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C. 2. Les and .. Explicatifs-de-l-'activisme, 231 Section 1. Le rappel des hypothèses théoriques et la description de l'approche empirique232 1. La description des variables explicatives, p.233

.. La-présentation-descriptive-des-Échantillons, 242 2. 1. Les échantillons, p.245

S. 2. La-méthodologie-et-les-résultats and .. , 268 1. L'analyse factorielle en composantes principales, p.268