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Résistance des circuits cryptographiques aux attaques en faute

Kaouthar Bousselam 1
1 SysMIC - Conception et Test de Systèmes MICroélectroniques
LIRMM - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier
Abstract : The cryptographic blocks used in the integrated circuits implement algorithms proved robust against cryptanalysis. However, malicious manipulation against the circuit itself can retrieve the secret data. Among known hardware attacks, attacks called "fault attacks" are proved particularly effective. Their principle is to inject a fault in the circuit (using for example a laser beam) that will produce an erroneous result and to compare it with a correct result. Therefore, it is essential to detect these errors during the circuit running. The work presented in this thesis concerns the concurrent detection of errors in cryptographic circuits, using as support the implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard "AES". Thus, we analyze several error detection schemes based on the redundancy of information (detector code). We present a solution using dual code of parity to improve the rate of error detection in these circuits. We also present a study showing that the choice of the type of the detector code depends on one hand on the type of error that can be produced and be used by an attacker. On the other hand, it depends on type of the circuit implementation that we want to protect. The cryptographic circuits are also the target of further attacks, especially attacks by consumption analysis. The measures proposed against a type of attack, proved mostly negative against other types of attack. We propose in this work a joint measure that protects the circuit against both fault attacks and attacks by analysis of consumption.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, January 8, 2013 - 2:55:35 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 22, 2022 - 5:20:43 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, April 1, 2017 - 1:51:51 AM


  • HAL Id : tel-00771357, version 1


Kaouthar Bousselam. Résistance des circuits cryptographiques aux attaques en faute. Micro et nanotechnologies/Microélectronique. Université Montpellier II - Sciences et Techniques du Languedoc, 2012. Français. ⟨tel-00771357⟩



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