Analyse de code et processus d'évaluation des composants sécurisés contre l'injection de faute

Abstract : Vulnerability detections for smart cards require state of the art methods both to attack and to protect the secure device. A typical type of attack is fault injection, most notably performed by means of laser techniques. To prevent some of the consequences of this kind of attacks, several analyses are conducted at the software level. Being able to define criteria and to propose automated tools that can survey the robustness of an application to fault injection is thus nowadays a hot topic, even more so since the hardware attack techniques allow today an attacker to perform several attacks in a single software execution. Indeed, recent research works evaluate the effectiveness of counter-measures against fault injection[1], or attempt to develop models of fault injection at the C level[2]. This thesis project addresses the issue of multiple faults injection, albeit by adding the distinctive aspect of static and dynamic analysis interaction in a context of binary-level fault injection. An objective of the thesis is to achieve a configurable framework to simulate fault injections in the way they are currently performed by the CESTI-LETI laboratory on the actual hardware. To do so we will develop a generic intermediate model that will allow us to specify hardware constraints, such as the various kinds of memories (RAM, EEPROM, ROM), whose different properties can induce either permanent or volatile faults. Combining the static code analysis with dynamic fault injections should prevent the combinatory explosion of the executiions while attack patterns will guide the analysis. A taxonomy of attacks and new attack modelisations could emerge from this work. An adaption of the tools for static analysis is also required, because dynamic fault injection can deeply change the code by modifying the interpretation of the instructions, in a similar manner to dynamic compilation. This thesis project falls within the CESTI-LETI's innovation strategy, et could lead to an automated code verifier that could be used by the CESTI-LETI evaluation specialists. [1] A. Séré, J-L. Lanet et J. Iguchi-Cartigny. « Evaluation of Countermeasures Against Fault Attacks on Smart Cards ». en. In : International Journal of Security and Its Applications 5.2 (2011). [2] Xavier Kauffmann-Tourkestansky. « Analyses sécuritaires de code de carte à puce sous attaques physiques simulées ». Français. THESE. Université d’Orléans, nov. 2012. url :
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  • HAL Id : tel-01403749, version 2



Louis Dureuil. Analyse de code et processus d'évaluation des composants sécurisés contre l'injection de faute. Algorithme et structure de données [cs.DS]. Université Grenoble Alpes, 2016. Français. ⟨NNT : 2016GREAM068⟩. ⟨tel-01403749v2⟩



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