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Analyses sécuritaires de code de carte à puce sous attaques physiques simulées

Abstract : This thesis focuses on the effects of attacks by physical faults on embedded source code specifically for smart cards. Such attacks can compromise the security of the system by providing access to confidential information, compromising the integrity of sensitive data or disrupting the execution flow. In this thesis, we describe security properties to express security guarantees on the system. We also offer an attack model defining at high level an attacker’s ability to disrupt the system. With these properties and model, we check the source code security against physical attacks. We use static analysis and dynamic testing, combined with attack injection to simulate the consequences of physical faults at software level. Two techniques are created to stress the functional behavior of the code under attack, test the reliability of built-in security countermeasures and identify new threats. These techniques were implemented in a framework to help developers secure their source code in an industrial environment.
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Submitted on : Saturday, April 13, 2013 - 11:57:12 AM
Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022 - 10:12:18 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, July 14, 2013 - 3:05:11 AM


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  • HAL Id : tel-00771273, version 4



Xavier Kauffmann-Tourkestansky. Analyses sécuritaires de code de carte à puce sous attaques physiques simulées. Autre [cs.OH]. Université d'Orléans, 2012. Français. ⟨NNT : 2012ORLE2044⟩. ⟨tel-00771273v4⟩



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