L'INEFFICACITÉ DE L'ACTION CIVILE EN RÉPARATION DES INFRACTIONS AU DROIT DE LA CONCURRENCE : Etude du contentieux français devant le Tribunal de Commerce de Paris

Abstract : The Green Paper and the White Paper on damages actions for breach of EU competition law found them in state of total underdevelopment and identified some obstacles. Empirical study of french case law does not support entirely these findings. Exclusionary practices litigated between competitors show reasonable success. The reforms proposed by the European Commission concerning access to documents and quantification of damages would not bring any significant improvement. However, damages actions in compensation of overcharges brought by direct and indirect purchasers seem doomed to failure, in the absence of a collective action mechanism. Debate is storming at EU and national level, but the considered options appear unconvincing. It is proposed a public mechanism for collective redress. Within their existing powers, competition authorities should review the fine policy to achieve collective compensation as private penalty. This could be done either by : injunction ordering to create a trust or funds to the benefit of victims, or by partial distribution of administrative fines to victims as private penalty, or by deciding that compensation of victims is a condition of leniency.
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M Zambrano. L'INEFFICACITÉ DE L'ACTION CIVILE EN RÉPARATION DES INFRACTIONS AU DROIT DE LA CONCURRENCE : Etude du contentieux français devant le Tribunal de Commerce de Paris. Droit. Université de Montpellier 1, 2012. Français. ⟨tel-01496120⟩

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