-. Norde, -fortement balancé (Théorèmes Driessen et Meinhardt, 2002.

. Avec-coûts-identiques, Avec coûts identiques : -convexe (Théorème 6.3.5)

. Bertrand-non-convexe, Proposition 7.3.1) -totalement balancé

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