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Cinq essais sur les jeux d'oligopoles coopératifs

Abstract : In the first essay, we study Cournot oligopoly TU-games in gamma-characteristic function form. First, we prove that if any individual profit function is concave, such games are balanced. Then, when the individual cost functions are linear, we provide a solution in the core, called NP(Nash Prorata) value. The second essay considers Cournot oligopoly interval game in gamma-set function form. The first (second) result states that the interval (standard) core is non empty if and only if the Cournot oligopoly TU-game associated with the best (worst) worth of every coalition in its worth interval admits a non-empty core. In the thirdessay, we focus on Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in gamma-characteristic function form. First, we prove that the core is equal to the set of imputations. Th en, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition, depending on the heterogeneity of firms' marginal costs, under which the core is non-empty. In the fourth essay, we show that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games inalpha and beta-characteristic function forms are convex. Then, we prove that the equal division solution is in the core of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in gamma-characteristic function form and we give a sufficient condition under which such games are convex. The fifth essay studies the case where the marginal costs are distinct. If the intercept of demand is sufficiently small then games in _beta-characteristic function form are totally balanced. Otherwise, these games are convex.
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Aymeric Lardon. Cinq essais sur les jeux d'oligopoles coopératifs. Economies et finances. Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne, 2011. Français. ⟨NNT : 2011STETT096⟩. ⟨tel-00743703⟩

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