Formal Software Methods for Cryptosystems Implementation Security

Abstract : Implementations of cryptosystems are vulnerable to physical attacks, and thus need to be protected against them. Of course, malfunctioning protections are useless. Formal methods help to develop systems while assessing their conformity to a rigorous specification. The first goal of my thesis, and its innovative aspect, is to show that formal methods can be used to prove not only the principle of the countermeasures according to a model, but also their implementations, as it is where the physical vulnerabilities are exploited. My second goal is the proof and the automation of the protection techniques themselves, because handwritten security code is error-prone.
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Contributor : Pablo Rauzy <>
Submitted on : Friday, October 2, 2015 - 5:24:32 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, October 6, 2015 - 1:00:41 AM
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Pablo Rauzy. Formal Software Methods for Cryptosystems Implementation Security. Cryptography and Security [cs.CR]. Télécom ParisTech, 2015. English. ⟨NNT : 2015-ENST-0039⟩. ⟨tel-01208533⟩

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