriented analysis of the emotion keywords brings to light a variety of “things” that emotions can be located in. The group titled *Importance and flexibility* represents examples that indicate emotions as “effects” on a state linked to somebody or something. Emotions as causes of somebody’s actions have in turn a separate conceptualization “an effect on action.” Besides, this group includes prevalent conceptualizations of “entities that characterises somebody/something,” which

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<sup>74</sup> See Appendix 3 for an exhaustive table with codes, groups of codes, the target and the source domains.

identifies emotions as descriptions of various things, including “happy day” or “fearful passion.” The group *Miscellaneous* demonstrates almost no variations of the source domains because most of these source domains are unique, except for the sources “a component,” “an entity,” and “parental care/parental work,” which show from one to five extensions.

The distribution of the source domains tend to be stable in terms of a constant presence of the sources “an effect on a state linked to somebody/something” and “an effect on action” in the top five sources among all emotion keywords. However, the findings show several differences. The predominant conceptualizations of *fear* and *surprise* differ as “an effect on action” and “an effect on a state linked to somebody,” respectively. *Guilt* and *happiness* are represented with the same predominant source—“an existence of emotion is presence here”—which considers the most basic in the cross-domain mapping of emotion concepts. The most different set of the source domains belongs to the emotion keyword *interest*, which shows an overlap with the source “a possession.” Concerning this source, the pattern has been revealed among the multiple cross-domain mappings, representing a combination of the sources “a possession” or “an object” with the source domain “an entity located inside something.” Both source domains mentioned above have been found among all emotion keywords, but separately. The combination exists only with the emotion keyword *interest* and only once with *happiness*.

### 1.3.1 Metaphor patterns of emotion keywords: Emotion as an EFFECT

As discussed in Chapter 1, emotion is a sequential process with the cause for emotion, appraisal of the cause and further emotional response, as is also supported by the findings. Taking its basis in the source “a force,” the evidence from the corpus shows the sources “an effect on a state linked to somebody/something” and “an effect on action,” which make up the most significant conceptualizations among all emotion keywords. The cross-domain mapping has resulted in the predominant conceptualizations mentioned above across all emotion keywords, except for *interest*, with the source “a possession” prevailing over others and the similar source “an object,” which is the third most frequent source with this emotion keyword. According to the findings, “effects” emotions produce on somebody also link to actions somebody is taking or is going to take. In this regard, I came across with the overlapping combination of the sources “an effect on a state linked to somebody/something” and “an effect on action.” As an example, people often fear action that somebody else took or is going to take, if this action is a matter of danger and/or threat for somebody.

The statement made in Chapter 1 that emotions have a cognitive element to them—that is, they are cognitively appraised—has been confirmed by the findings. While examining the conceptualization “an effect on action,” two major categories of action have been traced: the physical action and action pertaining to mental processes, such as *thinking*, *knowing*, or *remembering*. All emotion keywords are provided with examples of both types of actions. In particular, *surprise* and *happiness* show a strong influence on physical actions, including *(to) take*, *(to) find*,

or (to) wait. However, the majority of examples demonstrates prevalence of mental actions, especially with the emotion keywords *interest*, including the verbs (to) know, (to) think, or a phrase “to arrive at the truth.”

### **1.3.2 Metaphor patterns of emotion keywords: Emotion as an ENTITY**

#### **LOCATED INSIDE SOMETHING/SOMEBODY**

As is well-known, the conceptualization as “a container” is one of the traditional in metaphor logic, and in relation to emotions, signifies that the emotion under scrutiny is intense or powerful. The source “a container” is represented among the sources but in a limited number. The findings from the present study suggest slightly reversed cases. In particular, the emotion keyword *interest* conceptualized as “an entity located inside something” rather than as “a container.” Similarly to the actions that pertain to mental processes, the source “an entity” includes examples of “location” of *interest* in various non-material objects. In other words, people tend to “take” *interest* “in” something, including things or objects, such as “suit,” “case,” “criminal law,” and “trial.” Considering this source, I came across a pattern of the multiple cross-domain mapping—“a possession” or “an object” in a combination with the source “an entity located inside something.” This suggests a “relocation” of *interest* as “an object,” because *interests* are often personally driven with the expectation of some benefit or profit.

### 1.3.3 Metaphor patterns of emotion keywords: Emotion as an EFFECT ON THE BODY

In addition to “locating” inside something, the findings show that emotions can be “effects” on bodily orientation in space and body motions, such as gestures. Cartesian mind and body dualism is embedded in Western thought to the extent that all emotions have representations via bodily changes or that certain body parts are associated with certain emotions. Such connection is central in the study of emotions from the point of view of cognitive linguistics, as well as that of psychology. However, the findings demonstrate that not all emotion keywords are sufficiently represented via “effects” on bodily changes. To be able to trace variation in emotional agitation, Talmy’s force dynamic has been adopted to examine emotions. Emotions as powerful “forces” affect people in different ways. Consequently, two types of a force dynamics have been identified in the corpus: Type 1 and Type 2. The first one indicates physical/bodily changes, which are often expressed in language as responses to stimuli. The second type prevails in the corpus and is linked to the ways emotions influence the self without focusing on bodily changes.

Such state of affairs is both anticipated and unexpected, depending on the type of the emotion keyword. For example, it was anticipated that the dual-nature emotion keyword of *surprise* would display more cases of bodily changes (Type 1), as the emotion of surprise is normally unexpected and causing involuntary body movements, such as raising eyebrows or jumping out of surprise. The evidence from the corpus shows such kind of examples but at the same time, the force dynamic Type 2 represents a slight overlap. This may signal that the emotion keywords in

legal fiction tend to be used when describing situations involving not only physical but also mental actions. This accounts for the inclusiveness of emotions in the processes of decision-making or judging.

In the context of bodily changes, it should be mentioned that not all emotion keywords show a strong connection as causes for these changes. For example, guilt is a self-assessed emotion linked to the notions of *innocence* and *shame* but the emotion of surprise plays a significant role in the bodily changes caused by the factors triggering surprise. The findings show that *surprise* is the only emotion keyword that is represented by the most numerous examples of bodily changes. The conceptualization of emotions as “effects,” especially on the face and the voice, are linguistically represented by means of such phrases as *to raise an eyebrow in surprise*, *to say something in surprise*, or *to look surprised*. All these examples are part of force dynamic Type 1. Nevertheless, force dynamic Type 2 is consistently stable with the emotion keyword of *surprise*, as well as all other emotion keywords. The given emotion keywords show predominance with examples in which emotions influence somebody or something, both as an actual influence, as in *the contemplation of our happiness alone affected him* (1:612), or a thought of such an influence, as in this example: *Elinor Carlisle had reason to fear that she might be disinherited in favour of an outsider* (3:8/1).

### 1.3.4 Metaphor patterns of emotion keywords: Emotion as an OBJECT and a POSSESSION

The conceptualizations of emotions as “objects” and “possessions” are represented with numerous examples although less numerous than “effects” causing (potential) changes, for example, in behavior. The conceptualization as “objects” is more frequently used not simply as “objects” but with certain characteristics, including “lost object,” “visible object,” or “entrusted object.” As an illustration, the conceptualizations of “objects” have been traced as “undesirable” with the negative emotion keyword *guilt*, as well as “painful possessions” with the same keyword. Both positive and negative connotations have been found among examples with the emotion keyword *interest*, such as in being “personal,” “desired,” or “pressing” *interest*.

Interestingly, the source domain “a possession” demonstrates almost as many variations as the source domains that indicate bodily changes. The findings suggest that emotions as “possessions” can be both visible and hidden (e.g. *surprise*), that one can entrust emotions as “possessions” to somebody else (e.g. *interest*), or share “possessions” (e.g. *happiness*), while other emotions as “possessions” require taking care of or looking after (e.g. *interest*).

As can be seen, not only do source domains vary, but the emotion keywords have several extra-linguistic parameters. In the next section, a summary is provided for the parameters of emotional expression in the language of legal fiction, which is then elaborated as a possibility for future research.

## 2. EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION IN LANGUAGE

### 2.1 The parameters of emotional expression in language

As discussed in Chapter 2, the psychology of emotions suggests that emotional experiences usually have their time course and intensity—in other words, they can be long-lasting and mild or, on the contrary, impulsive and strong. However, it is not exactly known how emotions would be expressed in language until there have been some preliminary observations of, in my case, genre specific texts. That is, one of the prerequisites for identifying the parameters of emotions is to examine the source data. When selecting the source data for the analysis, the number of fiction novels has been considered in order to check whether the parameters of emotional expression tended to be the same or, perhaps, there were additional parameters that could be traced. On the whole, the four novels display similar parameters, which accounts for the universality of emotional experiences and the ways authors represent them in their novels even in such different time spans.

As for the distribution of the parameter *link*, it demonstrates that each emotion keyword is used in close proximity to other words, mainly of the same type. This is specifically applied to the emotion keywords of *fear* and *happiness*. The emotion keyword of *fear* is predominantly used with the negative words, such as “terror” and “horror,” whereas opposite to *fear* *happiness* commonly shows more examples with the positive connotations, including “joy” and “hope.”

The theme of guilt and innocence is embedded in many cultures through the socially and psychologically driven notion *guilt culture*, as well as through the legal

concepts *presumption of innocence* and *reasonable doubt*. This has also been traced in the way *guilt* is represented in the corpus. Here, the negative emotion keyword *guilt* shows both negative connotations, such as “resentment” and some positive ones, including “innocent” and “hope.” More twofold distribution of connotations has been traced with the dual-nature emotion keyword *surprise* and the context-dependent emotion keyword of *interest*. As an illustration with *surprise*, the parameter *link* varies from positive “satisfaction” and “pleasure” to negative “regret” and “horror.” However, there are some examples of being “puzzled” and “startled,” which account for the marginal zone of *surprise*: “puzzled” and “startled” can relate to positive and negative experiences.

As can be seen, the emotion keywords under scrutiny all co-occur either with other emotion keywords, or notions related to emotional experiences. In this sense, the analysis of *interest* brings to light one of the most compelling findings. Depending on the context, *interest* has a close proximity to positive (“happy,” “sanguine,” “sympathetic”) and negative (“fear,” “regret,” “pity”) emotion and/or emotion-related words, as well as various context-related words of “rights,” “challenge,” or “memory.”

The parameter *link* indicates the proximity of the given emotion keywords to other notions, two other parameters—*quality* and *intensity*—which are directly related to each emotion keyword. An “affective” aspect to reading discussed in Chapter 2 points out that the reader’s recollection of emotional information attached to events is used to trigger emotion while reading. Besides, I demonstrate that these examples exist even in the official legal documentation. The findings from the analysis suggest that all emotion keywords have gradation that varies from having

high and low influence on somebody with prevalence of the high influence. On the one hand, emotions have few effects, which is linguistically marked by the degree quantifiers of decrease, including *little* and *less*. On the other hand, emotion keywords are significantly represented by means of degree modifiers, more exactly modifiers, including *very*, *much*, *too*, and *great*. The overall distribution of degree modifiers of increase is higher than those indicating decrease of intensity. However, not only does the analysis show that emotions—as expressed in the language of legal fiction—can be intense, but they also possess other characteristics. In this context, based on the source data, the parameter *quality* is designed to represent examples, in which emotion keywords are characterised by other features than their intensity.

The findings show a wide range of characteristics of the emotion keywords in legal fiction, that is why no specific predominance is established. Here, various emotion keywords are characterized differently: *fear* as “miserable,” *guilt* as “subconscious,” *surprise* as “unspeakable” or “pleasant,” *happiness* as “perfect” and “high,” and *interest* as “heartfelt” or “detached.” It is important to note that *interest*, *surprise*, and *fear* include emotion words and/or emotion-related words to describe them. In these examples, *fear* can be “terrible,” *surprise* “happy,” and *interest* both “horrible” and “satisfactory.” These cases are also known as “special cases,” which represent the parameter of the same name. In this regard, the cognitive linguistics’ claim that cross-domain mapping is performed on the level of thought is supported by the findings. The evidence from the corpus shows that the lexical items from the semantic groups are also part of quotations and conceptualizations. For example, *curious* and *attentive* are commonly used with *interest*, and *shame* with *guilt*.

## 2.2 The parameters of emotional expression and mental processing

Throughout this thesis, I have argued that the cognitive element to emotions, which is promoted by researchers in psychology (Scherer, 1982; Lazarus, 1993), linguistics (Kövecses, 2000a), and legal studies (Bandes & Blumenthal, 2012), is important for labeling emotions as a process. The cognitive approach to emotions shows that people appraise emotions, that emotions shape their actions and reactions, and (re-)direct the way of thinking. In legal fiction, the emotion keywords are described very differently, which makes the parameter *quality* to be one of the most relevant in the present study. The examples (such as *an intellectual interest* or *professional interest*) are numerous, in addition to cases when one emotion keyword is described by another emotion keyword, such as *a happy surprise*. This accounts for a complex nature of emotions and their representation in language: emotions are not only strong or weak, but they also have qualities.

Apart from that, the findings bring to light the connections between emotional experiences and mental actions, especially evident with the source domain “effects.” The source domain “an effect” is frequently used not only to describe emotional impact toward somebody or something or the cause for this influence, but also actions. The significant part of actions traced in the corpus represents mental actions of various types, such as *(to) know* or *(to) think*. This supports the research into emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), which advocates the central role of emotions in mental processing. As discussed in Chapter 2, mental processes, including decision-making, argumentation and judgment, are fundamental in legal discourse. The interconnected relationships between emotions and the law, and/or

emotion and reason—rather than emotion vs. reason—has emerged from the necessity to explain the implication of emotions in the law, their impact on mental processes mentioned earlier, including the mechanisms of coping with emotions. In this context, it seems especially relevant to continue the analysis of the emotional function in mental processes—for example, in decision-making, which has already successfully been done by such researchers, as Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) and Pfister and Böhm (2008).

In the wake of cognitive approaches to linguistics and psychology starting from the 1960s, cognitive appraisal theories have followed a series of emotional-cognitive processing theories and models.<sup>75</sup> It has become evident that emotions are valuable parts of mental processing and that the influence of emotions in decision-making can be higher than the calculated probabilities of the outcome (e.g. Han & Lerner, 2009). For example, Pfister and Böhm propose a four-function framework of emotional mechanisms in decision-making, when emotions are approached as “informational inputs into decision-making” (Loewenstein & Weber, 2001). Table 15 below represents a summary of the emotion function in decision-making.

<b>Function</b>	<b>Emotion type</b>	<b>Prototypes</b>	<b>Mechanisms</b>
information	reducible emotions	joy, (dis)liking	integration, trade-offs
speed	affect-programs, drives	fear, disgust, sexual lust	stimulus-specific response
relevance	complex discrete emotions	regret, disappointment, envy	selective attention, appraisal
commitment	moral sentiments	guilt, love, anger	social coordination, perseverance

**Table 15.** Emotional function in decision-making (Pfister & Böhm, 2008)

<sup>75</sup> See examples in Chapter 1, section 3.

As can be seen from Table 15 above, such functions of emotions as *information* and *speed*, as well as emotional mechanisms of *stimulus-specific response* and *selective attention* and *appraisal*, have been examined in the present thesis from the cognitive linguistics perspective in an experiment with legal fiction as source data. Further investigation of emotions in language can be continued, for example, with the *commitment* function of emotions. Moral-oriented emotions of guilt and love are specifically relevant when examining social-oriented texts that address a wide range of social and cultural phenomena. Topics that are concerned with these phenomena (e.g. gender, race, environment, politics) are highly opinionated and argumentative, where decision-making plays an important role.

It should be also noted that the cross-cultural approach to the study of emotions as expressed in language has its significant benefits. As an illustration, guilt as the emotion of self-assessment varies significantly in intrapersonal contexts (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994) due to defence mechanisms against guilt, such as repression or self-harm. On the other hand, guilt is one of a few emotions that influences perception of cultural mentality and general national identity. Guilt has a strong collective bond, which is reflected in the culturally marked notion of *collective guilt*. This emotion shows more collective characteristics in certain cultures, such as German or American, and less in other cultures, such as Japanese, which is a shame-oriented culture.<sup>76</sup>

Decision-making as a process assumes anticipation of an outcome and further action or inaction. The role of anticipatory guilt in decision-making can be rather positive for post decision-making. This means that actions that could have potentially

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<sup>76</sup> See previous discussion in Chapter 4, section 2.1.

lead to guilt might be avoided. Because guilt tends to belong to someone (e.g. *his guilt is a heavy burden*), it can be difficult to get rid of this emotion, and consequently, one usually tries to avoid it after a decision has been made. The perception of *guilt* as a burden in a sub-division of “a force” conceptualization gives slightly different characteristics to the emotion keyword of *guilt* in decision-making. For example, researchers can anticipate conceptualizations of *guilt* as “a burden,” which brings suffering and struggling.

The fundamental principles of cognitive linguistics can be used to research the relationships between emotions and decision-making. Emotions are linked with linguistics via information processing—in other words, how people acquire, process, and store information. Information processing is a part of a decision-making process because when making a decision people are making up their minds on any point on a course of action, a resolution or determination or thinking through the final and definite result of examining a question (OED, 2015).

### **3. QUALITATIVE METAPHOR ANALYSIS**

#### **3.1 Qualitative approach to the study of emotions in language: Advantages and shortcomings**

The qualitative approach has been applied to the analysis in order to support the present study with findings that are rigorous. After employing such an approach to analyze the five emotion keywords in the previous two chapters, both advantages and weaknesses have been disclosed.

One of the most important advantages of the qualitative approach to data is that a researcher retrieves context-based examples without missing out subtleties, which contrasts against the main drawback of the quantitative analysis. Even though the number of analyzed items (emotion keywords) is less numerous, in comparison with what corpus linguistics analysis offers, each example is evaluated in depth and detail. As stated in Chapters 4 and 5, the majority of coded quotations have more than two codes and sometimes up to six codes, depending on the length and context of a quotation. This means that apart from the target and the source domain, the analysis of the emotion keywords reveals variations in source domains, the force dynamics of emotion keywords, and sometimes more than one extra-linguistic parameter, such as *quality* or *intensity*.

The amount of linguistic and extra-linguistic information in qualitative metaphor analysis is sufficient, which implies that a researcher's "workplace" needs to be organized in a convenient and structured way to properly use the data, retrieve and compare examples at any point of the analysis. In this sense, the framework of the qualitative research supported by CAQDAS is beneficial, as a researcher can add and/or revise the data in case new information has emerged.

Apart from certain advantages, the qualitative approach to analyzing data shows a few shortcomings, which do not affect the present study, but rather put some limitations of a general character. It is important to voice them in order to be aware of what to expect from the analysis of this type and how to manage its certain stages to benefit the analysis.

Apart from its obvious time-consuming nature, one of the most common shortcomings of a qualitative analysis is subjectivity, which is unavoidable yet

significantly reducible. To diminish subjectivity, every step of the analysis is described in detail and visualized in tables, figures, and flowcharts. The discovery of the categories of emotions has been made on the basis of the source data, which is important in theory building. To ensure the validity of the findings, I have compared them with the known cognitive linguistics models. Concerning the levels of the cross-domain mapping, it is important to note that when examining the cross-domain mappings not only lexical (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2004) but also grammatical levels (Glynn, 2002; Fillmore, 2007) are taken into consideration. This approach leads to the in-depth understanding of conceptual structure of the emotion keywords. Concerning the cross-domain mappings, subjectivity has been reduced by implementing a two-tier strategy in coding metaphors in order to disclose variations of source domains. This approach is helpful in representing each example with every possible combination that emotion keyword provides.

Thanks to the coding techniques mentioned above and the CMT principles, a variety of source domains and other extra-linguistic information have been revealed. The number of analyzed examples is sufficient to trace common and less anticipated findings and to make interesting conclusions on the ways emotions are expressed in legal fiction.

Another issue to consider is an integration of more statistical surveys in the framework of a research. As can be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, quantitative surveys have been presented to show overlaps among source domains or specifics in parameters of emotional expression. The statistical information is demonstrated in figures, which represent semantic fields of the emotion keywords. It is clear that the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches is necessary to balance

between the frequency of examples in order to create categories and interpret them. More statistical surveys with a bigger corpus would be beneficial.

The procedural choices placed some limitations on the analysis but the qualitative framework has fulfilled all tasks needed to provide a rigorous analysis of the emotion keywords in legal fiction from the cognitive perspective.

### **3.2 Qualitative metaphor analysis: Types of source data and approaches to the study of emotions as expressed in language**

It is important to note that fiction literature is rich in emotion keywords, and it would have been interesting to explore more emotion keywords and emotion-related phrases. This is an opportunity for further research and not a limitation of the present study. The tendency is that less predominant but salient examples are found in the data occasionally, which account for interesting context-based cases of the conceptualization of emotions that are difficult to trace when the corpus is not big enough.

Although the main aim of the present study is intended to focus on conceptualization patterns of the emotion keywords in language rather than delve into subtle genre specifics, legal fiction as the source data brings to light interesting context-based examples, which might not be possible to trace in other genre or they might be less evident. This is considered as one of the main advantages of literary genre as the source data. As an illustration, the cases when the emotion keywords of *interest* conceptualize as “an investment” (*When I contemplated these **relations** between us four which have so brightened **my life** and so **invested it** with new*

*interests and pleasures [...]*, [1:743]) or *happiness* as “a liquid” (*He felt along his veins a tingling happiness, almost frightening in its physicality*, [4:198]) are more likely to be traced in literary genre rather than in, for example, official legal documentation.

Mainly because emotions are universal (though, not all of them) and because emotions pervade in various areas of our everyday life, the framework can be suitable to examine emotions in various source data. As stated in Chapter 4, section 1.3.1, the choice of the source data for the analysis has its influence on the possible findings of the ways emotion keywords lexicalize and conceptualize in language, which presupposes some limitations of the findings. This means that either certain conceptualizations can be found frequent in certain source data, or they can be limited but salient. In connection to this, as mentioned in the introduction, official legal documentation has been considered as the second part of the source data for the current study. That is why a certain number of documentation from various time periods have been overviewed and the same framework has been employed to this type of the source data.

First of all, an overview of the official legal documentation, in particular court proceedings with witness (cross)-examination, legal decisions, opinions, or judgments in the same time periods used in the present study, makes clear that the emotion keywords are rather limited in this kind of source data. Secondly, these emotion keywords have more of a descriptive character—meaning that, for example, *disgust*, *fright*, *fear* and its variation of *to be disgusted*, *to be frightened*, and *to be afraid*, are systematically used by witnesses to explain their experiences of a frightful event or repellent personality. The keyword of *guilt* is commonly used to pronounce

a verdict or when debating about whether the accused is guilty or not, whereas such affective states as *euphoria* or *hysterics* are quite frequently described, also mainly by witnesses. One could also add that the official legal documentation prevails with negative emotion keywords rather than positive, when the intensity of negative emotions depends on the type of document. Thus, judgments of a severe murder or manslaughter cases generally include more examples of the use of strong negative emotions in comparison to the judgments of the cases like robbery, theft, wounding with intent, or violent disorder.

Not all questions concerning emotional expression in language can be answered with the qualitative approach to data analysis. Having provided qualitative metaphor analysis, some interesting prospects for future research for corpus-based studies have been highlighted. The framework developed in the present thesis is, first and foremost, addressed to the study of the emotion keywords as represented in language, and this therefore opens up choices for the use of a large corpus as the source data. In this context, a corpus-based approach could be considered, which would be advantageous with more statistical surveys and in-depth investigation of lexemes, lexical relations between metaphorical meanings, the aspects of syntactic behaviour of lexemes and their metaphorical meanings (see Deignan, 2007). As a reminder, in the present thesis, the study is specific in its source data (legal fiction) with a relatively small corpus and an emphasis on a qualitative analysis of data. What seems beneficial is to partially implement the qualitative metaphor analysis developed in this thesis to the constantly evolving cognitive semantics “part” of corpus-based studies, such as Oster (2010), who investigated emotions in large corpora from the cross-cultural and cognitive perspectives. In the case of a large

corpus, a two-tier strategy (as a consideration of multiple source domains for a single target domain) to metaphor might disclose more subtle cases of emotion conceptualization. Drawing attention to various parameters of emotional evaluation (e.g. force dynamics) might account for a rigorous analysis of the ways emotions are expressed in language.

### **3.3 Qualitative metaphor analysis: Application to the study of notions other than *emotions***

The findings from the analysis are mainly coherent with findings from other studies on conceptualization of emotions (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2004). However, the present study shows that the structure of conceptual metaphors goes beyond the traditional conceptualization with one target and one source domain. It has been possible to illustrate the complexity of the given emotion keywords owing to the fact that the source data is context-dependent and that the procedure of traditional cross-domain mapping is strengthened with the two-tier strategy. This strategy aims to reveal more potential source domains for a single target domain—i.e. *emotion*. Besides, lexical structure of emotion concepts is provided along with the grammatical insight into the structure of emotion concepts, which is crucial for the in-depth investigation of cross-domain mappings.

When performing cross-domain mapping of emotions (or other notions), researchers in cognitive linguistics rely on the principles of CMT, which are general and can be applied to different notions. This part of the analysis is generally accepted and can be readily applied to different source data (different text genres) and

different notions. However, examination of notions other than *emotions* can show different parameters because the extra-linguistic characteristics vary from notion to notion. For the insight about the nature of emotions, I address cognitive psychology as a “natural” discipline pertaining to the investigation of human emotions, behavior, and the mind. It is important to mention that emotions pervade in various aspect of humans’ lives. Thus, investigating notions other than *emotions* can potentially bring up emotional aspects to it. That is why, a possibility can occur for various notions under scrutiny to potentially have the “emotional” level to them, which makes it possible to use the framework developed in the present study, or at least partially employ it.

As an illustration, consider the notion of *risk*. Even though it may not be obvious at first sight, this notion is actually linked to emotion. According to the Macmillan English Dictionary (MED), *risk* is “the possibility that something unpleasant or dangerous might happen” (MED, 2016). Other dictionaries also suggest that *risk* is “the possibility of something bad happening” (CED, 2016). This might signal that dangerous situations can be accompanied with emotional experiences, especially evident when these situations are uncertain, when a person can *run the risk of doing something*. Risk is always linked to uncertainty (OED, MED, CED, 2016)—which means something (e.g. an event, a situations) is “unreliable,” “doubtful,” “unclear,” or “ambiguous” (*ibid.*)—and thus puts pressure on a person. One could also add that when someone risks something, or when someone is taking a risk, he/she is hoping for a successful outcome. From this perspective, *risk* is linked to the feeling of *hope*, the emotion of fear, and the notions of *luck*, *success*, and *action*. As the notion of *risk* is linked to a certain degree of

danger, the emotion keyword *fear* seems especially relevant. Most risky situations can be *a close call* or *a narrow escape*.

The extra-linguistic parameters of notions rather than *emotions* are dependent on notions under scrutiny and on the source data. When analyzing the emotion keywords, characteristics of quality, intensity, and duration are frequent. However, these characteristics are applicable to the notion of *emotion*, whereas the notion of *risk* would probably have characteristics of intensity (*huge risk, small risk*) measure (*some risks are impossible to insure*), and less indicating duration of risk. More likely, *risk* can be linked to the mental process of decision making in a stressful and/or dangerous situation, or in a situation, when a person is limited in time period to produce a decision under pressure. In this case, intensity of risk is important.

Another important notion in the present study is the notion of *force dynamics*. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, force dynamic of emotion is used in accordance with the approach suggested by Talmy (1988) and elaborated by Kövecses (2004). It should be noted that initially, force dynamic pertains to physical motion or actions made by humans. The psychological aspect of the force dynamic is used as a specific insight into what it means to experience emotion as “a force” that impacts humans. Therefore, force dynamic can be successfully applied to the notions that belong to any physical activity, motion, or change.

The study of emotions in language from the cognitive linguistics perspective has helped to examine the ways the given emotion keywords lexicalize and conceptualize in legal fiction. The findings show the prevalence of certain source domains over the others and disclose the dependency between the type of emotion keyword and source domains it represents. The source data compiled for this study

and the framework developed for the qualitative metaphor analysis have brought to light several extra-linguistic parameters of emotional expression in language, which have proved to be useful in evaluation of such complex a phenomenon as *emotion*.

## CONCLUSION

In the current thesis, a framework has been developed which has allowed me to examine the ways emotions are expressed in the language of legal fiction. As has been shown, not only keywords that denote emotions are sufficiently represented in legal fiction, but the ways these keywords conceptualize in a specific context bring to light certain peculiarities.

It was not until very recently that emotions have often been perceived as unnecessary or inappropriate in legal discourse, meaning, for example, the importance of emotional influence in legal decision, opinions (as types of official legal documentation), and court proceedings. Besides, fiction literature with legal themes, such as court proceedings and/or solving of murder cases, has also been left out, to some extent, from the recognition of emotional experiences that accompany situations involving legal battles or investigations of murder cases. This is what initially motivated the choice of the source data for the analysis. An attempt to provide an interdisciplinary research into conflicting, at first sight, notions of *law* and *emotion*, aims to draw more attention to the problematic of reason vs. emotions.

The theoretical framework has been established in accordance with a cross-disciplinary approach. As I investigate emotions on linguistic and conceptual levels, the main theories used in this study have been adopted from cognitive linguistics, including the Conceptual Metaphor Theory and the force-dynamics category (Talmy, 1988). The qualitative part of the analysis has resulted in two-tier coding strategy of the source and the target domains of conceptual metaphor, adopted from Kimmel (2012). This strategy is specifically designed to blend the traditional principles of

metaphor logic but with the presupposition of having more than one source domain for conceptual metaphors. Besides, this procedure is designed to benefit the process of coding with CAQDAS ATLAS.ti. Provided that emotions pertain “naturally” to psychology, attention is paid to the cognitive theories of emotion (Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1993) in order to explain emotion as a process, which is important when advocating the cognitive element to emotion.

Research into the ways emotion keywords lexicalize and conceptualize in the language of legal fiction provides valuable insights into the semantic nature of emotion keywords. The framework for the analysis is designed to answer research questions concerning the representation of emotions in the language of legal fiction. The main goal was to reveal the patterns of emotion conceptualization among different types of emotion keywords. This, in turn has allowed me to illustrate the dependency between the types of emotion keywords and their strongest and weakest conceptualizations. Special attention has also been given to the evaluation of emotion keywords on several parameters. The goal to create parameters in order to evaluate emotion keywords has been inspired by the qualitative approach to data analysis discussed in Chapter 3. The analysis provides an insight into the extent that emotions are expressed in the language of legal fiction, such as intensity and quality.

In regard to the analysis, two points are important to consider. Firstly, the qualitative framework is highly research specific. As has been acknowledged, not only the qualitative approach to data is used in this thesis in order to retrieve each example of emotion keywords in as much detail as possible but in addition to that cross-domain mapping is used to check the conceptualization of emotions in a specific context. Therefore, a qualitative approach seems to be more suitable to

account for a detailed examination of a limited number of examples rather than a large corpus. Secondly, preselecting emotion keywords has allowed me to concentrate on different recurring types of emotions. Having examined the classification and the definition of emotions from psychological and cognitive linguistics perspectives in Chapter 2, attention has then been drawn to five emotion keywords. Each of these emotions belongs to different types of positive, negative, and dual-nature emotions. Furthermore, the differentiation concerns the ways these five emotions are experienced by humans. For example, *fear* and *surprise* are highly dependent on physiological agitation; *guilt* is interconnected with the mental “struggles” of people, which links this emotion keyword with the fundamental notions of *shame* and *innocence*, as well as with the legal-related notions of *punishment*, *presumption of innocence* and *doubt*. In contrast to *guilt*, *happiness* shows its absolutely positive connotations. *Interest* demonstrates connections with legal and business matters, when this emotion is used as a “tool” to gain one’s own benefit or profit. In this sense, *interest* is interconnected with mental processing, as this emotion is often forethought in accordance with one’s object of interest.

The study clearly shows that the cross-domain mapping from the source domains onto the chosen target domain *emotion* is systematic. This accounts for a complex rather than ambiguous conceptual structure of emotions. The emotion keywords show traditional mappings such as “an object,” “a container,” or “an existence of emotion is presence here,” as well as prevalent conceptualizations of the given emotion keywords as “effects” linked to somebody and/or something and also to somebody’s actions. Some strong similarities in lexicalization and conceptualization of the “universal” emotions of different types are demonstrated in

the qualitative metaphor analysis. In this regard, the choice to examine different types of emotions—positive, negative, and dual-nature emotions—has helped to recognize that each “universal” emotion under scrutiny is rather stable in the way people perceive it and the ways this emotion is expressed in language. This signifies, for example, that the emotion keyword of *surprise* would probably be accompanied with conceptualizations that indicate bodily changes, whether the emotion keyword of *guilt* would be lacking such conceptualizations. However, it is important to mention that the choice of legal fiction as the source data gives an opportunity to estimate certain dependency between the context of the source data and peculiarities that the emotion keywords might highlight. This has resulted in peculiar conceptualizations, such as “a destination” for the emotion keyword of *happiness* that has been traced in different time-frames, or “an entity located inside something” and “an investment” for *interest*. Also, the context-based examples of emotion metaphors bring to light different qualities to the traditional conceptualizations of metaphors, as “a possession” and “an object” in the following cases with the keyword *interest*: “a heavy object,” “a desired object,” or “a possession to look after.”

The theoretical value of this work is represented via an interdisciplinary approach to the study of emotions as expressed in language. The motivation for empirical part of this study is to move beyond the traditional cross-domain mapping and account for the synthesis between psychological and cognitive linguistics theories, as well as qualitative approach to the study of the notion of *emotion*. The practical value of this work lies in the methods used to examine emotion keywords

from the corpus, which can be readily used to investigate notions pertaining to emotional experience, as well as other notions.

The work takes into account a necessary interdisciplinarity. Further studies might be carried out by employing the same qualitative metaphor analysis but for another set of keywords. The framework has been designed in such a way as it could be used not only for examining emotions in language but other notions as well. As stated in the introduction, official legal documentation using legal discourse in a “real” context will be used in my future research to further explore the ways emotions are actually contextualized in legal discourse. The official legal documentation as source data would allow me to conduct specific analyses in order to check the strictly legal-related situations, which have been partially left out of the scope of this thesis. For example, it would be interesting to reveal the dependency between the emotion keywords used in different types of legal events, such as the cross-examination of witnesses, the decisions that judges make, or the oral argumentations of the defence attorneys.



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## **Résumé de la thèse**

La conceptualisation des émotions dans la fiction juridique :  
Métaphores conceptuelles et mises en correspondance croisée avec l’outil  
ATLAS.ti

## Préambule

L'objet de cette thèse est d'étudier la conceptualisation des émotions à travers leur expression linguistique. S'agissant d'une recherche dans le domaine des sciences du langage et, plus précisément, dans celui de la linguistique anglaise, l'étude porte sur la façon dont sont exprimées, en anglais, certaines émotions sélectionnées dans un ensemble de quatre romans datant des XIXe et XXe siècles.

Le point de départ de notre étude est le constat que les émotions, contrairement aux idées reçues, sont très présentes dans le discours juridique spécialisé, perçu comme un discours de raison et non de passion comme Aristote, déjà, le formulait : *la loi est l'intellect sans le désir.*<sup>77</sup>

Ce champ de recherche, largement investigué par les psychologues et les neuro-linguistes depuis plusieurs décennies, est resté relativement peu exploré par les linguistes jusqu'à récemment. Notre recherche s'inscrit donc à la suite de ces travaux récents effectués par des linguistes sur la question du point de vue, du sentiment et des émotions.

Pour des raisons pratiques et pour rester dans le cadre d'une thèse de doctorat, nous avons choisi, dans un premier temps, d'aborder la question indirectement par l'étude d'œuvres fictionnelles appartenant au genre de la « fiction juridique ». Richard Weisberg, l'un des représentants du mouvement « Droit et littérature », plaide pour une « liaison spécifique du droit et de la littérature » (1989: 4), et Schauer souligne que la fiction juridique est fondamentale pour « la langue de la communauté linguistique dans laquelle existe un certain système juridique » (2015:

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<sup>77</sup> *Politique*, III 16, 1287.a32, trad. Tricot.

127).<sup>78</sup> Ce choix nous a permis de constituer un corpus maniable, représentatif de plusieurs périodes.

D'un point de vue théorique, nous avons opté pour une approche cognitive, en raison de nos travaux antérieurs et parce que cette approche, en plein développement, permet de mettre au jour les interactions entre la linguistique cognitive et la psychologie.

L'hypothèse que nous formulons, et la thèse que nous entendons défendre, propose de considérer que l'utilisation de mots désignant des émotions dans la fiction juridique est motivée par des types particuliers de métaphores conceptuelles. Si les différents types d'émotions sont représentés dans le langage de la fiction juridique par le biais de leurs conceptualisations les plus fortes et/ou faibles et des patrons spécifiques de lexicalisation, l'étude de la métaphore conceptuelle que l'on associe à ces émotions permet de comprendre les raisons sous-jacentes à l'utilisation du lexique spécifique des émotions dans un certain contexte.

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<sup>78</sup> Notre traduction.

## 1. Introduction

Les émotions sont au cœur de l'expérience humaine, et le langage quotidien les rend particulièrement visibles. Les psychologues s'intéressent depuis longtemps aux émotions, mais c'est seulement récemment que les linguistes ont commencé à explorer les émotions exprimées dans un contexte juridique, soit dans le discours spécialisé soit dans le discours ordinaire. C'est à partir de ce constat que s'est construit le projet de notre recherche, dont l'une des ambitions est de contribuer à une plus grande visibilité de ce domaine linguistique particulièrement riche.

Le choix du corpus s'est porté sur la fiction juridique. L'objectif principal de notre recherche est de montrer comment et à quelles fins les émotions sont lexicalisées et conceptualisées, en prenant appui sur un corpus de textes de fiction juridique, lequel nous est apparu constituer une source fiable d'exemples assez proches de la vie « réelle ».

Dans le discours juridique, le débat est centré autour d'une opposition saillante entre émotion d'une part, et le domaine de la logique et de la raison d'autre part. Pourtant, il est communément admis en psychologie que les émotions peuvent fonctionner comme un outil d'interprétation très efficace, et ce à plusieurs niveaux, y compris celui du comportement social et de la communication. Cette citation d'Aristote — *la loi est l'intellect sans le désir*<sup>79</sup> — illustre cette dissociation stéréotypée entre émotions et loi. Une telle vision ne semble plus aujourd'hui tout à fait légitime. L'expression des émotions se rencontre de façon manifeste dans les

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<sup>79</sup> *Polit*, III, 1287.a32, trad. Tricot.

textes juridiques écrits dans différents genres et différentes périodes, comme l'illustrent les exemples suivants :

- (1) “*Venetia **had enjoyed** her cross-examination of Stephen Wright...*”  
(*A Certain Justice*, P. D. James, 1997, 9);
- (2) *MR. BODKIN. Q. You say your daughter was of a **happy disposition**? A. Yes; that was so after she was separated from the prisoner—she still seemed **happy**, but **on the worrit**, for **fear** she should meet him, for **fear** he should molest her—she seemed **as happy as usual** when she went out that morning; she seemed **very happy**.*  
(The Old Bailey Proceedings, Killing: murder, 04.04.1853, Trial of Thomas Mackett)

Dans les études universitaires, l'analyse des émotions est souvent menée différemment selon qu'elles prennent pour point de départ le texte littéraire ou le texte juridique. D'une part, il s'agit de procéder à une recherche sur la représentation linguistique des émotions et leur conceptualisation dans le langage. Ce domaine de recherche est porteur, comme l'indique le nombre de travaux menés sur les émotions en tant que concepts dans des petits et grands corpus, et celui des travaux qui concernent la façon dont le langage influe sur la qualité de notre expérience émotionnelle, et qui intègrent les variations culturelles (Oster, 2010 ; Ogarkova & Soriano, 2014). D'autre part, la prise de conscience des problèmes linguistiques dans la théorie et la pratique juridiques conduit traditionnellement les chercheurs à considérer le jargon juridique comme une langue très complexe et formalisée (Tiersma, 1999). À notre connaissance, presque aucune des études antérieures sur le droit et la littérature ne prend en compte le rôle des émotions exprimées dans le langage de la fiction juridique, et presque aucune n'adopte une approche cognitive pour comprendre les fonctions du langage émotif utilisé dans fiction juridique. Dans

un souci de mieux mettre en avant les travaux qui combinent étude du langage, des émotions et de la loi, nous proposons d'étudier les émotions dans le discours juridique à travers leurs réalisations linguistiques et conceptuelles. La théorie de la métaphore conceptuelle (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) a été adoptée pour analyser les stéréotypes dans le langage parce que la mise en correspondance conceptuelle (*cross-domain mapping*) entre le domaine cible et le domaine source révèle des motifs sous-jacents. En fondant notre réflexion sur les principes de la théorie de la métaphore conceptuelle proposée par Lakoff & Johnson (1980), nous nous sommes efforcée de mettre en valeur les métaphores de l'émotion via leur représentation linguistique dans la littérature de fiction. L'outil CAQDAS ATLAS.ti, développé par *Scientific Software Development GmbH* (Berlin), nous a servi de cadre pour déterminer les principales lexicalisations et conceptualisations de cinq mots-clés émotionnels : *fear* (peur), *guilt* (culpabilité), *surprise* (surprise), *happiness* (bonheur), et *interest* (intérêt).

## **2. Structure de la thèse**

La thèse se compose d'une introduction, de six chapitres, d'une conclusion, d'une bibliographie et de quatre annexes regroupées dans un fascicule indépendant du volume principal.

Le premier chapitre est consacré à l'examen de la littérature sur le sujet (ou « état de l'art ») afin d'une part de rassembler les connaissances théoriques permettant de soutenir une étude plus empirique et, d'autre part, de déterminer les limites des approches concernées. Dans cette thèse, la principale approche pour

l'étude des émotions dans la langue et la cognition est celle de la linguistique cognitive. Les principes fondamentaux de cette approche sont discutés dans le premier chapitre et soutenus par les nouvelles tendances en matière d'approche empirique de l'étude du langage et de la cognition (Low, 1999 ; Kövecses, 2008b ; Gibbs, 2012), qui ont été partiellement motivées par la critique de la linguistique cognitive au cours des dix à quinze dernières années. Etant donné que les émotions constituent l'objet « évident » des études des psychologues (Tomkins, 1962 ; Plutchik, 1980 ; Ekman, 1992), le chapitre examinera également les aspects psychologiques du fonctionnement émotionnel tant dans le langage que dans l'esprit des différents personnages (Arnold, 1960 ; Schachter & Singer, 1962 ; Lazarus, 1993) ; le chapitre se poursuit par un aperçu historique des théories fondamentales consacrées aux émotions par les chercheurs en psychologie, qui ont contribué à la relance de la recherche sur l'émotion, envisagée du point de vue cognitif.

Pour procéder à une étude des émotions exprimées verbalement, il est nécessaire de limiter le nombre d'émotions à observer (voir la première partie du chapitre 2). La mise au point des deuxième et troisième parties du deuxième chapitre porte sur les thèmes des émotions et du droit (Nussbaum, 1999 ; Karstedt, 2002 ; Bandes & Blumenthal, 2012), ainsi que sur la façon dont les sujets de nature juridique sont représentés dans la littérature de fiction (White, 1973 ; Dolin, 2007). Le processus de compréhension de ces textes y est envisagé dans sa dimension affective, c'est-à-dire dans la façon dont le processus de lecture se voit lié à la langue, à l'émotion et à la mémoire (Burke, 2010 ; Mar *et al.*, 2011 ; Lehne *et al.*, 2015). Le chapitre 3 explique en premier lieu le choix de l'origine des données pour l'analyse, puis dresse le cadre méthodologique et présente un exemple significatif de

l'analyse de la métaphore en ayant recours à l'utilisation du logiciel ATLAS.ti dont les avantages sont mis en lumière. Ce logiciel a été jusqu'ici principalement utilisé dans des projets de sciences sociales en Allemagne et en Grand-Bretagne, et s'est montré particulièrement utile pour faciliter la collecte, la catégorisation et l'interprétation des données de base (Gibbs, Friese & Mangabeira, 2002 ; Friese, 2014). Enfin, la troisième partie de ce chapitre fournit une description détaillée du logiciel utilisé et examine sa compatibilité avec la mise en correspondance inter-domaines.

Dans les chapitres 4 et 5, l'analyse de la métaphore qualitative pour les cinq mots-clés sélectionnés est menée selon la même procédure — notre but étant de faire émerger des modèles de lexicalisation et la plus grande variété possible de conceptualisations des expériences émotionnelles véhiculées par le langage, dans l'espoir que cette procédure puisse être généralisée. Les principaux résultats de la recherche sont discutés dans le chapitre 6, qui résume les conclusions que l'étude des mots-clés sélectionnés a apportées au problème plus général de la verbalisation des émotions. Il ouvre également des pistes pour la recherche future. L'annexe 1 fournit un glossaire des termes spécialisés qui sont utilisés dans la thèse. L'annexe 2 propose une classification des émotions en tant que concepts. L'annexe 3 combine les tableaux à un codage des textes développés dans l'analyse. L'annexe 4 inclut la correspondance inter-domaines complète des émotions.

### **3. Objectifs de la thèse**

L'objectif principal de cette thèse est d'étudier les variations de lexicalisation des émotions et leur conceptualisation dans le discours juridique du point de vue de la linguistique cognitive. La révélation des motifs de conceptualisation des émotions entre les différents types de mots-clés émotionnels nous permet d'illustrer la dépendance de ces derniers avec leurs conceptualisations les plus fortes et/ou les plus faibles. Une attention particulière est également accordée à l'évaluation des mots-clés sur la base de plusieurs critères appelés « paramètres ». La création de ces paramètres a été inspirée par l'approche qualitative de l'analyse des données. Dans le cas de notre étude, une telle approche signifie qu'il faut se concentrer sur l'information linguistique fondée sur le corpus en plus de la correspondance inter-domaines maintenant rentrée dans les usages. Grâce à cette approche, on obtient un aperçu de la mesure dans laquelle les émotions sont exprimées dans le langage de la fiction juridique, de l'intensité, de la qualité et de la durée de l'expérience émotionnelle, ainsi qu'une vision précise de la co-occurrence des mots-clés de l'émotion avec d'autres mots.

### **4. Corpus**

Afin d'atteindre les principaux objectifs de l'étude et de procéder à une analyse empirique approfondie, nous avons compilé un corpus des mots-clés d'émotion. Dans la présente étude, la fiction juridique est utilisée comme une extension du discours juridique. L'avantage de la fiction sur la documentation juridique officielle

est qu'elle contextualise l'émotion dans des situations fictives mais plausibles, qui sont comprises par des néophytes en droit, c'est-à-dire qu'aucune connaissance juridique professionnelle n'est nécessaire pour traiter ces textes. La première étape de la conception du corpus est la sélection de la source de données — des romans provenant d'une culture particulière, qui appartiennent également à un genre spécifique. Ont été sélectionnés quatre romans qui représentent trois périodes importantes de la culture et de la littérature britannique en termes de thèmes abordés. La première est la littérature victorienne représentée par le roman *Bleak House* de Charles Dickens, publié en 1853. La deuxième période, l'une des plus importantes dans l'histoire du genre, représente l'âge d'or du roman policier, illustrée ici par deux romans — *Strong Poison* de Dorothy Sayers (1930) et *Sad Cypress* (1940) de Agatha Christie. Enfin, la troisième période est relativement récente, marquée par les thrillers juridiques comme le roman sélectionné pour la présente étude — *A Certain Justice* de P. D. James, publié en 1997.

La littérature de fiction britannique présente souvent des tribunaux réels, comme la Cour de la Chancellerie il y a plus d'un siècle dans *Bleak House*, qui peut être considérée comme un personnage elle-même; et relativement récemment, en 1997, la Cour centrale de la Couronne britannique (*Old Bailey*) dans *A Certain Justice*. C'est ce qui a été considéré initialement lors de la recherche des données.

#### 4.1 Cadre temporel 1 : littérature victorienne<sup>80</sup>

Historien juridique et professeur de droit à Oxford, Sir William Holdsworth, dans son ouvrage *Charles Dickens as a Legal Historian* (1928) n'a pas exagéré quand il a affirmé que les romans de Dickens devraient être la seule source pour les historiens du droit anglais. L'omniprésence du droit dans la littérature victorienne est largement caractérisée par la situation sociale et morale de cette époque. Écrit sous le règne de la reine Victoria (1837-1901), la littérature de l'époque reflète, entre autres, la pauvreté de la classe ouvrière, la lutte entre le bien et le mal, et l'évolution de la vision du monde sur les développements majeurs de la technologie et de la science (cf. la théorie de Darwin).

*Bleak House*, en tant qu'exemple de la fiction littéraire de l'époque victorienne, a attiré l'attention des théoriciens du droit et est devenu l'objet d'une étude critique pour de nombreux chercheurs du droit et de la littérature (par exemple Krueger, 2010). *Bleak House* décrit tous les niveaux de la société de la Grande-Bretagne victorienne, de l'aristocratie à la classe ouvrière. L'objet principal du roman est le cas de la cour fictive *Jarndyce et Jarndyce*, une affaire sans fin concernant un important héritage et impliquant les ayants-droits revendiquant cet héritage. La Cour de la Chancellerie était l'un des deux principaux tribunaux en Grande-Bretagne à cette époque aux côtés des tribunaux de la *common law*. Il s'agit d'un tribunal de « l'équité sous la direction du Grand Chancelier qui a commencé à se développer au 15<sup>ème</sup> siècle » (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2015); cependant, il est caricaturé dans le roman.

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<sup>80</sup> Le terme « time-frame » (« cadre temporel ») est utilisé en référence aux trois périodes de temps qui ont été choisies pour représenter les données d'analyse exploitées dans cette thèse.

## 4.2 Cadre temporel 2 : le *Golden Age* du roman policier

La deuxième période représente le sommet du roman policier en tant que genre, considérée comme l'âge d'or du roman policier. C'est l'ère des cas classiques de meurtres, écrits entre la Première et la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Pendant cette période, l'intrigue des romans policiers est devenue plus complexe, avec des rebondissements inattendus et des dénouements surprenants.

Ce cadre temporel est représenté par deux romans. Lorsqu'on pense à cette époque, il est impossible de ne pas évoquer Agatha Christie, qui a été surnommée « la reine du mystère ». En outre, en raison de sa grande popularité à l'époque et de l'appréciation dont elle jouit encore aujourd'hui, il semble cohérent d'utiliser encore un roman d'un autre auteur comme source des données. Les deux œuvres sont des romans policiers à énigme (« whodunit ») avec des séquences judiciaires, impliquant le thème de l'empoisonnement, et introduisant de célèbres détectives — Hercule Poirot et Lord Peter Wimsey.

*Strong Poison* représente un conflit entre le bien et le mal, résolu au cours de l'investigation d'un crime. Dès le début du roman, le lecteur est plongé dans une salle d'audience britannique. Son personnage principal, Harriet Vane, a été accusé d'un assassinat. Dans le sous-genre « récolte des indices » du roman policier à énigme, l'auteur crée des situations incertaines, du procès décrit dans le roman aux circonstances de l'assassinat et au processus de résolution de l'affaire.

*Sad Cypress* est un exemple de drame judiciaire avec les sous-thèmes de l'assassinat (ici l'empoisonnement, récurrent dans les romans de Christie) et de l'héritage. Le roman est divisé en trois parties. Dans la première partie, le personnage

principal — Elinor Carlisle — reçoit une lettre anonyme. La lettre indique qu'elle est la seule héritière. La deuxième partie se concentre sur l'enquête d'un crime par un détective privé, Hercule Poirot. La troisième partie décrit le procès d'Elinor Carlisle.

### **4.3 Cadre temporel 3 : thriller judiciaire moderne**

Dans l'histoire de la fiction criminelle, un terme en est venu à désigner un certain style d'écriture, dans la description du crime comme dans celle de ses participants — suspects, victimes, enquêteurs — le style dit « cosy ». Il fait référence à l'âge d'or des romans criminels britanniques, et vaguement au sous-genre de la fiction mystérieuse (*mystery fiction*) qualifiée de « douillette ». Plus tard a émergé, en réaction à cette dernière, la « hardboiled » ou « fiction dure » américaine. Les scènes d'action, les milieux urbains et la violence ont changé de manière significative l'atmosphère des romans et, par conséquent, ont engendré une attitude cynique envers la compassion ou toute expérience émotionnelle positive.

Une représentation réaliste des scènes de crime, des personnages franchement cyniques et l'ambiguïté morale des professionnels du droit sont les principaux thèmes de P. D. James dans *A Certain Justice*, qui représente la troisième période de l'étude. L'auteur décrit de façon frappante la mort et les corps dans les scènes de crime. *A Certain Justice* soulève des questions au sujet du système de justice criminelle, en particulier les principes moraux d'un avocat de la défense, Aldridge, qui a été assassiné au tribunal après un procès. Ce roman fait partie de la série d'enquête *Adam Dalgliesh*. Non seulement il dépeint l'enquête et les détails du

crime, mais en plus il plonge le lecteur dans l'état émotionnel et psychologique d'un criminel, ainsi que dans les dilemmes moraux d'un avocat de la défense.

Pour résumer, avec la masse des renseignements disponibles, dans de nombreux cas, les données nécessaires à l'analyse proviennent de différentes sources. Il existe plusieurs raisons pour lesquelles nous combinons des informations similaires, c'est-à-dire des mots-clés liés à l'émotion, à partir de ces quatre romans. La principale raison, analytique, est que l'utilisation de différentes périodes de temps est bénéfique pour la qualité de l'échantillonnage. Les trois échéances sélectionnées pour l'analyse sont emblématiques de trois périodes différentes de la culture britannique et, plus particulièrement, mettent en évidence l'évolution de la fiction criminelle. Dès lors, les mots-clés liés à l'émotion extraits des textes doivent être des exemples typiques des périodes-clés de la fiction juridique. La deuxième raison est l'augmentation de la taille de l'échantillon, une exigence habituelle d'une telle analyse. Ce point est important pour découvrir les différences dans les modèles métaphoriques des mots-clés liés à l'émotion dans la fiction juridique. En outre, les quatre romans représentent différents auteurs et styles d'écriture comportant des variations dans l'utilisation des mots-clés émotionnels dans le contexte. Enfin, il convient de mentionner que la période globale, de 1853 jusqu'à 1997, soit près d'un siècle et demi, n'est probablement pas assez longue pour présenter des changements diachroniques significatifs, et l'analyse ne tient donc pas compte du facteur historique. Cependant, chaque fois que des différences dans la façon dont sont exprimées les émotions sont repérées, cela est indiqué.

## 5. Analyse : méthodologie et traitement

Un total de 900 mots-clés émotionnels a été sélectionné à partir de ces romans, représentant cinq émotions différentes : « peur », « culpabilité », « surprise », « joie », « intérêt ». La sélection des émotions a fait l'objet de critères spécifiques. Le choix provient de la classification psychologique des émotions dites « de base » ou « universelles », et tient compte des différences entre émotions ayant trait au *sentiment*, à l'*affect*, et à l'*humeur*. Puisque la source de données pour l'analyse est la fiction juridique, les émotions de base qui semblent être les plus présentes dans le discours juridique approprié ont été prises en considération dans le choix final de cinq émotions pour l'analyse.

Comme on étudie les émotions sur les plans linguistiques et conceptuels, les principales théories utilisées dans cette étude sont tirées de la linguistique cognitive, ce qui comprend la théorie de la métaphore conceptuelle (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) et la catégorie de la dynamique des forces (Talmy, 1988) (*force dynamic*). La partie qualitative de l'analyse consiste en une stratégie de codage à deux niveaux (*two-tier coding strategy*) de la source et les domaines cibles de la métaphore conceptuelle (Kimmel, 2012), et en la récupération d'informations linguistiques supplémentaires fondées sur les données. La stratégie à deux niveaux a été spécialement conçue pour mélanger les principes traditionnels de la logique de la métaphore, mais avec comme présupposition d'avoir plus d'un domaine source pour les métaphores conceptuelles. La procédure d'analyse des données qualitatives (QDA) est manuelle, mais l'utilisation de CAQDAS améliore considérablement les processus d'analyse et d'interprétation.

L'analyse effectuée dans cette étude peut être divisée en deux parties principales : (i) la correspondance à deux niveaux inter-domaines (*two-tier coding strategy*) proposé par Kimmel (2012) et (ii) une analyse qualitative afin de recueillir des informations supplémentaires sur les mots-clés d'émotion. La première partie a révélé la variété dans la distribution des domaines sources entre les domaines cibles — c'est-à-dire des mots-clés d'émotion. La deuxième partie permet de déterminer un ensemble de paramètres d'évaluation des émotions analysées. Ces paramètres comprennent notamment l'intensité et la qualité, la dynamique des forces des mots-clés de l'émotion, et les cas particuliers de co-occurrence entre ces mots-clés.

### **5.1 Recherche empirique de métaphore : analyse de la métaphore qualitative**

Dans notre recherche qualitative, nous visons à enquêter sur un corpus fermé qui réponde aux exigences du genre et qui fournisse le matériel source pertinent pour répondre aux objectifs de la recherche. Pour « gérer » ce matériau source, un logiciel spécial est nécessaire. Pour l'analyse de la métaphore qualitative, nous utilisons CAQDAS ATLAS.ti (version Mac). Il convient de souligner dès le départ que CAQDAS n'a pas été créé pour analyser les données, mais plutôt pour assister le chercheur lors de ce travail. Nous pouvons considérer de tels logiciels comme des « lieux de travail » conçu pour faciliter le travail laborieux d'un chercheur ou, selon les termes de Kimmel, des « paniers de course pour ranger les unités de texte à utiliser pendant le traitement du texte » (2012 : 13).

L'analyse des données qualitatives (QDA) a été développée à l'origine dans le domaine des sciences sociales. Elle est caractérisée par une explication en

profondeur des données qualitatives, qui se réfère à l'« information recueillie sous forme non numérique et souvent textuelle sur les significations, les intentions, les actions, les comportements et les événements ». Par exemple, Kimmel enjoint les chercheurs en métaphore à « se mesurer à la meilleure pratique en recherche qualitative en général », c'est-à-dire « à sa manière de procéder » et de « faire preuve de transparence sur la manière dont la théorisation est enracinée dans les données » (2012 : 4).<sup>81</sup>

La procédure manuelle reste « sensible au contexte », alors qu'en termes quantitatifs ou d'analyse basée sur un corpus, un chercheur peut manquer de métaphores, étant donné que le logiciel ne permet pas d'identifier les expressions figurées. Le codage manuel est effectué bien plus en détail, puisque nous extrayons et codons ce qui se trouve dans nos données. Plus important encore, « l'identification manuelle reste le seul moyen d'être exhaustif ». Nous supposons (i) qu'il faut classer manuellement les diverses métaphores de telle sorte (ii) qu'aucune ne soit exclue.

L'un des principaux objectifs pratiques de cette thèse est de proposer l'analyse de la métaphore qualitative des émotions telles qu'exprimées dans la langue de la fiction juridique, ce qui est peu courant dans le domaine de la recherche.

## **5.2 Le logiciel pour faciliter l'analyse de la métaphore qualitative : appareil de terminologies ATLAS.ti**

Le réseau des termes utilisés par ATLAS.ti est assez complexe, mais nous ne nous intéresserons qu'à ceux qui font partie du cadre de cette étude. Toutes les définitions

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<sup>81</sup> Notre traduction.

sont tirées du Manuel de l'utilisateur ATLAS.ti Mac, qui accentue la nécessité de maîtriser ses concepts fondamentaux, tels que les *documents primaires*, les *citations* et les *codes* (2015 : 6).

### **5.2.1 Projet et document primaire**

Trois cadres temporels ont été établis conformément aux trois époques étudiées. Cependant, le corpus comprend quatre romans, ce qui implique quatre projets distincts dans ATLAS.ti nommés comme suit:

Projet 1 : cadre temporel 1 (1853)

Projet 2 : cadre temporel 2 (1930)

Projet 3 : cadre temporel 2 (1940)

Projet 4 : cadre temporel 3 (1997)

Séparer l'étude en quatre projets distincts permet d'éviter de mélanger les segments textuels codés entre les projets, ce qui facilite l'accès ultérieur à l'information et donne une représentation claire des résultats.

### **5.2.2 Citation**

De manière générale, une citation est « un segment/partie d'un document considérée par l'utilisateur comme intéressant ou important » (2015 : 6). Dans les documents textuels, une citation est « une séquence arbitraire de caractères allant d'un seul

caractère à un mot, une phrase ou à un paragraphe » (*id.*, 7). Les citations sont donc ce que l'on appelle des exemples dans les méthodes traditionnelles. Les citations sont créées manuellement, bien que le logiciel permette également des « citations rapides » en utilisant l'outil d'auto-codage. Cet outil est utilisé pour rechercher des mots-clés émotionnels. La longueur d'une citation varie entre environ une et sept phrases. L'exemple suivant, où la phrase entière fait partie d'une citation, permet d'éviter la confusion entre un « code » et une « citation » :

*Naughton looked for a moment as guilty as if he had been accused of the murder. (4 : 352)*

Le segment en gras nous intéresse particulièrement, car il contient le mot-clé d'émotion *coupable* ainsi que d'autres informations, auxquelles on attribue des codes. En règle générale, une seule citation peut contenir jusqu'à quatre codes. Le numéro unique de chaque citation est généré par ATLAS.ti lors du codage manuel du texte. Le premier numéro dans une citation est celui du projet considéré, c'est-à-dire indiquant le roman utilisé. Le deuxième numéro indique la citation. Alors, dans la citation « 4 : 352 » ci-dessus « 4 » se réfère au projet 4 (P. D. James) du cadre temporel 3, et « 352 » est l'identifiant unique de cette citation.

### **5.2.3 Code**


Un « code » est un mot ou une phrase courte qui décrit de manière symbolique un attribut bref, saillant et évocateur assigné à une partie des données linguistiques. Le point important est que les codes « capturent la signification des données » et sont

utilisés comme « dispositifs de classification à différents niveaux d'abstraction permettant de créer et de comparer des ensembles d'unités d'information connexes » (2015 : 9). D'une part, les principes de la théorie de la métaphore conceptuelle (CMT) sont appliqués aux domaines source et cible, qui font partie de l'annotation conceptuelle inter-domaines. D'autre part, le codage dans QDA est un terme essentiel qui fait référence à un thème, une idée ou à une caractéristique des données (Gibbs, Clarke et *al.*, 2015). Par conséquent, la question se pose de savoir ce qui doit être codé dans une citation lors de l'emploi de la CMT. Pour répondre à cette question, qui est cruciale dans la mise en pratique du codage, nous revenons à la citation « 4:352 » : *Naughton looked for a moment as guilty as if he had been accused of the murder*. Tout d'abord, nous attribuons un code pour le mot-clé d'émotion *coupable*, qui se lit comme <émotion cible : négative : coupable>. Ensuite, nous assignons le domaine source au domaine cible, qui se lit comme <source : entité visible sur le corps>. Enfin, nous ajoutons le code <marqueur temporel> à la durée de l'expérience émotionnelle indiquée par l'expression « pour un moment ». Cet attribut n'appartenant pas à un domaine source, il exprime une caractéristique supplémentaire du mot-clé d'émotion en question.

### **5.3 Stratégies de codage : codage compositionnel et codage à deux niveaux**

Dans une approche systématique du codage, nous nous référons à la stratégie employée par Kimmel, qui suggère une procédure de composition et une stratégie de codage à deux niveaux dans l'analyse de la métaphore qualitative. Comme le mentionne la section 2.4 du Chapitre 1, le codage compositionnel correspond à la

cartographie conceptuelle traditionnelle, dont les domaines source et cible sont assignés séparément dans CAQDAS. Dans le cadre du codage à deux niveaux, nous identifions (i) un domaine source plus large de la métaphore, (ii) un domaine cible plus large (si nécessaire) et (iii) « la quantité spécifique d'information qui est effectivement reliée à ces deux domaines » (*ibid.*). Par conséquent, en travaillant avec la cartographie conceptuelle au sein de ATLAS.ti, nous présentons les cas où les métaphores conceptuelles sont utilisées comme un outil puissant pour révéler les conceptualisations les plus fortes/faibles des émotions, telle qu'elles sont exprimées dans le langage de la fiction juridique. La motivation derrière cette procédure est de révéler la dépendance entre les domaines source et les types d'émotions (positives et négatives) exprimées dans la langue. D'ailleurs, nous visons à tracer la dépendance entre les conceptualisations des émotions et des parties du discours. L'exemple ci-dessous illustre le total de six codes attribués à un seul identifiant de citation « 1 : 39 ». Il comprend deux domaines cibles et quatre domaines source attribués séparément à une seule citation:



**Image 1.** Codes multiples attachés à une seule citation

La citation « 1 : 39 » est particulièrement intéressante :

*There is a wild disturbance - is it **fear** or **anger**? - in her eyes.*

Dans l'exemple ci-dessus, l'un des deux domaines cibles est codé « émotion cible : négatif : la peur ». Il dispose de deux principaux domaines sources codés comme « source : attaquant » et « source : entité située dans les yeux ». Cet exemple est assez complexe, car il contient deux mots-clés d'émotion négative et, par conséquent, deux codes pour chaque émotion : <fear> et <anger>. Ici, toutes les deux métaphores conceptuelles FEAR IS AN ATTACKER (LA PEUR EST UN ATTAQUANT) et FEAR IS AN ENTITY LOCATED IN THE EYES (LA PEUR EST UNE ENTITÉ SITUÉE DANS LES YEUX) sont pertinentes parce que l'information dans cette cartographie signifie que la peur peut être quelque chose de très troublant (*a wild disturbance*) et qu'elle se trouve dans les yeux (*in her eyes*). En outre, les émotions jouent un rôle important dans les expériences corporelles. Par conséquent, nous traitons souvent de la métaphore conceptuelle BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS (LE CORPS EST UN CONTENANT POUR EMOTIONS). En dehors des deux domaines cibles et trois domaines sources, la peur peut aussi être évaluée en ce qui concerne le paramètre de proximité, car, comme on peut le voir, *la peur* est associée à une émotion négative — *colère* — par la conjonction « ou ». Pour cette raison, on y attribue un autre code : <paramètre d'évaluation : lien>.

Cet exemple d'une analyse de la métaphore qualitative illustre la manière dont chaque mot-clé d'émotion est abordé dans la présente étude, et les types d'information linguistiques et conceptuelles qui sont au cœur de l'analyse.

Compte tenu de tout ce qui précède, il semble que la reconstruction systématique des modèles métaphoriques exige une attention particulière à plusieurs problèmes vitaux pour la recherche empirique afin de parvenir à un résultat. Dans la

partie pratique de cette thèse, nous illustrons comment les conditions requises pour une analyse de la métaphore qualitative mentionnées ci-dessus peuvent être remplies en utilisant ATLAS.ti.

## 6. Résultats : modèles cognitifs

L'étude (quantitative) des mot-clés représentant les émotions sélectionnées a montré une prédominance d'*intérêt* avec 299 exemples et une faible quantité d'occurrences de *culpabilité* avec seulement 84 exemples. Un total de 122 domaines sources et 11 paramètres d'évaluation de l'émotion sont apparus au cours du codage manuel des 900 mots-clés de l'émotion avec ATLAS.ti. L'étude montre clairement que le mappage inter-domaines des domaines sources sur le domaine cible « émotion » choisi est systématique. Nous considérons que la structure des émotions relève plutôt de la complexité que de l'ambiguïté. Les concepts d'émotion étudiés dans notre corpus ont pu être classés selon les rubriques suivantes : « objet », « conteneur » ou « effet sur un état lié à quelque chose », ainsi que selon des conceptualisations dominantes de mots-clés de l'émotion comme « effet sur un état lié à quelque chose / quelqu'un ».

Bien que les deux premières conceptualisations soient traditionnelles dans le mappage métaphorique, l'épreuve du corpus a montré que le mot-clé *intérêt*, en particulier, est variablement configuré en tant que « objet » ou « possession ». Cette émotion peut se conceptualiser comme « objet lourd » (*a matter of this pressing interest* [1 : 692]) ou « objet caché » (*She seldom showed interest in people she hadn't met* [4 : 495]). De même, la conceptualisation « possession » révèle des

variations du mot-clé *intérêt*, comme par exemple, « possession à protéger » ou « possession qui exige des explications ». Dans le même temps, quelques cas contextuels d'occurrence unique se sont dégagés parmi tous les mots-clés de l'émotion. Ceci confirme en outre l'affirmation selon laquelle de nouvelles métaphores peuvent être créées en plus du mappage traditionnel inter-domaines. Par exemple, *bonheur* semble être conceptualisé dans l'esprit comme « une destination » et le mot-clé *intérêt* est conceptualisé comme « un investissement ».

Pour révéler la structure conceptuelle de mots-clés de l'émotion avec le plus de détails possible, une stratégie de codage à deux niveaux a été utilisée. L'emploi de cette stratégie nous a permis d'isoler des modèles de conceptualisations des mots-clés.

La répartition des domaines sources a tendance à être stable puisqu'on note une présence constante des sources suivantes : « effet sur un état lié à quelque chose » (*an effect on a state linked to something*) et « effet sur l'action » parmi les deux principales sources entre tous les mots-clés de l'émotion. Cependant, les résultats ont mis au jour plusieurs différences. Les mots-clés des émotions *culpabilité* et *bonheur* partagent la même source dominante — « une existence de l'émotion est la présence ici », qui est considérée comme la conceptualisation la plus fondamentale dans le mappage inter-domaines des concepts d'émotion. L'ensemble de sources qui comprend le plus de variétés appartient à l'émotion mot-clé *intérêt*, qui a révélé un chevauchement avec la source « possession ». En ce qui concerne cette source, un modèle se dégage parmi les multiples correspondances inter-domaines. Par exemple, les domaines sources « possession » ou « objet » se combinent au domaine source d'« entité située à l'intérieur de quelque chose ». Les deux domaines sources

mentionnés ci-dessus ont été trouvés parmi tous les mots-clés de l'émotion, mais séparément. La combinaison existe seulement entre des mots-clés de l'émotion *intérêt* et *bonheur*.

### **6.1 Modèles de métaphore de mots-clés de l'émotion : l'émotion comme un effet**

Comme indiqué au chapitre 1, l'émotion est un processus séquentiel avec sa cause, l'évaluation de la cause et la réaction émotionnelle subséquente, ce qui a également été confirmé par les résultats. Prenant son fondement dans la source « une force », les indices du corpus ont révélé les sources « un effet sur un état lié à quelqu'un/quelque chose » et « un effet sur l'action », ce qui a compensé les conceptualisations les plus importantes parmi tous les mots-clés de l'émotion. La mise en correspondance inter-domaines a entraîné les conceptualisations dominantes mentionnées ci-dessus dans tous les mots-clés d'émotion, à l'exception *d'intérêt*, qui chevauche la source « une possession » et la source similaire « un objet », qui est quatrième en fréquence avec ce mot-clé. Selon les résultats, les « effets » que les émotions produisent sur quelqu'un sont aussi liés à des actions que quelqu'un fait ou va faire. À cet égard, nous sommes tombée sur la combinaison de chevauchement des sources « un effet sur un état lié à quelqu'un/quelque chose » et « un effet sur l'action ». À titre d'exemple, les gens redoutent souvent l'action que quelqu'un d'autre a faite ou va faire, si cette action présente un danger et/ou une menace pour quelqu'un.

L'affirmation du chapitre 1 selon laquelle les émotions contiennent un élément cognitif — c'est-à-dire, qu'ils sont évalués sur le plan cognitif — est corroborée par

les résultats. En examinant la conceptualisation « un effet sur l'action », deux grandes catégories d'action ont été dessinées : l'action physique et l'action concernant les processus mentaux comme la réflexion, le savoir et le souvenir. Tous les mots-clés d'émotion sont fournis avec des exemples des deux types d'actions. En particulier, *la surprise* et *le bonheur* ont montré la domination de l'influence sur les actions physiques, y compris « prendre » (*to take*), « trouver » (*to find*) ou « attendre » (*to wait*). Cependant, la majorité des exemples a montré une prévalence des actions mentales, en particulier avec le mot-clé *intérêt*, y compris les verbes « savoir » (*to know*), « penser » (*to think*), ou un syntagme « arriver à la vérité » (*to arrive at the truth*).

## **6.2 Modèles de métaphore des mots-clés d'émotion : l'émotion comme une entité située à l'intérieur de quelque chose/quelqu'un**

Dans les recherches précédentes au sujet des concepts émotionnels, le corps a été considéré comme « un contenant pour les émotions ». Toutefois, les résultats de la présente étude suggèrent des cas allant à l'encontre de cela. Le domaine source « un contenant » est représenté parmi les sources mais est limité. En particulier, le mot-clé *intérêt* est conceptualisé comme « une entité située à l'intérieur de quelque chose » plutôt que représenté comme « un contenant ». De même pour les actions qui se rapportent à des processus mentaux, la source « une entité » inclut des exemples de « localisation » d'*intérêt* dans divers objets immatériels. En d'autres termes, les gens ont tendance à « prendre » de l'*intérêt* « à » quelque chose, y compris dans des choses ou des objets tels que « droit pénal » (*criminal law*) et « procès » (*trial*).

Considérant ce domaine source, nous sommes arrivée sur un motif de la correspondance inter-domaine « une possession » ou « un objet » en combinaison avec la source « une entité située à l'intérieur de quelque chose ». Cela suggère une « délocalisation » *d'intérêt* comme un « objet », parce que les intérêts sont souvent personnellement entraînés avec l'espoir d'un avantage ou d'un profit.

### **6.3 Les paramètres d'évaluation émotionnelle : dynamique des forces**

En plus de « localiser » l'intérieur de quelque chose, les résultats montrent que les émotions peuvent avoir des « effets » sur l'orientation corporelle dans l'espace et le corps des mouvements tels que des gestes. Le dualisme cartésien du corps et de l'esprit est intégré dans la pensée occidentale dans la mesure où toutes les émotions ont des représentations via des changements corporels, ou que certaines parties du corps sont associées à certaines émotions. Cette connexion est centrale dans l'étude des émotions de la linguistique cognitive, ainsi que des points de vue psychologiques. Cependant, les résultats montrent que tous les mots-clés émotionnels sont suffisamment représentés par des « effets » sur les modifications corporelles. Pour être en mesure de retracer la variation de l'agitation émotionnelle, la catégorie de la dynamique des forces de Talmy a été adoptée pour examiner les émotions. Par conséquent, nous avons découvert deux types de dynamique des forces : le type 1 indiquant des changements corporels et le type 2, qui exclut les changements corporels provoqués par l'émotion et met en évidence des troubles émotionnels de soi. Si *la culpabilité* est une émotion auto-évaluative liée aux notions *d'innocence* et de *la honte*, l'émotion de *surprise* joue un rôle important par les

changements corporels que cette émotion provoque. Les résultats montrent que *la surprise* est le seul mot-clé d'émotion qui soit illustré et accompagné par de multiples changements corporels. La conceptualisation des émotions comme « effets », en particulier sur le visage et la voix, est linguistiquement représentée par les expressions comme « lever le sourcils de surprise » (*to raise an eyebrow in surprise*), « dire quelque chose avec surprise » (*to say something in surprise*), ou « avoir l'air surpris » (*to look surprised*). Tous ces exemples font partie de la force dynamique de type 1. En revanche, la dynamique des forces de type 2 est toujours stable avec le mot-clé *surprise*, ainsi qu'avec tous les autres mots-clés de l'émotion. De nombreux exemples montrent qu'un effet les émotions exprimées exercent une influence sur quelqu'un ou quelque chose, comme dans « the contemplation of our happiness alone *affected* him » (1 : 162), ou la pensée d'une telle influence, comme dans cet exemple « Elinor Carlisle had reason to fear that she *might be disinherited* in favour of an outsider » (3 : 8/1).

#### **6.4 Les paramètres d'évaluation émotionnelle : *lien*, *anti-lien*, et *marqueur temporel***

Malgré leur type différent — positif, négatif ou duel — tous les mots-clés émotionnels ont révélé un ensemble similaire de paramètres. Il convient de noter qu'ils sont significativement représentés par les paramètres indiquant la corrélation avec d'autres notions (*lien*), leur degré d'*intensité*, et la façon dont les émotions sont décrites dans les textes (*qualité*).

En ce qui concerne la distribution du paramètre *lien*, il est apparu que chaque mot-clé est utilisé en proximité étroite avec d'autres termes, essentiellement du même type. Ceci s'applique particulièrement aux mots-clés *peur* et *bonheur*. *Peur* est majoritairement utilisé en conjonction avec des mots négatifs tels que « terreur » (*terror*) et « horreur » (*horror*), alors que *bonheur* offre plus d'exemples avec des connotations positives telles que « joie » et « espoir » ce qui, somme toute, est assez naturel et attendu. Dans le même temps, *culpabilité*, *surprise*, et *intérêt* ont révélé des connotations légèrement différentes. Les thèmes de la culpabilité et de l'innocence sont attachés, dans de nombreuses cultures, à la notion, sociale et psychologique, de « culture de la culpabilité » (*guilt culture*), ainsi qu'aux concepts juridiques de *présomption d'innocence* et de *doute raisonnable*. Cela a également été vérifié par la manière dont le mot *culpabilité* est représenté dans le corpus. Ici, le mot-clé de l'émotion négative *culpabilité* a montré à la fois des connotations négatives comme « ressentiment » et certains aspects positifs, y compris « innocence » et « espoir ». La double distribution des connotations a été attribuée à la double nature du mot *surprise* et la dépendance au contexte du mot *intérêt*. À titre d'illustration avec *surprise*, le paramètre *lien* varie de « satisfaction » (*satisfaction*) positive et « plaisir » (*pleasure*) aux émotions négatives de « regret » (*regret*) et d'« horreur » (*horror*). Cependant, on trouve quelques exemples du genre « perplexe » (*puzzled*) et « effarouché » (*startled*), qui représentent la zone marginale de *surprise* : « perplexe » (*puzzled*) et « effarouché » (*startled*) peuvent se rapporter à des expériences positives et négatives. Comme on peut le voir, les mots-clés d'émotion examinés sont toujours en co-occurrence avec d'autres mots-clés d'émotion, ou avec des notions liées à des expériences émotionnelles. En ce sens,

L'analyse *d'intérêt* a montré l'une des conclusions les plus convaincantes. Selon le contexte, *intérêt* a une proximité avec les émotions positives « heureux » (*happy*), « optimiste » (*optimistic*) et « sympathique » (*sympathetic*) et les négatives « peur » (*fear*) et « pitié » (*pity*) émotion et/ou des mots liés aux émotions, ainsi qu'avec divers mots liés au contexte, tels que « droits » (*rights*), « défi » (*challenge*), ou « mémoire » (*memory*).

Contrairement au paramètre exhaustif *lien*, les paramètres *anti-lien* et *marqueur temporel* ont une extension limitée au sein des mots-clés d'émotion. Cela indique que ces mots-clés ont tendance à être en co-occurrence avec d'autres mots plutôt que d'être opposés à diverses notions (*anti-lien*). À titre d'illustration, *intérêt* a révélé quelques cas d'opposition, qui sont représentés par les mots « curieux » (*curious*), « surprise » (*surprise*), « horrible » (*horrific*) et « difficile » (*difficult*).

Quant à la durée des émotions, elle n'est pas explicitement représentée dans les textes, sauf pour *bonheur*. Les résultats suggèrent que ce sont surtout les gens ont tendance à se remémorer les « jours heureux » (*happy days*), les « heures heureuses » (*happy hours*) et la « vie heureuse » (*happy life*).

### **6.5 Les paramètres d'évaluation émotionnelle : l'intensité, la qualité, et « les cas spéciaux »**

Si le paramètre *lien* indique la proximité de ces mots-clés d'émotion avec d'autres notions, deux autres paramètres – *qualité* et *intensité* – se lient directement à chaque mot-clé de l'émotion. Un aspect affectif de la lecture (examiné au chapitre 2) est

important dans la fiction juridique, dans laquelle le souvenir du lecteur sur l'information émotionnelle attachée à des événements est utilisé pour déclencher l'émotion lors de la lecture. D'ailleurs, nous avons démontré que ces exemples existent même dans la documentation juridique officielle. Les résultats de l'analyse ont montré que tous les mots-clés de l'émotion mettent, sur une échelle d'influence, l'accent sur l'influence forte. D'une part, les émotions ont peu d'effets, ce qui est linguistiquement marqué par les adverbes de degré de diminution tels que « un peu » (*little*) et « moins » (*less*). D'autre part, les mots-clés d'émotion sont significativement représentés par des adverbes de degré d'intensification, comme « très » (*very*), « beaucoup » (*much*), « trop » (*too*) et « grandement » (*great*). La distribution globale des intensifieurs est plus élevée que celle des adverbes de minoration. Cependant, les émotions, telles qu'elles sont exprimées dans la langue de la fiction juridique non seulement peuvent être intenses, mais elles possèdent également d'autres caractéristiques. Sous cet angle, en se basant sur les données, le paramètre *qualité* a été conçu pour représenter des exemples, dans lesquels les mots-clés de l'émotion ont d'autres caractéristiques que l'intensité. Les résultats ont montré un large éventail de caractéristiques des mots-clés d'émotion dans la fiction juridique, ce qui explique l'absence de domination d'un sens particulier. Ici, différents mots-clés sont caractérisés différemment : la *peur* comme « malheureuse » (*miserable*), la *culpabilité* comme « masquée » (*subconscious*), la *surprise* comme « indicible » (*unspeakable*) ou « agréable » (*pleasant*), le *bonheur* comme « parfait » (*perfect*) et « grand » (*high*), et l'*intérêt* comme « sincère » (*heartfelt*) ou « détaché » (*detached*). Il est important de noter que l'*intérêt*, la *surprise*, la *peur* ont des mots liés à l'émotion pour les décrire. Dans ces exemples, la *peur* peut être « terrible »

(*terrible*), la *surprise* « heureuse » (*happy*), et l'*intérêt* à la fois « horrible » (*horrible*) et « satisfaisant » (*satisfactory*). Ces cas sont également connus comme des « cas spéciaux », qui représentent le paramètre du même nom. À cet égard, l'affirmation en linguistique cognitive que la correspondance inter-domaines est effectuée au niveau de la pensée est corroborée par les conclusions. Les indices du corpus ont montré que les éléments lexicaux des groupes sémantiques font également partie des citations et conceptualisations. Par exemple, les adjectifs *curieux* et *attentif* sont couramment utilisés avec *intérêt*, et *honte* avec *culpabilité*.

## 7. Conclusion

L'analyse de la métaphore qualitative est basée sur le contexte et présente une grande variété de résultats pour chaque exemple alors que cette étude s'est déroulée sur un petit corpus par rapport à ceux d'autres études. Pour ce type d'analyse, il a été nécessaire d'annoncer certaines limites. Les facteurs qui ont limité cette étude rentrent dans le cadre (i) du cadre qualitatif pour l'analyse et (ii) des types d'émotions à examiner. Tout d'abord, le cadre qualitatif est très particulier à cette recherche. Comme indiqué auparavant, l'approche qualitative des données a été utilisée dans cette thèse afin de récupérer des exemples de mots-clés d'émotion aussi détaillés que possible. En plus de cela, la correspondance inter-domaines a été utilisée pour vérifier la conceptualisation des émotions dans un discours spécifique. Par conséquent, une approche qualitative semble être plus appropriée pour rendre compte d'un examen approfondi avec un nombre limité d'exemples, plutôt que l'usage d'un grand corpus. Deuxièmement, la présélection des mots-clés de

l'émotion nous a permis de nous concentrer sur différents types dominants d'émotions dans la pensée juridique. Ayant examiné la classification et la définition des émotions à la lumière de la linguistique psychologique et dans une perspective cognitive perspective dans le chapitre 2, l'attention a été portée sur cinq mots-clés de l'émotion. Chacune de ces émotions pouvait être positive, négative, ou duelle. En outre, la différenciation concerne les façons dont ces cinq émotions sont vécues par les humains. Par exemple, les émotions *peur* et *surprise* sont très dépendantes de l'agitation physiologique ; l'émotion *culpabilité* est interconnectée avec les « luttes » mentales des gens, qui relie ce mot-clé aux notions fondamentales de *honte* et d'*innocence*, ainsi que les notions juridiques liées à des peines, *présomption* d'innocence et *doute*. Contrairement à *culpabilité*, *bonheur* a révélé ses connotations positives. Dans le même temps, *intérêt* montre des affinités d'emploi en contextes juridiques et commerciaux, lorsque cette émotion est utilisée comme un « outil » pour obtenir des avantages ou faire des profits personnels. En ce sens, *intérêt* est interconnecté avec le traitement mental, puisque cette émotion est souvent accompagnée d'un objet d'intérêt nécessaire.

Ce travail a pris en compte une interdisciplinarité nécessaire. D'autres études pourraient être effectuées en utilisant la même analyse de la métaphore qualitative, mais pour un autre ensemble de mots-clés. Le cadre a été conçu de telle sorte qu'il puisse non seulement fonctionner pour l'étude des émotions dans la langue, mais aussi pour d'autres notions. Comme indiqué dans l'introduction, les données qui représentent la documentation juridique officielle pourraient être utilisées dans notre future recherche afin de découvrir les moyens par lesquels les émotions sont exprimées dans le discours juridique. La documentation juridique officielle comme

données de base permettrait la réalisation d'analyses pour vérifier les situations strictement juridiques, qui ont été partiellement exclues du champ d'application de cette thèse. Par exemple, il serait intéressant de révéler la dépendance entre les concepts d'émotion utilisés dans différents types d'événements juridiques tels que le contre-interrogatoire des témoins, les décisions que rend le juge, ou les plaidoiries de l'avocat de la défense.

## APPENDIX 1

### Glossary

*Code* – a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based data (Saldaña, 2009: 3).

*Cognitive appraisals* – determinants of emotional experience, which have an influence on person's perception of events (*Psychology Dictionary*, 2015).

*Compositional coding* – a conceptual mapping with the target and the source domain coded separately with the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Software (CAQDAS). This term is used by Kimmel (2012).

*Conceptual metaphor* – a fundamental cognitive tool, which is understood in terms of two main conceptual domains: the source domain and the target domain. Cross-domain mapping is performed between these domains. The source domain is the conceptual domain from which metaphorical expressions are extracted. The target domain is the conceptual domain that we try to understand by means of the source domain.

*Emotional experience* – a cover term to describe four experiences: *emotion*, *feeling*, *affect*, and *mood*. This term is especially used in Chapter 2 to describe the abovementioned experiences.

*Emotional intelligence* – ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one's thinking and actions (Salovey & Mayer, 1990a; 189).

*Emotion keyword* – a word that denotes certain emotion. It can be represented via nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs.

*Force dynamics* – a fundamental semantic category that examines how entities interact with respect to force (Talmy, 1988: 49). Two main force entities—*Agonist* (inaction) and *Antagonist* (action)—are employed in the present study to examine the

ways emotion keywords are expressed in language with respect to psychological forces (e.g. when describing emotional pressure, burden, blockage).

*Material object* – a term used to describe things, objects, or people “relating to or composed of physical substance[s]” (CoED, 2016) and “distinguished from the mind and spirit” (CED, 2016).

*Non-material object* – a term used to describe things or objects as opposed to material things—that is, to designate something related to spiritual or mental processing.

*Quotation* – a segment of a document that is deemed interesting or important by the user of CAQDAS (Friese, 2015: 6).

*Qualitative approach to data analysis* refers to techniques for analyzing textual (visual, audio, etc.) data. The techniques used in qualitative research are non-numerical in nature, as the main aim of a researcher does not imply collecting numerical data from a large corpus and transform it into useable statistics. The main aims include reflecting on the data, sequential data interpretation, and coding (Friese, 2015)

*Qualitative data analysis* – a non-statistical approach to data, where its methodological approach is primarily guided by the concrete material (e.g. text) at hand (Friese, 2015).

*Qualitative metaphor analysis* – a combination of *qualitative data analysis* (QDA) with *conceptual metaphor theory* (CMT), which is helpful for the systematic analysis of the linguistic expression of emotions. This term is used by Kimmel (2012).

*Time-frame* refers to the three periods of time chosen to represent the source data for the analysis.

*Two-tier coding strategy* – a coding procedure of cross-domain mapping that presupposes more than one source domain for a single target domain. This term is used by Kimmel (2012).

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Alena SOLOSHENKO

## **Emotions in legal fiction: conceptual metaphors and cross-domain mapping with ATLAS.ti**

### **La conceptualisation des émotions dans la fiction juridique : métaphores conceptuelles et mises en correspondance croisée avec l'outil ATLAS.ti**

This thesis, which is concerned by the study of emotions, is written within the theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics and focuses on the ways emotion keywords, in so far as they linguistically represent emotional experiences, lexicalize and conceptualize in the language of legal fiction. The first part of the work provides an interdisciplinary discussion about the interconnection between language, cognition, and emotion. This is followed, in a second part, by the complex lexicographical study of five emotion keywords in legal fiction, a genre of texts which has remained overlooked by researchers in the field. The third part brings to light the metaphorical patterns of different types of emotion keywords (positive, negative, and dual-nature) in order to show how they lexicalize and conceptualize in language, and demonstrate the dependency between the types of emotion keywords and their strongest and weakest conceptualizations. In addition, this thesis offers an application of the software ATLAS.ti, which allows a qualitative approach to the study of emotions as expressed in language.

**Keywords:** emotions, cognitive linguistics, conceptual metaphor, qualitative data analysis, ATLAS.ti

Cette thèse, dont l'objet est l'étude des émotions d'un point de vue linguistique, se positionne dans le cadre théorique de la linguistique cognitive. Son objectif principal est d'étudier le processus de lexicalisation et de conceptualisation des émotions, représentées linguistiquement par des mots-clés, dans le contexte littéraire de ce qu'on pourrait appeler « fiction juridique ». La première partie du travail examine les relations interdisciplinaires en jeu dans l'interconnexion entre le langage, la cognition et les émotions. La seconde partie est consacrée à l'étude lexicographique complexe des mots-clés exprimant des émotions dans le contexte littéraire de quatre romans mettant en scène la justice. La recherche dans le domaine des émotions ne s'est pas encore penchée sur ce type de contexte malgré la présence forte d'émotions dans ce contexte. Dans une troisième partie, sont mis au jour les « patrons » métaphoriques sous-jacents à la lexicalisation et à la conceptualisation en discours des différentes catégories d'émotions (positive, négative et duelles), ce qui permet d'illustrer la dépendance entre le lexique des émotions et ses conceptualisations les plus fortes et les plus faibles. Enfin, cette thèse utilise une méthodologie dérivée du logiciel ATLAS.ti qui permet une approche qualitative de l'étude des émotions telles qu'elles sont exprimées en discours.

**Mots-clés:** émotions, linguistique cognitive, métaphore conceptuelle, analyse qualitative, ATLAS.ti

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**Emotions in Legal Fiction:  
Conceptual Metaphors and Cross-Domain Mapping with ATLAS.ti**

*La conceptualisation des émotions dans la fiction juridique :  
Métaphores conceptuelles et mises en correspondance croisée avec l’outil  
ATLAS.ti*

Appendices (accompanying CD-rom)

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## APPENDIX 2

### Source domains that apply to emotion concepts

(Kövecses, 2004: 36-40)

*Source domains that apply to all emotion concepts*

EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS PRESENCE HERE (*All feelings are gone*)

EXISTENCE OF EMOTION IS BEING IN A BOUNDED SPACE (*She was in ecstasy*)

EXISTENCE OF EMOTIONS IS POSSESSION OF AN OBJECT (*She has a lot of pride*)

EMOTION IS A LIVING ORGANISM (*His fear grew*)

*Source domains that apply to most emotion concepts*

CONTAINER with “inside-outside” perspective

FORCE: NATURAL FORCE and PHYSICAL FORCE

SOCIAL SUPERIOR

OPPONENT, CAPTIVE ANIMAL, INSANITY

DIVIDED SELF

BURDEN

ILLNESS

*Source domains that apply to some emotions*

HEAT/ FIRE combined with a FLUID/ HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER images

WARM-COLD, LIGHT-DARK, UP-DOWN, and VITALITY-LACK OF VITALITY

ECONOMIC VALUE

NUTRIENT/ FOOD, WAR, and GAME

MACHINE, ANIMAL AGGRESSION, and HUNGER

RAPTURE/HIGH and HIDDEN OBJECT

MAGIC, UNITY, and JOURNEY

## PHYSICAL DAMAGE

*Source domains that apply to one emotion*

ANGER – TRESPASSING, PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE

FEAR – HIDDEN ENEMY, SUPERNATURAL BEING

HAPPINESS – BEING OFF THE GROUND, BEING IN HEAVEN, AN ANIMAL  
THAT LIVES WELL, PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION

SHAME – HAVING NO CLOTHES ON, DECREASE IN SIZE, BLOCKING OUT  
THE WORLD

APPENDIX 3

**Table 16.** Codes, target domains, source domains, and parameters of emotional evaluation

	Code <>		Source domain variations
<i>Group: target domains</i>			
1.	Target emotion: negative		
2.	Target emotion: positive		
3.	Target emotion: dual		
<i>Group: target domains</i>			
4.	Target emotion: negative: (a) fear		
5.	Target emotion: negative: (to) fear		
6.	Target emotion: negative: fearful		
7.	Target emotion: negative: fearfully		
8.	Target emotion: negative: feariocious		
9.	Target emotion: negative: guilt		
10.	Target emotion: negative: guilty		
11.	Target emotion: positive: happiness		
12.	Target emotion: positive: happy		
13.	Target emotion: positive: happily		
14.	Target emotion: positive: (an) interest		
15.	Target emotion: positive: (to) interest		
16.	Target emotion: positive: (to be) interested		
17.	Target emotion: positive: interesting		
18.	Target emotion: dual: (a) surprise		
19.	Target emotion: dual: (to) surprise		
20.	Target emotion: dual: (to be) surprised		
21.	Target emotion: dual: surprising		
<i>Source domains: Objectification, possession, and personification</i>			
22.	Source: object	1.	Object
		2.	Hidden object
		3.	Visible object
		4.	Undesired object
		5.	Desired object
		6.	Exhibited object

		7.	Lost object
		8.	Heavy object
		9.	Compound object
		10.	Entrusted object
		11.	Pressing object
		12.	Worn out object
		13.	Heavy object located under consideration
23.	Source: possession	14.	Possession
		15.	Visible possession
		16.	Painful possession
		17.	Hidden possession
		18.	Conflicting possession
		19.	Possession entrusted to somebody
		20.	Possession confided to somebody
		21.	Possession required taking care of
		22.	Possession to look after
		23.	Possession to watch
		24.	Possession to be watched (over)
		25.	Possession to be pursued
		26.	Possession under study
		27.	Possession to be consulted with somebody
		28.	Ensured possession
		29.	Possession that requires proof
		30.	Possession under pressure
		31.	Possession not to be neglected
		32.	Possession to be protected
		33.	Possession that requires explanation
		34.	Possession as an offer to somebody
		35.	Possession kept in the dark
		36.	Possession located beyond doubt
		37.	Shared possession
		38.	Secured possession
24.	Source: living creature	39.	A living creature
		40.	A living growing creature
		41.	Conflicting living creature
		42.	Living creature with demands
		43.	A living creature with a short life of a second
25.	Source: monster	44.	Monster
<i>Group: source domain: kinesics</i>			
26.	Source: an effect on bodily movement	45.	Effect on bodily movement
27.	Source: an effect on the body	46.	Effect on the body
28.	Source: an effect (hidden) on the body	47.	Hidden effect on the body
29.	Source: an effect visible on the body	48.	Effect visible on the body
30.	Source: an effect on internal organ	49.	Effect on heart

31.	Source: an effect on the face	50.	Effect on the face
32.	Source: an effect on the face (coloring)	51.	Effect on the face (coloring)
33.	Source: an effect on the look	52.	Effect on the look
34.	Source: an effect on contemplation	53.	Effect on contemplation
35.	Source: an effect not visible on the face	54.	Effect not visible on the face
36.	Source: an effect visible on the face	55.	Effect visible on the face
37.	Source: an effect on eyebrows	56.	Effect on eyebrows
38.	Source: an effect on the eyes	57.	Effect on the eyes
39.	Source: an effect on a stare	58.	Effect on a stare
40.	Source: an effect on the looking	59.	Effect on the looking
41.	Source: an effect on a glance	60.	Effect on a glance
42.	Source: an effect on observation	61.	Effect on observation
43.	Source: an effect on regard	62.	Effect on regard
44.	Source: an effect on seeing	63.	Effect on seeing
45.	Source: an effect on casting the eyes upon somebody	64.	Effect on casting the eyes upon somebody
46.	Source: an effect on the lips/mouth	65.	Effect on the lips/mouth
47.	Source: an effect on the voice	66.	Effect on the voice
48.	Source: an effect on tone of voice	67.	Effect on tone of voice
49.	Source: an effect on breathing	68.	Effect on breathing
50.	Source: an effect on speech	69.	Effect on speech
51.	Source: an effect on hearing	70.	Effect on hearing
52.	Source: an effect on listening	71.	Effect on listening
53.	Source: an effect on a manner	72.	Effect on a manner
54.	Source: existence of emotion is presence here	73.	Existence of emotion is presence here
		74.	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here
		75.	Existence (shared) of emotion is presence here
		76.	Existence of emotion is presence here (that can be felt by others)
		77.	Existence (dependent) of emotion is presence here
<i>Group: source domain: proxemics and containment</i>			
55.	Source: spatial orientation of the body	78.	Spatial orientation of the body
		79.	Up
		80.	Down
56.	Source: container	81.	Container
		82.	Container to get lost in and to hide in
57.	Source: body is a container for emotions	83.	Body is a container for emotions
58.	Source: an entity located inside somebody	84.	Entity located inside somebody

		85.	Entity located in the eyes
59.	Source: an entity located inside something	86.	Entity located inside something
		87.	Transformative entity located inside something
<i>Group: source domain: importance and flexibility</i>			
60.	Source: an entity that characterises somebody	88.	Entity that characterises somebody
61.	Source: an entity that characterises something	89.	Entity that characterises something
62.	Source: an effect on a state linked to somebody	90.	Effect on a state linked to somebody
		91.	Reversed effect on a state linked to somebody
		92.	Transformative effect on a state linked to somebody
63.	Source: an effect on a state linked to something	93.	Effect on a state linked to something
		94.	Transformative effect on a state linked to something
64.	Source: an effect coming from somebody	95.	Effect coming from somebody
		96.	Transformative effect coming from somebody
		97.	Half-effect coming from somebody
65.	Source: an effect coming from something	98.	Effect coming from something
66.	Source: an effect on action	99.	Effect on action
<i>Group: source domain: force</i>			
67.	Source: force	100.	Irresistible force
68.	Source: attacker	101.	Attacker
		102.	Intruding attacker
69.	Source: counterforce	103.	Counterforce
<i>Group: source domain: miscellaneous</i>			
70.	Source: destination	104.	Destination
71.	Source: illness	105.	Illness
72.	Source: pain	106.	Pain
73.	Source: harm	107.	Harm
74.	Source: component	108.	Component in a mixture
		109.	Component in a muddle
75.	Source: reward	110.	Reward
76.	Source: investment	111.	Investment
77.	Source: unrealistic entity	112.	Unrealistic entity
78.	Source: an entity with a light	113.	Entity with a light
79.	Source: an entity pending confirmation	114.	Entity pending confirmation
80.	Source: an entity to be proved	115.	Entity to be proved
81.	Source: scented entity	116.	Scented entity
82.	Source: ability	117.	Desired ability
83.	Source: parental care	118.	Parental care
84.	Source: parental work	119.	Parental work

85.	Source: undeniable event	120.	Undeniable event
86.	Source: fire	121.	Fire
87.	Source: liquid	122.	Liquid
<i>Group: parameters of emotional expression</i>			
88.	Emotion parameters: quality		
89.	Emotion parameters: measure		
90.	Emotion parameters: intensity		
	(a) degree qualifiers: increase		
	(b) degree qualifiers: decrease		
	(c) emphatic: do/does/did		
	(d) emphatic: so		
	(e) emphatic: too		
91.	Emotion parameters: time marker		
92.	Emotion parameters: link		
93.	Emotion parameters: anti-link		
94.	Special case: emotion describes emotion		
95.	Special case: emotion is "located" inside emotion		
96.	Special case: feeling emotion		
<i>Group: force-dynamics of emotions</i>			
97.	Force dynamics Type 1: Agonist = body		
98.	Force dynamics Type 2: Agonist = self		

## APPENDIX 4

### Cross-domain mapping of the emotion keywords

Table 17 below shows the findings from the qualitative metaphor analysis. The diagram below (Figure 21) is an illustration of one of the analyzed quotations, which is then followed by the table.




Figure 21. Quotation 4:69 diagram

**Table 17.** Cross-domain mapping

The emotion keyword of *FEAR*

Time-frame (TF)	Quotation #	Quotation	Cross-domain mapping/ <i>parameters of emotional evaluation</i>
TF 1			
1.	(a) <i>fear</i> 1:3	"I cannot admit the air freely," said the little old lady—the room was close, and would have been the better for it—"because the cat you saw downstairs, called Lady Jane, is greedy for their lives. She crouches on the parapet outside for hours and hours. I have discovered," whispering mysteriously, "that <b>her natural cruelty is sharpened by a jealous fear of their regaining their liberty</b> . In consequence of the judgment I expect being shortly given. She is sly and full of malice. I half believe, sometimes, that she is no cat, but the wolf of the old saying. It is so very difficult to keep her from the door."	Object <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>
2.	1:12	<b>I think I admired her with a kind of fear</b> , and I know that in her presence my thoughts always wandered back, as they had done at first, to that old time of my life.	Effect on action (to admire) Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
3.	1:17	Gentlemen of the green-baize road who could discourse from personal experience of foreign galleys and home treadmills; <b>spies of strong governments that eternally quake with weakness and miserable fear</b> , broken traitors, cowards, bullies, gamesters, shufflers, swindlers, and false witnesses; some not unmarked by the branding-iron beneath their dirty braid; all with more cruelty in them than was in Nero, and more crime than is in Newgate.	Effect on the body <i>Link (weakness)</i> <i>Quality (miserable)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
4.	1:33	And when I had turned, <b>I was in such fear of the</b>	Container

		<p><b>coach coming up behind me</b> (though I still knew that it neither would, nor could, do any such thing)</p> <p><b>that I ran the greater part of the way</b> to avoid being overtaken.</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p>Effect on action (to come up)</p> <p>Effect on bodily movement</p> <p><i>Intensity (such)</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
5.	1:35	<p><b>I have some fears</b>, my dearest cousin, that it may be partly for my sake you are now laying up so much unhappiness for yourself—and if for yourself, for me.</p>	<p>Possession</p> <p><i>Measure (some)</i></p>
6.	1:39	<p>He steps into the room, and she comes in too, closing both the doors behind her. <b>There is a wild disturbance – is it fear or anger? – in her eyes.</b></p>	<p>Entity located in the eyes</p> <p>Attacker</p> <p>Body is a container for emotions</p> <p><i>Link (anger)</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
7.	1:44	<p>Phil Squod and Jo are sent out immediately on this work of improvement. Miss Flite, quite enraptured by her success, makes the best of her way to court, <b>having great fears that otherwise her friend the Chancellor may be uneasy about her</b> or may give the judgment she has so long expected in her absence, and observing "which you know, my dear physician, and general, after so many years, would be too absurdly unfortunate!" Allan takes the opportunity of going out to procure some restorative medicines, and obtaining them near at hand, soon returns to find the trooper walking up and down the gallery, and to fall into step and walk with him.</p>	<p>Possession</p> <p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p>Effect on action (to be uneasy)</p> <p><i>Intensity (great)</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
8.	1:45	<p><b>It revived a fear I had had before</b> that my dear girl's little property would be absorbed by Mr. Wholes and that Richard's justification to himself would be sincerely this.</p>	<p>Possession</p> <p>Living creature</p>

9.	1:82	Through her means I got out to take the air with my guardian when <b>there was no fear of meeting Ada</b> , and wanted for nothing in the way of attendance, any more than in any other respect.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to meet) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
10.	1:87	It matters little now how much I thought of my living mother who had told me evermore to consider her dead. I could not venture to approach her or to communicate with her in writing, <b>for my sense of the peril in which her life was passed was only to be equalled by my fears of increasing it.</b>	Possession Effect on a stated linked to something (peril)
11.	1:89	Such crowding reflections, <b>increasing the distress and fear I always felt when the name was mentioned, made me so agitated that I could scarcely hold my place at the table.</b>	Effect on the body Up <i>Link (distress)</i> <i>Time marker (always)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
12.	1:90	There was not a servant in or about the house but was so good that they would all most gladly have come to me at any hour of the day or night <b>without the least fear or unwillingness</b> , but I thought it best to choose one worthy woman who was never to see Ada and whom I could trust to come and go with all precaution.	Object <i>Link (unwillingness)</i> <i>Intensity (the least)</i>
13.	1:91	In her carriage and all else she looks as she looked downstairs two hours ago. <b>Is it fear or is it anger now?</b> He cannot be sure. <b>Both might be as pale, both as intent.</b>	Living creature <i>Link (anger)</i>
14.	1:92	So! <b>Anger, and fear, and shame. All three contending.</b> What power this woman has <b>to keep these raging passions down!</b>	Living creature Attacker <i>Link (anger, shame)</i>
15.	1:93	But when I came to myself and saw how shocked my guardian was and found that they were earnestly speaking of the suspected man and recalling every	Possession Up <i>Link (interest)</i>

		favourable impression we had formed of him out of the good we had known of him, <b>my interest and my fears were so strongly aroused in his behalf that I was quite set up again.</b>	<i>Intensity (so strongly)</i>
16.	1:94	"I do not accuse him." "No, my Lady, no. But others do, and he is in prison and in danger. Oh, Lady Dedlock, if you can say but a word to help to clear him, say it!" What delusion can this be? What power does she suppose is in the person she petitions to avert this unjust suspicion, if it be unjust? <b>Her Lady's handsome eyes regard her with astonishment, almost with fear.</b>	Effect on regard <i>Link (astonishment)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
17.	1:100	"I am thankful I have lived long enough to be with Sir Leicester in this illness and trouble, for I know I am not too old nor too useless to be a welcomer sight to him than anybody else in my place would be. But the step on the Ghost's Walk will walk my Lady down, George; it has been many a day behind her, and now it will pass her and go on." "Well, mother dear, I say again, I hope not." "Ah, so do I, George," the old lady returns, shaking her head and parting her folded hands. <b>"But if my fears come true,</b> and he has to know it, who will tell him!"	Possession
18.	1:192	It's going on for sixty year that I have been in this family, and <b>I never had any fears for it before.</b> But it's breaking up, my dear; the great old Dedlock family is breaking up."	Possession Effect on a state linked to something (family) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
19.	1:193	The morning was my usual time, but whenever I found I had an hour or so to spare, I put on my bonnet and bustled off to Chancery Lane. They were both so glad to see me at all hours, and used to brighten up so when they heard me opening the door and coming in (being quite at home, I never	Possession Effect on action (becoming troublesome) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		knocked), that <b>I had no fear of becoming troublesome just yet.</b>	
20.	1:194	By this time I too well understood Mr. Vholes's scrupulous way of saving himself and his respectability <b>not to feel that our worst fears did</b> but keep pace with his client's progress.	Possession <i>Quality (worst)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
21.	1:200	<b>My hopes and fears</b> are both fulfilled tonight.	Possession <i>Link (hopes)</i>
22.	1:202	"And I go into the business with you—very pleasant we are over it; and <b>I confirm you in your well-founded fears</b> that you will get yourself into a most precious line if you don't come out with that there will," said Mr. Bucket emphatically; "and accordingly you arrange with me that it shall be delivered up to this present Mr. Jarndyce, on no conditions	Possession Container <i>Quality (well-founded)</i>
23.	1:486	<b>We are not to be put in bodily fear</b> , and that ill-conditioned fellow shall be held to bail again.	Container <i>Quality (bodily)</i>
24.	<i>fearful</i> 1:8	<b>His passion was fearful.</b> I could not have believed in such rage without seeing it.	Entity that characterises something (passion)
25.	1:15	His remote impressions of the robes and coronets, the stars and garters, that sparkle through the surface-dust of Mr. Tulkinghorn's chambers; his veneration for the mysteries presided over by that best and closest of his customers, whom all the Inns of Court, all Chancery Lane, and all the legal neighbourhood agree to hold in awe; his remembrance of Detective Mr. Bucket with his forefinger and his confidential manner, impossible to be evaded or declined, persuade him that he is a party to some dangerous secret without knowing what it is. <b>And it is the fearful peculiarity of this condition</b> that, at any hour of his daily life, at any opening of the shopdoor, at any pull of the bell, at any entrance of a	Entity that characterises something (peculiarity of a condition)

		messenger, or any delivery of a letter, the secret may take air and fire, explode, and blow up—Mr. Bucket only knows whom.	
26.	1:101	Volumnia, in her room up a retired landing on the staircase—the second turning past the end of the carving and gilding, a cousinly room containing a <b>fearful abortion of a portrait</b> of Sir Leicester banished for its crimes, and commanding in the day a solemn yard planted with dried-up shrubs like antediluvian specimens of black tea—is a prey to horrors of many kinds.	Entity that characterises something (abortion of a portrait)
27.	1:102	On the step at the gate, <b>drenched in the fearful wet of such a place</b> , which oozed and splashed down everywhere, I saw, with a cry of pity and horror, a woman lying—Jenny, the mother of the dead child.	Entity that characterises something (wet of a place)
28.	1:205	The debilitated cousin, more debilitated by the dreariness of the place, <b>gets into a fearful state of depression</b> , groaning under penitential sofa-pillows in his gunless hours and protesting that such fernal old jail's—nough t'sew fler up—frever.	Entity that characterises something (state of depression)
29.	<i>fearfully</i> 1:10	Mr. and Mrs. Chadband have appeared in the court. The bell at the inner door in the passage immediately thereafter tinkling, she is admonished by Mrs. Snagsby, on pain of instant reconsignment to her patron saint, not to omit the ceremony of announcement. Much discomposed in her nerves (which were previously in the best order) by this threat, <b>she so fearfully mutilates that point of state</b> as to announce "Mr. and Mrs. Cheeseming, least which, Imeanter say, whatsername!" and retires conscience-stricken from the presence.	Effect on a state linked to something (that point) Effect on action (to mutilate) <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
30.	1:43	"But I want, in the young lady's name, to know. You may trust me. No one else shall hear." "Ah, but I don't know," <b>replies Jo, shaking his head fearfully</b> , "as he DON'T hear."	Effect on bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>

		"Why, he is not in this place."	
31.	<i>fearious</i> 1:4	Mrs. Piper lives in the court (which her husband is a cabinet-maker), and it has long been well beknown among the neighbours (counting from the day next but one before the half-baptizing of Alexander James Piper agplaintive ed eighteen months and four days old on accounts of not being expected to live such was the sufferings gentlemen of that child in his gums) as the plaintive—so Mrs. Piper insists on calling the deceased—was reported to have sold himself. Thinks it was the plaintive's air in which that report originatinin. See the plaintive often and <b>considered as his air was feariocious and not to be allowed to go about some children being timid</b> (and if doubted hoping Mrs. Perkins may be brought forard for she is here and will do credit to her husband and herself and family).	Entity that characterises something (air)
32.	( <i>to</i> ) <i>fear</i> 1:2	I really was frightened at the thought of the importance I was attaining and the number of things that were being confided to me. I had not meant this at all; I had meant that he should speak to Richard. But of course I said nothing in reply except that I would do my best, though <b>I feared</b> (I really felt it necessary to repeat this) <b>that he thought me much more sagacious than I was</b> . At which my guardian only laughed the pleasantest laugh I ever heard.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to think) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
33.	1:6	Sometimes I thought of telling Mr. Jarndyce. Then <b>I feared that the young man would lose his situation</b> and that I might ruin him.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to lose) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
34.	1:11	"Well, well," says Mr. Bucket, "you train him respectable, and he'll be a comfort to you, and look after you in your old age, you know." "I mean to try hard," she answers, wiping her eyes.	Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		"But I have been a-thinking, being over-tired to-night and not well with the ague, of all the many things that'll come in his way. <b>My master will</b> be against it, and he'll be beat, and see me beat, and <b>made to fear his home</b> , and perhaps to stray wild.	
35.	1:14	<b>He feared old Mr. Turveydrop might consider it undutiful</b> and might receive too great a shock. For old Mr. Turveydrop's deportment is very beautiful, you know, Esther," said Caddy, "and his feelings are extremely sensitive."	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to consider) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
36.	1:16	Mr. Snagsby, greatly perplexed by the mysterious look he received just now from his little woman—at about the period when Mr. Chadband mentioned the word parents—is tempted into modestly remarking, "I don't know, I'm sure, sir." On which interruption Mrs. Chadband glares and Mrs. Snagsby says, "For shame!"  "I hear a voice," says Chadband; " <b>is it a still small voice, my friends? I fear not, though I fain would hope so—</b> "  "Ah—h!" from Mrs. Snagsby.	Effect on a state linked to something (voice) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
37.	1:26	"Confide in me, my child. <b>Don't fear me</b> . I wish you to be happy, and will make you so—if I can make anybody happy on this earth."	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
38.	1:27	Mr. Tulkinghorn comes and goes pretty often, there being estate business to do, leases to be renewed, and so on. He sees my Lady pretty often, too; and he and she are as composed, and as indifferent, and take as little heed of one another, as ever. <b>Yet it may be that my Lady fears this Mr. Tulkinghorn</b> and that he knows it. It may be that he pursues her doggedly and steadily, with no touch of compunction, remorse, or pity.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
39.	1:28	<b>Seeming to fear that she had been too gloomy</b> , and seeming also to lose the connexion in her mind, she	Existence of emotion is presence here

		said politely as she sipped her glass of wine, "Yes, my dear, as I was saying, I expect a judgment shortly. Then I shall release my birds, you know, and confer estates."	Effect on action (to be too gloomy) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
40.	1:29	I saw very well how many things had worked together for my welfare, and that if the sins of the fathers were sometimes visited upon the children, <b>the phrase did not mean what I had in the morning feared it meant.</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (phrase) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
41.	1:34	"Richard," said I, "you place great confidence in me, <b>but I fear you will not take advice from me?</b> " "It's impossible that I can on this subject, my dear girl. On any other, readily."	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to take advice) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
42.	1:37	Caddy, who had not seen me since her wedding-day, was so glad and so affectionate that <b>I was half inclined to fear I should make her husband jealous.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to make somebody jealous) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
43.	1:38	"I asked the favour of seeing you for a few moments here," said I, "in preference to calling at Mr. Kenge's because, remembering what you said on an occasion when you spoke to me in confidence, <b>I feared I might otherwise cause you some embarrassment, Mr. Guppy.</b> "	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to cause embarrassment) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
44.	1:41	"Nor do I understand," said he, "that any doubts tend towards you, my dear. Much suspicion may exist without that connexion." "With the lawyer," I returned. "But two other persons have come into my mind since I have been anxious. Then I told him all about Mr. Guppy, <b>who I feared might have had his vague surmises when I little understood his meaning,</b> but in whose silence after our last	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to have surmise) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		interview I expressed perfect confidence.	
45.	1:42	He had often thought of our <b>future</b> , and foreseeing that the time must come, <b>and fearing that it might come soon</b> , when Ada (now very nearly of age) would leave us, and when our present mode of life must be broken up, had become accustomed to reflect on this proposal.	Effect on a state linked to something (time) Effect on action (to come) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
46.	1:47	He turned his old bright fatherly look upon me, laid his hand on my hand in his old way, and said again, "She will succeed, my dear. Nevertheless, Bleak House is thinning fast, O little woman!" I was sorry presently that this was all we said about that. I was rather disappointed. <b>I feared I might not quite have been all I had meant to be</b> since the letter and the answer.	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect on action (to be) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
47.	1:84	<b>She tapped me several times upon the arm and nodded good-humouredly</b> as if she were anxious I should understand that <b>I had no cause to fear her</b> , though she spoke so gloomily, and confided these awful secrets to me.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
48.	1:187	In consideration for those master points in him, and even in consideration for them in herself, she made the sacrifice, she said, and would live in it and die in it. <b>She did both, I fear</b> ; certainly he never saw her, never heard of her from that hour. Nor did any one."	Existence of emotion is presence here
49.	1:189	"And pray has he done so?" "Really, Lady Dedlock, I cannot make you a definite reply. <b>I fear not</b> . Probably not yet. In our condition of life, we sometimes couple an intention with our—our fancies which renders them not altogether easy to throw off. I think it is rather our way to be in earnest."	Existence of emotion is presence here
50.	1:191	That being settled, there is another thing—how have you left Caddy?" "Very unwell, guardian. <b>I fear it will be some time</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to

		<b>before she regains her health and strength."</b>	regain health and strength) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
51.	1:195	"You are not to think, my dearest Esther, that <b>I fail to see what you see and (1) fear what you fear.</b> No one can understand him better than I do.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to fear) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
52.	1:195/ 1	"You are not to think, my dearest Esther, that I fail to see what you see and fear <b>what (2) you fear.</b> No one can understand him better than I do.	Existence of emotion is presence here
53.	1:196	"Mr. Skimpole," said I, "I must take the liberty of saying before I conclude my visit that I was much surprised to learn, on the best authority, some little time ago, that you knew with whom that poor boy left Bleak House and that you accepted a present on that occasion. I have not mentioned it to my guardian, for <b>I fear it would hurt him unnecessarily;</b> but I may say to you that I was much surprised."	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to hurt) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
54.	1:199	Dear Esther, let me only tell you that the fond idea of you which I took abroad was exalted to the heavens when I came home. I have always hoped, in the first hour when I seemed to stand in any ray of good fortune, to tell you this. <b>I have always feared that I should tell it you in vain.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to tell) <i>Time marker (always)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
55.	1:204	It was night when I came to my journey's end and found my guardian waiting for me. This was a great relief, for towards evening <b>I had begun to fear</b> (the more so as his letter was a very short one) <b>that he might be ill.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be ill) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
56.	1:487	She looked at me more intently as she took it, and seemed to take note, with her momentary touch, of every vein in it. " <b>I fear I surprised you,</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to

		mademoiselle, on the day of the storm?" she said with a parting curtsy.	surprise) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 2			
57.	(a) <i>fear</i> 2:1	The judge was an old man; so old, he seemed to have outlived time and change and death. His parrot-face and parrot-voice were dry, like his old, heavily-veined hands. His scarlet robe clashed harsh with the crimson of the roses. He had sat for three days in the stuffy court, but he showed no sign of fatigue. He did not look at the prisoner as he gathered his notes into a neat sheaf and turned to address the jury, but the prisoner looked at him. <b>Her eyes</b> , like dark smudges under the heavy square brows, <b>seemed equally without fear and without hope</b> . They waited.	Entity located in the eyes Body is a container for emotion <i>Link (hope)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
58.	2:2	Now Mr Urquhart is a solicitor, and is therefore inclined to take a cautious view of rumours and suspicions, and he warned Mr Vaughan that it was not wise to go about making accusations against people, <b>for fear of an action for libel</b> . At the same time, he naturally felt uneasy that such a thing should be said about a relation who had died in his house.	Effect on a state linked to something (action for libel) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
59.	2:12	'Whew!' said Miss Murchison. She darted to her desk. <b>Her fears had deceived her</b> . The bag was shut and the keys invisible.	Possession Living creature
60.	<i>fearful</i> 2:11	Of course not,' said Captain Bates. 'The police know what they're about. They don't put people into the dock if there isn't something pretty shady about 'em.' <b>Now this was a fearful brick</b> , for it was not so many years since the Duke of Denver had himself stood his trial on a mistaken charge of murder.	Entity that characterises somebody
61.	<i>fearfully</i> 2:4	The murmur of conversation rose and swelled into a loud rumble. 'By Jove,' said Freddy Arbuthnot, 'I believe it's your	Entity that characterises something (tough consciousness)

		Miss Climpson that's holdin' the jolly old show up, Wimsey. Did you see how the foreman glared at her?' 'Good egg,' said Wimsey. 'Oh, excellent, excellent egg! <b>She has a fearfully tough conscience</b> – she may stick it out yet.'	
62.	2:5	' <b>I'm fearfully sorry to trouble you</b> , especially as it's all so very distressin' and all that, but it's about the death of your son, and the trial and so on. Please don't think I'm wanting to make an interfering nuisance of myself, but I'm deeply interested – personally interested. You see, I know Miss Vane – I – in fact I like her very much, don't you know, and I can't help thinking there's a mistake somewhere and – and I should like to get it put right if possible.'	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to trouble) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
63.	2:6	Like the poisoned Athulf in the Fool's Tragedy, he could have cried, 'Oh, <b>I am</b> changing, changing, <b>fearfully changing.</b> ' Whether his present enterprise failed or succeeded, things would never be the same again.	Effect on action (to change) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
64.	2:8	'Very sickening, to think of all that good stuff going west and not getting a look-in one's self. By the way, how about you? Don't you get anything? <b>I beg your pardon, fearfully inquisitive</b> and all that, but I mean to say, considering you've been looking after her for years and are her only available relation, so to speak, it would be a trifle thick, what?' The solicitor frowned, and Wimsey apologised.	Entity that characterises somebody
65.	2:9	'I know, I know – <b>I've been fearfully impudent.</b> It's a failing of mine. And, anyhow, it'll all be in the papers when the old lady does pop off, so I don't know why I should be so anxious to pump you. Wash it out – I'm sorry.'	Entity that characterises somebody
66.	(to) <i>fear</i>	He could not believe that Philip had felt that particular kind of affection for Harriet Vane. Perhaps,	Effect on action (to cloud judgment)

	2:10	though, it was merely that he did not want to think well of the man. <b>His emotions were, he feared, clouding his judgement a little.</b>	<i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
67.	2:7	‘And I say,’ said Wimsey, ‘that it would be better for her to be hanged outright than to live and have everybody think her a murderess who got off by a fluke.’  ‘Indeed?’ said Mr Crofts. <b>‘I fear that is not an attitude that the defence can very well adopt.</b> May I ask if it is adopted by Miss Vane herself?’	Effect on a state linked to something (attitude of the defence)  <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 2			
68.	(a) <i>fear</i> 3:8	Miss Carlisle, perhaps, she dies that night before that will can be made.’  ‘Look here, what are you hinting at?’ Roddy’s face was wrathful. Poirot answered him like a flash: ‘You have told me, Mr Welman, as regards the death of Mary Gerrard, that the motive attributed to Elinor Carlisle is absurd – that she was, emphatically, not that kind of a person. But there is now another interpretation. Elinor Carlisle had reason to fear that she might be disinherited in favour of an outsider. The letter has warned her – <b>her aunt’s broken murmurings confirm that fear.</b>	Entity pending confirmation
69.	3:10	“It couldn’t be any other way than that I left it on the mantelpiece and it fell into the dustbin, could it?” she says. And “No, indeed, that was the way of it,” I said to her; and neither of us saying what was in our minds <b>and the fear that was on us.</b>  Hercule Poirot asked: ‘And what do you think now?’	Object
70.	(to) <i>fear</i> 3:8/1	Miss Carlisle, perhaps, she dies that night before that will can be made.’  ‘Look here, what are you hinting at?’ Roddy’s face was wrathful.	Effect on a state linked to somebody  Effect on action (to be disinherited)

		<p>Poirot answered him like a flash:</p> <p>‘You have told me, Mr Welman, as regards the death of Mary Gerrard, that the motive attributed to Elinor Carlisle is absurd – that she was, emphatically, not that kind of a person. But there is now another interpretation. <b>Elinor Carlisle had reason to fear that she might be disinherited in favour of an outsider.</b> The letter has warned her – her aunt’s broken murmurings confirm that fear.</p>	<i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
71.	3:9	<p>‘Has Elinor Carlisle made a will?’</p> <p>‘Yes.’</p> <p>‘Recently? Since her aunt’s death?’</p> <p>‘Yes.’</p> <p>‘To whom has she left her property?’</p> <p>‘That, M. Poirot, is confidential. I cannot tell you without authorization from my client.’</p> <p>Poirot said:</p> <p>‘Then I shall have <b>to interview</b> your client!’</p> <p><b>Mr Seddon said with a cold smile:</b></p> <p>‘<b>That, I fear, will not be easy.</b>’</p> <p>Poirot rose and made a gesture.</p> <p>‘Everything,’ he said, ‘is easy to Hercule Poirot.’</p>	<p>Effect on lips/mouth</p> <p>Effect on a state linked to something (interview)</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
TF 3			
72.	(a) <i>fear</i> 4:26	<p>She was holding herself with a controlled stillness, <b>willing herself to contain the fear and distress which momentarily he saw in her eyes.</b></p>	<p>Entity located in the eyes</p> <p>Counterforce</p> <p>Body is a container for emotions</p> <p><i>Link (distress)</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
73.	4:34	<p>The knowledge that she hadn’t fought for him, hadn’t defended him with vigour, let alone passion, that <b>she had felt more shame for herself and fear of her father</b> than she had felt compassion, stayed with her to taint the memory of those evenings together.</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p><i>Intensity (more)</i></p> <p><i>Link (shame)</i></p> <p><i>Special case: feeling</i></p>

			<i>emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
74.	4:37	<p>‘I suppose that’s all that’s wrong, worry about Octavia?’</p> <p>‘It’s enough, I should have thought, but I’m only guessing. She doesn’t talk to me about it. Our friendship doesn’t extend to personal confidences. The fact that we go to an occasional exhibition together doesn’t mean that I understand her – or any other woman come to that. It’s interesting, though, the power she exerts in Chambers. Has it ever occurred to you that a woman, <b>when she is powerful, is more powerful than a man?</b>’</p> <p>‘Powerful in a different way, perhaps.’</p> <p>Laud said: <b>‘It’s a power partly based on fear.</b> Perhaps the fear is atavistic, memories of babyhood. Women change the nappy, give the breast or withhold it.’</p>	Object
75.	4:37:/1	<p>‘I suppose that’s all that’s wrong, worry about Octavia?’</p> <p>‘It’s enough, I should have thought, but I’m only guessing. She doesn’t talk to me about it. Our friendship doesn’t extend to personal confidences. The fact that we go to an occasional exhibition together doesn’t mean that I understand her – or any other woman come to that. It’s interesting, though, the power she exerts in Chambers. Has it ever occurred to you that a woman, when she is powerful, is more powerful than a man?’</p> <p>‘Powerful in a different way, perhaps.’</p> <p>Laud said: ‘It’s a power partly based on fear. <b>Perhaps the fear is atavistic, memories of babyhood.</b> Women change the nappy, give the breast or withhold it.’</p>	Entity that characterises something (memories of babyhood)
76.	4:39	<b>The memory of the day</b> when their relationship	Container

		ended was so painful that gratitude <b>was subsumed in embarrassment, fear and shame</b> . If she thought of him it was because, as now in this moment, some trick of memory intruded on the present and she was fifteen again, sitting in the Frog's bed-sitting-room listening to his stories, learning about the criminal law.	<i>Link (embarrassment, shame)</i>
77.	4:40	The other would receive her back each late afternoon, a world composed of boys' voices, feet ringing on boards, the slamming of desk tops, the smell of cooking, drying clothes and young inadequately washed bodies and, overlaying all, <b>the scent of anxiety, incipient failure and fear</b> .	Scented entity <i>Link (anxiety, incipient failure)</i>
78.	4:42	<b>She was filled with a terrible apprehension, a fear for herself</b> which made her voice sharper than she realized.	Body is a container for emotion <i>Link (terrible comprehension)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
79.	4:44	But they never would meet again, and what <b>she was feeling now was not affection but fear and shame</b> .	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Anti-link (affection)</i> <i>Link (shame)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
80.	4:45	She was <b>sick with fear of him</b> .	Illness Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
81.	4:46	She had always been frightened of him and had known that she couldn't look to her mother for support; <b>her mother's fear was greater than her own</b> .	Possession <i>Intensity (greater)</i>
82.	4:51	She was aware of <b>her own quickened breathing, of a mixture of fear and excitement</b> , and something	Effect on breathing A component in a

		else which was as exhilarating as it was shameful.	mixture <i>Link (excitement)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
83.	4:52	Octavia gazed down at it while he waited for her response, and then she <b>shivered</b> and <b>caught her breath</b> as if the air had become icy cold. Her <b>veins</b> and <b>muscles tightened with fear</b> , and she could <b>hear the thud of her heart</b> .	Effect on the body (breathing, shivering, muscle tightening, heart racing) Attacker <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
84.	4:54	He needed time to think, needed, too, the physical release of walking while he tried to make sense of this <b>muddle of anxiety, hope, guilt and half-formulated fears</b> . If the offer to stay on were made, should he accept it?	Component in a muddle <i>Link (anxiety, hope, guilt)</i> <i>Quality (half-formulated)</i>
85.	4:56	<b>Despite a slight fear of her</b> , of that quick, authoritative voice, that demand for instant response, he didn't really dislike her, although he wouldn't want to serve under her as Head of Chambers.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Quality (slight)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
86.	4:57	The woman's <b>hands were shaking</b> , her <b>eyes looked</b> into Kate's <b>with a mixture of fear and appeal</b> which was all too familiar.	Effect on the body (shaking) A component in a mixture Entity located in the eyes Body is a container for emotions <i>Link (appeal)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
87.	4:59	She could criticize the words, behaviour, appearance and diction of actors, politicians and pundits <b>without fear of contradiction</b> .	Effect on a state linked to something (contradiction) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
88.	4:60	Horror, shock, disgust, astonishment, regret; those were the emotions common enough after the murder of a colleague. But grief? Who would feel genuine	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (terror)</i>

		pain for the death of Venetia Aldridge? What was he <b>feeling</b> now but <b>a fear close to terror</b> ?	<i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
89.	4:62	He glanced at Kate as she stood quietly by the body. Her face was white but calm and <b>he had no fear that she would faint</b> . She was a senior officer; he could rely on her to behave like one.	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to faint) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
90.	4:63	When <b>the news did break</b> , the <b>response</b> would be as varied as it always was: <b>fear, pity, fascinated interest, self-importance</b> ; a <b>surge</b> of heightened energy at being alive; the <b>pleasure</b> of sharing the news at work, among friends; the <b>half-shameful excitement</b> of blood spilt which was not one's own.	Effect on a state linked to something (the news) <i>Link (pity, fascinated interest, self-importance, surge, pleasure, half-shameful excitement)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
91.	4:64	She seems more concerned about the keys than about the accident. She didn't even ask what had happened or how it had happened. I think she assumes that Mrs C fell over. Falling over and getting mugged are <b>her two main fears</b> . I think she regards one or both of them as more or less inevitable.	Possession
92.	4:67	There are some horrors, and the murder of a child is one, which probe <b>our deepest fears</b> , fears we hardly dare acknowledge in case a malignant fate senses the depths of our imagined horror and strikes triumphantly to make it real.	Possession <i>Quality (deepest)</i>
93.	4:67/1	There are some horrors, and the murder of a child is one, which probe <b>our deepest fears, fears we hardly dare acknowledge</b> in case a malignant fate senses the depths of our imagined horror and strikes triumphantly to make it real.	Possession
94.	4:69	My concentration on him was so intense that when, for the only time, he looked up at the public gallery	Effect on a state linked to somebody

		and scanned us with a glance of contempt, <b>I felt a momentary fear that he had guessed my purpose there and was seeking out my face.</b>	Effect on action (to guess, to seek out) <i>Time marker (momentary)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
95.	4:71	<b>I'd had no fear that he would take the money from me, perhaps kill me.</b> Why should I fear?	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to take the money, to kill) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
96.	4:72	Then there <b>came a second of fear</b> as if something already precarious, nebulous, had been further diminished.	Living creature (with a short life of a second) <i>Time marker (second)</i>
97.	4:75	It was strange that the falling of so small an object should release such a flood of relief. She had freed herself from more than a ring. <b>Fear was like a pain. It swept over her,</b> receded into a few minutes of blessed peace, then returned <b>stronger and more terrible</b> than before.	Attacker Pain <i>Intensity (stronger, more)</i> <i>Quality (terrible)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
98.	4:77	He seized the dagger, rushed at her and struck. It must, I think, have been an <b>amazement</b> to him that he was capable of the deed, that the dagger went in so cleanly, so easily, that he had actually killed a human being. <b>Astonishment</b> rather than <b>horror or fear</b> would have been <b>the first emotion.</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (the process of killing) <i>Link (horror)</i> <i>Anti-link (astonishment)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
99.	(to) <i>fear</i> 4:71/1	I'd had no fear that he would take the money from me, perhaps kill me. <b>Why should I fear?</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here
100.	4:8	'Can you hear me clearly, Mrs Scully?' The woman nodded and whispered 'Yes.' Venetia smiled at her briefly. It was enough. The question,	Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		the encouraging smile, the warmth of the voice said it all: I'm a woman. We're on the same side. These pompous men don't frighten us. <b>You've nothing to fear from me.</b>	
101.	4:49	He had at least had the sense to dress soberly for his appearance in the witness-box; <b>she had feared that he might appear in overbold checks and breeches.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to appear) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
102.	4:58	Hubert Langton gazed helplessly at Laud. There was a second's hesitation in which <b>he almost feared that Drysdale wouldn't respond</b> , that he'd say, 'You're Head of Chambers. You cope.'	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to respond) <i>Quality (almost)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
103.	4:61	When Mrs Buckley spoke to her, Aldridge had someone with her. Obviously that person could be the killer. If so, it was either someone from Chambers or a man or woman <b>Miss Aldridge</b> had herself let in and <b>had no reason to fear</b> . No one from Chambers admits to being with her at seven forty-five. Everyone claims to have left by then.	Existence of emotion is presence here
104.	4:65	Everything I now know about her was told to me under the seal of the confessional. I'm sorry Adam.' 'That was rather <b>what I expected, and what I feared.</b> '	Effect on a state linked to something (knowledge) <i>Link (to expect)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
105.	4:73	She slid carefully between the taut sheets as she had on her first night at boarding school, when <b>she had feared that even to disturb the bedclothes was to risk disapproval</b> from that pervasive but mysterious authority which from now on would govern her life.	Effect on a state linked to something (bedclothes) Effect on action (to disturb, to risk) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
106.	4:76	What was AD trying to do? Spare her embarrassment? Was it as simple as that? <b>Or had he</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (memory)

		<b>feared to reactivate a memory</b> which he knew was painful, and by reactivating it, load it with additional trauma.	Effect on action (to reactivate a memory) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
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The emotion keyword of *GUILT*

TF 1	Quotation #	Quotation	Cross-domain mapping/ <i>parameters of emotional evaluation</i>
107.	<i>guilt</i> 1: 687	For which reason, with a sinking heart and <b>with that hang-dog sense of guilt upon him</b> which dread and watching enfolded in the Sol's Arms have produced, the young man of the name of Guppy presents himself at the town mansion at about seven o'clock in the evening and requests to see her ladyship.	Object Entity that characterises something (sense)
108.	1:689	"We are to meet as usual?" "Precisely as usual, if you please." "And <b>I am to hide my guilt</b> , as I have done so many years?"	Possession (hidden) <i>Time marker (so many years)</i>
109.	1:693	If I am sought for, or accused of, his murder, believe that I am wholly innocent. Believe no other good of me, for I am innocent of nothing else that you have heard, or will hear, laid to my charge. He prepared me, on that fatal night, for <b>his disclosure of my guilt to you.</b>	Possession (hidden)
110.	1:695	The next was written at another time: I have wandered a long distance, and for many hours, and I know that I must soon die. These streets! I have no purpose but to die. When I left, I had a worse, but <b>I am saved from adding that guilt to the rest.</b>	Object (undesired)
111.	<i>guilty</i> 1:682	Dear, dear, to think how much time we passed alone together afterwards, and how often I repeated to the doll the story of my birthday and confided to her that I would try as hard as ever I could to repair the <b>fault</b> I had been born with ( <b>of which I confessedly felt guilty and yet innocent</b> ) and would strive as I grew up to be industrious, contented, and kind-hearted and	Effect on a state linked to something (fault) <i>Link (innocent)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		to do some good to some one, and win some love to myself if I could.	
112.	1:683	This was really such a confusing question that Ada looked at me in perfect dismay. As to <b>the guilty nature of my own consciousness</b> after what I had been thinking, <b>it must have been expressed in the colour of my cheeks.</b>	Entity that characterises something (consciousness) Effect on the face (coloring) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
113.	1:684	"By my life and honour, yes!" cried the visitor. " <b>I wouldn't be guilty of the audacious insolence of keeping a lady of the house</b> waiting all this time for any earthly consideration.	Effect on a state linked to something (audacious insolence) Effect on action (to keep waiting) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
114.	1:685	For which reason, whenever a man unknown comes into the shop (as many men unknown do) and says, "Is Mr. Snagsby in?" or words to that innocent effect, <b>Mr. Snagsby's heart knocks hard at his guilty breast.</b>	Effect on internal organs (heart) Entity that characterises something (breasts) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
115.	1:688	"To bless and receive me," groaned my mother, "it is far too late. I must travel my dark road alone, and it will lead me where it will. From day to day, sometimes from hour to hour, I do not see the way before <b>my guilty feet</b> . This is the earthly punishment I have brought upon myself. I bear it, and I hide it."	Entity that characterises something (feet)
116.	1:690	Mr. Woodcourt then told us that the trooper's man had been with him before day, after wondering about the streets all night like a distracted creature. That one of the trooper's first anxieties was that <b>we should not suppose him guilty</b> . That he had charged his messenger to represent his perfect innocence with every solemn assurance he could send us.	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect on action (to suppose) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
117.	1:691	Say I am innocent and I get a lawyer. <b>He would be as likely to believe me guilty as not</b> ; perhaps more.	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect on action (to

			believe) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
118.	1:692	When Mr. Bucket has a matter of this pressing interest under his consideration, the fat forefinger seems to rise, to the dignity of a familiar demon. He puts it to his ears, and it whispers information; he puts it to his lips, and it enjoins him to secrecy; he rubs it over his nose, and it sharpens his scent; he shakes it before <b>a guilty man</b> , and it charms him to his destruction.	Entity that characterises somebody
119.	1:694	"Therefore I desire to say, and to call you all to witness—beginning, Volumnia, with yourself, most solemnly—that I am on unaltered terms with Lady Dedlock. That I assert no cause whatever of complaint against her. That I have ever had the strongest affection for her, and that I retain it undiminished. Say this to herself, and to every one. If you ever say less than this, <b>you will be guilty of deliberate falsehood to me.</b> "	Effect on a state linked to something (deliberate falsehood) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
120.	1:696	"Quite! Absolutely! <b>I couldn't be guilty of the meanness of coming back without it.</b> I should never be safe not to be off again. I have not sneaked home to rob your children, if not yourself, brother, of your rights.	Effect on a state linked to something (meanness) Effect on action (to come back) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
121.	1:686	His mental sufferings are so great that he entertains wandering ideas of delivering himself up to justice and requiring to be cleared if innocent and punished with the utmost rigour of the law <b>if guilty.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here
TF 2			
122.	<i>guilty</i> 2:64	'Poor misguided girl! I assure you, I have no vindictive feelings – that is to say, nobody would be more happy than myself to know that she was innocent of this dreadful thing. Indeed, Lord Peter, <b>even if she were guilty</b> , it would give me great pain	Existence of emotion is presence here

		to see her suffer the penalty.	
123.	2:169	‘Well, I think that is the case as it is presented to you. This woman is charged with having murdered her former lover by arsenic. He undoubtedly did take arsenic, and if you are satisfied that she gave it to him, with intent to injure or kill him, and that he died of it, then <b>it is your duty to find her guilty of murder.</b>	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here Effect on a state linked to something (murder) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
124.	2:173	After what appeared to be an hour, but was actually about seven minutes, <b>Miss Climpson, guilty and furtive</b> , was holding the flap of the envelope before the scalding steam.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (furtive)</i>
125.	2:159	‘Look here,’ said Wimsey, ‘I’m not out for a verdict of “Not proven”. As far as Miss Vane’s honour and happiness are concerned, <b>she might as well be found guilty</b> as acquitted on a mere element of doubt. I want to see her absolutely cleared and the blame fixed in the right quarter. I don’t want any shadow of doubt about it.’	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here
126.	2:166	You know, I am sure, that it is a great principle of English law that every accused person is held to be innocent unless and until he is proved otherwise. It is not necessary for him, or her, to prove innocence; <b>it is, in the modern slang phrase, “up to” the Crown to prove guilt</b> , and unless you are quite satisfied that the Crown has done this beyond all reasonable doubt, it is your duty to return a verdict of “Not guilty”.	Entity to be proved
127.	2:170	‘The prisoner had the means – the arsenic, she had the expert knowledge, and she had the opportunity to administer it. The defence say that this is not enough. They say the Crown must go further and prove that the poison could not have been taken in any other way – by accident, or with suicidal intent. That is for you to judge. If you feel that there is any reasonable doubt that the prisoner gave this poison to Philip	Container Effect on a state linked to something (murder) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		Boyces deliberately, <b>you must bring her in “Not guilty” of murder.</b>	
128.	2:171	The Court rose to its feet. The judge took his seat. The prisoner, very white in the electricity, reappeared in the dock. The door leading to the jury-room opened. ‘Look at their faces,’ said the fiancée. <b>‘They say if it’s going to be “Guilty” they never look at the prisoner.</b> Oh, Archie, hold my hand!’	Entity that characterises something (verdict)
129.	2:172	‘In that case, of course,’ said Mr Crofts, ‘we shall get an acquittal. But do you believe in that possibility, my lord?’  ‘It’s perfectly evident that you don’t,’ said Wimsey, hotly. <b>‘In fact, you think your client’s guilty.</b> Well, I don’t.’	Existence of emotion is presence here
130.	2:174	‘Do I understand that the charge against the prisoner is withdrawn?’  ‘Those are my instructions, my lord.’  ‘In that case,’ said the judge, impassively, turning to the jury, ‘there is nothing left for you but <b>to return a verdict of “Not Guilty”.</b> Usher, keep those people quiet in the gallery.’	Entity that characterises something (verdict)
131.	2:176	Now please – I sympathise very much with the people who are cheering, but this is not a theatre or a football match, and if they are not quiet, they will have to be put out. <b>Members of the jury, do you find the prisoner “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”?</b>  ‘Not guilty, my lord.’	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here
132.	2:176/ 1	Now please – I sympathise very much with the people who are cheering, but this is not a theatre or a football match, and if they are not quiet, they will have to be put out. <b>Members of the jury, do you find the prisoner “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”?</b>  ‘ <b>Not guilty, my lord.</b> ’	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here
TF 2			
133.	<i>guilt</i>	‘Who else could have done it, I should like to know?’	Possession (that requires

	3:157	You're not suggesting that I did?' 'Not for a moment. <b>But her guilt has not yet been proved, remember.'</b>	proof)
134.	<i>guilty</i> 3:156	The matter would pass straight out of Mary Gerrard's mind again, but it is possible that, later, she might recollect the fact and might mention it casually to the person in question – oh, without the least suspicion in the world. <b>But to the person guilty of the murder of Mrs Welman</b> , imagine the effect of that remark! Mary had seen: Mary must be silenced at all costs! I can assure you, my friend, that anyone who has once committed a murder finds it only too easy to commit another!'	Effect on a state linked to something (murder) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
135.	3:163	Closing speech for the Defence. 'Gentlemen of the jury, the responsibility now rests with you. It is for you to say if Elinor Carlisle is to go forth free from the court. If, after the evidence you have heard, you are satisfied that Elinor Carlisle poisoned Mary Gerrard, <b>then it is your duty to pronounce her guilty.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to pronounce) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
136.	3:166	Elinor was brought back into the court. The jury filed in. 'Gentlemen of the jury, are you agreed upon your verdict?' 'Yes.' ' <b>Look upon the prisoner at the bar, and say whether she is guilty or not guilty.</b> ' ' <b>Not guilty...</b> '	Effect visible on the body Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
137.	3:117	'Mais oui, you tried very hard, did you not? You were impatient because I did not seem to you to be getting anywhere. <b>And you were afraid, too, that she might, after all, be guilty.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Special: emotion describes emotion</i>
138.	3:153	He thought: ' <b>My God, she's going to plead guilty...She's lost her nerve...</b> '	Effect on action (to plead)

		Elinor Carlisle's lips parted. She said: 'Not guilty.'	
139.	3:154	Hercule Poirot said: ' <b>Supposing she is guilty</b> – do you still want to get her acquitted?'	Existence of emotion is presence here
140.	3:155	'Of all the things to say – so prim and smug, too! Who's asking you to approve? I'm not asking you to tell lies! Truth's truth, isn't it? If you find something that tells in an accused person's favour, you wouldn't be inclined to suppress it <b>because she's guilty</b> , would you?' 'Certainly not.'	Existence of emotion is presence here
141.	3:159	'What about the nurses?' 'Either of them could have done so, certainly. But Nurse Hopkins was concerned about the disappearance of the tube at the time and mentioned it openly. There was no need for her to do so. The death certificate had been signed. Why call attention to the missing morphine if <b>she were guilty</b> ?'	Existence of emotion is presence here
142.	3:160	The Scotland Yard man looked at him curiously. 'Is there anything on the other side?' Slowly Poirot shook his head. 'As yet, no. So far everything I have found out about the case points to <b>Elinor Carlisle's being guilty.</b> '	Existence of emotion is presence here
143.	3:161	Inspector Marsden said with cheerful certainty: ' <b>She's guilty, all right.</b> ' Poirot said: 'I should like to see her.'	Existence of emotion is presence here
144.	3:162	Poirot said gently: 'I have a little idea we shall find something – yes.' 'Something to prove Elinor's innocence?' 'Ah, I did not say that.' <b>Peter Lord stopped dead.</b> 'You don't mean you still think <b>she's guilty</b> ?' Poirot said gravely:	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect of bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>

		‘You must wait, my friend, before you get an answer to that question.’	
145.	3:164	You have had an example of both types of labels submitted to you. In my view, <b>the police were guilty of gross carelessness</b> in not checking the original fragment more closely and in jumping to the conclusion that it was a morphine label.	Effect on a state linked to something (gross carelessness) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
146.	3:165	‘If the Prosecution has convinced you that the accused and no other committed the crime, then <b>you must find the accused guilty.</b>	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here
147.	3:168	Peter Lord murmured: ‘Elinor herself !’ ‘Precisely. <b>The evidence pointed to her as the guilty party.</b> And she herself, with her sensitive and fastidious conscience, did nothing to dispel that assumption	Entity that characterises something (party)
148.	3:169	Accusing herself of the will, if not the deed, she came very near to abandoning a distasteful and sordid fight and <b>pleading guilty in court</b> to a crime she had not committed.’	Effect on action (to plead)
149.	3:170	Hercule Poirot went on: ‘From the moment that I started my investigations there was always the strong possibility that <b>Elinor Carlisle was guilty of the crime</b> of which she was accused. But I fulfilled my obligations towards you and I discovered that a fairly strong case could be made out against another person.’	Effect on a state linked to something (crime) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
150.	3:171	There could be only one answer to that <b>if Nurse Hopkins was guilty: because the other murder, the murder of Mary Gerrard</b> , was already planned, and a scapegoat had been selected, but that scapegoat must be shown to have had a chance of obtaining morphine.	Effect on a state linked to something (murder) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 3			
151.	<i>guilt</i>	If, however, <b>at the end of the case they were left</b>	Possession

	4:29	<b>with a reasonable doubt of his guilt</b> , then the accused was entitled to be acquitted of the murder of Mrs Rita O’Keefe.	<i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>
152.	4:32	In her more analytical moments she wondered whether <b>she might not be harbouring a subconscious guilt which</b> after a victory, and particularly a victory against the odds, <b>transferred itself into resentment</b> of the client.	Entity (transformative) located inside something (mind) <i>Quality (subconscious)</i>
153.	4:54	He needed time to think, needed, too, the physical release of walking while he tried to make sense of this <b>muddle of anxiety, hope, guilt and half-formulated fears</b> . If the offer to stay on were made, should he accept it?	Component in a muddle <i>Link (anxiety, hope, half-formulated fears)</i>
154.	4:125	But <b>I can’t think</b> of Emily’s death <b>without guilt and agony</b> . I can’t live with that imagined horror, with that pain, for the rest of my life. Forgive me.	Object Effect on action (to think) <i>Link (agony)</i>
155.	4:247	‘My turn to continue this interesting fabrication. So let us suppose that all the suppressed emotions of an essentially private man come together. <b>Long years of guilt, disgust with himself, anger</b> that this woman whose family have already <b>harmed him</b> so irrevocably should be planning more destruction.	Entity that characterises something (years) Harm <i>Link (disgust, anger)</i> <i>Time marker (long years)</i>
156.	4:299	And Robbins, what was your impression of Mrs Carpenter’s <b>reaction when she first heard the news?</b> Robbins took his time; he always did. ‘Surprise and shock, sir.’ He paused. ‘Yes, Robbins?’ ‘I thought there was something else. <b>Guilt perhaps. Or shame.</b> ’	Effect coming from something (news) <i>Link (shame)</i>
157.	4:349	The court isn’t concerned with what I think. I’m not there to give them my opinion. I’m there to test the prosecution’s case. <b>The jury had to be convinced of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt</b> . I was able to	Possession (located beyond doubt)

		show that there was a reasonable doubt. He was entitled to be acquitted and he was acquitted.	
158.	4:360	There's no triumph in defending the innocent. She doesn't love her daughter, <b>that's her guilt</b> . How do you think she'll feel if Octavia gets engaged to someone her mother believes is a killer, someone she defended?	Possession
159.	4:370	The denial had been as instinctive as <b>an arm raised to ward off a blow</b> and had sounded unconvincing even to his own ears. <b>His whole action had been one of guilt</b> .	Effect on action (his whole action) Effect on bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
160.	4:371	It was never possible to estimate how long the jury would be out. Sometimes a case which had seemed so strong as to admit no possible question of <b>the accused's guilt</b> resulted in a wait of hours, while one of apparent doubt and complexity produced a verdict with astonishing speed.	Possession
161.	4:372	And then at school it had seemed that every emotional crisis had been deliberately timed to make Venetia's professional life more difficult. Every speech day, every school play had been arranged on a day when it was impossible for her to get away, <b>increasing Octavia's resentment, her own nagging guilt</b> .	Possession (painful) Up <i>Link (resentment)</i>
162.	4:374	She had cut herself free from her old life with ruthless efficiency and the minimum of fuss, as if the death of her granddaughter and of her daughter-in-law had severed more than their own lives. But something other than the oak bureau had been brought with her. In the bottom drawer was a bulky manila envelope, unmarked and with the flap stuck down. Lacking a paper-knife, <b>Dalglish</b> insinuated his thumb under the flap and <b>felt an irrational second of mixed guilt and irritation</b> as the paper split into a jagged edge.	Entity that characterises something (an irrational second) Component in a mixture <i>Link (irritation)</i> <i>Time marker (second)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i>

163.	4:375	An accused man, however obvious <b>his guilt may appear to be before the facts are known</b> , however heinous the crime, however unprepossessing his appearance or repellent his character, is entitled to a defence.	Possession (hidden)
164.	4:376	Our law rests on the presumption of innocence. There are countries where <b>an arrest by the police is taken as a sign of guilt and the subsequent court procedures</b> are little more than a recital of the case for the prosecution. We should be grateful not to live in such a country.'	Entity that characterises something (sign)
165.	4:377	He was taking her somewhere private, somewhere special, somewhere only he knew about where they could be together, away from Mrs Buckley's accusing, worried eyes, away from that basement flat which had never really been hers, had always been grudged, away from death and murder and inquests, <b>insincere condolences and her own overwhelming sense of guilt</b> , the feeling that everything, including her mother's murder, was her fault and always had been.	Entity that characterises something (sense) <i>Intensity</i> <i>(overwhelming)</i>
166.	4:378	The police would surely reason that she had been killed to make them think that she had murdered Aldridge and done away with herself <b>out of remorse or guilt</b> , or because she could no longer live with the horror of what she'd done.	Container <i>Link (remorse)</i>
167.	4:380	Taking hopeless cases to court wastes time and money.' 'So sometimes the police can be sure that they've got the right man and still aren't able to take him to court?' 'That happens quite often. It's frustrating when it does. But it's not for the police, <b>it's for the court to decide guilt or innocence.</b> '	Effect on action (to decide) <i>Anti-link (innocent)</i>
168.	<i>guilty</i>	Rufus, of course, could not leave it like that. Entitled	Effect on the looking

	4:13	to re-examine on a point requiring clarification he got portentously to his feet, hitched up his gown and surveyed the air above the witness-box with the puzzled frown of a man expecting a change in the weather. <b>Mrs Scully looked at him with the anxiety of a guilty child</b> who knows that she has disappointed the grown-ups. Rufus attempted with some success to modify his tone.	Entity that characterises somebody <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
169.	4:344	The jury listened with impassive faces. Watching them, Venetia thought, as she often did, that it was a curious system but one which worked remarkably well provided that your first priority was the protection of the innocent <b>rather than the conviction of the guilty</b> . It wasn't designed – how could it be?	Entity that characterises somebody
170.	4:352	<b>Naughton looked for a moment as guilty</b> as if he had been accused of the murder.	Effect visible on the body <i>Time marker (moment)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
171.	4:353	After the door closed behind her, Costello said: ' <b>She's feeling guilty</b> , I suppose, <b>because of that business</b> with her brother.	Effect on a state linked to something (business) <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
172.	4:361	'It is a funny system, but it's the best we have. We can never expect perfect justice. <b>We have a system which sometimes lets the guilty go free</b> so that the innocent can live in safety under the law.'	Entity that characterises somebody
173.	4:342	'Garry, did you love your aunt?' A short pause, and then: 'I was very fond of her, and I was sorry for her. I don't think I know what people mean by love.' They were the first words he had spoken in court except for <b>that plea of not guilty spoken in a firm low voice</b> . The court was absolutely silent. The words fell on the quiet	Entity that characterises something (plea)

		expectant air. Venetia could sense the reaction of the jury.	
174.	4:343	‘My learned friend, in his opening address, put the matter to you quite clearly. If you are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that my client murdered his aunt, then <b>your verdict must be one of guilty</b> . But if, after considering all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that it was indeed his hand that struck down Mrs O’Keefe, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.’	Entity that characterises something (verdict)
175.	4:343/ 1	‘My learned friend, in his opening address, put the matter to you quite clearly. If you are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that my client murdered his aunt, then your verdict must be one of guilty. But if, after considering all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that it was indeed his hand that struck down Mrs O’Keefe, then <b>it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty</b> .’	Entity that characterises something (verdict)
176.	4:345	‘Garry, did you love your aunt?’ The question brought to mind a similar question asked – when? – eighty-four years earlier, in March 1912, when <b>Frederick Henry Seddon had been found guilty of the murder</b> of his lodger, Miss Eliza Barrow.	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here Effect on a state linked to something (murder) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
177.	4:346	The Clerk asked: ‘Have you arrived at your verdict?’ ‘We have, sir.’ ‘ <b>Do you find the accused, Garry Ashe, guilty or not guilty of the murder</b> of Mrs Rita O’Keefe?’ ‘Not guilty.’ ‘And that is the verdict of you all?’ ‘It is.’	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here Effect on a state linked to something (murder) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
178.	4:346/ 1	The Clerk asked: ‘Have you arrived at your verdict?’ ‘We have, sir.’ ‘ <b>Do you find the accused, Garry Ashe, guilty or not guilty of the murder</b> of Mrs Rita O’Keefe?’ ‘Not guilty.’	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here Effect on a state linked to something (murder) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		<p>‘And that is the verdict of you all?’</p> <p>‘It is.’</p>	
179.	4:346/ 2	<p>The Clerk asked: ‘Have you arrived at your verdict?’</p> <p>‘We have, sir.’</p> <p><b>‘Do you find the accused, Garry Ashe, guilty or not guilty of the murder of Mrs Rita O’Keefe?’</b></p> <p><b>‘Not guilty.’</b></p> <p>‘And that is the verdict of you all?’</p> <p>‘It is.’</p>	<p>Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here</p> <p>Effect on a state linked to something (murder)</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
180.	4:347	<p>She began moving away, but he was at her shoulder. Venetia thought she could smell his triumph.</p> <p>‘I don’t think we need refight the case, Mr Cartwright.’</p> <p>‘You didn’t say that I’d never before appeared in a court of law though, did you?’</p> <p>‘That would have been a lie. <b>Counsel don’t lie to the court.</b>’</p> <p>‘But they can be economical with the truth, can’t they? <b>Not guilty, then, this time</b> and not guilty the last time. Lucky for me. It wouldn’t have been a good thing to come before the court with form.</p>	<p>Existence of emotion is presence here</p>
181.	4:347/ 1	<p>She began moving away, but he was at her shoulder. Venetia thought she could smell his triumph.</p> <p>‘I don’t think we need refight the case, Mr Cartwright.’</p> <p>‘You didn’t say that I’d never before appeared in a court of law though, did you?’</p> <p>‘That would have been a lie. <b>Counsel don’t lie to the court.</b>’</p> <p>‘But they can be economical with the truth, can’t they? <b>Not guilty, then, this time and not guilty the last time.</b> Lucky for me. It wouldn’t have been a good thing to come before the court with form.</p>	<p>Existence of emotion is presence here</p>
182.	4:348	<p>She thought, but did not say: The judge did. So did prosecuting counsel.</p>	<p>Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here</p>

		As if he had read her mind, he went on: ‘They couldn’t say anything though, could they? <b>I was found not guilty.</b> ’ He lowered his voice and glanced round at the almost empty hall. He paused. ‘You remember what I told you about the last time, how I got off?’ ‘I remember, Mr Cartwright.’	
183.	4:351	After all, <b>the young man was found not guilty.</b> A brilliant defence, I believe.	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here
184.	4:354	‘I don’t propose to startle the North London magistrates’ court by turning up complete with a junior to save your brother from his folly. Get him a good solicitor.’ And <b>Kenny had been found guilty</b> and sentenced to six months.	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here
185.	4:355	‘Come off it, Kate. He’d had the whole journey from Buckhurst Hill to do his thinking. Isn’t it possible that he just couldn’t face going into Chambers? He knew damned well what was waiting for him. His behaviour this morning was totally irrational.’ Kate said: ‘But people don’t always behave rationally. And why pick on him? <b>Are you saying that you can’t believe a senior barrister would be guilty of murder?</b> ’ ‘Of course I’m not, Kate. That’s bloody silly.’	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect on a state linked to something (murder) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
186.	4:356	Only once did I get close, perhaps dangerously close, to my own obsession. The day had been given up to the prosecution evidence. I said: ‘ <b>But she must know that he’s guilty.</b> ’ ‘It isn’t important. It’s her job to defend him whether she thinks he’s guilty or not.’	Existence of emotion is presence here
187.	4:356/ 1	Only once did I get close, perhaps dangerously close, to my own obsession. The day had been given up to the prosecution evidence. I said: ‘But she must know that he’s guilty.’	Existence of emotion is presence here

		'It isn't important. It's her job to defend him whether she thinks <b>he's guilty or not.</b> '	
188.	4:357	He told me too that this was the court in which some of the greatest criminal trials of the century had been held. <b>Seddon, found guilty of murdering his lodger</b> , Miss Barrow, with arsenic; the notorious Dr Crippen; Haigh who had dissolved his victims in acid – all had been sentenced to death in that dock.	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here Effect on a state linked to something (murdering) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
189.	4:359	I said: 'Aldridge thinks that you killed your aunt. She believes you to be a murderer. That's how she gets her kicks, <b>defending people she thinks are guilty.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here
190.	4:434	Rufus Matthews' final words were almost perfunctory. If the jury were satisfied on the evidence put before them that Garry Ashe had murdered his aunt, it would be their duty <b>to return a verdict of guilty.</b>	Entity that characterises something (verdict)

The emotion keyword of *SURPRISE*

TF 1	Quotation #	Quotation	Cross-domain mapping/ <i>parameters of emotional evaluation</i>
191.	(a) <i>surprise</i> 1:115	"For me?" said I. "The housekeeping keys, miss." <b>I showed my surprise</b> , for she added with some little surprise on her own part, "I was told to bring them as soon as you was alone, miss. Miss Summerson, if I don't deceive myself?"	Possession (hidden)
192.	1:115/ 1	"For me?" said I. "The housekeeping keys, miss." I showed my surprise, for <b>she added with some little surprise</b> on her own part, "I was told to bring them as soon as you was alone, miss. Miss Summerson, if I don't deceive myself?"	Effect on speech <i>Intensity (little)</i> <i>Measure (some)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
193.	1:116	She threw open a door and I went into a chamber, where, <b>to my unspeakable surprise</b> , instead of finding Mr. Skimpole stretched upon the bed or prostrate on the floor, <b>I found him standing before the fire smiling at Richard.</b>	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Quality (unspeakable)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

194.	1:119	<p>Will you do me the favour to mention (as it may interest her) that I have something to tell her on her return in reference to the person who copied the affidavit in the Chancery suit, which so powerfully stimulated her</p> <p>curiosity. I have seen him."</p> <p>My Lady, leaning forward, looks out of her window.</p> <p>"That's the message," observes Sir Leicester.</p> <p>"I should like to walk a little," says my Lady, still looking out of her window.</p> <p>"Walk?" <b>repeats Sir Leicester in a tone of surprise.</b></p>	<p>Effect on tone of voice</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
195.	1:134	<p>I had another uneasiness, in the application of <b>the painful story</b> to the poor half-witted creature who had brought us there; but, <b>to my surprise, she seemed perfectly unconscious of that</b> and only led the way upstairs again, informing us with the toleration of a superior creature for the infirmities of a common mortal that her landlord was "a little M, you know!"</p>	<p>Possession</p> <p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
196.	1:135	<p>"May heaven reward you!" we said to her. "You are a good woman."</p> <p>"Me, young ladies?" <b>she returned with surprise.</b></p> <p>"Hush! Jenny, Jenny!"</p>	<p>Effect on speech</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
197.	1:143	<p><b>To my great surprise, on going in I found my guardian still there,</b> and sitting looking at the ashes. He was lost in thought, his book lay unheeded by his side, his silvered iron-grey hair was scattered confusedly upon his forehead as though his hand had been wandering among it while his thoughts were elsewhere, and his face looked worn.</p>	<p>Possession</p> <p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p><i>Intensity (great)</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
198.	1:150	<p>As soon as Richard and I had held the conversation of which I have given an account, Richard communicated the state of his mind to Mr. Jarndyce.</p> <p><b>I doubt if my guardian were altogether taken by surprise when he received the representation,</b></p>	<p>Attacker</p> <p>Effect on a state linked to something (presentation)</p> <p>Effect on action (to</p>

		though it caused him much uneasiness and disappointment.	receive) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
199.	1:417	"Your cousin, Mr. Jarndyce. I owe so much to him. Would you mind describing him to me?" Shaking her golden hair, Ada turned her eyes upon me with such laughing wonder that I was full of wonder too, <b>partly at her beauty, partly at her surprise.</b>	Possession <i>Link (beauty)</i>
200.	1:420	Mr. George directed another succession of quick bright glances at me as my guardian and <b>I exchanged a word or two of surprise at the coincidence</b> , and I therefore explained to him how we knew the name.	Entity that characterises something (word) Effect on a state linked to something (coincidence) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
201.	1:422	Perhaps this morning's pipe is devoted to the memory of Gridley in his grave. "And so, Phil," says George of the shooting gallery after several turns in silence, "you were dreaming of the country last night?" <b>Phil, by the by, said as much in a tone of surprise</b> as he scrambled out of bed.	Effect on tone of voice <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
202.	1:423	I didn't say much to you, commander, then, for <b>I was took by surprise that a person</b> so strong and healthy and bold as you was should stop to speak to such a limping bag of bones as I was.	Attacker <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
203.	1:426	<b>But this piece of information, instead of being an agreeable surprise to Peepy</b> , threw him on his back in such transports of kicking grief that I could do nothing on being sent for but accede to the proposal that he should be admitted to the breakfast table.	Entity that characterises something (piece of information) Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Quality (agreeable)</i>
204.	1:427	<b>The boy staggered up instantly and stared at me with a remarkable expression of surprise and terror.</b> His action was so quick and my being the cause of it was so evident that I stood still instead of	Effect on a stare Effect on bodily movement <i>Link (terror)</i>

		advancing nearer.	<i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
205.	1:428	He had no doubt, he said, that our young friend was an excellent boy in his way, but his way was not the Harold Skimpole way; what Harold Skimpole was, Harold Skimpole had found himself, to <b>his considerable surprise</b> , when he first made his own acquaintance; <b>he had accepted himself with all his failings</b> and had thought it sound philosophy to make the best of the bargain; and he hoped we would do the same.	Possession Effect on action (to accept) <i>Intensity (considerable)</i>
206.	1:431	<b>Lady Dedlock's. She was alone and coming to where I sat</b> with a much quicker step, <b>I observed to my surprise</b> , than was usual with her.	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on observation <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
207.	1:432	"My dear Esther!" he said. "My best friend!" And he really was so warm-hearted and earnest that <b>in the first surprise and pleasure of his brotherly greeting I could scarcely find breath</b> to tell him that Ada was well.	Container Effect on a state linked to something (brotherly greeting) Effect on breathing <i>Link (pleasure)</i> <i>Quality (first)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
208.	1:433	"Well, well, my dear," said Richard, "we won't go into that now. I want to appear quietly in your country-house here, with you under my arm, and <b>give my charming cousin a surprise</b> . I suppose your loyalty to John Jarndyce will allow that?"	Object Effect on a state linked to somebody
209.	1:434	"Responsibility, my dear Miss Summerson?" he repeated, catching at the word with the pleasantest smile. "I am the last man in the world for such a thing. I never was responsible in my life—I can't be." "I am afraid everybody is obliged to be," said I timidly enough, he being so much older and more clever than I.	Effect on a state linked to something ("new light") Effect on action (to receive) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>

		"No, really?" said Mr. Skimpole, <b>receiving this new light with a most agreeable jocularly of surprise.</b> "But every man's not obliged to be solvent? I am not. I never was. [...]."	<i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
210.	1:435	I was not so easy now during any reference to the name but that I felt it a relief when Richard, <b>with an exclamation of surprise, hurried away to meet a stranger</b> whom he first descried coming slowly towards us.	Effect on the voice Effect on action (to hurry away, to meet) Spatial orientation of the body <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
211.	1:438	As I received the story, they began in an imprudence on her own part one day when <b>she was taken by surprise</b> , which shows how difficult it is for the firmest of us (she was very firm) to be always guarded.	Attacker
212.	1:439	"It is relating," says Mr. Snagsby in a mysterious low voice, "it is relating—not to put too fine a point upon it—to the foreigner, sir!" <b>Mr. Tulkinghorn eyes him with some surprise.</b> "What foreigner?"	Effect on the looking Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Measure (some)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
213.	1:445	I had been unwilling that he should see <b>my altered looks. I had been taken by surprise</b> , and my courage had quite failed me.	Attacker Effect on the look <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
214.	1:448	Too capricious and imperious in <b>all she does to be the cause of much surprise in those about her</b> as to anything she does, this woman, loosely muffled, goes out into the moonlight. Mercury attends with the key.	Effect coming from something (cause) Entity located inside somebody <i>Intensity (much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
215.	1:450	"Well, you know," returned my guardian quickly, "there's Woodcourt." <b>I had not meant that, and was rather taken by surprise.</b>	Attacker <i>Intensity (rather)</i>
216.	1:458	When I went upstairs to bed, our house being small and this young woman's ears sharp, I stuffed the sheet	Effect on speech Entity that characterises

		into Mrs. Bucket's mouth that <b>she shouldn't say a word of surprise</b> and told her all about it.	something (word) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
217.	1:460	Yes, I remembered that too, very well. "That was me," said Mr. Bucket. <b>Seeing my surprise</b> , he went on, "I drove down in a gig that afternoon to look after that boy.	Possession (visible) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
218.	1:461	The whole household were amazed to see me, without any notice, at that time in the morning, and so accompanied; and <b>their surprise was not diminished by my inquiries.</b>	Possession Down
219.	1:464	Sir Leicester <b>hears</b> this tribute <b>with so much surprise</b> and stares about him in such a confused way that Mrs. Rouncewell feels it necessary to explain.	Effect on a state linked to something (tribute) Effect on hearing <i>Intensity (so much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
220.	1:465	He is lying thus, apparently forgetful of <b>his newer and minor surprise</b> , when the housekeeper returns, accompanied by her trooper son.	Possession <i>Quality (newer, minor)</i>
221.	1:466	"It's like you, guardian," said I, "to have been taking that into consideration for <b>a happy surprise to both of us.</b> "	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Quality (happy)</i> <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
222.	1:467	My dear, next to myself he is the most constant suitor in court. He begins quite to amuse our little party. Ve-ry friendly little party, are we not?" It was miserable <b>to hear this from her poor mad lips</b> , though <b>it was no surprise.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on hearing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
223.	1:469	<b>Mr. Kenge expressed the surprise and gratification he felt at the unusual sight of Mr. Jarndyce</b> in his office.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (gratification)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

224.	1:472	"Well, well," said he. "I am delighted that you approve. I thought you would. I meant <b>it as a pleasant surprise for the little mistress of Bleak House.</b> "	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Quality (pleasant)</i> <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
225.	1:473	"One more last word. When Allan Woodcourt spoke to you, my dear, he spoke with my knowledge and consent—but I gave him no encouragement, not I, for <b>these surprises were my great reward</b> , and I was too miserly to part with a scrap of it.	Reward
226.	1:474	<b>It was a great comfort and surprise to me to find him</b> in his low state cheerful and looking forward.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to find) <i>Link (comfort)</i> <i>Intensity (great)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
227.	(to be) <i>surprised</i> 1:49	I had perhaps <b>less reason to be surprised</b> than either of my companions, having never yet enjoyed an opportunity of thanking one who had been my benefactor and sole earthly dependence through so many years.	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect on a state linked to something (reason) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
228.	1:54	My Lady, changing her position, sees the papers on the table—looks at them nearer—looks at them nearer still—asks impulsively, "Who copied that?" <b>Mr. Tulkinghorn stops short, surprised by my Lady's animation and her unusual tone.</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (Lady's animation, unusual tone) Effect on bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
229.	1:55	At last Mr. Kenge came. HE was not altered, but <b>he was surprised to see how altered I was</b> and appeared quite pleased.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to alter appearance) Effect on seeing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
230.	1:56	She is a fine old lady, handsome, stately, wonderfully	Effect coming from

		neat, and has such a back and such a stomacher that if her stays should turn out when she dies to have been a broad old-fashioned family fire-grate, <b>nobody who knows her would have cause to be surprised.</b> Weather affects Mrs. Rouncewell little. The house is there in all weathers, and the house, as she expresses it, "is what she looks at."	something (cause) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
231.	1:117	<b>You must not be surprised to see him take me under his protection,</b> for he has never forgotten that I was a low boy at school and that our friendship began in his knocking two of my head tyrant's teeth out (he says six) before breakfast.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to take under protection) Effect on seeing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
232.	1:120	"A man of a very ill-regulated mind," observes Sir Leicester with severity. "An extremely dangerous person in any community. A man of a very low character of mind." "He is obstinate," says Mr. Tulkinghorn. "It is natural to such a man to be so," says Sir Leicester, looking most profoundly obstinate himself. <b>"I am not at all surprised to hear it."</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (characteristic of a man) Effect on hearing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
233.	1:132	<b>I</b> therefore supposed that Mrs. Jellyby was not at home, and <b>was quite surprised when the person appeared in the passage without the pattens,</b> and going up to the back room on the first floor before Ada and me, announced us as, "Them two young ladies, Missis Jellyby!"	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to appear) <i>Intensity (quite)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
234.	1:133	But before we met the cook, we met Richard, who was dancing up and down Thavies Inn to warm his feet. <b>He was agreeably surprised to see us stirring</b> so soon and said he would gladly share our walk.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to stir) Effect on seeing <i>Quality (agreeably)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
235.	1:136	Now, I observed that evening, as I had observed for some days past, that Ada and Richard were more than	Effect on a state linked to somebody

		ever attached to each other's society, which was but natural, seeing that they were going to be separated so soon. <b>I was therefore not very much surprised</b> when we got home, and Ada and I retired upstairs, <b>to find Ada more silent than usual</b> , though I was not quite prepared for her coming into my arms and beginning to speak to me, with her face hidden.	Effect on action (to find) <i>Intensity (very much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
236.	1:139	"I don't believe he can fence at all, ma'am," said the old lady. <b>I looked surprised and inquisitive.</b>	Effect visible on the body <i>Link (inquisitive)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
237.	1:141	<b>I should have been surprised if those two could have thought very highly of one another</b> , Mr. Boythorn attaching so much importance to many things and Mr. Skimpole caring so little for anything.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to think) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
238.	1:142	After walking and stopping, and several times leaving off rubbing his head, and beginning again, my guardian put his hand upon the keys and stopped Mr. Skimpole's playing. "I don't like this, Skimpole," he said thoughtfully. Mr. Skimpole, who had quite forgotten the subject, <b>looked up surprised.</b>	Effect on the look <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
239.	1:144	<b>I am not in the least surprised that she postpones her appearance</b> as long as possible.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to postpone) <i>Intensity (the least)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
240.	1:145	Sunday, a considerable part of the inconsiderable congregation expect to see me drop, scorched and withered, on the pavement under the Dedlock displeasure. Ha ha ha ha! <b>I have no doubt he is surprised that I don't.</b> For he is, by heaven, the most self-satisfied, and the shallowest, and the most coxcombical and utterly brainless ass!"	Effect (reversed) on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be surprised) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>

			<i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
241.	1:146	"Mark my words, Mrs. Perkins, ma'am, and <b>don't you be surprised</b> , Lord bless you, if that young man comes in at last for old Krook's money!"	Existence of emotion is presence here
242.	1:149	<b>I was not surprised by Caddy's being in low spirits</b> when we went downstairs, or by her sobbing afresh on my neck, or by her saying she would far rather have been scolded than treated with such indifference, or by her confiding to me that she was so poor in clothes that how she was ever to be married creditably she didn't know.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be in low spirits) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
243.	1:196	"Mr. Skimpole," said I, "I must take the liberty of saying before I conclude my visit that <b>I was much surprised to learn</b> , on the best authority, some little time ago, <b>that you knew with whom that poor boy left Bleak House and that you accepted a present on that occasion</b> . I have not mentioned it to my guardian, for I fear it would hurt him unnecessarily; but I may say to you that I was much surprised."	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to learn, to know, to accept) <i>Intensity (much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
244.	1:196/ 1	"Mr. Skimpole," said I, "I must take the liberty of saying before I conclude my visit that I was much surprised to learn, on the best authority, some little time ago, that you knew with whom that poor boy left Bleak House and that you accepted a present on that occasion. I have not mentioned it to my guardian, for I fear it would hurt him unnecessarily; but I may say to you that <b>I was much surprised</b> ."	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
245.	1:197	"No? <b>Really surprised</b> , my dear Miss Summerson?" he returned inquiringly, <b>raising his pleasant eyebrows</b> . "Greatly surprised."	Effect on eyebrows <i>Intensity (really)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
246.	1:421	It'll do you good; it'll freshen you up and get you into training for another turn at the Chancellor. Give in? Why, <b>I am surprised to hear a man of your energy talk of giving in</b> .	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to talk about giving in) Effect on hearing

			<i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
247.	1:424	"Mr. George, my dear friend," says Grandfather Smallweed, removing his right arm from the neck of one of his bearers, whom he has nearly throttled coming along, "how de do? <b>You're surprised to see me</b> , my dear friend."	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on seeing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
248.	1:425	"I should hardly have been <b>more surprised to have seen your friend</b> in the city," returns Mr. George.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on seeing <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
249.	1:436	"Well, Caddy," said I, <b>turning to her</b> , "perhaps <b>you will not be surprised</b> when I tell you, my dear, that there never has been any engagement—"	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
250.	1:437	" <b>I should not be surprised if they all voluntarily abandoned the girl</b> —yes, lover and all—instead of her abandoning them, supposing she remained at Chesney Wold under such circumstances."	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to abandon) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
251.	1:441	We were all assembled shortly before dinner, and he was still at the piano idly picking out in his luxurious way little strains of music, and talking between whiles of finishing some sketches of the ruined old Verulam wall tomorrow, which he had begun a year or two ago and had got tired of, when a card was brought in and my guardian <b>read aloud in a surprised voice</b> , "Sir Leicester Dedlock!"	Effect on the voice Effect on action (to read) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
252.	1:442	Here he produced a card and read, with much gravity and a little trouble, through his eye-glass, "Mr. Hirrold—Herald—Harold—Skampling—Skumpling—I beg your pardon—Skimpole." "This is Mr. Harold Skimpole," <b>said my guardian, evidently surprised.</b>	Effect on speech <i>Quality (evidently)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>

253.	1:444	"Charley, Charley," said I, "come away!" And <b>I hurried on so swiftly that my little maid was surprised.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
254.	1:446	The pretty village <b>face</b> looks brightly up. Then, seeing how serious my Lady is, <b>looks puzzled and surprised.</b>	Effect visible on the face Effect (transformative) on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (puzzled)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
255.	1:447	"Why, Lady Dedlock," says the lawyer, <b>taking a chair at a little distance from her and slowly rubbing his rusty legs up and down, up and down, up and down, "I am rather surprised by the course you have taken."</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (course taken) Spatial orientation of the body <i>Intensity (rather)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
256.	1:452	"Why, heaven save us, man," <b>exclaimed</b> my guardian, <b>surprised into his old oddity and vehemence</b> , "you talk of yourself as if you were somebody else!"	Effect on speech Entity located inside something (vehemence, oddity) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
257.	1:453	"Do you though, indeed?" said Mrs. Bagnet, continuing to grumble on good-humouredly. " <b>I'm sure I'm surprised at that.</b> I wonder you don't starve in your own way also.	Effect on a state linked to something (somebody's action) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
258.	1:457	" <b>I'm surprised at the indiscreetness you commit.</b> You'll say something that'll be used against you, you know. You're sure to come to it. Never you mind what I say till it's given in evidence. It is not addressed to you."	Effect on a state linked to something (indiscreetness) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
259.	1:462	A look passed between them when Mr. Bucket followed me in, <b>and I was surprised to see that the woman evidently knew him.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to know)

			Effect on seeing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
260.	1:470	<b>I was not surprised to observe Mr. Kenge inclined to dispute</b> what he said before he had said much, for I knew that no two people ever did agree about anything in Jarndyce and Jarndyce.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to incline) Effect on observation <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
261.	1:471	I thought if you took by any means forgivingly to my name I might gradually get myself up to the point of writing a letter. <b>But I should not have been surprised, brother, if you had considered it</b> anything but welcome news to hear of me."	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to consider) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
262.	1:121	Mr. Bayham Badger himself was a pink, fresh-faced, crisp-looking <b>gentleman with</b> a weak voice, white teeth, light hair, and <b>surprised eyes</b> , some years younger, I should say, than Mrs. Bayham Badger.	Effect on the eyes <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
263.	(to) <i>surprise</i> <i>e</i> 1:57	I said to myself, " <b>Esther, my dear, you surprise me!</b> This really is not what I expected of you!" And it had such a good effect that I folded my hands upon my basket and quite recovered myself. Mr. Jarndyce, expressing his approval in his face, began to talk to me as confidentially as if I had been in the habit of conversing with him every morning for I don't know how long. I almost felt as if I had.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
264.	1:429	It was not like what I had expected, but I had expected nothing definite, and <b>I dare say anything definite would have surprised me.</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (anything definite) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
265.	1:114	Peepy was lost for an hour and a half, and brought home from Newgate market by a policeman. The equable <b>manner</b> in which Mrs. Jellyby sustained both his absence and his restoration to the family circle <b>surprised us all.</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (manner) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
266.	1:118	Then I arranged my desk, and put everything away,	Effect on a state linked

		and was so composed and cheerful that I thought I had quite dismissed this <b>unexpected incident</b> . But, when I went upstairs to my own room, <b>I surprised myself by beginning to laugh about it</b> and then surprised myself still more by beginning to cry about it.	to something (incident) Effect on action (to laugh) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
267.	1:118/ 1	Then I arranged my desk, and put everything away, and was so composed and cheerful that I thought I had quite dismissed this unexpected <b>incident</b> . But, when I went upstairs to my own room, I surprised myself by beginning to laugh about it and then <b>surprised myself still more by beginning to cry about it</b> .	Effect on a state linked to something (incident) Effect on action (to cry) <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
268.	1:140	"But, suppose," said my guardian, laughing, "he had meant the meat in the bill, instead of providing it?" "My dear Jarndyce," he returned, " <b>you surprise me</b> . You take the butcher's position.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
269.	1:440	"Indeed it is not so, sir," said Ada. "He is poor." "No, really?" returned Mr. Skimpole <b>with his bright smile</b> . " <b>You surprise me</b> .	Effect on the lips/mouth Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
270.	1:443	I had not once looked up. I had not seen the visitor and had not even appeared to myself to hear the conversation. <b>It surprises me to find that I can recall it</b> , for it seemed to make no impression on me as it passed.	Effect on a state linked to something (conversation) Effect on action (to find, to recall) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
271.	1:449	"I can certify at all events that he is not anybody else's," returns Mrs. Bagnet, laughing. "Well, <b>you do surprise me!</b> Yet he's like you, there's no denying.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Intensity (do)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
272.	1:451	I proposed to Ada that morning that we should go and see Richard. <b>It a little surprised me to find that she hesitated</b> and was not so radiantly willing as I had expected.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to find, to hesitate)

			<i>Intensity (a little)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
273.	1:454	I don't suppose <b>there's a move on the board that would surprise ME</b> , and as to this or that move having taken place, why my knowing it is no odds at all, any possible move whatever (provided it's in a wrong direction) being a probable move according to my experience.	Effect on a state linked to something (move on the board) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
274.	1:487	She looked at me more intently as she took it, and seemed to take note, with her momentary touch, of every vein in it. " <b>I fear I surprised you, mademoiselle</b> , on the day of the storm?" she said with a parting curtsy.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 2			
275.	(a) <i>surprise</i> 2:27	She made no bones about accepting her client's invitation to dine, <b>and showed no surprise</b> when he confidentially murmured that he had a little proposition to put before her.	Object (hidden)
276.	2:31	'Not even when he parted company with Miss Vane?'  'Not even then. In fact, I gathered that he was rather more angry than despondent. I must say that <b>it was a surprise to me to hear that</b> , after all that had passed between them, she was unwilling to marry him. I still fail to comprehend it. Her refusal must have come as a great shock to him. He wrote so cheerfully to me about it beforehand. Perhaps you remember the letter?	Effect on a state linked to something (hearing information) Effect on hearing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
277.	2:38	Here, at least, she could not be overlooked. If anybody came in – even Mrs Hodges – <b>her presence might cause surprise</b> , but she would hear them coming and be warned in advance.	Effect coming from something (presence) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
278.	<i>surprising</i>	Don't say that,' pleaded Miss Climpson, 'even in jest. Your work here – so good, so valuable – would	Entity that characterises something (ways)

	2:135	be worth living for in spite of the saddest personal disappointments. And I have known jokes of that kind turn out very badly, <b>in the most surprising ways.</b>	<i>Intensity (most)</i>
279.	(to) <i>surprise</i> 2:42	Miss Climpson stepped softly up to the bed. Instinct made her move cautiously as a cat, though it was evident that <b>nothing would ever startle or surprise its occupant.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (startle)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
280.	(to be) <i>surprised</i> 2:26	Miss Marriott and Miss Price were told about it, and it also got to the ears of Mr Vaughan. Now <b>Mr Vaughan had been greatly distressed and surprised by Philip Boyes's death</b> , especially as he had been with him in Wales, and knew how much he had improved in health while on his holiday, and he also felt strongly that Harriet Vane had behaved badly about the love-affair.	Effect on a state linked to something (death) <i>Link (distressed)</i> <i>Intensity (greatly)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
281.	2:29	He took the course – the very sensible course – of consulting Dr Weare and suggesting that, if he was quite certain that the illness was due to gastritis and nothing else, he should take steps to rebuke Nurse Williams and put an end to the talk. <b>Dr Weare was naturally very much surprised and upset to hear what was being said</b> , but, since the suggestion had been made, he could not deny that – taking the symptoms only into account – there was just the bare possibility of something of the sort, because, as you have already heard in the medical evidence, the symptoms of arsenical poisoning and of acute gastritis are really indistinguishable.	Effect on hearing Effect on a state linked to something (what was being said/information) <i>Link (upset)</i> <i>Intensity (very much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
282.	2:30	When they told her that Boyes was found to have died of arsenic poisoning, <b>she appeared very much surprised</b> , and said, “Arsenic? What an extraordinary thing!” And then she laughed, and said, “Why, I am writing a book all about arsenic	Effect visible on the body <i>Intensity (very much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>

		poisoning.”	
283.	2:32	<p>‘Yes. What did you think of the verdict?’</p> <p>The clerk pursed up his lips.</p> <p><b>‘I don’t mind saying I was surprised.</b> It seemed to me a very clear case. But juries are very unreliable, especially nowadays, with women on them. We see a good deal of the fair sex in this profession,’ said the clerk, with a sly smile ‘and very few of them are remarkable for possessing the legal mind.’</p>	<p>Existence of emotion is presence here</p> <p>Effect on speech</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
284.	2:34	<p>I did just wonder about it when I read the report of the trial in the News of the World, and I said to George, <b>“I wouldn’t be surprised if that was the gentleman who came into the Rings</b> one night and seemed so poorly – just fancy!” I said – just like that.</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
285.	2:35	<p>‘And I say,’ said Wimsey, ‘that it would be better for her to be hanged outright than to live and have everybody think her a murderess who got off by a fluke.’</p> <p>‘Indeed?’ said Mr Crofts. ‘I fear that is not <b>an attitude</b> that the defence can very well adopt. <b>May I ask if it is adopted by Miss Vane herself?’</b></p> <p><b>‘I shouldn’t be surprised if it was,’</b> said Wimsey.</p> <p>‘But she’s innocent, and I’ll make you damn well believe it before I’ve done.’</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to something (attitude)</p> <p>Effect on action (to adopt an attitude)</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
286.	2:40	<p>‘Shall we speak to it?’ asked Miss Climpson.</p> <p>‘Wait a moment,’ said Miss Booth. ‘It wants to go sideways.’</p> <p><b>Miss Climpson was surprised by this statement,</b> which seemed to argue a high degree of imagination, but she obligingly imparted a slight gyratory movement to the table.</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to something (statement)</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
287.	2:41	<p>But what brought her to Windle?’ asked Miss Climpson. ‘I should have thought London, or some big town, would have been a better place for her if she is the kind of person you describe.’</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p>Effect on action (to be in hiding)</p>

		<b>'I shouldn't be surprised if she was in hiding,'</b> said Miss Tweall, <b>darkly</b> . 'There is such a thing as making a place too hot to hold you.'	Effect on the voice <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
288.	2:43	<b>'He will be very much surprised,'</b> said Miss Booth. 'I wonder what he will say. Lawyers don't believe in spirit communications as a rule. And he'll think it rather funny that we should have managed to open the safe.'	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (very much)</i>
289.	2:44	'In my last <b>letter</b> I explained the plan I had in mind, so you will know what to do about the Will itself, which was duly despatched by Registered Post this morning under cover to Mr Norman Urquhart. <b>How surprised he will be to get it!!</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (letter) Effect on action (to get the letter) <i>Intensity (how)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
290.	2:45	<b>So you will not be surprised if I am away from Town</b> for, say, another week! I am a little worried about the extra expense of this, but if you do not think it justified for the sake of safety, let me know – and I will alter my arrangements accordingly.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be away) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
291.	2:46	'Pardon me, sir, <b>Hannah was so much surprised by the episode</b> that she mentioned it to Mrs Pettican, the cook, who said that she distinctly recollected seeing her fill the bottle that morning.'	Effect on a state linked to something (episode) <i>Intensity (so much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 2			
292.	(a) <i>surprise</i> 3:64	<b>Nurse Hopkins said in pleased surprise:</b> 'Well, I must say, Miss Carlisle, that's extremely thoughtful of you. It is a nuisance to have to break off what you're doing and come all the way back from the village. I hoped we might finish this morning. I went round and saw my cases early. But, there, turning out takes you longer than you think.'	Effect on speech Container <i>Quality (pleased)</i> <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
293.	3:65	But on impulse Elinor decided differently. She said: 'Perhaps, though, you'd better read it first. Then we'll burn it. It's about Aunt Laura.' <b>Roddy's eyebrows rose in surprise.</b>	Effect on eyebrows Up Container <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>

294.	3:67	<p>Dr Lord <b>raised himself up on his toes</b>. His sandy <b>eyebrows climbed right up his forehead</b> till they nearly got merged in his hair.</p> <p><b>He said in surprise:</b>  ‘So she’s conked out – eh?’  ‘Yes, Doctor.’</p>	<p>Effect on bodily movement</p> <p>Effect on eyebrows</p> <p>Effect on speech</p> <p>Container</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
295.	3:69	<p>Nurse Hopkins said rather doubtfully:  ‘Was it like that?’</p> <p>Nurse O’Brien replied firmly:  ‘That was the way of it, and I’ll tell you this, Nurse Hopkins: In my opinion, if <b>Mrs Welman</b> had lived to make that will, <b>it’s likely there might have been surprises for all!</b> Who knows she mightn’t have left every penny she possessed to Mary Gerrard!’</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
296.	3:72	<p><b>‘Mrs Bishop!’</b>  <b>‘Why, Miss Elinor! This is a surprise!</b> I’d no notion you were in these parts! If I’d known you were coming to Hunterbury I’d have been there myself! Who’s doing for you there? Have you brought someone down from London?’</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to something (encounter)</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
297.	3:73	<p>Elinor and Mary were alone together. A queer tension crept into the atmosphere. Elinor, with an obvious effort, tried to make conversation. Her lips were dry. She passed her tongue over them. She said, rather stiffly:  ‘You – like your work in London?’  ‘Yes, thank you. I – I’m very grateful to you –’</p> <p>A sudden harsh sound broke from Elinor. A laugh so discordant, so unlike her that <b>Mary stared at her in surprise.</b></p> <p>Elinor said:  ‘You needn’t be so grateful!’</p> <p>Mary, rather embarrassed, said:  ‘I didn’t mean – that is –’</p> <p>She stopped.</p>	<p>Effect on a stare</p> <p>Container</p> <p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>

298.	3:77	Mr Seddon said cautiously: ‘I cannot, of course, guarantee to answer without the consent of my client.’ ‘Naturally. I understand that.’ He paused and then said, ‘Has Elinor Carlisle any enemies?’ <b>Mr Seddon showed a faint surprise.</b>	Object (hidden) <i>Intensity (faint)</i>
299.	3:78	‘As you say, Mrs Welman was much respected in Maidensford.’ The conversation had taken an unexpected turn, but <b>his face expressed no surprise or puzzlement.</b>	Effect on the face <i>Link (puzzlement)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
300.	3:80	Peter Lord said: ‘When did you go to your dinner?’ ‘One o’clock, sir.’ ‘And you didn’t see anything – any man hanging about – or a car outside – anything like that?’ <b>The man’s eyebrows rose in slight surprise.</b> ‘Outside the back gate, sir? There was your car there – nobody else’s.’	Effect on eyebrows Up Container <i>Intensity (slight)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
301.	3:81	‘Have you at any time had morphine in your possession?’ ‘Never.’ ‘Were you aware that your aunt had not made a will?’ ‘No. <b>It came as a great surprise to me.</b> ’	Living creature <i>Intensity (great)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
302.	(to be) <i>surprised</i> 3:59	‘No, nor I. <b>I daresay Doctor will be surprised!</b> ’ Nurse O’Brien said with a tinge of disapproval: ‘He’s always so hopeful about his cases.’	Existence of emotion is presence here
303.	3:68	<b>Peter Lord</b> said thoughtfully: ‘Conked out?’ <b>He stood for a moment thinking, then he said sharply:</b> <b>‘Get me some boiling water.’</b> <b>Nurse O’Brien was surprised and mystified, but</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (mystified)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		<p>true to the spirit of hospital training, hers not to reason why. If a doctor had told her to go and get the skin of an alligator she would have murmured automatically, ‘Yes, Doctor,’ and glided obediently from the room to tackle the problem.</p>	
304.	3:70	<p>She said:  ‘Roddy, I want you to listen to me carefully!’  <b>He turned to her, slightly surprised.</b>  ‘Of course, Elinor.’</p>	<p>Existence of emotion is presence here  Effect on bodily movement  <i>Intensity (slightly)</i>  <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
305.	3:71	<p>Mary said:  ‘It seems funny when she’d all that money that she never made a will to say how it was to go.’  Nurse Hopkins shook her head.  ‘People are like that. <b>You’d be surprised.</b> Always putting it off.’</p>	<p>Existence of emotion is presence here</p>
306.	3:74	<p>He was silent a moment, then he went on: <b>‘I was surprised at her death.</b> I hadn’t expected it.</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to something (death)  <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
307.	3:76	<p>Poirot said:  ‘You mean, I take it, that Mrs Welman might have left all her money to Mary Gerrard?’  <b>‘It wouldn’t have surprised me!’</b> said Mrs Bishop.  ‘That’s what the young woman was working up to, I’ve no doubt. And if I ventured to say a word, Mrs Welman was ready to bite my head off, though I’d been with her nearly twenty years. It’s an ungrateful world, Mr Poirot. You try to do your duty and it is not appreciated.’</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to something (somebody’s action)  <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
308.	3:79	<p>Poirot said:  ‘And he could have read it, too?’  Elinor’s voice was clear and scornful. She said:  ‘I can assure you, M. Poirot, that my “cousin”, as you call him, does not read other people’s letters.’</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to somebody  Effect on action (to do things)  <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>

		Poirot said: ‘That is the accepted idea, I know. <b>You would be surprised how many people do the things</b> that “are not done”.’ Elinor shrugged her shoulders.	
309.	(to) <i>surprise</i> 3:75	Poirot looked at her thoughtfully for a moment. Then he said with an apparent lack of guile: ‘ <b>You surprise me.</b> I had been given the impression that she was a very simple and unassuming girl.’	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 3			
310.	(a) <i>surprise</i> 4:263	There was no sound in the body of the court, but she heard from the public gallery <b>a low murmur, somewhere between a groan and a hiss, which could have been surprise, relief or disgust.</b>	Effect on the voice <i>Link (relief, disgust)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
311.	4:275	The clock on her friend’s mantelpiece had shown ten minutes past eleven and she had looked at her own watch <b>because of her surprise that the time had passed so quickly.</b>	Possession Effect on a state linked to something (time) Effect on action (to pass) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
312.	4:279	So he was going, he’d actually made up his mind at last. <b>Laud carefully kept from his voice either surprise or regret.</b> He said: ‘This place is going to miss you.’	Effect on the voice Counterforce <i>Link (regret)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
313.	4:281	<b>There had been general surprise in Chambers</b> when he had accepted a woman pupil; it could only be in penance for an infraction too grievous to be atoned for by less Draconian means.	Entity located inside something (Chambers) <i>Quality (general)</i>
314.	4:282	There was a half-minute when it seemed that <b>every breath was stilled, every eye in the court was bent on him with surprise, contempt or curiosity.</b>	Effect on the eyes Effect breathing <i>Link (contempt, curiosity)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
315.	4:292	Three men came out of a room to the right of the hall	Effect on seeing

		and <b>Dalgliesh</b> saw with surprise that one of them was the forensic pathologist, Miles Kynaston.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
316.	4:299	And Robbins, <b>what was your impression of Mrs Carpenter’s reaction when she first heard the news?</b> Robbins took his time; he always did. ‘ <b>Surprise and shock, sir.</b> ’ He paused. ‘Yes, Robbins?’ ‘I thought there was something else. Guilt perhaps. Or shame.’	Effect on a state linked to something (news) Effect on hearing <i>Link (shock)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
317.	4:308	It was Enid who had opened the door, <b>her broad face showing neither welcome nor surprise.</b>	Effect not visible on the face <i>Link (welcome)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
318.	4:313	<b>Dalgliesh was trained not to show surprise</b> when a suspect came out with the unexpected.	Object (hidden)
319.	4:316	The intrusion of murder into the very heart of the legal establishment and the celebrity of the victim had a piquancy which ensured that media interest was intense. <b>But somewhat to Dalgliesh’s surprise, and greatly to his satisfaction, the news of the wig and the blood hadn’t been leaked.</b> The police said little more than that the victim had been stabbed and that no arrest was imminent. Any more detailed information at present would only hamper inquiries, but further news would be issued as soon as there was anything to report	Possession Effect on a state linked to something (news) <i>Link (satisfaction)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
320.	4:324	Father Presteign looked at the photograph but did not take it. <b>Then he crossed himself unobtrusively and stood for a moment silently with his eyes closed.</b> ‘We need any information you can give which will help us to discover why she was killed and who killed her.’ Dalgliesh’s voice was calm, uncompromising, but gentle. <b>Father Presteign had</b>	Effect on the body (hidden) Effect on bodily movement <i>Link (horror)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>

		<b>expressed neither horror nor surprise.</b>	
321.	4:328	It was dim, and when Mrs Buckley switched on the light, <b>Kate saw with surprise that half the wall had been pasted with a collage</b> of illustrations from magazines and books.	Effect on a state linked to something (a wall with a collage) Effect on action (to paste) Effect on seeing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
322.	4:593	<b>But to her surprise the two girls looked at each other and smiled.</b> Catherine said: 'It's obvious you haven't seen Malcolm Beeston rehearse.	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to look, to smile) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
323.	4:304/ 1	'Very. I felt the usual emotions – horror, shock, grief at the death of someone who'd been close to me. But yes, I was surprised. <b>It's always a surprise when something bizarre and horrible happens to someone you know.</b> '	Effect on a state linked to something (something bizarre and horrible) Effect on action (to happen) <i>Time marker (always)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
324.	( <i>to be surprised</i> ) 4:304	'Very. <b>I felt the usual emotions</b> – horror, shock, grief at the death of someone who'd been close to me. But yes, <b>I was surprised.</b> It's always a surprise when something bizarre and horrible happens to someone you know.'	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
325.	4:260	'I'm wondering why you didn't leave early if you were feeling unwell. There is no woodwind in the Elgar. You wouldn't be wanted for the last part of the rehearsal.' <b>Kate, surprised, half expected the question to provoke either embarrassment or an angry retort from Trudy.</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (question) Effect on action (to provoke) <i>Link (half-expected)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
326.	4:272	<b>Dalglish was surprised at Piers's vehemence</b> – usually he showed more tolerance than this frank	Effect on a state linked to something

		disgust.	(vehemence) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
327.	4:276	She had stood watching him until <b>he was</b> out of sight, <b>surprised that he was leaving the house so late.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to leave the house) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
328.	4:277	Neville Saunders, <b>a little surprised</b> but setting his features into the gravity appropriate to taking a more active part in the proceedings, <b>got up from his seat</b> and began his slow game of grandmother's footsteps.	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect on bodily movement <i>Intensity (little)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
329.	4:278	Venetia rose at once to ask her single question. 'Mrs Pierce, can you remember whether Mrs Scully complained that she had difficulty in seeing the video that evening?' Mrs Pierce <b>was surprised into unexpected loquacity.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect located inside something (unexpected loquacity) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
330.	4:280	' <b>I'm surprised that you need to ask.</b> Mr Mitchell thought it right to inform me that my daughter was spending literally every evening until late in the bedroom of a junior master. If you had no sense of your own position in this school, you might at least have considered mine.'	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to need, to ask) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
331.	4:283	Malice and envy, that's what it's about.' <b>He added, with a tone of surprised triumph,</b> as if the words were inspired: 'They don't love foxes, they hate humans.'	Effect on tone of voice Entity that characterises something (triumph) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
332.	4:284	To Venetia, as she grew into middle age, it seemed that the men and women she defended, the colleagues she worked with, became more, not less, predictable. <b>Only rarely now was she surprised by an action</b> totally out of character.	Effect on a state linked to something (action) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
333.	4:288	He said: 'It's Harry Naughton, sir, ringing from	Effect on a state linked

		Chambers. I've just telephoned Mr Langton. Could you come at once, please? Miss Aldridge is dead in her room. It isn't a natural death, sir. I'm afraid it looks as if she's been murdered.' <b>He was surprised that his voice could be so strong, so steady.</b> There was silence. He wondered for a moment whether Mr Laud had taken it in, or whether shock had rendered him speechless, whether he had even heard the message. He began again tentatively: 'Mr Laud, it's Harry Naughton ...'	to something (voice) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
334.	4:289	Before he could speak, Harry took his arm and gently led him across the hall and into the conference room. <b>Surprised into acquiescence</b> , Langton was as docile as a child.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (acquiescence) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
335.	4:294	Venetia always liked life to be rational. Oh, and there's the housekeeper of course, Mrs Buckley, who rang Harry this morning. <b>I'm surprised she hasn't been on to us again.</b> '	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be on to somebody) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
336.	4:295	<b>A little surprised that Laud should know these domestic details</b> , Dalglish asked: 'And one or both of them has a key?'	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to know) <i>Intensity (a little)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
337.	4:296	<b>They turned to him as if surprised to find him</b> still among them.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to find) Effect on bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
338.	4:297	Dalglish had early learned not to judge in advance of the facts; this applied as much to appearances as it	Effect on a state linked to somebody

		did to character. Even so, <b>he was surprised and a little disconcerted when Janet Carpenter walked</b> with a quiet dignity across the reception room and held out her hand.	Effect on action (to walk) <i>Link (disconcerted)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
339.	4:298	Mr Naughton tells me in advance when it's going to be changed, but they only do that about once a year. It's easier for everyone if they keep the same combination of numbers.' Easier, but hardly an effective safeguard, <b>thought Dalglish, although he wasn't surprised.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here
340.	4:300	There was a brief silence while Gran took in the news, <b>then she said: 'Murdered, was she? Oh well, I can't say I'm surprised.</b> Always mixed up with criminals, getting them off. I expect one she didn't get off has come out of prison and done for her. Your ma won't like it. She'll want you to leave that place, get a job locally.'	Effect on speech Effect on action (to be murdered) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
341.	4:301	Margaret put her arms round her. She said: 'We'll try and see if we can get some help from Social Services. And I think you should speak to your gran. The old are much tougher than you think. <b>And I wouldn't be surprised if she doesn't know about Ken already.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to know) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
342.	4:302	'Erik, can you remember what time I got home yesterday?' It was Nigel who answered. 'You were late, Mr Langton. Three-quarters of an hour. <b>We were a bit surprised that you hadn't telephoned.</b> Don't you remember? You said you went for a walk after you left Chambers. It didn't matter because Erik never begins cooking the vegetables until you're drinking your sherry.'	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to telephone) <i>Measure (a bit)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
343.	4:303	Dalglish thanked her and turned back to Mark Rawlstone. 'You must, of course, have known Miss Aldridge well over the four years of the affair. <b>Were you surprised at her murder?'</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (murder) <i>Intensity (very)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		<b>‘Very.</b>	
344.	4:306	<b>I’m not surprised that she was appalled by the engagement</b> between Ashe and her daughter; she knew too much about that young man for any mother’s peace of mind.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be appalled) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
345.	4:307	‘Well, I didn’t read it to find it useful. Actually, it’s a very good training for a police officer. <b>You cease to be surprised by the unbelievable.</b> Theology isn’t so very different from criminal law.	Effect on a state linked to something (the unbelievable) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
346.	4:309	No doubt the murder was a shock but <b>I am a little surprised</b> that a woman of her character and intelligence <b>has allowed herself to be so upset by it.</b> ’	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to allow to be upset) <i>Intensity (little)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
347.	4:312	<b>The girls were obviously surprised at the questions,</b> but neither made any comment.	Effect on a state linked to something (question) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
348.	4:315	Dalgliesh said: ‘Your wife has told me about her visit to London. If the meeting had taken place it could hardly have been pleasant. <b>I was a little surprised you let her go alone.</b> ’ He didn’t add, ‘and when she was pregnant’.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to let go) <i>Intensity (little)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
349.	4:318	<b>Piers looked surprised.</b> Dalgliesh said: ‘I asked on Friday to be told if anything comes to light about her past life. Who went to Hereford, by the way? Who’s looking into that?’	Effect on the look <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
350.	4:319	Still squatting, and without touching the body, he looked carefully at each hand. The right was covered with blood, the left lying curled with the palm upward. He gently pressed the mound of the flesh at the base of the fingers, then ran an exploring hand down each of her fingers. After a moment he got	Existence (hidden) of emotion is presence here <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		quickly to his feet and said: ‘Let’s have a look at the kitchen.’ <b>If Kate was surprised, she didn’t show it.</b>	
351.	4:320	A plain brown handbag was on the floor beside the bed. Inside, it was as well-ordered as Venetia Aldridge’s had been, with nothing superfluous. <b>He was surprised</b> , however, <b>to find that she had</b> as much as £250 in crisp ten-and twenty-pound notes in her wallet.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to find) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
352.	4:321	If Mrs Carpenter did it, she acted like a fool and I don’t think that she was a fool. There’s another thing. I was the first to interview her after the murder. <b>I could swear she was surprised</b> . She was more than surprised, she was deeply shocked.’	Existence of emotion is presence here
353.	4:321/ 1	If Mrs Carpenter did it, she acted like a fool and I don’t think that she was a fool. There’s another thing. I was the first to interview her after the murder. I could swear she was surprised. <b>She was more than surprised, she was deeply shocked.</b> ’	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (deeply shocked)</i>
354.	4:322	My aunt swears by her. Mrs Capstick writes about her magnificent garden in Kent. She admitted to me that she hasn’t got a garden in Kent and never has had. It’s a garden of the imagination. That way, she claims, her readers get a better garden and so does she.’ <b>An unseen listener might have been surprised to hear him speak</b> with such amused detachment [...].	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to speak) Effect on hearing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
355.	4:325	<b>I’m only surprised that</b> , so drained, so depersonalized, <b>she found the strength</b> and the will to end the torment and to write me that last coherent note.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to find the strength) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
356.	4:329	Ashe had neither spoken nor stopped until they reached the house on Westway. <b>She was surprised that they were to stop there</b> , but he gave no	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to

		explanation.	stop) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
357.	(to) <i>surprise</i> 4:91	<b>The flood of resentment against Venetia surprised him by its intensity.</b> He was the last person who could help with this kind of problem.	Effect on a state linked to something (flood of resentment) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
358.	4:110	<b>You surprise me, Simon.</b> I didn't realize you were so happy to appear in the lower courts. A pity you didn't suggest it at the time.'	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
359.	4:240	She had spoken as she always did, without apparent resentment, but there had been something close to it <b>in her voice and he had detected a note of suppressed anger which surprised him.</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (a note of suppressed anger) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
360.	4:286	When she entered Hubert's room <b>she found Drysdale Laud with him. That didn't surprise her;</b> the archbishops usually acted together.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to find) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
361.	4:290	Against the dark-pink wall was the row of eleven target figures, stark black, forward-crouching, guns in hand, with a white line encircling the central visible mass which was the target area. The figures were reversed to show only the blank white backs. The AFO barked out his command, the crouching figures swung back into view. The air crackled with gunfire. <b>Despite the ear-muffs that first explosion of sound always surprised Kate by its reverberating loudness.</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (reverberating loudness of the sound of explosion) <i>Time marker (always)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
362.	4:293	'Thank you.' Dalglish turned to Kynaston. 'Shall we go up, Miles?' <b>It interested but did not surprise him that Kynaston had waited for him to arrive</b> before	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to wait, to arrive)

		examining the body. As a forensic pathologist Miles had all the virtues. He came quickly. He worked without fuss or complaint however inconvenient the terrain or repellent the decomposing corpse.	<i>Anti-link (interest)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
363.	4:311	Kate asked: ‘So Mr Langton was at the rehearsal, was he? <b>Did that surprise you?</b> ’ ‘Well, it did a little. I mean, he’s never attended a rehearsal before. He usually comes to the	Effect on a state linked to something (somebody’s action) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
364.	4:317	<b>Dalgliesh was capable of a patience which occasionally surprised his subordinates</b> , except with the arrogant, the incompetent or the wilfully obtuse.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Time marker (occasionally)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
365.	4:327	But I saw that he had made an attempt to clean up and I found this disconcerting. <b>And then he did something else that surprised me. He took a clean handkerchief from his pocket</b> – I can remember now the size and whiteness of it – <b>and flicked it over a chair seat</b> before motioning me to sit.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to take, to flick it ([handkerchief]) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
366.	<i>surprising</i> 4:97	<b>This business</b> was left to me some ten years ago by a maiden aunt of the same name. It has been in the family since the 1920s. I keep it going partly from family piety, but principally because I enjoy it. <b>It</b> brings me into touch with interesting people, although <b>no doubt Inspector Miskin would find that surprising</b> , since most of them are content to do housework.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Entity that characterises something (hidden business) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
367.	4:170	She said: ‘What’s that, last Saturday at Covent Garden?’ ‘No, this morning on Classic FM.’ He sang on, then said: ‘I’m rather looking forward to this interview. I have high hopes of Miss Elkington. <b>It’s surprising that she actually exists</b> , for one thing. You’d expect to find that the original Miss Elkington died in 1890 and Elkington’s is now just the usual boring domestic	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to exist) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		agency which has kept on the name.	
368.	4:594	“If my client has such an ungovernable temper, such a reputation for unprovoked violence, <b>you may find it surprising, members of the jury</b> , that at the age of fifty-five <b>he has never had a criminal conviction?</b> ”	Entity that characterises something (information about the accused)

The emotion keyword of *HAPPINESS*

TF 1	Quotation #	Quotation	Cross-domain mapping/ <i>parameters of emotional evaluation</i>
369.	<i>happiness</i> 1:334	The childish prayer of that old birthday when I had aspired to be industrious, contented, and true-hearted and to do good to some one and win some love to myself if I could come back into my mind with a <b>reproachful sense of all the happiness I had since enjoyed and all the affectionate hearts</b> that had been turned towards me.	Possession <i>Link (affectionate hearts)</i> <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>
370.	1:371	<b>What happiness was ours that day</b> , what <b>joy</b> , what <b>rest</b> , what <b>hope</b> , what <b>gratitude</b> , what <b>bliss!</b> We were to be married before the month was out, but when we were to come and take possession of our own house was to depend on Richard and Ada.	Possession (shared) <i>Link (joy, rest, hope, gratitude, bliss)</i> <i>Time marker (day)</i>
371.	1:480	I know you like it. For anything I can tell, I may have come into the world expressly for the purpose of increasing <b>your stock of happiness</b> .	Possession
372.	1:570	I recalled the first bright gleam of welcome which had shone out of those very windows upon our expectant faces on that cold bright night, and which had never paled. I lived my happy life there over again, I went through my illness and recovery, I thought of myself so altered and of those around me so unchanged; and <b>all this happiness shone like a light from one central figure</b> , represented before me by the letter on the table.	Entity with a light
373.	1:610	"Then it only remains," said Mr. Kenge, shaking	Destination

		hands with us, "for me to express my lively satisfaction in (good day, Miss Clare!) <b>the arrangement this day concluded</b> and my (GOOD-bye to you, Miss Summerson!) lively hope that <b>it will conduce to the happiness</b> , the (glad to have had the honour of making your acquaintance, Mr. Carstone!) <b>welfare</b> , the <b>advantage</b> in all points of view, of all concerned! Guppy, see the party safely there."	<i>Link (welfare, advantage)</i>
374.	1:611	"And really, my dear Miss Summerson," said Mr. Skimpole with his agreeable candour, "I never was in a situation in which that excellent sense and quiet habit of method and usefulness, which anybody must observe in you <b>who has the happiness of being a quarter of an hour in your society</b> , was more needed."	Possession Effect on action (to be) Entity located inside something (society) <i>Time marker (a quarter of an hour)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
375.	1:612	When I came back, Mr. Skimpole kissed my hand and seemed quite touched. Not on his own account (I was again aware of that perplexing and extraordinary contradiction), but on ours, as if personal considerations were impossible with him and <b>the contemplation of our happiness alone affected him</b> . Richard, begging me, for the greater grace of the transaction, as he said, to settle with Coavinses (as Mr. Skimpole now jocularly called him), I counted out the money and received the necessary acknowledgment.	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
376.	1:613	I had had some idea that the clerk who was to be sent down might be the young gentleman who had met me at the coach-office, and <b>I was glad to see him, because he was associated with my present happiness</b> .	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Quality (present)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
377.	1:614	"Not any," said I. "Not half a glass?" said Mr. Guppy. "Quarter? No! Then, to proceed. My present salary, Miss Summerson, at Kenge and Carboy's, is two pound a	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on the looking

		week. When <b>I first had the happiness of looking upon you</b> , it was one fifteen, and had stood at that figure for a lengthened period.	<i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
378.	1:615	I enjoyed it too much myself—and then we gradually fell to considering how young they were, and how there must be a lapse of several years before this early <b>love</b> could come to anything, and <b>how it could come to happiness</b> only if it were real and lasting and inspired them with a steady resolution to do their duty to each other, with constancy, fortitude, and perseverance, each always for the other's sake.	Destination <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>
379.	1:616	<b>I am only sorry that I cannot have the happiness of being their escort</b> about Chesney Wold, which is a very fine place!	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
380.	1:617	But he never thought—never, my poor, dear, sanguine <b>Richard, capable of so much happiness then</b> , and with such better things before him—what a fatal link was riveting between his fresh youth and her faded age, between his free hopes and her caged birds, and her hungry garret, and her wandering mind.	Ability (desired) <i>Intensity (so much)</i>
381.	1:618	And then he spoke so ingenuously and sincerely of the sacrifice he made in withdrawing himself for a time from Ada, and of the earnestness with which he aspired—as in thought he always did, I know full well—to repay her love, and <b>to ensure her happiness</b> , and to conquer what was amiss in himself, and to acquire the very soul of decision, that he made my heart ache keenly, sorely.	Possession (ensured)
382.	1:619	"My children," said Mr. Turveydrop, paternally encircling Caddy with his left arm as she sat beside	Possession Parental care

		him, and putting his right hand gracefully on his hip. "My son and daughter, <b>your happiness shall be my care</b> . I will watch over you. You shall always live with me"—meaning, of course, I will always live with you—"this house is henceforth as much yours as mine; consider it your home. May you long live to share it with me!"	
383.	1:620	And to both of you, my children, I would merely observe, in the spirit of a sainted woman on whose path <b>I had the happiness of casting</b> , I believe, <b>SOME ray of light</b> , take care of the establishment, take care of my simple wants, and bless you both!"	Possession Effect on action (to cast a ray of light)
384.	1:621	"You see again, Miss Summerson," observed Mrs. Jellyby serenely, " <b>what a happiness it is to be so much occupied as I am</b> and to have this necessity for self-concentration that I have.	Effect on action (to be occupied) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
385.	1:622	Then there was old Mr. Turveydrop downstairs, in a state of deportment not to be expressed, benignly blessing Caddy and giving my guardian to understand that <b>his son's happiness was his own parental work</b> and that he sacrificed personal considerations to ensure it.	Possession Parental work
386.	1:623	My guardian had throughout been earnest <b>to visit</b> me, and there was now no good reason <b>why I should deny myself that happiness</b> .	Event (undeniable)
387.	1:624	If Charley and I were to go to some country lodging as soon as I can move, and if I had a week there in which to grow stronger and to be revived by the sweet air and <b>to look forward to the happiness of having Ada with me again</b> , I think it would be better for us."	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to have) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
388.	1:625	"Now, when you mention responsibility," he resumed, "I am disposed to say that <b>I never had the happiness of knowing any one</b> whom I should consider <b>so refreshingly responsible as yourself</b> .	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to

			know) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
389.	1:626	"Well, sir," returns the stationer, shading his communication with his hat, "it falls a little hard upon me. <b>My domestic happiness is very great</b> —at least, it's as great as can be expected [...].	Possession <i>Intensity (very great)</i>
390.	1:627	I was the last to know <b>what happiness I could bestow upon him</b> , but of that he said no more, for I was always to remember that I owed him nothing and that he was my debtor, and for very much.	Object Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to bestow) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
391.	1:628	But I knew it, I knew it well now. It came upon me as the close of the benignant history I had been pursuing, and I felt that I had but one thing to do. <b>To devote my life to his happiness</b> was to thank him poorly, and what had I wished for the other night but some new means of thanking him?	Possession
392.	1:629	As he says himself, what is public life without private ties? He is in his humble way a public man, <b>but it is not in that sphere that he finds happiness</b> . No, it must be sought within the confines of domestic bliss.	Object (hidden)
393.	1:630	She has never believed any ill of him, never. <b>If she had died without this happiness</b> —and she is an old woman now and can't look to live very long—she would have blessed him with her last breath, if she had had her senses, as her beloved son George.	Object
394.	1:631	I am on unaltered terms with her, and I recall—having the full power to do it if I were so disposed, as you see—no act I have done for <b>her advantage and happiness</b> ."	Possession <i>Link (advantage)</i>
395.	1:633	I have often spoken of <b>his bright face</b> , but I thought I had never seen <b>it look so bright and good</b> . <b>There was a high happiness upon it</b> which made me think, "He has been doing some great kindness this	Effect visible on the face <i>Quality (high)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>

		morning."	
396.	1:634	"My darling girl, in what there has been between us, I have, I hope, been really solicitous for <b>your happiness.</b>	Possession
397.	<i>happily</i> y 1: 483	I was much impressed by her allusion to Richard and by the sad meaning, so sadly illustrated in her poor pinched form, that made its way through all her incoherence. <b>But happily for her,</b> she was quite complacent again now and beamed with nods and smiles.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
398.	1:636	"At all events, Chancery will work none of its bad influences on US. <b>We have happily been brought together,</b> thanks to our good kinsman, and it can't divide us now!"	Effect on action (to bring together) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
399.	1:638	Peepy, <b>happily unconscious of the defects in his appearance,</b> sat on the carpet behind one of the legs of the piano, looking calmly out of his den at us while he ate his cake.	Entity that characterises something (state of being unconscious) Effect on a state linked to something (defects of somebody's appearance) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
400.	1:641	To these succeed, by command of Mr. Smallweed, "three Cheshires," and to those "three small rums." <b>This apex of the entertainment happily reached,</b> Mr. Jobling <b>puts up his legs on the carpeted seat</b> (having his own side of the box to himself), <b>leans against the wall,</b> and says, "I am grown up now, Guppy. I have arrived at maturity."	Effect on action (to reach) Effect on bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
401.	1:642	She is so indubitably sister to Mr. Smallweed the younger that the two kneaded into one would hardly make a young person of average proportions, while <b>she so happily exemplifies the before-mentioned family likeness to the monkey tribe</b> that attired in a spangled robe and cap she might walk about the table-land on the top of a barrelorgan without	Effect on a state linked to something (likeness) Effect on action (to exemplify) <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		exciting much remark as an unusual specimen.	
402.	1:643	"Why, not quite, my dear," said Mrs. Jellyby in the calmest manner. "He has been unfortunate in his affairs and is a little out of spirits. <b>Happily for me, I am so much engaged</b> that I have no time to think about it.	Effect on action (to be engaged) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
403.	1:644	"Not if it's Africa, Ma, I have not." "Of course you have not. Now, <b>if I were not happily so much engaged</b> , Miss Summerson," said Mrs. Jellyby, <b>sweetly casting her eyes for a moment on me</b> and considering where to put the particular letter she had just opened, "this would distress and disappoint me.	Effect on action (to be engaged) Effect of casting the eyes upon somebody <i>Intensity (so much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
404.	1:645	Why did he never come? Because he was told not to come. Who told him not to come? Who? Ha, ha! Mrs. Snagsby sees it all. <b>But happily</b> (and Mrs. Snagsby <b>tightly shakes her head and tightly smiles</b> ) <b>that boy was met</b> by Mr. Chadband yesterday in the streets [...].	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be met) Effect on bodily movement Effect on the lips/mouth <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
405.	1:646	Sir Leicester is particularly complacent because he has found in his newspaper some congenial <b>remarks</b> bearing directly on the floodgates and the framework of society. <b>They apply so happily to the late case that Sir Leicester has come from the library to my Lady's room expressly to read them aloud.</b> "The man who wrote this article," he observes by way of preface, nodding at the fire as if he were nodding down at the man from a mount, "has a well balanced mind."	Effect on action (to apply) Effect on a state linked to something (case) Spatial orientation of the body <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
406.	1:647	I felt that I was stricken cold. <b>Happily for both of us</b> , it was not until Charley was safe in bed again and placidly asleep that I began to think the contagion of her illness was upon me.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

407.	1:648	<b>You, Tony, possess in yourself all that is calculated to charm the eye and allure the taste. It is not—happily for you,</b> perhaps, and I may wish that I could say the same—it is not your character to hover around one flower.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
408.	1:649	Her father-in-law was extremely kind and considerate, Caddy told me, and <b>they lived most happily together.</b>	Effect on action (to live) <i>Intensity (most)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
409.	1:650	If I felt that I could ever give him the best right he could have to be my protector, and <b>if I felt that I could happily and justly become the dear companion of his remaining life,</b> superior to all lighter chances and changes than death, even then he could not have me bind myself irrevocably while this letter was yet so new to me, but even then I must have ample time for reconsideration.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to become the dear companion) <i>Link (justly)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
410.	1:651	" <b>And as Rick and you are happily good friends,</b> I should like to know," said my guardian, "what you think, my dear. Would you be so good as to—as to speak up, Mr. Vholes?"	Entity that characterises somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
411.	1:652	"Why, my love!" I remonstrated. "Ada, why should you not speak to us!" Ada only dropped her head and pressed me closer to her heart. "You surely don't forget, my beauty," said I, smiling, "what quiet, old-fashioned people we are and how I have settled down to be the discreetest of dames? <b>You don't forget how happily and peacefully my life is all marked out for me,</b> and by whom? I am certain that you don't forget by what a noble character, Ada. That can never be."	Effect on action (to mark out) Effect on a state linked to something (life) <i>Link (peacefully)</i> <i>Intensity (how)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
412.	1:653	"Bounds, my dear?" returned Mr. Bucket. "Bounds? Now, Miss Summerson, I'll give you a piece of advice that your husband will find useful <b>when you</b>	Effect on action (to be married) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		<b>are happily married</b> and have got a family about you.	
413.	1:654	I look forward a long while, through years and years, and think that then, when I am growing old, or when I am dead perhaps, a beautiful woman, <b>his daughter, happily married</b> , may be proud of him and a blessing to him.	Effect on action (to be married) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
414.	1:655	We <b>left home</b> directly after breakfast to be at Westminster Hall in good time and <b>walked down there through the lively streets—so happily and strangely it seemed!</b> —together.	Spatial orientation of the body <i>Link (strangely)</i> <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
415.	<i>happy</i> 1:7	" <b>I am very happy to see Miss Jellyby's friend</b> ," he said, <b>bowing low</b> to me.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on seeing <i>Intensity (very)</i> Effect on bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
416.	1:18	"My dear friend! <b>So happy in this meeting!</b> And this is your establishment? It's a delightful place. It's a picture! You never find that anything goes off here accidentally, do you, my dear friend?"	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (meeting) <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
417.	1:26	"Confide in me, my child. Don't fear me. <b>I wish you to be happy, and will make you so</b> —if I can make anybody happy on this earth."	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
418.	1:26/1	"Confide in me, my child. Don't fear me. I wish you to be happy, and will make you so— <b>if I can make anybody happy on this earth.</b> "	Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
419.	1:81	Mr. Jarndyce had written to a relation of the family, a great Sir Leicester Dedlock, for his interest in	Effect on action (to advance the prospects)

		Richard's favour, generally; and <b>Sir Leicester had replied in a gracious manner that he would be happy to advance the prospects of the young gentleman</b> if it should ever prove to be within his power, which was not at all probable, and that my Lady sent her compliments to the young gentleman (to whom she perfectly remembered that she was allied by remote consanguinity) and trusted that he would ever do his duty in any honourable profession to which he might devote himself.	Effect on a manner <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
420.	1:210	<b>Mr. Pardiggle is happy to throw in his limited donation</b> , under my direction; and thus things are made not only pleasant to ourselves, but, we trust, improving to others."	Effect on action (to throw in a donation) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
421.	1:261	"We must not say so, Dame Durden," he cheerfully replied; " <b>Ada is the happier, I hope</b> , and that is much. I did think that I and both these young creatures might be friends instead of distrustful foes and that we might so far counter-act the suit and prove too strong for it.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (happier)</i> <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>
422.	1:332	<b>The little creature</b> —sent into the world, surely, to minister to the weak and sick— <b>was so happy, and so busy</b> , and stopped so often in her preparations to lay her head upon my bosom, and fondle me, and cry with joyful tears she was so glad, she was so glad, that I was obliged to say, "Charley, if you go on in this way, I must lie down again, my darling, for I am weaker than I thought I was!"	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Link (busy)</i>
423.	1:466	"It's like you, guardian," said I, "to have been taking that into consideration for <b>a happy surprise to both of us.</b> "	Entity that characterises something (surprise) Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

424.	1:489	"How do you do, Mr. Tulkinghorn?" He receives these salutations with gravity and buries them along with the rest of his knowledge. <b>Sir Leicester Dedlock</b> is with my Lady and <b>is happy to see Mr. Tulkinghorn.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on seeing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
425.	1:492	<b>I passed</b> at Greenleaf <b>six happy, quiet years.</b> I never saw in any face there, thank heaven, on my birthday, that it would have been better if I had never been born.	Entity that characterises something (years) <i>Time marker (six years)</i>
426.	1:493	After the first six months or so I had taken Miss Donny's advice in reference to the propriety of writing to Mr. Kenge to say that <b>I was happy and grateful,</b> and with her approval I had written such a letter.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (grateful)</i>
427.	1:494	"Good-bye, Esther. <b>May you be very happy!</b> "— could I help it if I was quite bowed down in the coach by myself and said "Oh, I am so thankful, I am so thankful!" many times over!	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (very)</i>
428.	1:495	In short, she had such a natural, captivating, winning manner that in a few minutes we were sitting in the window-seat, with the light of the fire upon us, <b>talking together as free and happy as could be.</b>	Effect on speech <i>Link (free)</i> <i>Intensity (as...as)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
429.	1:496	Mr. Kenge now retired, and Richard with him, to where I was, near the door, leaving my pet (it is so natural to me that again I can't help it!) sitting near the Lord Chancellor, with whom his lordship spoke a little part, asking her, as she told me afterwards, whether she had well reflected on the proposed arrangement, <b>and if she thought she would be happy under the roof of Mr. Jarndyce</b> of Bleak House, and why she thought so?	Existence of emotion is presence here Spatial orientation of the body ("under the roof") <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
430.	1:497	"Oh!" said she. " <b>The wards</b> in Jarndyce! <b>Ve-ry happy,</b> I am sure, <b>to have the honour!</b> It is a good omen for youth, and hope, and beauty when they find themselves in this place, and don't know what's to	Effect on action (to have the honour) <i>Intensity (very)</i>

		come of it."	
431.	1:499	<b>The African project</b> at present employs my whole time. It involves me in correspondence with public bodies and with private individuals anxious for the welfare of their species all over the country. <b>I am happy to say it is advancing.</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (project) Effect on speech <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
432.	1:501	Caddy left her desk to see us depart, kissed me in the passage, and stood biting her pen and sobbing on the steps; <b>Peepy, I am happy to say, was asleep and spared the pain of separation</b> (I was not without misgivings that he had gone to Newgate market in search of me) [...].	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on speech <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
433.	1:502	I was certain it was he. I never was so frightened in my life as when I made the discovery, for he caught my glance, and appearing to read my thoughts, gave such a look at the door that I thought we had lost him. However, <b>I am happy to say he remained where he was, and asked me what I thought of Mrs. Jellyby.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to remain, to ask) Effect on speech <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
434.	1:503	"I am thankful!" Mrs. Rouncewell is fond of her son but has a plaintive feeling towards him, much as if he were a very honourable soldier who had gone over to the enemy. " <b>He is quite happy?</b> " says she. "Quite."	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (quite)</i>
435.	1:504	I could not help it; I tried very hard, but being alone with that benevolent presence, and meeting his kind eyes, <b>and feeling so happy and so honoured</b> there, and my heart so full—I kissed his hand.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (honoured)</i> <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
436.	1:505	<b>From that hour I felt quite easy with him, quite unreserved, quite content</b> to know no more, <b>quite happy.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (easy, unreserved, content)</i> <i>Intensity (quite)</i>

			<i>Time marker (hour)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
437.	1:506	<b>I am</b> very fond of being confided in by children <b>and am happy in being usually favoured in that respect</b> , but on this occasion it gave me great uneasiness.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (being favoured) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
438.	1:507	<b>Ada's influence; but with it, he became</b> one of the most winning of companions, always so ready to be interested and <b>always so happy, sanguine, and light-hearted.</b>	Effect (transformative) coming from somebody <i>Link (sanguine, light-hearted)</i> <i>Time marker (always)</i> <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
439.	1:508	"Did he owe you any rent?" "Six weeks." "He will never pay it!" says the young man, resuming his examination. "It is beyond a doubt that he is indeed as dead as Pharaoh; <b>and to judge from his appearance and condition, I should think it a happy release.</b> Yet he must have been a good figure when a youth, and I dare say, good-looking."	Entity that characterises something (release)
440.	1:510	And we sat before the fire, and I had all the talking to myself for a little while (though there was not much of it); and <b>Ada was soon quiet and happy.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (quiet)</i>
441.	1:511	"Aye? And what is it, Esther?" "Guardian," said I, "you remember <b>the happy night</b> when first we came down to Bleak House?"	Entity that characterises something (night)
442.	1:512	"Right!" said Mr. Jarndyce. " <b>If you are not to make her happy</b> , why should you pursue her?"	Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
443.	1:513	So young, so beautiful, so full of hope and promise,	Entity that characterises

		they went on lightly through the sunlight <b>as their own happy thoughts</b> might then be traversing the years to come and making them all years of brightness.	something (thoughts)
444.	1:514	I was to live with them afterwards; I was to keep all the keys of their house; <b>I was to be made happy forever and a day.</b>	Effect coming from somebody <i>Time marker (forever and a day)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
445.	1:515	"No," said Miss Jellyby, softening. "I hope not. <b>I should try to make him happy and comfortable</b> when he came to see me, and Peepy and the others should take it in turns to come and stay with me, and they should have some care taken of them then."	Effect coming from somebody <i>Link (comfortable)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
446.	1:517	Caddy sat upon the other side of me, next to Ada, to whom we imparted the whole history of the engagement as soon as we got back. We made much of Caddy, and Peepy too; and Caddy brightened exceedingly; and my guardian was as merry as we were; <b>and we were all very happy indeed</b> until Caddy went home at night in a hackney-coach, with Peepy fast asleep, but holding tight to the windmill.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (very)</i>
447.	1:522	At any rate, I made up my mind to be so dreadfully industrious that I would leave myself not a moment's leisure to be low-spirited. For I naturally said, "Esther! You to be low-spirited. YOU!" And it really was time to say so, for I—yes, I really did see myself in the glass, almost crying. "As if you had anything to make you unhappy, <b>instead of everything to make you happy</b> , you ungrateful heart!" said I.	Effect coming from something (everything) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
448.	1:523	I held his hand for a little while in mine. "I saw my ward oftener than she saw me," he added, cheerily making light of it, "and <b>I always knew she was beloved, useful, and happy.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (beloved, useful)</i>
449.	1:524	Mr. Woodcourt seemed a little distressed by her	Entity that characterises

		prolixity, but he was too considerate to let her see it and contrived delicately to bring the conversation round to making his acknowledgments to my guardian for his hospitality and <b>for the very happy hours</b> —he called them the very happy hours—he had passed with us.	something (hours) <i>Intensity (very)</i> <i>Time marker (hours)</i>
450.	1:524/ 1	Mr. Woodcourt seemed a little distressed by her prolixity, but he was too considerate to let her see it and contrived delicately to bring the conversation round to making his acknowledgments to my guardian for his hospitality and for the very happy hours—he <b>called them the very happy hours</b> —he had passed with us.	Entity that characterises something (hours) <i>Intensity (very)</i> <i>Time marker (hours)</i>
451.	1:525	Very well! I say 'Mighty potentate, here IS my homage! It's easier to give it than to withhold it. Here it is. If you have <b>anything of an agreeable nature</b> to show me, <b>I shall be happy to see it</b> [...].	Effect on a state linked to something (anything of an agreeable nature) Effect on seeing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
452.	1:526	If you have <b>anything of an agreeable nature</b> to give me, <b>I shall be happy to accept it</b> .	Effect on a state linked to something (anything of an agreeable nature) Effect on action (to accept) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
453.	1:527	He had got at the core of that mystery now, he told us, and nothing could be plainer than that the will under which he and Ada were to take I don't know how many thousands of pounds must be finally established if there were any sense or justice in the Court of Chancery—but oh, what a great IF that sounded in my ears—and that <b>this happy conclusion</b> could not be much longer delayed.	Entity that characterises something (conclusion)
454.	1:529	"My son!" said Mr. Turveydrop. "My children! I cannot resist your prayer. <b>Be happy!</b> "	Existence of emotion is presence here
455.	1:530	So we took our departure after a very loving farewell	Existence of emotion is

		between Caddy and her betrothed, and <b>during our walk she was so happy and so full of old Mr. Turveydrop's praises</b> that I would not have said a word in his disparagement for any consideration.	presence here Effect on bodily movement <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Link (full of somebody)</i>
456.	1:531	"Ah! Miss Summerson!" she said at last. "I was thinking of something so different! I hope you are well. <b>I am happy to see you.</b> Mr. Jarndyce and Miss Clare quite well?"	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on seeing <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
457.	1:532	"I am engaged, Ma," sobbed Caddy, "to young Mr. Turveydrop, at the academy; and old Mr. Turveydrop (who is a very gentlemanly man indeed) has given his <b>consent, and I beg and pray you'll give us yours, Ma, because I never could be happy without it.</b> I never, never could!" sobbed Caddy, quite forgetful of her general complainings and of everything but her natural affection.	Existence (dependent) of emotion is presence here Effect on a state linked to something (consent) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
458.	1:533	And I looked up at the stars, and thought about travellers in distant countries and the stars THEY saw, <b>and hoped I might always be so blest and happy as to be useful to some one in my small way.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (blest, useful)</i> <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
459.	1:534	And if you please, Tom and Emma and me is to see each other once a month. <b>And I'm so happy and so thankful, miss,</b> " cried Charley with a heaving heart [...].	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (thankful)</i> <i>Intensity (so)</i>
460.	1:535	But I should like you to consider well about it too, as I should like you <b>to be in all things very happy.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (things) <i>Intensity (very)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
461.	1:536	But in a few minutes he would recklessly conjure up <b>some undefinable means by which they were both to be made rich and happy for ever,</b> and would	Effect coming from something (undefinable means)

		become as gay as possible.	<i>Link (rich)</i> <i>Time marker (for ever)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
462.	1:537	"If you believe you are a good prophet," said I. "Why, then, it is that you will marry some one very rich and very worthy, much older—five and twenty years, perhaps—than yourself. <b>And you will be an excellent wife, and much beloved, and very happy.</b> "	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (beloved)</i> <i>Intensity (very)</i>
463.	1:538	What my guardian would not have given her if we had encouraged him, it would be difficult to say, but we thought it right to compound for no more than her wedding dress and bonnet. He agreed to this compromise, and <b>if Caddy had ever been happy in her life</b> , she was happy when we sat down to work.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (in life)
464.	1:538/ 1	What my guardian would not have given her if we had encouraged him, it would be difficult to say, but we thought it right to compound for no more than her wedding dress and bonnet. He agreed to this compromise, and if Caddy had ever been happy in her life, <b>she was happy when we sat down to work.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect on action (to sit down, to work) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
465.	1:539	The production of these devoted little sacrifices in any presentable condition being quite out of the question at a week's notice, <b>I proposed to Caddy that we should make them as happy as we could on her marriage morning</b> in the attic where they all slept, and should confine our greatest efforts to her mama and her mama's room, and a clean breakfast.	Effect coming from somebody <i>Intensity (as...as)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
466.	1:540	"My heart aches for him; that it does!" sobbed Caddy. "I can't help thinking to-night, Esther, <b>how dearly I hope to be happy with Prince</b> , and how dearly Pa hoped, I dare say, to be happy with Ma. What a disappointed life!"	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
467.	1:540/ 1	"My heart aches for him; that it does!" sobbed Caddy. "I can't help thinking to-night, Esther, how	Effect on a state linked to somebody

		dearly I hope to be happy with Prince, <b>and how dearly Pa hoped, I dare say, to be happy with Ma.</b> What a disappointed life!"	<i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
468.	1:541	"Take a little care of Pa while I am gone, Mama!" Mrs. Jellyby positively laughed at the fancy. "You romantic child," said she, lightly patting Caddy's back. "Go along. I am excellent friends with you. Now, good-bye, Caddy, <b>and be very happy!</b> "	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (very)</i>
469.	1:542	He was extremely gay all the rest of the evening, for he absolutely chirped—those were his delighted words—when he thought by <b>what a happy talent for business he was surrounded.</b>	Entity characterises something (talent)
470.	1:543	Charley's last report was that the boy was quiet. I could see, from my window, the lantern they had left him burning quietly; and <b>I went to bed very happy to think that he was sheltered.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to go to bed, to think) <i>Intensity (very)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
471.	1:545	"No! Dash it, Tony," says that gentleman, "you really ought to be careful how you wound the feelings of a man who has an unrequited image imprinted on his heart and <b>who is NOT altogether happy in those chords which vibrate to the tenderest emotions.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (chords) <i>Quality (altogether)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
472.	1:547	The disconcerted young man bows, as he goes out, and cringingly hopes that Mr. Tulkinghorn of the Fields is well. "Aye, aye?" says the lawyer, looking at him from under his bent brows, though he has no need to look again—not he. "From Kenge and Carboy's, surely?" "Kenge and Carboy's, Mr. Tulkinghorn. Name of Guppy, sir." "To be sure. Why, thank you, Mr. Guppy, I am very well!" <b>"Happy to hear it, sir.</b> You can't be too well, sir, for	Effect on hearing Effect on a state linked to something (somebody's well-being) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>

		the credit of the profession." "Thank you, Mr. Guppy!"	
473.	1:548	At once a child, an elder girl, and the little woman <b>I had been so happy as</b> , I was not only oppressed by cares and difficulties adapted to each station, but by the great perplexity of endlessly trying to reconcile them.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (so)</i>
474.	1:550	I could understand the stillness in the house and the thoughtfulness it expressed on the part of all those who had always been so good to me. <b>I could</b> weep in the exquisite felicity of my heart and <b>be as happy in my weakness as ever I had been in my strength.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (weakness, strength) <i>Intensity (as...as)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
475.	1:551	It was heaven's mercy we were at home, or she would have walked back again." <b>The old conspiracy to make me happy!</b> Everybody seemed to be in it!	Effect coming from something (old conspiracy) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
476.	1:552	When we had finished and had our little dessert before us, embellished by the hands of my dear, who would yield the superintendence of everything prepared for me to no one, <b>Miss Flite was so very chatty and happy</b> that I thought I would lead her to her own history, as she was always pleased to talk about herself.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (chatty)</i> <i>Intensity (so very)</i>
477.	1:553	Charley's delight calmed mine; and after we had had a walk in the garden, and Charley had exhausted her whole vocabulary of admiring expressions, <b>I was as tranquilly happy as I ought to have been.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Quality (tranquilly)</i> <i>Intensity (as...as)</i>
478.	1:554	Therefore I had wanted to be alone, and therefore I said, now alone, in my own room, " <b>Esther, if you are to be happy</b> , if you are to have any right to pray to be true-hearted, you must keep your word, my dear."	Existence of emotion is presence here
479.	1:555	"Dear, dear, miss!" cried Charley, starting. "Is that	Existence of emotion is

		you?" "Yes, Charley," said I, quietly putting up my hair. <b>"And I am very well indeed, and very happy."</b>	presence here <i>Link (well)</i> <i>Intensity (very)</i>
480.	1:559	Two such letters together made me think how far beyond my deserts I was beloved <b>and how happy I ought to be</b> . That made me think of all my past life; and that brought me, as it ought to have done before, into a better condition.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (how)</i>
481.	1:563	<b>You can do nothing for my sake that will make me half so happy as for ever turning your back</b> upon the shadow in which we both were born.	Effect coming from somebody (half-effect) <i>Quality (half so happy)</i> <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
482.	1:564	I am quite sure, if you will let me say so, that the object of your choice would greatly prefer to follow your fortunes far and wide, however moderate or poor, and <b>see you happy, doing your duty and pursuing your chosen way</b> , than to have the hope of being, or even to be, very rich with you (if such a thing were possible) at the cost of dragging years of procrastination and anxiety and of your indifference to other aims.	Effect visible on the body Effect on action (to do the duty, to pursue a chosen way) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
483.	1:566	I have expressly stated my sole consideration to be Sir Leicester's feelings and honour and the family reputation. <b>I should have been happy to have made Lady Dedlock a prominent consideration</b> , too, if the case had admitted of it; but unfortunately it does not."	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to make a consideration) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
484.	1:567	Lastly, up comes the flag over Mr. Tulkinghorn's unconscious head cheerfully proclaiming that <b>Sir Leicester and Lady Dedlock are in their happy home</b> and that there is hospitality at the place in Lincolnshire.	Entity that characterises something (home)
485.	1:568	"Oh!" exclaimed Sir Leicester, " <b>I am happy to meet Mr. Skimpole</b> and to have the opportunity of	Effect on a state linked to somebody

		tendering my personal regrets.	Effect on action (to meet) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
486.	1:569	The owners of such places as Chesney Wold," <b>said Mr. Skimpole with his usual happy and easy air,</b> "are public benefactors.	Effect on speech Entity that characterises something (air) <i>Link (easy)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
487.	1:570/ 1	I recalled the first bright gleam of welcome which had shone out of those very windows upon our expectant faces on that cold bright night, and which had never paled. <b>I lived my happy life</b> there over again, I went through my illness and recovery, I thought of myself so altered and of those around me so unchanged; and all this happiness shone like a light from one central figure, represented before me by the letter on the table.	Entity that characterises something (life)
488.	1:571	Still I cried very much, not only in the fullness of my heart after reading the letter, not only in the strangeness of the prospect—for it was strange though I had expected the contents—but as if something for which there was no name or distinct idea were indefinitely lost to me. <b>I was very happy, very thankful, very hopeful;</b> but I cried very much.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (very)</i> <i>Link (thankful, hopeful)</i>
489.	1:572	I went on with my hair now, quite comfortably. I sobbed a little still, but that was because I had been crying, not because I was crying then. "And so Esther, my dear, <b>you are happy for life.</b> Happy with your best friends, happy in your old home, happy in the power of doing a great deal of good, and happy in the undeserved love of the best of men."	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Time marker (for life)</i>
490.	1:572/ 1	I went on with my hair now, quite comfortably. I sobbed a little still, but that was because I had been crying, not because I was crying then. "And so Esther, my dear, you are happy for life. <b>Happy with</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		<b>your best friends</b> , happy in your old home, happy in the power of doing a great deal of good, and happy in the undeserved love of the best of men."	
491.	1: 572/3	I went on with my hair now, quite comfortably. I sobbed a little still, but that was because I had been crying, not because I was crying then. "And so Esther, my dear, you are happy for life. Happy with your best friends, <b>happy in your old home</b> , happy in the power of doing a great deal of good, and happy in the undeserved love of the best of men."	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (home) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
492.	1:572/ 4	I went on with my hair now, quite comfortably. I sobbed a little still, but that was because I had been crying, not because I was crying then. "And so Esther, my dear, you are happy for life. Happy with your best friends, happy in your old home, <b>happy in the power of doing a great deal of good</b> , and happy in the undeserved love of the best of men."	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (power) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
493.	1:572/ 5	I went on with my hair now, quite comfortably. I sobbed a little still, but that was because I had been crying, not because I was crying then. "And so Esther, my dear, you are happy for life. Happy with your best friends, happy in your old home, happy in the power of doing a great deal of good, and <b>happy in the undeserved love of the best of men.</b> "	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (undeserved love) <i>Special case: emotion inside emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
494.	1:574	"I was very ill." "But you have quite recovered?" "I have quite recovered my health and my cheerfulness," said I. "You know how good my guardian is and <b>what a happy life we lead</b> , and I have everything to be thankful for and nothing in the world to desire."	Entity that characterises something (life) <i>Intensity (what a...)</i>
495.	1:575	My Lady, with that motherly touch of the famous ironmaster night, lays her hand upon her dark hair and gently keeps it there. "I told you, Rosa, that I	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect coming from

		<b>wished you to be happy and that I would make you so</b> if I could make anybody happy on this earth. I cannot. There are reasons now known to me, reasons in which you have no part, rendering it far better for you that you should not remain here.	somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
496.	1:575/ 1	My Lady, with that motherly touch of the famous ironmaster night, lays her hand upon her dark hair and gently keeps it there. "I told you, Rosa, that I wished you to be happy and that I would make you so <b>if I could make anybody happy on this earth</b> . I cannot. There are reasons now known to me, reasons in which you have no part, rendering it far better for you that you should not remain here.	Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
497.	1:576	" <b>Now, be happy, child</b> , under better circumstances. Be beloved and happy!" "Ah, my Lady, I have sometimes thought—forgive my being so free—that YOU are not happy." "I!" "Will you be more so when you have sent me away? Pray, pray, think again. Let me stay a little while!"	Existence of emotion is presence here
498.	1:576/ 1	"Now, be happy, child, under better circumstances. <b>Be beloved and happy!</b> " "Ah, my Lady, I have sometimes thought—forgive my being so free—that YOU are not happy." "I!" "Will you be more so when you have sent me away? Pray, pray, think again. Let me stay a little while!"	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (beloved)</i>
499.	1:577	"I hope you are well, Mr. Rouncewell. Be seated. (My solicitor, Mr. Tulkinghorn.) My Lady was desirous, Mr. Rouncewell," Sir Leicester skilfully transfers him with a solemn wave of his hand, "was desirous to speak with you. Hem!" " <b>I shall be very happy</b> ," returns the iron gentleman, " <b>to give my best attention to anything Lady Dedlock does me the honour to say.</b> "	Effect on action (to give attention to something) <i>Intensity (very)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

500.	1:578	Rosa sobs out that she is very sorry to leave my Lady, and that <b>she was happy at Chesney Wold</b> , and has been happy with my Lady, and that she thanks my Lady over and over again.	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect on a state linked to something (Chesney Wold) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
501.	1:578/ 1	Rosa sobs out that she is very sorry to leave my Lady, and that <b>she was happy at Chesney Wold</b> , and <b>has been happy with my Lady</b> , and that she thanks my Lady over and over again.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
502.	1:582	We will go to London for a while and take possession of our old lodgings." "Not for me, dear guardian," said I, "for I never feel tired," which was strictly true. <b>I was only too happy to be in such request.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here Effect on action (to be) <i>Intensity (too)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
503.	1:584	"Tell me that you are better to-day." "Oh, much better, thank you, Mr. Turveydrop," Caddy would reply. "Delighted! Enchanted! And our dear Miss Summerson. She is not quite prostrated by fatigue?" Here he would crease up his eyelids and kiss his fingers to me, <b>though I am happy to say he had ceased to be particular in his attentions since I had been so altered.</b> "Not at all," I would assure him.	Effect on speech Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to cease to be particular about something) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
504.	1:587	How I persuaded myself that this was likely, I don't know. I had no idea that there was any selfish reference in my doing so. I was not grieved for myself: <b>I was quite contented and quite happy.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (quite)</i> <i>Link (contented)</i>
505.	1:588	"True," said my guardian. "I had forgotten that. But we would agree to make him rich enough to live, I suppose? Rich enough to work with tolerable peace of mind? <b>Rich enough to have his own happy home</b> and his own household gods—and household goddess, too, perhaps?"	Entity that characterises something (home)

506.	1:589	This, sir, I take the opportunity of stating openly to you as the friend of Mr. C. <b>Without funds I shall always be happy to appear and act for Mr. C.</b> to the extent of all such costs as are safe to be allowed out of the estate, not beyond that.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to appear, to act) <i>Time marker (always)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
507.	1:590	I dried my sobbing darling's eyes and sat beside her on the sofa, and Richard sat on my other side; and while I was reminded of that so different night when they had first taken me into their confidence and <b>had gone on in their own wild happy way</b> , they told me between them how it was.	Entity that characterises something (ways) <i>Link (wild)</i>
508.	1:591	Neither of us spoke after that, until he said with a sigh, "Well, well, my dear! Bleak House is thinning fast." "But its mistress remains, guardian." Though I was timid about saying it, I ventured because of the sorrowful tone in which he had spoken. " <b>She will do all she can to make it happy</b> ," said I. "She will succeed, my love!"	Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
509.	1:595	"Oh, dear me, he is ill!" "No, no, believe me; not ill, but not quite well. He was depressed and faint — you know he gets so worried and so worn sometimes—and Ada sent to me of course; and when I came home I found her note and came straight here. Well! Richard revived so much after a little while, and <b>Ada was so happy and so convinced of its being my doing</b> , though God knows I had little enough to do with it, that I remained with him until he had been fast asleep some hours. As fast asleep as she is now, I hope!"	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to revive) <i>Link (convinced)</i> <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
510.	1:599	"When I married Richard I was not insensible to what was before him. <b>I had been perfectly happy for a long time with you</b> , and I had never known any trouble or anxiety, so loved and cared for, but I	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Time marker (a long time)</i>

		understood the danger he was in, dear Esther."	<i>Quality (perfectly)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
511.	1:601	Or that a generous brave <b>man</b> , as handsome as he used to be, <b>as hopeful, and far more happy</b> , may walk in the sunshine with him, honouring his grey head and saying to himself, 'I thank God this is my father! Ruined by a fatal inheritance, and restored through me!'"	Entity that characterises somebody <i>Link (hopeful)</i> <i>Intensity (far more)</i>
512.	1:602	"Mr. Woodcourt," said I, "you will be glad to know from my lips before I say good night that in the future, which is clear and bright before me, <b>I am most happy, most fortunate</b> , have nothing to regret or desire."	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (fortunate)</i> <i>Intensity (most)</i>
513.	1:603	"I share those feelings," he returned. "You speak of Mr. Jarndyce." "You know his virtues well," said I, "but few can know the greatness of his character as I know it. All its highest and best qualities have been revealed to me in nothing more brightly than in the shaping out of <b>that future in which I am so happy</b> ."	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located in something (future) <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
514.	1:604	But I shall get on best at Chesney Wold, where there's more room for a weed than there is here; and <b>the dear old lady will be made happy</b> besides. Therefore I accept of Sir Leicester Dedlock's proposals.	Effect coming from something (Chesney Wold) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
515.	1:605	"Hear me, my love, but do not speak. It is for me to speak now. <b>When it was that I began to doubt whether what I had done would really make you happy is no matter</b> . Woodcourt came home, and I soon had no doubt at all."	Effect coming from somebody <i>Intensity (really)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
516.	1:606	"Understand me, my dear girl. <b>I had no doubt of your being contented and happy with me</b> , being so dutiful and so devoted; but I saw with whom you would be happier. That I penetrated his secret when Dame Durden was blind to it is no wonder, for I	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (contented)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		knew the good that could never change in her better far than she did.	
517.	1:607	He rose and raised me with him. We were no longer alone. My husband—I have called him by that name <b>full seven happy years</b> now—stood at my side.	Entity that characterises something (years) <i>Time marker (seven years)</i>
518.	1:608	<b>Full seven happy years</b> I have been the mistress of Bleak House.	Entity that characterises something (years) <i>Time marker (seven years)</i>
519.	1:609	They throve, and by degrees I saw my dear girl pass into my country garden and walk there with her infant in her arms. I was married then. <b>I was the happiest of the happy.</b> It was at this time that my guardian joined us and asked Ada when she would come home.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (the happiest)</i> <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>
520.	1:896	<b>I had never been so happy as in hearing of my progress</b> , began to understand the mixture of good and evil in the world now, felt that he appreciated health the more when somebody else was ill, didn't know but what it might be in the scheme of things that A should squint to make B happier in looking straight or that C should carry a wooden leg to make D better satisfied with his flesh and blood in a silk stocking.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (hearing of my progress) <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
521.	1:896/ 1	I had never been so happy as in hearing of my progress, began to understand the mixture of good and evil in the world now, felt that he appreciated health the more when somebody else was ill, didn't know but what it might be in <b>the scheme of things that A should squint to make B happier in looking straight</b> or that C should carry a wooden leg to make D better satisfied with his flesh and blood in a silk stocking.	Effect coming from somebody <i>Intensity (happier)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
522.	1:1072	[...] MY little tastes and fancies, MY little methods	Effect on a state linked

		and inventions which they used to laugh at while they praised them, <b>my odd ways everywhere</b> . I could not say enough in admiration of what was all so beautiful, but one secret <b>doubt</b> arose in my mind when I saw this, I thought, oh, <b>would he be the happier for it!</b> Would it not have been better for his peace that I should not have been so brought before him?	to something (odd ways) <i>Intensity (happier)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
523.	1:1074	Everybody in the house, from the lowest to the highest, showed me such a bright face of welcome, and spoke so cheerily, and <b>was so happy to do anything for me</b> , that I suppose there never was such a fortunate little creature in the world.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to do anything) <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 2			
524.	<i>happiness</i> 2:124	‘Go on,’ said Mrs Bulfinch, ‘you’re a one, aren’t you? Don’t you pay no attention to him, your lordship. You know what these police fellows are.’ ‘Sad dogs,’ said Wimsey, shaking his head. ‘But I don’t need his testimonials; I can trust my own eyes and ears, Mrs Bulfinch, and I can only say that, <b>if I had had the happiness to make your acquaintance before it was too late</b> , it would have been my lifetime’s ambition to wipe Mr Bulfinch’s eye.	Possession Effect on action (to make an acquaintance) Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
525.	2:159	‘Look here,’ said Wimsey, ‘I’m not out for a verdict of “Not proven”. As far as <b>Miss Vane’s honour and happiness are concerned</b> , she might as well be found guilty as acquitted on a mere element of doubt. I want to see her absolutely cleared and the blame fixed in the right quarter. I don’t want any shadow of doubt about it.’	Possession <i>Link (honour)</i>
526.	2:160	‘Highly desirable, my lord,’ agreed the solicitor, ‘but you will allow me to remind you that <b>it is not merely a question of honour or happiness</b> , but of saving Miss Vane’s neck from the gallows.’	Entity that characterises something (question) <i>Link (honour)</i>

527.	2:161	An enforced inactivity will produce irritable symptoms in the best of men. <b>Nor did the imbecile happiness of Chief Inspector Parker</b> and Lady Mary Wimsey tend to soothe him, accompanied as it was by tedious demonstrations of affection for himself.	Possession <i>Quality (imbecile)</i>
528.	<i>happily</i> 2:162	‘A murderess might make quite a good wife,’ said Harringay. ‘There was Madeleine Smith, you know – she used arsenic too, by the way – <b>she</b> married somebody and <b>lived happily to a respectable old age.</b> ’	Effect on action (to live)
529.	2:164	‘Sweeping through the gates, Sweeping through the gates of the New Jerusalem Washed in the Blood of the Lamb.’ <b>Wimsey</b> , who appeared to find it all very good fun, <b>carolled away happily</b> , without the slightest embarrassment; whether because he was accustomed to the exercise, or merely because he was one of those imperturbably self-satisfied people who cannot conceive of themselves as being out of place in any surroundings, Miss Murchison was unable to determine.	Effect on action (to carol away)
530.	<i>happy</i> 2:58	Various friends have testified that they appeared to live on terms of the greatest mutual affection. Miss Price said that, although <b>Harriet Vane</b> obviously felt her unfortunate position very acutely – cutting herself off from her family friends and refusing to thrust herself into company where her social outlawry might cause embarrassment and so on – yet she was extremely loyal to her lover and <b>expressed herself proud and happy to be his companion.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be somebody’s companion) <i>Link (proud)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
531.	2:59	He goes to Harlech, and spends a very pleasant time there and is much better. But he has a friend to accompany him, Mr Ryland Vaughan, whom you have seen, and this friend says that “ <b>Philip was not happy</b> ”.	Existence of emotion is presence here

532.	2:61	<p>‘No,’ said Harriet Vane, kindly and a little sadly.</p> <p>‘No, you don’t repel me.’</p> <p>‘I don’t remind you of white slugs or make you go goose-flesh all over?’</p> <p>‘Certainly not.’</p> <p>‘I’m glad of that. Any minor <b>alterations</b>, like parting the old mane, or growing a toothbrush, or cashiering the eye-glass, you know, <b>I should be happy to undertake</b>, if it suited your ideas.’</p>	<p>Effect on action (to undertake alternations)</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
533.	2:62	<p>Wimsey reached his destination about 10 o’clock, and was directed to the vicarage, one of those large, rambling, and unnecessary structures which swallow the incumbent’s income during his life and land his survivors with a heavy bill for dilapidations as soon as he is dead. The Rev. <b>Arthur Boyes</b> was at home, and <b>would be happy to see Lord Peter Wimsey</b>.</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p>Effect on seeing</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
534.	2:63	<p>‘Oh – oh, yes!’ said Mr Boyes. He carefully polished a pair of pince-nez and balanced them on his nose, where they sat crookedly. He peered at Wimsey and seemed not to dislike what he saw, for he went on:</p> <p>‘Poor misguided girl! I assure you, I have no vindictive feelings – that is to say, <b>nobody would be more happy than myself to know that she was innocent of this dreadful thing</b>.</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to somebody</p> <p>Effect on action (to know)</p> <p><i>Intensity (more)</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
535.	2:66	<p>What more should any cook or house-parlourmaid want?’</p> <p>‘<b>I am always happy</b>,’ replied Bunter, ‘<b>to exert myself</b> to the best of my capacity in your lordship’s service.’</p>	<p>Effect on action (to exert)</p> <p><i>Time marker (always)</i></p>
536.	2:69	<p>‘With Bunter and the books. I envy you sometimes, Peter.’</p> <p>Wimsey said nothing. Marjorie looked at him almost in alarm, and tucked her arm in his.</p> <p>‘Peter – <b>do please be happy</b>. I mean, you’ve always been the comfortable sort of person that nothing</p>	<p>Existence of emotion is presence here</p>

		could touch. Don't alter, will you?'	
537.	2:71	And also, though I am strong and healthy yet, I am glad to say, and have my wits quite about me, still, that <b>happy state of things might alter at any time.</b>	Entity that characterises something (state of things)
538.	2:74	'She's quite helpless, I suppose?' 'Yes, quite.' 'Can she speak?' 'Not to say speak. She mumbles sometimes, but one can't make anything of it. It's sad, isn't it, and her so rich. <b>It will be a happy day</b> for her when she passes over.' 'Poor soul!' said Miss Climpson.	Entity that characterises something (day) <i>Time marker (day)</i>
539.	2:77	'Have you brought us news, Miss Murchison? If so, you have come at the exact right moment to find the eagles gathered together. Mr Arbuthnot, Chief Inspector Parker, Miss Murchison. Now let's all sit down and <b>be happy together.</b> Have you had tea? or will you absorb a spot of something?'	Existence (shared) of emotion is presence here
540.	2:165	'Yes,' said Parker, modestly, 'but I'm more logical, I think. And I'm not being flustered by the Attorney-General. <b>I should feel happier with a little evidence of a more objective kind.</b> ' 'You would. You want some real arsenic. Well Bunter, what about it?'	Effect on a state linked to something (evidence) <i>Intensity (happier)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 2			
541.	<i>happiness</i> 3:28	She was silent for a little, thinking of her dead husband. She murmured: 'So long ago...so very long ago...We had only been married five years when he died. Double pneumonia...We were happy – yes, very happy; but somehow <b>it all seems very unreal, that happiness.</b>	Unrealistic entity
542.	<i>happy</i> 3:2	Aunt Laura, tell me, honestly, <b>do you think love is ever a happy thing?'</b> Mrs Welman's face became grave. 'In the sense you mean, Elinor – no, probably	Entity that characterises something (love) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>

		not...To care passionately for another human creature brings always more sorrow than joy; but all the same, Elinor, one would not be without that experience.	
543.	3:26	‘She’s rallied wonderfully, but it won’t be for long. There will be a second stroke and then a third. I know the way of it only too well. You be patient, my dear. <b>If you keep the old lady’s last days happy and occupied</b> , that’s a better deed than many. The time for the other will come.’	Entity that characterises something (last days) <i>Link (occupied)</i> <i>Time marker (last days)</i>
544.	3:27	Mrs Welman said softly: ‘They’re good children – very good children. And fond of me, both of them. I always know I’ve only got to send and they’ll come at any time. But I don’t want to do that too often. <b>They’re young and happy</b> – the world in front of them. No need to bring them near decay and suffering before their time.’ Mary said, ‘I’m sure they’d never feel like that, Mrs Welman.’	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (young)</i>
545.	3:28/1	She was silent for a little, thinking of her dead husband. She murmured: ‘So long ago...so very long ago...We had only been married five years when he died. Double pneumonia... <b>We were happy – yes, very happy</b> ; but somehow it all seems very unreal, that happiness.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (very)</i>
546.	3:29	But I’ve always fancied that you had, perhaps, rather an intense nature – that kind of <b>temperament</b> runs in our family. <b>It isn’t a very happy one for its possessors</b> ...But, as I say, when you came back from abroad so indifferent to Roddy, I was sorry about that, because I had always hoped you two would come together.	Entity that characterises something (temperament) <i>Intensity (very)</i>
547.	3:30	Elinor said gravely: ‘I care for Roddy enough and not too much.’	Existence of emotion is presence here

		Mrs Welman nodded approval. <b>'I think, then, you'll be happy.</b> Roddy needs love – but he doesn't like violent emotion. He'd shy off from possessiveness.'	
548.	3:32	Elinor said: 'Yes, I can. Go on.' Roddy said helplessly: 'I didn't want to fall in love with her... <b>I was quite happy with you.</b> Oh, Elinor, what a cad I am, talking like this to you...' Elinor said: 'Nonsense. Go on. Tell me...'	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Intensity (quite)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
549.	3:50	'On the rose trellis at the Lodge – a thorn. I'll get it out presently.' The rose trellis at the Lodge... Memory poured in waves over Elinor. She and Roddy quarrelling – the Wars of the Roses. She and Roddy quarrelling – and making it up. <b>Lovely, laughing, happy days.</b>	Entity that characterises something (days) <i>Link (lovely, laughing)</i> <i>Time marker (days)</i>
550.	3:51	Poirot asked: <b>'Was Mary Gerrard happy when she was down here?</b> Was she fond of old Mrs Welman?' 'She'd have been happy enough, I dare say, if Nurse had let her alone. Nurse Hopkins, I mean. Putting ideas into her head of earning a living and going off to do massage.'	Effect on a state linked to something (a certain place) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
551.	3:51/1	Poirot asked: <b>'Was Mary Gerrard happy when she was down here?</b> Was she fond of old Mrs Welman?' <b>'She'd have been happy enough,</b> I dare say, if Nurse had let her alone. Nurse Hopkins, I mean. Putting ideas into her head of earning a living and going off to do massage.'	Effect on a state linked to something (a certain place) <i>Intensity (enough)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
552.	3:52	Poirot murmured deprecatingly: 'No, no. A <b>little curiosity on my part,</b> that is all.' <b>'Only too happy to satisfy it.</b> Which case is it?'	Effect on a state linked to something (curiosity) Effect on action (to

		<p>‘Elinor Carlisle.’</p> <p>‘Oh, yes, girl who poisoned Mary Gerrard. Coming up for trial in two weeks’ time. Interesting case.</p>	<p>satisfy)</p> <p><i>Intensity (too)</i></p> <p><i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
TF 3			
553.	<p><i>happiness</i></p> <p>4:191</p>	<p>And he would tell you nothing?’</p> <p>‘Only that he’d had a good day. I think he’d promised Ashe that the place would be their secret. <b>He’d come back full of happiness, full of hope.</b> He loved Ashe, but not in the way they said.</p>	<p>Body is a container for emotions</p> <p><i>Link (hope)</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
554.	4:196	<p>It sometimes seemed to him that <b>they were more preoccupied with the comfort and happiness of the aupair</b> than they were with each other’s.</p>	<p>Possession</p> <p><i>Link (comfort)</i></p>
555.	4:198	<p><b>He felt along his veins a tingling happiness, almost frightening in its physicality</b>, that soul-possessing joy which is so seldom felt once youth has passed.</p>	<p>Body is a container for emotions</p> <p>Liquid</p> <p><i>Quality (tingling, frightening)</i></p> <p><i>Special case: feeling emotion</i></p> <p><i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
556.	4:200	<p>She said, “You should avoid <b>living too much in the real world</b>, young man. <b>It isn’t conducive to happiness.</b>”</p>	<p>Destination</p>
557.	4:201	<p>‘I know what questions to ask. It’s the answers I’m after. And what about learning how to live? Isn’t that philosophy too? What’s yours?’</p> <p>The reply had come easily but, she had thought, with honesty: ‘<b>To get as much happiness as I can.</b> Not to harm others. Not to whine. In that order.’</p>	<p>Object (desired)</p> <p><i>Intensity (much)</i></p>
558.	4:202	<p>But those shared half-hours or so of undemanding companionship became some of the happiest</p>	<p>Existence of emotion is presence here</p>

		interludes of my obsessed life. Perhaps ‘happiest’ is too positive a word. <b>Happiness is not an emotion I feel now, nor ever expect to feel.</b> But there was a kind of contentment, a restfulness and a sense of belonging again to the real world, which I found comforting.	<i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
559.	4:204	He was looking towards it and <b>it seemed to her that his face was alight with happiness.</b> She couldn’t ever remember seeing him like this. He was like a child who knows at last that the longed-for present is within his grasp.	Effect visible on the face Fire <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
560.	<i>happily</i> 4:336	Venetia went over the evidence quietly so that when she was ready to move in for the kill the <b>victim was happily compliant.</b>	Effect on action (to be compliant) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
561.	4:337	To this <b>home</b> , to his <b>comfort</b> , to the <b>bringing up of their children</b> , to the <b>garden</b> and <b>greenhouse</b> , to the local <b>church</b> and her patchwork quilts, <b>Margaret had happily given her life.</b> She had never wanted to take a job and he had valued his domestic comfort too highly to encourage her to look for one.	Effect on a state linked to something (home, comfort, garden, greenhouse, church, the bringing up children) Effect on action (to give somebody’s life) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
562.	4:338	My wife had known of the affair for about two years. She didn’t, of course, condone it and about a year ago I promised her that it would end. <b>Happily Venetia’s and my wishes coincided.</b> Actually it was she who ended it. If she hadn’t brought matters to a head I suppose I should have taken the initiative.	Effect on a state linked to something (wishes) Effect on action (to coincide) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
563.	4:339	<b>I decided that I couldn’t happily continue to co-operate with a man for whom I was losing respect,</b> so I gave in my notice.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to continue to co-operate) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
564.	4:340	<b>Happily she was a counsel</b> who never glanced at the	Effect on a state linked

		public benches and, of course, I took care not to sit in the front row.	to somebody
565.	4:341	<b>'Our putative Desmond is happily ignorant of the minutiae of the criminal law</b> but he does know that malefactors find it convenient to supply the police with an alibi.	Entity that characterises something (ignorant state)
566.	<i>happy</i> 4:41	<b>The high school</b> was a refuge from more than the estate. <b>She was happy there</b> , or as happy as she was capable of being. But her life was so separate from her life at Danesford as her parents' only child that all her schooldays she had the sensation of living in two worlds.	Effect on a state linked to something (high school) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
567.	4:41/1	<b>The high school</b> was a refuge from more than the estate. She was happy there, <b>or as happy as she was capable of being</b> . But her life was so separate from her life at Danesford as her parents' only child that all her schooldays she had the sensation of living in two worlds.	Effect on a state linked to something (high school) <i>Intensity (as...as)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
568.	4:101	She hadn't expected the case to be heard in the Old Bailey's most famous court or to be judged by a High Court Judge, but a previous trial had collapsed and the judge's sittings and court allocation had been reorganized. <b>It was a happy omen</b> . She had lost in Court One, but the memories of defeats there were not bitter. More often she had won.	Entity that characterises something (omen)
569.	4:102	'But is that what we need? There are going to have to be changes, Drysdale. <b>I'm happy I shan't be here to see them</b> , but I know they'll come. People talk about managing change. There'll be new people in Chambers, new systems.'	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be, to see) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
570.	4:103	At nine o'clock she would break off their talk and go downstairs to say good-night, to answer the predictable questions about how her work had gone, the timetable for the next day. But she would return always to <b>the only room in the house in which she</b>	Effect on a state linked to something (room) Spatial orientation of the body <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		<b>had ever been happy</b> , to the hiss of the fire, the armchair with the broken springs which was made comfortable because the Frog would take a pillow from his bed and put it at her back, to the Frog sitting opposite her in the upright chair with his six volumes of Notable British Trials piled on the floor by his side.	
571.	4:104	‘Are people put in the cell today?’ He had stared at the two window slits, imagining that he could see desperate eyes peering down. ‘Not today. The Templars Order was dissolved in 1312.’ ‘But what about the lawyers?’ ‘ <b>I’m happy to say that the Lord Chancellor is satisfied</b> with less Draconian measures.’	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to be satisfied) Effect on speech <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
572.	4:105	A court attendant had come up. He said: ‘There’s quite a crowd of anti-hunt saboteurs outside. <b>They’re not happy with the verdict.</b> It might be wise to leave by the other door.’	Effect on a state linked to something (verdict) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
573.	4:106	The thin knowing <b>face</b> , which could so easily assume a look of fatuous slyness or mutinous resentment, now <b>looked peaceful, almost happy</b> , and for the first time in years she looked steadily at her mother with the rich deep-brown eyes which were the only feature they shared in common.	Effect visible on the face <i>Link (peaceful)</i> <i>Quality (almost)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
574.	4:107	She could remember clearly every word of the conversation with Miss Egerton, the headmistress. ‘ <b>We haven’t been able to make her happy.</b> ’ ‘I didn’t send her to you to be made happy. I sent her to be educated.’	Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
575.	4:107/ 1	She could remember clearly every word of the conversation with Miss Egerton, the headmistress. ‘We haven’t been able to make her happy.’ ‘ <b>I didn’t send her to you to be made happy.</b> I sent her to be educated.’	Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

576.	4:108	'That's unworthy of you. It's also unfair. <b>I thought I made you happy.</b> ' And now there was a harshness in her voice which chilled his blood.	Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
577.	4:110	You surprise me, Simon. <b>I didn't realize you were so happy to appear in the lower courts.</b> A pity you didn't suggest it at the time.'	Effect on action (to appear in the lower courts) <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
578.	4:111	He said: ' <b>Drysdale Laud should be happy with this Vanessa Bell.</b> She could be a slovenly artist at times, but this is one of her best. Odd that Miss Aldridge was so keen on these Bloomsbury painters.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
579.	4:113	He asked: ' <b>You have been happy here?</b> ' 'Contented rather than happy. I had hopes of evening classes, but it isn't really possible for an elderly woman to go out alone at night.	Effect on a state linked to something (a certain place) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
580.	4:113/ 1	He asked: 'You have been happy <b>here?</b> ' ' <b>Contented rather than happy.</b> I had hopes of evening classes, but it isn't really possible for an elderly woman to go out alone at night.	Effect on a state linked to something (a certain place) <i>Anti-link (contented)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
581.	4:115	'Not well. We met from time to time, mainly at law functions. I doubt that I exchanged more than a dozen words with her at any time. <b>I thought that she was a handsome woman but not a happy one.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Anti-link (handsome)</i>
582.	4:116	<b>They had been a happy find</b> in a second-hand book and print shop off the Charing Cross Road, discovered by Dalgliesh when he was a detective sergeant, bought after anxious calculation of their affordability and now worth ten times what he had paid.	Entity that characterises something (a find)
583.	4:117	He would watch the situation, more for the good of the squad than for hers. But he cared about her. <b>He wanted her to be happy.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here
584.	4:118	'Yes, to the front door of Chambers and to the	Effect on action (to

		Devereux Court entrance. I have keys to ten of the offices we clean. It's useful in case one of the women unexpectedly can't do her hours and I need a replacement. <b>Some offices are happy to provide a spare key</b> for this purpose, others not. I keep all the keys in my safe. None is named, as you'll see. I can assure you that none has left my possession in the last month.'	provide a spare key)
585.	4:119	<b>Men and women</b> who would never dream of lending their <b>office keys</b> even to their closest friends <b>are quite happy to hand them over</b> to their cleaning woman.	Effect on action (to hand over office keys) <i>Intensity (quite)</i>
586.	4:120	That's one of the frustrations of this job. You meet people, question them, get intrigued by them, eliminate them from inquiries and never see them again.' <b>'Most of them I'm only too happy not to see again,</b> and that includes Miss Elkington.'	Effect on seeing Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Intensity (too)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
587.	4:121	Kate said: <b>'And then she was apparently happy to work privately for Miss Aldridge</b> when Mrs Buckley needed an extra pair of hands. It looks as if Janet Carpenter was using every means to get close to Aldridge. Why? The answer could lie in her past.'	Effect on action (to work privately for somebody) Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Quality (apparently)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
588.	4:122	'Yes, she knew. After I'd got back to Alice's flat I thought it was possible that Venetia hadn't come to the gate because she'd suddenly been taken ill. It didn't seem at all likely, but <b>I wasn't happy about going to bed without alerting someone.</b>	Effect on action (to go to bed) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
589.	4:123	I do a little supply teaching here, it's different in the country. But mostly I do the garden and the studio accounts.' He paused and then said quietly: <b>'I didn't believe that anyone could be so happy.'</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Intensity (so)</i>
590.	4:124	I could remember Ralph with love, even when	Existence of emotion is

		remembering hurt most, because I was there with him when he died and I held his hand and he knew that I loved him, and <b>we had known what it was to be happy.</b>	presence here
591.	4:126	He was silent for a moment, looking across at Langton, then said more gently: ‘Hadn’t we better settle the agenda for the thirty-first? <b>Are you happy with the main items and with the order?</b> Rupert and Catherine are offered the two places in Chambers.	Effect on a state linked to something (items, an order) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
592.	4:127	Laud said: ‘And that includes decisions in Chambers. <b>If you’re happy,</b> Hubert, I’ll take the agenda and get it typed and copied.	Existence of emotion is presence here
593.	4:128	He liked to sit in the second row and thought it odd of me not to share this preference until I realized that there was little chance of Miss Aldridge looking up, let alone of her recognizing me. I always wore a hat with a brim and my smartest coat; she had seen me only in my working overalls. There was no real risk, yet it was several weeks before <b>I first felt happy sitting so close to the front.</b>	Effect on action (to sit close to the front row) <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
594.	4:129	I put my proposition to him simply and without emotion. I said: ‘Venetia Aldridge has a daughter, Octavia, who is just eighteen. I’m willing to pay you £10,000 to seduce her and another £15,000 if she agrees to marry you. I’ve seen her. <b>She’s not particularly attractive and she isn’t happy.</b> That last should make it easier. But she is an only child and she does have money. For me it’s a matter of revenge.’	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (attractive)</i>
595.	4:131	It was Kate who broke the silence. ‘But she was crazy to make that assignation. Did she really expect him to bring Octavia?’ ‘Perhaps. We don’t know what was said between them when he rang. He may even have told her that	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to know the truth) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		<p><b>he was happy for Octavia to know the truth.</b> He may have persuaded her that he could convince Octavia that what had begun as a deception on his part had ended for him in love. There was unfinished business between them.'</p>	
596.	4:132	<p>'In what way, Mrs Buckley? Was he aggressive, threatening?'</p> <p>'Oh no, he was perfectly polite. Cold, but not threatening. But he was always watching me, calculating, hating. And Octavia was the same. He influenced her, of course. <b>It isn't happy living in a house where you're resented and hated.</b> She really needs help and kindness, but I can't give it. You can't give love where you're hated. I'm glad that they've gone.'</p>	Entity that characterises something (living)
597.	4:133	<p>Still <b>gently jumping he spread his arms</b> and <b>she saw again that happy transforming smile.</b> He said: 'We'll unpack and carry our stuff across. Then I'll come back for the bike. The bridge should hold.'</p>	<p>Effect on the lips/mouth</p> <p>Entity that characterises something (transforming smile)</p> <p>Effect on bodily movement</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
598.	4:134	<p>Away from me, she thought, but didn't speak. She felt again a momentary churning of the heart. She was with Ashe. <b>She should be feeling happy, exultant,</b> sharing his pleasure in the peace, the silence, the knowledge that this isolated island was their special place. Instead she was aware of a moment of claustrophobic unease.</p>	<p>Existence of emotion is presence here</p> <p><i>Link (exultant)</i></p> <p><i>Special case: feeling emotion</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
599.	4:136	<p>She was trying <b>to sound happy,</b> but there was something false in her over-bright voice.</p>	<p>Effect on the voice</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
600.	4:139	<p>Imagine as our <b>protagonist a man,</b> successful in his career, <b>reasonably content if not happy,</b> but who loved only two people in his life: his brother and his niece.</p>	<p>Entity that characterises somebody</p> <p><i>Link (reasonably content)</i></p>

601.	4:202	But those shared half-hours or so of undemanding companionship became some of <b>the happiest interludes of my obsessed life</b> . Perhaps <b>'happiest' is too positive a word</b> . Happiness is not an emotion I feel now, nor ever expect to feel. But there was a kind of contentment, a restfulness and a sense of belonging again to the real world, which I found comforting.	Entity that characterises something (interludes of life) <i>Intensity (the happiest)</i>
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The emotion keyword of *INTEREST*

TF 1	Quotation #	Quotation	Cross-domain mapping/ <i>parameters of emotional evaluation</i>
602.	(an) <i>interest</i> 1:81	Mr. Jarndyce had written to a relation of the family, a great Sir Leicester Dedlock, <b>for his interest in Richard's favour</b> , generally; and Sir Leicester had replied in a gracious manner that he would be happy to advance the prospects of the young gentleman if it should ever prove to be within his power, which was not at all probable, and that my Lady sent her compliments to the young gentleman (to whom she perfectly remembered that she was allied by remote consanguinity) and trusted that he would ever do his duty in any honourable profession to which he might devote himself.	Possession Entity located inside something (favour) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
603.	1:93	But when I came to myself and saw how shocked my guardian was and found that they were earnestly speaking of the suspected man and recalling every favourable impression we had formed of him out of the good we had known of him, <b>my interest and my fears were so strongly aroused in his behalf</b> that I was quite set up again.	Possession Entity located inside something (behalf) Up <i>Link (fears)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
604.	1:259	Rick mistrusts and suspects me—goes to lawyers, and is taught to mistrust and suspect me. Hears <b>I have conflicting interests</b> , claims clashing against	Possession (conflicting)

		his and what not.	
605.	1:269	<b>In attending to your interests</b> , I wish to have all possible checks upon me; it is right that I should have them; I court inquiry.	Possession
606.	1:270	"Well enough to know what his intentions were. <b>Are or are not our interests conflicting?</b> Tell—me — that!" says Richard, accompanying his last three words with three raps on his rock of trust.	Possession (conflicting)
607.	1:271	I mentioned to you that I could offer no opinion or advice as to <b>your interests</b> while those interests were entrusted to another member of the profession.	Possession
608.	1:271/ 1	I mentioned to you that I could offer no opinion or advice as to <b>your interests while those interests were entrusted to another member of the profession.</b>	Possession (entrusted to somebody)
609.	1:456	I am surprised that you should think of making a noise below in the hall. <b>It was so opposed to your interests.</b> That's what I look at."	Possession
610.	1: 692	When <b>Mr. Bucket has a matter of this pressing interest under his consideration, the fat forefinger seems to rise</b> , to the dignity of a familiar demon. He puts it to his ears, and it whispers information; he puts it to his lips, and it enjoins him to secrecy; he rubs it over his nose, and it sharpens his scent; he shakes it before a guilty man, and it charms him to his destruction.	Object (heavy) located under something (consideration) Effect on bodily movement <i>Quality (pressing)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
611.	1:708	Foot passengers, jostling one another's umbrellas in a general infection of ill temper, and losing their foothold at street-corners, where tens of thousands of other foot passengers have been slipping and sliding since the day broke (if this day ever broke), <b>adding new deposits to the crust upon crust of mud, sticking at those points tenaciously to the pavement, and accumulating at compound interest.</b>	Object (compound) <i>Quality (compound)</i>

612.	1:709	My Lady Dedlock, having conquered HER world, fell not into the melting, but rather into the freezing, mood. An exhausted composure, a worn-out placidity, <b>an equanimity of fatigue not to be ruffled by interest or satisfaction</b> , are the trophies of her victory. She is perfectly well-bred.	Attacker (intruding) <i>Link (satisfaction)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
613.	1:710	Sir Leicester has no objection to an interminable Chancery suit. It is a slow, expensive, British, constitutional kind of thing. To be sure, <b>he has not a vital interest in the suit in question</b> , her part in which was the only property my Lady brought him [...].	Possession Entity located inside something (suit) <i>Quality (vital)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
614.	1:716	While Ada was speaking to him in reply, <b>I glanced (I need not say with how much interest) at his face.</b>	Effect on a glance Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Intensity (how much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
615.	1:718	Richard and I looked at one another again. It was a most singular thing that the arrest was our embarrassment and not Mr. Skimpole's. <b>He observed us with a genial interest</b> , but there seemed, if I may venture on such a contradiction, nothing selfish in it.	Effect on observation Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Quality (genial)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
616.	1:720	The grandson, however, being smitten by a sudden wish to see the house himself, proposes to join the party. <b>The grandmother, who is pleased that he should have that interest</b> , accompanies him—though to do him justice, he is exceedingly unwilling to trouble her.	Possession <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>
617.	1:721	But a <b>portrait</b> over the chimney-piece, painted by the fashionable artist of the day, acts upon him like a charm. He recovers in a moment. <b>He stares at it with uncommon interest</b> ; he seems to be fixed and fascinated by it.	Effect on a stare Effect on a state linked to something (portrait) <i>Quality (uncommon)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
618.	1:722	As <b>no one present takes any especial interest in Mr. Guppy's dreams</b> , the probability is not pursued.	Object Entity located inside

			something (dreams) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
619.	1:723	But he still remains so absorbed by the portrait that he stands immovable before it until the young gardener has closed the shutters, when <b>he comes out of the room in a dazed state that is an odd though a sufficient substitute for interest</b> and follows into the succeeding rooms with a confused stare, as if he were looking everywhere for Lady Dedlock again.	Entity that characterises something (dazed state) Spatial orientation of the body <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
620.	1:725	They wanted everything. They wanted wearing <b>apparel</b> , they wanted <b>linen rags</b> , they wanted <b>money</b> , they wanted <b>coals</b> , they wanted <b>soup</b> , <b>they wanted interest</b> , they wanted <b>autographs</b> , they wanted <b>flannel</b> , they wanted whatever Mr. Jarndyce had—or had not. Their objects were as various as their demands.	Object (desired) <i>Link (wearing apparel, linen rags, money, coals, soup, autograph, flannel)</i>
621.	1:728	I saw him so often in the course of the evening, which passed very pleasantly, <b>contemplate Richard and Ada with an interest and a satisfaction</b> that made his fine face remarkably agreeable as he sat at a little distance from the piano listening to the music	Effect on contemplation Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (satisfaction)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
622.	1:730	Though a young man, I have ferreted out evidence, got up cases, and seen lots of life. Blest with your hand, what means might I not find of <b>advancing your interests</b> and pushing your fortunes!	Possession Up
623.	1:731	I told him that <b>he addressed my interest</b> or what he supposed to be my interest quite as unsuccessfully as he addressed my inclination, and he would now understand that I requested him, if he pleased, to go away immediately.	Possession
624.	1:731/ 1	I told him that <b>he addressed</b> my interest or what he supposed to be <b>my interest</b> quite as unsuccessfully as he addressed my inclination, and he would now understand that I requested him, if he pleased, to go away immediately.	Possession

625.	1:733	"Do you think he did it on purpose?" asks Krook. "Took the over-dose?" "Yes!" <b>Krook almost smacks his lips with the unction of a horrible interest.</b>	Effect on the lips/mouth <i>Quality (horrible)</i> <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
626.	1:734	During this dialogue Mr. Tulkinghorn has stood aloof by the old portmanteau, with his hands behind him, equally removed, to all appearance, from <b>all three kinds of interest exhibited near the bed</b> —from the young surgeon's professional interest in death, noticeable as being quite apart from his remarks on the deceased as an individual; from the old man's unction; and the little crazy woman's awe. His imperturbable face has been as inexpressive as his rusty clothes.	Object (exhibited)
627.	1:734/ 1	During this dialogue Mr. Tulkinghorn has stood aloof by the old portmanteau, with his hands behind him, equally removed, to all appearance, from all three kinds of interest exhibited near the bed—from <b>the young surgeon's professional interest in death</b> , noticeable as being quite apart from his remarks on the deceased as an individual; from the old man's unction; and the little crazy woman's awe. His imperturbable face has been as inexpressive as his rusty clothes.	Possession Entity located inside something (death) <i>Quality (professional)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
628.	1:735	Policeman seen to smile to potboy. <b>Public loses interest</b> and undergoes reaction.	Object (lost)
629.	1:737	"A young scholar of mine, my Lady. Rosa." "Come here, Rosa!" <b>Lady Dedlock beckons her, with even an appearance of interest.</b> "Why, do you know how pretty you are, child?" she says, <b>touching her shoulder with her two forefingers.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect visible on the body Effect on bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
630.	1:741	If he were not there when we went in, and I began to	Entity that characterises

		hope he would not come and yielded myself for a little while to <b>the interest of the scene</b> , I was certain to encounter his languishing eyes when I least expected it and, from that time, to be quite sure that they were fixed upon me all the evening.	something (scene)
631.	1:743	When I contemplated these relations between us four which have so brightened my <b>life</b> and <b>so invested it with new interests and pleasures</b> , I certainly did contemplate, afar off, the possibility of you and your pretty cousin here (don't be shy, Ada, don't be shy, my dear!) being in a mind to go through life together.	Investment <i>Link (pleasures)</i> <i>Quality (new)</i>
632.	1:746	He is of such a very easy disposition that probably he would never think it worth-while to mention how he really feels, but he feels languid about <b>the profession. He has not that positive interest in it</b> which makes it his vocation.	Possession Entity located inside something (profession) <i>Quality (positive)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
633.	1:747	<b>Young men</b> like Mr. Allan Woodcourt <b>who take it from a strong interest in all that it can do</b> will find some reward in it through a great deal of work for a very little money and through years of considerable endurance and disappointment.	Entity located inside something (all that it [profession] can do) <i>Intensity (strong)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
634.	1:749	I should be able <b>to look after Ada's interests</b> and my own interests (the same thing!); and I should peg away at Blackstone and all those fellows with the most tremendous ardour."	Possession (requires taking care of)
635.	1:749/ 1	I should be able <b>to look after</b> Ada's interests and <b>my own interests</b> (the same thing!); and I should peg away at Blackstone and all those fellows with the most tremendous ardour."	Possession (requires taking care of)
636.	1:752	Mr. Guppy, who has an inquiring mind in matters of evidence and who has been suffering severely from the lassitude of the long vacation, <b>takes that interest in the case</b> that he enters on a regular cross-examination of the witness, which is found so interesting by the ladies that Mrs. Snagsby politely	Object Entity located inside something (case) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		invites him to step upstairs and drink a cup of tea, if he will excuse the disarranged state of the tea-table, consequent on their previous exertions.	
637.	1:753	Mr. Weevle and Mr. Guppy then repair to Cook's Court, Cursitor Street, where the personal introduction of the former to Mr. Snagsby is effected and (more important) <b>the vote and interest of Mrs. Snagsby are secured.</b>	Possession (secured) <i>Link (vote)</i>
638.	1:754	With such infantine graces as a total <b>want of observation, memory, understanding, and interest</b> , and an eternal disposition to fall asleep over the fire and into it, Mr. Smallweed's grandmother has undoubtedly brightened the family.	Object (desired) <i>Link (observation, memory, understanding)</i>
639.	1:759	"You told me when you were so good as to step round here last night—" "For which I must ask you to excuse me if it was a liberty, sir; but <b>I remember that you had taken a sort of an interest in that person</b> , and I thought it possible that you might—just—wish—to—"	Object Entity located inside somebody <i>Quality (sort of)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
640.	1:762	"What was that man?" <b>asked my guardian in a new tone of interest.</b> "Why, he began by being a small Shropshire farmer before they made a baited bull of him," said Mr. George. "Was his name Gridley?" "It was, sir."	Effect on tone of voice <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
641.	1:764	"I was born in the country, Phil." "Was you indeed, commander?" "Yes. And bred there." Phil elevates his one eyebrow, and after respectfully staring at <b>his master to express interest</b> , swallows a great gulp of coffee, still staring at him.	Effect not visible on the face <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
642.	1:766	Mr. Tulkinghorn merely utters an occasional sentence, as, "You are the best judge of <b>your own interest</b> , sergeant." "Take care you do no harm by this."	Possession

643.	1:768	<p>“If you think there’s enough in this chain of circumstances put together—in the undoubted strong likeness of this young lady to your ladyship, which is a positive fact for a jury; in her having been brought up by Miss Barbary; in Miss Barbary stating Miss Summerson's real name to be Hawdon; in your ladyship's knowing both these names VERY WELL; and in Hawdon's dying as he did—<b>to give your ladyship a family interest in going further into the case</b>, I will bring these papers here.</p>	<p>Object Entity located inside something (to go further into the case) <i>Quality (family)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
644.	1:772	<p>Mr. Weevle and Mr. Guppy look at each other, the former as having relinquished the whole affair, the latter with a discomfited countenance as having entertained some lingering expectations yet. But there is nothing to be done in opposition to <b>the Smallweed interest</b>.</p>	<p>Possession</p>
645.	1:777	<p>A young man so unfortunate," here he fell into a lower tone, as if he were thinking aloud, "cannot at first believe (who could?) that Chancery is what it is. He looks to it, flushed and fitfully, <b>to do something with his interests</b> and bring them to some settlement.</p>	<p>Possession</p>
646.	1:778	<p>There was a favourite spot of mine in the park-woods of Chesney Wold, where a seat had been erected commanding <b>a lovely view</b>. [...] A picturesque part of the Hall, called the Ghost's Walk, was seen to advantage from this higher ground; and the startling name, and the old legend in the Dedlock family which I had heard from Mr. Boythorn accounting for it, <b>mingled with the view and gave it something of a mysterious interest in addition to its real charms</b>.</p>	<p>Object <i>Quality (mysterious)</i></p>
647.	1:781	<p>"Yes. I have run over <b>to look after my—my Chancery interests</b> before the long vacation," said Richard, forcing a careless laugh. "We are beginning to spin along with that old suit at last, I promise you."</p>	<p>Possession (to look after)</p>

648.	1:783	<b>It may cause</b> other parties interested <b>to become lax about their interests</b> ; and people may die off, and points may drag themselves out of memory, and many things may smoothly happen that are convenient enough."	Possession
649.	1:784	"Esther," Richard resumed, "you are not to suppose that I have come here to make underhanded charges against John Jarndyce. I have only come to justify myself. What I say is, it was all very well and we got on very well while I was a boy, utterly regardless of this same <b>suit</b> ; but as soon as <b>I began to take an interest in it</b> and to look into it, then it was quite another thing.	Object Entity located inside something (suit) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
650.	1:785	I also want Ada to know that if I see her seldom just now, <b>I am looking after her interests as well as my own</b> —we two being in the same boat exactly—and that I hope she will not suppose from any flying rumours she may hear that I am at all light-headed or imprudent [...].	Possession (to look after)
651.	1:786	"Mr. Carstone has laid down the principle of <b>watching his own interests</b> ," said Mr. Vholes, "and when a client lays down his own principle, and it is not immoral, it devolves upon me to carry it out.	Possession (to watch)
652.	1:788	"You said on that occasion," I recommenced, "that you might possibly have the means of <b>advancing my interests</b> and promoting my fortunes by making discoveries of which I should be the subject.	Possession Up
653.	1:790	"I think you had, sir, without knowing it," returns the equable Vholes. "Very naturally. It is my duty to attend to <b>your interests</b> with a cool head, and I can quite understand that to your excited feelings I may appear, at such times as the present, insensible.	Possession
654.	1:791	<b>But your interests demand that I should be cool and methodical</b> , Mr. Carstone; and I cannot be otherwise—no, sir, not even to please you."	Possession Living creature with demands

655.	1:792	I am to attend to <b>your interests</b> . I am to be found here, day by day, attending to your interests. That is my duty, Mr. C., and term-time or vacation makes no difference to me.	Possession
656.	1:793	I am to be found here, day by day, attending to <b>your interests</b> . That is my duty, Mr. C., and term-time or vacation makes no difference to me.	Possession
657.	1:794	If you wish to consult me as to <b>your interests</b> , you will find me here at all times alike. Other professional men go out of town. I don't. Not that I blame them for going; I merely say I don't go. This desk is your rock, sir!"	Possession
658.	1:795	<b>You are</b> separately represented, and <b>no longer hidden and lost in the interests of others</b> . THAT'S something. The suit does not sleep; we wake it up, we air it, we walk it about.	Container (to get lost in and to hide in) Possession
659.	1:797	"Mr. C.," returns Vholes, immovable in attitude and never winking his hungry eyes, "I should be wanting in my duty as your professional adviser, <b>I should be departing from my fidelity to your interests</b> , if I represented those interests as identical with the interests of Mr. Jarndyce.	Possession Destination
660.	1:797/ 1	"Mr. C.," returns Vholes, immovable in attitude and never winking his hungry eyes, "I should be wanting in my duty as your professional adviser, I should be departing from my fidelity to your interests, <b>if I represented those interests as identical</b> with the interests of Mr. Jarndyce.	Object (entrusted) <i>Quality (identical)</i>
661.	1:797/ 2	"Mr. C.," returns Vholes, immovable in attitude and never winking his hungry eyes, "I should be wanting in my duty as your professional adviser, I should be departing from my fidelity to your interests, <b>if I represented</b> those interests as identical with <b>the interests of Mr. Jarndyce</b> .	Possession

662.	1:798	I must not shrink from a professional duty, even if it sows dissensions in families. I understand you to be now consulting me professionally as to <b>your interests?</b> You are so? I reply, then, they are not identical with those of Mr. Jarndyce."	Possession
663.	1:799	You, sir, thought fit <b>to withdraw your interests</b> from that keeping nevertheless <b>and to offer them to me.</b> You brought them with clean hands, sir, and I accepted them with clean hands. Those interests are now paramount in this office.	Possession (as an offer to somebody)
664.	1:799/ 1	You, sir, thought fit to withdraw your interests from that keeping nevertheless and to offer them to me. You brought them with clean hands, sir, and I accepted them with clean hands. <b>Those interests are now paramount in this office.</b>	Object Entity located inside something (office) <i>Quality (paramount)</i>
665.	1:800	During the long vacation, sir, I shall devote my leisure to <b>studying your interests</b> more and more closely and to making arrangements for moving heaven and earth (including, of course, the Chancellor) after Michaelmas term;	Possession (under study)
666.	1:801	<b>Mr. Guppy, refolding his arms, resettles himself against the parapet, as resuming a conversation of interest.</b>	Entity that characterises something (conversation) Effect on bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
667.	1:803	"—I don't intend to do it." "Quite so," says Mr. Tulkinghorn with a calm nod. "Very good; I see by these portraits that <b>you take a strong interest in the fashionable great, sir?</b> "	Object Entity located inside something (the fashionable great) <i>Intensity (strong)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
668.	1:804	I charge you as a friend, by <b>the interest you have ever testified in the fashionable intelligence,</b> and by any little advances with which I may have been able	Possession Entity located inside something (the

		to accommodate you, so to bury it without a word of inquiry!"	fashionable intelligence) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
669.	1:805	<b>And he thinks, with the interest of attentive curiosity</b> , as he watches the struggle in her breast, "The power and force of this woman are astonishing!"	Effect on action (to think) Entity that characterises something (attentive curiosity) <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>
670.	1:806	<b>But I have an interest in her</b> , or I should rather say—no longer belonging to this place—I had, and if you can find so much consideration for the woman under your foot as to remember that, she will be very sensible of your mercy."	Possession Entity located inside somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
671.	1:811	My wish is that everything should be openly carried on. I desire to leave a good name behind me. <b>If I consulted merely my own interests</b> with Mr. C., I should not be here.	Possession (to be consulted with somebody)
672.	1:812	This is <b>not a professional attendance</b> . This can he charged to nobody. <b>I have no interest in it</b> except as a member of society and a father—AND a son," said Mr. Vholes, who had nearly forgotten that point.	Possession Entity located inside something (not a professional attendance) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
673.	1:813	But it is some satisfaction, in the midst of my troubles and perplexities, to know that <b>I am pressing Ada's interests in pressing my own</b> .	Possession (under pressure)
674.	1:814	"No, no!" cried Richard exultingly. "If every farthing of <b>Ada's little fortune</b> were mine, no part of it should be spent in retaining me in what I am not fit for, <b>can take no interest in</b> , and am weary of.	Object Entity located inside something (fortune) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
675.	1:815	There was a concourse of people in one spot, surrounding some <b>naval officers</b> who were landing from a boat, and <b>pressing about them with unusual interest</b> . I said to Charley this would be one of the great Indiaman's boats now, and we stopped to look.	Object (pressing) <i>Quality (unusual)</i>

676.	1:816	"You have been in shipwreck and peril since you left us, Mr. Woodcourt," said I, "but we can hardly call that a misfortune which enabled you to be so useful and so brave. <b>We read of it with the truest interest.</b>	Effect on action (reading) <i>Quality (truest)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
677.	1:817	I was not sure that I had a right to lay his whole story open, but I referred in a few words to his estrangement from Mr Jarndyce and to his being entangled in the ill-fated Chancery suit. <b>Mr. Woodcourt listened with interest and expressed his regret.</b>	Effect on listening <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
678.	1:818	Nor is he merely curious, for <b>in his bright dark eye there is compassionate interest</b> ; and as he looks here and there, he seems to understand such wretchedness and to have studied it before.	Entity located in the eyes Body is a container for emotions <i>Quality (compassionate)</i> <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
679.	1:820	But as she informs her physician in her disjointed manner on coming down in full array that <b>General George</b> , whom she often calls upon, knows her dear Fitz Jarndyce and <b>takes a great interest in all connected with her</b> , Allan is induced to think that they may be in the right way.	Object Entity located inside somebody <i>Intensity (great)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
680.	1:822	Phil bears down upon them according to his usual tactics. "Here is a man, sir, who was found, when a <b>baby</b> , in the gutter. Consequently, it is to be expected that <b>he takes a natural interest in this poor creature</b> . You do, don't you, Phil?"	Object Entity located inside somebody <i>Quality (natural)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
681.	1:823	"Excuse the apparent curiosity," says Mr. George. "It seemed to me probable that <b>you might take more than a common interest in this poor creature</b> because Miss Summerson had taken that unfortunate interest in him.	Object Entity located inside somebody <i>Quality (common)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
682.	1:823/	"Excuse the apparent curiosity," says Mr. George. "It	Object

	1	seemed to me probable that you might take more than a common interest in this poor creature because <b>Miss Summerson had taken that unfortunate interest in him.</b>	Entity located inside somebody <i>Quality (unfortunate)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
683.	1:824	With him Mr. Jarndyce returns alone, confidentially telling him that there are reasons for keeping <b>this matter</b> very quiet indeed and <b>showing a serious interest in it.</b>	Object (visible) Entity located inside something (matter) <i>Quality (serious)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
684.	1:826	The trooper stands in the doorway, still and silent. Phil has stopped in a low clinking noise, with his little hammer in his hand. <b>Mr. Woodcourt looks round with that grave professional interest and attention on his face,</b> and glancing significantly at the trooper, signs to Phil to carry his table out.	Effect on the face <i>Link (attention)</i> <i>Quality (grave, professional)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
685.	1:827	Late in the afternoon, when she next appears upon the staircase, she is in her haughtiest and coldest state. <b>As indifferent as if all passion, feeling, and interest had been worn out in the earlier ages of the world</b> and had perished from its surface with its other departed <b>monsters.</b>	Object (worn out) Monster <i>Link (passion, feeling)</i>
686.	1:828	I would point out this little instance here on my arm who shows herself so affectionate and faithful in parting and in whom my mother, I dare say, has done something to awaken such feelings—though of course Lady Dedlock, by <b>her heartfelt interest and her genial condescension,</b> has done much more."	Possession <i>Link (condescension)</i> <i>Quality (heartfelt)</i>
687.	1:832	It is a part of my professional duty to study and to understand <b>a gentleman who confides his interests to me.</b> In my professional duty I shall not be wanting, sir, if I know it.	Possession (confided to somebody)
688.	1:833	"You seem to forget," returned Mr. Woodcourt, "that <b>I ask you to say nothing and have no interest in anything you say.</b> "	Object Entity located inside something (anything you say)

			<i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
689.	1:836	Don't suppose that I am splitting my head and half breaking my heart over this miserable Chancery suit for <b>my own rights and interests alone.</b>	Possession <i>Link (rights)</i>
690.	1:837	My guardian said directly he would go too. Now, besides that I liked the retired soldier very much and that he liked me, <b>I had that secret interest in what had happened</b> which was only known to my guardian.	Possession Entity located inside something (what had happened) <i>Quality (secret)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
691.	1:838	" <b>I thank you</b> , miss and gentlemen both, many times for your attention, <b>and many times more for your interest.</b>	Possession
692.	1:839	Mrs. Bucket is dependent on their lodger (fortunately <b>an amiable lady in whom she takes an interest</b> ) for companionship and conversation.	Object Entity located inside somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
693.	1:841	Volumnia with all humility explains that she had not merely the plea of curiosity to urge (in common with the giddy youth of her sex in general) but that <b>she is perfectly dying with regret and interest for the darling man whose loss they all deplore.</b> "Very well, Volumnia," returns Sir Leicester. "Then you cannot be too discreet."	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (regret)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
694.	1:844	We want more painstaking and search-making into this murder. <b>We know where the interest and the motive was</b> , and you have not done enough.	Object <i>Link (motives)</i>
695.	1:850	She is considered so (I have heard) among the clerks in the Inn, and it is a point more in their way than in mine. In reference to <b>Mr. C.'s pursuit of his interests—</b> " "Oh! His interests, Mr. Vholes!" "Pardon me," returned Mr. Vholes, going on in exactly the same inward and dispassionate manner. "Mr. C. takes certain interests under certain wills	Possession (to be pursued)

		disputed in the suit. It is a term we use. In reference to Mr. C,'s pursuit of his interests, I mentioned to you, Miss Summerson, the first time I had the pleasure of seeing you, in my desire that everything should be openly carried on...	
696.	1:850/ 1	She is considered so (I have heard) among the clerks in the Inn, and it is a point more in their way than in mine. In reference to Mr. C.'s pursuit of his interests—" <p>"Oh! <b>His interests</b>, Mr. Vholes!"</p> "Pardon me," returned Mr. Vholes, going on in exactly the same inward and dispassionate manner. <p>"Mr. C. takes certain interests under certain wills disputed in the suit. It is a term we use. In reference to Mr. C,'s pursuit of his interests, I mentioned to you, Miss Summerson, the first time I had the pleasure of seeing you, in my desire that everything should be openly carried on..."</p>	Possession
697.	1:850/ 2	She is considered so (I have heard) among the clerks in the Inn, and it is a point more in their way than in mine. In reference to Mr. C.'s pursuit of his interests—" <p>"Oh! His interests, Mr. Vholes!"</p> "Pardon me," returned Mr. Vholes, going on in exactly the same inward and dispassionate manner. <p>"<b>Mr. C. takes certain interests</b> under certain wills disputed <b>in the suit</b>. It is a term we use. In reference to Mr. C,'s pursuit of his interests, I mentioned to you, Miss Summerson, the first time I had the pleasure of seeing you, in my desire that everything should be openly carried on..."</p>	Object Entity located inside something (suit) <i>Quality (certain)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
698.	1:850/ 3	She is considered so (I have heard) among the clerks in the Inn, and it is a point more in their way than in mine. In reference to Mr. C.'s pursuit of his interests—"	Possession (to be pursued)

		<p>"Oh! His interests, Mr. Vholes!"</p> <p>"Pardon me," returned Mr. Vholes, going on in exactly the same inward and dispassionate manner. "Mr. C. takes certain interests under certain wills disputed in the suit. It is a term we use. In reference to <b>Mr. C,'s pursuit of his interests</b>, I mentioned to you, Miss Summerson, the first time I had the pleasure of seeing you, in my desire that everything should be openly carried on..."</p>	
699.	1:851	<p>I mentioned to you that Mr. C. had laid down the principle of <b>watching his own interests</b>, and that when a client of mine laid down a principle which was not of an immoral (that is to say, unlawful) nature, it devolved upon me to carry it out.</p>	Possession (to watch)
700.	1:852	<p>"Always devoted to business, Vholes!" cried Richard. "Yes, Mr. C.," he returned, "<b>the interests of clients are never to be neglected</b>, sir. <b>They are paramount in the thoughts of a professional man like myself</b>, who wishes to preserve a good name among his fellow-practitioners and society at large.</p>	<p>Possession (not to be neglected)</p> <p>Entity located inside something (thoughts)</p> <p><i>Quality (paramount)</i></p>
701.	1:853	<p>My denying myself the pleasure of the present agreeable conversation may not be wholly irrespective of <b>your own interests</b>, Mr. C."</p>	Possession
702.	1:858	<p>"You ask me what is this to you, Mr. Jarndyce. If you had perused <b>this document</b>, you would have seen that <b>it reduces your interest considerably</b>, though still leaving it a very handsome one, still leaving it a very handsome one," said Mr. Kenge, waving his hand persuasively and blandly.</p>	<p>Possession</p> <p>Effect on a state linked to something (document)</p> <p>Down</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
703.	1:859	<p>"You ask me what is this to you, Mr. Jarndyce. If you had perused <b>this document</b>, you would have seen that [...]." "You would further have seen that <b>the interests of Mr. Richard Carstone</b> and of Miss Ada Clare, now Mrs. Richard Carstone, <b>are very materially advanced by it.</b>"</p>	<p>Possession</p> <p>Effect on a state linked to something (document)</p> <p>Up</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>

704.	<i>interesting</i> 1:717	"I don't mean literally a child," pursued Mr. Jarndyce; "not a child in years. He is grown up—he is at least as old as I am—but in simplicity, and freshness, and enthusiasm, and a fine guileless inaptitude for all worldly affairs, he is a perfect child." <b>We felt that he must be very interesting.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here (that can be felt by others) <i>Intensity (very)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
705.	1:752/ 1	Mr. Guppy, who has an inquiring mind in matters of evidence and who has been suffering severely from the lassitude of the long vacation, takes that interest in the case that he enters on <b>a regular cross-examination of the witness, which is found so interesting by the ladies</b> that Mrs. Snagsby politely invites him to step upstairs and drink a cup of tea, if he will excuse the disarranged state of the tea-table, consequent on their previous exertions.	Entity that characterises something (cross-examination of the witness) <i>Intensity (so)</i>
706.	1:763	Though it may be, Jo, that <b>there is a history so interesting and affecting</b> even to minds as near the brutes as thine, recording deeds done on this earth for common men, that if the Chadbands, removing their own persons from the light, would but show it thee in simple reverence, would but leave it unimproved, would but regard it as being eloquent enough without their modest aid—it might hold thee awake, and thou might learn from it yet!	Entity that characterises something (history) <i>Link (affecting)</i> <i>Intensity (so)</i>
707.	1:808	"It is pleasant," said Mr. Skimpole, turning his sprightly eyes from one to the other of us, "and <b>it is whimsically interesting to trace peculiarities in families.</b> In this family we are all children, and I am the youngest."	Effect on action (to trace peculiarities in families) <i>Quality (whimsically)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
708.	1:848	"My dear!" she began. "So delighted! How do you do! So glad to see you. And you are going to visit <b>our interesting Jarndyce wards?</b> TO be sure! Our beauty is at home, my dear, and will be charmed to see you."	Entity that characterises somebody (Jarndyce wards)

709.	1:860	<p>"And a very important document, Mr. Vholes," said Mr. Kenge.</p> <p>Again Mr. Vholes said, "Very much so."</p> <p>"And as you say, Mr. Vholes, when the cause is in the paper next term, <b>this document will be an unexpected and interesting feature in it,</b>" said Mr. Kenge, looking loftily at my guardian.</p>	<p>Entity that characterises something (feature)</p> <p><i>Link (unexpected)</i></p>
710.	1:861	<p>Worse than that, we found such an unusual crowd in the Court of Chancery that it was full to the door, and we could neither see nor hear what was passing within. It appeared to be something droll, for occasionally there was a laugh and a cry of "Silence!"</p> <p><b>It appeared to be something interesting, for every one was pushing and striving to get nearer [...].</b></p> <p>We asked a gentleman by us if he knew what cause was on. He told us <b>Jarndyce and Jarndyce.</b></p>	<p>Entity that characterises something (<i>Jarndyce and Jarndyce</i>)</p> <p>Spatial orientation of the body</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 1</i></p>
711.	(to be interested) 1:847	<p>He cannot do so, she tells him, too plainly or too briefly. "Nor can I," Mr. Guppy returns with a sense of injury upon him, "too particularly request your ladyship to take particular notice that it's no personal affair of mine that brings me here. <b>I have no interested views of my own to serve in coming here.</b></p>	<p>Entity that characterises something (views)</p>
712.	1:855	<p>I was reluctant to enter minutely into that question, but as he begged I would, for he was really curious to know, I gave him to understand in the gentlest <b>words</b> I could use that his conduct seemed to involve a disregard of several moral obligations. <b>He was much amused and interested when he heard this</b> and said, "No, really?" with ingenuous simplicity.</p>	<p>Effect on a state linked to something (words)</p> <p><i>Link (amused)</i></p> <p><i>Intensity (much)</i></p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
713.	1:856	<p>But Miss Summerson and I will immediately place the paper in the hands of my solicitor in the cause, and its existence shall be made known without delay to all other <b>parties interested.</b>"</p>	<p>Entity that characterises something (party)</p>
714.	1:857	<p>At first he had not seemed to attach much importance</p>	<p>Effect visible on the</p>

		to the <b>paper</b> , but when he saw it <b>he appeared more interested</b> , and when he had opened and read a little of it through his eye-glass, he became amazed. "Mr. Jarndyce," he said, looking off it, "you have perused this?"	body Effect (transformative) on a state linked to something (paper) <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
715.	1:507	<b>Ada's influence</b> ; but with it, he became one of the most winning of companions, <b>always so ready to be interested and always so happy, sanguine, and light-hearted.</b>	Effect coming from somebody <i>Link (happy, sanguine, light-hearted)</i> <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Time marker (always)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
716.	1:711	I had never heard my mama spoken of. I had never heard of my papa either, but <b>I felt more interested about my mama.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Special case: feeling emotion</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
717.	1:712	"Miss Clare," said the Lord Chancellor. "Miss Ada Clare?" Mr. Kenge presented her, and his lordship begged her to sit down near him. <b>That he admired her and was interested by her</b> even I could see in a moment. It touched me that the home of such a beautiful young creature should be represented by that dry, official place.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (admired)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
718.	1:713	I have a great respect for Mr. Jarndyce, and <b>no one in whom he is interested can be an object of indifference to me.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
719.	1:727	"But it's the inside of the man, the warm heart of the man, the passion of the man, the fresh blood of the man, Rick—and Ada, and little Cobweb too, for <b>you</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside

		<b>are all interested in a visitor</b> —that I speak of," he pursued.	somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
720.	1:729	I felt, from my guardian's manner, that beyond this point I could not pursue the subject without changing the wind. I therefore forbore to ask any further questions. <b>I was interested, but not curious.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Anti-link (curious)</i>
721.	1:742	<b>Perhaps you may be interested, Mr. Jarndyce,</b> " continued Mr. Bayham Badger, leading the way into the next drawing-room, " <b>in this portrait</b> of Captain Swosser.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (portrait) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
722.	1:744	She's going to put out five thousand new circulars, and <b>she knows you'll be interested to hear that.</b> I have brought one of them with me. Ma's compliments."	Effect on hearing Effect on a state linked to something (information) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
723.	1:760	"I am always delighted to see Miss Summerson," said Mrs. Jellyby, pursuing her employment with a placid smile. " <b>Though I wish,</b> " and she shook her head, " <b>she was more interested in the Borrioboolan project.</b> "	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (project) <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
724.	1:761	This, too, when Mr. Quale, one of the first philanthropists of our time, has mentioned to me that <b>he was really disposed to be interested in her!"</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
725.	1:771	Now, this appears to me a case of misdirected energy, which has a certain amount of reason in it and a certain amount of romance; and I don't know but what <b>I should be more interested in our young friend,</b> as an illustration of such a case, than merely as a poor vagabond—which any one can be."	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside somebody <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
726.	1:775	By and by my strength began to be restored. Instead of lying, with so strange a calmness, watching what	Entity that characterises somebody

		was done for me, as if it were done for some one else whom I was quietly sorry for, I helped it a little, and so on to a little more and much more, <b>until I became useful to myself, and interested, and attached to life again.</b>	<i>Link (useful, attached to life)</i>
727.	1:780	Greater still when Ada asked me what she had said, and when <b>I replied that she had been kind and interested,</b> and when Ada, while admitting her beauty and elegance, remarked upon her proud manner and her imperious chilling air.	Existence of emotion is presence here <i>Link (kind)</i>
728.	1:782	My dear Esther, how can you be so blind? <b>Don't you see that he is an interested party</b> and that it may be very well for him to wish me to know nothing of the suit, and care nothing about it, but that it may not be quite so well for me?"	Entity that characterises something (party)
729.	1:783/ 1	<b>It may cause other parties interested</b> to become lax about their interests; and people may die off, and points may drag themselves out of memory, and many things may smoothly happen that are convenient enough."	Entity that characterises something (party)
730.	1:787	He talks to Pa of an evening about the Prince Regent, and <b>I never saw Pa so interested."</b>	Effect visible on the body <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
731.	1:810	<b>We are capable of looking on and of being interested,</b> and we DO look on, and we ARE interested.	Existence of emotion is presence here
732.	1:810/ 1	We are capable of looking on and of being interested, and we DO look on, and <b>we ARE interested.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here
733.	1:834	<b>You are interested in anything, and in everything, that relates to your friend.</b> I know human nature much better, sir, than to admit for an instant that a gentleman of your appearance is not interested in whatever concerns his friend."	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (anything, everything) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

734.	1:835	"Well," replied Mr. Woodcourt, "that may be. <b>I am particularly interested in his address.</b> " "The number, sir," said Mr. Vholes parenthetically, "I believe I have already mentioned. If Mr. C. is to continue to play for this considerable stake, sir, he must have funds. Understand me! There are funds in hand at present.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (address) <i>Quality (particularly)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
735.	1:843	"I am not aware, officer," Sir Leicester observes; raising his eyes to his face, "whether you wish us to be alone, but that is entirely as you please. If you do, well and good. If not, <b>Miss Dedlock would be interested—</b> "	Existence of emotion is presence here
736.	1:845	Tulkinghorn together, and conferred with Mr. Tulkinghorn on the change in Mr. Guppy, and helped to turn up <b>the circumstances in which the present company are interested</b> , casually, by the wayside, being still and ever on the great high road that is to terminate in Mr. Snagsby's full exposure and a matrimonial separation.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (circumstances) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
737.	(to) <i>interest</i> <i>t</i> 1:119	Will you do me the favour to mention ( <b>as it may interest her</b> ) <b>that I have something to tell her</b> on her return in reference to the person who copied the affidavit in the Chancery suit, which so powerfully stimulated her curiosity. I have seen him." My Lady, leaning forward, looks out of her window. "That's the message," observes Sir Leicester. "I should like to walk a little," says my Lady, still looking out of her window. "Walk?" repeats Sir Leicester in a tone of surprise.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
738.	1:750	<b>She</b> was as graceful as she was beautiful, perfectly self-possessed, and <b>had the air, I thought, of being able to attract and interest any one if she had thought it worth her while.</b>	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Link (attract)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
739.	1:738	"'Tis almost a pity," Mrs. Rouncewell adds—only "almost" because it borders on impiety to suppose	Effect on a state linked to somebody

		that anything could be better than it is, in such an express dispensation as the Dedlock affairs —"that my Lady has no family. <b>If she had had a daughter now, a grown young lady, to interest her</b> , I think she would have had the only kind of excellence she wants."	<i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
740.	1:739	"Certainly, a <b>collection of horrors</b> ," says my Lady, gathering up her mantles and furs, " <b>but they interest one for the moment!</b> Have the kindness, Mr. Tulkinghorn, to open the door for me."	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Time marker (for the moment)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
741.	1:740	"By heaven!" cried Mr. Boythorn, <b>who interested himself strongly in the subject</b> —though I need not say that, for he could do nothing weakly; "I rejoice to find a young gentleman of spirit and gallantry devoting himself to that noble profession!"	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (subject) <i>Intensity (strongly)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
742.	1:726	They were as quiet as mice too, so far as any words were concerned, but <b>the innocent manner</b> in which they relied more and more upon me as they took more and more to one another was so charming that <b>I had great difficulty in not showing how it interested me.</b>	Force (irresistible) Effect on a state linked to something (innocent manner) Effect on the body (hidden) Counterforce <i>Intensity (how)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
743.	1:225	We had told him of our former visit, and <b>our account had interested him</b> ; but something had always happened to prevent our going there again.	Effect on a state linked to something (account) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 2			
744.	( <i>an interest</i> ) 2:128	' <b>In our client's interests,</b> ' he said, 'we are bound to look at the unfavourable side of all evidence, so as to anticipate the points that are likely to be made by the prosecution. I repeat, my lord, that you have acted indiscreetly.'	Container Possession

745.	2:226	The Dowager Duchess made her way along the benches and squeezed in next to Lord Peter. Sir Impey Biggs, <b>having watched over his client's interests</b> to the last, disappeared, chatting cheerfully to the Attorney-General, and followed by the smaller legal fry.	Possession (to be watched over)
746.	2:230	'I know. Being a writer of detective stories, <b>I have naturally studied your career with interest.</b> '	Effect on a state linked to something (career) Effect on action (to study) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
747.	2:233	'Then, insurance. Now we come to the region of the possible. Was Boyes insured? It doesn't seem to have occurred to anybody to find out. Probably he wasn't. Literary blokes have very little forethought, and are careless about trifles like premiums. But one ought to know. <b>Who might have an insurable interest?</b>	Object <i>Quality (insurable)</i>
748.	2:234	'I see. Well now, Mr Boyes. Supposing it was not self-destruction—' 'I really do not think it could have been.' 'Now is there anybody else at all <b>who could have an interest in his death?</b> '	Object Entity located inside something (death) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
749.	2:236	'I am not allowing myself to contemplate any other possibility. But when that happens, <b>public interest will be liable to die down very quickly.</b> I am, of course, securing the most advantageous contracts I possibly can at the moment, to cover the next three or four books, but I can only really control the advances.	Living creature Possession
750.	2:237	'That's my idea,' said Wimsey. 'From what I know of your lordship, <b>I may say that your interest and assistance are the best stroke of luck</b> Miss Vane could have had.'	Possession <i>Link (assistance)</i>
751.	2:239	The advantage seems to be with the person who gets jealous first. Perhaps you could manage to be jealous	Object Entity located inside

		of me. I wish you would, because it would prove that <b>you took a bit of interest in me.</b>	somebody <i>Measure (a bit of)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
752.	2:242	In short, I want particulars of <b>any document which may seem to be of interest.</b> Don't waste too much time making notes.	Entity that characterises something (document)
753.	2:245	By this time the waitress had got to know her, and <b>betrayed a certain amused and tolerant interest in her comings and goings.</b>	Object Entity located inside something (comings and goings) <i>Quality (amused, tolerant)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
754.	2:249	Miss Climpson made no further ado, and they went upstairs. It was a queer business – practically <b>robbing a helpless woman in the interests of someone she had never seen.</b> Queer. But the motive must be a good one, if it was Lord Peter's.	Container Possession
755.	2:252	'So far as I make it out,' he said, when he had reviewed the whole question of motive, ' <b>it was very much to your interest to get rid of Mr Philip Boyes.</b> And indeed the fellow was in my opinion, a pimple and a wart, and in your place I should have felt much the same about him.'	Possession Effect on action (to get rid) Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
756.	2:254	A group appeared at the door – Urquhart, very white, his hair and clothes disordered, flanked by Parker and Bunter, who held him firmly by the arms. <b>'Was he sick?' asked Wimsey, with interest.</b> 'No, he wasn't,' said Parker, grimly, snapping the handcuffs on his prey. '	Effect on speech <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
757.	<i>interest</i> 2:127	I specially want to know whether anything was left to Philip Boyes or if any mention of the Boyes family is made in the will. Failing a will, there might be <b>some other interesting document</b> , such as a secret trust, instructing the executor to dispose of the money in	Entity that characterises something (document)

		some special way.	
758.	2:225	Freddy. <b>Such an interesting case</b> and interesting people, too, don't you think, though what the jury make of it I don't know, with faces like hams most of them, except the artist, who wouldn't have any features at all if it wasn't for that dreadful tie and his beard, looking like Christ, only not really Christ but one of those Italian ones in a pink frock and a blue top thing.	Entity that characterises something (case) <i>Intensity (such)</i>
759.	2:225/ 1	Freddy. Such an interesting case <b>and interesting people</b> , too, don't you think, though what the jury make of it I don't know, with faces like hams most of them, except the artist, who wouldn't have any features at all if it wasn't for that dreadful tie and his beard, looking like Christ, only not really Christ but one of those Italian ones in a pink frock and a blue top thing.	Entity that characterises somebody
760.	2:227	'I wish I had known that girl,' replied the Dowager, in her usual indirect manner, ' <b>so interesting and a really remarkable face</b> , though perhaps not strictly good-looking, and all the more interesting for that, because good-looking people are so often cows.	Effect on the face Entity that characterises something (face) <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Link (remarkable)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
761.	2:227/ 1	'I wish I had known that girl,' replied the Dowager, in her usual indirect manner, 'so interesting and a really remarkable <b>face, though perhaps not strictly good-looking, and all the more interesting for that</b> , because good-looking people are so often cows.	Effect on the face Entity that characterises something (face) <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Anti-link (not good-looking)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
762.	2:229	At first she was ready to vote with the majority, but she took a dislike to the foreman, who tried to bear her down by his male authority, and eventually she said she was going to back up my friend Miss Climpson.'	Entity that characterises something (an inside information about juries) <i>Intensity (very)</i>

		<p>Sir Impey laughed.</p> <p>‘<b>Very interesting.</b> I wish we always got this <b>inside information about juries.</b> We sweat like hell to prepare evidence, and then one person makes up her mind on what isn’t really evidence at all, and another supports her on the ground that evidence can’t be relied on. How about the man?’</p>	
763.	2:231	<p>I know I’ve got a silly face, but I can’t help that. As a matter of fact, I’d like somebody I could talk sensibly to, <b>who would make life interesting.</b> And I could give you a lot of plots for your books, if that’s any inducement.’</p>	<p>Entity that characterises something (life)</p> <p>Effect coming from somebody</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
764.	2:232	<p>‘But you wouldn’t want a <b>wife</b> who wrote books, would you?’</p> <p>‘But I should; it would be great fun. <b>So much more interesting than the ordinary kind</b> that is only keen on clothes and people.</p>	<p>Entity that characterises somebody</p> <p><i>Intensity (so much more)</i></p>
765.	2:238	<p>‘Have you seen the cousin yet – the Urquhart creature?’</p> <p>‘Got an appointment with him for tomorrow. Why?’</p> <p>‘Sylvia’s <b>theory</b> is that he did it,’ said Eiluned.</p> <p>‘<b>That’s interesting.</b> Why?’</p> <p>‘Female intuition,’ said Eiluned, bluntly. ‘She doesn’t like the way he does his hair.’</p>	<p>Entity that characterises something (theory)</p>
766.	2:240	<p>‘But there’s just one thing. <b>I fancy it would be interesting to investigate his financial activities.</b> I’ve done a good bit one way and another with stockbroking, you know, and yesterday in his absence I took a call for him which I wasn’t meant to hear.</p>	<p>Effect on action (to investigate)</p> <p>Effect on a state linked to something (financial activities)</p> <p><i>Force dynamic Type 2</i></p>
767.	2:241	<p>It was not what she wanted, but she went. And she found that it was not quite a typing <b>bureau</b> after all, but <b>something more interesting.</b></p>	<p>Entity that characterises something (bureau)</p> <p><i>Intensity (more)</i></p>
768.	2:246	<p>‘Pardon me,’ said Miss Climpson, ‘but I see you are <b>a student of spiritualism. How interesting that is!</b>’</p>	<p>Entity that characterises somebody</p>

			<i>Intensity (how)</i>
769.	2:247	He had rather liked Miss Climpson, and she had passed <b>several interesting evenings</b> hearing about the tricks of mediums.	Entity that characterises something (evenings)
770.	2:248	‘She told us her <b>story</b> one night. So romantic. She was thrown to the lions because she was a Christian and refused to have anything to do with Nero.’ <b>‘How very interesting.’</b>	Entity that characterises something (story) <i>Intensity (how very)</i>
771.	2:250	‘They all sleep in the other wing. Beside, they know that I sometimes have visitors. Mrs Craig has often been here as late as this when <b>we have had interesting sittings</b> . There’s a spare bedroom where I can put people up when I want to.’	Entity that characterises something (sittings)
772.	(to be) <i>interested</i> 2:113	Wimsey explained that <b>he was interested in the Vane poisoning trial</b> , and that he had the authority of Messrs Crofts & Cooper to come and bother Mr Urquhart with questions, adding, as usual, that he was afraid he was being a nuisance.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (trial) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
773.	2:228	Mr Crofts, not being quite clear whether this was funny or fatuous, smiled deferentially. ‘Quite so,’ said Sir Impey, ‘but <b>I should be interested to know how many of the jury saw it in that light.</b> ’	Effect on action (to know) Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
774.	2:235	<b>Mr Cole</b> was a stout and cheerful person, and <b>was much interested to hear that the notorious Lord Peter Wimsey was concerning himself with the affairs</b> of the equally notorious Mr Boyes.	Effect on hearing Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to concern) <i>Intensity (much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
775.	2:243	I looked at it from the road for a little time – I did not think this would be at all peculiar behaviour, if anybody saw me, because <b>anybody might be interested in such a fine old place</b> . Most of the	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (a fine old

		blinds were down, as though the greater part of the house were uninhabited, and I could not see any gardener or anybody about – I suppose there is not very much to be done in the garden this time of the year.	place) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
776.	2:251	‘I have come round,’ said Mr Urquhart, ‘in answer to your letter. <b>I am greatly interested to hear that you have some fresh information</b> about my unfortunate cousin’s death. Of course, I shall be delighted to give you any assistance I can.’	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to have information) Effect on hearing <i>Intensity (greatly)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
777.	2:253	‘Allowing that all this preposterous story were true, which I most emphatically deny,’ observed Mr Urquhart, ‘ <b>I should be greatly interested to know how you imagine</b> that I administered the arsenic.’	Effect on action (to know) Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Intensity (greatly)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 2			
778.	(an) <i>interest</i> 3:86	Poirot said gently: ‘ <b>What made you take so much interest in the girl?</b> ’ ‘Well, I don’t know...’ Nurse Hopkins hesitated. She looked shy and a little ashamed of herself. ‘There was something – well – romantic about Mary.’	Object Entity located inside somebody <i>Intensity (so much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
779.	3:119	‘Mary Gerrard? Who’s she?’ ‘The daughter of the people at the lodge. You must remember her as a child? <b>Aunt Laura</b> was always fond of the girl, and <b>took an interest in her</b> . She paid for her schooling and for various extras – piano lessons and French and things.’	Object Entity located inside somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
780.	3:120	‘So that filthy letter has done some good, after all! We’ll go down <b>to protect our interests</b> and because we’re fond of the old dear!’	Possession (to be protected)

781.	3:124	Aloud she said in a pleasant, businesslike voice: ‘I think you know, Mary, that <b>my aunt always took a great interest in you</b> and would have been concerned about your future.’	Object Entity located inside somebody <i>Intensity (great)</i> <i>Time marker (always)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
782.	3:130	<b>Hercule Poirot was looking at Peter Lord with some interest.</b> He said gently: ‘I think, mon cher, there is something else – something that you have not yet told me.’	Effect on the looking Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Measure (some)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
783.	3:133	‘As you say, quite a romance – a mystery romance.’ Nurse Hopkins’ face lit up. ‘Wasn’t it? <b>One can’t help taking an interest in people</b> when one knows something that nobody else does about them.’	Object Entity located inside somebody Force (irresistible) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
784.	3:137	<b>Poirot looked with interest</b> at the long, sensitive <b>face</b> of Roderick Welman.	Effect on the looking Effect on a state linked to something (face) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
785.	3:139	Hercule Poirot said: ‘I am acting, Monsieur, <b>in the interests of your client.</b> ’	Possession Container
786.	<i>interesting</i> 3:52	Poirot murmured deprecatingly: ‘No, no. A little curiosity on my part, that is all.’ ‘Only too happy to satisfy it. Which case is it?’ ‘Elinor Carlisle.’ ‘Oh, yes, girl who poisoned Mary Gerrard. Coming up for trial in two weeks’ time. <b>Interesting case.</b>	Entity that characterises something (case)
787.	3:96	Poirot was silent a moment or two. He seemed to be considering. He said at last: <b>‘It is interesting that you feel that.’</b> Ted Bigland said deprecatingly: ‘I dare say it doesn’t make sense to you, sir. I can’t figure out any how and why about it. It’s just a	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to feel) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		feeling I've got.'	
788.	3:112	Hercule Poirot murmured: ' <b>It is interesting, that.</b> Can I see it, this <b>letter</b> ?' 'Afraid you can't. As a matter of fact, I burnt it.' 'Now, why did you do that, Mr Welman?'	Entity that characterises something (letter)
789.	3:118	Nurse O'Brien said: 'A very <b>handsome man.</b> Looked as though he might be a <b>cavalry officer!</b> ' Nurse Hopkins sipped her tea. She said: ' <b>That's very interesting.</b> ' Nurse O'Brien said romantically: 'Maybe they were boy and girl together and a cruel father separated them...' Nurse Hopkins said with a deep sigh: 'Perhaps he was killed in the war...'	Entity that characterises something (description of somebody) <i>Intensity (very)</i>
790.	3:122	He hated people who reeled off their thoughts and feelings to you, who took it for granted that you wanted to know all their inner mechanism. <b>Reserve was always more interesting.</b>	Entity that characterises something (reserve) <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Time marker (always)</i>
791.	3:129	<b>An interesting study</b> in the laws of probability,' said Poirot. 'The mathematical chances against that happening would be high, I fancy. But another point, if food poisoning was to be suggested: Why not choose a different poison? The symptoms of morphine are not in the least like those of food poisoning. Atropine, surely, would have been a better choice!'	Entity that characterises something (study)
792.	3:132	Peter Lord cried out: 'That's fantastic. I tell you, she isn't that kind of person! Money doesn't really mean anything to her – or to Roderick Welman, either, I'm bound to admit. I've heard them both say as much!' 'You have? <b>That is very interesting.</b> That is the kind of <b>statement</b> I always look upon with a good deal of suspicion myself.'	Entity that characterises something (statement) <i>Intensity (very)</i>

793.	3:134	As a matter of fact, it was Nurse O'Brien who set me on the track; but that's another story. But, as you say, <b>it's interesting knowing past history.</b>	Effect on action (to know) Effect on a state linked to something (past history) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
794.	3:135	Presently she and M. Poirot were engaged in pleasant conversation on <b>a really interesting theme</b> – no less than the selection of a suitable future husband for Princess Elizabeth.	Entity that characterises something (theme) <i>Intensity (really)</i>
795.	3:140	That I should be seeing the self-same photograph on the piano and at the same minute Nurse Hopkins was hearing all about it from the doctor's housekeeper.' <b>'That,'</b> said Poirot, <b>'is very interesting.'</b> He murmured tentatively: 'Did Mary Gerrard know – about this?'	Entity that characterises something (information discussed) <i>Intensity (very)</i>
796.	3:142	Peter Lord said: 'Someone was here that morning...someone who was not Elinor Carlisle, nor Mary Gerrard, nor Nurse Hopkins...' Poirot said: <b>'This is very interesting.</b> Come, let us make our investigations. Let us see, for instance, supposing a man (or woman) were to wish to approach the house unseen, how they would set about it.'	Entity that characterises something (information discussed) <i>Intensity (very)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
797.	(to be) <i>interested</i> 3:121	The sympathetic look, <b>the interested voice</b> , made a tender look come into the older woman's face.	Entity that characterises something (voice) Effect on the voice <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
798.	3:55	He supposed that Elinor and he would be married quite soon – that is, if Elinor wanted to; perhaps she'd rather put it off for a bit. He mustn't rush her. They'd be a bit hard-up at first. Nothing to worry about, though. He hoped sincerely that Aunt Laura	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (what he was doing)

		wouldn't die for a long time to come. <b>She was</b> a dear and had always been nice to him, having him there for holidays, <b>always interested in what he was doing.</b>	<i>Time marker (always)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
799.	3:131	'Hopkins is a sensible, shrewd, middle-aged woman, quite kindly and competent, but <b>a sight too much interested in other people's business!</b> '	Entity that characterises something (sight) Entity located inside something (other people's business) <i>Intensity (too much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
800.	3:143	If we lived on the place it would seem natural that <b>Mrs Welman should be interested in the child</b> and she'd see to educating her and giving her a place in the world. She thought it would be better for Mary never to know the truth.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
801.	(to) <i>interest</i> 3:125	The patient's a nice quiet gentleman – double pneumonia, but the crisis is past and doctor says going on well. What I've got to tell you <b>that will really interest you</b> is the very queerest coincidence you ever knew.	Effect on a state linked to somebody <i>Intensity (really)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
802.	3:127	Hercule Poirot, with care and precision, lighted a very tiny cigarette. He said: 'But is it not a little unethical what you say there? <b>To arrive at the truth, yes, that always interests me.</b> But the truth is a two-edged weapon. Supposing that I find facts against the lady? Do you demand that I suppress them?'	Effect on action (to arrive at the truth) <i>Time marker (always)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
803.	3:128	Hercule Poirot <b>moved in his chair.</b> He said: ' <b>You interest me...</b> ' After a minute or two he said: 'You had better, I think, tell me the exact facts of the case.'	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on bodily movement <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
804.	3:136	'Nor I,' said Poirot. ' <b>You interest me extremely, Mrs Bishop.</b> Some people have the knack of	Effect on a state linked to somebody

		presenting a character clearly and vigorously in a few words. It is a great gift. I have at last a clear picture of Mary Gerrard.	<i>Intensity (extremely)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
TF 3			
805.	<i>(an)</i> <i>interest</i> <i>t</i> 4:63	When the news did break, <b>the response would be</b> as varied as it always was: <b>fear, pity, fascinated interest, self-importance</b> ; a <b>surge</b> of heightened energy at being alive; the <b>pleasure</b> of sharing the news at work, among friends; the <b>half-shameful excitement</b> of blood spilt which was not one's own.	Effect on a state linked to something (the news) <i>Link (fear, pity, self-importance, surge, pleasure, half-shameful excitement)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
806.	4:146	'Some knowledge is dangerous. <b>I hope in your own interest that you'll keep this particular knowledge to yourself.</b> You'll get my fee-note in due course. I don't need additional payment in the form of private information.'	Possession Container <i>Special case: emotion describes emotion</i>
807.	4:274	Under stress, it is difficult to think of everything. On leaving, perhaps from long habit, he double locked the front door. It would, of course, have been wiser to have left it open, thus casting suspicion on an outsider rather than on members of Chambers. <b>The subsequent furore has, however, had its interest to a student of human nature.</b>	Possession Effect on a state linked to somebody
808.	4:426	<b>And now there was this murder with all it promised of excitement, human interest, the challenge</b> of the investigation, the <b>satisfaction</b> of ultimate success. Someone had to die before she could feel like this. And that, too, wasn't a comfortable thought.	Possession (of a murder) <i>Link (excitement, challenge, satisfaction)</i> <i>Quality (human)</i>
809.	4:454	'Venetia? This is the first I've heard of it. <b>She's never shown the slightest interest in becoming Head of Chambers.</b> '	Object (hidden) Entity located inside something (becoming head of Chambers) <i>Intensity (the slightest)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

810.	4:455	By God, it wasn't enough. He stood looking down at the man he had thought was his friend and, for the first time in that long association, it was a look more judgemental than affectionate. It was as if he were seeing Langton with the critical, unclouded eyes of a stranger, <b>noting with detached interest the first ravages of merciless time.</b>	Effect on action (to note) Effect on a state linked to something (first ravages of merciless time) <i>Quality (detached)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
811.	4:458	He had been in the middle of his closing arguments in a case which had been more forensically interesting than difficult, a lucrative brief from an international company, and a case concerned as much with establishing a point of law as with any <b>dramatic conflict of interests.</b>	Living creature (conflicting)
812.	4:464	'You mean, to indulge in a little preliminary <b>lobbying in the interests of getting through the meeting</b> with the minimum of dissension? I shouldn't be too optimistic.'	Container Effect on action (to get through the meeting) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
813.	4:465	I am her sponsor, remember. <b>I've taken an interest in her</b> and I've seen some of her work.	Object Entity located inside somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
814.	4:466	Laud went on as if she hadn't interrupted. 'If we decided that there was nothing to choose between them, then <b>in the interests of balance</b> we'd take the woman.'	Possession Container
815.	4:467	Five hundred? That effectively puts justice out of the reach of most people. Doing something about that is rather more difficult than pushing a few women into jobs for which they are under-qualified, <b>in the interests of balance</b> [...].'	Possession Container
816.	4:468	'It isn't as simple as that. She could find proof about the shares, I imagine. And Cartwright will probably give her the jurors' names if pressed.' <b>'It's hardly in his interest</b> to, is it? Why the hell did	Possession Container <i>Quality (hardly)</i>

		he tell her, anyway?'	
817.	4:470	Cartwright won't spread it around. He hasn't done so for the last four years. <b>It isn't in his interest,</b> anyway. I'll speak to Venetia.'	Possession Container
818.	4:471	Lucy would do what was expected of her and would do it well. She was little interested in politics. The world in which he strove, with its intrigues, its strategies for survival, its coteries and rivalries, its frenetic ambition, was alien to her fastidious mind. <b>But she had a genuine interest in people,</b> seeming unconscious of class or rank or importance, and they had responded always to that gentle, inquiring gaze, felt at ease in her drawing-room, knew themselves to be safe.	Possession Entity located inside somebody <i>Quality (genuine)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
819.	4:473	If Lucy kept quiet it was because <b>she knew it was in her interests to keep quiet.</b> You weren't going to break up the marriage, were you? It was just a little diversion on the side. Men do these things.'	Possession Container Effect on action (to keep quiet) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
820.	4:475	As a successful lawyer specializing in libel, his profession gave him ample opportunity to witness the mess some people made of their lives, messes that he viewed with proper professional sympathy, but with a greater wonder that <b>human beings,</b> given the choice between order and chaos, reason and stupidity, <b>could behave with such a lack of self-interest.</b>	Effect on action (to behave) <i>Quality (self-interest)</i> <i>Intensity (such)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
821.	4:476	But <b>she entered his sitting-room without the slightest sign of interest either in the room,</b> or in the wide expanse of shining water outside the windows and the glittering floodlit wonder of Tower Bridge.	Effect on action (to enter a sitting-room) Entity that characterises something (sign) Spatial orientation of the body <i>Quality (the slightest)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
822.	4:477	There had always been the two worlds, his and	Possession

		Margaret's. His world – she had come to believe or had decided to believe – was a mysterious masculine enclave of which her husband, after the Head of Chambers, was the most important member. <b>It required nothing from her, not even her interest.</b>	
823.	4:478	But what place was there for him in that world? His and <b>Margaret's only shared interest had been in the bringing-up of the children</b> , though even that had been mainly Margaret's responsibility.	Possession (shared) Entity located inside something (bringing-up the children) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
824.	4:479	But occasional suggestions that <b>the conference room should be given over to a new member of Chambers in the interest of productive use of space</b> were always resisted. The table, which had once been owned by John Dickinson, was the pride of Chambers and no other room could suitably accommodate it.	Container
825.	4:480	<b>He</b> drew open the two bottom drawers and <b>found little of immediate interest</b> . There were boxes of writing-paper and envelopes, notepads, a wooden box containing a collection of ballpoint pens and, in the bottom drawer, two folded hand towels and a toilet bag containing soap, a toothbrush and toothpaste.	Object (hidden) <i>Time marker (immediate)</i> <i>Intensity (little)</i>
826.	4:481	The only <b>paper of interest</b> in the top right-hand drawer was a copy of a thin pamphlet, inexpertly printed, and headed 'Redress'. It was apparently distributed by an organization concerned with opportunities for women in senior posts in the professions and industry,	Entity that characterises something (paper)
827.	4:482	The bookcase contained a small library of law books and bound statutes, with beneath them a row of barristers' <b>blue notebooks</b> . Drawing one or two out at random, <b>Dalgliesh saw with interest</b> that they covered the whole of her professional career and were meticulously kept.	Effect on seeing Effect on a state linked to something (notebooks) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>

828.	4:483	Dalgliesh waited. <b>He was aware of a heightened interest in the room, an almost perceptible tightening of tension.</b> Laud said: ‘Octavia’s taken up with Garry Ashe, the boy Venetia defended a month ago. He was accused of murdering his aunt in a house on Westway. You’ll remember the case, of course.’	Object (heavy) Entity located inside something (room) <i>Quality (heightened)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
829.	4:491	‘You could try her sitting-room. Top floor at the back. But I shouldn’t take much notice of anything she tells you.’ <b>Dalgliesh, who was beginning to get up, sat down again and said in a voice of calm interest:</b> ‘Wouldn’t you? Why is that, Miss Cummins?’ She reddened. ‘Well, she’s old.’	Effect on the voice Effect on bodily movement <i>Quality (calm)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
830.	4:493	<b>Showing no interest in her granddaughter’s arrival,</b> she complained: ‘I can’t hear what they’re saying half the time.’	Object (hidden) Entity located inside something (granddaughter’s arrival) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
831.	4:495	As expected, Gran took the news of the murder in her stride. <b>She seldom showed interest in people she hadn’t met,</b> and had long decided that Pawlet Court was her granddaughter’s world, too remote from her life to be of interest.	Object (hidden) Entity located inside somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
832.	4:497	The <b>children</b> and her <b>garden</b> had occupied most of Marigold’s energy and <b>in neither had he taken much interest.</b>	Object Entity located inside something (garden) Entity located inside somebody <i>Intensity (much)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
833.	4:498	Kate said: ‘How does he do this on an MP’s salary?’ <b>Dalgliesh</b> was standing in front of the window, apparently in thought, and <b>taking little interest in the details of the room.</b> He said quietly: ‘He	Object Entity located inside something (details of the room)

		doesn't. His wife has money.'	<i>Intensity (little)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
834.	4:499	Obviously <b>anything that happened</b> during the days preceding her death is <b>of interest to us</b> . Why did you call on her?'	Effect on a state linked to something (anything that happened) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
835.	4:507	Because she was my sponsor <b>I think she believed she ought to take an interest in me</b> – although Mr Costello is my pupil-master. QCs don't have pupils. Everyone said how lucky I was to have her as sponsor.	Object Entity located inside somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
836.	4:508	It was odd that a woman so obviously maternal as Mrs Cummins should so casually reject Venetia's claim on her <b>ex-husband's interest in his daughter's welfare</b> .	Possession Entity located inside something (daughter's welfare) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
837.	4:509	<b>He's an elderly bachelor</b> who's fond of Alice and <b>takes a proprietary interest in her flat when she's away</b> .	Object Entity located inside something (flat) <i>Quality (proprietary)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
838.	4:513	It was as if they needed a respite even from <b>their colleagues' interest or curiosity</b> . But with Monday the calm was broken.	Possession <i>Link (curiosity)</i>
839.	4:514	He said: 'You have been told, Commander, that I have come about the murder of Miss Venetia Aldridge, QC. <b>I should explain my interest in this matter</b> , but I expect you will first need my name and address.' 'Thank you,' said Dalglish, 'that would be helpful.'	Possession (that requires explanation) Entity located inside something (matter) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
840.	4:516	But the study of the criminal law has been my main hobby and I used to discuss <b>cases of particular forensic and human interest</b> with Venetia. She was fourteen when we began our lessons.	Entity that characterises something (cases) <i>Quality (particular, forensic, human)</i>
841.	4:518	But that isn't really accurate; she lost touch, I never	Object

		did. Not unnaturally <b>I have taken a lively interest in her career.</b> I've made it my business to follow it closely.	Entity located inside something (somebody's career) <i>Quality (lively)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
842.	4:519	Mr Froggett had needed to show his book to someone who might be expected <b>to have an interest in his achievement</b> , and Venetia Aldridge's death had at last given him an excuse.	Possession Entity located inside something (somebody's achievement) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
843.	4:520	I was naturally curious when she joined Chambers. I asked her. <b>It was a matter of slight interest</b> , no more.'	Entity that characterises something (matter) <i>Quality (slight)</i>
844.	4:521	She has a reputation for being a difficult woman and I keep free of personalities in Chambers. <b>I have no interest in the criminal law.</b> Law should be an intellectual discipline, not a public performance.'	Possession Entity located inside something (criminal law) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
845.	4:522	He switched on the desk lamp and unwrapped and opened Edmund Froggett's scrap-book, <b>turning the pages at first with casual interest</b> , and then with a more deliberate attention.	Effect on action (to turn the pages) <i>Quality (casual)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
846.	4:523	Froggett had spoken with a dignified regret that could be covering a more personal loss, but Dalgliesh suspected that the reality of Aldridge's death had yet to hit him. At present he was caught up in the excitement of it, the self-importance of bringing his record to the police, the sense that he still had a part to play. <b>Or was his interest more in the criminal law than in the lawyer?</b>	Possession Entity located inside something (criminal law) Entity located inside somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
847.	4:524	Mrs Carpenter might have had a sudden wish to experience a trial. <b>She might have had some interest in the case.</b>	Possession Entity located inside something (case) <i>Measure (some)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

848.	4:525	Old Bailey? Had there been another <b>trial</b> on that day <b>in which she had a personal interest</b> ? Or was this tied up with her interest in Aldridge?	Possession Entity located inside something (trial) <i>Quality (personal)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
849.	4:526	She returned quickly with two keys on a ring. Thanking her, Dalglish wondered how he could persuade her to stay in her flat. But <b>she showed no further interest in them or in their doings</b> except to say again: 'You won't find her. She isn't there. She's gone for a holiday.'	Object (hidden) Entity located inside somebody Entity located inside something (doings) <i>Quality (further)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
850.	4:529	'She's right, of course, the only immortality for the dead is in our remembrance of them. If that is tainted with horror and evil, then they're dead indeed. <b>The bank statements and a file on her property sale and purchase are of more immediate interest.</b> '	Effect on a state linked to something (bank statement, file on property) <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Time marker (immediate)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
851.	4:530	There was nothing in the flat to suggest that Mrs Carpenter was a churchgoer, but then <b>there was nothing in the flat to throw any light on her interests or her personality</b> , except that she was essentially private.	Possession (kept in the dark) <i>Link (personality)</i>
852.	4:531	On the whole the law had seemed both a more sensible and a more consistent guide to morality than <b>her grandmother's eccentric self-interest.</b>	Possession <i>Quality (eccentric, self-interest)</i>
853.	4:532	'Simon? Relieved, I imagine, as we all are. It was uncomfortable knowing oneself to be a suspect. <b>The experience had its initial interest</b> , if only as a novelty, but it became tedious when prolonged.	Possession <i>Quality (initial)</i>
854.	4:534	He was obsessed with the criminal law, nothing seemed more natural to him than that <b>I should share this compelling interest.</b>	Possession (shared) <i>Quality (compelling)</i>

855.	4:535	Not looking at him, I made my voice steady, <b>the question no more than one of casual interest.</b>	Entity that characterises something (question) <i>Quality (casual)</i>
856.	4:538	He spoke with extraordinary force. For the first time I sensed in him a personal belief, emotional and deeply felt. Up till then <b>I had seen his obsession with the law</b> as no more than <b>an overwhelming intellectual interest.</b> Now, for the first time, I saw signs of a passionate moral commitment to an ideal.	Entity that characterises something (obsession with the law) <i>Quality (intellectual)</i> <i>Intensity</i> <i>(overwhelming)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
857.	4:539	Occasionally, when <b>there was a case of particular interest in Number One Court</b> , I would join him there even if Venetia Aldridge wasn't the Defending Counsel.	Entity located inside something (Number One Court) <i>Quality (particular)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
858.	4:542	Or perhaps he rang the bell and overpowered her when she opened the door. Or was Octavia with him? Were they in it together?' 'I don't think so. <b>It's in his interest that the marriage goes ahead.</b> She's an heiress of sorts, after all.	Possession Container
859.	4:543	It was as easy as that. <b>The girl showed as little interest in the transaction as she had in Octavia.</b>	Object (hidden) Entity located inside something (transaction) Entity located inside somebody <i>Intensity (as little...as)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
860.	4:544	She couldn't remember when <b>her interest in him, in his mysteriousness, his silences, his power, had grown into fascination</b> , but she knew the precise moment when fascination had sharpened into desire.	Possession Entity located inside somebody Entity located inside something (mysteriousness, silence, power)

			Living growing creature <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
861.	<i>interesting</i> 4:37	<p>‘I suppose that’s all that’s wrong, worry about Octavia?’</p> <p>‘It’s enough, I should have thought, but I’m only guessing. She doesn’t talk to me about it. Our friendship doesn’t extend to personal confidences. The fact that we go to an occasional exhibition together doesn’t mean that I understand her – or any other woman come to that. <b>It’s interesting, though, the power she exerts in Chambers.</b> Has it ever occurred to you that a woman, when she is powerful, is more powerful than a man?’</p> <p>‘Powerful in a different way, perhaps.’</p> <p>Laud said: ‘It’s a power partly based on fear. Perhaps the fear is atavistic, memories of babyhood. Women change the nappy, give the breast or withhold it.’</p>	Entity that characterises something (power)
862.	4:97	This business was left to me some ten years ago by a maiden aunt of the same name. It has been in the family since the 1920s. I keep it going partly from family piety, but principally because I enjoy it. It brings me into touch with <b>interesting people</b> , although no doubt Inspector Miskin would find that surprising, since most of them are content to do housework.	Entity that characterises somebody
863.	4:247	‘My turn to continue this <b>interesting fabrication</b> . So let us suppose that all the suppressed emotions of an essentially private man come together. Long years of guilt, disgust with himself, anger that this woman whose family have already harmed him so irrevocably should be planning more destruction.	Entity that characterises something (fabrication)
864.	4:406	Miss Eager departed with many enthusiastic bobbings and thanks. No doubt the prospect of an hour out of the office compensated for missing what could be <b>an interesting conversation</b> .	Entity that characterises something (conversation)

865.	4:458/ 1	He had been in the middle of his closing arguments <b>in a case which had been more forensically interesting than difficult</b> , a lucrative brief from an international company, and a case concerned as much with establishing a point of law as with any dramatic conflict of interests.	Entity that characterises something (case) <i>Anti-link (difficult)</i> <i>Intensity (more)</i>
866.	4:459	Henry III and his nobles as they processed into the Round Church on Ascension Day in 1240 for the consecration of the magnificent new choir; had heard the weakening moans as a condemned knight starved to death in the five-foot long Penitential Chamber. The <b>eight-year-old had found the story more interesting than horrific</b> .	Entity that characterises something (story) <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Anti-link (horrific)</i>
867.	4:474	<b>That interesting piece of information would overshadow</b> the months between now and February, wouldn't it?	Entity that characterises something (piece of information)
868.	4:486	I remember the case because a friend of mine was a detective constable working on it. And <b>there's something else that's interesting</b> : Venetia Aldridge was defending counsel.'	Entity that characterises something (something else)
869.	4:488	But Dalgliesh sensed her relief in the more confident gait, the almost imperceptible relaxation of the shoulders. <b>An interesting witness</b> . She hadn't even asked directly how Venetia Aldridge had died.	Entity that characterises somebody
870.	4:490	'Tell him I'll be with him in ten minutes. And you'd better ring Public Relations. Unless <b>some interesting news</b> breaks tomorrow this is likely to make the front page.	Entity that characterises something (news)
871.	4:500	<b>The committee</b> on which he served had, he thought, passed <b>its interesting stage</b> and was now slowly battling through the hinterland of boredom.	Entity that characterises something (stage)
872.	4:505	'She intrigued me. All right, she was playing a part, but who isn't? <b>It would be interesting to know</b> why that particular part, but it isn't important.	Effect on action (to know) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
873.	4:510	Would a sane man have killed to avoid the	Entity that characterises

		inconvenient importunities of an ex-wife – ex by eleven years? Or for £8,000? <b>That too was interesting.</b>	something (information discussed)
874.	4:511	Then there was the red-haired man Anna Cummins had seen entering and leaving the Temple. If she could positively <b>identify Simon Costello</b> , then <b>it would be interesting to hear his explanation.</b>	Effect on hearing Effect on a state linked to something (explanation) <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
875.	4:512	Dalgliesh said: ‘It can wait. <b>Your interview with Miss Elkington was interesting.</b> You were right to send a couple of officers to Hereford.	Entity that characterises something (interview)
876.	4:517	We used to have <b>interesting discussions</b> in her parents’ drawing-room after dinner. They would sit listening to our arguments but took little part.	Entity that characterises something (discussion)
877.	4:533	We first met in the public gallery of Number Two Court at the Old Bailey. There are regulars who go to <b>important or interesting trials</b> , particularly at the Old Bailey,	Entity that characterises something (trials) <i>Quality (important)</i> <i>Link (important)</i>
878.	(to) <i>interest</i> 4:293	‘Thank you.’ Dalgliesh turned to Kynaston. ‘Shall we go up, Miles?’ <b>It interested but did not surprise him that Kynaston had waited for him to arrive</b> before examining the body. As a forensic pathologist Miles had all the virtues. He came quickly. He worked without fuss or complaint however inconvenient the terrain or repellent the decomposing corpse.	Effect on a state linked to somebody Effect on action (to wait, to arrive) <i>Anti-link (surprise)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
879.	4:457	In her more analytical moments she wondered whether she might not be harbouring a subconscious guilt which after a victory, and particularly a victory against the odds, transferred itself into resentment of the client. <b>The thought interested but did not worry her.</b> Other counsel might see it as part of their job to encourage, to support, to console. She saw her own in less ambiguous terms; it was simply to win.	Effect on a state linked to something (thought) <i>Anti-link (to worry)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
880.	4:504	‘Yes, you didn’t like each other much, did you? <b>But</b>	Effect on a state linked

		<b>didn't she interest you</b> – as a woman, not as a prospective suspect or a provider of useful information?’	to somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
881.	<i>(to be) interested</i> 4:451	‘I think they mostly used the back door, both of them.’ ‘I see. They mostly used the back door.’ Then, still quietly, still <b>in the same interested, sympathetic voice</b> : ‘The spectacles you are wearing today, Mrs Scully, are they new?’	Effect on the voice Entity that characterises something (voice) <i>Link (sympathetic)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
882.	4:471/ 1	Lucy would do what was expected of her and would do it well. <b>She was little interested in politics.</b> The world in which he strove, with its intrigues, its strategies for survival, its coteries and rivalries, its frenetic ambition, was alien to her fastidious mind. But she had a genuine interest in people, seeming unconscious of class or rank or importance, and they had responded always to that gentle, inquiring gaze, felt at ease in her drawing-room, knew themselves to be safe.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (politics) <i>Intensity (little)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
883.	4:453	He said: ‘I’d rather thought that you wanted me to succeed you. We work together well. I thought that Chambers had come to take it for granted.’ ‘That you were crown prince? I expect they have. But it might not be as straightforward as I expected. <b>Venetia is interested.</b> ’	Existence of emotion is presence here
884.	4:460	But the piggy bloodshot eyes were sharp. He was a fool about some things but not about everything. He said: ‘ <b>You’re interested</b> though. Thought you might be. After all, Costello’s in your chambers.	Existence of emotion is presence here
885.	4:461	‘He’s innocent. You know he’s innocent. You told the court that he didn’t do it.’ ‘I didn’t tell the court that he didn’t do it. I’ve explained all this to you before, only <b>you’ve never been interested enough to listen.</b>	Effect on listening <i>Quality (enough)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 1</i>
886.	4:462	‘He’ll work. I’ve got my allowance. You’ve settled	Existence of emotion is

		that on me. You can't take it away. And we may sell our story to the papers. Ashe thinks <b>they would be interested.</b> '	presence here
887.	4:463	' <b>Oh, they'll be interested all right.</b> You won't get a fortune but you'll get something. I can imagine the line he'll take. "Disadvantaged young man unjustly accused of heinous crime. Brilliant defence lawyer.	Existence of emotion is presence here
888.	4:484	Langton said: 'I thought that Venetia was in a very odd mood when she got back from the Bailey on Monday. I suppose she was worried about Octavia.' It was then that Ulrick looked up from his book. He said to Laud: ' <b>I'm interested in why you should think</b> this is – how did you describe it? – a factor in the situation.'	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (reasons to think about something) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
889.	4:489	Odd that she didn't ask <b>why we were so interested in Ulrick's blood.</b> But if she did take it, then it was probably safer for her to say that she never looked in the fridge than to say that she did and the blood wasn't there.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (somebody's blood) <i>Intensity (so)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
890.	4:492	She had confided about the gossip in Chambers over Mr Langton's successor, about the rumour that <b>Miss Aldridge was interested</b> , the changes she might make.	Existence of emotion is presence here
891.	4:496	Seldom did Valerie come home to <b>interested questions</b> about what sort of day she'd had, what people in Chambers had said or done.	Entity that characterises something (questions)
892.	4:502	Miss Elkington got down to business with admirable promptness. 'You said on the telephone that <b>you were interested in the keys to Chambers and in the cleaning arrangements.</b> Since the latter concerns two of my employees, Mrs Carpenter and Mrs Watson, I telephoned them early this morning to get their permission to give you any information you	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (keys to the Chambers, cleaning arrangements) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>

		require about their arrangements with me.	
893.	4:506	If she wants to live in the 1930s – if that’s what she’s doing – then that’s her concern. <b>I’m more interested in what she told us about Janet Carpenter.</b> She was pretty determined – wasn’t she – to work in those particular Chambers. She was doing perfectly well with Sir Roderick Matthews. Why change? Why Pawlet Court?’	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (telling something about somebody) <i>Intensity (more)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
894.	4:515	<b>I have been interested in the law all my life,</b> particularly criminal law, but I’m afraid I lack those physical and vocal attributes which contribute so much to success at the criminal Bar.	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (the law) <i>Time marker (all life)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
895.	4:536	‘Do you see her now? I expect she’d be grateful to know <b>you’re still interested in her career.</b> She’d probably arrange for you to have a seat in the court.’	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (somebody’s career) <i>Time marker (still)</i> <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
896.	4:537	We must have looked a strange couple to <b>anyone interested,</b> but, of course, no one was interested. This was London, the city workers chatting together before they began their journeys home, the tourists with their cameras, their maps, their foreign jabber, the occasional solitary drinker of tea, they came in without a glance in our direction.	Entity that characterises somebody
897.	4:537/ 1	We must have looked a strange couple to anyone interested, but, of course, <b>no one was interested.</b> This was London, the city workers chatting together before they began their journeys home, the tourists with their cameras, their maps, their foreign jabber,	Existence of emotion is presence here

		the occasional solitary drinker of tea, they came in without a glance in our direction.	
898.	4:540	Occasionally, when there was a case of particular interest in Number One Court, I would join him there even if Venetia Aldridge wasn't the Defending Counsel. It was important that I did; he must never suspect that <b>I was interested only in the defence.</b>	Existence of emotion is presence here Entity located inside something (the defence) <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
899.	4:541	I said: 'Yes, you'll need money if you're going to take her out, <b>get her interested.</b> She's used to money, she's had it all her life.	Effect coming from somebody <i>Force dynamic Type 2</i>
900.	4:548	'Of course. That would be his right. And if his lawyer is as clever as your mother was, he may be acquitted.'  There was a pause, then Octavia said: 'It's a funny system, isn't it? Mummy tried to explain it to me, <b>but I wasn't interested.</b> I never even went to hear her in court except for one time with Ashe.	Existence of emotion is presence here