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Supervision bancaire et contraintes en capital : hiérarchie des régulateurs et arbitrage optimal des instruments

Abstract : The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the current debate on the implementation of an efficient regulatory framework in the banking industry. To this end, we extend the existing literature in many aspects. First, we consider the impact of capital requirements recently suggested by the Third Basel Accord on credit supply as well as banking stability. Second, we take into account the disparity between the regulators' authority to audit and sanction banks. Besides, we analyze how a central regulation can lead to a more efficient framework compared to a combination of local regulations. Overall, the consideration of this set of dimensions brings a new perspective for the banking regulation approach. In the first chapter, we investigate how the implementation of a leverage ratio in addition to a risk-weighted capital ratio affects the regulator's welfare. We show that such a capital regulation leads to a reduction in credit supply. On the other hand, a leverage ratio restriction can improve the banking stability when the regulator suffers from a low supervisory power. On the contrary, the welfare of regulators enjoying a high supervisory power is decreased by the application of a leverage ratio. The second chapter tests results of this first theoretical approach. In order to do so, this second chapter is based on data available since the effective application of the leverage ratio suggested by the Basel Committee. We find that the implementation of such a capital ratio decreases credit supply while increasing credit risk. Furthermore, we show that a strong supervisory power accentuates these effects. In the third chapter, we analyze how a regulatory scheme could internalize the externalities produced by the presence of several local regulators with different aims. We establish that the optimal framework is the set up of a central regulator delegating supervisory tasks to local regulators. This central regulation is more efficient when spillover effects across countries are important and when local regulators suffer from a high capture from banks.
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Submitted on : Thursday, January 14, 2016 - 1:12:06 PM
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Kévin Spinassou. Supervision bancaire et contraintes en capital : hiérarchie des régulateurs et arbitrage optimal des instruments. Economies et finances. Université de Limoges, 2015. Français. ⟨NNT : 2015LIMO0079⟩. ⟨tel-01256087⟩