Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation

Architecture sécurisée pour les systèmes d'information des avions du futur

Maxime Lastera 1
1 LAAS-TSF - Équipe Tolérance aux fautes et Sûreté de Fonctionnement informatique
LAAS - Laboratoire d'analyse et d'architecture des systèmes
Abstract : Traditionally, in avionics, on-board aircraft software used to be totally separated from open-world software in order to avoid any interaction that could corrupt critical on-board systems. However, new aircraft generations require more interaction with off-board systems to provide extended services, which makes these information flows potentially dangerous. In a previous work, we have proposed the use of virtualization to ensure dependability of critical applications despite bidirectional communication between critical on-board systems and untrusted off-board systems. In this thesis, we propose two contributions. The first contribution concerns the establishment of a benchmark of hypervisors. We have developed a test bed to assess the performance impact induced by the use of virtualization. In this work, various configurations have been experimented ranging from a basic machine without an OS up to the complete architecture featuring a hypervisor and an OS running in a virtual machine. Several tests (computation, memory, and network) are carried out, and timing measures are collected on different hypervisors. The second contribution focuses on the improvement of an existing security architecture. A comparison mechanism based on the analysis of execution traces is used to detect discrepancies between replicas supported by diverse virtual machines. We propose to strengthen the comparison mechanism at runtime by the use of an execution model, derived from a static analysis of the java bytecode. To validate our approach, we have developed a prototype building on a case study identified with Airbus on a laptop dedicated to aircraft maintenance.
Document type :
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Arlette Evrard <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, January 29, 2014 - 3:53:39 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, June 10, 2021 - 3:06:57 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, April 9, 2017 - 2:40:43 AM


  • HAL Id : tel-00938782, version 1


Maxime Lastera. Architecture sécurisée pour les systèmes d'information des avions du futur. Systèmes embarqués. INSA de Toulouse, 2012. Français. ⟨tel-00938782⟩



Record views


Files downloads