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La corruption institutionnalisée : un nouveau concept issu de l'analyse du monde émergent

Abstract : This thesis develops an innovative approach of corruption in order to capture the complex reality of the phenomenon and explain its persistence in the emerging world. After a critical analysis of the economic orthodoxy of corruption, i.e. the most common understanding of corruption based on a patchwork of theoretical approaches culminating with the model of good governance, we emphasise the weakness of attention on structural factors. In our research we conducted expert's opinion survey (Delphi method) and multidimensional exploratory statistical analysis (factoral analysis) which led to new interpretations of the observed phenomenon. Relying on lessons of contemporary heterodox schools (unified within the institutionalist political economy described by A.Caillé), building a positive and comprehensive approach based on holindividualism, we propose a structuro-institutionalist analysis of corruption. With a renewed paradigm on rationality and coordination of economic agents we rebuilt the interpretative framework of corruption. In this regard, we have developed the concept of institutionalised corruption that describes situations where corruption is no longer a deviance but a rule of behaviour. We studied the mechanisms of institutionalised corruption by highlighting the role of cultural attitudes, of inherent principles in social networks and neo-patrimonial characteristics of contemporary states. In this way, we explain the origins of corruption referring to its historicity and embededness (cultural, social, institutionnal), the operating mechanisms based on hybrid coordination, as well as the effects and ambiguous ties between institutionalised corruption and economic growth. Our dynamic analysis of corruption focuses on transformation patterns in neo-patrimonial systems through the understanding of institutional evolutions, where the path dependency and actions of politico-economic clans explain resistance and reproduction of corrupt systems. We suggest scenarios to get out of clientelism in neo-patrimonial states, where we put forward issues and levers of gradual and endogenous evolutions. In our analysis we emphasise the role of clientelism in democratic construction (a paradoxal vector), where reciprocity networks make democratisation possible. We highlighted two key moments in a virtuous evolution: the decentralisation (or dispersion) of powers among clientelist networks and the diversification of autonomous networks resources, which are notably possible throught integration in global economy. The thesis leads to a set of concrete proposals for improving the relevance of anti-corruption programmes. We reconsider the role of international integration and highlight the superiority of the bottom-up programmes in the fight against corruption, which must be based on the gradual evolution of societal structures. The significance of our analysis exceeds the emerging world and is applicable to different economic systems. Indeed, institutionalised corruption is not specific to emerging or developing countries and therefore can not be reduced to the dynamic of development.
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https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00921574
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Anastassiya Zagainova. La corruption institutionnalisée : un nouveau concept issu de l'analyse du monde émergent. Economies et finances. Université de Grenoble; Académie russe de l’économie nationale et du service public auprès du Président de la Fédération de Russie (Moscou), 2012. Français. ⟨NNT : 2012GRENE015⟩. ⟨tel-00921574⟩

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