Romania’s Post-Cold War International Relations
Marc Bonnemains

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Académie de Paris
École des Hautes Études Internationales
Centre d’Études Diplomatiques et Stratégiques

Romania's Post-Cold War International Relations

By
Marc Bonnemains

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations and Diplomacy

Under the supervision of Professor Dr. Jacques Barrat, Thesis Director

Paris, 2010
To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Marc Bonnemains entitled “Romanian's Post-Cold War International Relations”. I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations and Diplomacy.

Prof. Dr. Jacques Barrat, Thesis director

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Emmanuel Caulier, Doctor in International Law

Accepted for the Council:

Mikaël Strauss, Doctor in International Relations and Diplomacy
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Signature

Date: July 18, 2010
JURY'S REPORT ON PhD DISSERTATION

Grade: PhD in international relations and diplomacy

Date: September 9, 2010

PhD candidate: Marc BONNEMAINS

Title: Romania's Post-Cold War International Relations

Dissertation supervisor: Pr Jacques BARRAT (Professor at Paris II Panthéon Assas University)

Members of Jury: Pr Jacques BARRAT (Professor at Paris II Panthéon Assas University), Dr Michael Strauss (PhD graduated from CEDS, Professor at CEDS), Dr Emmanuel CAULIER (Barrister, Professor at CEDS)
JURY’S REMARKS AND EVALUATION

After the candidate’s presentation, the jury appreciated his work as follows:

Pr Jacques BARRAT

Professor Barrat congratulates the candidate for the high level of the 600 pages dissertations and the 180 pages of appendixes skillfully selected because of their relevance for the core of the subject. He emphasizes on the perfect mapping of the work. The candidate begins by a clear presentation of the subject and searches in history the reasons explaining the characteristics of Romania’s foreign policy. Then he exploits geopolitics in order to explain the very outcomes and future stakes of Romania’s place and role in South-Eastern Europe.

Very few remarks and critics can be effectively made concerning any formal lacks or mistakes. The candidate considered and complied with all the formal academic criteria. He supported his assumptions with 1971 footnotes and with a very rich bibliography of 135 pages cautiously and perfectly ordered and written, thus leading to sincere congratulations from his dissertation supervisor.

As a head of diplomatic mission in Romania, Pr Barrat recognizes that the candidate was excellent in explaining the role of Romania as a “crossroad” in the region, and in defending the case for a steady commitment of the country in favor of his historical ties with France instead of the recent Bucharest-London-Washington axis. He did well in demonstrating the useless of the latter except for those who believe that a Romanian involvement in Iraq in supporting US invasion of Iraq was something positive.

Pr Barrat is also totally satisfied with the high quality of expression in English that we can notice in this dissertation in international relations and expresses all his satisfaction for having supervised such a serious and precise analysis of the Romanian present diplomacy. No doubt that this work deserves the jury’s congratulations, but also the right to be published as soon as possible in order to inform and learn more to the Romanian English speaking diplomats about this French way of looking at the international relations practiced by the country these recent years.

Dr Michael J. Strauss

Mr. Bonnemain produced a very strong thesis – one of best I have seen from the PhD candidates at CEDS.

His selected an important but largely untreated subject in the current European context – Romania’s international relations in the past two decades. He then discussed it comprehensively with solid explanations and assessments of many different aspects. The breadth and quality of his treatment of the subject was impressive. He not only covered Romania’s foreign relations in a direct sense, but he also examined the internal dynamics of Romania as they pertained to these relations – social, cultural, the corruption problem, etc.

Importantly, Mr. Bonnemain highlighted aspects of Romania’s international relations that will have ongoing importance in its future policy decisions, such as its situation vis-à-vis the Balkans.

The thesis was also insightful – for example, in discussing Romania’s need to adapt to NATO and EU membership, he also discussed how NATO and the EU were forced to adapt to the challenges of expanding to a country like Romania.

The number and quality of sources Mr. Bonnemain used in preparing the thesis was equally impressive.
The thesis was very long, but I found every element of the main text to be relevant for someone who wanted to understand Romania in the current international context. At the end of the defence, I commented that the thesis would probably be the most useful text that any diplomat could read upon being stationed in Romania.

The only thing I found missing from the main text was that it did not prepare the reader for understanding the current international tensions involving the Roms — their expulsions from France and previously Italy, and the diplomatic talks that have surrounded these events, have become a very prominent aspect of Romania’s relations with other European countries at present, even if Romania is not the active protagonist in these events.

My primary criticisms involved the appendices — the information in some was too vague to be of much use in understanding the matters they discussed. For example, the list of diplomatic visits abroad by Romanian government leaders showed the dates and locations and people visited, but not the specific purpose of the visit or any achievements that resulted (the object of many trips was listed simply as “visit” or “agreement” without elaboration).

Also, some information raised new questions but did not provide answers, such as the appendix that showed the state of diplomatic relations between Romania and other countries; an example is where it showed that Romania and Bolivia opened reciprocal embassies but closed them “temporarily” within one year — although 10 years later they are still closed, but no reason was given (a bilateral problem? budget reasons?).

These are minor comments relative to the work as a whole, which was extremely good. I agreed entirely with the mention of summa cum laude, and recommended that it be published (although its length might make it problematic for a single volume).

Dr Emmanuel CAULIER

Dr Caulier recognized also the high level of the dissertation and of the research done by the candidate. No doubt that a deep involvement of the latter is obviously displayed by the quality of the arguments, the density of the sources and references (more than 130 pages in bibliography), and the relevance of the appendixes.

The structure of the work seems also to be perfect and the candidate fulfilled all the academic requirements. He didn’t neglect any of them and complied with what was expected.

So was the strong commitment of the candidate who gave the case for a resume of a French-Romanian alliance versus the present trend to bandwagon with Washington. Anyway and despite an academic work has to distinguish between fact judgments and value judgments as Emile Durkheim taught us, we cannot criticize the candidate’s obvious commitment. He was excellent in taking all the academic and scientific care and cautious required by political science.

The candidate was comprehensive in his approach because he didn’t forget the historical dimension of Romania’s diplomacy and he put it together with a geopolitical very clear and rational explanation for this reason we might congratulate the candidate for his excellent research.

Next to the defense session, Mr Marc BONNEMAIN is Admitted to the Grade of PhD in international relations and diplomacy with SUMMA CUM LAUDE

Fouad NOHRA
Academic Director
LETTER CERTIFYING THE OBTENTION OF PHD GRADE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

Paris July 13th 2011

Mr Marc BONNEMAIN has obtained on Thursday September, 9, 2010, the PhD Grade in International Relations and Diplomacy after having submitted and successfully defended his PhD dissertation on the following subject: “Romania’s Post-Cold War International Relations” under the supervision of Pr Jacques BARRAT.

He obtained the PhD grade with “Summa Cum Laude” next to his excellent and original work, that has been really appreciated by the jury.

The CEDS is British accredited since February 2011, and has been granted the statute of Premier College by the Accreditation Service for International Colleges (ASIC) and is partner of Anglia Ruskin University (ARU) since may 2011.

Fouad NOHRA
Academic Director
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Dedication

To all the persons I love, in particular to my family.
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Acknowledgments

Even if a thesis is a personal work, it involves a lot of persons around, especially by their interactions which permit you to run your project until the end and to refine the meander of the initial idea until its draft.

First, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my thesis director under whom I realise this work, Jacques Barrat, Professor at the Panthéon-Assas Paris II University and at the Joint Defence College (Collège interarmées de défense) and former diplomat. Despite his very busy schedules, he gave me part of its valuable time to discuss about the subject of this thesis, provided me guidance and advices and suggested me some valuable references for my work. I would like to express my sincere thanks to the Academic Director at the ‘Centre d’Étude Diplomatique et Stratégique’ (CEDS), Professor Fouad Nohra, Doctor in Political Sciences, as well the professor Emanuel Caulier, former Academic Director at the CEDS.

To all friends, which it will be too long to name all of them here and who helped me by their interaction and discussion to refine my reflexion in the complexion of this thesis.

During my thesis’ researches, I have become indebted to many people for their help in the research and the consultation of the necessary documents: the librarians of the Sciences-Po library in Paris and the special access conditions, the librarians of the ‘Institut Europeen des Hautes Études Internationales’ (IEHEI) in Nice, as well thus of the University library in Bucharest.

I would like to name few people as Anca Gabriela Scurtu, student in Master of Art in American Studies at the University of Bucharest and Miruna Luana Ionescu, student at the Faculty of psychology and Educational Science at the University Alexandru Ioan Cuza in Iasi for their assistance in documentation research, bibliography preparation and verification. I am also very grateful to Alina Coman for her assistance in reviewing my thesis in English language.
Acknowledgments

And lastly, special thanks must go to Madalina Vlasceanu for her support, her critical point of view, her listening, her interaction all along the accomplishment of this work.
Abstract

This work’s research examines the international relations of Romania after the 89’ Revolution, within the changing parameters in the Romania’s near shore as well the new paradigms of International Relations appeared at the end of the eighties and the dawn of the 21st century. Focusing on the ‘major forces’ (geopolitics, country’s history…) likewise ‘variable forces’ (foreign policy, domestic policy, sociology…), this work identified three pillars: the powerful impact of the ‘Others’, an in-between situation and the complexity of Romania’ borderland as well its crossroad situation. These pillars underline the Romanian international relations actions and impel the Romanian foreign policy decisions. It is pointed out that Romania’s case study represented the Central and Eastern European Countries’ (CEECs) path and contingencies, likewise the politico-ideological transformation of the military alliance as well the European Union enlargement strategy adaptation in the Post-Cold War Era interdependence. In addition, this work allows validating some theories in different fields as Foreign Policy Change, International Relations, Geopolitics, Interdependence...

Over its history despite the geopolitical and domestic changes, Romania's main options in the international relations remained unchanged relying on system of alliance thru balancing or bandwagoning likewise International Organizations to guaranty the country’ peace and freedom. In addition, from a constant in-between situation associated to a complex borderland context, the country will move regularly to a crossroad situation. Besides, after restructuring the country’s internal situation, its alliances and its bilateral relations, Romania took an active role towards the Balkans and the Wider Black Sea. With its new status, Romania is becoming the ‘Nato's aircraft carrier’ and practically the EU’s voice at the southeast European frontiers with a new role custom designed in the post-Yalta international system.

Key Words: Romania, International Relations, Foreign Policy, Post-Cold War, European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Black Sea, Interdependence.
Abstract

Ce travail de recherche examine les relations internationales de la Roumanie après la Révolution de 89, dans le contexte des bouleversements survenus à la proximité géographique de la Roumanie et au travers des nouveaux paradigmes des Relations Internationales misent en place à la fin de années quatre-vingt et au début du 21e siècle. En mettant l’accent sur les « forces majeures » (la géopolitique, l’histoire...) ainsi que sur les « forces variables » (la politique étrangère, la politique intérieure, la sociologie ...), ce travail a identifié trois piliers : le puissant impact des « autres », une situation d’entre-deux et la complexité de sa situation de frontière ainsi que sa situation de carrefour. Ces piliers sous-tendent les actions de la Roumanie dans ses relations internationales et influencent les décisions de sa politique étrangère. On soulignera que l’étude de cas de la Roumanie représente bien le chemin chaotique et les péripéties des Pays de l’Europe Centrale et Orientales (PECO), de même que la transformation politico-idéologique de l’Alliance Atlantique, ainsi que l'adaptation de la stratégie d'élargissement de l'Union Européenne dans l'interdépendance de l'après-guerre froide. En outre, ce travail permet de valider certaines théories dans différents domaines comme le changement en politique étrangère, les relations internationales, la géopolitique, l'interdépendance ...

Au cours de son histoire, en dépit des changements géopolitiques et nationaux, les principales options de la Roumanie dans les relations internationales restent inchangées, s'appuyant sur le système d'alliance par le biais du « balancing » (équilibrage) ou du « bandwagoning » (suivisme), mais également au travers des organisations internationales pour garantir la paix et la liberté du pays. En outre, à partir d'une constante situation d’entre-deux associés à un contexte complexe de frontières, le pays va se placer régulièrement dans une situation de carrefour. D'ailleurs, après la restructuration interne du pays, de ses alliances et de ses relations bilatérales, la Roumanie a pris un rôle actif envers les Balkans et la grande région de la mer Noire. Avec son nouveau statut, la Roumanie devient le « porte-avions » de l'OTAN et pratiquement la voix de l'UE à la frontière du sud-est Européen, comme un nouveau rôle conçu sur mesure dans le système international post-Yalta.

Mots clés : Roumanie, Relations Internationales, Politique étrangère, Après guerre froide, Union Européenne (UE), Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN), Mer Noire, Interdépendance.
In the events of the late '80s and the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, as well as changes at the dawn of the 21st century, which created new paradigms in international relations, make the period from 1989 to 2009 an interesting subject to study.

After spending several years in the early 90s in Eastern Europe and in particular in Romania, I have seen the scale of changes, the country's wealth and its particular path as the chaotic return to the West. Under these circumstances, it seemed interesting to me to deal with the topic of international relations of Romania after the 1989 Revolution, to understand and assess more accurately the progress made by the country over the past twenty years. Moreover, I wanted to find out why this path was so special and if the Romania's international relations in this particular period brought some changes or if there was a constant continuity in these relations.

This essay about a unique case in the field of contemporary history has posed several obstacles in its treatment. First, the availability of primary sources which are not always accessible due to their classification and their release to the public only after the opening of states archives. Second, the plurality and the multiplicity of information drown you in a huge amount of information not always pertinent. Third, the need to give time on time in order to stand back from the immediacy of history and to put into perspective various information, oftentimes in contradictory relation to the present moment.

In addition, this issue benefits from very little coverage as well some questions were partially treated or even never. Romanian international relations since the 1989 Revolution have been treated shortly in a partial way, on the one hand, thru several topics not referring directly to Romania, but implying it indirectly, on the other hand, by studying only one aspect of its international relations, such as the domestic policy, the Romanian foreign policy over a given period.

This study is important because it allows through the Romania’s case study to explain some options taken in international relations of the country, the way of its implementation among its historical dimension and the questioning of why and how the political class did this choice and took specific orientations. In addition, it permits to
show that this case is representative of a whole Eastern Europe region at a historic turning point in contemporary history.

This study explains the geopolitical context and its involvement in a series of specific regions (the Balkans and Wide Black Sea) and the role played in the past, present and future by Romania in the European Union and North Atlantic construction and orientation, as well as vis-à-vis its near and far neighbors.
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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

9/11    September 11, 2001
ACT     Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa
ANP     Annual National Programme
BBC     British Broadcasting Corporation
BoP     Balance of Power
BSEC    Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSER    Black Sea Euro-Region
BSS     Black Sea Synergy
CDR     Democratic Convention
CEDS    Centre d’Etude Diplomatique et Stratégique
CEEC    Central and Eastern European Country
CEI     Central European Initiative
CEFTA   Central European Free Trade Area
CFE     Conventional Force in Europe
CFSP    Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHDGM   Committee of History of the Second World War
CIA     Central Intelligence Agency
CIO     Chairperson-in-Office
CIS     Commonwealth of Independent States
**List of Acronyms and Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<td>CMEA</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>CNRS</td>
<td>French National Center for Scientific Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index</td>
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<td>CSAT</td>
<td>Supreme Council of National Defence - (Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Tării)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>CVM</td>
<td>Cooperation and Verification Mechanism</td>
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<td>DCP</td>
<td>Danube Co-operation Process</td>
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<td>DEF</td>
<td>Danube Environment Form</td>
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<td>DISAM</td>
<td>Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC-CMEA</td>
<td>European Communities - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Steel and Coal Community</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>European Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighborhood and Partnership Instruments</td>
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<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>GMF</td>
<td>German Marshal Fund of the United States</td>
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<td>GRECO</td>
<td>Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption</td>
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<td>IAAE</td>
<td>International Agency of Atomic Energy</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>InterGovernmental Conference</td>
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<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>IHTP</td>
<td>Institute of History of the Present time</td>
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<td>IICCR</td>
<td>Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Romania</td>
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<td>IMAS</td>
<td>Institute for Marketing and Public Opinion Polls</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<td>IPP</td>
<td>Institute for Public Policy</td>
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<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>IR</td>
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<td>IRSI</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JTFE</td>
<td>Joint Task Force East</td>
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<td>KGB</td>
<td>Committee for State Security - (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSOC</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSR</td>
<td>Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millenium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGR</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals Country Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Members of European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most-Favoured-Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Basic Multilateral Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSSR</td>
<td>Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MURM</td>
<td>Unionist Movement of the Republic of Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAA</td>
<td>North Atlantic Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACS</td>
<td>National Anti-Corruption Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAS</td>
<td>National Anti-corruption Strategy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPAA</td>
<td>National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPAR</td>
<td>National Program for Accession of Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Salvation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLAF</td>
<td>EU’s European Anti Fraud Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>Operation Per Acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUA</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Political Consultative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDSR</td>
<td>Party of Social-Democracy in Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Plan for Preparation of Accession</td>
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### List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNAR</td>
<td>National Program for Accession of Romania to the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNL</td>
<td>National Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNJCD</td>
<td>Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Greater Romania Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Romania</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>Pact of Stability in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNR</td>
<td>Party of Romanian National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP</td>
<td>Romania Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMRRF</td>
<td>UN rapid-reaction force in MONUA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSI</td>
<td>Romanian Security Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCND</td>
<td>Supreme Council of National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDN</td>
<td>Société des Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECI</td>
<td>Southeast European Cooperative Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEECAP</td>
<td>South-Eastern Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEED</td>
<td>Support for East European Democracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Political Committee at Senior Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC R</td>
<td>Political Committee at Senior Level Reinforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPSEE</td>
<td>Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSNR</td>
<td>The National Security Strategy of Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCA</td>
<td>Trade and Cooperation Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDA</td>
<td>U.S. Trade and Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIC</td>
<td>Informational Communication and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRACECA</td>
<td>Transport Corridor Europe – Caucasus – Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDMR</td>
<td>Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNECE</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Organisation des Nations unies pour l'éducation, la science et la culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDIR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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*xx*  
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**List of Acronyms and Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIN</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wildlife Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

I Introduction

Due to the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’, the collapse of the existing international relations system and the 1989 Revolution in Romania, we want to explain Romania’s international relations in this new local and international context.

We chose to study Romania’s international relations, due to the geographical position of the country, its future potential role played in the North Alliance Treaty Organisation and its future possible role in the European Union. This country has a very rich historical background and historical relations with European states, especially France and Germany likewise other Eastern countries (the Republic of Moldova, Russia) and countries on Asiatic continent (Turkey). Romania was and continues to be in a paradoxically situation like being in a shadow and in the same time involved on the international scene. The way the country acted during some international major events trigger will help us to better understand and to explain how and why Romania acted in the way it did.

We decided to cover the period from the 89’s Revolution until nowadays in order to have a complete view of the Romania’s Post-Cold War international relations covering a period less than twenty years and to fill a gap in knowledge on a poorly and partial studied topic. In our point of view all this period has a logical aggregate that gives the possibility to better clarify the Romania’s international relations achievements and motivations. In order to illustrate this, we explored this precise period, which is characterised by some major international events and change shift of presidents in the country. In other words, this historical period is representative for our study of the Romania’s evolution with the political and military changes. In the same time, the Romania’s important objectives cover international relations’ activities until the European Union accession in 2007, without neglecting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization accession in 2004. We consider that some special past events are enough important to create a logical end of the period studied, covering from the 89’s Revolution to 2008. Events held in 2008, consist in the organization of the NATO summit in April, the end of Radio Free Europe in Romania in September and the strong implication of Romania as a potential regional leader toward the Black Sea and the Balkans. For us, the closing of Radio Free Europe for Romania puts an
end to a period of history started during the Cold War as a tool for the liberation of Eastern European country from the Soviet domination until the restoration of democracy and freedom. The organization of the NATO Summit indicates the full Romania’s participation in the Western democratic institutions. The diplomatic actions and the Romania’s initiative give a potential leadership for Romania in the NATO and EU concerning the South-Eastern borders of the Union and the military Alliance.

We will explain the particular acting pillars of the Romanian international relations, the subject of the research and the general context added to it. More precisely, we will describe our understanding in the international relations field, the choice of theories and the different implications according to our case study. In addition, we will set the limits of our study. Within the framework of our research, we will present the different sources used with their advantages and their limits. We will also announce our thesis plan elaboration with its different sections.
**Introduction**

### I.1 Subject and Issue of Research

#### I.1.1 Subject of Research

The upheaval of the eighties provoked by the ‘perestroika’\(^1\), introduced in 1985 by the Soviet leader Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, after his election as General Secretary of the Communist Party, followed by the opening of the Austria-Hungarian border on May 2, 1989\(^2\) and by the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989\(^3\), has been regarded as the opening point of the East by the total disappearance of the Iron Curtain. As Moreau wrote,

It all starts in an almost alleviating way: as of August 1989, East Germans cross the border clandestinely (...) On November 9, 1989, the inter-German border is opened; it is the end of the Wall. During this same month, Bulgaria engages in a reorganization process and Czechoslovakia enters democracy. In December, in Romania, the regime of Ceausescu disappears in blood. In one autumn, the Eastern European socialist block disappeared. The East-West system in Europe lived; ...\(^4\)

These steps marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War, which really ended when “the Soviet Union lowered its flag over the Kremlin on December 25 [...] 1991, when the Russian Federation flag took its place.”\(^5\) Even if the Cold War was not officially over – an

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1. ‘Perestroika’ is the Russian term for the economic reforms introduced in June 1987, by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Its literal meaning is ‘restructuring’, referring to the restructuring of the Soviet economy.
Introduction

issue of dialectic or experts - after December 1989, we witness a complete collapse of the satellite countries of the Soviet Union, with the bankruptcy of their communist system, their economy and the total reorientation of these Eastern European states. Albert Legault wrote in 1991,

*Annum mirabilis*, ‘the time of all the ruptures’, ‘the year of the gigantic upheavals’, here are the many expressions that each and every one of us can find in the large pages of the current status quo in relation to these events. The ruptures are deep. First of all, it is the old order established after the Second World War which collapses. For some, the United States won the Cold War; for others, it is a victory of the West and the ‘end of history’. Unquestionably, it is the beginning of a new history...  

As Fred Halliday commented it, the fall of the Berlin wall represented “the end of the inter-state conflict that has dominated the world since 1945 and of the Soviet-US nuclear confrontation”. If the end of the Cold War made necessary a fundamental change, it was also the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the peace process in the Middle East and the end of the apartheid in Southern Africa that brought a fundamental revision not only within the international system, but also for all the international actors that had to re-examine their international relations and their foreign policies according to the latest events. The wave of change has stake out all the countries: the Soviet Union, the United States, the Western European States and Eastern European countries. Romania could not have escaped from this transformation, which was materialized thru the Revolution of 1989, leading to the fall and execution of the dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. The international relations were rendered chaotic and created a new dimension by removing the East-West confrontation, a disruption on the international plan and a change in the world confrontation with the United States as the world’s only superpower.

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7. Halliday Fred is a British academic and a leading expert in international relations. He was professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and a member of the Centre for the Study of Human Rights. Today is a research professor at the Barcelona Institute for International Studies (IBEI). He argued that the Soviet and Communist periods were detrimental for international relations and profoundly undemocratic.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War, the break-up of different space in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union defined a new strategically position for Romania and brought new neighbors and challenges. With new neighbors in the South-west (Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo), in the North-east (Moldova and Ukraine) as the violent uprising of the 89’s Revolution create new security and foreign policy questions.

All that came to add to the spheres of instability in the nineties: the Balkans and the post-Soviet instability followed by the Russian weakness on the world scene. Moreover, there was the international context of the years 2000, with particular emphasis on the United States on September 11, 2001 called 9/11, and with the fight against terrorism and rogue states, which followed, as well as the questions on the supply of energy sources. Within this new international context and challenges, we will put Romania’s international relations in parallel with those of the Eastern European states and with the way they adapted their foreign policy to the new world challenges. In other words, we will study the Romanian international relations since the 1989 Revolution, with the proclamation of the “Communiqué for the country” issued by the National Salvation Front Council on December 22nd⁹, until the years 2008 within the NATO Summit organized in Bucharest in 2008.

I.1.2 Issue of Research

Since the 1989 Revolution, within the new international context, Romanian international relations goals had to be redefined, with particular emphasis on the necessary redevelopment of its international relations and redefinition of its foreign policy. The question is – which were Romania’s new international relations goals and, in particular, the direction of the Romanian foreign policy after the 1989 Revolution, thru the North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership obtained in March 2004, thru the accession to the European Union in January 2007 and to the organization of the NATO Summit in April 2008?

After the 1989 Revolution and the set-up of the new provisional government, how did the Romanian foreign policy change? With the loss of Romania’s influence in the eighties and the change of years

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1989-1991 on the world scene, what was Romania’s strategy for its repositioning as an influential actor in international relations? Did Romania have a true strategy to establish a specific foreign policy or was the Romanian foreign policy imposed by the choices made? How was the change made and implemented? Was it an interaction between the external actors and the internal actors of Romania? Do we have some invariable factors existing in the country, independent from the international situation or the change of government? Do we have any variable factors? Why did Romania seek, immediately after 1989, to get closer to NATO and Europe? Is there any continuity, with some nuances, of the Romanian international relations from 1989 to the entry in the European Union, going thru various periods before the First World War, the interwar period, the communist period and after the 1989 Revolution? Which have been the big steps of the Romanian international relations and foreign policy since 1989? Why was the Romania’s transformation slower than the one of other Eastern European countries? What is Romania’s current position on the international chessboard?

This issue benefits from very little coverage and some of the questions were never asked or very quickly answered. If Romania’s International Relations have been largely covered for previous period\(^\text{10}\) as in modern period\(^\text{11}\), Romanian international relations since the 1989 Revolution have been treated in a partial way; on the one hand, thru several topics not referring directly to Romania, but implying it indirectly, such as: the enlargement of NATO,\(^\text{12}\) the enlargement of the European Union,\(^\text{13}\) the Black Sea area...\(^\text{14}\); on the other hand, by studying only one aspect of it all, such as the domestic policy, the Romanian foreign policy over a given period of

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\(^{12}\) Alamoreanu, Adriana. La Roumanie et l’OTAN. Plaidoyer pour un avenir commun (Romania and NATO. Plea for a common future). Dissertation (Master), Institut Européen des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Université de Nice - Sophia-Antipolis, 1996.


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time - 1989 to 1994, from 1989 to 1993, after 1992, after 2001... or by treating only an aspect of this foreign policy, such as the actors. No books, theses or articles cover the entire period of Post-Cold War Romanian international relations, going from the 1989 Revolution to nowadays, i.e. the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008.

There is only one recent work, a thesis that approaches the analysis of the foreign policy, which covers part of this subject until 2006. The thesis was released in 2007 and entitled The Romanian Foreign Policy, 1990-2006. Actors, Processes and Results. This thesis presents the factors that influenced the strategic decisions of the Romanian foreign policy thru the method of foreign policy analysis, focused on the analysis of the actors.

As we want to fill a gap in knowledge, this study of the Post-Cold War period, from 1989 Romanian Revolution to 2008, will bring the following clarifications:

First, the gap in knowledge requires thorough coverage; moreover, all studies were not made by taking into account the entirety of international relations, from the above-mentioned period, within the theories of the 21st century.


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Secondly, we want to specify in detail what one knows in a general way, and to fulfill the lack of explanations related to Romania’s way of acting; in addition, we will discuss what and why Romanians took this course of action and these decisions. We will do a different reading, covering not only the foreign policy, but also the Romanian international relations. We will bring a global vision to see whether the Romanian international relations show continuity or discontinuity with the country’s past foreign policy behavior.

However, Romania became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2004 and of the European Union on January 1st, 2007. The understanding of its international relations, within its foreign policy will bring the comprehension of the European foreign policy regarding the strong and weak points of the Romanian foreign policy. In addition, as an Alliance member, the foreign policy of Romania can interfere with neither NATO’s strategy nor goals. It is necessary to consider this, as Romania is today in the Alliance and in the European Union. Indeed, within the European context, any foreign policy issues of any of the states becomes or will become in the long term an issue, but also any abilities or strong outcomes will become a strength for the Alliance nor the European Union and for these member states. This analyse is also important, in order to better understand Romania’s foreign policy and political actions. Today, not all assumptions on the major reasons of Romania’s behavior, as a country, within the international relations and the implementation of Romania’s foreign policy were explained. By now, no scholar could identify a theory that is able to explain Romania’s actions at the international level.
I.2 Methodology, Concepts and the Corpus of Sources

I.2.1 Methodology

The thesis will cover the field of International Relations\textsuperscript{20} (IR). However, more precisely, it will be in the area of the History of International Relations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, covering a recent period of time through the case study of Romania. Case study is a research methodology but also a research strategy, an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context.\textsuperscript{21} Theories will provide a blueprint for research and establish propositions as “a hypothetical story about why acts, events, structure and thoughts occur”\textsuperscript{22} before starting fieldwork.

Our topic could be treated by different researches approaches\textsuperscript{23}, as quantitative or qualitative approaches. Quantitative approached will require to identifying certain variables in relation with the question treated, to isolate them and then to see their effects on the question being investigated. In order to do it, it will be necessary to build a measurement scale to be able to compare all results, and to carry out experimental subject to obtain these measurements. With these measurements, it will be possible to compare the question studying to many other experimental subjects. However, because data about other experimental subjects in the same field of research do not necessary exist and because the measurement tool has to have a scale and certain limits that cannot permit to take into account factors outside of the scale created, this method will not be adapted to our research topic.

\textsuperscript{20} We will write International Relations, with ‘I’ and ‘R’ caps, when we will speak about the Discipline. Further details will be given when we will speak about the topics.
\textsuperscript{23} Singleton, Royce and Straits Bruce C. \textit{Approaches to social research}. 3rd ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999.
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In opposite, qualitative approached will permit to conduce the research with a more flexible and open-ended perspective. Qualitative research can be described as “the non-numerical examination and interpretation of observations, for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships”\(^{24}\). This approached that could use different methods as interviews, participant-observation, archive, document collection, document analysis, have a more flexible path that might permit to cash unexpected outcomes. As we focus on a study concerning Romania after the 89’ Revolution, the qualitative approach is chosen to give better results in the research.

I.2.2 Concepts

I.2.2.1 International Relations Definitions

By the term ‘international’, we understand ‘between nations’, a phrase built at the end of 18th century by Jeremy Bentham\(^{25}\), an English jurist, philosopher, legal and social reformer. For James N. Rosenau the ‘International Relations’ represents

a generic concept for a vast array of activities, ideas, and goods that do or can cross national boundaries, international relations (IR) embraces social, cultural, economic, and political exchanges that occur in ad hoc as well as institutionalized contexts.\(^{26}\)

The above-mentioned definition means that “the study of the International Relations analyzes and explains the relations between


Introduction

the political communities organized in a territory, i.e. between the states”. 27

Nevertheless, we would rather choose this less restrictive definition by Daniel Colard, 28 who says that

the study of the international relations includes the peaceful or quarrelsome relationship between states, the role of the international organizations, the influence of the transnational forces and the whole exchanges or activities which transgress the states’ borders (italic in original text). 29

The question is how to study this discipline? International Relations have so many different theories, such as realism, neo-realism, liberalism, neo-liberalism, Marxism orthodoxy, English school, constructivism, neo-Marxism, critical theory, post-modernism, feminism ..., that no one can agree to completely and everyone can explain everything in a different way. If

[s]peakers perceive events through very biased or ideological national positions, the concepts of objectivity or ‘pure fact’ are at the very least random. There is no reason to believe that the situation is very different for specialists in the International relations. 30

Canadian Robert Cox wrote that a “[t]heory is always for someone and, for some purpose”. 31 As proved, the exercise done by Alex Macleod and Dan O’Meara in their book on the ‘Iraqi War’, every

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28 Colard Daniel is professor in Law at the Franche-Conté University and an International Relations expert. He wrote many books and articles on international political questions in many publications.
situation can be explained and given a meaning with any theory.\textsuperscript{32} In 2003, Randall Schweller underlined that:

There is no unifying, grand theory of international relations (IR), and there is little hope of ever constructing one. I am not even sure what such a theory would look like.\textsuperscript{33}

Being a ‘crossroads discipline’, “the international relations are not a science”\textsuperscript{34} as Philippe Moreau Defarges said. It appears that International theory is a “[c]rossroads discipline associating geography, history, economy, cultural data, politics and even psychology, this field draws its unity from its field of analysis: human decisions, their more or less foreseeable consequences, their interactions.”\textsuperscript{35}

In order to analyze Romania’s international relations, it is compulsory to take into account other disciplines in our thesis, such as geopolitical study, history, sociology and foreign policy. To reinforce this idea, we join Moreau Defarges saying that “sovereign states are only historical constructions [...] they are in perpetual transformation. Moreover, these states are taken in vaster flows, which contribute to their construction or destruction.”\textsuperscript{36} We add that international relations are relations cannot be dissociated and are established between states themselves. These relations impose agreements, rules, limitations, and various movements of goods, people, and ideas. It is the action of the states “in the center of the international relations”, the general framework in which we will fit here. Within the framework of the state, we will take in account the interest of the state itself, its initiatives, its government’s actions, decisions, intentions, as well as personal interests, powers, capacities and safety.

To explain the Romanian international relations, we need to understand two simultaneous forces: the ‘major forces’ which created the framework of the state and determined it’s ‘character’, and the

\textsuperscript{32} Macleod, Alex (dir.) and O’meara Dan (dir.). Théorie des relations internationales. Contestations et résistances. (Theory of International Relations. Contestation and Resistance). Outremont, QC: Athéna éditions and CEPES, 2007. Translated by Marc Bonnemains


\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. p. 55. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
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‘variable forces’ which changed in time according to the circumstances.

Pierre Renouvin understands by ‘major forces’\(^{37}\), the elements having shaped the state and having created a way of doing, a manner of being. These ‘major forces’, such as geography, history, demography, economical forces, nationalism, and natural resources are studied, in addition to other scientific fields, such as geopolitics and history. Because the ‘majors forces’ are invariable, we would like to introduce a second concept called ‘variable forces’, in order to correctly draw all the different forces in actions in the state international relations. This new concept, ‘variable forces’, adapts the shift about the local and international variation across situation and time. We explain the ‘variable forces’, as non-permanent elements changing in time such as government, political leaders, nation’s chief executive, crisis, ideological goals, economical prosperity as well international situation and can be studied by analyzing mainly the state’s foreign policy.

1.2.2.1.1 Major Forces – Geopolitics

Geopolitics, recognized by us as a ‘major force’, was defined by ancient and modern historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides, Montesquieu\(^{38}\), Henri Thomas Buckle, Hippolyte Taine and Heinrich von Treitschke. We can underline that, for a long time, the study of geopolitics had been unfashionable, largely due to its historical association with fascism. It was developed in an attempt to justify German aspirations to ‘Lebensraum’\(^{39}\) (living space) in the period between the two world wars. Several definitions have been drafted by

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\(^{38}\) More exactly: Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu

\(^{39}\) ‘Lebensraum’ is a German word usually translated as ‘vital space’. It is a concept that refers to the idea of territory sufficient to, first, ensure the survival of a people and, second, foster its growth. This territory is available in the ‘cleaning’ as the Nazi ‘Final Solution’ or the conquest, most often by the war.

This idea is generally known for being one of the main justifications for the Nazi expansionist policies of Germany during the Second World War. However, it is not considered as a ‘Nazi idea’ because it is, like many other nationalist political (for example, the American Manifest Destiny), a simple explanation of expansionism.
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different scholars as Kejllén\textsuperscript{40}, Demangeon\textsuperscript{41}, Ancel\textsuperscript{42}, Lorot\textsuperscript{43}, Lorot and Thual\textsuperscript{44}, Chauprade and Thual\textsuperscript{45}, Barret and Charvet\textsuperscript{46}, Vidal De La Blanche\textsuperscript{47}, Moreau Defarges\textsuperscript{48}, Levy and Lussault\textsuperscript{49}, Lacoste\textsuperscript{50} and Fabre\textsuperscript{51}. However, each definition deals with a specific orientation and ideology.

In order to draft a comprehensive definition of the term ‘geopolitics’, we will start by retaining three definitions. First, according to the Unabridged Hutchinson Encyclopaedia: “Geopolitics is the study of the relationship between geographical factors and the political aspects of states”\textsuperscript{52}. Emmanuel Fabre tries to give the most complete definition based on a compilation of scholars’ definition, as follows:

Geopolitics is the study of the territorial stakes mobilizing different rival powers (state powers, but also intra and inter-state). It is knowledge (science?) of conflicts, which result from the more or less violent expression of contradictory representations of a territory. It is the practical and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Kjellén}{Kjellén, Rudolf.} Der Staat als Lebensform (The State as a Living Form). Berlin-Grunewald: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1924.
\bibitem{Demangeon}{Demangeon, Albert.} Géographie Politique (Political Geography). Annales de Géographie, 1932.
\bibitem{Ancel}{Ancel, Jacques.} Géopolitique (Geopolitics). Paris: Delagrave, 1936.
\bibitem{Lorot1}{Lorot, Pascal and Thual François.} La géopolitique. Paris: Montchrestein, 1997.
\bibitem{Lévy}{Lévy, Jacques (dir) and Lussault Michel (dir).} Dictionnaire de la géographie et de l’esp\c{c}ce des sociétés. Paris: Belin, 2003.
\end{thebibliography}
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operational knowledge based on a scientific method of analysis that relies on multiple scales of time and space.53

As we can notice, the two definitions resumed relations between states and territories. However, the scholar Aymeric Chauprade introduces very well the human aspect of the relations between states. He says: “Geopolitics is the study of the will for power applied to the situations of the physical and human geography”.54 He specifies, in addition, that in geopolitics, “the power is the product of both the force of the actors and of the geographical location”.55 For Chauprade “geopolitics analysis aims at understanding the deep psychology of the states, considered, deep down, as beings; beings characterized by the constant features of their personality, but also by the fact that they face a changing environment during their life.”56 This last definition will be a better match for our study and will meet the ‘major forces’ of Renouvin.

If the study of International Relations is related to events, crises, changes and rupture, geopolitics underlines the continuity, which finds its stable character in geographical characteristics. The foreign policy of several states often seems constant, whatever happens and irrespective of the ideological changes or inversions, because the geographical environment is stable in time and has constant historical weight. To be partly compelled from the ideological analysis of international relations, Chauprade started, in his introduction to the geopolitical analysis, by saying that

the logic of the geographical map is higher than philosophy, the ideological idealism, or merely the economic logics. [...] ideology plays a part, not as a major reason, but as an instrument of propaganda, of maneuver, of foreign politics.57

55 Ibid. p. 9. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
56 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
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It will be important also to take in consideration history, because as believed Lucian Boia, “everything in this world must be explained in the first instance by history.”\(^{58}\)

1.2.2.1.2 Variable Forces – Foreign Policy

We will study Foreign policy, seen by us as a ‘variable force’, to understand the state diplomatic actions and the perception of the influence of its actions.

In their handbook of Political Science, Bernard Cohen and Harris Scott have warned, “for no two people seem to define it [foreign policy] in the same way, disagreements in approach often seem to be deep-seated, and we do not yet know enough about it to be able to say with confidence whether it may be differential from all other areas of public policy”.\(^{59}\) To draft a comprehensive definition of the term ‘foreign policy’ we will refer, first, to the Oxford dictionary definition. Thus, foreign policy

is a nineteenth-century expansion of the idea of ‘policy’, which had been in use since Chaucer to denote a government’s conduct of affairs. Foreign policy, then, can be characterized as the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.\(^{60}\)

This definition is short and of practical use with enough flexibility to incorporate the changes that have occurred and continue to occur in the nature of modern international politics. However, many materials have appeared since the sixties on foreign policy to provide us with many different views, as there are different schools of thought on international relations, or types of political ideology and theories according to different times and scholars. We have chosen a limited number of scholars for the purpose of the sensitivity of our study.


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Cohen and Harris define it as

a set of goals, directives or intentions, formulated by persons in official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the environment beyond the sovereign nation state, for the purpose of affecting the target in the manner desired by the policy-makers.\(^{61}\)

For Charles Hermann, it is “a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative policymakers (or their representatives) directed towards entities outside the policymakers’ political jurisdiction”\(^{62}\), Rosati while Jerel A. understands foreign policy to be “the scope and collection of goals, strategies and instruments that are selected by governmental policymakers to respond abroad to the present and future environment”.\(^{63}\)

Contrary to Colard’s point of view that “[the] study of the foreign policy is not related to our discipline [International Relations] either, because it is interested in the conditions under which a state power functions, acts and reacts in relation to external problems,”\(^{64}\) we will further argue that the foreign policy of the state have an influence on the country’s international relations.

Concerning the components of the definition, ‘international relations’ refers to the web of transactions across state boundaries by all kinds of groups and individuals, and ‘external relations’ refers to the same activities from the point of view of these actors as they move outside their own society into dealings with others. Neither is restricted to ‘policy’ in the narrow sense, as almost any act can be political if it relates to fundamental issues like the distribution of power or the setting of social values and priorities. On the other hand, relations must be ‘official’ to be qualify as foreign policy, because otherwise all transactions could be included in and there

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would be no inherent sense of agency or purposive action, which is what the term ‘policy’ always implies. In this sense, all external relations conducted by legitimate officeholders of the entity express and contribute to foreign policy: defense ministers, foreign trade ministers, and environment ministers may be almost as involved as their colleagues in charge of the diplomatic service. To the extent that senior bureaucrats also take part directly in high-level international transactions, they will be conducting foreign policy, although their margin of maneuver will vary enormously from state to state and from issue to issue. At the extremes, bureaucratic and political competition sometimes means that a state is running several foreign policies simultaneously.

A country's foreign policy is a set of goals that seeks to outline how that particular country will interact with other countries of the world and, to a lesser extent, with non-state actors. Foreign policies are generally designed to help protect a country's national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. This can occur as a result of peaceful cooperation with other nations, or through aggression, war, and exploitation. It may be assumed that foreign policy is ancient as the human society itself. The Twentieth century saw a rapid rise in the importance of foreign policy, with virtually every nation in the world now being able to interact with others in some diplomatic form.

According to Frank Robert, the historian Pierre Renouvin is at the origin of a great epistemological turn in the fifties. He expressed the will to exceed the concept of 'History Diplomacy' and to replace it by the 'History of International Relations'. But “this global point of view, which goes beyond classical boundaries and historical periods, frequently brings us to interest ourselves in the present and to observe current affairs with a much more different eye than that of a journalist or political analyst”. But what is history? In 1821, Wilhelm von Humboldt proposes his definitions of history (which will be resumed by Marc Bloch): "history is a science of men in time, science which needs incessantly to link the study of the dead to that of those who live...".

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alive”.67 In addition, Paul Veyne wrote that “history is the description of what is specific, i.e. comprehensible, in human events”.68

In the history of international relations, we have to be relative and reset our analysis “within the perspective of a long term evolution, giving it at the same time a larger scope than it would initially seem to have or, on the contrary, considerably weakening its impact”.69 Or, we witnessed the disintegration of the system of international relation following the end of the Cold War. This new era is the start of the new contemporary study that brings us to the present. We will conclude here with the thought of Jean-Louis Martres: “What is then the theory that answers these needs best? None and all of them at the same time. Each one murmurs the best solution in the Prince’s ear...”70

1.2.2.2 History of International Relations – Present Time

This thesis, in the field of the history of international relations, will cover a recent period of time which is less than two decades. We want to underline that in our thesis the definition timeline of History will be based on international historian definition and not on the French one. In this situation, how can we study the history of international relations? To do so, for the purpose of international relations history, we will develop our study in the field of

contemporary history. In France, under the influence of politics, especially for the study of the Second World War, “the present time ends up fully reinvestigating the scientific field”. The Institute of History of the Present time (IHTP), as a new laboratory of the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), was founded in 1978; at the time, it inherited the library of the Committee of History of the Second World War (CHDGM) with its acquisitions dating back to 1944. The Institute responded to the recent renewal of contemporary history research under the management of Bédarida François. We can also mention that the Institute of Contemporary British History was founded in 1986, but it took as its starting-point the year 1945; in the United States, in 1966, the Journal of Contemporary History was created for the scientists of the modern history.

Contemporary history is about advancing interpretation and understanding of our own times through an historical and comparative analysis of political and societal changes that have taken place during several past decades. The study of history in international relations in the recent past, no more than two decades in our case, is called the history of the present time, also called ‘immediate history’. “Since 1980, in order to be different from the modern history, the history of present time was defined as a chronological period during which the studied moment and its study coincided” or “as a field of research being interested only in this small fraction of the past, whose actors are still alive”.

“Contemporary history should be considered as a distinct period of time, with characteristics of its own which mark it off from the

71 Contemporary history, for international historians, describes the historical timeframe that are immediately relevant to the present and is a certain perspective of modern history. Recent contemporary history's intentionally loose definition includes major events of this Twentieth century. At contrary, French historians consider Contemporary history a period begins with the French Revolution and covers the Nineteenth century, the Twentieth century and early Twentieth-first century.


74 Noiriel, Gérard. Qu’est-ce que l’histoire contemporaine ? (What is it Contemporary History?). Paris: Hachette, 1998. (Carré histoire). p. 27. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
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preceding period”.\textsuperscript{75} in our case, we can say with “revolutionary change and crisis”.\textsuperscript{76}

Our approach will stumble on two important questions in the fields of Contemporary History study. One of these questions is concerning the working material and will be detail in the next chapter. The other one is the study of contemporary events, which we were as a spectator, a witness or even a potential actor. This status can induce a possible subjectivity in processing information and lead to wrong interpretation. To avoid possible subjectivity, we will put us with the status of observer, a person exterior to the events with a look more or less acute and critical questioning.

As Peter Catterall says, “our understanding of the contemporary needs to be shaped, not just by the headlines, or by the study of social, political or economic structures, but by how these have changed over time and been molded by the past”.\textsuperscript{77} Without history to restitute the events’ context as part of our understanding, manned by Jean-François Soulet ‘vertical’ perspective\textsuperscript{78}, there will always be the risk to give to the current fact too much importance because “this is not simply the writing of the history of the contemporary, but the explicit addressing of a series of questions which apply only to a specific period.”\textsuperscript{79} Moreover, this ‘vertical’ approach “helps thus to overcoming conjunctural analysis to highlight the recurring phenomena, the only way to express ‘principles’ or at least constant, only so as to understand what is really new in the current context”\textsuperscript{80}. Moreover, we need also to choose a ‘horizontal’ perspective to adapt to our contemporary world and its interdependence. This approach obliges to use contemporary appropriate concepts, tools and theories

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid. p. 450.
to cover this study, especially with Social Sciences, viewed by Soulet as a *sine qua non* condition of success.\(^{81}\)

In addition, we will analyse fact in the four different dimension describe by Soulet.\(^{82}\) The fact has itself a factual dimension within a perspective in the situational environment, a systemic dimension. Nevertheless, the fact generates series of reaction and representation that oblige to study the cultural and symbolic dimension. In general, the fact in which we are interesting is not isolated but an element of a serial dimension because fact is not arbitrary but has an origin\(^{83}\). With this methodological approach, the fact will become a ‘historical fact’ after being analysed with methods on multiple dimension.\(^{84}\)

As we define the methodological approach associated with the historical research field, we need to define and explain the case study approach, too.

### I.2.2.3 Case Study Theory

From the methodological point of view, we will work on a case study represented by Romania. For our approach, the case study is an ideal methodology when an in-depth holistic investigation is needed.\(^{85}\) We notice also, that “[t]he single case study is actually a family of research designs”.\(^{86}\) Our approach through the case study is, in the science of history, a part that we call micro-history and in the political science “closely similar to, that of clinical studies”\(^{87}\). Robert Stake defines the case study as being “the study of the particularity

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\(^{81}\) Ibid. p. 73.
\(^{82}\) Ibid. p. 79-81.
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and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances”.\textsuperscript{88} For Robert Yin the case study method is viewed as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”\textsuperscript{.89}

For further explanations, Stake underlines that the ‘case study’ is “a common way to do qualitative inquiry. [...] [it] is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied”\textsuperscript{.90} The interest is that “as a form of research, case study is defined by interest in an individual case, not by the methods of inquiry used”.\textsuperscript{91} In addition, “[f]urthermore, within a single case study, however defined, multiple observations of theoretically relevant variables normally can be made”. \textsuperscript{92} It “is both a process of inquiry about the case and the product of that inquiry”.\textsuperscript{93} Lamnek reinforces it with the following remarks: “The case study is a research approach, situated between concrete data taking techniques and methodological paradigms”.\textsuperscript{94} It is important to outline the fact that we can have different types of case study and with the use of the case study methodology more than one objective can be followed. In our specific case, we will choose the heuristic case study\textsuperscript{95} as defined by Harry Eckstein:

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid. In.
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[...] the case study is regarded as an opportunity to learn more about the complexity of the problem studied, to develop further the existing explanatory framework, and to refine and elaborate the initially available theory employed by the investigator in order to provide an explanation of the particular case examined.\textsuperscript{96}

The above-mentioned definition is linked to Stake’s definition, in the sense that “the purpose of a case report is not to represent the world, but to represent the case.”\textsuperscript{97}

\textbf{I.2.3 The Corpus of Sources}

Within the framework of our study, we used both primaries as secondary sources. Most of the principal sources, often accessible by Internet, are issued by governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, but also by knowledge bases containing primary documents and thesis on the subject.

Governmental sources come from various institutions such as the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in different countries: Romania, France, United States, England, Moldova, Russia... but also from various other governmental institutions indirectly involved in the topic of our subject, like the Senate, Parliament, and last but not at least official representations as foreign embassies in Romania, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) House.

International organizations sources come from the various organizations involved and which are impossible to circumvent in the international relations or regional representation. We can list, at the international level, the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and several others; at the regional level, there are the European Union, the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for Security and Co-operation in


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Europe and all the others whose list would be too long to mention here.

Nongovernmental organizations sources represent the sets of organizations working in the field of interest to us with reference to Romanian international relations. These organizations are from various countries and various sectors. For further details, you can find the entire list of sources in the bibliography chapter of this thesis.

We consulted on governmental websites, fundamental documents in which we found legal texts, official agreements, strategy drafts, action plans, but also press releases, official statements, speeches, interviews, working session reports...

It is necessary for us to mention that some of these primary sources have limited access in time and/or space, and it is one of our problem. In particular, the website of the Romanian presidency offers various sources from 1996 to 2009, the prime minister website from 2000 to the present, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2001 to 2009. Certain sources are not accessible anymore because they were not stored online, following the change of administration or dissolution of the ministry in question, especially the Ministry for European Integration. Other sources are not accessible due to the lack of authorization, availability or due to the geographical distance, such as documents at the Library of the United Nations in New York or Geneva. The accessibility of certain documents in the history of the present time, was not possible because they were subject to national security considerations and will be available only after the contemporary period. An other problem considering this type of source is objectivity. These sources contain political idea that can give a first wrong interpretation.

One retains from this stage, which consisted of identifying the sources used for this analysis, that this research has an abundance of primary sources. Contrary to other types of historical studies, the primary sources could not be used exclusively. In the field of the history of the international relations, each source brings in fact its part of the answer. Standalone, they lead most of the times to

98 We must specify here that it was not possible for us to access and consult, in the various organizations, the paper sources on the missing period, in spite of our request with these institutions and laws in Romania on the right to public information access. This refusal was justified by the confidentiality of information not being able to be released for study.
truncated realities, which can lead to an erroneous interpretation of a phenomenon. The analyzed sources are abundant, but do not necessarily have the same value for our study. It is noted indeed that certain documents provide the foundations of a new orientation or strategic redefinition. These documents are of major importance for us. It is mainly about legal texts, official agreements, documents of strategy orientation and various public statements.

Others, on the other hand, are rather regarded as being of a second order, thus we will call them secondary sources, because they do not necessarily set new realities and they only tackle our problems. These secondary sources can be press articles, professional magazine articles, monographs, experts’ books, analyses books, history books, autobiographies, etc. These documents remain necessary, since they give access to inaccessible information and reinforce our comprehension of the subject. In a pragmatic way, that thus makes it possible to confront the practical side of the diplomacy with the great principles it implies. On certain questions, these sources generally allow for better comprehension than the simple reading of fundamental texts, because they refer to information which does not show any things or which is less obvious to detect ideas during a first analysis. If we refer in the same way to the historians of the present time, we note that they commit to a variety of sources, which exceed the analysis alone of the official files; by this, we understand the official documents with public access, public records, media documents, interviews, etc. Of course, the chosen problems make that not all of them necessarily exploit the same documents, but the essence that they refer to it. At this stage, the subjectivity of the historian can be taken into account. It is noted indeed that the choice of the other sources is dependant on the vision of the historian compared to his object of study. Does that make the choice of sources arbitrary? Not inevitably. Insofar as the historian takes note of his inevitable partiality and manages to justify his choices, the arbitrary makes room for the logic. As Thierry Hentsch points out:

The link which is established between mental structures, the methodological reflexes of the researcher and the historical field in which he always works preserve something irrational, unexplainable. Rendering, in an accessible conceptual form, the intuition one has of the past (or of the present) and making this framework flexible enough to make it possible to
take information (or data) into account new and firm enough to remain coherent represent a permanent challenge.\(^{99}\)

The other sources are more regular and are related to subjects such as democratization, justice, respect of minorities, the internal political situation, laws, decrees, etc. These complementary documents were vital and allowed us to preserve a temporal thread on the evolution of the country, and the essential points in Romania’s integration in the international environment and its relations with the other states.

The careful examination of the sources independently from each other certainly makes it possible to establish the general lines, but we quickly notice the limits of such an approach when it comes to analyzing the major tendencies. Confrontation with other sources made it possible to move on to a higher stage of analysis. Thus, we could look further into our comprehension on the nature of the collaboration between the various actors and we could check for agreements or disagreements between what one observes in the analysis of the various sources. We will make a triangulation process of the sources. This process is used in the case of qualitative studies. More exactly, Stake defines triangulation as follows: “an effort to see if what we are observing and reporting carries the same meaning when found under different circumstances”\(^{100}\) and “a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation”.\(^{101}\)

By this process, we arrive to very interesting results, since this forces us to put into perspective the collected data and to integrate them in a vaster whole of knowledge. Thus, this method makes it possible to establish a reasonable distance from the source, so that we can integrate it in a broader context and release the historical process. In our case study, it will be used to determine the way in which Romania’s international relations are

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representative of the transformation of Eastern European countries, since 1989 and of the overall transformations of the international system and its new stakes.
I.3 Thesis Plan

Our thesis plan has three mains parts, starting by a special chapter explaining ‘Romania and the international situation’ describing the ‘Romania’s situation’ at the edge of the ‘89 Revolution and the ‘Post-Cold war international situation’. This special chapter set-up the background of the Romania’s situation that is necessary to understand how the country arrived to the revolutionary phenomenon. Likewise, the context of the Post-Cold war international situation changed and brought at the end of the Twentieth and the beginning of the Twentieth-first centuries two radical shifts on the international scene creating paradigm’s changes.

**The first part, ‘the change into continuity’,** presents the different presidency periods and their impact on the Romanian international relations, as well as the way to implement the foreign policy. For each presidential period, we focus on the main challenges faced and/or the important changes characterizing by the period. We will demonstrate through, this chapter, on one hand that the Romanian international relations changed, and in the other hand the continuous process and the continuity of the Romanian international relations with the previous pre-revolutionary period. The first presidency mandate (1990 to 1996) is characterized by ‘a controversial situation’ within the democratic process and the Romania international situation. It ensured the continuity of the institution and the behavior inherited from the previous communist period. The citizens’ desire for change and the will to access richness and security led to ‘the rupture’, represented by the Emil Constantinescu presidency (1996-2000). ‘The comeback’ of Ion Iliescu with the deception and the high costs paid for the change, starts a new period (2000-2004) in the foreign policy continuity. The electorate’s desire for change and the mitigated result of the past mandate (2000-2004) reinforced by the program ‘Justice and Truth Alliance’ brought ‘a wind of change’ by the election of Traian Băsescu in 2004.

**The second part** focuses on the foreign policy change and will trace the shift of the Romanian international relations ‘from isolation to interdependence’, thru dependence. We will explain the choice and the foreign policy change of Romania seeking for security within the North Association Treaty Organization (‘the security: North Association Treaty Organization’), viewed the European Union, as a Western dream for democratic and economic
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purposes (‘the European Union as a western dream’), and the relation with neighbors (‘the neighborhood’). Within NATO, we will underline the importance and the link with the United States’ foreign policy and its role as ‘World’s policemen’. As well, we will explain the challenges faced by the Alliance and the integration process building in order to accept the Eastern European Countries and Romania. We will describe and explain the Romania’s integration process ‘from cooperation to integration’, as well the new position of the country as the new ‘NATO’s membership’. Likewise, we will treat the European Union process of transformation and integration of the Eastern countries and their obligation to meet ‘the European Union accession criteria’, including the ‘accession timetable’ and the ‘enlargement process’ itself. ‘From the cooperation with the EEC to the accession in the EU’, we will present the progress accession of Romania, and the Romania’s foreign policy as European members’ state. ‘The neighborhood’ represents an important component in the Romanian foreign policy linked with history and minorities.

The third and final part, ‘Romania, a crossroads’, contains the pillars of Romania’s international relations choices and actions. We will discover ‘the others and the impact on Romania’ with different aspects as ‘the victimization feeling’ thru different examples and ‘the need for recognition’ in different fields. However, the country will feel to be in an in-between situation (‘Romania, in-between’) that we will examine thru three different axes, the ‘Romania between West (Latinity) and East (Orthodoxy)’, the ‘permanent balance between Europe (EU) and the United States (NATO)’ and the country ‘in-between geographical situation’. In fact, we will see how Romania will move ‘from borderland to crossroad’, managing the ‘complexity of the borderland’ in order to enjoy a ‘crossroad’ situation.
II Romania and the International Context

II.1 Romania’s Situation

There is so much to say on the events of the eighties, which brought the international boycott of the country and the fall of Ceausescu’s regime. Indeed, Romania was isolated not necessarily by its will, but by the consequences of international and domestic policies. This part of the subject is outside our scope of study, but it is necessary to quickly describe the reasons which led to this situation. We saw that the nationalist and independent Romanian foreign policies were a strong skill force in the previous years of the ‘détente’, between 1955 and 1978, and by the refusal of change in the eighties, they became a handicap which will precipitate the fall of the power in place. In fact “[i]n the wake of the wave of reforms that swept Eastern Europe in late 1989, Romania was increasingly isolated as the only anti-reform state in the block”.102

II.1.1 International Recognition

After a long period of recognition and opening policy by Romania since the sixties on the international scene, especially through the United Nations Organization, “a central element in Ceausescu’s activist foreign policy”103, and by a development plan at the economical and political level in all directions, we can say that

Romanian foreign policy is directed [...] at a maximum of maneuvering within present economic, defense and ideological groupings, and at increasing economic cooperation with the noncommunist world.104

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Nicolae Ceausescu, in spite of its will, wanted to show, on the international scene at the political level and the commercial level, an independent positioning from the East and an opening to the West. In 1980, Romania signed “an agreement on the trade of industrial products...” the first agreement of this kind concluded by the European Community with an Eastern European country, other than sectorial agreements. The European Community notified that “the government of Bucharest also took its distances with the thesis in force in the socialist camp.”

Also, Ceausescu avoided military participation inside the Warsaw pact by diminishing the number of troops and by cutting down military expenditure, and “step by step, the military link between Romania and the Warsaw Pact weakened”. As the following statement, uttered in 1978 at a meeting of the executive political committee of Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Treaty, explains it:

Bucharest argued there was no need to spend more money for military expenditures. On the contrary, the Romanians thought that it was necessary to reduce the costs in the military field. In this respect, the Romanian government proposed a minimum 5 percent reduction of troops and military expenditures...

Romania, in this period of the eighties, is confronted with serious problems such as economical difficulties, important foreign debts, more and more problems of dissidence, as well some problems of internal contestation on behalf minorities, and a dealing-out of the borders more and more contested by the democracies of the West.

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106 Lemaitre, Philippe. La C.E.E et la Roumanie concluent un accord commercial (ECE and Romania concluded a trade agreement). Le Monde, 30 March - 31 March 1980. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
II.1.2 Romania’s First Challenge(s)

From the eighties, “the margin of Romania’s independence from the Soviet Union has diminished”\(^\text{110}\), as Bernard Guetta emphasizes in ‘Le Monde’ of January 1980;

The foreign policy that Mr. Ceaușescu had skillfully developed during the ascending time of the détente is indeed likely to suffer from a climate of confrontation of block to block, to be much less easily tolerated by Moscow. The economic difficulties and the energy crisis already substantially increased Romania’s dependency from its powerful neighbor, by leading it to plan to resort to Soviet oil imports.\(^\text{111}\)

Dependence increased with the Eastern European countries because “the worsening economic hardships encourage closer links with the Comecon”.\(^\text{112}\)

But economical difficulties were real\(^\text{113}\) as well as the important foreign debts.\(^\text{114}\) The country lost assistances, such as the refusal of a 65 million dollar loan by the American president Ronald Reagan and the loss of the clause of the most-favored-nation in 1987.\(^\text{115}\) In fact, “[i]n the United States, pressure was put on the Senate to deny

\(^{110}\) La marge d’indépendance de la Roumanie vis-à-vis de l’URSS s’est réduite (visite du président de Roumanie à Paris) (The margin of the independence of Romania face to the Soviet Union has diminished (visit of the President of Romania in Paris)). *Le Monde*, 23 June 1980. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{111}\) Guetta, Bernard. La Roumanie demande que cesse la « politique de force et de diktat » (Romania calls for end to the "policy of force and diktat"). Ibid., 6 Jan. -7 Jan. 1980. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{112}\) Laux, Jeanne. L’aggravation des difficultés économiques incite au resserrement des liens avec le Comecon (The worsening economic hardships encourages closer links with the Comecon). *Le Monde diplomatique*, Feb. 1982. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{113}\) Le gouvernement prend des mesures draconiennes pour faire face aux graves difficultés alimentaires (The government is taking draconian measures to cope with severe food problems). *Le Monde*, 15 Oct. 1981. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{114}\) One can note it through the articles of ‘Le Monde’ from 1981 and 1982 that - ___. Les difficultés financières de la Roumanie on fait l’objet d’« échanges de vues approfondis » (visite de S. Andrei en France) (The financial difficulties of Romania made the subject of "deep discussions" (visit of S. Andrei in France)). *Le Monde*, 27 Nov. 1981. – and - ___. Les difficultés économiques ont été au centre de la conférence nationale du parti (Roumanie) (The economic difficulties have been in the centre of the national conference of the party (Romania)). *Le Monde*, 21 Dec. 1982. – but also - ___. La Roumanie ne remboursera pas le principal de ses dettes échues en 1983 (Romania will not reimburse the principal of its debts failed in 1983). *Le Monde*, 5 Jan. 1983.

\(^{115}\) Ceaușescu denied the most-favoured-nation status in February 1988.
Romania and the International Context

Romania its most-favored-nation status because of its anti-minority policies”¹¹⁶ and by the end of 1981,

Romania had accumulated more than $1 billion in arrears to foreign banks, had totally lost access to new credits, and was therefore out of compliance with the terms of the stand-by arrangement with the Fund.¹¹⁷

We can note that

With 10 billion dollars worth of debts, Romania was, in 1980, one of the most indebted Eastern European countries. On April 12, 1989, the dictator could announce triumphantly that Romania was the only Eastern European country - and probably one of the few if not the only one of all the poor countries on the planet - to have completely refunded its debts.¹¹⁸

Because of the internal situation of poverty and human rights, Romania’s catastrophic internal situation generated much dissidence¹¹⁹ and contestation, especially from the Hungarian minority.¹²⁰ The United Nations denounced the retention by the

¹¹⁸ Laguiller, Arlette. Ceux qui en occident profitaien de la dictature de Ceausescu (Those in the West who took advantage of the Ceausescu dictatorship). Lutte ouvrière, 5 Jan. 1990. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
¹²⁰ ___. Trois membres de la minorité hongroise protestent contre la violation des droits de l’homme (Three members of the Hungarian minority protesting against the violation of human rights). Le Monde, 26 March 1983. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Romanian government of one of their Romanian high-level civil servant from 1987 to 1988.121 Also

[in France, traditionally a country well disposed to Romania, attitudes began to change as several espionage scandals involving Romania became public. Likewise, in West Germany, there was concern over the fate of the German minority in Romania, and some of this rubbed off on the Hungarians.122

From 1982 to 1989, the veil fell gradually off the Romanian policy because "sixteen years after that, the West continues periodically to feel shivers of fright concerning the non-conformism, apparent rather than real, of Nicolae Ceausescu and his diplomatic freaks".123

II.1.3 The Beginning of the End

In Dupoy Georges’ opinion, Ceausescu “has always held in strict Stalinism, Romania being the country the most ‘spied on’ of Europe because of its ‘Securitate’124125. Romania was

quarantine[ed] by the international community. Amidst an avalanche of criticism from both West and East, the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva adopted on 9 March 1989, by 21 votes for to 7 against, a resolution

121 Mossu, Laurent. Epreuve de force entre l'ONU au Bucharest. Un expert des Nations unies serait retenu contre son gré depuis l'an dernier par le gouvernement roumain (Test of strength between the United Nations at Bucharest. An expert of the UN would be held against him last year by the Romanian government). Le Figaro, 9 Sep. 1988. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
124 The ‘Securitate’ (Romanian for Security; official full name Departamentul Securității Statului, State Security Department), was the secret service of the Communist regime of Romania, was founded on August 30, 1948, with help from the Soviet NKVD. The ‘Securitate’ was abolished in December 1989, shortly after the fall of the president Nicolae Ceausescu. The Securitate was, in proportion to Romania's population, one of the largest and most brutal secret police forces in the Eastern bloc.
calling for an inquiry into alleged human rights abuses in Romania, the first such investigation to be authorized in any country for five years.\textsuperscript{126}

This progressive isolation results in refusal of co-operations, assistances, denunciations on behalf of the international community, and by various governments, diplomats and Western newspapers. The Romanian international involvement was at its lowest level, being stopped by international mediators. Diplomats said that “Romania’s Communist government, long seen as the most independent of the Soviet Union’s Eastern European allies, has suffered a marked deterioration in its relations with both the East and the West, as President Nicolae Ceausescu has embraced financial tactics and extreme domestic policies...”\textsuperscript{127} In fact “Ceausescu symbolizes [today – 1986 -] all the things Gorbachev is opposing – dogmatism, lack of economic realism, personality cults’, said a diplomat in Bucharest”\textsuperscript{128}. On can notes that

‘Romania tries to play a role, but there is no role for them anymore. They are no longer regarded as a reliable partner by anyone,’ said a [other] diplomat in Bucharest. [...] Mr. Ceausescu’s domestic policies, however, have restricted Western economic cooperation in the last five years and have drawn the attention of human rights groups.\textsuperscript{129}

The international community started to react vis-à-vis the Romanian case\textsuperscript{130} because

[...]or several years, Romania makes itself conspicuous by multiplying the authoritative acts in total violation of the human rights and of the contracts signed with international organizations. Bucharest acts in its own way, according to its moods, in contempt of personal freedoms.\textsuperscript{131}

Governments also reacted. “Hungary, the German Federal Republic and France denouncing together the tyranny which is destroying Romania...” and note is to be taken that this

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{127} Diehl, Jackson. Romania Faces Eroding East, West Ties. Hérald Tribune, 30 Oct. 1986.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{130} To see: ____. Un avertissement à M. Ceausescu (A warning to Mr. Ceausescu). \textit{Le Monde}, 11 March 1989.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Rovan, Joseph. Un "Khmer rouge" à Bucharest (A "Khmer Rouge" in Bucharest). Ibid., 4 Oct. 1988. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
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[w]arning is all the more serious for Nicolae Ceausescu, as the four include not only the USSR and the Ukraine, but also Bulgaria and East Germany. These two countries are not perceived to be the climax of the movement of democratization started in the East by the Gorbachev perestroika.\(^{132}\)

We note that, in 1989, the international pressure, generated by the postponing of the negotiations with Bucharest by the Commission of Brussels for a cooperation agreement was real. Moreover, Paris called back home its ambassador, Le Breton Rene, for consultation “and the Quay of Orsay published a very severe official statement for the Romanian state”.\(^{133}\)

“In 1989, Ceausescu realized that unless he intensified his repressive policy, the whole edifice of what he called the ‘multilaterally developed socialist society’ would immediately and ingloriously crumble”.\(^{134}\) As it has been argued,

No other East European Leninist regime was overthrown by a violent popular uprising from below. In no other country of the region did the communist governments resort to ruthless forms of repression against peaceful demonstrators during the dramatic events of 1989.\(^{135}\)

But when the world situation changed,

Romania’s present and political policies are leading towards a form of self-imposed isolation which is affecting the country’s relations not only with the West but also with Eastern Europe. [...] Mr. Ceausescu is determined, as one Eastern European journalist put it, “to prove a point that Romania can go at it alone”.\(^{136}\)

But the main point was that “virtually all governments in Europe would now admit that violations of human rights are a legitimate subject of concern even beyond the frontiers of the particular state where they occur”\(^{137}\) and that “Ceausescu has come closer than anyone to provoking a war between Soviet satellites by

\(^{132}\) Un avertissement à M. Ceausescu (A warning to Mr. Ceausescu). Le Monde, 11 March 1989. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{133}\) Tren, Claire. Roumanie : les pressions internationales sur le régime de M. Ceausescu (Romania: international pressure on the regime of Ceausescu). Ibid., 18 March 1989. Translated by Marc Bonnemains


\(^{135}\) Ibid. In. p. 403.


hounding his Hungarian minority...". Of all the Eastern European countries having reversed the communist mode after the fall of the Iron Curtain during the autumn and the winter of 1989-1990, Romania was the only one where this metamorphosis was done in blood.

II.2 The Post-Cold War International Situation

The end of the Cold War did not bring the ‘End of History’ but an important international change due to a change in paradigms. Francis Fukuyama, in his book, argues that the advent of Western liberal democracy may signal the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the final form of human government.

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

II.2.1 The End of the Cold War

But,

After 1989, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union began to be reintegrated in the international system created by the West. They wanted both political integration, such as the membership of Western organizations, and economic integration, meaning more intensive links of economic interdependence with the advanced economies of Western Europe, North America and Japan.

In the same time the created situation also brings some changes in view and several problems.

**First of all,** in the nineties, “[t]he end of the Cold War marks the end of the inter-state conflict that has dominated the world since 1945 and of the Soviet-US nuclear confrontation”\(^{142}\), but it is a coming back to the First World War situation, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and “we now see a situation of great fluidity in which no bloc of states seems likely to emerge to match the US, but where the US itself appears reluctant to play the unipolar ‘Roman’ role”.\(^{143}\) At that time, there were also new threats to security, such as ethnic conflicts, nationalism, xenophobia, irredentism, religious fundamentalism and international terrorism, weapons proliferation, terrorism, political and financial instability, failed states, the impact of climate changes, infectious diseases, and poverty causing regional instability and conflicts, and casting a shadow over the initial optimism.

**Secondly,** we witnessed “the end of communism as political forces”\(^{144}\) but not the end of communism and of the communist country. There still were some countries like Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam ... We saw the victory of democracy as political reference, called “the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy [...] an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism”\(^{145}\) with the liberalism (capitalism) as economical morn. Sharing the view of Fukuyama Francis,\(^{146}\) democracy is not an easygoing process that will be implemented in one night. The democratic process needs a period of transition to be implemented.

**Thirdly,** “the break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) ... has created a situation in which, with the break-up of the pre-existing order, new regional alliances and several

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\(^{143}\) Ibid. In. p. 42.

\(^{144}\) Ibid. In.


potential hegemonies have emerged”. 147 This change, especially in Europe, brought us to the situation before the First World War, in 1914, with the problems of minority self-determination, especially in the Caucasus and the Balkans. The collapse also brought the dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), on June 30 and of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on July 1st.

The change induced by the end of the Cold War as for result to put the “United States in an almost unprecedented position across all the dimensions by which power is typically measured: economic, military, technological, and cultural.”148 Likewise, the restraint capacities of international and regional organization propels, in the nineties, the United States “to undertake limited humanitarian interventions”149 and to act as a ‘World’s policeman’ in some international problems.

II.2.2 The Millennium Development Goals

The United Nations (UN), under the leadership of the former UN Secretary General Kofi A. Annan, proposed for the new Millennium an opportunity of reflection and suggested that the globalization would become an opportunity for development, security and environment through the Millennium Development Goals, because “the central challenge we face today [2000] is to ensure that globalization


becomes a positive force for all the world’s people, instead of leaving billions of them behind in squalor”.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), based on a series of international conferences and summits that took place in the 1990s, are today the framework agreed upon at the international level to monitor progress in development. The MDGs developed out eight chapters stipulated in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, signed on September 2000 in New York at the Millennium Summit, during the fifty-fifth General Assembly. The eight targeted goals are to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal education, promote gender equality, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development to be achieved by 2015.

The Millennium Summit was the largest gathering of world leaders in history that met to discuss the role of the United Nations in the 21st century. The Millennium Project was commissioned by the UN Secretary General in 2002 for developing a concrete action plan for the world to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to reverse the grinding poverty, hunger and disease affecting billions of people. In January 2005, a report was presented with final recommendations in a document named ‘A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals’. In January 2007, the Millennium Project secretariat team was integrated into the United Nations Development Program (UNPD), which assists countries in preparing and implementing MDG-based national development strategies in partnership with other organizations of the UN system. All countries took part - as well Romania - in the MDG program and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) played a crucial role in assisting countries in drafting the first Millennium Development Goals Country Report (MDGR), tailored to the realities of the country.

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II.2.3 September 11, 2001

September 11, 2001 is the date of the terrorist attacks (often referred to as 9/11) against the United States of America, on the World Trade Center (Twin Towers) in New York and on the Pentagon in Washington D.C. These actions were a series of coordinated suicide attacks done by al-Qaeda upon the United States.

These attacks have an historical impact on the United States. First, the American soil was rarely touched by attacks. These attacks were the British offensive in 1812, the Pearl Harbor attack in 1942 and the ‘Axis force’ attacks on the American coast during the Second War World. Second, it is one of the rare terrorist attacks in the United States (World Trade Center in 1993, Oklahoma City in 1995, Olympic games in Atlanta in 1996), but the most murderous terrorist attack of the Contemporary History.

The United States reacted immediately, both at domestic and international level. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the Bush administration declared war on terrorism, with the stated goals of bringing Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to justice and preventing the emergence of other terrorist networks. These goals would be accomplished by various means, including economic and military sanctions against states perceived as harboring terrorists and increasing global surveillance and intelligence sharing. The United States passed the USA PATRIOT Act\textsuperscript{153}, an Act of Congress that United States President George W. Bush signed into law on October 26, 2001.\textsuperscript{154} One month after, the United States led a broad coalition of international forces for harboring the Al-Qaeda organization, and removing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

In addition, there was a worldwide reaction to these terrorist attacks. The NATO council stated that the attacks on the United States were considered as an armed attack on all NATO members and, as such, NATO activated Article V of the charter of the North

\textsuperscript{153} USA PATRIOT Act: the acronym stands for ‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism’ Act of 2001

Atlantic Treaty of 1949. This was the first time in NATO’s history that the collective defense obligation in the treaty had been activated. These attacks were denounced by mainstream media and governments worldwide. Across the globe, nations offered pro-American support and solidarity. Leaders in most Middle East countries, including Afghanistan, condemned the attacks. For NATO, the fight against terrorism becomes “a permanent agenda item and priority”, confirmed by the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance’s principal decision-making body.

Likewise, the attack changed the United States alliances by strengthening relations with some other countries, such as Russia. 

155 Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.


159 Ibid.

because of this tragic event.\textsuperscript{161} The council, which oversees relations between the two former cold war enemies, said NATO and Russia would intensify their cooperation to fight the scourge of terrorism. “NATO and Russia call on the entire international community to unite in the struggle against terrorism,”\textsuperscript{162} the statement says.

Russia's support for the United States and the alliance as a whole was unusually forthright rooted in what Moscow perceived as a common cause: the fight against Islamic radicalism. Russia portrayed the war in Chechnya as a struggle against Islamic fanatics and blamed the same forces for the instability on its southern borders.

The End of the Cold War led the US global role to be involved in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions, as well as in nation building. From 1989 to 2001, there was a series of dangers and conflicts, mentioned above, and the United States intervened in a number of local or regional conflicts\textsuperscript{163}. During this period, the United States had a situation of primacy across multiple dimensions, and supported “ideas concerning a new world order, assertive multilateralism, and a strategy of engagement and enlargement to encourage the spread of democracies and market economies.”\textsuperscript{164} Also, the United States was acting in concert with other powers and with international organization and took the lead in supporting democratic peace. The President Bill Clinton’s and its government “priorities were expanding democracy, free markets, and preparing the US for the challenges of globalization”.\textsuperscript{165} But George W. Bush adopted an “unilateralist approach during the first term in office”\textsuperscript{166} and “the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{161} Countries around the world are sharing the grief of the U.S. as it becomes clear that hundreds of their citizens were caught in the terrorist attacks on New York [online]. CNN.com WORLD, September 14, 2001, [cited 23 June 2007].
\bibitem{166} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
September 2001 terrorist attacks led to a major change in US foreign policy.\textsuperscript{167}

The United State’s National Security Strategy\textsuperscript{168} defined a new doctrine, known as the Bush Doctrine, with the right to aggressively secure itself from countries that harbor or give aid to terrorist groups. The new US grand strategy allowed the United States to depose foreign regimes that represented a potential or perceived threat to their security. Their foreign policy encourages democracy around the world, especially in the Middle East with a willingness to pursue U.S. military interests in a unilateral way. In summary, the Bush Doctrine is based on unilaterism, attacking countries that harbor terrorists, with preventive strikes and democratic regime change. This event (9/11) brought about a big change in the paradigm of international relations. The Cold War period, with the East-West separation and Communism-Capitalism separation – will be replaced by democracy and by the fight against terrorism.

\section*{II.3 The Paradigm’s Change}

The change of paradigm in international relations, as well as in International Relations discipline, was done at the first round after the end of the Cold War and for the second round after the 9/11 attack and brings a new World order.

\subsection*{II.3.1 The Human Rights as an International Issue}

The human rights field, as well as the protection of minorities, became more important in international politics and “has been an established subject of international relation for only half a century\textsuperscript{169}, representing an important point in the foreign policy of many states

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.


such as the Unites States in the mid-seventies, as well for Western European countries. The frozen situation induced by the Cold War through “an intense ideological struggle”\textsuperscript{170} maintained a status quo on the question reinforced by geopolitical consideration until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But the Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975, “introduced human rights into the mainstream of U.S.-Soviet relations”\textsuperscript{171} and brought a modification in the question between democratic and communist countries. The seventies “was also the decade in which nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with human rights emerged as a notable international political force”\textsuperscript{172} and we saw the growing influence of international organization in this field.

At the end of the Cold War, the collapse of numerous states, due to interethnic conflicts such as the former Yugoslavia, has increasingly brings recognition for the protection of minorities as an important guarantee of political and social stability as well the territorial integrity of states. This situation increased the attention, at the international level, drawn to the protection of minorities, particularly since the early 1990s. The end of Cold War strengthened international human rights efforts. In 1992, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the ‘Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’.\textsuperscript{173} The declaration defined the rights of members of minorities for the first time and guaranteed the right of persons belonging to ethnic minorities to practice their own language, culture and religion (article 27). This question is also a core issue of the Council of Europe which adopted the ‘Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’\textsuperscript{174} in February 1995, entered in force in 1998, convention that set the principles of action for national minorities’ protection. The protection of national minorities is one of the four priority areas in cooperation between the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

\textsuperscript{170} Human Rights in Brief Ibid. p. 8.
\textsuperscript{171} Human Rights in Brief Ibid. p. 11.
\textsuperscript{172} Human Rights in Brief Ibid. p. 13.
The United States, along its history, “has played a special role in the development and support of human rights ideas and practices”\textsuperscript{175}, values as underlined by the Declaration of Independence written by Thomas Jefferson in 1776:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable [inalienable] Rights that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. To secure these Rights, Governments is instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its Powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.\textsuperscript{176}

But the special role played by the United States was limited and conditioned upon the national interest, such as during the Cold War period, when “the United States was [...] willing human rights lapses in “friendly” anti-Communist regimes”\textsuperscript{177}, and “supported some brutal military dictatorships, providing them with financial and military support so long as they supported U.S. economic and geopolitical interests”\textsuperscript{178}. In the recent period, the United States was also criticized about treatment of some suspected terrorists, as the prisoner abuse during the Iraqi War. In fact, “[t]he boundaries of rights in instances of conflicts involving terrorists - who, after all, are out to destroy everybody’s rights - are still being debated in civilized societies.”\textsuperscript{179} But, on the contrary “the United States also has a long record of positive international actions on behalf of human rights. And, with the end of the Cold War, the United States has emerged as


\textsuperscript{178}___, Human Rights in Brief Ibid. p. 23.

a leader in multilateral human rights and humanitarian initiatives in Somalia, Sudan, Haiti, Bosnia, and other countries.”

II.3.2 The Modern Globalization Phenomena

The definitions of globalization abound in the scientific literature, and cause some confusion about the use of the term. There is a large amount of documents in this regard and it would be unrealistic to undertake a comprehensive review of the literature. We therefore chose to focus on recent writings (most of which were published after 1995) dealing with political and economic aspects of globalization as from Jean-luc Ferrandéry,181 Antoine Ayoub,182 Anthony Mcgrew,183 Boukhalfa Kherdjemil,184 Stepehn Krasner,185 Jan Nederveen Pieterse,186 Tom G. Palmer,187 John Urry,188 Thomas L. Freidman,189 Noam Chomsky and Sum Woo Lee.190

Globalization can mean a various-border flow, interdependence or trans-nationalization of governance. Stephen Krasner explains that

180 Ibid.
globalization is “the increase in international flows of ideas, people, goods, and factors.” Globalization is the transformational process of local or regional phenomena into a global one, and can be described as a process unifying into a single society and functioning together with people of the entire world. This process is a combination of economic, technological, socio-cultural and political forces. Globalization is often used to refer to economic globalization that is integration of national economies into the international, economy through trade, foreign direct investment, capital flows, migration, and the spread of technology. Because the definition of globalization varies among theorists, we will provide some additional definitions. Tom Palmer, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, defines globalization as “the diminution or elimination of state-enforced restrictions on exchanges across borders and the increasingly integrated and complex global system of production and exchange that has emerged as a result.” Thomas L. Friedman, “examines the impact of the ‘flattening’ of the globe”, and argues that globalizes trade, outsourcing, supply-chaining, and political forces have changed the world permanently, for both better and worse. He also argues that the pace of globalization is quickening and will continue to have a growing impact on business organization and practice. According to Noam Chomsky, the word globalization is also used in a doctrinal sense to describe the neo-liberal form of economic globalization. From these definitions, every mainstream academic focuses on the dimension that seems most relevant. For example, some academics

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195 Thomas L. Friedman is the ‘Foreign Affairs’ columnist at The New York Times.
as Manuel Castells, a sociologist, focus on the link between economic and social dimensions. Others, such as John Urry, emphasize the increasing complexity that characterizes all human exchanges (economic, cultural and political). Also, the term and its popularity are related to development issues, as evidenced by Jan Nederveen Pieterse, professor in globalization at the University of Maastricht. The controversy that affected the academics reflects the existence of a global debate, and also the terms globalization and ‘mondialisation’, with the meaning assigned to them being based on the views and current thinking by enunciators.

In addition, Herman E. Daly considers that the terms ‘internationalization’ and ‘globalization’ are used interchangeably and there is a slight formal difference. In his opinion, the term ‘internationalization’ refers to the importance of international trade, relations, treaties, etc and “international” means between or among nations. ‘Globalization’ supposes erasure of national boundaries for economic purposes; ‘international trade’ (governed by comparative advantage) becomes “inter-regional trade” (governed by absolute advantage).

The most complete definition that can enclose all aspects of Globalization comes from David Held. He defines the word globalization as being

A process (or set of process) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transaction – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental

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or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.\textsuperscript{202}

For us, globalization is a multifaceted process in need of a multi-dimensional conceptualization. To conclude, we can say that globalization “is not just an economic phenomenon, but a political, cultural, military, and environmental, [social] one as well”\textsuperscript{203} and includes, “among other things, technology, culture, human rights and communication”.\textsuperscript{204} Globalization has socio-economic consequences and implications for state power and governance with impact on economy, social and politic field, as well international relations. It increases interdependence among states, society and non-states actors, “which by no means cancels out existing Nation-States or institutions and organizations, but which creates new challenges in managing and governing societies with new problems”.\textsuperscript{205}

**II.3.3 Impact of the Globalization on International Relations**

In International Relations, globalization has transformed the nature of power itself, and “power today is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game.”\textsuperscript{206} The three dimensions are represented by the military power, economy and the transnational relations, where power is widely dispersed and essentially beyond government control. This last dimension represented the nonstarter actors from multinational

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid
companies, criminal organizations to NGOs and international media.\textsuperscript{207} The last consequence of globalization is the nation-states’ growing loss of power. In view of the increasing mobility of international capital, the globalization of markets, and the integration of economies, state governments are seeing their possibilities of macro-economic action diminishing in the blink of an eye.

Susan Strange believes that the authority of all states is diminished as a result of changes in technology, finance and the integration of national economies into a global world economy.\textsuperscript{208} Also, she argues that “[t]he diffusion of authority away from national governments has left a yawning hole of no authority, ungovernance it might be called”.\textsuperscript{209} In fact

new forms of political borders are emerging, political communities are developing and multi-stratified governments are arising, such that there is a change in market governance characterized by de-territorialization of politics and the emergence of new forms of law (growth of international organizations) and new structures of power.\textsuperscript{210}

The increase of non-state actor also has an impact on prosperity, security and threats.

\section*{II.4 The 21\textsuperscript{st} Century}

The globalization of terrorism created a paradigm shift, after the 9/11 attacks, and highlighted the essential dimension of unpredictability in threat perceptions. This dimension brought a new foreign policy doctrine to international diplomacy, with the help of military terminology, called ‘pre-emptive’, or more widely known as the Bush doctrine. Realpolitiks and security questions have become

\begin{thebibliography}{99}


\bibitem{Ibid} Ibid. p. 14.

\end{thebibliography}
an important factor in international relations. Muhtarrem Ekşi, a
Caucasian and Central Asia Specialist at the Global Strategy Institute
underlines that the ‘pre-emptive’ concept shows some similarities
with international relations theories (realism and liberalism), which
understands the world as anarchic, the main difference is the new
dimension of international politics: chaotic conjuncture. This situation
signifies the end of “ad-hoc” and “wait-and-see” politics in foreign
policy making. The implication of this is not just the re-evaluation of
foreign policies but also an increase of uncertainty in the international
system, which in any case, did not reach a level of order after the
Cold War.211

"With the dawn of the 21st century the world has entered a new
stage of geopolitical struggle."212 And for Richard Heinberg, a Senior
Fellow of Post Carbon Institute, the twenty-first century ushered in an
era of declines, in a number of crucial parameters: Global oil, natural
gas, and coal extraction, yearly grain harvests, climate stability,
population, economic growth, fresh water, minerals and ores, such as
copper and platinum.213 The 21st century has created a geopolitical
gap by moving geopolitical question to Europe and the Far East
towards Asia, called by scholars Eurasia.

Eurasia refers to the combined land mass of Europe and Asia,
and is alternatively considered to be a continent, or a super continent
composed of the two continents above. Due to the cultural
differences between Asia and Europe, the historical tradition is to
consider them separate continents. This is controversial, as many
historians perceive much of South and West Asia as historically closer
to Europe than to East Asia. The earth sciences, with a more precise
definition of continent, more frequently consider Eurasia to be a
continent in and itself. The Silk Road symbolizes trade and cultural
exchange linking Eurasian cultures through history within the
civilizations in China, India, and Mediterranean as the principal
civilizations in Eurasia in early CE times. Over recent decades the
idea of a greater Eurasian history has developed with the aim of

211 Ekşi, Muhtarrem. NATO's Global Transformation and Quest for Absolute
Hegemony: Missile Defence and Energy Security [online]. EurasiaCritic. London,
212 Heinberg, Richard. The US and Eurasia: End Game for the Industrial Era?
213 Heinberg, Richard. Peak Everything: Waking Up to the Century of
investigating the genetic, cultural and linguistic relationships between European and Asian cultures of antiquity. But, Eurasia is also sometimes used in geopolitics as a neutral way to refer to organizations or affairs concerning the post-Soviet states, in fact known as Central Eurasian. A prominent example of this usage is in the name of Eurasian Economic Community, the organization including Kazakhstan, Russia, and some of their neighbors, with headquartered in Moscow and Astana. We will retain in our study that Eurasia refers to the combined land mass of Europe and Asia.

If in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, United States was the main power, today for scholar, as Richard Heinberg, the power is moving to Far East. For some scholars, Eurasia will provide a solution to the acute energy needs of developing economies. For others, it will remedy the instability created by an unipolar world. In our days, some regions become prominent, especially in Asiatic and Oceanic regions. Eurasia sustains mutation and changes and provides energy resources; Europe is in construction and in a mutation process; Russia is moving towards re-establishing itself as a ‘pole’; China is an undisputed candidate for superpower; India, a large democracy, is a nuclear power with a productive population. We can say that Eurasia will probably become a determining factor for balance of power in the future.
III  Change into Continuity

In politics, before of all, let be Romanians!

Ion C. Brătianu214

In this part, we will study the evolution of Romania’s international relations and foreign policy throughout several presidential mandates, from the first elections in 1990 until the new presidential campaign.

Aside the international political situation, at the end of 1989, there are changes on the international scene. Thus, Romania has to face foreign policy changes and difficult domestic questions. In this section, we will explain how Romania’s international relations change in the continuity of the traditional and historical Romanian international relations. We will demonstrate that, given the fact that the different presidential mandates offer alternation in the political system, Romania’s foreign policy follows the same aim all along this period. The domestic policy changes with each presidential mandate applying their program, but we will see that there is a strong link, for Romania, between the international relations of the state and its domestic politics. Even if it is outside our study theme, we will nevertheless underline the scope of domestic policy, because domestic and international politics often affect each other; domestic politics affect international politics, and vice-versa, as Robert Putman

214 ‘În politică, înainte de toate, să fim români!’ expression used by Ion C. Brătianu (August 20, 1864—November 24, 1927), a Romanian politician, leader of the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Prime Minister of Romania for five terms, and Foreign Minister on several occasions, on the 6 of July 1870 in an Romanian Parliamentary session. This expression was cited by Adrian Năstase in his declaration on the occasion of the new government’s swearing-in on 28 of December 2000, in the speech delivered at the joint session of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate for trust granting with respect to the government’s program and list.
argued in his paper ‘the logic of two-level games’ written in 1998.\textsuperscript{215} The study of Romania’s international relations between 1990 and 2009 will show four different periods corresponding to four different presidencies.

With the first mandate of Ion Iliescu (1990-1992), the domestic situation will be viewed as authoritarian and communist and as damaging to the country’s image on the international scene. The main political actions will be criticized and will slow down Romania’s recognition as a western country. We will see that government leaders will have to deal with pressures and constraints from domestic political sources, and from the international political system, as argued by Joe Hagan.\textsuperscript{216} As far as the foreign policy question is concerned, we can underline the fact that Romania will hesitate to reconsider the direction of its international situation and its relations with neighbors, and the questions about the country’s border will be difficult. The period of Iliescu’s mandates will be viewed as a controversial period (1990-1996).

In the 1996 elections, the electorate, eager for change, decided a Necessary Rupture by the election of Emil Constantinescu (1996-2000). This new government will be seen by other state leaders and by the European Union as an important step to anchor democracy in Romania. Even if the Emil Constantinescu’s presidency brings Romania to the doors of the EU and NATO, the challenge in the economic and military fields and the cost associated to the reforms displeased the population. The Comeback of Ion Iliescu, at the 2000 elections, was the sanction of the cost due to reforms implementation and the delay in Romania’s accession to NATO.

Under the presidency of Ion Iliescu (2000-2004), the adhesion to NATO and to the EU will be finalized. The government has to face the 2001 international change and the Iraqi War Crisis in 2003. The dissatisfaction of the electorate and the opposition of the ultranationalist faction bring a Wind of Change, materialized by the election of Traian Băsescu in 2004.


The new president (2004-2009) will bring domestic policy change and, following the development on the international scene, an international recognition of Romania as a crossroads for the EU and NATO.

It is important to write a few lines about the decision-making process in the Romanian foreign policy to draft all the landscape. Even if the constitutional process imposes the validation thru Parliament and the Senate, International Organizations insisted for larger collaboration with the civil society in the decision process. The foreign policy decision has been made by the institutional triangle of the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs depending on their personality and their interest in Foreign Policy. This idea has been demonstrated by Ruxandra Ivan in her work ‘Romanian Foreign Policy. 1992-2006’. But the institutions as well the civil society started to be more or less involved, pushing to comply with the EU and NATO requirements and in the same way influencing foreign policy decisions. However, when they tried to do so, the institutional triangles were so powerful that the others parties involved could not act as decision makers.

This is why this triangle has, with regard to the weight in the catch of the decisions of foreign politics, a variable architecture. It is governed by the personality of the occupants of the functions and by other contextual determinations, such as the political color, and the structure of the government coalition. [...] The political parties represented in Parliament, when in the opposition, do not succeed in modifying the decisions taken by the executive branch of. The treaties concluded by the government were always ratified, [...]. From this point of view, Romanian Parliament always expressed a vocation to get involved in the foreign policy. That can be explained, on the one hand, by the concentration of the decision-making power in the hands of the executive branch, and on the other hand, by the consensus which the Romanian political parties found with regard to the main trends of the foreign politics.

Moreover, the report on ‘Public Perceptions on Foreign Affairs in Romania’, a public survey carried out in 2005 by the Institute for Public Policies (IPP) with the support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) concluded that the political elite, as well as the public opinion “acknowledges the fact that the President of

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218 Ibid. p. 238. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Romania is the most influential factor in the country’s foreign policy.”

III.1 A Controversial Period

The first priority of Iliescu’s presidency was to open Romania to the world as stipulated in Articles 9 and 10 of the CNSF statement, published immediately after the Revolution. The Romanian leader will seek to find a solution to get out the country of its isolation thru all possible ways. Due to foreign policy makers, educated within the Marxist-Leninist style, Romanian leaders will hesitate to state a clear position regarding the relation with Russia and the orthodoxy versus the nationalism of Latinity, giving a political mix between isolationist attitudes versus a large opening and reformation as a Western country. With instrumental actions and discourses, Romania will seek to be viewed as a European country. Romania will be in-between during a large part of this period and will seek to adhere to the European Union (EU) for mainly economic purposes, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for a security purpose likewise to solve the conflicts with the neighboring countries, due to the constraints of the two organizations above. The domestic policy will have a large impact on Romania’s accession process, as the accession process will have an important impact on Romania’s domestic policy. In 1990, Romania had two important political problems: domestic and international linked with a catastrophic internal economic situation. Nevertheless, as we will see, hereafter, Romania’s bad international image will leech off the international relations development of the country and will put its foreign policy in difficult situations. The Romanian foreign policy will be manhandled by Romania’s position and most of all because the Romanian’s will is to get closer the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Romania’s bad image results from the domestic problems on the one side, and from the Romanian foreign policy on the other side.

Regarding the domestic problems, the way in which democracy is implemented, the control of the government by former communists and the strong government reaction in different domains such as minorities and civil society contestation, create the Romanian undemocratic image toward the international community. Moreover, the will of a slow implementation of economic reforms strengthen the communist image of Romania.

The foreign policy attitude towards the Soviet Union - Russia after 1991 - and the Yugoslav Republic, in the period of the Yugoslav ‘banishment’ from the international community put Romania in an ambiguous situation and brought the international community to
reject Romania and to classify the country more as a ‘Balkan country’ rather than a Central and Eastern European Country (CEEC). Romania was isolated, during the Cold War, from other Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) by its own inactive participation in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The Romanian attitude toward the issue of minorities, before and after 1989, reinforced the rejection of Romania by the other Eastern European countries. The refusal to accept Romania in the Visegrád group\textsuperscript{220} in spite of the Romanians demand in 1991 is a perfect example of the situation.

In 1990, the new president Ion Iliescu delivered his speech during the swearing-in ceremony, stating the will of the democratization process and Romania’s integration into a ‘United Europe’. In the same year, President Ion Iliescu delivered a speech at the Paris meeting of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). This speech is an interesting statement of foreign policy goals and gives some indications about what the Romanian leaders think. Ion Iliescu states:

> The new Romania that resulted after the Revolution of December 1989 adopted a policy oriented towards re-establishing historical and traditional relations with the other countries of Europe and North America, as well as towards developing relations with states sharing the same Latin culture and civilization, within the circumstances of its opening to all states. The Romanian foreign policy is focused on inalterable axioms: cooperation, understanding and mutual respect, and adhesion to international law principles.\textsuperscript{221}

In the same way, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adrian Năstase, stipulated at the Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest in February 1991 that:

> Within this context, a priority direction of action for Romania after 1989 is to promote wide partnership relations with the North-Atlantic Alliance and the Western European Union, to associate with the European

\textsuperscript{220} The Visegrád group is composed by Czechoslovakia, and after the Czech Republic and Slovakia (which were formally created on January 1, 1993), Hunagry and Poland.

\textsuperscript{221} Tinu, Dumitru. Discursul preșeinzelui României la reușinuinea la nivel înalt de la Paris a C.S.C.E. (Speech of the Romanian president at the high level meeting of the CSCE in Paris). Adevărul, 21 noiembrie 1990, no. 1-239. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Economic Community and to participate in the other remaining European structures.\textsuperscript{222}

We can see that, with any occasion - summit, conferences, meetings - Romanian officials will emphasize the goal of Romania’s access to both the EU and NATO, which consists in

\textit{the continuance of efforts for integration in the Western-European and North-Atlantic structures and, within this context, for harmonization of Romanian policy strategy and actions to basic orientations of Romania, of protecting territorial security and integrity. The government will promote a policy of consolidation of the relations with NATO and WEU [Western European Union], until the full integration of our country into the above organisms (as it is in original text).}\textsuperscript{223}

The main problem with the Iliescu’s presidency, despite the fact that the beginning of the Romanian democratic life was chaotic and damaged Romania's image, hereafter explained, it that the president is shaped by the Marxist-Leninist school, as well his collaborators. He did not know how to implement democracy in domestic policy and followed the same foreign policy way of Ceausescu's foreign policy. Certainly, it was difficult for the new president to have another way of action, different from his behavior and from how he was used to do things, especially after the severe isolation of the country from the international community. After 1989, the country is in a disastrous economical situation and needs goods, money, investments. One of the ways to get these is to rely on the country’s relations network and to apply the old proven methods that functioned and brought success to Romania in the past. In 1990, Romania chooses “a gradual path of reform, from the centrally-planned economy to a market economy. But gradualism is not an excuse for delaying reform”.\textsuperscript{224} During this period, “the economic policy of transition in Romania may be best characterized as a ‘stop and go’ policy and partial reforms.”\textsuperscript{225} Many decisions were not taken in the first presidential years after the Revolution because of the unpopular feeling linked with the measures.

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid. p. 56. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.
Only from 1993, the government started to take some measures under the pressure of International Organizations in order to meet the International Monetary Fund (IMF) criteria and to implement the transition program to market economy. Until 1992, a decline of investments, a considerable reduction of exports and the opening to the internal market with large imports dramatically damaged the economy. The fall of internal resources due to a bad efficiency of the productive system, and the increase of large import products worsened the budget deficit, the balance of payment and the whole economy. The will to buy the social stability by the Iliescu’s government and the lack of implementation of the necessary reforms such as the privatization of state companies, and the restructuring of the economical system put Romania in a difficult situation. However, in this wrong start, Romania had the opportunity to use the International Organizations (IOs), and especially its status in the United Nations, to promote a different image. Thru historical links, especially with France associated to the idea of Latinity, sharing the same culture and civilization, Romania strengthens its relations and succeeds in being co-opted in the Francophone Organization as a first step toward the democracy club and later the European Union, because “the French language has an undeniable role to play at the cultural but also economic and geopolitical levels.”

In all speeches, in all kinds of manifestations - meetings, inaugurations, colloquia, summits, and assemblies - on all occasions - state visits, Council of Europe, NATO and UN -, Romanian officials - President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government representatives... - affirm and re-affirm the will to integrate Romania in the European Union as well in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as any other linked organizations. They want to present their country as a democratic one, sharing the universal values as the other democratic states, a country shaped by its European history. This principle of repeating the same discourse, over and over, looks like a propaganda method from the Romanian side. They wanted to be sure that with time these ideas will become so normal and natural, and will be accepted as it is by foreign political leaders. Nevertheless, if on paper the Romanian officials presented Romania as a democratic country with a functioning market economy, sharing the same value as other Western European Countries; if in their mind the Romanian leaders think that the will is equal to facts, for the international actors the country is far from democracy and a

functioning market economy. As usual, we will always note a strong shift between speeches and practice in the Romanian case. At the beginning of this new area, the state and the government need domestic and international recognition due to a revolutionary question.

III.1.1 State and Government Recognition

The ‘89 Revolution toward democracy in Romania was the last one in the Eastern European countries’ process accepted for the Soviet countries. The change was accomplished in all Eastern Europe Countries in a democratic way, and only in Romania, we witnessed a revolutionary situation that ended in blood. Why may the Revolutionary situation in Romania be a problem for the new provisory Romanian government?

Many names are given to the Romanian revolution: the Stolen Revolution (Revoluția Furată),227 the Impossible Revolution (Revoluția imposibilă),228 the Obscure Revolution (Revoluția încălcită), High-level Betrayal (Trădare la nivel înalt),229 and Romanian Revolution Live (Revoluția română în direct), and many theories appeared about the revolution. For some, the Revolution did not exist! It was a ‘Coup d’état’ or a conspiracy: December ’89 and the conspiracy theory.230 One cannot forget, therefore, to ask oneself about the role played by foreigners in the Romanian Revolution, explain later in the third part of this thesis. We must write some words about the Romania Revolution, which continue to create debate: has the revolution taken place with popular uprising or/and with a ‘coup d’état’ orchestrated with the support of foreign interest? Nobody has an interest to hold at its borders a dictatorial country with a lot of misery and with a dictator speaking about having the atomic bomb!

The beginning of the new democracy faces a few important questions, for which some will never find a clear answer. The first

230 Decembrie ’89 și teoria conspiratiei.
important debate of the new democracy is the revolutionary question. This large debate brings an important problem vis-à-vis the new government recognition on the internal level as well as on the international level. If the internal and international recognition found a positive end, the revolutionary question would be debated until nowadays.

### III.1.1.1 The Revolutionary Question

As Richard Hall wrote, “[a]ny history is in fact two histories: the history being told and the history of the period in which it is being told”.\(^{231}\) Despite, the discussion between the two factions, the one for the ‘coup d’état’ with the assistance of external aids – CIA or KGB -, and the other that it was a spontaneous popular revolution, it is clear that many questions arise. This is not the scope of our thesis, but it is important to underline this aspect in several words. It is significant to answer the question because this topic will haunt the civil society relations and the political life.

Catherine Durandin affirms that “it would seem that there was, if not a direct intervention by the United States, at least an agreement between Washington and Moscow on the issue of the Romanian events”.\(^{232}\) Radu Portocala, a Romanian journalist, has written in his book ‘An Autopsy of the Romanian Coup’\(^{233}\) that he saw the direct intervention of the Russian Committee for State Security (KGB) in the Romanian events of December 1989 and mentions the cooperation of part of the Romanian army, the KGB, and a group of associates close to Ion Iliescu. Canadian historian, Jacques Levesque, published a work where he tries to define the exact role and participation of the Soviets in Romania in 1989. The Russian persons


with whom he spoke said that they were not involved but they gave their agreement to overthrow Ceausescu. Finally, as Michel Castex, journalist of the Agence France Press puts it:

\[\text{to conclude that the Romanian Revolution was a concerted company of destabilization, then from liquidation from the Ceausescu mode by Moscow, which was dissimulated behind the folding screens of the East. With for the first time on this level the recourse to a generalize media intoxication, which did us, Westerners, actors of a page of History whom we contributed to accelerate, therefore to write.}^{235}\]

But in the Tismăneanu Report, one can read that

\[\text{[w]ithout denying conspiracies against Ceausescu, woven in the Party apparatus, in the Army, in the ‘Securitate’ and in the Secrets Services, one cannot accept the hypothesis of those who claim that the fall of the regime was only the result of this kind of actions or a ‘Coup d’état’.}^{236}\]

We will bear in mind that this event is, for us, the mix of different versions; it was a spontaneous uprising, stolen by the communist nomenclature by a coup d’état done with the participation or/and the help and the compliance of foreign interests to overthrow Ceausescu. However, if the bloody revolution made by the former communist member was highly questionable, demonstrated here before, there is still an open question regarding the domestic and international recognition. This problem of recognition was in the mind of the new political leaders in order to secure their political situation.

III.1.1.2 Domestic Recognition

In the domestic policy, the new government did not have the support of the entire population. The new government called the National Salvation Front (NSF), was created officially on December

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22, 1989 after the overthrow of Ceausescu, and took the power from the Communist authorities with the leadership of Ion Iliescu. Ion Iliescu named Petre Roman as an interim Prime Minister with some members of the “Letter of the six” at the NSF leadership. The group was made up of Silviu Brucan, Gheorghe Apostol (former RCP first secretary), Alexandru Barladeanu (former deputy prime minister), Corneliu Manescu (former chairman of the UN General Assembly), Constantin Pirvulescu (former Politburo member), and Grigore Raceanu237 prominent member of the Communist Party. The group wrote an open letter in March 1989 to Romanian Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu to denounce his abuses of power and his economic policies. The letter circulated in the Western media and was read on Radio Free Europe, where it was described as the manifesto of an underground organization, the National Salvation Front (NSF).

The NSF decreed the abolishment of the one-party system and the convocation of future elections. The NSF is mostly made up of former second and third-rank Communist Party members and Silviu Brucan launched the concept of the big party238 to support the transformation of NSF into a political party on February 6, 1990, in order to be able to run in the upcoming elections. The National Salvation Front (NSF) was virtually in control of the country, showing that Communism was far from being ousted from Romania. Silviu Brucan claims that “the Romanian revolution was directed against Ceausescu, not against communism”239. As a former French Ambassador in Bucharest during the Revolutionary period, Jean-Marie Le Breton wrote:

the capacity was going to be taken in hands by people who admirably knew all the wheels of the mechanism of the [communist] state, those of the Party and, can be also, those of the services of Safety. And which, in any case, was going to endeavor to canalize the revolutionary movement, to

direct the army and, probably, to arrive at an agreement with the services of national safety.\textsuperscript{240}

The opposition parties – the Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party (PNȚCD) and National Liberal Party (PNL) – held several demonstrations in January and February 1990 against the new government. The most important demonstration was the University Square protest in Bucharest in April 1990, called ‘the Golaniad’\textsuperscript{241}, initiated before the first elections, to demand that former members of the Communist Party (‘nomenklatura’) and the former member of the ‘Securitate’ (security service) should be banned from elections. The protesters also disagreed with the official doctrine of the NSF. They supported faster reforms, a true market economy and a Western-type democracy. They protested against Iliescu's NSF victory mostly because the opposition had no chance to mount an effective campaign due to the control of media and institutions by the former communist.

The government reaction to the opposition manifestation was sudden and immediate. Ion Iliescu called the 'working class' to support the NSF against what he called the forces training to destabilize the country. This resulted in what were named the first and second Minerias.\textsuperscript{242} However, the more drastic counter-manifestation was the third Mineriad, in June 1990, meant as Ion Iliescu put it, to save the ‘besieged democratic regime’ and restore order and democracy in Bucharest. The NSF and its candidate, Ion Iliescu, won comfortably the legislative and the presidential elections on May 20, 1990, with a majority in the Deputies’ Chamber and the Senate. Petre Roman remained Prime Minister, and its government started cautious economic reforms. We would like to underline the uncertainty of the institution in place, because “Iliescu could appeal neither to the police nor the army. So he had to call on his troops [the miners],’ a Romanian political analyst said”.\textsuperscript{243} Iliescu is not sure about the institution loyalty especially in the police and the Army. The lack of domestic recognition involves a problem with international recognition.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{240}] Le Breton, Jean-Marie. L'Europe centrale et orientale de 1917 à 1990 (Central and Oriental Europe from 1917 until 1990). Paris: Nathan Université, 2005 [1994]. (Fac). p. 231. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\item[\textsuperscript{241}] The word Golaniad (Golaniada) is build from the word golan meaning hoodlum.
\item[\textsuperscript{242}] A Mineriad (Mineriați in Romanian) is the parody term used to name the successive violent interventions of miners in Bucharest;
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
III.1.1.3 International Recognition

Normally, the recognition of the new government has to be done automatically, because in international law, the state remained the same and the “recognition will only really be relevant where the change in government is unconstitutional”\(^{244}\) and normally “these changes [changes affecting the state government] have no impact on international relations”\(^{245}\). We can say that the government generally acknowledged as being in control of a nation and deserving formal recognition, the act by which other nations acknowledges that a foreign government is a legitimate government,\(^{246}\) to acknowledge the legitimacy of a particular ruler or governing structure. As explain Cate Malek\(^{247}\) and Heidi Burgess\(^{248}\), “for a long time, the U.S. refused to recognize Mao as the leader of China, insisting that the legitimate leader was Chang Kai Chek.”\(^{249}\) This example indicate that “a relationship between parties, be they individuals, groups, or nations, that is important for effective cooperation and/or negotiation.”\(^{250}\)

And “when there is a change in the revolutionary form of the government”\(^{251}\) and the

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\(^{248}\) Heidi Burgess is a Founder and Co-Director of the University of Colorado Conflict Research Consortium. She holds a Ph.D. in Sociology and has been working in the conflict resolution field, as a scholar and a practitioner, since 1979. She is also one of the primary authors and creators of online conflict resolution courses, and has edited and authored a number of books, journals, and articles on intractable conflicts, and conflict resolution.


\(^{250}\) Ibid.

desire to break away from the revolutionary government can question the engagements taken before on behalf of the state. In these circumstances, the question of recognition arises again by various manners, especially about the government.  

“The revolutionary government must, then, respect the bond taken by the former authorities”. Normally “[e]ven in the event of revolution, the change does not affect the continuity and the personality of the state and it does not recognize the state. It is not necessary to recognize the new government.” On the international scene, “there is a strong tendency [to do so] that translates the Wilson255, Tobar256 or Hallstein257 doctrines, and which consists of the attempt to make prevail a certain legitimacy and because the political considerations have an essential place on the matter”. In the Romanian case, the ‘coup d’etat’ had to be recognized inside and outside the country in reciprocal recognition for the stability of the country. The international recognition will give legitimacy to the new government vis-a-vis the internal situation and the population. The “recognition can be de jure, i.e. full and definitive, or de facto, i.e. limited and temporary. […] The Recognition is a juridical act, but also a political act”. De facto or de jure, the government recognition implies an important effect on the juridical and political aspect. It is a political foreign policy tool for the government to determine, in case of contestation, its legitimacy on the international scene regarding the viability of international representation of state attributes (Embassies, Romania’s representation within International Organizations ...).

252 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
253 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
254 Ibid. p. 73. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Normally, many international treaties guarantee the principle of non-intervention\textsuperscript{260}, but the right to interfere appears at the end of the eighties and was used in certain ways during the Ceausescu regime thru the isolation of the country by the international community. The new government will be recognized by foreign states, even if it was a high, “foreign criticism ... [about] the way the Front has conducted its election campaign, particularly Washington's decision to recall its ambassador”\textsuperscript{261}. However, the international recognition was important for the new government, also to secure the domestic situation. The Romanian leaders will use all the possible links and all possible triggers to get support from foreign political leaders. For this purpose, the new political representative will use the trigger of history and cultural proximity with France thru Latinity and with Germany thru minorities and economy. In the same way, the government will try to get support from Russia as well from the United States, by the use of balancing power. However, the contestable situation – Romania’s undemocratic behavior – has an impact on the image of Romania.

### III.1.2 Romania’s Image

After several years of isolation, Romania showed up again on the international scene, but not necessarily on the way that Romania was expected. During the first half of 1990, the state of affairs showed that Romania made a wrong start into transition, especially as compared to the way things were going on in former communist countries and that

Romania seems [...] to have cumulate[d] all the handicaps which one found here and there in the other old satellite countries of the USSR: a political vacuum which will be long to fill, an economic serious attack and risks of nationalist explosion primarily aiming the Gypsies and the Magyars.\textsuperscript{262}


Change into Continuity

At the end of the Millennium, the image of Romania is not only a political question, but also a question raised by intellectuals. The question is “the way in which Romania and the Romanians are seen ‘in the West’ by the intellectuals, the politicians, NGOs and various assistance organizations, and the image which the country has, or would have, to project abroad”. The controversial image of Romania will be issued from domestic situation generated by a problem of government legitimacy, the controversial miners’ riots interventions and the resolution of minorities’ questions. Likewise, the behavior in foreign policy will question the Romanian democratic and liberal orientation.

III.1.2.1 Domestics Problems

III.1.2.1.1 Government Legitimacy

The new President Ion Iliescu was elected on May 20, 1990 by Parliament, despite opposition accusations of electoral irregularities. “Iliescu was indeed popular, especially in the provinces, even if there were to be some doubts about the extent to which the massive 85 per cent of the votes which he received at the presidential election was truly fair”.

The legitimacy of the government is contested by the opposition and questioned by the foreign press. Journalist Veronique Soulé arises several questions trying to alert the public opinion as:

how not to see that an election of which the winner obtains more than 85% of the votes, is, basically, suspect? How not to admit that an election campaign during which Iliescu and its ’camarilla’ had a scandalously preferential access to the media (in particular on television) is a bird catching campaign? How can one not say that, while believing to elect


followers of the democracy, those being only disguised Communists, the Romanian people weren’t swindling?²⁶⁵

One question arises at that time: is it the real evolution towards democracy or only the confiscation of the power by a communist nomenclature, which wanted power instead of Ceausescu? Did the past dolphin, Ion Iliescu, took the place of the Leader as in a third world’s dictatorship with the confiscation of the power in place by force? Undoubtedly not! However, the fact in the period of time can bring questions. The power in place changed toward democracy in the other Eastern European countries, while in Romania, the former apparatus and the value system remained in place. It looks that colour and demon changed, but the whole system, including the institutions, persons, and chiefs remained the same. Several years should pass before the government would change. Nevertheless, “[a]s a result of the 1990 election, Romania had ceased to be a full single-party system, but it appeared to be dominated by a ‘charismatic’, yet also rather ruthless leader supported by a dominant party”²⁶⁶

Radu Portocala, a Romanian dissident located in France since 1982, says, “[n]either the communist party, neither the political police forces nor the army changed their nature. The NSF in power is nothing else than the old communist party made up in a hasty and shallow way”²⁶⁷ and the new constitution (1991)

‘does not stipulate the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers’ and that ‘thus the judicial power capacity is subordinated to the executive.’ It also underlined that ‘the heritage of Communism proves extremely heavy. Why? Because the stench of the former regime marked mentalities very often. The mass was assisted during decades, economically, socially and psychologically. It intends to continue to be so.’²⁶⁸

Even if Petre Roman, thru of a very controversial speech ensured that the country wanted to go towards democracy,²⁶⁹ one

²⁶⁵ Soulé, Véronique. La tache indélébile de l’épisode des mineurs (The indelible mission of the minors episode). Liberation, 18 Apr. 1990. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
²⁶⁸ Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
has the impression that the speech is in opposition to the reality. The visit of French president François Mitterrand in April 1991 is used by the government in place, but also by the opposition for a domestic fight. For the newspaper “Today” (Azi) and “Morning” (Dimineața), close to the government, this is a recognition and confidence in the Romanian young democracy.\textsuperscript{270} But,

Romania remained – in the eyes of Westerners – the guilty’s country, when its president called, in June 1990, workers-miners of the Jiu valley in Bucharest to settle their accounts with the opponents, the students, the intellectuals who remained attached to the values of freedom and a basic anti-communism background in place of faith.\textsuperscript{271}

\section*{III.1.2.1.2 Mineriads}

The main problem was different miners interventions, called ‘Mineriads’, in January, June and September 1990, used as ‘a new political instrument’ for the government in place. In Horia Roman Patapievici’s opinion, the miners’ riot was “an instrument of pressure and intimidation designed to coerce and punish forces which were felt to be threatening the security and welfare of Romania and its people”.\textsuperscript{272} On January 25-29, the first violent miners’ riot “in Bucharest was the decision of NSF to run for the general elections that were to be held in May, despite previous declarations that NSF would act only as a provisional government and not run for elections”.\textsuperscript{273} “The miners came to Bucharest and physically attacked all the peaceful protesters”.\textsuperscript{274} The second Jiu valley miners’ riot intervention – Mineriad - under the call of Ion Iliescu, took place in June 1990, after the election result and the contested winning of the

\textsuperscript{271} Préface de Catherine Durandin in Péliossier, Nicolas (dir.), Marrié Alice (dir.) and Despres François (dir.). \textit{La Roumanie contemporaine : approches de la "transition"} (Contemporary Romania: Approach of the 'Transition'). Paris: Éd. l’Harmattan, 1996. p. 7. Translated by Marc Bonnemains  
new government. The indignation of western televisions\textsuperscript{275} and
newspapers in France, Germany, United States, but also governments
from Europe and United States for the events orchestrated in
Bucharest was real. The downstream of the Romanian government
for the fight against the opposition, was so important that not only
the American government announced the stop of all assistance other
than humanitarian, but also the European Economical Community
(EEC) stopped all programs.\textsuperscript{276} We could read in the press at that time
the following comment:

Would Ceausescu have a twin? Judging it by the brutality of the
repression which has just poured, in Bucharest, on the Romanian protestors,
one would be tempted to believe it... Less than 180 minutes away from Paris
by flight, a people is deprived by its revolution and its hopes. [...] The
international community reacted quite firmly: from Brussels to Vienna,
passing through Washington, authorized voices rose to condemn these
attacks of another era.\textsuperscript{277}

We can conclude that "the sympathy and solidarity shown
towards Romania in the West in December 1989 gave way to
stupefaction and an intense wariness [...] Romania became a strange
country in Western eyes".\textsuperscript{278} This first semester situation, with the
three miners’ riots damaged the Romanian image granted to the
country and its government after the ‘89 Revolution. Not only the
first semester of 1990 damages the Romanian ‘democracy’, but also
the 4\textsuperscript{th} miners’ riot, in September 1991. This riot leads to the fall of
the Romanian Government. On the October 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1991, the ministers
of the European Community made a declaration to condemn the riot
violence in Romania. This action damages Romania’s prestige abroad,
affects all political and international relations with other states and
economical-financial programs with international organizations as
IMF, EBRD... and conditioning the international help to the setup of
economic and political reforms. Except in the Czech Republic and
Latvia, where the legislation barred former communist apparatchiks

\textsuperscript{275} Ion Iliescu - Minerida din 1990 [online]. (Ion Iliescu - 'Mineriada' in

\textsuperscript{276} To read the press of this period and in particular ___. La CEE suspend sa
coopération économique (ECE suspends its economic cooperation). Le Monde, 16
Jun. 1990. and Wajisman, Patrick. Le jumeau de Ceausescu (The twin of
Ceausescu). Le Figaro, 22 Jun. 1990. and Reuters. La CEE divisée sur l’aide à

\textsuperscript{277} Wajisman, Patrick. Le jumeau de Ceausescu (The twin of Ceausescu). Le
Figaro, 22 Jun. 1990. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\textsuperscript{278} Gallagher, Tom. Theft of a Nation: Romania since Communism. London:
from politics and public positions, a vast majority of former ruling elites was not accountable, in all other CEECs, for what they have done during the communist period. No legal barrier was instituted to forbid them to continue to take part in the political system. On the contrary, a large part of the former communist civil servants was able to convert their political influence into economic power.\textsuperscript{279} In fact, “they managed to capture enough of the denationalized state assets that, with their skills and contacts [...] they were able to re-create the same corporatist-clereteles support base they enjoyed under the old order”.\textsuperscript{280} The former communists benefited from all resources they had during the entire communist period, such as resources, networks and experiences, which the new political opposition does not have. As Thomas Baylis noted, the “widespread view of ordinary East Europeans [is] [...] that there is little real difference between the new elites and the old ones”.\textsuperscript{281}

### III.1.2.1.3 Minorities Problems

After 1989, the situation in Eastern Europe came back to the period of the inter-war, where, after the First World War and the dislocation of the Russian Empire and Habsburg Empire created many different countries, border changes, let new, and old countries remain with minority’s questions. It was the concern with Romania and its minorities, representing 28 percent of the population in 1930 – Armenian, Bulgarian, Gagaouze, German, Greek, Hungarian, Jewish, Polish, Turkish, Ukrainian – (table 1).

But, with the fall of the system, the old question came back to the surface and became a crucial problem for all Eastern European countries. Romania is not outside the problem and two minorities represented a potential big problem in Romania, the Magyar and the Gipsy minorities. Despite the signing of the Helsinki Act in 1975, Romania discriminated toward minorities and in particular the Magyars and Gypsies, especially with the old problem between Hungarians and Romanians in the Transylvania region. One group says to the other: I was the first here, on this land! “From this

moment there, all means are good to legitimate the thesis of the first.”\textsuperscript{282} We will explore this concept in the chapter ‘Neighborliness’ of the second party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percent of the total population</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians (incl. Szeklers)</td>
<td>1,431,807</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>Transylvania, Bucharest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>535,140</td>
<td>2.46%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>61,098</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>Bukovina, Maramureș</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transylvanian Saxons, Swabians</td>
<td>59,754</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>Sibiu, Brașov, Bistrița, Timiș, Caraș-Severin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians/Lipovani</td>
<td>35,791</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>Tulcea County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>32,098</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>Dobrogea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean Tatars</td>
<td>23,935</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>Dobrogea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>22,561</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>Timiș, Arad, Caraș-Severin, Mehedinti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>17,226</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>8,025</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>Banat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>6,007</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>Caraș-Severin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>6,472</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>Dobrogea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>5,785</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>Bucovina, Bucharest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechs</td>
<td>3,938</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>Caraș-Severin County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>3,559</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>Sucuș County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>Bucharest, Timiș County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>Ghirla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceangă</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>Western Moldova</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Minorities in Romania in 1930.

As D.E.M. Mihas writes, “[t]he international community, and particular the EU and the USA have urged post-communist authorities to accommodate some of the most basic demands of minorities, especially when directly related to human rights.”\textsuperscript{283} We have to remember that Romania’s lost of the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) statute with the United States as well Romania’s isolation from the international community was a consequence of the Romania’s Human Right abuse.


Change into Continuity

The minority question will be a big lagging factor in the Romanian foreign policy, and towards the accession in the European Union and NATO. Valentin Stan explained in his article, ‘Nationalism and European Security: Romania’s Euro-Atlantic Integration’, that Romania cannot qualify for Euro-Atlantic integration at that time because if Romanian officials considered Romania as “an ‘island of stability’” surrounded by chaos (Yugoslavia and former USSR), they were far from it even if they saw themselves respecting the Western values on minorities treatment. He quotes Ion Iliescu’s words from an interview with an Italian journalist, Giuseppe Leuzzi, in April 1993. The President specified during this interview that

you will find in Romania, in the legislative field, in the political and cultural practice, the most comprehensive rights for minorities (emphasis added). I think there are not many states in Europe in which national minorities have representatives in the country's Parliament. Not to mention their representation in the local administration and the education in their mother tongue. At least the Magyars have it from primary up to university education. There is a real network of schools in the areas where they live. The Magyar population has its own cultural institutions, magazines, newspapers, radio and television programs. Thus, from this point of view, there are no restrictions.

In the mind of the Romanian official and ‘on the paper’, it can be true. However, as Valentin Stan argued, the Western analysts' perception was different and for them the inter-ethnic tensions cannot allow the Romanian integration in Euro-Atlantic structures and neither in the European structures, we should add. For his demonstration, Valentin Stan went back in 1990 until early 1994 and quoted different writers such as John Mearsheimer, Hubert Hanquet and Javier Ruperez, SIPRI Report nr.5, UNIDIR Report

285 Iliescu interview with Giuseppe Leuzzi, Italian journalist (La Stampa, Il Tempo) on 5 April 1993 coted in Ibid.
nr.21, 289 Michael E. Brown, 290 Lothar Ruehl. He explains that, in 1990, John Mearsheimer underlines the ‘serious tensions’ between Romania and Hungary due to the “Romanian treatment of the Hungarian minorities”. For Mearsheiner, “this conflict could have brought Romania and Hungary to war by now [1990], and it may bring them to war in the future”. 292

In 1994, Stan reports about the rapporteurs König and Jansson for the Council of Europe, who notified that

minority matters were frequently raised during our discussions and we held a special meeting with the members of the National Council for Minorities. As far as those of Hungarian ethnic origin were concerned, we were told that their situation had not improved but, on the contrary, the Prefect in Cluj had taken new discriminatory measures and that Parliament had not yet adopted a law on minorities. 293

It is not important if the perception is true or not, but it is important to consider that the expert reports will influence any decision taken toward the country. We may underline that the experts have no particular interest if the country is inside or outside the Alliance or the European Union. In our point of view, they certainly do not have particular obsession about Romania, but they notified what in their opinion is not compatible with the Western values. As Valentin Stan points out, it is “the perception of important European bodies and Western scientific circles that indicates Romania as a stage for possible inter-ethnic conflicts. No matter what the real situation might be, this perception is of a nature to bar our country's


Change into Continuity

[Romania] Euro-Atlantic integration”.\textsuperscript{294} This point amongst others will be a brake restraint for Romania’s accession to the Alliance and to the European Union. The other question on the issue is the Hungarian minority’s possible will of independence, as after the War World II, in 1952, when a Hungarian Autonomous Province was created in Romania by the communist authorities until 1968. We want to announce here the risk with minority that as Bruce Parrott, Professor of Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins University states: “the break-up of states severely complicates efforts to achieve democratization. The process frequently triggers incendiary controversies over the national identity [...], contested borders, and rival groups’ competing claims to be the only indigenous inhabitants of their [...] country.”\textsuperscript{295} He also explains: “Democratization stands a greater chance of success when internal ethnic Diasporas are small or are willing to be incorporated into successor states outside their ‘homeland,’ and when nationalist movements in the ethnic homelands are moderate rather than extremist.”\textsuperscript{296}

III.1.2.2 The Political Problems

During the Iliescu’s presidency, Romania faces three problems. The first one was the Ultra-Nationalist party associated in the government during all the governance period. The second was the ‘Westernization’ of the political scene and the ‘Occidentalisation’ of the political elite. The third one was the President and political elite behavior shaped by their participation at a political level in the Ceausescu’s system.

During the first part of Iliescu’s presidency (1990-1992), Romania will hesitate to take a clear position toward its foreign policy: to go to the West, to be neutral or to turn to the East. The international situation during this period, 1990-1993, makes Romania hesitate to decide on the foreign policy orientation, because of the Russian power threat until 1992, of the Romanian dream about the ‘Greater Romania’ (România Mare) and of the hesitation to make the necessary sacrifices in order to achieve change in the political system, toward democracy and economy. The Romanian Government

\textsuperscript{294} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid. In. p. 10.
was constituted with some parties considered as Nationalist and Ultra-Nationalist and which influenced the Romanian policy toward a native orientation. Nationalism has been defined by John Mearsheimer as “a set of political beliefs which holds that a nation - a body of individuals with characteristics that purportedly distinguish them from other individuals - should have its own state”. He added that “[a]lthough nationalists often believe that their nation is unique or special, this conclusion does not necessarily mean that they think they are superior to other peoples, but merely that they take pride in their own nation.” But especially for Mearsheimer “hyper-nationalism was caused in large part by security competition among the European states, which compelled European elites to mobilize publics to support national defence efforts” and “[d]omestic factors - most notably hyper-nationalism – [...] also helped cause the wars of the pre-1945 era”.

We can add that Iliescu’s government influenced by nationalist has the tendency to follow Ceausescu’s nationalist policy. David Turnock notified very well this fact in his articles as follows:

“[w]ith Western-style liberalism and pluralism resented as alien to Romanian ‘indigenous’ traditions, the communist leadership under Ceausescu extolled a ‘pure’ life divorced from Western materialism and not entirely at odds with the calls of the Orthodox Church for fortitude in the face of economic stress. Since 1989, the same thinking has emerged through the politics of the national parties like ‘Romania Mare’ and the conservative wing of the Salvation Front, articulating the view that the country cannot withstand radical economic reform and must be protected by an interventionist system to support a centralized economy (through

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297 The parties in question were: the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (Romanian acronym (PDSR), the Romanian National Unity Party (Romanian acronym PUNR), the Great Romania Party (Romanian acronym PRM) and the Socialist Labour Party (Romanian acronym PSM).


301 Turnock David is Professor Emeritus of Human Geography in post-socialist countries, especially those in Eastern Europe at the University of Leicester in England.

Gabriel Andreescu and Renate Weber reinforced it by saying that

Romania is the only European country where an extremist party participates in the governance. This status held by the Romanian National Unity Party [...] as member of the ruling coalition, engenders a situation which cannot be compared, in terms of its practical and symbolic impact, to any other internal factor of instability.\footnote{Andreescu, Gabriel and Weber Renate. Nationalism and its Impact Upon the Rule of Law in Romania [online]. International Studies. Bucharest: Center for International Studies, 1995. Hypertext Markup Language. Available from: <http://studint.ong.ro/national.htm>.


Valentin Stan’s thesis is that, until the Romanian Government - at that time led by the Party of Social-Democracy in Romania (Romanian acronym PDSR) - will associate parties considered in the “West as extremists”, Romania will have no opportunity to adhere to the Alliance and to the European Union. The problem was that Ion Iliescu did not consider this party as extremist, but just as nationalist. On the other side, the country claims the belonging to the European family by tradition, history and geography, as it was during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, where “[t]he West [was] perceived [...] as ‘the world of civilization’ by the political intellectuals and extra-Westerners actors that favoured this vast movement of export [of democracy]” “[...] in Europe with the advent of the principle of nationalities which involved a bursting of the great empires (Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian)”.\footnote{La diffusion de l’Etat-nation: Bertrand Badie - L’Etat importé [online]. (The dissemination of the nation-state: Bertrand Badie - The State imported). Paris: Université Paris 1 - Panthéon - Sorbonne, 2006k. [cited 13 November 2006]. Portable Document Format. Available from: <scpo.univ-paris1.fr/fichiers/L%20Etat%20importe.pdf>. Translated by Marc Bonnemains}

“[T]he European model
became the reference of the public life in Romania”.306 According to Bertrand Babe, the occidentalization of the country by the top leaders leads to a ‘conservative modernization’, and this occidentalization is considered as a pragmatic choice of the political elite to preserve power by adopting an ideal of modernity which brings new richness to them, as well a surplus of legitimacy. This attitude aims to establish an unsteady power and to answer to the domestic problems by taking the successful recipes of the West. Adrian Severin, one of the Romanian deputies at the time, described the government of this period as “a battle between partisans of ‘the new’ and partisans of the ‘later on’ ” and recalls that he told Iliescu on one occasion: “Unfortunately, Mr. President, you still believe that Stalinism and Ceausescuism were errors made in applying Marxism-Leninism. We are of the opinion that the only ones who correctly applied the theses of Marx and Lenin are Stalin and Ceausescu”.307

III.1.2.3 International Positioning

Regarding the foreign policy, Romanian decision makers hesitated to choose a position between the East and the West. An agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Romania, during a visit of president Ion Iliescu in April 1991, despite the collapse of the communism in Eastern Europe and the diminishing Soviet Union. None of the other CEECs and Balkan countries signed such a treaty with the Soviet Union. We have to remember that in the period – 1989 to 1991 -, the Soviet Union still had an active foreign diplomacy and do not necessary allowed everything to be done in Eastern Europe as we saw during the Baltic states independence and in particular with the Soviet intervention in Vilnius (Lithuanian) during the 1991’s revolution for independence. Also during the period, the war began in Yugoslavia in 1991, on June 26, after the proclamation of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence. The war with Slovenia ended ten days later, but continued with Croatia, with Bosnia-Herzegovina until the signing of the Dayton Peace agreement in 1995. In 1992, the Security Council sent UNPROFOR to Yugoslavia to provide protection and aid supply for the civilians. In 1992, NATO provided 6,000 soldiers. A general and complete arms embargo had

been voted and put in place under Council resolution 713, on September 25, 1991. However, the Romanian image was grazed by the situation in Yugoslavia. From May 1991 to February 1992, the war period, Romania officially applied the embargo towards Serbia, but the porous border allowed supplies for the Serbian population and the country to pass with everything needed such as food, gas... The Romania population supported the Yugoslavian one. As we can read in French newspapers from journalists in the field,

[t]he population of the area does not hesitate to express its indignation for what happens to the Serbian neighbors. They do not forget that thanks to them they had been able ‘to soften’ their living conditions during the long years of dictatorship... ‘they have been our neighbors for centuries’ says an old lady... a Serb old man quotes Churchill for the occasion: ‘Friendship cannot be subjected to embargo’.

In fact, Romania’s attitude was discussed in European foreign chanceries as well by the observatories-on-place. Therefore, Romania tried to be positioned as an Eastern European country and not to be associated with the Balkan countries, viewed as a threat to Romania’s integration into Europe. Romania tried to access the visegárd group, but the demand was rejected by the group constituted by Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in 1991. We can understand that, even if Poland has sympathy for Romania, the conflicting relations between Romania and Hungary remained an obstacle to the accession. Another argument is that Romania was not classified as a Central European country.

Nevertheless, how can be defined Central Europe? Central Europe, in German ‘Mitteleuropa’, is a historical idea, a geographical space and a cultural tradition. Central Europe is under the label of ‘Eastern Europe’ within Eastern Central and Southeastern Europe, suggested by Western Europe after 1945, qualifying the European part under Soviet domination. We can say that “[i]ke Europe itself, no one can quite agree where Central Europe begins and ends”. We can conclude by citing Timothy Ash that “Central Europe is not a


region whose boundaries you can trace on the map – like say, Central America. It is a kingdom of the spirit.\textsuperscript{311} If, for the Visegárd group, Romania is not a Central European country, we do not share this point of view. As Predag Matvejević\textsuperscript{312} wrote: “Bucharest in some respects is likewise connected to Central Europe and beyond Central Europe, to Paris.”\textsuperscript{313} As well, Essayist Claudio Magris\textsuperscript{314} presents in his study entitled ‘Danube’ (Danubio) that Central Europe “follows the course of the Danube perhaps even to its mouth”\textsuperscript{315}. Matvejević reinforces the idea saying that from the Baltic Sea in the North to the Adriatic in the South, “[i]t is difficult to pinpoint the border separating Central Europe from the Mediterranean...”\textsuperscript{316} From this demonstration, Romania can be easily classified as a Central European Country rather than a Balkan one, according to the definition we used. However, we have to remember that Romania is in-between from several points of view, as we will explain in the third part of this thesis.

The Romanian image is degrading vis-à-vis the European States Union. As states by Catherine Durandin:

The image of Romania in France is very partial and information crystallizes around some realities: the fate of the children imported and dedicated to begging or prostitution in the streets of large French cities, the fate and the status of the Roma minority. The report within Romania was reduced to a security approach.\textsuperscript{317}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{311} Ibid. In.
\textsuperscript{312} Matvejević, Predag is an essayist and literary critic, a Professor of French Literature at the University of Zagreb.
\textsuperscript{314} Magris, Claudio is an Italian scholar, translator and writer, Germanist, and has been professor of Modern German Literature at the University of Trieste since 1978.
\textsuperscript{317} Durandin, Catherine (dir.) and Cărnci Magda (Col.). \textit{Perspectives roumaines : Du postcommunisme à l'intégration européenne} (Romanian Perspective: from Postcommunism to the European integration). Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004. p. 8. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
III.1.3 Latinity

The way to rebuild Romania’s image will be thru Latinity. As we will demonstrate hereafter, Latinity allows Romanians to assert themselves as compared the others. The Latinity will be used as a tool arguing for a Romanian common culture and civilization with the ancient Roman Empire.

III.1.3.1 Latine Origin

The question of the origins of Romania is a recurrent one in the Romanian history. Romanians are linked with Latinity by their origin, which was an element always and very much discussed in the Romanian history. The idea was developed and studied by Adolf Armbruster in his thesis in 1977, i.e. Romania had existed for centuries, from 275 B.C. until the 19th century, only by the name that neighbors or conquerors gave to it and by the origin and cultural difference vis-à-vis the Slavic, the Byzantine, the Hungarian, etc. This difference comes from their Latin origin. In short, different foreign sources – the Vatican, Hungarian, French, Slavic, and Byzantine – spoke about Romania or, more precisely ‘Wallachia’ as a homogeneous shepherd people with a Latin origin. They were named by the notary of King Bela ‘pascua Romanorum’ (the pastors of the Romans). The Latinity of the Romanians is not under discussion and has been admitted by Romania and the others, and becomes a political weapon each time it is necessary to construct the identity or unity vis-à-vis the others. This political weapon – Romania’s membership of the Latin community - was used by different foreign states in their political interests in relation to the Romanian people.

Latinity allows Romanians to assert themselves versus the others. This point is an important one, because it is a way for Romania to be identified as a Latin country, and by extension not a Far East or Balkan country, but an old and historical member of the European civilization and then a European country. This assertion towards one origin versus the other - Slavic - is a way to renew with Romania’s European past. One usually says that ‘Romania is a Latin

319 Ibid.
320 Ibid. p. 31-32.
isle in a slave ocean’.\textsuperscript{321} We can see, during Iliescu’s mandate, many contacts with Latin countries in Europe, as well as in Latin America.\textsuperscript{322} Romania became a member of the Latin Union in 1975, and a member of the group of the 77 with the support of Latin American countries. The group of the 77 formulated the political point of view of the Third World situation at that moment, in the seventies, thru the speeches address by his Excellency Mwalima Julius K. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, to the Fourth Ministerial Meeting in Arusha, on February 12-16, 1979. He claimed the following:

What we have in common is that we are all, in relation to the developed world, dependent – not interdependent – nations. Each of our economies has developed as a by-product and a subsidiary of development in the industrialized North, and it is externally oriented. We are not the prime movers of our own destiny. We are ashamed to admit it, but economically we are dependencies – semi-colonies at best – not sovereign States.\textsuperscript{323}

The objective was “to complete the liberation of the Third World countries from external domination”.\textsuperscript{324} This point resumes the Romanian foreign policy in the seventies and the eighties from external domination. The Latin origin and the cultural affinities allow Romania to aim, in 1991, at being a member of the International Francophone Organization (OIF). Romania became a Full member in 1993 after being an observer during two years.

\textbf{III.1.3.2 Francophony}

Francophony is a normal way to seek integration on the international scene, a normal consequence of resuming ties with French values and ideology from the nineteenth century and a step toward Europe. For Eastern European countries, Francophony has its roots in the 1848 French revolution and the emergence of the nationalism identity, called ‘Principe des nationalités’ or ‘Droit des peuples’, being equally a political and economical question in this new world situation of the nineties. It is an alternative to mark down from other historical powers or new hegemonies and it is a way to renew

\textsuperscript{321} ‘Romania is a Latin isle in a slave ocean’ is an expression used by a lot of people and enter in the Romanian history as a saying, and no one can say today the first time it was used.

\textsuperscript{322} To see at the end the appendix on foreign diplomacy.


\textsuperscript{324} Ibid. p. 134.
with economical contacts thru a large community dedicated to diversity and tolerance. Following a happy coincidence, at the Francophony Summit of Dakar in May 1989, it was decided to undergo a deep change of the organization, especially concerning its political projects, which made possible to enlarge the organization, to welcome new countries among its members. This opening permits their access to new processes of integration and globalization, which developed countries due to the opportunities that open the end of the Cold War. Independently from the reasons mentioned above, the accession to Francophony was an opportunity for Romania, in the context of the period of nineties, to diversify partners on a well-known basis. We can underline, here, that

Ceausescu has visited Africa more often than any other Warsaw Pact leader. [...] Romania’s African connection generally reflects what has been described as a multilaterally developed foreign policy, representing efforts to gain access to raw materials and markets and also perhaps an effort to boost Romania’s influence in the world political system.\(^{325}\)

The Francophony was also for Romania a way to resume its international relations, and to take a step back in Europe. It was also a way to balance with Central Europe states and the new Central European power strategy of Germany.

Beyond these general features, however, the reasons of the choice of the Francophony are related to national stories. The accession of [Romania] [...] falls under this perspective since they claim to come from ‘Français en partage’ failing to have it as official language.\(^{326}\)

Thru Latinity and Francophony, and with the link with France, Romania was seeking an economical and political support on the international scene, and anchored the country within the idea of different value from Marxist-Leninist’s one. The danger for Romania in this period was to be classified as a Balkan country and to be associated with the situation declared in the Balkan area. By becoming the first Eastern European states admitted in the


Francophony club, Romania along with Bulgaria have opened the way to the 'Europeanization' of the OIF.

**III.1.4 Romania’s Foreign Policy**

After the erosion, decline, and decay of Romania in the international community (1976-1989),\textsuperscript{327} the president, the prime minister or the foreign minister and/or other ministers travelled all around the world to ensure that Romania exists, to reinforce ties and sign treaties and contracts of co-operation,\textsuperscript{328} and put emphasis on International Organizations (IO), regional organizations and direct contact with countries. Romania was involved in all cooperation organizations in South-Eastern Europe, such as the Council of Europe (1993), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the association agreement with the EU in 1994... But in fact, we can conclude, as Robert Weiner wrote in 1984, that for the new Romanian state,

International Organizations are an important component of Romania’s foreign policy. They are an important asset that can be used by Romania to influence other small and medium-sized nations, to project its image of national independence, and to try to protect the national security of the nation. [...] Moreover, Bucharest supports international organizations like the United Nations, which it argues exist to protect the national sovereignty of its members.\textsuperscript{329}

In 1995, Romania celebrated not only the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the United Nations, but also 40\textsuperscript{th} anniversary since the country in the World Organization. In order to have a good analysis of the Romanians’ activity at the United Nations, we have to understand the historical tradition built by the country for generations. As the stage of the League of Nations was Romania’s, through the famous diplomat Nicolae Titulescu\textsuperscript{330}, the United Nations in Ceausescu period was the scene where part of the Romanian foreign policy was very

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\textsuperscript{328} To see in Annexe – Foreign Diplomacy, the list of travels, exchanges between Romanian and the World during this period.


\textsuperscript{330} Nicolae Titulescu (1882-1941), was the president of the International Diplomatic Academy, and from 1927 to 1936 several time Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was chosen twice (in 1930 and 1931) to be the President of the League of Nations in Geneva.
active, where Romania brought good initiatives and where it actively promotes a relations network to achieve power. In this ‘jungle’ Romanian official learned to discuss, negotiate, act and pressure to obtain success for them or the others.

We must underline that Romania believed in multilateralism and in the idea and concepts of peace and security, good neighborliness, regional cooperation and the strong belief in the international law. As Mircea Malitza, Romanian academician, wrote

Romania did not simply enter the United Nations with a historical or blank slate. It had historical memories, largely shared by the population, of a visible and active role in the League of Nations. During that time, Romania followed a well-designed philosophy that generally adhered to a ‘legalistic approach’ and that allowed it to make a mark on the world system.  

From January 1st, 1990, Romania gained the seat of non-permanent member of the Security Council for two years (1990-1992), during a period with high political tensions, such as the election of the new Secretary-General and the Second Gulf War between Iraq and Kuwait. It was not the first time that Romania, with its positive credit, got a seat at the Security Council (1962, 1976-77, 1990-91) and The United Nations presidency - presidency of the 22nd General Assembly with H.E. Mr. Corneliu Manescu. During the outbreak of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti War, Romania, represented by Aurel-Dragos Munteanu, Ambassador at the UN, held the Presidency of the Security Council from August 1st to August 31st, 1990. He saw the necessity for the United Nations to take action considering the respect of international law and the protection of a small state against a violation of it sovereignty - annexation - from a great power. Romania’s representative also believed that situation could create a precedent by the possible unilateral action of the United States to protect their Middle-East interest and ally and could lead to the possibility that Russia would act in a similar way in the future. As stated the Romanian Ambassador to the United Nations: “the best


332 Aurel-Dragos Munteanu (1942-2005) was the first president of the free Romanian TV and Radio (1989-1990), Ambassador of Romania to the United Nations (1990-1991) and to the United States (1992-1994). The 41th president of the United States, Georges W. Bush described him as “true patriot, a very effective ambassador and a warm human being”.

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shield for Romania is full respect for international law”. Romanias supported all the United Nations' sanctions and resolutions against Iraq, including the authorization for the coalition (United States and other nations) to carry out military action against Iraq. Romania did it despite the potential loss for Romania up to $3 billion in oil refining revenues and defaulted Iraqi loans. Romania also took part in the Gulf War on behalf of the coalition, with 180 chemical warfare experts. However, “[t]he decision affects the economic interests of the country (the losses are extremely high; Iraq's debts to Romania alone, blocked now, amount to over USD one billion”).

In 1992, during the Yugoslav war, Romania agreed to cooperate and to endorse the UN decision for embargo toward Serbia. By this decision, Romania suffered a loss of an estimated USD 7-8 billion due to the sanctions, while an increase in corruption and black market economy flourished among Romanians benefiting from the embargo. Moreover, Romania was worried because of the flood of refugees from Yugoslavia, especially from the North of Serbia (Vojvodina).

One sees in this situation that Romania did not hesitate to make a choice against its immediate interest instead of acting for its international recognition. It would be unthinkable for Romania, as president of the Security Council, to be against the decision, one the one hand and support the violation of the UN charter, on the other hand. This situation gave Romania the opportunity to assert itself as a normal international actor with the same value as other democratic countries. Romania seemed to be back in some way to the seventies, when the Romanian foreign policy used the United Nations as a platform to promote its foreign policy. It is not a surprise that

334 To see : Ibid.
Change into Continuity

Romania had a strong support within the international organization. After a long period of recognition and opening policy by Romania since the sixties on the international scene, especially through the Organization of the United Nations, “a central element in Ceausescu’s activist foreign policy” and by a development plan on the economic and political level in all directions, we can say that Romania’s foreign policy is directed in a maximum manoeuvre within economic, defence and ideological fields and an increasing economic cooperation.

The post Revolution period is in light of the Past and we will see history repeated again. Romania used the United Nations as a platform for the country’s foreign policy, and was actively involved in the United Nations Organization and the organization’s debates. For example, in the 49th session (1994), Romanian president Ion Iliescu delivered a speech on the necessity to reform and modernize the United Nations, and he addressed to the Assembly by saying that,

[t]he dynamics of the world has changed. This creates many questions for the international community, governments, politicians and political forces. So far the answers have been few and inadequate, and life does not wait. States and peoples have concrete needs as well as hopes and ideals. Their natural tendency is to act in order to fulfill them, whether or not there is an organized international framework to harmonize divergent interests. This is where the international organizations and the United Nations, in particular, have a role to play. [...] In this framework, we believe that there is a need to rethink the entire machinery and to adapt the structures of the United Nations to contemporary requirements. 339

We want to underline that Romanian leaders used the UN platform to promote the way of legitimacy and law at the international level, and to explain that the UN have to reshape itself because of the international change. However, Romania did not make such effort in its situation. We can see here a large gap between Romania’s international speech and the domestic situation. It is exactly like the discourse of Ceausescu at the United Nations platform. During his visit to the United Nations as a guest at the UN General Assembly opening, in September 1994, Iliescu took

advantage in order to meet Bill Clinton and get support toward the economic situation.

It is interesting to analyze the speech of Romanian president Ion Iliescu, to understand the goals of Romania’s foreign policy. We will proceed in this direction, hereafter, in the first part of this chapter. This speech is a good summary of the Romanian foreign policy in this period and reminds us of an already played situation. He says that “[Romania] presence at the United Nations General Assembly and at the Parliamentary Assembly represented an opportunity to reiterate Romania’s fundamental foreign policy options and to state … country’s standing on current international issues, both European and international”.

We can conclude, if Romania used the platform of the United Nations to promote its multilateralism foreign policy and a certain image of Romania, Romanian officials brought valued initiatives and reflections to the United Nations, and acted as an intermediary or initiator of many decisions. We can mention here the admission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in 1978, within the United Nations, due to the Romanian effort. Romania took part in many international operations within the United Nations, e.g. in 1996, the Romanian Infantry Battalion “Neagoe Basarab” took over peacekeeping missions in Angola.

Romania was not only a member of the UN but also of all UN Specialized Agencies, and a signatory of many important UN conventions and some other international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Romania also renewed the contact with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) “about the state of the economy and the need to start economic reforms, showing willingness in granting technical assistance in the banking, financial and budget sectors”. Member of the IMF since 1972, as the first and only ‘communist’ country, Romania benefited from the fund’s support and international credit until the eighties. In the eighties, Ceausescu’s policies and country


debts put a temporary end to the Romanian-IMF collaboration. In 1991, the IMF agreed to help Romania by a stand-by arrangement in exchange for a pledge to initiate reforms in economical and financial sectors, even if the institution’s report underlines the difficult economical situation. Moreover, Romania became member of the WTO on the 1st of January 1995, while before Romania was a member of the GATT. In addition, Romania collaborated and participated in regional organizations.

In 1993, Ion Iliescu as President addresses a letter of application to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In this letter, Ion Iliescu stipulates the high importance of NATO for Romania and “that the final goal of Romania’s cooperation with NATO is its integration in the structures of the Alliance, as full member”.342 He reminds that the Alliance is crucial for Romania and other Eastern states in order to guarantee their security in this unstable and threatening environment. In addition, he underlines Romania’s efforts concerning “its good relations with the countries in this region [neighbors]” and “the continuation and strengthening of the process of internal democracy and the implementation of economic reforms”.343 His emphasis was on Romania’s geo-strategic position in Europe and on Romania’s economical, political, military and human potentials. However, he also warns about “the drawing of demarcation lines” and the risk of postponing the integration “depending on the good will of the ‘former allies in the Warsaw Pact’ “.344 Here, considering the political and history contact of Romania with the WTO members, the President is afraid about a potential boycott by ‘former allies’. He insists many times on the fact that it will be better for the Alliance to “consider the Central and South-East of Europe as a unitary region”.345

In an interview carried out in 1993 by Jean-Baptiste Naudet, ‘Le Monde’’s correspondent in Bucharest, one can note the following remarks of Teodor Melescanu, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

> Among my objectives, the integration of Romania in the European structures remains a priority. [...] The objective of European integration remains. This is why my most important objective is the normalization of Romania’s relations with the neighboring countries, which becomes an element of stability in the area. Romania’s integration in European structures

343 Ibid.
344 Ibid.
345 Ibid.
also offers new laws to us for our relations with the neighboring states. With the European standards, we can regulate our problems with them.\footnote{346}  

Compared to the problems of borders with neighboring countries such as Bulgaria – for Dobroudja –, Hungary – for Transylvania and Hungarian minorities –, the Ukraine – for the Romanian territory annexation following the signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in 1940 –, the minister will answer “[w]ith Bulgaria, Romania already signed a basic treaty [...]. Since the Second World War no official standpoint of Romania claiming anything on Drobeta-Turnu Severin, there was not territorial claims.”\footnote{347}  

However, he outlines that “[o]n this side (Ukrainian and Hungarian), the situation is a little more complicated.”\footnote{348}  

Furthermore, he says: “[t]his is why, in our relations with Hungary, we are interested in a clear and plainly obligation (of border recognition - journalist’s note)”\footnote{349}  

and to specify, “it is impossible to solve the question of the minorities by borders change. There are no compact groups of minorities living at the border of a nearby country”,\footnote{350}  

and to mention that “[t]here are two aspects” to take into account, “first the legal aspect [...] and, in the event of conflict between the national legislation and the international one, it is the latter which prevails. [...] The second aspect, it is the practical application (material and financial problems) of this excellent system”.\footnote{351}  

He adds, “the question (of the Cluj University) belongs to the Hungarians of Romania.”\footnote{352}  

Compared with Ukraine, he notes, “the appearance of this state [Ukrainian] raises the question of the borders and of the minorities, which are the two fundamental questions”\footnote{353}, like in the relations with Hungary. In addition, he concludes:

[w]e must find the juridical language to say very clearly that Romania respects the borders which exist, that any argument must be solved by exclusively peaceful means... We hope, by the negotiation, to find means to repair the damage caused to Romania, but that does not necessarily mean a change of borders. Many other solutions can be considered for the statute and the rights of the Romanian minority in these areas [Hungary, Bulgaria,

\footnote{346} Naudet, Jean-Baptiste. Un entretien avec M. Teodor Melescanu (An interview with Mr. Teodor Melescanu). Le Monde, 16 Jan. 1993. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\footnote{347} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\footnote{348} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\footnote{349} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\footnote{350} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\footnote{351} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\footnote{352} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\footnote{353} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
and Ukraine]. One cannot demolish what was made. There is no dream of the Large Romania [România Mare].

The Romanian Foreign Minister declares that

for the first time, Romania is not the neighbor of an Empire anymore. It has completely normal borders instead of having borders with three Empires; it is no longer crushed and sometimes quartered between the Russian Empire in the East, the Austrian Empire in the West, the Ottoman Empire in the South. Romania does not have imperial neighbors anymore ...

For the first time, Romania follows its own way, in theory, and has the possibility to build its own independent foreign policy. However, as we will see by the will to integrate the alliance and the European Union, hereafter explained, it will not be the case.

The position of the Minister reflects the difficulty with the Republic of Moldova, recognized at the same time as an independent country, but also as a continuity of Romania – ex-Basarabia – as we can find in the remarks underlined here: "Romania was one of the first countries to recognize its independence (Moldova)“, but

[w]e think that the integration of the Republic of Moldova in a community of this type (CIS journalist's note) is a negation of the Romanian foreign policy because we have always tried to promote the idea of the existence of two Romanian independent states. If Moldova is integrated in the Community, one of two disappears.

Here, in the remarks of the Foreign Minister, we can understand that it is a problem for the Republic of Moldova to remain under the umbrella of Russia in the CIS. The foreign policy idea of the Romanian state will be the integration of the Moldovan Republic within the Romanian territory in one way or the other. At that time, in 1991, the independence of the Soviet Republic of Moldova created the opportunity for Romania to make an ‘Operation Per Acquisition’ (OPA) in the same style of the German reunification. The Minister underlines: “[w]e think that the line of demarcation between the Communities of the independent States must also pass by Moldova. We think that the only solution is a status of observer for Moldova in the CSI.” As the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty was denounced by the Romanian Parliament on June, 24th 1991 just before the CMEA session dissolution and after the Warsaw Organization Treaty, “[t]he

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354 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
355 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
356 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
357 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
reunification of these territories to Romania was an unexpressed goal for many Romanians..."358 It was an extraordinary possibility for the reunification option. “This was why some political circles in Romania assumed that the collapse of communism in [the] country, the breaking up of the USSR and the proclamation of Moldova’s independence could constitute the premises of the reunification.”359

In a way, the Romanian politics was not strongly focused on this option, but more on the idea of the EU and NATO integration. We would say that they did not want, at that time, to disappoint the future EU and NATO partners by a border modification within the international law obstacle; they did not want to create a precedent vis-à-vis the Hungarian minority, even if it was all about a historical land retrocession. Despite the fact that Romania denounced the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the country leaders have been attach by the borders established by international treaties, and the alteration of any borders would be counter the stability and security of the European continent. The fear of the Russian interest and reaction, likewise the presence of the 14th Russian army in the transnistrian part of the Republic of Moldova blocked the process on the Romanian re-appropriation of this old territory. We will detail suggestion and answer of this question hereafter in the second part in the ‘Neighboring relations’ chapter.

Due to the Black Sea economical importance for Romania and its will to reintegrate the International Community, the country takes part in the foundation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, in 1992, led by the Turkish initiative. However, we will see, hereafter, that Romania will try to turn from a follower into a leader.

President Ion Iliescu presents, at a press conference in October 1994, the Romanian foreign policy. He continues to say that Romania’s foreign policy is in continuity of what was defined in 1989 in the framework of the ‘Romanian revolutionary program’, as he quotes in his speech. In short, the development of the Romanian foreign policy is the exit from isolation, by confronting with the international problems within the framework of the international community. According to Ion Iliescu, the Romania’s “presence at the United Nations General Assembly and at the Parliamentary Assembly

represented an opportunity to reiterate Romania’s fundamental foreign policy options and to state our country’s [Romania] standing on current international issues, both European and international”. 360 He emphasizes that “[o]n this occasion, we’ve reiterated our openness to the world in general, and to the European and Euro-Atlantic space in particular, as a constant element of Romania’s foreign policy...” 361 He also reminds about Romania’s active participation in the General Assembly of the Council of Europe as a full member 362 on the one side, and some positive developments in the Romanian-American relations on the other side. He outlines the “evolution of the Romanian society toward democracy and the free-market economy, vis-à-vis the stabilization process of […] the domestic policy and vis-à-vis a more sensible role, as Romania’s stability factor in this fragmented zone [Balkan zone].” 363 According to Ion Iliescu, the country needs to develop at the economic level and he does not want to leave any unexploited track. Romania will develop all the necessary contacts for its economic development.

Following Petre Mihai Bucanu’s question during a press conference on 11 October 1994, about the relations with Russia, he answers that United States and Japan gave attention to Russia, and Russia is a big player, which represented some influence in the equilibrium of the zone, and if the democratic process stops, they can reaffirm their pro-imperial vocation. He considers that any economic relation is good for Romania, and Russia represents the first partner in the area and “is the first partner of Hungary”. 364 In his opinion, Romanians do not want to be “the slaves or subordinates of any other economic power” and “[f]rom this point of view, [t]here has been considerable interest in the development of economic relations, both

361 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
362 Romania becomes member of the Council of Europe in October 1993.
364 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
at the government level and within business communities”.365 “[W]e don’t want to have any pro-East or pro-West policy, pro-Russian or pro-German or pro-American policy or whatever,”366 he states. We can underline, following Iliescu’s statement, that Romania’s foreign policy wants to be independent as it was during Ceausescu’s time, a crossroads between the East and the West, the North and the South, between democracy and undemocratic countries, between developed and undeveloped economies.

President Ion Iliescu explains that his visits to China and Russia as well to other countries in the Far East were an opportunity to develop the relations with both governments, Chinese and Russian, to discuss about the development of economic relations.367 He argues:

How can one not be interested in developing relations with a country with such economic potential, with such power of absorption as a future market – one of the largest and most interesting promising markets? Being in their vicinity, we have traditions, how can we not be considering this?368

He adds that the international relations of the countries need to be an intelligence balance between different sources of collaboration and “not to be unilaterally dependent on a particular source or market”.369 It will be the main “economic strategy in [...] Romania’s future economic relations”370. For Ion Iliescu “Europe stands a chance to come back, [...] spectacularly, in several years”371 considering the natural, material and human potentials as well the intellectual potential of the countries vis-à-vis the Central and Eastern European space. However, for the President, the potential of economic development will be in traditional collaboration with the Middle East and Latin America, as well in the Southeastern and Pacific area, because it is “the hub of today’s world economic activity”.372

In conclusion, the President says that he will be faithful to the NSF statement made on December 22 to renew with the international community and to provide economic success for the country by trading with all potential partners with a balance toward future economic leaders (Asia and Pacific). He reaffirms that the priority of the Romanian foreign policy on the political, security and economical

365 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
366 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
367 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
368 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
369 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
370 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
371 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
372 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
plans is the European, Euro-Atlantic and United States space because it is “a constant and a necessity, in this period”. In June 1994, NATO and Russia agreed to set the stage for the development of a far-reaching, cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, aimed at enhancing mutual confidence and openness.

### III.1.5 The Change of Strategy

After 1993, the Romanian government, under the pressure of International Organizations such as the IMF, changed its strategy and started reforms. After 1995, it cared less about extremist parties at the government. Without ambiguity in 1996, Foreign Minister, Teodor Melescanu reaffirms that Romania’s accession to the European Union is a ‘genuine’ goal for the Romanian society “which corresponds to the national interest”. It is interesting to note that, in his speeches, the Foreign Minister qualifies Romania as a Central European country, and nothing else. This is an indication to see how Romanian official tried to avoid the amalgam with Balkan countries and to emphasize all the time their European quality. He agrees that “as a Central European country […] on an intrinsic part of the Western European democracy, Romania’s desire to become member of EU”. In brief, Romania’s goal is to be a member of the European Union as a European country as soon as possible, possibly in 2000 (the foreign minister’s words) and all the Romanian effort will be directed toward this goal as the state strategy. In this strategy, “the relations with Central European countries are a top priority for the Romanian foreign policy” thru the signing of good neighborly relations and trade treaties. Romania understood that the relation with other East European countries would be a key of the European integration, and not only by the good relations and by good trade with the Western European Union states. For Romania, it will be an important point to become a member of the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) as soon as possible, because it will reinforce the idea that Romania is an Eastern European country and increase the economic strength of the country. The statute was denied to Romania years before and the country’s officials have to make pressure on the CEFTA board thru the European Union states.

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373 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman
376 Ibid. p. 27.
It appears, here in 1995, that Romania understood the basic principle of the European Union accession, built as a national priority supported by all the Romanian political class confirmed by the signing of the ‘Declaration of Snagov’.\textsuperscript{377} As a national priority, the European accession as well the integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures will become a foreign policy priority, which will be followed not only by Iliescu’s government, but also by the next elected government. Secretary of state, Ghiorghi Prisacaru, Head of the Department for European Integration, stipulates that “[i]ntegration within the European and Euro-Atlantic structures represents the main priority in our foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{378} In the mind of the government, February 11\textsuperscript{th} 1995 meant for Romania the starting point in the competition for reform and restructuring in order to become eligible for membership with the European Union.\textsuperscript{379}

It is interesting to note that, towards the end of the Iliescu’s presidency, Ghiorghi Prisacaru wrote: “European Commissioner Hans van der Broek confirms that Romania is currently making great efforts to prepare itself for the future membership...”\textsuperscript{380} and in his opinion, “the declaration made in some Romanian and foreign policy analysis circles assuming that Romania’s chances for European Integration are lower than those of other Central European countries, ignore the steps already made by Romania towards the consolidation of democracy, a state of law and an operational market economy.”\textsuperscript{381}

We would like to underline, here, the paradox of the Romanian officials that clearly still behave as the leaders of the Ceausescu period, when the rhetoric and the wishes were viewed as an incontestable fact and the real situation was not taken into account. If, during the Iliescu’s presidency, the government made efforts to change behavior, acting more as a democratic country, there is still a long way in order to reach the Western democracy style and to reach an operational market economy, granted only ten years later, in 2004.

\textsuperscript{377} ‘Declaration of Snagov’ was signed on June 1995, by the President of Romania and all party leaders, both in the government and in opposition in the city of Snagov (Ilfov County, Romania).


\textsuperscript{379} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{380} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{381} Ibid.
III.2  A Necessary Rupture

President Emil Constantinescu took his position after the 1996 November election. He promises to the Romanian people during the election that he will bring democratic stability, economic prosperity, European and Euro-Atlantic integration. These promises will be set up at the main goal of Constantinescu’s mandate. This election is won by the opposition and turns to the right political side, enjoying the western organizations that view this alternation as a proof of democracy implementation in Romania.

Foreign chancellery saw the government’s foreign policy as a strong point. Immediately, it adopted a pro-Western stance, and early in its mandate launched a diplomatic offensive to improve the image of Romania abroad. Joining NATO and the European Union were proclaimed Romania’s top foreign policy priorities. With these objectives in mind, Romania sought to improve relations with its neighbors and signed many treaties and develops collaboration. Romania did not forget to increase visibility in International and Regional Organizations. President Constantinescu received senior foreign officials, including French President Jacques Chirac (February 1997) and U.S. President Bill Clinton (July 1997), as well the visit of Pope John Paul II (May 7-9, 1999), the first time in 1,000 years...

President Emil Constantinescu says in the speech to the North Atlantic Council on 4 February 1997, that “[t]he essential message that [he wishes] to convey is the firm option of the Romanian people to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structure, as soon as the gates of the organization open to receive new Member States”;\(^1\) For the President, the only way to guarantee democracy, to make reforms and to develop the Romanian country, is the European as well the Euro-Atlantic integration. As he states, “[t]he only big remedy for Romania is integration.”\(^2\) As the previous presidency, he underlines that both will benefit from Romania’s integration, because “Romania brings to it [- NATO, in this case -] an experience that is at the same time complex.”\(^3\) We can notice in


\(^{2}\) Ibid. p. 4.

\(^{3}\) Ibid. p. 3.
his statement the reality of interdependence of the international community, as it will be explained in the second part of the thesis.

Likewise, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adrian Severin, emphasizes that, during the Cold War, the security, stability, prosperity and democracy were maintained in the Western part of Europe because the “framework that has secured these basic conditions” were “the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union” which “have proved to be the only viable and effective structure to this extent”.\(^{385}\) Romania makes all the necessary efforts to set up good neighborhood relations with Hungary and Ukraine\(^{386}\).

However, the frequent changes in the government and governmental structures, the delays in the process of institutions democratization, the absence or failure of a long-term government development strategy, and the vacillating steps made by Romania in the implementation of reforms did not help Romania, and pushed the country to the second rank of the accession candidates.

### III.2.1 Romania at the Crossroad

Very active in the field of NATO and the EU accession, President Emil Constantinescu launched the initiative ‘Romania, at the crossroad’ (România la rășcruce) on June 1997, in order to value the Romanian geopolitical position as an economical crossroad from North to South and from East to West\(^{387}\) within the geopolitical oil context. Romania intended to be the road link between Europe and the Caucasus thru the Black Sea. The program was debated in the Romanian Parliament in 1998, and parliamentarian Dimitru Popescu underlined that “in October 1997, Mr. President Emil Constantinescu announced that: ‘Romania has managed to be included in the TRACECA\(^{388}\), and the port of Constanta will become an up rotating transport energy from the

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\(^{386}\) To see more details in the Neighborliness chapter of the Thesis.


\(^{388}\) TRACECA is the Transport Corridor Europe – Caucasus – Asia.
Caspian Sea to Western Europe’’."\(^{389}\) However "[a] month later, at a meeting [...\] in Washington [...] there was no reference, and from the expression, Romania was not even listed on the map".\(^{390}\) Actually, "[t]he project on the transit of oil to Western Europe thru Romania is of great importance for the future of [Romanian] [...] economy".\(^{391}\) In fact, this strategic initiative in the end of nineties, with the "forum ‘Romanian, at the crossroad’ [...] was a lamentable failure".\(^{392}\) It was also a political failure for the government in place. To reinforce the idea during this period, Romania has constantly improved the bilateral relations with neighbors – Hungary, Republic of Moldova, Bulgaria - and developed trilateral co-operation – Romania-Bulgaria-Greece, Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey, Romania-Hungary-Austria, Romania-Poland-Ukraine, Romania-Republic of Moldova-Ukraine - for political consultation, economic and development programmes with neighboring and regional actors in the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe Countries. To assure their role Romania develops a strategic partnership with the United States in the fields of economic, politic, regional security as well military. On the economical plan, the United States will increase collaboration and FDI in Romania.

The idea comes back thru foreign investment, as we can notice in the statement from one of the U.S. companies. "‘Because of its geostrategic position, Romania is one of the most interesting countries of the world. For this reason Romania is the perfect place for Bell’, writes the American company."\(^{393}\) However, this idea set up by Romania in order to value its position for NATO accession was not perceived immediately as valuable. “Yet at the time, President Bill Clinton had not been allured by this reasoning and had vetoed the Romanian candidature, in July in Madrid, when


\(^{390}\) Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{391}\) Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains


\(^{393}\) Neacu, Andrei. La rigueur budgétaire en Roumanie menace un important contrat militaire américain (Fiscal tightening in Romania threatens a major American military contract). Le Monde, 26 Aug. 1995.
NATO opened to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.”\textsuperscript{394} We will see, hereafter in the NATO chapter, the reason for denying Romania’s accession in NATO, on the one hand by the Russian’s attitude, and on the other hand by Romania’s lack of readiness for integration.

\textbf{III.2.2 The Challenge}

Romania has to implement political, structural and economic reforms. After more than 7 years of political and structural status quo, and the ‘stop-and-go’ of economical reforms, Constantinescu's presidency implements the reforms in the economic field with the blessing of International Organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank.

\textbf{III.2.2.1 The Economic Field}

The government implemented several National Programs for Romania’s accession to the EU. In 1999, we can read in newspapers that:

Since October, we have perceived a qualitative change in the approach and the frame of mind of the authorities with respect to the need for reforms [...] The government decided in particular on the closing of a score of government enterprises and of about thirty mines which recorded large losses, and made a success of several great privatizations, among which that of the telecommunications operator Romtelecom and the Romanian Bank for Restructuration (BRD). We have the feeling that this beginning will continue in a substantial and accelerated way in the months to come, which will constitute a strong foundation to lead to an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank, underlined Mr. Ettori.\textsuperscript{395}

But, following the strong reforms and reorganization toward government enterprises and mining, the population become unhappy and “[t]hen thousand Romanian miners [...] decided to carry to

\textsuperscript{394} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\textsuperscript{395} Rodina, Mihaela. La Roumanie réforme pour gagner la faveur du FMI et de la BM (Romania reforms to win the support of IMF and WB). Le Quotidien Suisse des Affaires et de la Finance (AGEFI), 14 Jan. 1999. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Bucharest...vis-à-vis the threats of closing of wells and their salary demands." This fourth Minerliads brings clashes between the police and miners. But the EU underlines the need to pursue reforms, even painful and reaffirms that it [EU] is determined to support Romania in the difficult process of transformation which it currently knows. The European Union recognizes that this process supposes the adoption of painful measurements for the Romanian people. The will of the EU to see Romania adhering to the European Union remains whole. The economic reforms in particular, and in particular the proposed measures by the international institutions, are of major importance to make it possible for Romania to progress on the way which must lead it to EU accession.

However, the international situation did not help the Romanian economy. Even if the foreign direct investment (FDI) started to flood Romania from 1998, mainly from France, Italy, and the United States... The Romanian government “considers that bringing two large US industrial companies into the country would boost flagging efforts to encourage foreign investment, preserve jobs and help cement economic and military ties with the US.”

III.2.2.2 The Military Field

The government drafted the change by designing

‘Romania’s National Security Strategy’ [June 1997], [and ‘Romania’s Military Strategy’] with the slogan ‘Euro-Atlantic stability and integration’, emphasizing the principle of Romania’s national security with own resources and means and by cooperating with states and security organisms from the European, Euro-Atlantic and international space.

398 A.E.F. L’UE souligne la nécessité de poursuivre les reformes, même douloureuses (The EU underlines the need to pursue reforms, even painful). Ibid., 23 Jan. 1999. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
399 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched the White Book: Romania-NATO\textsuperscript{402} in April 1997. This book describes Romania’s offer to the Alliance in the South-Eastern European space with the political cost of not being in the Alliance and the steps for NATO accession. Romania also launched the ‘\textit{Romania-NATO Individualized Dialogue’}. In November 1999, the Parliament approved the ‘\textit{White Paper of the Government Armed Forces of Romania 2010: Reform and Europe-Atlantic Integration’}\textsuperscript{403}.

Romanian President Emil Constantinescu will seek support towards the accession to NATO and to the EU. France will be a strong supporter for Romania’s accession in NATO for 1999, and for the European Union as soon as possible. Romania also had the encouragement of Turkey (June 1997), Germany (December 1997), as well as of Great Britain (January 2000). Canada will advocate Romanian accession to NATO in the first wave (April 1997), as well as Italy (May 1997). In fact, “[t]he file nevertheless is supported by the majority of the countries of Europe of the South - of which Turkey and Greece - and initially by France.”\textsuperscript{404} To lobbying the Romania’s accession decision, Romania held in the year 1997 before the Madrid Summit a number of conferences and seminars on politic and military fields about NATO integration, as also in 1999, before the Washington Summit. In Rome, on February 1997, took place the conference on ‘\textit{Romania and NATO-The place of Romania within the New Security Architecture of Europe’}. In Bucharest, the workshop on ‘\textit{Security Dimensions Regional Infrastructure’} for the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), took place on May; The seminars ‘\textit{Romania and NATO – alternatives for the future’} and ‘\textit{American Interest in the Central and South-Eastern European Geo-politics’} were organized by ‘Manfred Wörner’ Association on May. The Professor Seth Cropsey, - at the here before named seminars - from the ‘George c. Marshall’ Centre for Security Studies of Germany considers that “for the stability of Balkans, Romania remains an essential factor”.\textsuperscript{405} In 1999, the seminar ‘\textit{Romania and European Security’} took place in Bucharest,


\textsuperscript{404} Semo, Marc. L’Otan, idée fixe des Roumains (The NATO, the fixed idea of Romanians). Libération, 4 Nov. 1996. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

and in 2000, the round table ‘Romania and the Future Enlargement of NATO’. On the top of that, on the Romanian television begins a TV show on the PRO-TV channel, ‘Pro NATO Operation: Mission Possible’.

In 1996, Marc Semo, a journalist with the French newspaper ‘Liberation’ reports that

The only real guarantee of security vis-à-vis Russia goes through integration into NATO. For the first time since the war we can again freely choose our alliances and return to the West, but we have never been as isolated as now on the diplomatic side, adds historian Zoé Petre, presidential adviser of Constantinescu, the leader of the Democratic Convention (right liberal). The abandonment of Romania to the Soviet sphere of influence, agreed at Yalta, remains an open wound in the national imaginary.\footnote{Semo, Marc. L’Otan, idée fixe des Roumains (The NATO, the fixed idea of Romansians). Libération, 4 Nov. 1996. Translated by Marc Bonnemains}

After the Madrid Summit, where the Alliance accepted only three countries from Central and Eastern Europe, United States’ President Bill Clinton came to Romania, in July 1997, for a brief visit after visiting Poland and Slovenia. He encouraged the Romanian effort for NATO accession. On this occasion, the United States President launched a strategic partnership with Romania for collaboration in the areas of economy, politics, regional security and defense. But all Romanians were strongly disappointed. The officials remained optimistic for the future: “’[b]eing in NATO is our main target,’ said Colonel Mihail Ionescu, chief of the Defense Ministry’s Directorate for European and North Atlantic Integration. ‘It was before Madrid, and it is even more so now.’”\footnote{Cody, Edward. Snubbed, a Determined Romania Makes NATO Entry ‘Our Main Target’. The Washington Post, 27 Aug. 1997.} Romania drafted up the ‘Post-Madrid Acting Strategy of the Ministry of National Defense for NATO Integration’ to describe the strategy and action in order to access to the Alliance at the next Summit and the ‘2000 Armed Forces’ about the restructuring of the Romanian Armed Forces, as well the management of human resources.

President Emil Constantinescu declares, at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, that

Romania’s option for NATO is a strategic and irreversible one. I have firmly showed that in Romania there is the political will to accelerate the Armed Forces reform and restructuring process. I have underlined that such
reforms occur with people’s painful sacrifices and that the Romanian people ought to be respected for that.\textsuperscript{408}

\textbf{III.2.2.3 The Kosovo War}

The Kosovo war began in 1999 by the NATO launch of the air attack on Yugoslavia, on March 24, in order to settle the crisis in Kosovo. On April 22, the Parliament authorizes the use of Romania’s air space by the allied planes during the military operation with Yugoslavia, even if Romania broke the friendship, good neighborhood and cooperation treaty between both countries signed in 1996\textsuperscript{409} and handicapped the good Romanian-Serbian relations. Romanian president Emil Constantinescu specifies, “Romania would not take part in any operation against its Yugoslav neighbor.”\textsuperscript{410} Against the threat of Yugoslavian reaction, NATO stipulates that they will protect the Yugoslavian neighbor countries involved with the Alliance.

The ambassadors of Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Macedonia were convoked at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to receive a note underlining the possible political and military consequences of an aggression of NATO. [...] The general secretary of NATO, Javier Solana, wrote to the persons in charge of the five countries to ensure them that the Alliance would protect them in the event of an attack from Yugoslavia, one learned Atlantic Wednesday of authorized source.\textsuperscript{411}

\textsuperscript{408} Luca, Ioan (Col.). Președintele Emil Constantinescu a pledat cauza integrării României în NATO (The President Emil Constantinescu pledged the cause of Romania’s integration in NATO). Observatorul Militar, 1-8 decembrie 1998, no. 48 (467). Translated by Marc Bonnemains


\textsuperscript{410} Reuters. Roumanie-Le parlement réclame la fin de la répression yougoslave (Romania-Parliament calls for the end of the Yugoslav repression). s.n., 30 March 1999. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\textsuperscript{411} Reuters. Belgrade met en garde ses voisins, l’Otan promet de les protéger (Belgrade warns its neighbours, NATO promises to protect them). s.n., 24 March 1999. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
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However “[t]he country is torn between its Serb friendships and its candidatures for the EU and NATO.”\(^{412}\) Emil Constantinescu president’s adviser, Zoé Petre, stipulates that “[i]t should be known if we are friend of Milosevic or of Yugoslavia, but the two things are, since years ago, increasingly different”\(^{413}\). But

[t]he majority of the opposition deputys, like the ex-Communists, preferred to abstain rather than vote, at the end of April, against the opening of the airspace to NATO. But they denounced at least ‘the servility of the power’ vis-à-vis Washington. [...] ‘NATO one day will change its position on Yugoslavia, but we will not be able to change the geographical position’, insists Adrian Nastase, vice-president of the PDSR (ex-Communist), stressing that Romania did not obtain anything in exchange of its ‘engagement’, ‘nothing but promises’. At the last NATO Summit, Romania was placed on the top of the list of the countries likely to adhere, in the second wave, but nothing really precise. [...] ... one cannot help remember that Romania had lost some 7 billion dollars during the first embargo against Belgrade, from 1992 to 1995, without being compensated.\(^{414}\)

The situation becomes difficult and unpopular for the government. Romania wants to integrate into NATO and the European Union and to support the allies’ actions against the Yugoslavian neighbor, but its heart beats for Serbia...\(^{415}\) Romania is increasingly uncomfortable with the widening gap between the official rhetoric, strongly pro-Western, and its population, composed of 87% Orthodox, expresses solidarity with its fellow Serbs. The citizens disapprove and one of them says that

‘they are our neighbors since centuries. At the time of Ceausescu, they sold the goods which missed in Romania; now, it is the opposite’, explains one of these ‘ants’ of the gasoline smuggling, which, as many inhabitants of the area, lives sparsely of this traffic readily presented like an act of ‘solidarity’.\(^{416}\)


\(^{413}\) Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{414}\) Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{415}\) Chikoff, Irina de. Aux frontières du monde slave : La Roumanie veut intégrer l’Europe, Mais son cœur bat pour la Serbie... (At the boundaries of slave World: Romania wants to integrate into Europe, but his heart beats for Serbia...). Le Figaro, 14 Apr. 1999. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

As the Romanian official position vis-à-vis Serbia was not supported by the population, several demonstrations were held against NATO in Bucharest especially from Romanians of Serbian origin.\textsuperscript{417} As confirms Mirel Bran, Romanian journalist at ‘Le Monde’,

\[\text{the majority of the Romanians are solidar with Serbia. [...] The goods old day of the smuggling with gasoline ended two years ago, following the coming to power of President [...] Emil Constantinescu. The complicity of the regime of its predecessor, Ion Iliescu, had allowed the villagers of this poor mine field at the edge of bankruptcy an amazing enrichment. Thousands of tons of gasoline were transported to Serbia in spite of the embargo issued by the UN, in 1992.}\textsuperscript{418}

Not parts of the pan-Slavism, Romania are strongly linked by the religion and the Mount Athos, the spiritual center for Serbs and Romanians. Back in history, we know as Mirel Bran underlines that “[t]he solidarity of the Romanians and Serbs does not go back to today. The absence of conflicts between the two countries throughout history and the membership to the same religion made their cordial contact in spite of different origins, respectively Latin and Slavic.”\textsuperscript{419} Moreover, we can conclude we the citation of the philosopher Horia Patapievici, that “[i]t is initially a collective fear which crystallizes in solidarity with the Serb people: that a sovereign state can be attacked because a minority said there are, wrongly or rightly, persecuted’ ”.\textsuperscript{420}

At the same time, the Romanian economy suffered from the Serbian boycott by the slowdown of the trade between Romania and Serbia. As we know “[b]efore the burst of Yugoslavia, Romania was its third partner for economic exchanges, after Russia and

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\textsuperscript{418} Bran, Mirel. A la frontière serbo-roumaine, la contrebande refleurit (At the Serbian-Romanian border, smuggling blossoms). Le Monde, 16 Apr. 1999. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
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Hungary.” The incertitude and instability slowed down the investment for all the South-Eastern European countries within Romania. The countries asked for help from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the European Union promised a financial aid for the compensation of the loss. The IMF is mobilized to avert the stagnation, which threatens the Balkans and made a first concrete gesture in favor of Romania for “a loan of 500 million dollars (468, 9 million Euros).”

During the Kosovo conflict, Romanian leaders did not manage their effort making certain ‘uninterrupted diplomatic efforts’ in order to help to find a solution for the resolution of the conflict. But “Romania managed to cope with internal turbulence in the form of strikes and the external crisis in the Western Balkans without departing from democratic practice and respect for the rule of law”, Romania reaffirms the will to access to the European Union with a letter from the Romanian Parliament addressed to the European Parliament and to Parlaments of EU members.

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III.2.3 NATO and the EU

The NATO and EU integration was the two main pillars of the Constantinescu’s foreign policy, as well the neighborliness just as ex-Yugoslavia. We will give a precious insight regarding NATO and EU topics in the second part of this thesis called ‘From Isolation to Interdependence’. In the present chapter, we will develop the NATO and EU accession acts during Emil Constantinescu’s presidential mandate. For integration purposes, Romanian leaders built a strategy to promote the Romanian crossroad position (România la răscruce) by enlightening the potential of Romania in South-Eastern Europe. For the first time thru discourse and attitudes, Romania builds a foreign policy toward NATO, turning from a country in need of security to a security provider in South-Eastern Europe. Romania’s strategy, elaborated by the President was to build regional collaboration with neighbors and a collaboration axis with important countries.

The Romanian President, in his speech at the North Atlantic Alliance Summit in Washington, underlines that “[m]y country [Romania], the first to sign the Partnership for Peace, succeeded in transforming the essence of the initial NATO partnership in a coherent open system of partnership with neighboring countries, in the political, diplomatic and human relations fields.”426 He specifies that Romania, as security provider,

develop[s] a whole of preferential relation with Hungary in the West, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova in the East; [...] built[s] a system of tripartite agreements – with Ukraine and Poland, with Bulgaria and Turkey, with Bulgaria and Greece, with Ukraine and Austria – these agreements are done to consolidate our regional stability.427

Romania takes several initiatives, such as the writing of the working document, ‘South-Eastern Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities’


427 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
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(SEECAP), approved at the reunion of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NATO member countries. In July 1998, he took advantage of a nine-day visit in the U.S. to argue before a joint session of Congress that his country played a key role in Balkan stability and should therefore be admitted to NATO. In October, Romania agreed to allow limited access to its air space in the event of NATO military intervention in the Serbian province of Kosovo.

At the edge of the presidential mandate, the European Union estimated Romania incapable to face the EU requirement in terms of administrative capability to implement acquis communautaires as well the lack of reform to be granted ‘free-market economy’. The president Emil Constantinescu, along his period, looked for support from European states in order to advance in the EU integration process. Romania got support from France, Italy, Germany ... For example, with France Romanian leaders initiate several high levels meeting in France and in Romania. The French president, Jacques Chirac, declares supporting Romania in the accession process indifferently for NATO and EU.

In March 1998, President Constantinescu attended the London conference of European Union member states and candidates. To advance the Romanian case, the government put in place in 1998 and updated in 1999, the first 'National Program for Accession of Romania to the European Union' (PNAR). In addition, Romanian officials denounced the ‘unacceptable discrimination’ between states candidates, and ask for equal treatment in the integration processes. The negotiation with the European Union started officially on February 15th, 2000 with the goal to conclude all chapters before 2007. But the slow reforms, the delay in economic reforms and the political shift between factions resulted in the division of the political spectrum with on one side between partisan to the Romania’s integration in EU and other side nationalist criticizing the interference in Romania’s domestic affairs by international organizations or/and foreign powers.

Both NATO and the EU nonetheless passed over the country in the first wave of expansion. The refusal of NATO to integrate Romania in the first wave and the EU postponement of the

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accession process will bring an ultra-nationalist reaction and bring Ion Iliescu back as president.
III.3 The Comeback

Ion Iliescu was elected for the third time as President of Romania, as a manifestation of the disappointment of the population towards the policy of Constantinescu’s presidency and in order to bar the election of Vadim Tudor\textsuperscript{429} election at the second ballot. In his speech, ‘New stage in Romania’s History’, delivered in front of the Romanian parliament during the swearing-in ceremony on December 20, 2000, Ion Iliescu presented the government program based on the country’s major issues, related to the accession to the European Union and NATO. The government program corresponded exactly to the point that Romania had to achieve in order to integrate the European Union and NATO. The president also wanted to reinforce the authority of the State and of its institutions.

Iliescu’s party comes into power with his own program. However, in fact, the new government was forced to apply the previous government program instead of its own electoral program. In fact, they had more success by implementing Constantinescu’s agenda as well his foreign policy, which aimed to integrate Romania into NATO and into the European Union, to follow the IMF and World Bank recommendations on macro-economic policies, to continue the privatization program, increase productivity and to reorganize the industrial field.

This presidential mandate started by an important international challenge for the Romanian diplomacy, i.e. the chairmanship of the OSCE for one year, in 2001. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mircea Geoana, exercises the function of the Chairperson-in-Office (CIO).

In 2003, citizens overwhelmingly endorsed a redesigned constitution thru a referendum, in order to align it to the European Union legislation. The new constitution defines Romania as a semi-presidential democratic republic with the executive functions shared between the president and the prime minister. The president is elected by popular vote for a maximum of two five-year terms. Once elected, the president appoints the prime minister, who in turn appoints the cabinet.

\textsuperscript{429} Cormeliu Vladim Tudor is the President of the Greater Romania Party (Romanian acronym PRM) an ultra-nationalist and extremist party.
Given that it was the first mandate after the ’89 Revolution, the president stated that the country must act to “regain the international credibility and respect for Romania and its people”\textsuperscript{430}. It was the same discourse as in 1990, because for Ion Iliescu the country was banned from international scene. The country did not have enough presence on the international scene or enough power in this respect.

\textbf{III.3.1 The 2001-2004 Government’s Program}

The government, under the leadership of new Prime Minister, Adrian Năstase, builds a program with such priorities as re-launching the economic growth, fighting poverty and unemployment, restoring the authority of the State and of its institutions, reducing bureaucracy, fighting corruption and criminality; the program was adopted by the Romanian Parliament in a joint session of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, held on December 28, 2000. In his statement, the foreign policy goals are presented as fundamental and aiming at the acceleration of “Romania’s integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic political, economical and strategic structures”.\textsuperscript{431} We would like to study ‘chapter XI’ of the Government program 2001-2004\textsuperscript{432} adopted by the parliament on December 28, 2000. ‘Chapter XI’ is about the Foreign Policy and the promotion of the real Romanian image. This nineteen-page statement is interesting because it defines the Romanian foreign policy for the upcoming presidential mandate.


First, we would like to underline that the statement stipulates if “[t]he Romanian foreign policy naturally contains elements of continuity”, it is the “consequence of the consensus existing at the political and popular level on ... [the] priorities at the international level”. This consensus is about the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, developing good-natured relations with our neighbors, underlining Romania’s role within the regional and international institutions, the consolidation of the national security, establishing the democracy and the state in its right, observing the democratic values and the human rights, developing the market economy, the international commerce and the investments.

We can see here that Romania’s foreign policy adopted a major line with the European Union and NATO integration, applied not only during the previous mandate of the president Emil Constantinescu, but also defined by the first and second Ion Iliescu’s mandates from 1990 to 1996. The European and NATO integration were the goals of the previous government, in addition to the good neighborhood partnership and others. We can say that Romania has a consensus about the foreign policy goals. The basic question asked in this chapter refers to the differences between the other presidential mandates.

III.3.1.1 The Foreign Policy New Lines

At the dawn of the 21st century, the country leaders feel the need to change and adapt Romania’s foreign policy to the new challenge concerning the international situation and the international institution goals, such as the UN’s Millenium Development Goals. They decided to establish some modern strategies and solutions for globalization, integration and regionalization of the contemporary world.

The government will launch the reforms of the Diplomatic Services, which was started by the previous government and resulted

433 Romanian Government Ibid. p. 326. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
434 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
436 Ibid.
in failure and “[t]he administrative reform of the diplomatic service will continue”\textsuperscript{437} as we can read in the government program. In order to achieve the European integration, as well the performance of the diplomatic goals, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will be reorganized to meet the standard of the European Union acquis. It will reorganize the education and training system of diplomatic civil servants through the creation of a new Romanian Institute of International Studies "Nicolae Titulescu" (IRSI),\textsuperscript{438} and the Diplomatic Academy\textsuperscript{439} that will be transformed later (2005) into the Romanian Diplomatic Institute.\textsuperscript{440} In yet another move to enter the new century, the government will implement the modernization of the ministry with an Informational Communication and Technology (TIC) system\textsuperscript{441} in the framework of the e-government implementation program. As stated under the recommendation of the RAND Corporation study financing by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA)\textsuperscript{442}, “[t]he

\textsuperscript{437} Ibid.


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Government will try to develop the use of informational technologies, as a needed tool for supporting the diplomatic activities and promoting Romania's interests.\textsuperscript{443}

The Romanian foreign policy will also introduce other notions, such as the 'Civil Society', the 'Economic Diplomacy' and the 'Cultural Diplomacy', in addition to promoting Romania’s real image, later known (2005) under the program ‘Branding Romania’. Theses innovative approaches will be introduced from 2001, gradually, because the government (2001-2004) will not named immediately these themes as they are. It will be done only in 2005 as it can be found on the MFA’s website: ‘Economic diplomacy’ and ‘Cultural diplomacy’ topics well identified and described. The reforms started during Constantinescu’s presidential mandate and will continue during the Traian Basescu administration.

III.3.1.1.1 Civil Society

For the first time, the program stipulates that the government will encourage, under the pressure of the international community, the civil society, the NGOs and Romanian private institutions to take active part in the promotion of the Romanian goals. It is interesting to underline that the government will use the civil society and NGOs as a tool in its foreign policy. The government understood the weight of the civil society and the NGOs in the evaluation of Romania’s image and readiness for its NATO and EU accession. Because as it states it, “[i]n order to reach it [European Union accession], there is need of joint efforts of government institutions, civil society, business


environment and every citizen”. Moreover, “[t]he Government will encourage an active implication of the international relations in Romania, of the college people and the civil society in supporting Romania’s candidature for NATO integration”. This is the recognition of the civil society and NGOs role in the foreign policy definition and of their diplomatic role toward achieving the country’s goals. It added that

[d]uring the process of elaboration of strategies and taking action in the field of foreign policy, Romanian Government and Foreign Affairs Ministry will be very careful in consulting on elaborate stages with the Romanian Parliament, with the civic society, with the business, media and academically representatives, with the representatives of Romanians abroad.

If in governmental statements, Romanian officials speak about the Civil Society, only in 2004 will the Ministry of Foreign Affairs create an office for relations with NGOs in its organizational structure. However, as usual the government triangle decision is so powerful and loneliness that the decision will be done mainly without the Civil Society.

### III.3.1.1.2 Economic Diplomacy

The economic diplomacy is the use of foreign policy instruments and of the state International Network, as well as the presence within international organizations, to promote the economic interest of the country. For this purpose, the country will carry out the “active

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446 Ibid.

447 Ibid.

promotion of economic diplomacy for the period 2001-2004. The Economic Diplomacy Directorate will be created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but only in 2005, within the next government. Before that, the government will use more the definition of foreign trade and economic promotion. This is the link built between Romania’s diplomatic missions abroad, the business environment and all institutions with economical responsibility, in order to help Romanian trade exportation and to attract more FDI, because “[t]he skills of a nation’s work force and the quality of its infrastructure are what makes it unique, and uniquely attractive, in the world economy.” For this purpose, the government states that

[one of the essential components of the Romanian foreign policy will be the developing of the economic relations with other states and the promoting of the national economic interests, especially the exports and the success of Romanian companies and products, the enticing of investments and international capital, the consolidations, enlarging and regaining our foreign markets. Insuring unlimited access on these markets and obtaining the facilities for stimulating Romanian export, along with the promoting and favoring the national capital’s commercial interests. The economic,


commercial and investment dimension will be used as a consistent criterion in establishing [...] foreign policy priorities.\footnote{453}

The economic diplomacy is not a new phenomenon. It started at the end of the twentieth century and grew to be an accelerated phenomenon in the framework of increasing globalization and informational economy, forcing the traditional diplomacy to face new challenges, with a redistribution of actors and opportunities on the international scene. In this context of globalization, “the economic diplomacy represents an efficient instrument for a national external action, not only as a simple set of practices regarding the support of the foreign trade.”\footnote{454} This new notion was introduced because

[t]he economic diplomacy represents a major issue for the Romanian external affairs, mainly regarding the external investments for different sectors of national economy and also other activities, such as: promoting export products, providing information to the commercial operators regarding the competitive market etc.\footnote{455}

Also the future “[...] Romanian integration in the European Union consolidates the role of companies and public administration institutions in the business environment and mainly influences the diplomatic activity in general and the economic activity in particular.”\footnote{456}

\section*{III.3.1.1.3 Cultural Diplomacy}

The cultural diplomacy is viewed as a political action and the promotion of Romania’s image and citizens abroad. The Romanian culture, minorities and Diaspora will be supported through the new foreign policy of the government, which is stated in the Government

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\item\footnote{455} Ibid. p. 696.
\item\footnote{456} Ibid.
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program - Chapter XI ("Foreign Policy and Promoting the Real Image of Romania"),

[t]he Government will encourage the cultural exchanges and the cultural relations with all the countries of the world, for promoting the Romanian culture values, giving them back their place in the universal values circuit, acknowledgement of other nations' cultural values and promoting environment of respect and tolerance, based on the dialogue between cultures and civilizations. By wise use of the resources, the Government promote in other countries events, celebrations and commemorations dedicated to Romania’s culture and national history.\(^{457}\)

The Romanian government will assist and support the Romanian Diaspora wherever they are. As stated in the government program, “[t]he Government will support the preservation of the cultural and linguistic identity of the Romanian communities in neighboring countries, as well as the creation of the conditions to express this identity in the countries whose citizens they are.”\(^{458}\) In a similar manner, “[t]he Government will enhance the links of the Romanian communities with persons and organizations in Romania” and “special attention will be given to the preservation of the Romanian language Romania's borders by editing books, newspapers, magazines and audio-video productions.”\(^{459}\) We will see that this last point will have a big influence on Romania’s foreign policy, especially with the Republic of Moldova. The cultural diplomacy was done until 2003 by the Romanian Cultural Foundation\(^{460}\), which then created the Romanian Cultural Institute (ICR), "official organization which promotes Romanian culture and civilization worldwide" as “a complementary way to achieve Romania’s strategic objectives, along with the initiatives related to foreign and economic policies\(^{461}\)."


\(^{458}\) Ibid.

\(^{459}\) Ibid.


Cultural Diplomacy has emerged as a new tool that can be defined as ‘soft power’. ‘Soft power’ has been described by Joseph S. Nye as “the influence and attractiveness a nation acquires when others are drawn to its culture and ideas”. A recent study described the cultural diplomacy as “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding”. This situation recalls the United States strategy in the ‘30s, vis-à-vis Latin America, when the “goal of the United States Department of State was clear: it hoped that the exchange would promote better relations with other nations and the improvement of America’s image abroad.”

III.3.1.2 The National Interest

One can remark the traditional ‘attacks’ against the previous government, which must be responsible for the poor results of Romania’s integration process and the erosion of Romania’s international status. We would like to say that these are only some words, which do not match with the exact reality. In fact, the balance of the previous government is good enough in the Romanian context and to some points – NATO and European Union - Romania advanced a lot. For example, the OSCE Romanian Presidency for 2001 based itself on the work of the previous government. In addition, we can underline that, if all different governments have the same consensus on foreign policy, the difference is behind the mind of the ‘national interest’. As Adrian Nastase’s government declares: “[t]he definition and the promotion of the priorities of the Romanian foreign policies will be constantly direct and reported to the national interest...”

The different understanding of the ‘national interest’ between the different governments can be crucial and can block the Romanian foreign policy in their negotiations and results. We saw it during the Ion Iliescu’s 1990-1996 Presidency with the negotiation of the

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Hungarian and Ukrainian agreement and thru the relation with the
Republic of Moldova. Ultra-nationalist political factions can influence
the national interest. This influence damages Romania’s international
image vis-à-vis international community. Romania will emphasize the
cultural dimension of the foreign policy by supporting the Romanian
communities abroad politically and financially. This is the first time
that Romania includes a cultural dimension in its foreign policy. The
cultural dimension is different from the interference and the fight for
the support of minorities abroad.

When we read the general objectives of Nastase’s government
foreign policy, we notice that the program does not differ from that of
earlier governments (Emil Constantinescu presidency), and they are
exactly the same as Ion Iliescu’s 1994 press conference held on
Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains} The only important different point is in Ion Iliescu’s
statements, which stipulated: “we don’t want to have any pro-East or
pro-West policy, pro-Russian or pro-German or pro-American policy
or whatever”\footnote{Ibid. p. 333. Translated by Marc Bonnemains}. Because, if in 1994 Romania wanted to be non-
aligned with particular alliance, the country strategy in 2000 is to be
integrated to the West (NATO and EU). The new government will re-
install the previous diplomatic attitude ‘to be world connected’ and to
be actively present in all international and regional organizations thru
multilateral diplomacy. Another important point is “the active support
of the interests of the Romanian citizens and of their compatriots

The integration in the European Union and the Euro-Atlantic
Alliance remains Romania’s priority, independently from the political
tendency of the government, being a plan set for 2007. The only
difference is the will to accelerate the accession into NATO and
European Union as the top priority.

Romania will reactivate “the traditional cooperation relation
with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”\footnote{Ibid. p. 333. Translated by Marc Bonnemains} as well as with the Russian
Federation. In addition to minority’s problems inside the country,
Romania is also worried about its minority abroad in neighboring countries. Romania will be worried about the treatment of the Romanian minority in Yugoslavia and will attach importance to the relations between both countries in a common interest. The government’s program stipulates, also, the development of foreign policy with as many as possible countries all around the world, especially with Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Middle East – likewise Africa as certainly a result of the Francophony membership and a reactivation of the Ceausescu foreign policy.

III.3.1.3 The NATO integration

Before starting to develop this theme in the second part of the thesis, we will resume Romania’s integration process for 2001-2004. The program underlines the need to be admitted into NATO to guarantee the stability and national security of Eastern European countries, and Romania’s defense because “NATO is the largest alliance capable to ensure stability, transatlantic cohesion and peace in Europe.” The government also underlines the Romanian contribution to the region’s stability by its integration in the military alliance, NATO. The government defines a program to achieve these goals thru an intensified participation in all organizations and activities linked with the Alliance, intensifying the bilateral relationship with the states that were already NATO members, in addition to creating the necessary conditions to welcome Romania as a full-right member state of NATO through intensified relations with


the United States on multilateral levels. The minister underlines that they want to play a major role in NATO’s enlargement. For Romania, the integration into NATO means being nears the allies of the United States. The government explain that it will pursue “the consolidation of Strategic Partnership with United States in politic, economic, military fields”.473

Romania gives pledges of credibility, communicates with the United States and become step-by-step in the foot of the United States. The policy of continuity vis-à-vis the US is a constant factor in the Romanian foreign policy. We can underline that the current Minister of Foreign Affairs had been before the Romanian Ambassador in Washington. Romania, not yet member of NATO, nevertheless already places itself as a support for the adhesion of its neighbors. The increase of bilateral cooperation and “the consolidation of Strategic Partnerships with the United States in the political, economic, and military field and the struggle of non-conventional threats in the security field [...] and the encouragement of the volume of American Direct Investments in Romania” become a necessity for the government. Romania will become a member of the alliance in April 2004 and thus achieve one of its foreign policy goals. Security-wise, Romania announces that it is ready for a European defense identity and ready to contribute to it!

III.3.1.4 The European Union accession

Developed in the second part, we will resume in this section the EU accession process during Ion Iliescu’s presidential mandate. Romania’s accession program insists on the fact that the accession into the EU is the strategic priority of the Romanian foreign policy and


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depends on the effort done by all - as stipulated in the Prime Minister's statement - government institutions, civil society, businesses and citizens. The government will develop a domestic policy called ‘National Strategy for Romania's medium-term economic development’, based on the European economic policy and the implementation of the community acquis. Along the same line, the Minister for European Integration announced a new communication strategy for the accession into the European Union. The new government, as presented during the joint session of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, announced the intensification of the accession program to the EU by strong follow-up actions thru a detailed monthly planning. As strategy in order to comply with it, the government will ask for help and exchanges with the states recently admitted into the Union and with the Central European states ahead in the accession process. By the same token, the country will determine Romania’s future position in the European Union. From 2001 to 2004, the country will close 21 chapter of negotiation. It will obtain several results in the fields of economy, justice and administrative reform, and will be granted the status of functioning free-market economy in 2004. But we can read in a French newspaper that

[t]he European Commission is about to give Romania a very nice diplomatic present, by granting it the status of market economy, which it declined a year before. This label, which sets conditions for Bucharest's upcoming accession into the EU.[...] .. ‘Romania is not ready to accede, the situation there is terrifying', a community source explains.475

The commission evaluation program underlines that Romania is “on the last place among the candidate states, from the point of view of economic indicators and of the progress made in the negotiating process.”476 The accession effort will be carried out thru the development of relations with the “traditional Western European

475 Avril, Pierre. Union Européenne. Un des derniers obstacles à l'accession de Bucarest est levé. La Roumanie déroche le label d’économie de marché (European Union. One of the last obstacles to the accession of Bucharest is lifted. Romania won the label on the market economy). Le Figaro, 5 Oct. 2004. Translated by Marc Bonnemains


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partners”⁴⁷⁷ but also with the other European countries “with which the cooperation potential is underdeveloped”.⁴⁷⁸ In return, Romania promises to do the same with West Balkans states in order to be associated in the European Union accession process.

III.3.2 Romania’s International Actions

At the beginning of 2001, with the new government, the Romanian foreign policy is very active and aggressive. Romania holds the Presidency of the OSCE, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mircea Geoana, and “coincides with the organization’s entrance into a new phase, marked by evolutions in the Euro-Atlantic area”.⁴⁷⁹ The Romanian OSCE presidency will promote the ideals of peace and plan to reinforce the OSCE role as “a forum of political dialogue and cooperation on security issues”.⁴⁸⁰ During this year, Romania will make its own promotion with all OSCE countries thru the Chairman-in-Office. On the other hand, Romania will propose collaboration between the OSCE and other organizations, in particular the UN.

Romania will strive for a multilateral relation between European members. The program foresees the intensification of bilateral relations with “traditional Western European partners of Romania, first of all with Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria,” and also with other European partners, and neighboring countries. Romania will seek worldwide contacts especially from the Black Sea until the Caucasus – in particular with Georgia, with which Romania has some plans and wants to develop strong bilateral relations. In fact, the Romanian project under the

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⁴⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 333. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
foreign policy is to take part in the revitalization of the Silk Road \(^{481}\) with these ramifications starting from China to the European countries, while passing thru Romania. According to the president’s point of view, for this great project, Romania, Georgia as well as other countries, can make many things. On the other hand, “Romania creates windows for Georgia in Europe”. \(^{482}\) The basic question asked here is why the Romanian politicians speak about revitalizing the Silk Road when we know that Romania was not exactly part of this ancient road? The subjacent idea is ‘Romania as a crossroads’, an idea built in certain ways during the Ion Iliescu’s first mandate and renewed by Emil Constantinescu with the ‘Romania, the crossroads’ project, as a bridge between East and West, a subsequent element in the link of the ‘Silk Road’.

III.3.2.1 The Neighbors

The program emphasizes the increased relationship with neighboring countries and focuses foreign policy actions on the South-East of Europe. The new government insists, also, on “the dynamic and pragmatic development of Romania’s special and favored relations with the Republic of Moldova, on the basis of language identity, culture and history…” \(^{483}\) and on the “traditional relations of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. \(^{484}\)

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\(^{481}\) During the first millennium B.C.E. through the middle of the second millennium C.E. (fourteenth Century), a vast network of trade routes known as the "Silk Road" linked the people and traditions of Asia with those of Europe. These historic routes served as a major conduct for the transport of knowledge, information and material goods between East and West and resulted in the first global exchange of scientific and cultural traditions. Or, I want to underline that Romania was never a stage on the Silk Road.


\(^{484}\) Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Romania wants to use its status to support the Eastern countries – Moldova and Ukraine - in their integration in the EU and NATO.

Therefore, Romania will work with Bulgaria for the accession into the European Union. As Minister Hildegard Puwak stipulates “[i]n their joint path to become members of the EU, Romania and Bulgaria have many elements in common, they are not in competition”.\textsuperscript{485} The Minister of European Integration said:

We have in front of us important moments in the institutional dialogue with the European Commission - there are important moments for Romania in December, such as the visa waiving, and I hope that we will have Bulgaria's support in managing to meet the expectations of member states and, this way, from one stage to another, we will succeed in building and developing faster down this road.\textsuperscript{486}

She added “together [with Bulgaria,] we must defend not only the best interests of each state, but also the interests of the region where we work.”\textsuperscript{487}

\textbf{III.3.2.2 \quad The 9/11 International Crisis}

Romanian authorities condemned the attack of September 11, 2001 against New York City thru a press release of the MFA, of the Prime Minister and of the presidency, of Parliament and the Romanian Senate. All other democratic states denounced the attack on the United States as well. An aid was granted to the United States. Romania decided, after a proposal of the Supreme Council of National Defense (SCND)\textsuperscript{488} and validation by president Ion Iliescu “to act as
de facto NATO ally\(^{489}\), in the spirit of the 5\(^{th}\) Article of the North Atlantic Treaty following the North Atlantic Council decision, “in fighting thru all the means, military ones included, against international terrorism”\(^{490}\) and to place at the disposal of USA and NATO “upon request, the facilities offered by the national air, land and maritime space, in support of a possible response operation against terrorism.”\(^{491}\) Why this high-level decision of the Nation to involve the country in a ‘war’? Can one see, here, a result of Romania’s action to obtain the favors of the USA and support for NATO membership? We think this is not the case and will explain why.

As a future NATO member, Romania wanted to give the assurance that it can get involved under the rules of NATO to take part and protect the Alliance’s members. The information we got shows that Ion Iliescu decided on September 11 with the SCND “to act as de facto NATO ally” in the framework of Article 5 and this even before the North Atlantic Council decision to invoke this article for the first time in the history of the organization.\(^{492}\) Romania’s officials do everything to be involved in the NATO enlargement. Romania took part in all NATO organizations, exercises and foreign operations in close cooperation with the United States and NATO leaders. For this point, the Romanian invocation of the 5\(^{th}\) Article after the 9/11 attack was the normal end in Romania’s logic. Not only was Romania involved in the decision, but also the other NATO members did the same on September 12 at the North Atlantic Council, one day later


\(^{490}\) Ibid.


than Romania. Romania, in this situation, reacts rapidly, with pro-active decisions concerning the International Involvement. We can underline that this is the perfect example of the Romanian pro-active way involvement.

9/11 reinforced the need for the United States to have allies and to be helped in the fight against terrorism. Eastern European countries are good allies and Romania in particular. However, this situation can also be perceived as a chance for the countries of the Vilnius group, if the United States will accelerate the integration and will help the candidate states by a financing program for their army, after 9/11.

### III.3.3 The Iraqi War Crisis

The 9/11 changes everything in the world, but especially the United States’ foreign policy. In 2003, the Romanian foreign policy is confronted with big problems coming from their best supporter: France, putting Romania in turbulence.

#### III.3.3.1 The Betrayal

The crisis started in February 2003, when some European countries declared their support for the United States and their war in Iraq, in spite of a general declaration on Iraq’s disarmament at the Security Council of the UN. The motion decided that the usage of the force must be used in last recourse. At the Security Council, France and Germany’s vocal opposition to American and British policy was followed by Russia and China. The support was given by the ‘Letters of the Eight’ (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom) and followed by the letter of the Vilnius group comprising Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia which effectively supported an US military intervention in Iraq.493

This incident brings about a crisis at the European Union level by creating a breaking line between European members and

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European Union candidates. This crisis turns into a painful and violent verbal conflict between France and Romania in reply to the French president criticism. French president Jacques Chirac criticized the CEEC attitudes by saying: “these countries were, I would say, at the same time, saying the word, not very well educated and a little bit unconscious of the dangers which involved too fast alignment to the American position.” Likewise, the French president underlines: “I find that Romania and Bulgaria were particularly thoughtless to dash like that, whereas their position is already very delicate with regard to Europe. If they wanted to decrease their chances to enter Europe, they could not find a better means.” The French president’s opinion creates a strong reaction in Romania, not only at the political level, but also thru the civil society relayed by the media. Prime Minister Adrian Nastase explained that the French President’s statement “made [him] think of a father who loses his head...” He adds, “[i]n fact, I do not understand why Romania and Bulgaria must pay the cost of a tensed relation between France and the United States.”

In fact, chapter 27 of the community acquis states that “Romania is ready to accept and to apply the acquis in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European


495 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains


497 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Community (EC)." To reinforce this sentence, we can add from the same document, that Romania’s engagement demonstrated through the active participation in the political dialogue with EU member states, carried out within the Union’s foreign policy and security structures, as well as through the consistent alignment and the support shown for the EU statements, initiatives, positions and joint actions, open to the participation of candidate states.499

At this time, Romania and other Eastern European countries made their decision without acting in concert with the European Union and by not respecting the Chapter 27 of the acquis. They aligned the American policy with any participation in common definition for a “pooling of the reasons and the actions”500 of the European Union.

In 2002, regular reports on Romania’s progress towards accession, edited by the Commission of the European Communities, stipulates that: “Romania has confirmed its good track record in Common Foreign and Security Policy and has continued to align its policy with that of the European Union”501 and that “Romania is an active participant in the political dialogue established by the Association Agreement and has played a constructive role within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including meetings at the level of Political Directors, European Correspondents and Working Groups.”502 The Report concludes that “Romania has continued to align its positions with EU statements and declarations and, when invited to do so, has associated itself with the Union’s common positions and joint actions. Romania has continued to comply with international sanctions and restrictive measures imposed by the UN and the EU.”503 We would like to underline that in


499 Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman.


502 Ibid. p. 120.

503 Ibid.
the 2003 Report do not mention the Romanian position toward the United States when the European Union was following the UN decision against the Iraqi War.

President Jacques Chirac argued that one could not build a common consensus if we refuse dialogue and coordination. For Cristian Preda, “Jacques Chirac’s speech has perhaps been exaggerated in content. Ultimately, however, he made an issue more important (not only for Romania) than that defined by the United States. Chirac said bluntly that the EU is a political project that is more ambitious than any other current objective.”

From this point of view, one can speak about a true Romanian betrayal. In a more moderate acceptance of this term, we can say it is the act by which one ceases to be faithful to the given promise. In fact, before any discussion or concert with the EU, Romania signed the ‘Letter of Vilnius’ followed by the Romanian Parliament decision, on February 12, 2003, for military participation in the coalition against Iraq.

### III.3.3.2 The Slander

“The betrayal of the Romanian authorities was accompanied by a whole operation of public slandering aiming, initially, at the French president.” One could read “that president J. Chirac had missed an occasion to keep silent” or “J. Chirac pulls Eastern-Europeans by

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505 The agreement included the Romanian engagement in a possible war was for 70 soldiers specialized in chemical defense, 25 police officers, 30 doctors and 149 engineers. To see ___. Parlamentul a aprobat trimiterea de trupe in Irak [online]. (The Parliament approved the sending of military groups in Irak). Evenimentul zilei, 13 March 2003, no. 5101. [cited 29 Fev. 2008]. Hypertext Markup Language. Available from: <http://www.evz.ro/articole/detali-articol/507964/Parlamentul-a-aprobat-trimiterea-de-trupe-in-Irak/>. Translated by Marc Bonnemains


the ears”\textsuperscript{508} because he is “[m]anichean, egocentric, irrational and loser”\textsuperscript{509} or “arrogant and paternalist”\textsuperscript{510}, or that he is a “decayed spirit” which believes “that the tone borrowed from the actors of the Comédie Française can replace the loss of the world statute of France”,\textsuperscript{511} or finally, “because it coincides perfectly with the spirit of the School of National Administration”\textsuperscript{512}, symbol of “foreseeable frivolity of any French political leader”.\textsuperscript{513} In fact, for Romania, France as compared to the United States has done an “exercise of proud sovereignty” unable “to conceive in a rational and convincing way its geopolitical future”.\textsuperscript{514}


\textsuperscript{511} Dobrescu, Caius. Mizeria pacifismului (I) Ibid. (The abjectness of the pacifism (I)). Available from: <http://www.observatorcultural.ro/infoframe.phtml?xid=7803&xrubrica=SOCIET E&return=arhiva&xnrrevista=158>. Translated by Marc Bonnemains


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III.3.3.3 The Reasons

Cristian Preda analyses, presents some reasons justifying the relationship with the American position, and classifies them into five categories.\textsuperscript{515}

The first one is “a close and comprehensive friend of Romania”, either because they played a decisive part in the admission of Romania within NATO\textsuperscript{516}, or because they are opposed to a dictatorship similar to the Romanian dictatorship prior to 1989.\textsuperscript{517} The second one is “the American excellence”, represented by the United States’ “know-how of the democracy”.\textsuperscript{518} They represent “the only political forces having assumed the traditions of freedom”.\textsuperscript{519} The third one is “the argument of the reactive pro-Americanism, which is in fact built like an answer to the pacifist anti-Americanism”.\textsuperscript{520} The fourth reason “is the fear of Russia” because “Romania is near Transnistria, hearth of conflicts and an area of concentration of the

\textsuperscript{515} Preda, Cristian. Le proaméricanisme roumain : trahison et diffamation (Romanian Pro-Americanism: Betrayal and Slander). Revue internationale et stratégique, Printemps 2004, 2004, no. 53. Translated by Marc Bonnemains


\textsuperscript{517} It is the assertion of the dissident anticommunist Radu Filipescu in the debate organized by the Review 22: “We had experience of a dictature in Romania and, consequently, our opposition to a dictature such as Iraqi goes from oneself”. To see Filipescu, Radu. Dezbate GDS – Kosovo si Irak – reactia societatii si a clasei politice romanesti (Debate GDS - Kosovo and Irak - the reaction of the society and of the romanian political class). Revista 22, 29 Apr. 2003 – 5 Mai 2003, 2003, no. 686.


\textsuperscript{520} Preda, Cristian. Le proaméricanisme roumain : trahison et diffamation (Romanian Pro-Americanism: Betrayal and Slander). Revue internationale et stratégique, Printemps 2004, 2004, no. 53. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Russian troops”.521 For Cristian Preda, “[t]he refusal of a ‘formula of European safety which would include Kremlin in the place of Washington”522 can explain the reason why the Eastern European countries would have “to seek oxygen in the direction of America”.523 In addition, the last reason is a financial one: “[T]he Prime Minister A. Nastase had declared that Romania intended to recover a debt of 1.7 billion dollar which Iraq owes it for more than 10 years”.524 All these five reasons are realistic. However, we have to add some other reasons, such as Romania’s will to act according to Article 5 of the Alliance Treaty as a future new member of NATO like the other countries of the ‘Vilnius group’. Romania also wants ‘to reward’ the NATO protection decision against the threat of Yugoslavians’ reprisals during the Kosovo war.

III.3.3.4 Conclusion

In fact, the lack of political unified decision at the European political level and the division of the member countries upon the decision to take and the absence of European military forces capable to provide a coherent protection for Europe, push Romania as well other CEECs to support the U.S. thru the NATO involvement. These days, the European protection is carried out with the support of NATO and NATO is driven by the United States. If the decision of United States to invade Iraq was highly disputable, the engagement of the NATO allies under the fifth Article was absolutely moral.


Christian Preda points out in his article, "Romanian Pro-Americanism, Betrayal and Stalid," that the United States has only a military ambition. The French point of view affirms that there is a political project for Europe which does not refer anymore to French, German, Spanish or British resources of all these nations.


Ibid.


The year 2004 was crucial for Romania. On the one hand, in April 2004, Romania achieved one of its main objectives, set after the '89 Revolution, the country’s accession as a full member in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On the other hand, Romania has to close the remaining chapters, because Romania is “the last one in the negotiation process for the accession to the European Union”\(^{529}\) in order to be able to integrate into the EU in 2007. Romania has a lot of problems and needs that demand more efforts for the integration process. The Romanian diplomacy goal will be to calm the relations with the Republic of Moldova, as the tension between both countries was increasing by speeches aggression.

For Alin Teodorescu, in Romania, some problems subsist and according to his analysis, “justice has never been an independent power in the state, has never been a strong professional cast, with self-regulation and self-control”\(^{530}\). Furthermore, he added: “there has been no change”\(^{531}\). This point is confirmed by the '2004 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress towards Accession’ by this notification:

> [c]orruption in Romania continues to be serious and widespread. Romania’s anticorruption legislation is generally well developed, but its ability to curb corruption will depend on the effective implementation of the law. In particular, additional efforts are required to ensure the independence, effectiveness and accountability of the National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office.\(^{532}\)

For him “[a]n another area of important meaning for the evaluation of the accession into the EU is the public administration. Since there is a modern Romanian state, we do not have public


\(^{531}\) Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

administration rules, with capacity of autonomy, with capacity of mobilization”.

III.4 A Wind of Change

The campaign for the party of Traian Basescu, a Romanian politician and former Merchant Navy officer, is based on the theme ‘Justice and Truth Alliance’ (Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr). At the heart of the presidential campaign, Traian Basescu openly took some positions, such as to end the privileges of elected officials, to open the archives of the “Securitate”, to return the property confiscated by the regime and unsuccessfully claimed during fifteen years to their original owners, to accelerate the country’s legal standards and the economic progress toward the European Union accession. He is highly controversial, but his frank language goes beyond political divisions and thus is elected with 51.22%. 534

Just after being elected on December 20, 2004, 535 Traian Basescu presented the Romanian Foreign Policy during his speech addressed at the Romanian Parliament during the president swearing-in ceremony. As President, he repeatedly stated that Romania’s accession to the European Union kept being a top priority. Both the President and the government of Prime Minister Popescu-Tariceanu focused on Romania's planned accession to the EU, which remained a central component in Romania’s foreign policy until the accession on January 1st, 2007.

The consolidation of the Romanian position with NATO is another priority of the Romanian foreign policy in order to be an inexorable actor in the south of the Danube (Serbia) and at the East of the Prut (Ukraine and Russia). The president has a strong

focus on the relations with the Republic of Moldova, saying that “the population of this country is part of the Romanian people”.

In addition, Traian Basescu focuses on a strong strategic partnership with the United States strengthen during the Ion Iliescu mandate, a relationship that he called the ‘Bucharest-London-Washington axis’. Romania is engaged in International Coalition in Afghanistan with Romanian troops and in Iraq in the ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ with a small contingent. Romania was the signatory of the ‘Vilnius Letter’ for the engagement near the United States in 2003 and an agreement was signed in December 2005 between Romania and the United States to allow U.S. troops to use Romanian military facilities as the Mihail Kogalniceanu military airport. The president made strong ties with the President of the United States, who in return called him a friend: “The President and I are friends. Romania and the United States are friends, and we're allies”.

The President said that Romania wants to bring a decisive contribution to the success of the neighborhood policies and the European path of the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine and Georgia will contribute to regional stability. The chief of state has been vocal in calling for a regional approach to security in the Black Sea basin, which, he noted, remained susceptible to trans-border security threats such as drugs and human trafficking.

Traian Basescu stated that Romania supports Kosovo to be an integral part of Serbia as an outcome of Kosovo’s status process and that Romania will not recognize any unilateral declaration of


independence by Kosovo.\textsuperscript{539} Romanian authorities are determined to respect the identity of all national minorities, but the establishment of “‘enclaves’ based on ethnic criteria is unconceivable”\textsuperscript{540}, the president said in his 2005 annual speech for the Diplomatic Corps accredited in Bucharest. He added that he will “be intransigent with any kind of extremist, xenophobic or anti-Semitic manifestation, and he will not tolerate Romania’s being associated with moves of this kind”.\textsuperscript{541} The President will also focus on the re-establishment of the relations with the Romanian Diaspora that totals 6 million people outside the country.\textsuperscript{542}

With a new president, there is also a new diplomacy. He declares that he is ”one of the Romanian politicians supporting the idea that the accession into the European Union is not a diplomacy


\textsuperscript{541} Ibid.

matter any longer, but a domestic policy one”. For the President, “the integration into the European Union is a priority” and “represents an objective of utmost importance” which “will not limit Romania’s foreign policy to the two big objectives, the EU and NATO.”

The president underlines, that for the last 10 years, Romania’s unique foreign policy goals were to integrate into NATO and the EU. According to Traian Băsescu, Romania is not a small state, but a medium one with coast access – Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea – and large land. In his opinion, in the last ten years, the country lost important foreign policy objectives, such as to be involved in solutions in the Eastern part of Romania, with the Transnistria issue, and to the South of the Danube, with the Yugoslavian one. In addition, he underlines the necessity to warmer relations with Russia. He also talked about the interest in developing relations with the rest of the world, such as China, Japan, India, Korea, the states in the Near East and Africa, Israel, Latin America. Romania wants to remain a privileged partner for countries that share the affinity of language and origin, both in Europe and in Latin America. “Latinity is a valuable common platform on which we continue to build”, the President says in


544 Ibid.

545 Ibid.


547 Ibid.

2007, a statement reinforced by the organization of the Francophone Summit in Bucharest in September 2006. In 2008, he sees a significant potential of development between the EU and Latin America countries that must be exploited without delay. Romania will continue the policy of renewal and will strengthen relations with Arab States, in the gulf area and The Maghreb region as well as with Israel.

The President mentioned, in 2005, the Asia-Pacific region as a future goal of the Romania foreign policy in the architecture of international geopolitics, a goal “which offers unexplored opportunities for the assertion of a new international profile” for Romania. The country develops more intensive relations with China and Japan, as well as with other states such as India or Philippines. The traditional relations with China are excellent and will be developed within Romania’s foreign policy, in a discreet way.

During the period 2005-2008, the Romania’s foreign diplomacy has made an important contribution to the strengthening of the Romanian regional perspective to the creation of European economic and political development in the Balkans, another contribution to the Republic of Moldova near the European structures and strengthening strategic partnerships with major countries, bilateral relations are circumscribed European model. In addition, the boost of Economic diplomacy, implemented under the previous presidency, was an important step in re-opening pragmatic relations outside the European Union. The MFA supporting with conviction and professionalism important cases


near the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Danube Delta, Case Romania vs. Ukraine\textsuperscript{552} and others). The MFA has made significant progress in the reform of the diplomatic corps, with a particular emphasis on consular services reform.

III.4.1 The Romanian European Union Accession

President Traian Basescu often underlined that “the European Union will continue to have a crucial contribution for Romania’s development, for the prosperity and the welfare of its citizens”.\textsuperscript{553} The President states in 2005, in front of the diplomatic corps accredited to Bucharest, that Romania’s top priority is fulfilling all commitments undertaken during the negotiation process and implementing the reforms for the accession targeted for January 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2007. He strongly emphasizes that it is not possible “to speak about integration, with dignity, in European Union without a resolution of the Romanian biggest problems: corruption and poverty”.\textsuperscript{554} The president will strongly link the domestic policy with the EU integration foreign policy strategy, by declaring, during the first Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) meeting, corruption as a national security risk.\textsuperscript{555} “I want to be a President that translates words into facts. I am decided to request from the state institutions action and efficiency in fighting corruption, insuring the freedom of the press and continuing justice.

\textsuperscript{552} The case concerning the delimitation of the Continental Shelf and of the Exclusive Economic Zones of Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea.


reforms⁵⁵⁶, stated Traian Basescu. The Romanian President stressed that nobody has anything to gain from the integration of an unprepared Romania in the EU and that the target is to transform the efforts of the European integration into visible effects in the everyday life of Romanians.

In the prolongation of the previous foreign policy action, Traian Basescu mentioned that partnership relations with the European countries represent the foundation for the success of Romania’s integration into the EU. He noted the special relationship with Great Britain, which has assumed the responsibility of leadership in helping the current administration to fight against corruption, the traditional relationship with France, which, together with Germany, was the ‘engine’ driving Romania in its EU integration process, and with the support of Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Poland. The Romanian President also said that the relation with Hungary is an example of cooperation with neighboring countries. He expressed his expectations that authorities in Kiev will show openness to a closer relation with Romania. The President stated that Romanian authorities want to attract stronger European support for infrastructure projects on Pan-European transport corridors that cross Romania⁵⁵⁷: the railroad Corridor IV, river Corridor VII (Danube) and the Corridor IX as well as the ‘TRACECA’ Corridor.⁵⁵⁸

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⁵⁵⁷ The pan-European transport corridors form the basis for linking the trans-European transport networks with the Central and Eastern European states. Ten Pan-European transport corridors were defined at the second Pan-European transport Conference in Crete, March 1994. They are a further-developed form of the Western European transport network's major transport arteries. Their definition is based on co-ordination between the EU Commission, the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) States, the ECMT (European Conference of Ministers of Transport), the UNECE (United Nations/Economic Commission for Europe) and the international financial institutions with the Central and Eastern European states.

⁵⁵⁸ The ‘TRACECA’ Corridor is the Transport Corridor Europe – Caucasus – Asia or the reconstruction of the historical Silk Road, named "New Silk Road". It was established in 1993 during a conference in Brussels by originally 8 Nations and nowadays 13 Nations aiming at improvements in trade and transport along the Europe - Caucasus - Asia Corridor. In 1998 in Baku was signed at the ‘TRACECA Summit – Restoration of the Historic Silk Route’ the Basic Multilateral Agreement (MLA) by 12 states including Romania. Romania was accepted in the TRACECA
Romania gained access to the European Union on January 1st, 2007, accomplishing its second goal, set up after the ‘89 Revolution. The President emphasizes that Romania, in the current European construction, can assume the security of the Union’s external border thru Romania’s experience to good neighborly relations and cooperation in South-East Europe, having the ability to be a factor of stability and balance in the Black Sea Region and Western Balkans areas, which are high strategic important regions. He suggested that it is time to include the problems of these regions on the Euro-Atlantic agenda and the European perspective of the Western Balkans could become a vector for historical change for all countries in the region.559 The President proposes to share the experience that Romania has gained thru the negotiation process with the candidate countries - Croatia and Macedonia - and those who have signed the association agreement such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro and Albania.560 Romania pleads with the European Union for an ‘open doors policy’, as a major stimulation factor for democratic reforms and economic development.

program in 2002 as well Bulgaria and Turkey. The corridor starts in the Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine), crosses Turkey. There are route passing the Black Sea to the ports of Poti and Batumi in Georgia, further using transport network of the Southern Caucasus, and a land connection towards this region from Turkey. From Azerbaijan by means of the Caspian ferries (Baku – Turkmenbashi, Baku – Aktau) TRACECA route reaches the railway networks of Central Asian states of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The transport networks of these states are connected to destinations in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and reach the borders of China and Afghanistan.


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III.4.2 The Bucharest-London-Washington Axis

Traian Basescu’s declaration on the ‘Bucharest-London-Washington axis’, made after the presidential election, was misunderstood and highly criticized by foreign political leaders, members of the European Union, and by Romanian political leaders such as Cozmin Gusa, a former member of the Democratic Party and a former ally of President Basescu.

He specifies that this alliance is not a separate one from European Union, but in the context of NATO, and today, in 2005, only the United States can support the Romanian foreign policy in the Black Sea area.\textsuperscript{561} He underlines that Romania has developed a preferential relationship with the United States, gradually, from 1995. In addition, Romania has an interest in the relocation of the American forces in Europe, with American bases on the Romanian territory. “The US knows that they can count on the Romanian contribution in the global war on terror,”\textsuperscript{562} president Basescu said. He also mentioned that Romania is going to follow with renewed interest the strengthening of the US-Romanian economic relationship as a privileged partnership for the support of Romania internal reforms in the political, economical, military and administrative fields. This economic partnership will be translated into practice by a consistent and balanced trade relationship and solid US investments in Romania, including investments in high-tech industries.

The Washington-London-Bucharest axis will be a foreign policy priority for Romania's president and this intention looks positive. However, the question here is in the use of the word ‘axis’. Its use is a little bit odd in the foreign policy context and

\textsuperscript{561} Băsescu, Traian. Participarea domnului Traian Băsescu, Presedintele României la emisiunea "10 si un sfert" Postul de televiziune Realitatea TV Realizator Stelian Tanase (10 Ianuarie 2005) [online]. (Participation of Sir Traian Băsescu, President of Romania to the TV Show ‘10 and half’ on the Channel of the Realitatea TV). București: Departamentul de Comunicare Publică, 2005e. [cited 23 Oct. 2007].

remembers the fighting of the ‘Axis of Evil’ stated by United States president Georges W. Bush in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002. It also has a historically negative connotation, especially since Romania was initially part of the Axis in World War II. The President recognized, in an interview with ‘Le Monde’, that the term ‘axis’ was not the most adequate.

But for some other political leaders in Romania, it is a mistake because “[t]he real political axis on which Romania’s policies must be directed is Moscow-Washington, not axes invented by (the president) Traian Basescu based on circumstances,” 563 according to the head of the National Initiative Party, Cozmin Gusa. According to Gusa, the Romanian foreign policy should be directed more towards Washington and Moscow, a direction suggested by both U.S. President George W. Bush in 2002 and by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the beginning of 2004.564 In December 2005, the government further enhanced relations with the United States by signing an agreement that would allow U.S. troops to train and be stationed in several military facilities throughout the country.

### III.4.3 The Kosovo Crisis

The Romanian President is opposed from the very beginning to the independence of Kosovo, arguing that the province must remain within the borders of the Republic of Serbia. Two different aspects coming from the neighborhood foreign policy with Serbia and from domestic policy considerations motivate the president’s position.

On the foreign policy side, Traian Basescu maintains the very good relation between Romania and Serbia with the will to be a democratic leader in the Balkan area, helping neighbors to access to the European Union. The historical link between the two countries made the Romanian president support the Serbian point of view related to the Kosovo independence, vis-à-vis Serbia’s history and Balkan situation. The Romanian president says Kosovo’s status solution should not be damaging to Serbia’s


564 Ibid.
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territorial integrity. Traian Basescu also argues that the Kosovo solution should “remain within the boundaries of the international law and not seek to change Serbian borders”.565 A “solution that gives collective rights to a minority living in the territory of a sovereign and independent state should not be considered”566, the Romanian president said. The Romanian ambassador in Serbia, Ioan Macovei states:

Romaia favors broad autonomy for Kosovo, agreed on through a direct dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. In case of an unprecedented decision to grant Kosovo independence, other separatist regions throughout Europe would see this as an encouragement to continue with their demands.567

He added that “the Romanian minority in Serbia and the Serb minority in Romania must enjoy all the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, and continue to be loyal citizens of the states where they live”.568 For the Romanian President, the recognition of Kosovo’s independence can be a precedent in the solution of frozen conflicts, such as the conflict in Moldova with Pridnestrovie, as well as other conflict in the Black Sea region. He argued that, “[i]f the reason of the recognition of Kosovo’s independence is that 84% of its population consist of Albanians, this precedent can be applied”569 to other regional conflicts. For the Romanian President, the extent of autonomy, the preservation of culture and traditions of national minorities can be a solution, but not the establishment of new states. The Romanian political leaders’ decisions are more linked with the Russian


566 Ibid.


568 ___. Ibid.

position\textsuperscript{570} than with the United States decision to recognize Kosovo's independence.\textsuperscript{571} The President and political leaders are influenced by the Romanian domestic situation with the Hungarian minority, which will be detailed hereafter in the following chapter.

Romania continues to affirm that the sustainable solution for Kosovo’s status must be based on a negotiated solution between Belgrade and Pristina, and in accordance with the principles of international law, which guarantees the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of Serbia’s borders. The Kosovo precedent with the European Union agreement is similar to opening the Pandora box and can destabilize the entire Eastern region. Romania’s position is ambiguous because it is negative towards Kosovo’s independence, but could envisage Moldova’s reunification without the Transdnistria region. Part of the international community - 50 states - decided differently and many states in Europe – 22 European states -, members of the OECD, have recognized Kosovo’s independence, even if the United Nations declared the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{572} In October 2008, following a vote in the UN General Assembly, Serbia asked the International Court of Justice to status on the legality of Kosovo independence. In the Kosovo Independence situation, we can underline that Romania is an unconditional supporter of the world order and waits the UN decision to accept the Kosovo independence.

However, the MFA presented its own analysis base on a viable solution for long terms. The MFA wrote that Romania "has shown flexibility in the EU and NATO where, without compromising its position of principle against the Kosovo file, always found ways to facilitate consensus on the future employment of EU and NATO in


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Kosovo. Romania accepted to fulfil its duty in KFOR, as well as participation in the EULEX mission. The MFA concluded that these things help a lot the Romania’s image and strengthened the country’s position on international relations arena.

III.4.4 The Moldovan Issue

Traian Basescu tried to improve Romania's relations with The Republic of Moldova (RM), which shares a common language and culture. He said that the “[r]elationship with the Republic of Moldova will be a priority of my mandate as president of Romania”. Furthermore, he has expressed several times his belief in the future unification of the two countries, either politically or in the framework of the European Union. He adds that “[w]e [Romanians] believe that Moldova has only one destiny and the destiny is a European one [...] We believe that Romania and Moldova are linked by history, by tradition, by inter-human relations and the unification of the Romanian nation can be done in the European Union”.

However, the Romanian political attitude brought tension as well an increase of the anti-Romanian rhetoric from the communist government of Moldova, led by Vladimir Voronin. An important point remains thru the opening of two Romanian consulates outside the capital of Moldova, as well as a minimum of 900,000 Moldovan


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applying for Romanian citizenship. In both cases, Băsescu strongly supported the strengthening of the relations with Moldova, while the Moldovan leadership sought to cool down Băsescu's energy. In 2008, the relationship with the Republic of Moldova, “the sovereign neighbor with which we [Romanians] connect thru deep cultural and historical affinity”, remains a priority of Romania's foreign policy. The Romanian political leaders show the will to be involved in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict where Russian troops are based.

III.4.5 The Domestic Policy

III.4.5.1 The Corruption

The election of Traian Băsescu was based on the theme campaign ‘Justice and Truth Alliance’. The alliance had its origins in collaboration between the centre-right National Liberal Party (PNL) and the centre-left reformist Democratic Party (PD), which began in early 2002 upon the initiative of the PNL's former president, Valeriu Stoica. This alliance was established as a vehicle for coordinating opposition efforts against the ruling Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSD). Thru the campaign topic on the fight against corruption, Traian Băsescu won the election. This topic becomes the major objective of Traian Băsescu's presidential domestic policy (here before explained in the chapter: ‘Romania’s European Union Accession’). The President declares: “Romania no longer accepts the general label of corrupt country” and the fight against corruption becomes a national priority, handled at the level of the CSAT.


However, why does corruption become a high priority for the Romanian domestic policy and why is this important for Romania’s international relations?

The corruption issue is not a new one in Romania - hereafter explained - and had prevented Romania’s accession in 2004, putting the EU accession for 2007 in danger. The Member States and European institutions sharply criticized the lack of efforts by Romanian authorities in the fight against corruption and were very concerned about its scale, because since January 1st, 2007, Romania, as well as Bulgaria, are the new Eastern borders of the European Union, and such levels of corruption generate fears of permeable borders and in particular of an influx of illegal immigrants across the European Union. In addition, this development had a significant influence on the country’s domestic policy, as Romania increased judicial cooperation with other member states, pledging to combat corruption, and instituted several reforms.

It is not the first time that the European Parliament denounces corruption in Romania, as it is written in the 2004 European Parliament Report. The European Parliament

[d]eplores that despite progress in a number of areas, Romania currently faces serious difficulties fulfilling the requirements of the political Copenhagen-criteria; states that finalizing accession negotiations at the end of 2004 and becoming a member in 2007 is impossible unless Romania fully implements the following: anti-corruption measures, especially addressing corruption at the political level and implementing anti-corruption laws [...]578

What is Corruption? Corruption is an old phenomenon and may be found in all societies, in various degrees, and may exist in different proportions from one period to another. Moreover, “the causes and the consequences of corruption are complex [– as says Theobald “elusive and complex”579 -] and diverse, and have been sought in both individual ethics and civic cultures, in history and tradition, in the economic system, in the institutional

arrangements, and in the political system.”

Even if large International Organizations built and signed many conventions and edited books and reports on corruption, these organizations do not give a definition of ‘corruption’, but, “[i]instead they establish the offences for a range of corrupt behavior”. Then, we can ask the question: what is corruption?

There is no single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition of corruption. Attempts to develop such a definition invariably encounter legal, criminological and, in many countries, political problems. When the negotiations of the United Nations Convention against Corruption began in early 2002, one option under consideration was not to define corruption at all but to list specific types or acts of corruption.

In order to work on the same basis, International Organizations set an institutional working definition of corruption. According to Transparency International (TI), “Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. The World Bank set an approximate definition for which “Corruption is [...] defined as the abuse of public office for private gain”. These definitions are simple and understandable. The definition of corruption has always

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583 Since 1993, Transparency International (TI) is a global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption around the world. To see the website http://www.transparency.org .


been a source of difficulties and has often brought confusion and difficulties to scholars, policy makers and researchers.

In this context, we need to draft a scholar definition, because there are different definitions representing the different manifestations of the problem itself according to cultural, legal or other factors. We have different schools of thought concerning the definition of corruption. For Inge Amundsen, there are various forms of corruption and it is important to define them in order for them to be a useful concept for social sciences and in particular political science. Numerous books on corruption were published and can be characterized by the approaches chosen.

The first scholars to highlight and to draw attention about the existence, causes and consequences on corruption, as far back as the sixties, were Nathaniel Leff, David Bayley, Joseph Nye and Samuel Huntington. They put the basis of the definition on which modern scholars - Michael Johnston, Robina Theobald,

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Mancur Olson\textsuperscript{595}, Joshua Charap and Christain Harm\textsuperscript{596}, as well as Susan Rose-Akerman\textsuperscript{597} - developed and expanded the definition further and brought out some different schools on the definition. During the last decade, corruption has become a highly international topic and development policy issue. It has also become a meeting place for research pursued by different academic disciplines. The amount of research into corruption has expanded rapidly, taking many different directions. The academics emphasis has been on economics, political science and social anthropology perspectives.

The different approaches led by different schools identify the different facets of the term and bring difficulty surrounding this issue. The first approach, a cultural definition, warns that the definition of corruption depends on society and culture, considering that it depends on the context.\textsuperscript{598} The second approach considers corruption thru an objective and independent definition used as a universal definition.\textsuperscript{599} These two opposing views about corruption can lead to confusion and discrepancy.

\textsuperscript{599} This approach is supported by: The international organizations as the United Nations, the World Bank, the OECD, Transparency International...
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In addition, Michael Johnston contributes to the definition by providing other definition typology. The first typology is oriented on the behavioral aspects of the corruption supported by Carl Friedrich, Joseph Nye, John Waterbury, van Klaveren and Arnold Heidenheimer. The second one focuses on the interactions and relationships between the parties in a principal-agent-client framework, as defined by Susan Rose-Akerman, Robert Klitgaard and M. S. Alam.


607 “An individual or institution that actually performs the operation of the agency.” Cited in Ibid. Institutional Working definition of Corruption.

608 “A private individual or institution with whom the agent interacts.” Cited in Ibid. Institutional Working definition of Corruption.


However, Arnold Heidenheimer,\(^{612}\) the father of contemporary social science analysis of political corruption, attributes the definitional problems of corruption to its different shades and the complexity of the decision-making process. He classified corruption into three different categories representing depth and which are defined as white\(^{613}\), grey\(^{614}\) and black\(^{615}\) corruption. In the same way, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) defined the depth of the corruption by three levels: “petty corruption (bureaucratic corruption), grand corruption (political corruption) and state capture (corruption which affects the entire state apparatus).”\(^{616}\)

The classic definition of corruption is attributed to Joseph S. Nye, as “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains”\(^{617}\) - and we can add - “or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.”\(^{618}\) We can update this ancient definition, as Inge Amundsen writes, by citing a more recent scholar, Mushtaq Khan.\(^{619}\) Khan says that corruption is a “behavior that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a


\(^{614}\) Grey corruption “indicates that some elements, usually elites, may want to see the action punished, others not, and the majority may well be ambiguous” cited in Ibid.

\(^{615}\) Black corruption “indicates that a particular action is one that a majority consensus of both elite and mass opinion would condemn and want to see punished on grounds of principle” cited in Ibid.


position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status.” 620 Likewise, the Asian Bank, as well as Ian Senior, recognizes the aspect of corruption in public, but also in private sectors. The Asian Bank specifies that corruption is a “behavior on the part of officials in the public and private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are placed”. 621 Senior states that corruption takes place when “a corruptor covertly gives a favor to a corrupted or to a nominee to influence action(s) that may benefit the corruptor or a nominee and for which the corrupted has authority”. 622 A good and simple enough definition was stated for the Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa (ACT) and defines corruption as follows: “Corruption is the abuse or complicity in the abuse of private or public power, office or resources for personal gain.” 623

This definition is larger and can cover more phenomena than only private gain, as Steven Reed shows thru different examples on major corruption scandals in Western democracies, which involved the illicit party funding than individual gain. 624 Mark Warren, who establishes a modern conception of corruption more adequate in

\[\text{\textsuperscript{620}}\text{Khan, Mushtaq H. A Typology of Corrupt Transactions in Developing Countries. IDS Bulletin, April 1996, 1996, vol. 27, no. 2.}\]
political contexts, supports this idea.\textsuperscript{625} It avoids misinterpretation, covers both the public and private sectors, takes into consideration responsibilities in neglecting combat against corruption\textsuperscript{626}, and the fact that all acts of corruption do not necessarily result in damage or loss.

Corruption takes a variety of forms. The main forms of corruption are bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, favoritism, graft, patronage, nepotism and cronyism, kickbacks, clientelism and involvement in organized crime. Even when these forms are partly overlapping and at times interchangeable with other forms, some of the basic characteristics of corruption can be identified thru these forms. In view of the difficulties surrounding this definition, it is often even more difficult to agree on the necessary punishment of the act itself.

\textbf{III.4.5.1.1 A Worrying Situation}

As far we know, in 2002 the Council of Europe’s Group of States against corruption (GRECO) publishes an ‘Evaluation Report on Romania’ and states that

\begin{quote}
\textit{it seems that, in reality, corruption affects the activities of almost all public institutions in Romania and is a worrying phenomenon. The most serious acts of corruption are directly linked to organized crime, with the attendant risk that government bodies and the judicial system have been infiltrated. In particular, several investigations have outlined the existence of corruption within the Romanian courts and police system, and the levels of satisfaction with these services are the lowest for all public services assessed. According to the Corruption Index 2001, published by}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{626} “Complicity in corruption offences lies at the heart of third party responsibility (and thus third party liability). Both failure to exercise oversight and failure to engage in a sufficient amount of detection effort can make a superior an accomplice to a corruption crime. Other civil servants who share bribes or businessmen who change middle-men fees may also be complicit in corruption through aiding and abetting a criminal offence. The failure to denounce corruption may also be considered as complicity: […]” coted in Michael, Bryane. Drafting Implementing Regulations for International Anti-Corruption Conventions [online]. Paper presented at the Queen Elizabeth House. Oxford, UK: Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. p. 54. [cited 3 Nov. 2008]. Portable Document Format. Available from: <http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/RePEc/qeh/qehwps/qehwps150.pdf>.
\end{footnotesize}
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Transparency International, Romania lies in 69th place (jointly with Venezuela).  

Even if the GRECO underlines that "[i]n recent years, the various Romanian governments have generally been greatly concerned by the problem of corruption, and have made considerable efforts to prevent and combat it"628, it adds that "the phenomenon of corruption in Romanian daily life is undeniable, and confirmed by a series of official sources and fairly detailed data and investigations."629 The report concludes that "[t]he undoubted reality of corruption offences in Romania is all the more worrying in that the institutions most implicated in fighting corruption, namely the police and the justice system, are also affected by the phenomenon."630 In its report, the GRECO made in 2002 thirteen recommendations on the fight against corruption. In 2004 the same institution publishes a second document and concluded “that Romania has implemented all the recommendations of the ‘First Round Evaluation Report’ with the exception of one which has been partly implemented”.631 The recommendation XII on the restriction of the categories of people entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution. Consequently, according to the report published, Romania has reached the GRECO standards.

However, in 2004, the issue of corruption is placed on the top of the list of the four areas discussed for the Romanian accession to EU, being able to block the accession to the European Union. In December, the European Council decided to match the accession of Romania with a new threat: “the Twenty-Five could decide, by qualified majority, to postpone by one year the accession of Romania if they find, before January 1st, 2007, that Romania does

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not meet certain requirements on competition, as well as justice and domestic affairs.”

III.4.5.1.2 Inertia of the Practices

Taking a longer view, we can find another idea indicating inertia of the practices in fighting corruption. The ‘2004 Regular Report on Romania’s progress Toward Accession’ edited on October 2004 by the European Commission, states, in the Anti-corruption measures chapter, that “[s]urveys and assessments conducted by both national and international organizations confirm that corruption remains a serious and widespread problem in Romania which affects almost all aspects of society.” The report underlines, in the same idea, that

There has been no reduction in perceived levels of corruption and the number of successful prosecutions remains low, particularly for high-level corruption. The fight against corruption is hampered by integrity problems even within institutions that are involved in law enforcement and the fight against corruption. […] The priority for the Romanian government must be to ensure the rigorous enforcement of existing legislation. Measures contained in the National Corruption Strategy and associated Action Plan have so far had a limited impact.

The report, also, brings out that

[s]ince becoming operational [National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office (PNA)] investigations have led to 86 prison sentences, though few of these could be regarded as being for high-level corruption. The PNA should ensure that it remains focused on its core mandate of investigating high-level corruption instead of processing a large number of petty corruption cases.

The other problems announced are that

[o]ther agencies also have some degree of competence for investigating corruption but inter-agency co-operation is generally weak.

634 Ibid.
635 Ibid.
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This is detrimental to the effectiveness of the law enforcement process and reduces transparency in the handling of corruption cases.\(^{636}\)

In the same way, Transparency International (TI) created tools, based on their working definition\(^{637}\) of corruption, to measure corruption and released an annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) built with expert assessments and opinion surveys. The index ranks from 0 to 10. From the less corrupt, near 10 to the more corrupt, the grade 0.

In 2001, Romania ranks 2.8 on the 69\(^{th}\) place, behind all other European States, including Bulgaria, which is ranked the 47\(^{th}\) with 3.9.\(^{638}\) In 2004, Romania ranks the 87\(^{th}\) out of 146, with a CPI of 2.9, behind Bulgaria, which occupies the 54\(^{th}\) place, with a 3.9 CPI.\(^{639}\) In 2007, Romania has a CPI of 3.1, being ranked the 84\(^{th}\) out of 160.\(^{640}\)

\(^{636}\) Ibid. p. 22.
Table 2: Romania Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and rank – 2001-2008.

Within EU 27, Finland is ranked 9.9 out 10, on the first place, while Romania is the last of the European States. Even if the CPI’s evaluations are better and better, Romania remains the last European state, far behind Bulgaria, Poland (3.5) and Turkey (3.2). Of course, Romania made progresses, but what is 0.1 points, from 2004 to 2005, as compared, for example, to Estonia, which moved from 5.5 to 6.0 in the same period?

Even if the GRECO acknowledges the country’s good progress, the European Commission and Transparency International consider that there still are corruption issues in Romania. After Romania’s accession in January 2007, the problem remains crucial and still supervised by the European Union.

**III.4.5.1.3 Origin of the Problem**

In 1976, Alain Besançon wrote that

Corruption is a disease of communism. Accordingly, in opposition between us and them, between the Party and civil society, corruption is for the latter a sign of health. It is a manifestation of life, a pathological life, but
of life rather than death. It resulted in a rebirth of life, as the figure itself is a trafficker victory of the individual, the person.\textsuperscript{641}

Wayne Sandholtz and Rein Taapegera declare that “[s]cholars and political commentators alike view corruption as one of the most serious problems facing post-communist societies.”\textsuperscript{642} In the same idea, Richard Rose says:

Corruption is the greatest obstacle to progress in post-communist countries. [...] [T]he longer corruption persists at the elite level, the greater the likelihood that the mass of the electorate will become indifferent to dishonesty, or decide that the only way to deal with a corrupt state is to benefit from lawbreaking oneself, whether in the form of avoiding taxes, smuggling, or corruption of civil servants and elected representatives.\textsuperscript{643}

To reinforce this idea, Valerian Stan, an independent Romanian expert and member of the Council of Legal Resources Centre, considers that the corruption in Romania is a ‘systemic evil’\textsuperscript{644}, because “the current situation is also a consequence of nearly five decades of totalitarian communism that Romania has suffered and which generated a structured networks of the black economy, so a bit of practice to circumvent the law.”\textsuperscript{645} Stan explains that there are two main reasons at the origin of the corruption system in Romania. The first reason is the lack of collaboration between the civil society, state institutions and the government. The second is the inheritance of the old regime, because

the communist political police, the Securitate, has successfully maintained very strong positions, even after 1990. Although the identity of

\textsuperscript{645} Ibid. p. 74. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
these former officers and employees has been one of the best kept secrets for the past fifteen years, some of them - enough, in fact - have been identified. If from these data, was placed end to end these names, it would, as in a puzzle, a picture showing the men of the Securitate placed in the most important positions of political life, public institutions, financial and banking system, media, etc. With each major scandal linked to corruption, we discover that one or even more Securitate officers are actively involved in it.\textsuperscript{646}

He strengthens thru different articles that “[i]n recent years, investigations on this subject\textsuperscript{647}, highlighted the fact that most parliamentarians and ministers are involved in private businesses, which often generates ‘incompatibilities’ and ‘conflicts of interest’.\textsuperscript{648} In his article, Stan notes the statement of Valeriu Stoica, Minister of Justice in 2000, made during the seminar on the ‘Financing Political Party – A Condition for Democracy’, that 80 per cent of the political parties are financed with illegal fundraising.\textsuperscript{649} For Pierre Verluise, “[f]inally, the Securitate officers are, in connivance with some of the political class, a system of organized crime.\textsuperscript{650}

The political scene witnessed several scandals that confirmed the here before allegation thru what we can call ‘conflict of interest at work’. In August 2003, a corruption scandal broke out when BBC Romania reported that some companies owned by Hildegard Puwak, the Minister for European Integration and her family (her son and husband) received non-reimbursable funds of 150,000 Euros allocated by the Leonardo de Vinci fund of the European Union,

\textsuperscript{646} Ibid. p. 74-75. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
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granted during her function. The request for these funds was sent on 19 January 2001, three weeks after Puwak became minister.

The National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office (PNA) carried out an investigation and the EU’s Anti Fraud Office (OLAF) and both concluded that there had been no breach of contract awarding procedures. Both the government members and the ruling party took Puwak's side during this scandal, the official stance of the government being that she did not break any law and so was the stance of the Romanian Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Office. On 21 October 2003, she resigned, together with two other ministers, Health Minister Mircea Beuran and Government Co-ordination Minister Serban Mihailescu, in the Nastase government. "The resignations came after a series of accusations in the media that they initiated or tolerated corruption, although the government backed them during the referendum campaign." \(^{651}\)

In 2006, Deputy Prime Minister, George Copos, who is the richest member of the government, is under investigation in relation to the alleged illegal acquisition of a commercial area by the Romanian Lottery from Ana Electronic, a group of companies owned by the politician.

**III.4.5.1.4 The Initiative**

In order to solve the corruption issues, the government develops a number of programs after the nineties, under the requirement of the European Union and the NATO, called the National Anti-corruption Strategy (NAS) to fight corruption. Along the same lines, the government created a number of governmental institutions to fight corruption. The first program NAS I covered the period 2001-2004 and was setup to prevent corruption. In 2001, a Romanian Government Decision adopts the National Program on Corruption Prevention and the National Action Plan against Corruption thru the Government decision no. 1065/2001.\(^{652}\) The governmental conclusions on the NAS I program underlines that "[t]he fight against

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corruption is not an objective in itself, it does not represent a blind crusade for straightening the evils of Romanian society”, and that “The corruption phenomena can never be eliminated”.653

The second program, NAS II, covered the period 2005-2007 and was built on the lessons learnt of the NAS I. The new plan defines 10 objectives to be resolved. The most important of them are the ones related to transparency and integrity of the public administration, prevention of corruption in the business world, information campaigns and educational measures, the strengthening of resistance to corruption in the judicial system, reducing the number of structures dedicated to the fight against corruption to improve their efficiency, and integration of anti-corruption measures advocated by the European Union, the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the OECD. As usual, it looks like an ambitious program on the paper, but the question is: do politicians have the will to apply this program and put in the necessary resources to accomplish it?

Traian Basescu declares in 2005: “Bribe has become a national sport”654 and it is not a European mentality to be partner of corrupt institutions. “A European Citizen is a partner of law”655, he says. He asks the Romanian citizen, “[s]tarting from tomorrow to not pay bribe anymore to ask public servants to comply with the law, to ask the physician to comply with the law, to ask anyone – including in the relations between private companies, to comply with the law. [...] I would ask, if possible, to support the citizen; it’s part of getting back our national dignity.”656

Corruption is a large problem in Romania, linked with the reminiscence of the communist system, including governmental continuity in political life and institution management within the


655 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

656 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
former ‘nomemklatura’. To cure this gangrene, it is necessary to shed light on past events and remove the evil undermining the structures of the state. Moreover, these impunities do not calm the civil society and do not help it to heal the wound and to restart on new basis of democracy.

In order to get rid off the corruption, the Prime Minister, following the proposal of Marius Oprea, created the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Romania (IICCR), acknowledged by a Romanian Government Decree, because “[m]any people are asking whether an outright condemnation of communism is still necessary, now that 16 years have passed since the Revolution of 1989.”657 It is “a profoundly moral decision, meant to restore the Romanian society from its foundation”.658 Oprea writes, in the presentation of the Institute, that

[w]e [Romanians] gradually witnessed the regrouping of the former communist leaders (nomemklatura), of the ‘Securitate’ – the former political police of the communist regime –, while different people from the Mitia and the Prosecutor’s Office secured their positions or even upgraded them, despite their having made compromises during the former regime. We were witnesses to how these people re-conquered their political and economic power. This political and bureaucratic class turned into a strong oligarchy, after having served a criminal regime.659

In the same way, Traian Basescu creates the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, in April 2006, headed by Vladimir Tismaneanu.660 The report, ‘Final Report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania’, was issued in December 2006. By formally condemning communism, Romania became the first Eastern European country to do so thru an academic study bringing together scholars and researchers on this issue.

658 Ibid.
660 Tismaneanu Vladimir is a Romanian and American political scientist, sociologist, and professor at the University of Maryland, College Park and a specialist in political systems and compared politics. He left Romania in 1981 and lived in United States from 1982.
Traian Băsescu declares, in his speech in front of the Parliament, in December 2006, that

[...]he Commission’s conclusions, which I support, confirm that the totalitarian communist regime in Romania was imposed by foreign dictate [, imported by USSR]. Indeed, it was a case of an illegitimate regime, founded upon a fanatical ideology, an ideology that systematically cultivated hatred, an ideology for which the ‘lass struggle’ and the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ symbolized the essence of historical progress.661

Traian Băsescu said: “As Head of the Romanian state, I expressly and categorically condemn the communist system in Romania, from its foundation, on the basis of dictate, from 1944 to 1947, to its collapse in December 1989."662 He adds that “[b]eing aware of the realities presented in the Report, I affirm with full responsibility: the communist regime in Romania was illegitimate and criminal.”663 He adds, “[f]or the citizens of Romania, communism was a regime imposed by a political group self-designated as possessor of the truth, a totalitarian regime born through violence, and ended through violence”.664 In conclusion, the President says: “In condemning this regime[, the communist one], the democratic Romanian State condemns its instruments, the Romanian Communist Party and the Securitate in the first place.”665

For the Commission chairman Vladimir Tismaneanu, the best phrase which defines the conclusion of the report is the following one: “From the beginning to the end, communism in Romania has been an illegitimate and criminal regime”.666

The scientific community and the media, as well political leaders, criticized this initiative for its form and substance. The report’s critics focused on three problems: the choice of events and personalities included in the report, the moral authority of the

662 Ibid.
663 Ibid.
664 Ibid.
665 Ibid.
commission members and the conclusions of the report. Romanian journalist, Ion Cristoiu, believes that the personalities nominated in the report are perceived as political enemies of Traian Basescu, who initiated the commission. Some critics noted that condemning a political doctrine is useless as the crimes of the regime should be condemned and dangerous because existing communist states could take it as an attack. Some believe that Traian Basescu's choice to declare the Communist regime as illegitimate based on the report, is also dangerous because it may be interpreted as an annulment of all international treaties in which Communist Romania took part. We can note, also, that the report mixes all victims of the Communist regime into a single category, whereas some should be singled out. Another point is that important dissident leaders are also omitted from the report.

In general, for Pierre Verluise, “[t]hrough the research of the Securitate officers and Communist Party members, the institute could have a positive impact on the fight against systemic corruption.” The other good point is the opening of the National Archives to grant easier access to information. However, this entire measure leads to a major political crisis with the President’s suspension in 2007. The president gains his power back thru the referendum, in particular with the support of the population and the Diaspora.

III.4.5.2 The Battle

In June 2006, the president came into open conflict with Popescu-Tariceanu, the Prime Minister, after he announced with the


Defence Minister that they and the PNL sought to withdraw Romania's troops from Iraq. However, the troops stayed in Iraq, after the president called a meeting of the Supreme Defense Council, which voted that the troops should stay.\textsuperscript{670} Thus, the Romanian elite do not deny the importance of partnership with the United States, more that it does not date only of this government. However, there are some different approaches from neither the president nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from a simple basic one to a more complex and nuanced one's.

Nevertheless, the President and Prime Minister’s conflicts continued, not only on the Romanian troop’s withdrawal, but also in the political sphere, through the suspension of the President by the Parliament in April 2007, on ground of presidential abuse of authority “using secret services to spy on cabinet members and politicians”\textsuperscript{671}. Also the opposition claims

that the president had infringed upon and ‘substituted’ the authority of the government, the judicial system and the Parliament; committed acts of ‘political partisanship’ [...] and abused his power by acting more like a ‘judge of the other public authorities’ than a ‘collaborator’ and thus ‘abandoned his role of impartial mediator required by the Romanian constitution’; and manipulated and ‘investigated public opinion against other state institutions’ such as the Parliament and the government.\textsuperscript{672}

Another reason for the suspension of Romania’s president resulting from the political sphere was the fight against corruption under the pressure of the EU, which resulted in the Commission’s progress reports and the possibility to invoke safeguard clauses, explained above. Even if Romania made substantial progress on juridical reforms, the EU’s justice commissioner, pushed by French and British officials, accused the Union to be too soft concerning what they called the ‘serious’ corruption problems in the country. The President is particularly energetic in pushing an anti-corruption


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agenda, and as Bogdan Teodorescu, director of a Romanian think-tank -Institute Pro- said, Traian Basescu “wanted to fight corruption through political power instead of building institutions based on law”. The President denounces that “too often, mafia arrived on the table of the government.” He explains that the political environment is like “an aquarium in which illegitimate interest groups struggle to discredit state institutions. They have tremendous energy in trying to discredit State institutions, be they ministers, let’s say the minister of justice, or prosecutors, or the police” Traian Basescu, head of the state, fights with interest groups and explains that “[w]hen you look back and see sustainability, you realize that it is illegitimate interest groups that support it, because they have access to television and writing.” He adds that “[i]t is a wonderful battle”. However, the President got criticized about the manner of implementing the fight against corruption, arguing that his tempestuous style and resistance “threatened its members and supporters”. All efforts were made against the president’s enemies or opponents neither politician nor businessmen close to him. In strong opposition with the Prime Minister, the President organized a referendum in order to return to the presidential place. He succeeded with the large support of the population, including the Romanian


676 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

677 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

Diaspora, by winning the referendum on May 19, with 74 per cent of the participating voters rejecting the president’s impeachment.

This battle demonstrated the effect of the Romanian foreign policy interaction with the Romania domestic policy, through the Iraqi war and the alliance with the United States, and the corruption issues with the European Union acquis communautaires.
III.5 Partial Conclusion

The Iliescu’s presidency runned until December 1996, from the first democratic election by the parliament in 1990 and followed by a popular election in 1992. As the particular situation of Romania’s transition from dictatorship to democracy, and the supervision of Romania by Western democracies for the European and NATO integration, the legacy of the past, the Romania’s domestic policy and image had an important impact on the foreign policy and leeches off the international relations of Romania. In addition, the political program related to administration and economic reforms was highly important for Romania’s image and then on Romania’s international relations. From 1993, reforms were not seriously done and the Romanian official wishes of change remained in their imaginary and their beliefs. We argue that there were no difference between Iliescu’s presidency foreign policy and Ceausescu’s one. However, after 1993, the Westernization of the political elite slowly brings a change in the attitude for the normalization of International Relations in 1996. For Catherine Durandin, a French historian specialists in Romania’s aggregate history, “[t]he first, long period extended from 1990 to 1996, was dominated by Gorbachevian and post-Gorbachevian forces.”

We can see that the government, in the context of the revolutionary issue, has difficult legitimacy and was challenged by the population and opposition. Nothing changed in depth, but only in surface. The only chance of the Romanian government at the beginning was the recognition on the international scene to secure its recognition and its power on the domestic scene. This presidency was marked by several topics regarding the foreign policy. After the statement of the NSF to broke the isolation of the country for a

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comeback in the international community, Romania acted actively thru International Organizations – the UN and its subsidiary, IMF, ... - and participated in regional organizations – NATO, EU, BSEC, OSCE, WUE, ... -. In addition, emphasis was put on active worldwide contacts with the major powers - Russia, United States -, as well as major economic powers – Japan – and historical partners – South-America, China – at the diplomatic level. From this point of view, Romania succeeded in returning and playing a full role in the international community.

The integration goals in European and Euro-Atlantic space were stated on different occasions, from the start of the new Romanian government. Because of the slow importation of the Western democracy, as it was done during the 19th century, Romania had a handicap in the accession towards NATO and the EU. Romanian leaders’ political attitude towards democratic reforms and human rights topics described in the Romanian image paragraph, troubles Romania’s relation with regional organizations (NATO, EU) as well with the neighbors. Romania decided to make a large effort and concession in order to solve these problems and to be seen as a viable candidate for the EU and NATO integration.

On the base of the dichotomous Romania’s attitude, one side toward the Western model and the other side toward the native model, Romania finally chose the Western model, despite the reminiscence of the historical Latin link with France, Spain, Italy, Latin America and the Francophony, as well as the European model link implemented after the 1849 revolution. The native model pushed Romania to flirt with the Slavic neighbors (Russia and Yugoslavia) and to be potentially classified as a Balkan country, especially during the first Yugoslavian war (1990-1992).

President Ion Iliescu decided, after a period of hesitation, to turn Romania’s membership of both organizations, the European Union and NATO, into the foundation pillar of his foreign policy, and this position was fully shared by the parties in opposition at that time. We want to specify that, during this period, as usual, we noted a strong shift between speeches and practices.

On the base of will of change, The Constantinescu’s presidency was underlined in the domestic policy by the will to reform the economy, the administration and the defense, and by the foreign policy aimed to integrate the Western institutions as EU and NATO. The goals of the Constantinescu presidency were the integration in European and Euro-Atlantic space, with the importation of the Westerners democracy as back in history at the 19th century, and the
positioning of the country as a factor of crossroad between East and West, South and North, equilibrium and stability toward the South-East European space. "Indeed, since his election, in November, President Constantinescu strives ‘to build a solid and flexible regional architecture’ “681 as it was written in a Western newspaper, ‘Le Monde’. However, the director of the daily Romanian newspaper ‘Today’ (Azi), Ion Cristoiu said: “[f]or six years [after the overthrow of communism], Romanians waited for a miracle, and when Constantinescu came, we thought it was the miracle. But no miracle happened”.682 A growing dissatisfaction with the government’s inefficiencies and economic policies, as well the inability to keep the promises to bring a free-market economy to Romania led to a wave of protests in 1997 and 1999.

Not all government’s projects succeeded; Romania as a crossroad failed in implementation and only the stability factor was recognized by the international community. The Romanian crossroad idea, expressed in another way in the previous presidency, gave results later thru the use of Romania’s idea by foreign leaders positioning Romania as a key element in the region. Under Constantinescu’s presidency, the good neighborhood relations strategy was continued in particular with Hungary and Ukraine. Romania continued and reinforced its participation with International Organizations – IMF, World Bank, etc. - as well as with Regional Organizations such as the BSCE. Romanian’s officials developed a concept with the Romanian-Bulgarian-Greek link based on Orthodoxy.

The implementation of government reforms, the compliance with international organizations’ recommendations, the economic cost of the ‘war sacrifice’ had a social and financial impact, combined with the government choice during the Kosovo war in opposition with the population feeling - all these strongly disappointed a part of the voters. The refusal of NATO to integrate Romania in the first wave and the EU postponement of the accession process will bring an ultranationalist reaction and brought back Ion Iliescu as president. The failure to integrate into NATO during first wave was due to two problems; The first was the international situation and the will of

681 Châtelot, Christophe. En normalisant ses relations avec l’Ukraine la Roumanie cherche les faveurs de l’OTAN (By normalizing its relations with Ukraine Romania searches the favours of NATO). Le Monde, 6 Jun.1997. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
United States officials to manage the Russians’ feeling towards the NATO enlargement; the second one was the failure in the political, administrative and military reforms of Romania’s domestic policy. Thus blocking the Romanian accession during the first wave. As we can read in newspapers: “The foreign intelligence service, a spy operation notorious for its hardball tactics, is still run by agents who had positions in the Ceausescu dictatorship. Mr. Ionescu acknowledged that, for Romania to be acceptable to NATO, the foreign intelligence service needed to be cleaned out.”

Alin Teodorescu, a deputy at the Romanian Parliamentary assembly, analyses the policy of the Constantinescu presidency and concludes that the Romanian government has the merit to gain the respect of the European Union during the Kosovo war due to Romania’s attitude and its capacity to make front to the unpopularity of its policy. He concludes that it is not much, but it is something nonetheless. As he puts it:

The 96-2000 government wanted Romania to join NATO, but it was not ready for that and did nothing to prepare itself for that. The only thing that is truly worth mentioning is Constantinescu’s position during the Kosovo conflict, when he supported NATO’s intervention, running the risk of losing his popularity in the polls and, eventually, the elections. He kept his word and set a certain individual behavior. For several months, Romania had a good image again, being invited to Helsinki to start the EU accession process, even though everybody knew it was a country way behind the others. It’s not much for four years of mandate, but it was something nonetheless.

Communism remained in Romania for 6 years after the Revolution, until 1996. On the contrary, in other Eastern European States, communism disappeared, as political forces after the Eastern European States independence but came back to power in Poland (1993) and Hungary (1994) and mainly in all other Eastern States, where the post-communist governments were unable to improve the economic situation. “At the time of their initiation, reform programs in both Hungary and Poland enjoyed widespread public support, but when the people realized the price they were asked to pay for

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marketization, they quickly turned against the reforms.⁶⁸⁵ And, we can say that the non-accession to NATO during the first wave, the delay of the European Union accession process with the country ‘sacrifice’ made in applying the reforms recommended by International Organizations and the ‘Kosovo War’ created a scission between the population and the government. This scission will favor the election of the Ion Iliescu coalition.

Ion Iliescu was re-elected on the basis of the civil society’s disillusion toward Emil Constantinescu’s presidency and to bar Vadim Tudor’s election. The government builds a program with such priorities as the re-launch of the economic growth, the fight against poverty and unemployment, restoration of the authority of the State and of its institutions, reduction of bureaucracy, the fight against corruption and criminality. The acceleration of the integration into the EU and NATO remain the top priority of the Romanian foreign policy, as the relationship with neighboring countries. As previous Ion Iliescu’s mandate and Ceausescu’s foreign policy, Romania wants to be ‘world connected’, by strengthening historical relation with the Latin country and the ‘third world’, as well as former communist countries, and with the mythic United States, by consolidating its strategic partnership with them. The country leaders surf on the waves of globalization and of the development relations with the Far East. They renew the idea of ‘Romania at the crossroads’ between the East and the West launched during Emil Constantinescu’s mandate. In the regional and continental area, the country obtained successful results through the OSCE Chairmanship and started to develop the leadership toward the Black Sea region. The Romanian government paid special attention to the Republic of Moldova, encouraging the European anchor of this state. Moreover, Romanian officials paid particular attention to the issue in relation with Ukraine concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic areas in the Black Sea. In recent years, Romania has worked to boost and develop its bilateral relations and trade with the Russian Federation.

The period from 2001 to 2004 increased Romania’s visibility in the world arena and influenced its relations with major players, upgrading cooperation between state institutions and Romanian communities everywhere, improving Romania’s image in the world on its coordinated objective to attract foreign investments by imposing

specific Romanian field marks and a new ethos of the diplomatic profession. Romanian leaders introduce some innovation approaches in the foreign policy by using the civil society as NGOs to promote the Romanian image to achieve the foreign policy goals. They developed the sphere of the ‘Economic Diplomacy’, the ‘Cultural Diplomacy’ as well the the relations with the Romanian Diaspora.

On a global multilateral level, the government’s foreign policy have been tenaciously pursued, promoting Romania’s candidature as a member of the permanent UN Security Council for 2004-2005. Moreover, as a member of the Security Council, from 1990 to 1991 and again from 2004 to 2005, Romania wanted to play a role in the diplomatic space in the ‘large Middle East’. We want to underline the intense development of the political and economical cooperation with the People’s Republic of China.

President Traian Basescu, in continuity of his predecessors, applies the same main foreign policy goal – the accession to European Union – and strengthens the relationship with NATO. The relationship with Washington will become the other main goal of Basescu’s presidency, through the creation of a ‘Bucharest-London-Washington axis’. The goal of this closer relationship with the United States, in the framework of the fight against terrorism, is the deep development of the military, political and economical relations. In the military field, the goal is to welcome US military bases in the framework of the American re-deployment in Europe. In the political field, it is the will to continue to have support from Washington leaders in order to strengthen Romania’s position toward the Black Sea. As for the economical field, it is the opportunity to develop the American foreign investment in the Romanian economy. For Romanian leaders, the relationship with the United States cannot be separated from NATO and the European security issue, contributing to the stability and economic growth for Europe in general, and South-Eastern Europe in particular.

However, the large corruption phenomenon and the domestic political fight between the President and the Prime Minister have a profound impact on the Romanian international relations, which crystallized the forces and attention on personal issue instead of the country’s future role in NATO and the European Union.
IV From Isolation to Interdependence

The European Romania, the Euro-Atlantic Romania: For a Better Life in a Democratic, Safer and More Prosperous Country.

The National Security Strategy of Romania

Led by Ion Iliescu, former communist and newly designated president of the CNSF, it was the wish of the new provisory government representative to break away from the last 10 years of controversy and isolation from the international community. In a private interview in January 2006, former president Ion Iliescu came back on this period and said that:

We [Romania] were completely isolated, i.e.... At the end of the eighties, Romania was hated. [...] Everywhere in the world. [...] The year 1989 marked isolation. This is why, in the program of the Revolution, among the ten points, there was this: to put an end to the international isolation of Romania, to open the country towards the world.

Romania suffered from its last ten years of isolation at the level of international relations, but also at the level of its domestic economic situation. Far from making a speech analysis, we notice here, in Ion Iliescu’s interview, that the important point was that Romania was hated and isolated from the international scene. The will of the new leader was ‘to put an end’ and to have Romania be again an actor on the international scene.

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Was the will to change the Romanian situation on the international relations scene put into action? Can we say that there was a change in the Romanian foreign policy? As we defined foreign policy in the introduction part, here before, we need to define the foreign policy change and, hence, to see if the status quo meets the definition.

We will demonstrate that the Romanian foreign policy changes, from isolation during the Ceausescu period to dependence vis-à-vis the EU and NATO and their representation through the program accession, during the first stage of Constantinescu’s presidency (1996 to 2000) and during the Ion Iliescu’s fourth mandate (2000 to 2004). Romania will build, during a second step, an interdependence relationship with NATO and the EU and their state representatives as well as with its neighbors. We will see, also, that the new international situation, after 1989, creates a world of interdependence between states and actors.
IV.1 The Global Situation

The end of the Cold War, starting with the ‘Iron Curtain’ fall and ending with the Soviet Union dissolution, brings a change in the European situation, as well as in international relations and diplomacy. This situation brings Eastern European countries back to the period from before the Second World War, which means a jump back in history, to the old geopolitical issue of the interwar period. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) bring some potential threats on the economic, social and political plans.

For NATO, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 removed de facto the main adversary and the Soviet threat for Europe. These facts caused a strategic re-evaluation of NATO’s purpose, nature and tasks and were to affect the transatlantic relationship and the United States foreign policy deeply.

The European Economical Community (EEC) was under construction and the EEC was surprised by the new situation, as was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). All previously communist states represented by Central, Eastern and Balkan states were at different levels from the point of view of economic, social and political changes and in a difficult situation. At that time, the EEC was not stable enough and even ready for the idea to integrate the ex-communist states, which were in complete political and economical bankruptcy, and neither was NATO. For the European Community, the fall of the communist regime and the opening of the Soviet satellite border lead to some economical, social and political issues. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) bring some potential threats. The political development becomes an important matter in order to guarantee the security and stability at the doors of European states, and to avoid potential conflicts and border reshaping. The economical development will avoid poverty and social troubles and will create easy access to the free-market economy.

Central and Eastern European and Balkan countries were in a transformation process, with deep concerns regarding the economic and political future of the state identity. The new freedom brings back some facts that were never accepted and old litigations or disputes that were never resolved. This situation brought the redefinition of alliances and borders and the creation of new states, sometimes in a
bloody manner. In this situation, neighboring countries and their vicinity were highly important. The minority presence and the behavior of the state became an important issue. The first Eastern European country to join the European Economical Community (EEC) was the German Democratic Republic, following its dissolution and integration within the German Federal Republic. The Ex-German Democratic Republic (GDR) became, de facto, a member of the EEC and NATO at the end of 1990. This precedent marks the possibility to integrate Eastern European countries in large organizations, such as the European Economical Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The new German state made some constitutional changes and signed a treaty with Poland, finalizing Germany’s boundaries as permanent along the Oder-Neisse line to avoid potential tensions.

Why were these organizations – the EEC and NATO – so important and why did they attract Romania within other CEECs? What connection or influences did these two organizations have regarding Romania’s international relations? Why were neighboring relations so important and how did they influence the state’s change and development? What was the treatment of neighboring relations and the minority presence on the state territory?

In this section, we will demonstrate that the CEECs strategy was the same, i.e. to integrate large organizations to provide economic and military security and to move from a kind of dictatorship and centralized economy to democracy and free-market economy, each at their own pace. We will demonstrate that the Romanian foreign policy will move from isolation in 1989 to dependence vis-à-vis international organizations such as the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as in relation to Western democracies such as United States or European states. Finally, we will show that Romania moved from dependence to interdependence with the here-before organizations and states.

**IV.1.1 The Choice**

**IV.1.1.1 Central and Eastern European Countries**

For Central and Eastern European Countries,

[i]Immediately after 1989, the world seemed to have been enormously simplified, according to the logic which saw the ‘liberal democracy’ [...] imposing itself in a relentless manner all over the world.
From Isolation to Interdependence

Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History’ expressed this vision. At the end of the day, for transition countries, the entry into economic and political normality found its incarnation in the accession within the two main clubs of the Euro-Atlantic space: NATO and the European Union; it is also from this that stemmed the definition of priorities regarding foreign and economic policies.\textsuperscript{688}

Romania, as other CEECs, adopted the same strategy, as we will see hereafter in this part, for various reasons:

First, the necessity to be military safer from any threats, as Russian expansionism, Black Sea and Balkan instability thru the association and integration within a military organization that can stand against these threats, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO within an alliance with the United States, winner of the Cold War.

Second, to go towards democracy and economic opulence by turning to the political organization representing democracy and to switch trade relations from the East side to the West side, by strengthening the link with Europe and, in this case, with the Union (CEE and after EU).

Third, to stabilize the state borders and domestics institutions, as to resolve internal strong dissension issues within the neighborliness relations thru good relations by treaties, negotiation and cooperation. The neighborliness relation will be used as a positive trigger in Romania’s international relations and in the accomplishment of the state international strategy.

IV.1.1.2 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

"In the post-Cold War era, NATO has confronted the challenge of remaining relevant in a European security environment devoid of threat from all-out attack from the East."\textsuperscript{689} In fact, NATO was created after the Second World War as an alliance to react to the Soviet threat of invasion of Western European countries. However, the ‘Iron Curtain’ fall and the end of the Cold War brought forward the need to

\textsuperscript{688} Tomescu-Hatto, Odette. Identité et culture politique dans la Roumanie post-communiste. In Durandin, Catherine (dir.) and Căraciuc, Magda (Col.) (Eds.), Perspectives roumaines : Du postcommunisme à l’intégration européenne. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004. p. 70. Translated by Marc Bonnaems

maintain the alliance after the disappearance of former enemy. The Alliance was built as a collective defense alliance in Europe, even if some actors – France, for example – viewed it as “nothing more than a loose and fragile conditional alliance of potentially defecting nations-states.” The organization, created as a security provider “to ward off specific and defined dangers” against a well-identified enemy, would adapt to face and respond to more diffuse threats and instability. In fact, NATO “is increasingly centered on the principle of collectively managing security interest.” The survival of the organization will be achieved through enlargement towards the East, thru cooperation and later integration of the former enemy with different cooperation relations and programs implementation. The new security paradigm with the Kosovo war and after the 9/11 events introduced the United States as an active and aggressive actor inside the alliance and accelerated the enlargement process to all the former Warsaw treaty members. The Alliance’s transformation and enlargement processes were easier than the European Union one, due to the unique decision - maker and commander – the United States.

IV.1.1.3 The European Union Integration

In 1989, the European Community was surprised by the events of the Iron Curtain and the Communism fall, and the end of the Cold War period. Especially the German reunification, in 1991, will give the top start for the Central and Eastern Europe Countries accession to Europe. The CEECs, as well some Balkan countries will ask to come back in the European family as a normal and a due to the East European states after their domination by the Soviet rules.

At that time, the European Economic Community (EEC) and later the European Union was in construction, and different actions and initiative were put in place to archive the construction. From 1990 to 1999, the creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was built in order to coordinate economic policy, to

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facilitate exchange and payment culminated with the adoption, in 2001, of the EU's single currency - the Euro - for all European citizens. In 1990, the abolition of systematic border controls among the participating countries conducted in 1995 to the implementation of the Schengen Agreement. The European Community thru the European Commission aimed to complete the single market before January 1st, 1993. Meanwhile, the European Commission has decided to simplify the internal market legislation, the regulations and directives to improve the economic efficiency of the EU. From 1957 until 1995, the Union thru fourth enlargement as created the European Union (1993) by the adhesion of democratic and free-market economy countries.

Concerning the new situation in the beginning of the nineties at the Union border with the ex-communist states, for Frank Schimmelfenning, the "[e]largement can be seen as an instrument to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, to control the negative externalities of political and economic transformation in the East, and to expand the borders of the EU zone of peace and prosperity." Here, we want to stress the change happened in the international environment and the non-readiness of the European Union for this historical process of CEECs’ integration. We will see throughout this thesis than the enlargement will have a continual incident on the accession process, in negative and positive ways for both CEECs and the Union.

In the new international situation after the Cold War, we are in "an area of interdependence"693 and we can understand that what it is happening in any ex-communist state in term of social, politics and economy change can affect the neighbor countries with positive or negative effect.694 As Robert Keohane says:

Interdependence affects world politics and the behavior of states; but governmental actions also influence patterns of interdependence. By creating or accepting procedures, rules or institutions for certain kinds of activity, governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations.695

The enlargement process was an important one, because one can observe that in this process, the "[m]ember states on the eastern

694 To see: Ibid. p. 9-17.
695 Ibid. p. 5.
border of the EU are more sensitive to developments in Central and Eastern Europe than the more remote member states.₆₉₆

**IV.1.2 Foreign Policy Change**

The term of ‘foreign policy change’ can be placed on a larger level, indicating the magnitude deriving from the transformation from minor adjustment changes to fundamental changes in the country’s international relations orientation. Foreign policy change has been defined by several scholars, such as Kalevi Jaakko Holsti₆⁹⁷ (1982), Kjell Goldmann₆⁹⁸ (1988), Charles Hermann₆⁹⁹ (1990), Jerel Rosati₇₀⁰ (1994), Thomas Volgy and John Schwarz⁷₀¹ (1994), David Skidmore⁷₀² (1994) and can be named in many ways – restructuring, adaptation, redirection, and change. The focus, here, is not on normal foreign policy change, which tends to be slow, incremental and with low linkage between issues, but on a fundamental and non-incremental change. Charles Hermann and Jerel Rosati have defined a foreign policy change and established a typology of this change, which, as we will see, matches our study better. Kalevi Holsti defined the foreign policy change as “the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations”.⁷₀³ However, the intention is not sufficient to consider the occurrence of change. For Charles Hermann,


₇₀¹ Volgy, Thomas J. and Schwarz John E. Foreign Policy Restructuring and the Myriad Webs of Restraint. In Ibid.

₇₀² Skidmore, David. Explaining State Responses to International Change: The Structural Sources of Foreign Policy Rigidity and Change. In Ibid.

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foreign policy change “is a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative policymakers (or their representatives) directed toward entities outside the policymakers’ political jurisdiction”. The added definition gives more information about the achievement of change. He has viewed four “graduate levels of changes”. The first called “adjustment changes” represent minor changes for unchanged purposes; the second level of changes, “program changes”, implies changes in methods or/and means within unchanged purposes; the third named “problem/goal changes” implies changes of purposes; the fourth and last concerning “international orientation changes”, is the entire changed orientation toward the country’s international relations. For our case, we will select Hermann’s highest levels of foreign policy change, called the “international orientation change”.

Jerel Rosati had built four other typologies of changes, in the scope, goals and strategy of foreign policy. i.e. “intensification” (which looks as little), “refinement” (which looks as minor), “reform” (which looks as moderate) and “restructuring” (which looks as major). We will focus on Hermann extreme case definition – international orientation changes – and on Rosati – restructuring – that correspond to our case study. Kalevi Holsti based his work on the studies of foreign policy change labeled as “restructuring”. He defined the idea of restructuring as “the drastic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations” and he suggested that “restructuring occurs when there is change in many geographical and functional sectors simultaneously”, which is different from “normal foreign policy change” that is slower and incremental.

Moreover, we think that the definition of foreign policy change as restructuring, from Thomas Volgy and John Schwarz, meets our case study. For Volgy and Schwarz:

foreign policy restructuring is defined here as a major, comprehensive change in the foreign policy orientation of a nation, over a

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705 Ibid.


relatively short period of time, as manifested through behavioral changes in a nation’s interactions with others actors in international politics.  

They underline the three properties that the definition should meet: first, “a multidimensional change in behavior”; second, “the manifestations of change”; and third, it must be “changes in direction and changes in participations”. These properties can be linked with Holsti’s list of non-exhaustive indicators related to whether a state has a foreign policy change. They did not define the “relatively short period of time”, but according to Holsti, it happens in less than five years, depending on “the entire web of relations within which a country operates”.  

We will see, hereafter, that to analyze Romania’s foreign policy change as “restructuring”, it is necessary to use Holsti’s types labeled as isolation, self-reliance, dependence, and nonalignment-diversification.

To explain how the change was made, we will use Gustavsson’s model of foreign policy change, partly tested and adapted by Alina Georgescu to Romania’s foreign policy. Why to use Gustavsson’s model? The model allows us to “construct multi-causal explanations based on factors drawn from different levels of analysis.” Alina Georgescu wrote a good definition linked with Gustavsson’s model:

That foreign policy change occurs when fundamental structural conditions that favour the change are identified by key decision-makers, who then alter their various beliefs and priorities and through their interventions

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in the decision-making process bring about a reorientation of foreign policy.712

As Gustavsson explains, his model uses the outcome of Hermann’s “graduate levels of changes” described above. As we noted before, we will focus only on the last level of change – international orientation change -, as the other levels do not meet the definition we chose and do not represent “restructuring”. This is why Alina Georgescu changed the original figure.

We must notice here, as Georgescu remarked, “Gustavsson does not go into detail about the international and domestics factors”.713 To do so, Georgescu introduced a list of factors “to which one should pay attention. The list of international and domestic factors is not exhaustive. Factors are interrelated.” We can also underline that some of the chosen factors were already considered and used in studies of foreign policy change. We decided to make some modifications on the model to adapt it to our needs. Indeed, we prefer to deal with global factors as variables system such as international factors, domestic factors, decision-makers, and so on, and to describe case by case the content of each variable, according to the need of the case.

![Diagram of Foreign Policy Change]

Figure 1: A Model of Foreign Policy Change.714

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712 Ibid. Paper presented at.
713 Ibid. Paper presented at.
714 Adapted from Gustavsson and Georgescu.
We changed “individual decision-maker” because, in our case, it is not one person’s decision, but a group of decision-makers. We can study as a separate variable of the system, the interrelation of decision-makers. The variable is a process in itself. In our case, we will demonstrate that it was not an individual decision-maker only, but an interaction group of decision-makers, influenced by the civil society, led by the executive or presidential level, according to presidential mandate. Along the demonstration, through NATO, the EU and the neighborliness issue, we will explain each factor, according to the figure (figure 1).
IV.2 The Security: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

In the new post Cold War situation, after the break of stable world balance maintained by the two superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the international environment become more anarchic than ever and the most critical and obvious feature of international affairs is its state of anarchy. “In anarchy, security is the highest end”\textsuperscript{715} and first country priority. All countries try to assure their own security by military superiority or when it is not possible by others means as the Balance of Power (BoP), a central concept of neorealist. The representative figure of New Realism, Stephen Walt argues that states balance only against threat and not especially against strong states or aggregate power, which are not necessarily hostile.\textsuperscript{716} In addition, weak states can be a danger to others security, even if they do not have large military power but only by their internal or political instability. In the balance of power, Stephen Walt distinguishes two possibilities: to use balancing, an alliance with others against the dominant threat and bandwagoning, the alignment with the source of threat. Walt suggests that the bandwagoning appears only in exceptional cases, when a state has not an other choice because of isolation or lack of allies.\textsuperscript{717}

In this new international situation, a weak state, as Romania, in an area of Balkan and Black Sea instabilities, with the fair of Russian threat will seek to use the balance of power to protect their own security. The balance of power will be realised thru balancing with an alliance to neither a military organisation as NATO nor a superpower as the United States\textsuperscript{718}. Romania and the U.S. share one common source of threat represented by re-emergence of russian influence, which they jointly balance against it. In the same idea, NATO and Romania share a common source of threat

\textsuperscript{717} To see: Ibid.
\textsuperscript{718} We will see later on in this thesis that United States and NATO can be vue as the same, considering the U.S. power and decision maker in this organisation.
represented by the Balkan and Black Sea areas instability and they jointly balance against them. The integration process into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) takes at least 14 years in total, from the first letter of collaboration sent by Romania to NATO’s Secretary General in 1990. During this period, Romania took part in all the organization’s activities, such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and has contributed to all NATO missions since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Romania has accomplished, since 1999, four national plans for the preparation of its accession (PNA) to NATO.

During the 1989 Revolution, the communiqué for the country, issued by the National Salvation Front Council, stipulated, at point 9 that “[w]e will observe Romania’s international commitments and, first of all, the ones related to the Warsaw Treaty.” This point was drafted in concordance with the geopolitical situation of the Eastern revolution process. We need to underline that, in 1989, the Warsaw Pact was still active, and the Soviet Union was still a military and political power in this part of the world. However, in 1991, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the CIS will change part of the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe. In addition, the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Wöner, underlined in a speech delivered in October 1989, the necessity to reshape the East-West relations in a partnership and to help the change. He said that he “believes that 1989 will go down in history as a watershed in East-West relations, and as a decisive point in the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance”. He added that “[t]he NATO Summit reaffirmed the Alliance's political vocation; not only to preserve the integrity of its territory, but to build a new Europe in which security is preserved by common liberal values, not military straitjackets.”

The first Romanian contact with NATO, after 1989, is the letter sent on July 26, 1990 by Prime Minister Petre Roman, to invite the Secretary General of NATO to pay a visit in Romania for discussions about co-operation between Romania and NATO. This is not strange or special, as we know the will of Romanian people to


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take part in all organizations, after the welcome of all CEECs into the organization. Certainly, Ceausescu asked for the dissolution of both organizations arguing that they are not necessary for peace and the opposition NATO/Warsaw Pact will end in a dissolution. However, given that, these organizations remained and given the will for cooperation and the new Romanian government had to initiate contacts and co-operation with NATO.

Romanian’s candidacy presented two particular problems: the lack of borders contiguous with the alliance, and the country’s disputes with Hungary over the status of the Magyar minority and with Ukraine over the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement. The obstacles were considerable because Russia opposed an eastward enlargement of NATO. According to the international transformation with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on April 1st, 1991, the Alliance’s adaptation will take place in Rome in November 1991, and will be followed by a series of regular important meetings to adapt this decision to the international situation. Given that NATO was created to be a strong link between Europe and the Unites States and to fight against the Communism hegemony and the East-side block within the Soviet Union. Why was NATO not dissolved after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the dislocation of the Soviet Union? When we speak about the Alliance, we need to take in consideration its organization and the role played by the United States. But here – more precisely, we have to notice the role played by NATO in the United States foreign policy.

IV.2.1 The United States

IV.2.1.1 The Role of the United States

“The end of the Cold War”, said Secretary of State Christopher Warren, “has given us[,] United States[,] an unprecedented opportunity to shape a more secure world of open societies and open markets – a world in which American interests and ideals can thrive. But we also face serious threats from which

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no border can shield us".\textsuperscript{721} Since the eighties, a consensus has emerged in the U.S. foreign policy, based on three main pillars: democracy, free trade, and open markets.\textsuperscript{722} The U.S. Foreign policy was defined in the nineties with “special emphasis to three main objectives: first, pursuing peace in regions of vital interest to the United States; second, confronting the new transnational security threats; and third, promoting open markets and prosperity.” \textsuperscript{723} When speaking about U.S. foreign policy, former President Clinton said that “[e]verything from the strength of our economy, to the safety of our cities, to the health of our people depends on events not only within our border but half a world away.”\textsuperscript{724}

But, in the years 2001, after the tragic attack against the World Trade Center, on September 11, as John G. Ikenberry, an Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, states,

the Bush administration pursued one of the most controversial foreign policies in American history. It articulated a sweeping new doctrine of national security based on provocative ideas about American global dominance, the preventive use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.\textsuperscript{725}

Remember that the U.S. national interest has prevailed at all times and has driven the U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. National Interest is influenced by domestic variables such as political fights, political divisions, groups of interest and presidential election


campaigns. In fact “America’s integration into the world economy has always been uneven, and this unevenness has always been a source of domestic political conflict over foreign policy.”

IV.2.1.1.1 The Guarantor of Freedom and Democracy

“At the World Conference on Human Rights, convened by the United Nations in 1993, the Clinton administration made it clear that it had little patience for those who challenge the universality of human rights.” The U.S. President reinforces in 1995 in his ‘Message to the Congress Transmitting the Report of the National Endowment for Democracy’ that “[t]he promoting democracy abroad is one of the central pillars of the United States’ security strategy. [...] By continuing our support [to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)], we will advance America's interests in the world.”

As always, United States was promoted as the challenger of freedom and democracy, by the political regime itself and the

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728 The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a United States non-profit organization that was founded in 1983, by providing grants funded through an annual allocation from the U.S. Congress. Although administered as a private organization, its funding comes almost entirely from a governmental appropriation by Congress. The association was created by an act of Congress. NED promote and strengthen democratic institutions around the world through nongovernmental efforts. In addition to its grants program, NED also supports and houses the Journal for Democracy, the World Movement for Democracy, the International Forum for Democratic Studies, the Reagan-Fascell Fellowship Program, the Network of Democracy Research Institutes, and the Center for International Media Assistance. The NED has been accused by both right-wing and left-wing personalities of interference in foreign regimes, and to be simply the continuation of the CIA’s covert actions through other means. The NED’s main principle is that ‘What is good for America is good for the world’. (to see: http://www.wikipedia.org/, http://www.ned.org/ and http://www.voltairen.org/).

‘American way of life’. “The Declaration of Independence’s proclamation of ‘inalienable rights’ is, in fact, an assertion that certain rights are neither granted by government nor subject to removal by government”.730 Second, by the U.S. intervention to save Europe during the two World Wars, Democracy was promoted by the United States during the War and after World War II to fight against dictatorship and communism associated to the enemy of freedom. “Ever since the First World War, the crucial question that has confronted the United States is the defense of Western civilization.”731 In addition, during the Cold War, the United States was the guarantor of democracy and freedom for Europe through the Alliance – NATO - and directly or indirectly everywhere, communism was in progression (Latin America, Asia, etc). As John Ikenberry wrote: “In one sense, this might not be surprising. American presidents from FDR [(Franklin D. Roosevelt)] and Truman to Kennedy and Reagan to Clinton have made the championing of democracy and freedom a centerpiece of their foreign policy.”732

“Human rights have been central to U.S. self-image.”733 In the seventies, after the Helsinki Final Act, the United States integrated in their foreign policy the promotion of human rights, firmly rejecting the cultural and religious differences, but embracing the political and economic opportunities. This policy led to the creation of Human Rights Watch734, a U.S. international non-governmental organization that conducts research and advocacy on human rights to monitor the former Soviet Union's compliance with the Helsinki Agreements. For example, Romania’s loss of the MFN status is a consequence of the human right abuse, in the opinion of the United States, towards the end of Ceausescu’s period.

“[S]upport for democracy and human rights reflects our ideals and reinforces our interests”735, declares Christopher Warren at the

732 Ibid.
734 The name was orinaly Helsinki Watch in 1978.
John F. Kennedy School of Government (Harvard University), in 1996. He added that

[o]ur dedication to universal values is a vital source of America’s authority and credibility. [...] Our interests are most secure in a world where accountable government strengthens stability and where the rule of law protects both political rights and free market economies. 736

For that point, he underlines the role of United States to provide “strong support for courageous reforms in nations like [...] the new democracies of Central Europe.” 737

Bennett Kovrig, professor of political science at the University of Toronto and specialist in the U.S. diplomacy, wrote that

[i]f consistency of purpose and flexibility in tactics [...] America’s engagement in the affairs of Eastern Europe has stood the test of history. Only a nation possessed of ideological certainty and the attendant sense of mission could persevere so doggedly in championing the cause of democratic self-determination. 738

The tragedy of 9/11 did not change the United States’ attitude on these points, but reinforced the will to promote freedom and democracy everywhere needed. In the document on ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, Georges W. Bush states that “the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.” 739 In addition, as the president underlines, “the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We [U.S.] will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.” 740

736 Ibid.
737 Ibid.
740 Ibid.
IV.2.1.1.2 The Role of World’s Policeman

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, The United States remained the world’s only superpower that no one can challenge directly. At the same time, the new world order changed in the nineties and was characterized by regional threats and challenges. As George H. W. Bush states in 1990:

—a new world order—can emerge: A new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony.741

The free economic model, also called Capitalism, becomes the norm for many countries, especially for the former communist countries liberated from Soviet and Communist domination. Alone or through alliances – NATO –, the United States played ‘the role of world’s policeman’. “Since 1989, the frequency of US-led interventions is approaching one every other year”742 and the U.S. intervened in the Gulf crisis (Kuwait, 1991), in Africa (Somalia, 1993; Sudan, 1998; São Tomé and Príncipe, 2003), in the Caribbean Islands (Haiti, 1994), in the Balkans (Bosnia, 1995; Kosovo, 1999), in Afghanistan (2001) and in Iraq (2003).

The Secretary of State (1996), “a true believer that America must be involved in the world”743, declares that the Unites States provides leadership as the first central principle of its foreign policy guidelines744 with “the need to strengthen the institutions that provide an enduring basis for global peace and prosperity.”745 For Warren Christopher, “[t]hese institutions, such as the United Nations, NATO,

745 Ibid.
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and the World Bank, help [Unites States] [...] to share the burdens and costs of leadership."\textsuperscript{746}

We can read in the U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda of May 1996 that

[t]he issue of America’s role in the world is, of course, a very important one, [...] The administration’s position is very clear. We think that the personal interests of our citizens, economic as well as security, are better served if the United States takes a leadership position in the world.\textsuperscript{747}

In the wake of September 11, the Unites States strengthened its will to defend its own territory against all kind of threats, especially terrorism. For this purpose, the United States will use all their resources with preventive actions before threats emerge and “will build on these common interests [, dangers of terrorist violence and chaos,] to promote global security."\textsuperscript{748} For George W. Bush, “America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness in both nations, because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order” and “will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe."\textsuperscript{749} As he explains, “The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world.”\textsuperscript{750} He called the Unites states “the greatest force for good in history.”\textsuperscript{751}

He establishes the preemptive war concept as the foundation of the United States international role and unilaterally declares a long war against terrorism, and ‘rogue states’. He insists on the fact that

\textsuperscript{746} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{749} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{750} Ibid. p. 1.
America offers the "single sustainable model for national success," the only one that is "right and true for every person in every society". We can note that a White House spokesman remarked that the president "considers any opposition to his policies to be no less than an act of treason."

The U.S. President states, in a speech at West Point, that the United States had the unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world deemed a threat to the nation’s security. Later, in a joint session with the Congress, he declares that "the United States Government relies on the armed forces to defend America’s interests," and "[t]he presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends." For him, the United States "will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary", but "will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community".

In fact, we can quote Johnson Chalmers’ book on the new U.S. militarism that is transforming America. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States was described as the world’s ‘lone superpower,’ then as an ‘indispensable nation’, afterward as a ‘reluctant sheriff’, and in continuation of 9/11, as a ‘New Rome’. With the evolution of American power and influence in the 20th century, the United States found itself in a position of relative strength and global leadership.

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753 Ibid. p. 3.
756 Ibid. p. 29.
757 Ibid. p. 6.
758 Ibid.
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Century, Andrew Bacevich[^760] argues: “[t]he reality that [Charles A.] Beard[^761] feared has come to pass: like it or not, America today is Rome, commits irreversibly to the maintenance and, where feasible, expansion of an empire that differs from every other empire in history”,[^762] fit well. As the Marine Brig. Gen. Mastin Robeson[^763] says, “[...] in order to put ‘preventive war’ into action, we require a ‘global presence,’ by which he means gaining hegemony over any place that is not already under our thumb.”[^764]

For Johnson Chalmers, professor emeritus at the University of California in San Diego, the United States’

militarized empire is a physical reality with a distinct way of life but it is also a network of economic and political interests tied in a thousand different ways to American corporations, universities, and communities but kept separate from what passes for everyday life back in what has only recently come to be known as ‘the homeland’.[^765]

He underlines that some Americans view the military bases around the world as the validation of “the American way of life and [...] [American] ‘victory’ in the Cold War.”[^766] However, for him, the United States acted as the ‘Roman Empire’, because “U.S. military personnel flung across the world like Roman legionnaires on the marches of empire.”[^767] U.S. military forces stationed abroad play vital

[^760]: Andrew J. Bacevich, Sr. is a professor of international relations at Boston University, former director (from 1998 to 2005) of the Center for International Relations, and author of several books on the American diplomatic history.

[^761]: Charles A. Beard (1874-1948) is the most influential American historian in United States. He published hundreds of monographs, textbooks and interpretive studies in both history and political science and was a leader of the 'Progressive School' of historiography.


roles. As regional political and military dynamics shift, the United States adjusts its overseas military posts to accommodate new objectives and missions in new places.

IV.2.1.1.3 The United States and Eastern Europe

The natural attraction of the CEECs for the United States after the fall of the Iron Curtain has several reasons. The first is the sentiment by CEECs that the United States wins the Cold War. There is also the unwavering support of the U.S. government to the exiles through emigration and support programs; the non-recognition by the U.S. government of the occupation of Soviet republics, such as the Baltic States, and the occupation of East European states by Russian troops; the role of the media campaign such as the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and others.

The large Eastern Diaspora in the United States has been an influence on the American foreign policy regarding the aid to CEECs. For example, Lithuanian president, Valdas Adamkus\(^{768}\) worked as civil servant in the U.S. government administration, and was promoted in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the rank of regional administrator, or Zbigniew Brzezinski\(^{769}\), a Polish-born American political scientist, geostrategist, and statesman who served as the United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, or Madeleine Albright\(^{770}\), Czech-born American, who had an important position in the Carter administration, being in charge of the formulation of foreign policy legislation, and who was also the first female United States Secretary of State under the Clinton Presidency, and others. Many of those born in Eastern Europe climbed the ranks of the administration to reach key positions in the United States government. But emigrants were not the only ones that benefited from the American facilities, as after 1990 many military and civil servants from Eastern European states institutions had the opportunity to attend military or civil education programs in United States that favored ‘the American way of life’ and kept the ‘American ideal’ alive. On this point, we can underline the fact that many political leaders or civil servants of the Romanian government.

\(^{768}\) He emigrated in United States in 1949.
\(^{769}\) He emigrated after Yalta in Canada and then to the United States. He obtained the United States citizenship in 1958.
\(^{770}\) She moved with her parents to the United States in 1948, and she obtained the United States citizenship in 1957.
attended training programs or courses in prestigious U.S. universities through various programs such as the Fulbright program.

For the United States, the integration of Eastern European States was an element of stability and the way of promoting democracy and the free market. The enlargement is also a strategy of containment toward the possible German domination of Europe and the element to conquer confinement on Russia. The will for integration of the Visegrád group helped NATO to accomplish the United States strategy toward the European stability. Nevertheless, in the nineties, the Balkan tragedy and Bosnia pushed the United States to seek a specific strategy in the Balkan region. After the 9/11 events, the situation changed and the necessity to seek bases near the Middle East operations theatre and the need of allies for operation engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq accelerated the need to develop closer ties with Eastern European states. Moreover, the issue with the Turkish government refusing, for several months, to use their national soil for U.S. military operation bases during the 2003 Iraqi invasion pushed the United States to seek more stable allies in the Black Sea region, such as Romania and Bulgaria.

IV.2.1.2 NATO and the United States Foreign Policy

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created long after the end of the Second World War to counter the threat of the Soviet Union invasion of Western Europe, with NATO’s goal being "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down" as said Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary-General.771

With the presence of American troops on European soil, for many years, the United States guaranteed the safety of Western Europe and the development of democracy and freedom. Through NATO, the United States built during the Cold War a strong presence within the prolongation of a world pre-deployment bases and troops, mainly situated on allies and Second World War’s pass enemies (Germany and Japan). During the 45 years of collaboration, the NATO system became an element of the United States security and foreign policy. However, after 1991, the Soviet Union disappeared and the new Russian Federation became an economic partner to Western Europe countries and CEECs regarding the gas and oil supply, as well as other types of commodities. This economical exchange increased

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the European-Russian interdependence and greatly reduced the military risk and the necessity of such military alliance. In 1991, it seemed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had accomplished its mission and its essential role: the construction and security of Europe. However, the construction of the European Union and the Europeans’ need to develop the project of European security architecture challenged NATO's central role and American influence on European security. As economist Rodrigue Tremblay, professor at the University of Montreal, wrote, “the U.S. government does not see things that way. It would prefer keeping its role as Europe’s patronizing protector and as the world’s sole superpower. NATO is a convenient tool to that effect.”

The understanding of the need for reform and for maintaining the organization’s vital activities emerged in the idea of American political elites. As a United States Army officer wrote in his master’s thesis, “[t]he goal of U.S. policy in the Transatlantic Alliance should be maintenance of NATO as a collective defense organization. [...] As the remaining super power, the U.S. must take the lead in setting policy for NATO continuance.” In general, these changes after the end of the Cold War created both threats and opportunities.

**IV.2.1.2.1 American Security and Foreign Policy**

First, reforming NATO has a large influence on the United States foreign and domestic policy. In the nineties, several American politicians saw the opportunity to reduce the defense budget and the U.S. troops in Europe, while others considered necessary to reinforce democracy and military reforms in the world, and especially in Eastern Europe. During the nineties, the United States mostly focused on its domestic economic prosperity, with a focus on health care and gun control. At the same time, either alone or through alliances – NATO -, the United States played ‘the role of world policeman’.

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The beginning of the twenty-first century brings a change in the American foreign policy, and NATO becomes a resource for the American military fight against terrorism and ‘rogue states’.

In fact, since the World War II, the United States had been irrevocably bound with Europe, with this bond including a wide range of security, economic and cultural ties. In addition “[t]he goal of U.S. policy in the Transatlantic Alliance should be (sic) maintenance of NATO as a collective defense organization.”

IV.2.1.2.2 A Political and Military Organization

As the Major C. A. McNerney, of the United States Army, wrote: “One of the most basic reasons for the U.S. to stay the course with NATO in its collective defense role is, quite simply, that NATO is a proven deterrent.” During the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration vigorously supported the idea that opening NATO’s door to new members would allow the Alliance to “do for Europe’s East what it did for Europe’s West: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats, and create the conditions for prosperity to flourish.” It was the necessity, before the readiness of the European security architecture to maintain the European stability by assuring the growth of democracy and free-market economy, especially in the past communist countries. Normally this role devoted to the European Union failed, especially in the Balkans, and led to the NATO military intervention under the UN mandate to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia. The Secretary-General of the Western European Union, Willem van Eekelen, declares that “[e]verybody seems to be counting on 25,000 Americans and clearly we need them. No Americans, no NATO. There is political weight in this precedent of seeing NATO handle the problem.” The “nation-building has been a growth industry since the end of the Cold War. [...] Since 1989, the frequency, scale, scope

774 Ibid.
775 Ibid.

and duration of these nation-building missions have steadily risen.”  

The “nation-building becomes a core mission” of NATO in the extension of the American policy to defend and support freedom and democratic process around the world.

**IV.2.1.2.3 Implication for the US**

Until the nineties, the United States was “the largest contributor to the NATO infrastructure budget, providing almost 28 percent of the total sum”. With the enlargement of the Alliance, the new countries will also become contributors. The enlargement of the Alliance will need an update of the military forces for the candidate countries to achieve the military requirements of the NATO structure. This will imply supplying U.S. military equipment to the future members and will be translated by supplying funds and programs to the candidate countries. It will also imply an increase in the military defense from the candidate countries to update military equipment to NATO standards and “U.S. firms that have been major suppliers of equipment and services to NATO may be concerned about future NATO business opportunities”. However, in the meantime, “the ability of Europeans to contribute more heavily to their own defenses has grown considerably. In addition, Europe has become a major competitor of the U.S. in the manufacture and worldwide sale of defense equipment.” The United States has a large interest in this respect as well, in order to increase the enlargement of the Alliance and to impose de facto the U.S. military norms and equipments. We can also note that “American contributions to NATO's in-place forces have always constituted an indirect economic subsidy to the European partners.”

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779 Ibid.
781 Ibid.
782 Ibid.

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IV.2.1.3 The Romanian-American Relations

The relations between the United States and Romania had started long ago. In 1850,\textsuperscript{784} it opened the first U.S. consular office in Galati,\textsuperscript{785} and the relation was formally established in 1880, with the appointment of Eugene Schuyler, renowned and talented diplomat and historian, as the first American diplomatic representative to Romania.\textsuperscript{786} The political as well economical relations between Romanian and United States started towards the end of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century. For example, “[i]n November 1925, Romanian diplomat Nicolae Titulescu visited Washington, D.C. [...] In 1932, the Ford Motor Company opened a sales office in Romania, and in 1934 established an assembly plant in Bucharest.”\textsuperscript{787} Moreover, Romanian immigrants stood out in the American history and contributed to the development of the United States. As for example,

George Pomut, a Romanian immigrant, who fought as an officer in the U.S. Civil War under General Ulysses Grant, finally rising to the rank of Brigadier General in 1866. He subsequently entered the U.S. Diplomatic Service and served as U.S. Consul in St. Petersburg, where he participated in negotiations to purchase Alaska from Russia.\textsuperscript{788}

IV.2.1.3.1 Cold War’s Period Relations

The special relation never stops. From 1967 to 1984, Romania and the United States developed a special relation on a ‘policy of differentiation’ basis. Romania developed an intermediary role between the West and the East and benefited from some favors from

\textsuperscript{784} Two different sources give different informations. The American Cultural Center established the first consular office in Galati in 1958, then Mircea Raceanu in 1950 for the first consular office (vice-consulate).


\textsuperscript{787} ____. \textit{In Celebration of 125 Years of U.S.-Romanian Diplomatic relations} Ibid. p. 4.

\textsuperscript{788} ____. \textit{In Celebration of 125 Years of U.S.-Romanian Diplomatic relations} Ibid. p. 15.
the United States, represented in loans, technology, special programs and the MFN status (from 1975 to 1988).\textsuperscript{789} During the entire Cold War period, the political and economical relations, as well as the cultural and educational exchanges between both countries, were maintained, despite the difference of political systems. However, in the mid-1980s, given Romania’s attitude towards human rights application in the country, the U.S. stopped granting economical favors to Romania, i.e. loans and MFN status.

\textbf{IV.2.1.3.2 The Post-Revolution Relations}

Immediately after the Revolution, Secretary of State James Baker pays a visit in Bucharest to assess the political and economical relation between the two countries. During this visit, the issue of the loss of the most-favored-nation clause was also addressed, in addition to the possibility to have it restored. However, in April 1991, the US Department of State expressed its dissatisfaction about the Romanian treatment of minorities and human right application as well as about the freedom of the media. The slow process of political and economical reform disappointed United States.

The US-Romanian relations were restored in 1993, after the Stolojan government reform, and the new elections of 1992. Since this period, the American-Romanian relations have improved, and when “Romania’s policies became unequivocally pro-Western, the United States moved to deepen relations”\textsuperscript{790} The U.S. Ambassador in Romania from 1994 to 1997, Alfred H. Moses, stated that ”there was an historic transition in U.S.-Romanian relations. In three years, [1994-1997] Romania moved from being a pariah state in official Washington to its status as a strategic partner of the United States.”\textsuperscript{791} Romanian leaders, from Ion Iliescu, through Emil Constantinescu to Traian Basescu, have turned their foreign relations


\textsuperscript{791} ____. \textit{In Celebration of 125 Years of U.S.-Romanian Diplomatic relations} Ibid. p. 12.
policy toward strengthening relations with the United States, moving gradually from a rejected state to a position of a reliable ally in the Global War on terrorism.

Romania showed great reliability to the United States on many occasion\textsuperscript{792}; in 1991, at the United Nations, during the Kuwait crisis; in 1999, during the Kosovo War; after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, when “Romania offered its full support to the U.S. in the Global War on Terror.”\textsuperscript{793}

One have to remember that “Romania was the largest U.S. trading partner in Eastern Europe until Ceausescu's 1988 renunciation of most favored nation (MFN or non-discriminatory) trading status resulted in high U.S. tariffs on Romanian products”.\textsuperscript{794} The economic relations started again in 1990 by the U.S. financial assistance provided through the Support for East European Democracies (SEED) Program, and the support of many U.S. organizations as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and others U.S. NGOs. The bilateral trade was improved and on November 8, 1993, the United States restored to Romania the clause of the Most-Favored-Nation, as part of a new Bilateral Trade Agreement, after all other states in the East European region. The United States’ assistance was large and on many levels, such as the political, economic and administrative ones. The American expert advised in many fields, through civil society actions, in order to develop better governance, with different project such as those supporting civil education, NGOs, “nurturing the seeds of philanthropy”, encouraging independent mass media, supporting e-government, and “making public administration more open and transparent.”\textsuperscript{795} Two important laws - the Fiscal Code and the Micro Finance Law -, likewise reforms as the Red Tape analysis in 2000 and the One-Stop-Shop for the

\textsuperscript{792} To see the first part of the thesis - `Change into Continuity'.

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registration of the Business are the example of the U.S. involment in the Romania reform process. Another example is the involvement of the U.S. in the business community, through numerous study tours in the United States organized for leaders of business groups, as a large number of American specialists were brought to Romania to provide on-site guidance for business organizations. Along this idea, a National Advocacy Tour was organized, “where a team of American advisors visited 10 cities, met with local Chambers of Commerce and other business associations to promote advocacy”.  

The United States is a top-ranked investor in Romania, with many multi-national corporations including McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), Pizza Hut, Smithfield, Citibank, Procter & Gamble, Kraft, Colgate Palmolive, Pioneer, Monsanto, Cargill, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, IBM, CISCO and Liberty Global (UPC), General Motors, etc. As for the cultural cooperation, both states “cooperate in a number of cultural areas” and the Romanian-U.S. Fulbright Commission, established in 1993, realized an intensive educational and cultural exchange program through scholarships. From 1972, an American Library was functioning during the communist period and became a U.S. Information Resource Center in 1995.

Romania, after many years of disappointed remarks, ranks in 2007 first reformer country in Europe and ranks second, by the World Bank, for the successful reform concerning the simplification of procedures for obtaining business permit.

In the latest presidential mandate, Romania becomes a strong ally of the United States through a ‘Bucharest-London-Washington axis’, and, from the point of view of United States leaders “a key

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member of NATO [...] strengthening its Euro-Atlantic ties”.\textsuperscript{799} A special groundbreaking agreement was signed, in December 2005, providing to the U.S. forces access to Romanian military facilities, “setting the stage for a new era in U.S.-Romanian defense cooperation.” U.S. Ambassador to Bucharest, Nicholas F. Taubman\textsuperscript{800} declares: “friendship has grown over the past seventeen years as Romania has completed its impressive transition to a democracy and market-based economy”.\textsuperscript{801}

\textbf{IV.2.1.3.3 The Reasons}

\textit{The winner of the Cold War}

After the end of the Cold War, United States are viewed as a liberator and a strong economic power and represents a chance for the CEECs, especially for Romania because

American power is based on material elements (diplomacy, economy, military and high technology) and on immaterial elements (cultural products and positive image); that the history of the twentieth century has a significant and lasting impact on perceptions of elites and policymakers states of Central and Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{802}

about the American power. United States do not present for Romania a threat but an ideal way of life, representing a champion for the promotion of democracy.


\textsuperscript{800} Taubman, Nicholas F. served as U.S. Ambassador to Romania from December 5, 2005 until December 3, 2008.


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The Guarantor of Freedom and Democracy

During the entire Cold War period, only United States claims and proclaims with the support of radio broadcast: Unites States “does not solve to the permanent submission of the central Europe under the Russian yoke”\textsuperscript{803} For this purpose, President Harry Truman launched the ‘Campaign for Truth’\textsuperscript{804} while General Eisenhower launched the ‘Crusade for Freedom’\textsuperscript{805}, with the radio station ‘Radio Free Europe’ being created. A number of other stations – Radio Liberty\textsuperscript{806}, Voice of America\textsuperscript{807} - functioned to promote the American point of view and the American way of life.

As Catherine Durandin states:

The United States represents for the Romanians, from the years of communism, the ‘perfect country’ the ‘country of all freedoms’ and a real power. After 1989, the United States has become a model for much of Romanians [...] This fascination toward the United States persists today: it falls within the wide register of political myths saving post-communist.\textsuperscript{808}

The United States has an interest in Eastern European countries, such as Romania. Effectively, there from long time ago that the United States sustain the European political change, as we saw the support during the Greek war for independence from 1821 to 1829. In January 1989, the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) was voted by the U.S. Congress, in order to “[...] contribute to the development of democratic institutions and political pluralism” and “ [...] promote the development of a free market economic system ...”\textsuperscript{809} Romania, after Poland and Hungary in 1989, starts to benefit from this program in 1990. Since 1990, Romanian received

\textsuperscript{803} Ibid. p. 32. Translated by Marc Bonnemains.
\textsuperscript{804} Launched in April 1950.
\textsuperscript{805} Launch on the 4 September 1950.
\textsuperscript{806} Radio Liberty is founded in 1951 by the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.
\textsuperscript{807} The Voice of America, which first went on the air in 1942.
\textsuperscript{808} Durandin, Catherine (dir.) and Cârnci Magda (Col.). Perspectives roumaines : Du postcommunisme à l’intégration européenne (Romanian Perspective: from Postcommunism to the European integration). Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004. p. 62. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
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each year US$33 million, for a total amount of US$562\textsuperscript{810} for economic assistance in order “to expand the private sector, strengthen local democratic governance, and improve health and child welfare services.”\textsuperscript{811}

The Protector

As the world superpower and with troops assuring the European protection, United States represented within the Alliance the guarantee of protection. From long ago, Romanian leaders viewed the U.S. military forces as an assurance against potential threat, especially against large power at the Romanian borders. Romania’s negative representation of Russia will play a significant role in the choice for NATO’s integration. During the Cold War period, Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu asked, in 1974, the support of the U.S. through the sale of special military equipment, such as anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles,\textsuperscript{812} to face a potential Soviet invasion of Romania after the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Romania was already viewed as a moderate country and a mediator that benefited from special treatment from the U.S. and the West in general. Adrian Mihai Cioroianu, historian and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, says that

[aj] that moment [in seventies], the U.S. was also interested in encouraging the rebellion of Ceaușescu. And, I think this context was discussed in Washington about this (purchase of missile – journalist note): rather the idea of stirring Nicolae Ceaușescu’s rebellion, against the backdrop of fear towards the USSR ...


After the Revolution, only the United States could intervene in Europe, within NATO, to guarantee European stability. The European security was not ready and could not be built without the Alliance. The U.S. Army intervened in the Balkans to stabilize the region and to stop the war.

A Strong NATO Sponsor

As one of NATO’s founders, the United States is the main decision-making power at the Alliance. Romania and the United States collaboration reinforced the integration into NATO, and gave Romania the possibility to benefit from military exchanges in education, training and exercises.

During a visit tour (Poland, Slovenia and Romania) on 11 July 1997, US president Bill Clinton stimulates the Romanian way of reforms and assures that the accession into NATO is still open. The President opens a strategic partnership with possible collaboration in the economic, political, national security and military areas. The US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, concludes that “NATO door remains opened, in general, and in particular to Romania”.

IV.2.2 The Transformation of the Alliance

The transformation of the Alliance took place at the fortieth anniversary of the organization, in 1989. “The event coincided with the beginning of a period of profound change in the course of East-West and international relations and a far-reaching transformation of the security environment.” The origins of the changed security environment “can be traced to a number of developments during the 1960s and 1970s which were to have far-reaching implications.”

Many initiatives in the eighties, through several summits, developed discussions, contacts and collaboration relations between the East (Warsaw Pact members) and the West (Western democratic countries) on different topics as humans rights, security and arms control... and led to the conclusion of different treaties, agreements...

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816 Ibid.
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The transformation of the Alliance was possible following the events at the end of eighties (1989) and the beginning of the nineties (1990-91). The process is accelerated with the collapse of Communism in all Warsaw Pact members, such as the Soviet Union in 1991. In this period, American president George H. W. Bush affirms that NATO should develop “a new strategy”, adjusted to current times. In addition, the President reasserts that the future of the United States cannot be separated from that of Europe and that the North-Atlantic Alliance remains vital for ‘America’s place’ in Europe. However, “NATO leaders did not initially want the Alliance to enlarge, and many senior figures, especially those with Cold War experience, still do not want it to do so.”

The ‘hand of friendship and cooperation’ was initiated at the London Summit in July 1990, with the ‘Message from Tumberry’, the proposal to setup direct diplomatic relations at NATO level, and the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, where all NATO members as well as former Warsaw Pact members can have joint consultation at a high political level. An important step for NATO was the German reunification, but more than that, it was the non-Soviet opposition to it. In March 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev said to the GDR Minister that he had no doubt about the German unity and in July of the same year, he accepted the participation of a unified Germany in NATO.

It was necessary for NATO to begin at this time “a far-reaching review of its strategy in order to adapt it to the new circumstances.” The ‘Open Skies’ treaty was one of the initiatives that brought the way to build trust among nations. This initiative was the proposal of President Eisenhower in 1955 at the Geneva Conference, which authorized flight observation missions over each party’s territory. This initiative concerned the United States and Soviet Union in 1955. However, the ‘Open Skies’ was not accepted by the Soviet Union and remained just an idea. Nevertheless, “in 1989 President George H. W. Bush revived the idea as part of the new

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relationship with Russia\textsuperscript{619} and the treaty was signed in March 1992 (although it did not enter into force until 2002) not only with Russia, but also with Canada and twenty European nations including Romania. The treaty idea was to bring “openness and transparency” through its members. As William Lambers\textsuperscript{620} wrote that “Open Skies’ is one of the best military/diplomatic tools in the United States arsenal and it should be expanded to other regions of the globe to promote peace.”\textsuperscript{621}

The Gulf crisis has a significant role in the evolution of NATO-Russia relationships. On behalf the UN decision a “Coalition Force formed under United States leadership to repel the invasion did not involve NATO directly, but the solidarity achieved within NATO in relation to the conflict played a significant role.”\textsuperscript{622} Moreover, to underline that “[t]he dangers inherent in the Gulf crisis reinforced the Alliance’s determination to develop and enhance the level of its cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe”.\textsuperscript{623} However, the enlargement process will be suspended following the Russian reaction. The Alliance will not enlarge too rapidly to the East because of the potentially inadequate Russian reaction. In the case of the Baltic States, including Romania, the Russians’ view was important for the alliance in order not to enter a new tension circle. The alliance, in particular the United States, had to re-affirm each time their will not to threaten Russia, and that the extension will increase the stability in Europe, especially with the Russian participation in NATO different sub-organizations.


\textsuperscript{620} Lambers William is a historian graduate from the College of Mount St. Joseph in Ohio and writer of several books.


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IV.2.2.1 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization from London to Bucharest

Summits provide periodic opportunities, on a regular basis, for the Organization members (heads of state and government) to evaluate and provide strategic direction for the Alliance’s activities. In this new international context, the series of Summits was “to plot the course of Alliance’s adaptation”\(^{824}\) to new challenges, from the starting point of the London summit, where the alliance decided upon the need to transform towards acquiring a new role, to the Rome Summit (the 12\(^{th}\) NATO Summit), where the alliance’s New Strategic Concept was drafted. The Prague Summit (16\(^{th}\) NATO Summit) can be considered as important, as it opened the door to other CEECs, especially Romania, and also due to the reshape of the alliance to adapt to the 21\(^{st}\) century new international situation. It is not our goal to tackle NATO’s history, change or anything else of the sort, but we just wish to underline some important key points that impacted on the candidates’ accession to the organization, and in particular on the accession process of Romania.

**IV.2.2.1.1 The London Summit**

At the London Summit, which took place on July 7\(^{th}\)-8\(^{th}\), 1990, the Alliance notices that the international situation changed with the end of the Cold War and needs to transform the organization. Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) liberated themselves and the Soviet Union transformed itself through the Perestroika toward a free society. Article 2 of the Treaty stipulates that

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\text{[t]he Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.}^{825}\]

According to this point, the Alliance will be transformed from “forward defense” to a “flexible response” by reorganizing the “military forces into a multinational units, moving from the

\(^{824}\) Ibid. p. 17.

geographically based area-defenses of the past\textsuperscript{826} and with more integration within the European structure, together with the reinforcement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE has already become a platform of discussion between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, on reductions in Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Moreover, CEECs and the Soviet Union will be suggested to establish regular diplomatic relations with the Alliance. Romanian leaders, thru Petre Roman – Prime Minister –, will take advantage of this opportunity to send a letter to the NATO Secretary General underlining the will to establish diplomatic relations between NATO and Romania. Before that, in June 1990, at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Scotland, an exceptional step was taken by means of the ‘Message from Turnberry’, which extended an offer of friendship and cooperation to the Soviet Union and to all Eastern European countries. One of the results will be the signing of the ‘Open Skies’ agreement, “permitting overflights of national territory on a reciprocal basis in order to increase confidence and transparency with respect to military activities.”\textsuperscript{827} At the same time, all CSCE members, including Romania, will sign the ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’, in November 1990, as well as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

\textit{IV.2.2.1.2 The Rome Summit}

The Rome Summit, the 12\textsuperscript{th} NATO Summit, held on November 7\textsuperscript{th}-8\textsuperscript{th}, 1991, defined a new security architecture, the future role of the Alliance through a new strategic concept, the European security identity and defense role, as well the relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The alliance understood that its action would be "only in a framework of interlocking institutions [such as the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU, the Council of Europe as well as other Regional


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In addition, “the development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.”\textsuperscript{829} It is important to note that Europe will have more involvement in the Alliance, as the ‘Rome Declaration’ stipulates: “[t]he enhancement of the role and responsibility of the European members is an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance.”\textsuperscript{830} Moreover, “[t]he North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defense of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of the values they share.”\textsuperscript{831}

The redefinition of NATO’s role will be in three areas of activity, in the field of institutional, political, in defense, and military field and in crisis management and peacekeeping operation. The Alliance new strategic concept proposes to implement a multinational force structure within a rapid reaction force. The alliance will propose to develop cooperation in many fields as well in military and defense spheres with the CEECs within Romania. The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), whose first session will take place on 20 December 1991, “just as the Soviet Union was ceasing to exist”,\textsuperscript{832} with all foreign Minister of NATO, the CEECs and the Baltic states, will be the first step of the Alliance collaboration with the East.

\textbf{IV.2.2.1.3 The Brussels Summit}

The Brussels Summit, the 13\textsuperscript{th} NATO Summit, held in January 1994, brings new initiatives, such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a new program of cooperation addressed to the participants of the NACC and to the CSCE, “able and willing to contribute to the


\textsuperscript{829} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{830} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{831} Ibid.

program”. From NATO’s point of view, “two important principles underlie the success of cooperation […] in both the Partnership for Peace and the EAPC framework”. For the Alliance, these two points are the political dimension and the self-differentiation mechanisms. Each partner can have equal consultation and cooperation with each other and can decide at the level and area of the cooperation needed and wanted. However, in 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will be created to replace the NACC in order to manage the new stage of cooperation. Romania was the first Eastern European country to sign the PfP, in 1995.

**IV.2.2.1.4 The Madrid Summit**

In July 1997, the Madrid Summit, the 14th NATO Summit, was defined as a ‘landmark’ from the London Summit. The last seven years saw “the accomplishment of major initiatives” toward “a new and challenging phase in NATO’s development”. During this Summit, the first CEECs – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – were invited to begin accession talks, with the promise that the door will stay open for the others. “We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.” At this Summit, the organization endorses an ‘Open Doors’ policy for future accession. The Summit Declaration insists on the Partnership for Peace programme as a first step of collaboration and allows focusing on the Alliance’s efforts and on the preparation of the next steps.

The Alliance asked for a review of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, which was adopted in Rome in 1991, in order to face the next challenges. “Recognising that the strategic environment has changed since then, we [the Alliance] have decided to examine the

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833 Ibid. p. 19.
834 EAPC : Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

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Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges.\(^{837}\)

**IV.2.2.1.5 The Washington Summit**

The Washington Summit, in April 1999, the 15\(^{th}\) Summit of the organization, celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the organization. This Summit was marked by the Kosovo crisis and the intervention of NATO under the UN Council agreement, with the strong support of the U.S. military troops.

Just like in Madrid, NATO leaders engaged in the Partnership for Peace programme and a range of Alliance partnerships. The Summit issued some documents, such as the new alliance’s strategic concept; a tool that permitted the Alliance to be ready for the 21st century security challenges and for future political and military developments. Recognizing that the world dramatically changed in the last ten years, the Alliance’s Strategic Concept underlines that “the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”\(^{838}\) For this purpose, the Alliance will adapt to the new task and purpose. The Summit document strengthens the purpose and the tasks of the Alliance with the essentials purpose performing by the Alliance in the field of security, consultation according to the Article 4 (Washington Treaty), deterrence and defense as provided in the Articles 5 and 6 (Washington Treaty). The strategic perspective for the Alliance in an evolving environment is the collaboration with other organizations such as the UN, ASCE, EU and WEU with particular emphasis on the OSCE and the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

At the Summit, a Membership Action Plan (MAP), the “practical manifestation of the Open Door” was unveiled as a framework for the first step to start accession talks. There was also a report entitled ‘Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century – The Enhanced and more Operational Partnership’ offering the alliance and its partner forces the possibility to operate together. The Summit also

\(^{837}\) Ibid.

emphasized the “Mediterranean Dialogue countries in a mutually reinforcing way to enhance Euro-Atlantic security and stability.”

**IV.2.2.1.6 The Prague Summit**

At the 16th NATO Summit, held in Prague in November 2002, was the first summit after the 9/11 tragedy. NATO heads of state and government took a number of crucial decisions changing the alliance’s role in the Euro-Atlantic security and having the ability to adjust to new international priorities and to adapt its capabilities in order to meet new international challenges. We can underline that the 9/11 event shaped the decision of the United States to find help and partners in the fight against America’s enemies, and to use all ways of getting help in order to achieve their goals. It was decided “to enlarge [the] [...] Alliance and further strengthen NATO to meet the grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 21st century,” by inviting former communist states, as well as Romania, to join the alliance in the continuity of NATO’s post-Cold War Open Door Policy. “This decision is necessary to strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area”, as the NATO statement says. The Alliance puts in place “a comprehensive package of measures”, and reorganizes the NATO commandment, by creating a NATO Response Force (NRF) and “[s]triamline NATO’s military command arrangements”.

**IV.2.2.1.7 The Istanbul Summit**

The Istanbul Summit, the 17th NATO Summit held in June 2004, is named ‘The Istanbul Declaration: Our Security in a New Era’, which seems to be a continuation of the transformation process that began at the Prague summit in 2002, in order to create a shift from a Cold

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841 Ibid.

842 Ibid.

843 Ibid.
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War alliance against Soviet aggression to a 21st century coalition against new and out-of-area security threats.\textsuperscript{844}

NATO members welcomed seven new alliance members – including Romania – during the North Atlantic Council meeting.\textsuperscript{845} They decided to expand the alliance's presence within the War in Afghanistan and to end its presence in Bosnia, and agreed to assist Iraq with training, as well launched a new partnership initiative and adopted measures to improve NATO’s operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{846} The NATO-Russia Council meeting was remarked by the absence of the Russian president Vladimir Putin and in the same time, any progress concerning the ratification of the adapted CFE treaty or the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova was made.\textsuperscript{847} NATO leaders welcomed the progress made by Ukraine towards membership in the NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting\textsuperscript{848} and discussed some general and mostly symbolic topics with its non-NATO counterparts during the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meeting.\textsuperscript{849}

\textbf{IV.2.2.1.8 The Riga Summit}

The 19th NATO Summit was held in Riga, in November 2006, the first NATO summit held on the territory of a former USSR


The most important topics discussed were the War in Afghanistan and the future role and borders of the alliance. Further, the summit focused on the alliance's continued transformation, taking stock of what has been accomplished since the 2002 Prague Summit. NATO also committed itself to extend further membership invitations in the upcoming 2008 Bucharest Summit. At the Riga summit, NATO members confirmed the role of NATO, with an UN-mandated KFOR, to ensure a stable security environment in the Balkans, because Serbia strongly opposed the breakaway of Kosovo and the resulting tensions between Serbia and Kosovo could create instability in the region.

IV.2.2.1.9 The Bucharest Summit

The 20th NATO Summit was organized in Bucharest on April 2nd–4th, 2008, under the leadership of Romania, in the capital of a new membership alliance. Few themes were discussed at the Summit. The principal theme was the clarification of NATO’s mission and the necessity to draft a new 'Strategic Concept' for the Alliance, “to lay out the alliance’s future path, including mission, decision-making, and geographic reach.” In addition, NATO has the need to define “[n]ew Capabilities against New Threats”. However, due to the United States domestic policy calendar, it will not be done before the next Alliance’s summit. Concerning the Afghanistan, the “Allies

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agreed to a ‘strategic vision’ statement’\textsuperscript{855} and will remain there for a period of time in order to stabilize the country.

However, the fear that NATO is evolving into a worldwide coalition of the willing, as such increasing polarization and militarization in international affairs, sparked protests at NATO’s HQ in Brussels two weeks before the summit, as well as in Bucharest. Protesters targeted the renewed determination of NATO to use nuclear weapons and NATO’s backing of the US anti-missile shield “in Poland with 10 interceptors and an associated radar system in the Czech Republic”.\textsuperscript{856} Among other points debated at the Summit, there was the extension of the Alliance, the third enlargement round in the post-Cold War era. Croatia and Albania were invited to join the Alliance, but the Republic of Macedonia was not invited due to its ongoing name dispute with Greece. Georgia and Ukraine had hoped to join the NATO Membership Action Plan\textsuperscript{857}, but NATO members decided to review their request later. The Alliance, for the first time, used an unusual formulation: “We agreed today that these countries [Georgia and Ukraine] will become members of NATO.”\textsuperscript{858}

The Bucharest Summit showed “[t]wo dangerous signals”.\textsuperscript{859} The first one is the reestablishment of Russia’s “sphere of interest” in Europe, “where countries are no longer allowed to pursue their own goals without Moscow accepting them”.\textsuperscript{860} The second one is the ascertainment of the Alliance member-states’ own interest prevailing over the Alliance’s common interest.

\textsuperscript{855} Ibid. The NATO Summit at Bucharest, 2008.
\textsuperscript{856} Ibid. The NATO Summit at Bucharest, 2008. p. 3.
\textsuperscript{860} Ibid.
IV.2.2.2 The Process of Enlargement

To understand the enlargement process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we need to explain the process itself. The process of enlargement was not done immediately after the end of the Cold War, seen here before. In 1994, NATO launches a study on NATO’s enlargement opportunity to define the related ‘why and how’. The study gave a report: ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’\(^{661}\) made public and shared with potential partners.

Why? The dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization created “a unique opportunity to build an improved security architecture”\(^{662}\) for the European continent in the frame of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, “without recreating dividing lines”. The document stipulates that

[s]uch a broad concept of security should be the basis for the new security architecture which must be built through a gradual process of integration and cooperation brought about by an interplay of existing multilateral institutions in Europe, such as the EU, WEU and OSCE, each of which would have a role to play in accordance with its respective responsibilities and purposes in implementing this broad security concept.\(^{663}\)

To resume it, “NATO enlargement will safeguard the freedom and security of all its members in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.”\(^{664}\) Of course, there was no alternative solution, at that time, to replace NATO by, for example, a European Defense organization.

How? In accordance with “the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” that implies that new members should conform to some basic principles such as “the safeguarding of the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of all Alliance members and their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”\(^{665}\) The new members will have to assume the obligation of membership under the Washington Treaty; moreover, Article 10 stipulated that “the parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further


\(^{662}\) Ibid.

\(^{663}\) Ibid.

\(^{664}\) Ibid.

\(^{665}\) Ibid.
the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty [...]”. An “[a]ctive participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the enlargement of NATO”.  

In 1997, both the United States and Russian presidents signed the NATO-Russia Charter, a good point for the enlargement process. Of course, Romania considers it favorable and “hopes that NATO and the Russian Federation signing the [NATO-Russia Charter] [...]will open an era of new relations, based on trust, cooperation and partnership.”

**IV.2.2.2.1 Partnership for Peace**

The Partnership for Peace (PfP), an initiative introduced in 1994 at the Brussels Summit, has the aim to enhance stability and security in Europe. The PfP was addressed to all states members of the NACC and to all States members of CSCE willing to take part in the program.

The PfP program focuses on developing cooperation at all levels between NATO and the candidate countries. PfP members will also be members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Through a ‘Framework Document’, members will make sure that they will put in place transparency, democratic control of defense forces, capability and readiness to participate in operation, development of military cooperation, as well as to present a preparation document indicating the planned step in order to achieve all the goals of the Alliance – political, military and others – for cooperation in all fields – air defense, crisis management, military infrastructure, ... –. However, the participation in the PfP program does not necessarily imply membership with the Alliance.

**IV.2.2.2.2 Membership Action Plan**

The MAP, launched in 1999 at the Washington summit, is designed to assist aspiring partner countries to meet NATO standards and prepare for possible future membership. As NATO documents

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866 Ibid.  
867 Ibid.  
state: “The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is designed to assist those countries which wish to join the Alliance in their preparations by providing advice, assistance and practical support on all aspects of NATO membership.”\textsuperscript{869} In fact, the MAP has two levels; the first is the respect to a set of criteria, in democratic and political fields; the second is in the military field, where the national army has to be at NATO standards and under a democratic control, i.e. ruled by civilians. In addition, the candidate country must settle ethnic or/and territorial disputes by peaceful means, in order to demonstrate their commitment to human rights and the rule of law, and to guarantee that the domestic legislation does not oppose the cooperation with the Alliance.

However, the MAP does not guarantee future membership, even if it puts countries, de facto, on track to joining the Western military alliance. The MAP is just to help the aspirant countries to meet NATO standards and to be prepared for possible future membership. It was drawn on the accession of the Visegrád group to the Alliance. Aspiring nations must first participate in MAP before joining the alliance. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) will remain the vehicle to keep aspirants’ progress under review. This is an example of interdependence between NATO and Eastern countries, where the future integrated country shaped the process of integration.

\textbf{IV.2.3 From Cooperation to Integration}

Romania’s attraction for NATO can be found in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization whose goals are “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”.\textsuperscript{870}

On July 1990, after the London Summit and the NATO opening to the CEECs, Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman sent a letter to NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wôner to visit Romania in order to

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have “a better perception of the Romanian realities”\textsuperscript{871} and approach “the problems of co-operation between Romania and NATO”\textsuperscript{872} with the will to establish diplomatic relation between NATO and Romania. Romanian Government officials, the President and the Foreign Minister, signed in Paris in November 1990 the ‘Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces’ in the framework of the CSCE, and also the ‘Charter of Paris for a New Democratic Europe’. In December of the same year, the parliament voted the Law for the establishment, organization and functioning of the Supreme Council of National Defense (SCND) in order to unify, organize and coordinate the state defense. In 1990, the Romanian diplomacy took the first step towards the NATO accession by establishing contacts with NATO at diplomatic level and by organizing high-level visits of the Prime Minister, the Military Chief of staff and the Foreign Minister at the NATO headquarters in Brussels.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO were created during the Cold War as two antagonistic organizations, one against “Germany or any other Power which might be associated with Germany either directly or in any other way” (Warsaw Pact), while the other one (NATO) was created to protect the Western democratic world. The end of the Cold War normally has to end the two organizations activities.

Why enter in a relationship with NATO after the end of the Cold War and lead to the potential dissolution of both organization? In 1990, the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Wörner declared that “[...] even if the Warsaw Treaty self-dissolves, this is not a reason for the NATO dissolution. On the contrary, there exist all reasons for pointing out that our role as a stability factory will grow even more important.”\textsuperscript{873} Therefore, the situation is clear. In 1991, the situation became clearer between the Warsaw Pact Treaty and NATO. On April 1\textsuperscript{th}, the Warsaw Pact Treaty is officially dissolved after several meetings (Budapest –February 25, 1991, Prague – March 31, 1991). The Cold War was really ended by the loss of the Communist camps.

From the beginning, NATO’s reaction did not meet Romania’s expectation. Romania was in a difficult position because the former Romanian leader, Ceausescu, put the Romanian economy in a bankruptcy situation by repaying the large Western loan during the

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\textsuperscript{871} Roman, Petre. Letter from the Prime Minister of Romania to the Secretary General of NATO. Romanian Journal of International Affairs, 1990, vol. III, no. 2.
\textsuperscript{872} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
eighties, and by giving up the MFN status with the United States. The ‘89 Revolution events and the post-1989 political developments, amplified by the ethnic problems, created a “hands-off-attitude of the West”. Moreover, “the longevity of the former communists [led by Ion Iliescu,] without an intervening alternation of power, made the initial Iliescu administration suspect in Western eyes.” First, NATO was not pressed to build a relation with Romania, as shown by “the lack of enthusiasm […] reflected in the failure of the NATO secretary-general to respond to Iliescu’s invitation of July 1990” after the London Summit. Secondly, Romania was not included in the first NATO visit to CEECs – Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland - in 1991. Thirdly, as states Larry L. Watts, “[i]n December 1991, Romania was the only one of the group not to be invited to the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the forum created to institutionalize relations between NATO and Central Eastern Europe.” We want to underline that Romania did not have any common border with the Alliance before the admission of the Visegrád group in NATO in 2002.

From the very beginning, Romania communicates and promotes the will to collaborate and the need to be integrated into the Alliance. For this purpose, Romanian leaders took part in many different summits and conferences. At the Conference on Europe and the Mediterranean within the New Global Order in Athens in April 1991, President Ion Iliescu states:

We see our present visit and dialogue as a way of conferring new dimensions to Romania’s approaching process to the North-Atlantic Alliance, by way of contacts, conclusions and cooperation. The relations with NATO represent a priority for Romania with respect to its commitment to the integration process into the Euro-Atlantic structures. It is an irreversible option, determined by the attachment of my country to fundamental values of democracy, market economy and rule of law. As a consequence of its trans-Atlantic component, NATO succeeded in safeguarding security and stability in Western Europe during the Cold War. Within the new international environment, this organization maintains its importance. For Romania, as well as for other countries in Central Europe, it represents an essential element for building the new European security structure.”

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875 Ibid. In.
876 Ibid. In.
877 Ibid. In.
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At the Prague Summit in 1991 (dissolution of the Warsaw Pact), Ion Iliescu underlined the importance of the relations with Western structures.

The process of creating connections with Western European structures is of particular concern to us. We wish to develop collaboration relations with NATO, as an institution, to which practically all states participating in our meeting are committed to. We welcome the non-discriminatory approach of the North-Atlantic Alliance with respect to all Warsaw Treaty countries, which can stand for itself as an authentic measure of confidence.\textsuperscript{879}

We can understand in these statements that one of Romania’s goals at this time was to re-enter the International Community and to collaborate with NATO, regional organizations, part of the Romanian needs to be recognized as an active member of the International community and as a European actor. In order to re-enforce Romania’s will to join NATO, the President of Romania wrote in October 1991 a letter to the heads of NATO states and government members declaring the will to collaborate and “to participate in any collaboration formula available to Central and Eastern European countries.”\textsuperscript{880}

Any occasion was an opportunity for Romania’s representatives; in a colloquium named The New Europe’ (July 1992) in Jovic (France), one of them states in his speech that Romania

would like to cooperate closer and closer with NATO, to consolidate its connections with immediate positive structures within any associative or cooperating institutional formula. All these are meant to contribute to guaranteeing the premises for the accomplishment of our strategic goal – Romania’s guarantees for the normal evolution of the country’s irreversible democratization process.\textsuperscript{881}

At the United Nation General Assembly, on September 23, 1992, the Romanian Foreign Minister, Adrian Nastase reasserts, “Romania’s steady interest to become a NATO member” because it represented an important goal of the Romanian foreign policy “based on the tradition of the historical evolution of the Romanian civilization


within the European space”. 882 To reinforce Romania’s will to be closer the Alliance, Romania opens a Euro-Atlantic center in Bucharest in February 1992. At this inauguration, Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Nastase specifies that “Romania’s final goal is the complete integration into NATO structures”. 883 In October 1993, Ion Iliescu underlines that NATO is “the only organization able to ensure stability on the European continent and to guarantee the values of democracy and those of the rule of law, and he reasserted Romania’s rightful place, as a European state, within NATO”, 884 and the country’s will to “be more actively involved in the stability of this region’s security and in Europe in general” by assuming “all the responsibilities incumbent on its future status as a NATO member country.” 885

During the period 1990-1994, Romania’s main problem was with minorities and with neighboring countries, as seen hereafter. The minorities’ problem had influence on Romania’s foreign policy, as well as on the foreign perception of the Romanian image and abilities to respect the Western values, as explained in the first part. The minorities problem in Romania classified the country more as a Balkan country that a European one. The minorities’ problem handicapped Romania’s accession to the Alliance, as well as the relations with neighboring countries, especially with Hungary on the one hand, and Moldova and Ukraine on the other hand. If Romanian officials saw themselves respecting the Western values on human rights in general and minorities in particular, western experts have a different analysis and the inter-ethnic tension cannot allow Romania’s integration in Euro-Atlantic structures. It is not important, whether this is true or not, but it is important that the perception of the decision making of Romanian leader at this period seems unadapted to share the Western values on human rights and democratic values.

Romania sent many contradictory signals in its foreign policy because at the beginning, “Romania had a hesitant start in reshaping its foreign and security policy after the Revolution of 1989. During 1990-1993, Bucharest even adopted pro-eastern postures that contrasted sharply with Ceausescu’s traditional policies.” 886 The major breakthrough in the relation with NATO came in February 1993 during Ion Iliescu’s visit at the NATO headquarters, when the Romanian

882 Ibid. p. 57. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
883 Ibid. p. 60-61. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
885 Ibid. Romania in Europe and in the World.
leader asserted Romania’s wish to be integrated in the Euro-Atlantic structure, representing the “first priority” and an “irreversible option”. We have to underline that after 1993, the relation with NATO and EU member states becomes a priority for Romania’s foreign policy. Romania adopted an aggressive foreign policy “more consistently Western-oriented than [for example] Slovakia’s [one].”

After Emil Constantinescu’s election and his strong foreign policy commitment to anchor the country to the West with NATO and the European Union, the relation with the Alliance is warmer.

Romania made efforts to advance with neighbor relationship and thru the ‘Open Skies’ Treaty, Romania and Hungary signed their own bilateral Open Skies agreement during bilateral talk in May 1991. This agreement starts “an Open Skies regime and its successful implementation would encourage reciprocal openness on the part of the State Parties, enhance the predictability of their military activities and strengthen confidence between them”. “In order to benefit from its experience, Hungary and Romania still organize annual training exercises” according to Anca Jurcan, disarmament affairs representative for Romania. Moreover, Romania proposed to share its experiences with others states. “Hungary and Romania became the first states ever successfully to negotiate and sign a bilateral Open Skies agreement.”

At the 2005 ‘Open Skies’ Treaty Review Conference the members agrees that

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[t]he State Parties recognize that the Treaty might serve as a model for aerial surveillance regimes in other regions of the world in order to promote security and stability. They are prepared to enter into dialogue with interested parties in order to share experience, to exchange general information about the Treaty and its benefits and to provide support and advice on cooperative aerial observation.\textsuperscript{892}

The Parliament was involved in the foreign policy process and it approved, in 1991, the Romanian participation in the ‘Desert Storm’ operation following the UN decision against Iraq. This is the first participation of Romanian military forces outside the country since the Second World War. In April, under the UN and as part of a team of military observers (5 persons), Romania takes part in the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) until October 1996.

This first initiative is going in the direction of Romania’s announced foreign policy: the will to integrate the EU and Euro-Atlantic structure, to build a good neighbors relationship. The period, from 1990 to 1993, represents an intensive exchange of visits and meetings between Romania and NATO in order to build better understanding. Everywhere, in all kinds of meetings, colloquia, summits, Romanian officials reinforced the will for Romania to become a member of the NATO as a normal evolution due to the Romania history and Romanian quality, a country sharing the same universal value. However, Romania’s endemic problems do not position the country as an immediate candidate of the Alliance. Valentin Stan, political analyst and Romanian journalist, explained in his article, ‘Nationalism and European Security: Romania’s Euro-Atlantic Integration’,\textsuperscript{893} that Romanian cannot qualify for Euro-Atlantic integration at that time even if Romania’s officials considered Romania as “an ‘island of stability’ ” surrounded by chaos (Yugoslavia and former USSR); Romanians also saw themselves respecting the Western values regarding the treatment of minorities. He quotes Ion Iliescu’s words from an interview with an Italian journalist, Giuseppe Leuzzi, in April 1993. The President specified during this interview that


you will find in Romania, in the legislative field, in the political and
cultural practice the most comprehensive rights for minorities (emphasis
added). I think there are not many states in Europe in which national
minorities have representatives in the country's Parliament. Not to mention
their representation in local administration, the education in their mother
tongue. At least the Magyars have it from primary up to university
education. There is a real network of schools in the areas where they live.
The Magyar population have their own cultural institutions, magazines,
newspapers, and radio and television programs. Thus, from this point of
view, there are no restrictions.\footnote{Iliescu interview with Giuseppe Leuzzi, Italian journalist (La Stampa, Il
Tempo) on 5 April 1993 quoted in Ibid.}

In the mind of the Romanian official and ‘on paper’, it can be
true. However, as Valentin Stan demonstrated, the Western analysts’
perception was different and for them the inter-ethnic tensions
cannot allow Romania’s integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, as
explained in the first part ‘Change into Continuity’.

\section*{IV.2.3.1 The Partnership for Peace}

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) was initiated, and Romania was
the first country among the CEECs to sign the agreement treaty, in
January 1994. As usual in their speech, Romanian officials made
propaganda for the strong implication of Romania vis-à-vis the
integration, by active participation especially in the joint exercise of
the Partnership for Peace, and in the participation of Peacekeeping
operations. The justification for Romania’s integration into NATO will
be done, one more time by Romanian officials, through Foreign
Affairs Minister Adrian Severin, on the Western tribune via official
statement. Officials present Romania as geostrategical country in the
Southeast of Europe, a factor of equilibrium and stability in Central
and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Balkan area, because Romania’s
geopolitical position can assure the interface “between the Northern
and Southern flanks of the Alliance”.\footnote{Constantinescu, Emil. Speech by H.E. Mr. Emil Constantinescu, President
Moreover, President Constantinescu will insist on the good collaboration between NATO
and Russia and salutes the “fruitful cooperation framework” that
Romania “shall try to support and promote”.\footnote{Ibid.} In his speech to the
North Atlantic Council in 1997, President Constantinescu says that
“Romania perceives NATO as the only true chance to guarantee its
security, without threatening in any way the security of any country,
because [Romanian officials] [...] believe that the enlargement does not mean that NATO goes East, on the contrary, it is the East that goes to NATO. 897 Romanian officials tried to convince the North Atlantic Council that Romania is a good partner for the Alliance not only because of its strategic position, but also because of the good collaboration with other CEECs, especially with neighboring countries. Romanian officials underlined the role played by the country during the Yugoslavian war, and the enormous sacrifice made. Adrian Severin remembers that “Romania is the only country that had equally good relations with all the parties involved in the conflict, as it has no disputes whatsoever with any of them.” 898 For the Romanian official, Romania “has a ‘strong case’ when talking about NATO enlargement”.

However, at that time, the question of Romania’s readiness becomes an increasingly significant issue related to NATO’s enlargement, because, as explained here before in the first part, “its revolution had a slow start, its diplomatic effort had been diffuse and ineffective, and unlike Poland it had no political constituency in the United States.” 899 Romania was strongly disappointed by the restricted accession at the Madrid Summit in 1997, even if Hungarian leaders advised about the danger to reject Romania during the first wave of integration. Western countries that were also members of NATO supported Romania. France was the strongest supporter of Romania’s accession to NATO in 1997, and “tried to persuade the allies to include the country in the first wave of enlargement”, claiming “a special relationship with Romania by virtue of their shared Latin identity and a long history of French cultural influence in Bucharest.” 900 However, considering the relation between the United States and France, the French President was not a key advocate for Romania’s integration in NATO. This rejection had an important impact on Romania’s domestic policy, as described here before in the ‘Change into Continuity’ part.

897 Ibid.
898 Severin, Adrian. Romania: A Factor of Equilibrium and Stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Ibid.
Nevertheless, Romania continues to take a strong part in the cooperation with the Alliance. The Romanian government established in Bucharest the Regional Center for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime under the aegis of Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI). In addition, Romania reinforces the collaboration with the United States and with the alliance, described here before in the previous part. In April 1998, during a NATO working visit, Secretary General Javier Solana remarks, “Romania has an important role to play with respect to the stability and welfare of the entire area”.\(^{901}\) Moreover, General Wesley K. Clark, Commander-in-Chief of NATO forces in Europe, stated that “independently of the decision taken, Romania will still be seen as a key-country for NATO and a partner we’ll have closer and deeper relations with”.\(^{902}\) The President of the US Committee for NATO enlargement stipulates too that

[a]s friends of Romania, we consider the addressed invitation to join NATO will be made in the year 2001-2002, whereas the integration itself will occur in 2003-2004. Still, the political decision could only be taken after the Presidential elections in the USA [...] I wish that Romania be a de facto NATO member – at least from a military point of view –, before it becomes a de jure member, the moment it receives the invitation to join the Alliance.\(^{903}\)

### IV.2.3.2 The Membership Action Plan

In April 1999, NATO launched the action plan in order to welcome new members with its Membership Action Plan (MAP). As part of this mechanism, Romania drafted its own national annual plan for the Preparation for Accession (PNA), which establishes the objectives, measures and deadlines for their fulfillment, with a view to orienting, sustaining and assessing the efforts needed for the accession into the alliance. A major contribution to the good preparation of the accession was brought by the strengthening of the domestic inter-institutional cooperation, structured as the National Commission for Romania’s accession to NATO, and of the external cooperation with other candidate states in the Vilnius Group. Romania’s substantial participation in peacekeeping operations under

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\(^{901}\) Luca, Ioan (Col.) Secretarul General al NATO, din nou la București (The NATO Secretary General again in Bucharest). Observatorul Militar, 7-13 aprilie 1998, no. 14 (433). Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{902}\) Spenlea, Florin (Lt) România este o țară cheie pentru N.A.T.O. (Romania Is a Key Country for NATO). Observatorul Militar, 14-20 iulie 1998, no. 28 (447). Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{903}\) Spenlea, Florin (Lt) România este o țară cheie pentru N.A.T.O. (Romania Is a Key Country for NATO). Observatorul Militar, 14-20 iulie 1998, no. 28 (447). Translated by Marc Bonnemains
the aegis of NATO, the UN, and the OSCE and in the fight against
terrorism added to the interoperability with allies and demonstrates
the actual capacity to contribute to NATO objectives and missions.

In 2002, Romania established the Interdepartmental
Commission for the Preparation of Romania’s Integration into NATO.
An important initiative is the ‘Vilnius group’, expressing the common
solidarity of NATO candidate countries to cooperate in order to
increase the chance for integration into the Alliance, built on the
example of the Visegrád group. In addition to the European
integration, Romania will seek support from all necessary states to
achieve its goals with the Alliance. The support will come from
France, Spain, Italy and also from Turkey. In 1993, following the
establishment of the Economic Commission of the Black Sea
Parliament, Turkish President Husamettin Cindoruk states that “[w]e
believe that NATO will become consolidated through Romania’s
entering its structures, whereas the Black Sea would turn into a
strong citadel”\textsuperscript{904} and gives the Turkish support for Romania’s
integration into NATO. The strategy, initiated by President Emil
Constantinescu, starts to turn Romania from a ‘security needer’ into a
future ‘security provider’. Romania started to take a leading role by
proposing initiatives to NATO.

\textbf{IV.2.3.3 After September 11}

In 2001, the international situation changed dramatically with
the 9/11 event. The need for the United States to fight terrorism
changed the paradigm of security in the Middle East and the necessity
to ensure closer bases in Europe and guarantee energy provisions.
Romania acted as a de facto member of the Alliance during the 9/11
event and declared it acted in the spirit of the fifth article of the
Alliance. Romania placed itself at the disposal of the United States
and NATO “upon request to provide the facilities offered by the
national air, land and maritime space, in support of a possible

\textsuperscript{904} Chirieac, Bogdan. "Dacă securitatea României va fi ameninţată, NATO va
intervenii" ("If the security of Romania will be threatened, NATO will interven").
Adevărul, 8 octombrie 1993, no. 1076. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
response operation against terrorism. As a future NATO member Romania wanted to give the assurance that, it can become involved under the rules of NATO to take part in NATO’s missions and protect the Alliance members, reinforcing the words of the President of the US Committee for NATO Enlargement in 1998: “I wish that Romania shall be a de facto NATO member.”

The 9/11 reinforced the need for the United States to have allies and to be helped in the fight against terrorism. The Eastern European countries are good allies, and in particular Romania. But this is also a chance for the countries of the Vilnius group and the United States to accelerate the integration and to help the candidate states by a financing programme for their army, after the 9/11 attacks. In 2002, at the NATO summit in Prague, the heads of states and governments of NATO member countries decided to invite Romania, together with six other states - Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia - to begin talks for accession to the North-Atlantic Alliance. On March 26, 2003 in Brussels, the ambassadors of the NATO member states signed the accession Protocol. After signing the Protocol, Romania gradually became involved in Alliance operations, by participating, as observers, in the works of most allied structures. As stated in the ‘2005 Military Strategy of Romania’, Romania needs “to intensify the efforts to join NATO”, in order “to benefit from and take part in collective defense”.

This is imperative for the country to achieve its national security objectives, as well as to promote and defend the country interests. Either way, for the Romanian government, “NATO integration is the first priority and it is the best option for Romania to

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906 Spenlea, Florin (Lt) România este o țară cheie pentru N.A.T.O. (Romania is a key country for NATO). Observatorul Militar, 14-20 iulie 1998, no. 28 (447). Translated by Marc Bonnemains

advance towards a collective security environment⁹⁰⁸ that makes default to it at this moment.

IV.2.3.4 Romania and NATO

Romania's foreign policy orientation and economic aspirations were cemented in 1993 by the signing of an EU association agreement, effective as of February 1995. Romania also gained full membership of the Council of Europe and secured the reinstatement of the most-favored nation preferential trading status with the USA in 1993, made permanent in 1996, after being on annual review. Yet, until 1996, the country's commitment to democratization and openness was more formal than real.

Romania’s accession into NATO was chaotic and took a long time, as compared to the earlier and strong determination of the Romanian leaders, from 1990 on, to integrate as soon as possible in the Alliance. So, why did the Romania’s integration take such a long time, at least 14 years, as compared to the other CEECs such as Hungary or Poland? As Larry L. Watts, a security sector reform consultant to the Romanian Presidency’s National Security Advisor and former RAND consultant put it: “NATO enlargement has been a perplexing process, conforming poorly to any strategy that alliance theory might suggest. The course of Romania’s candidacy provides a good example of the difficulty in applying theory to the process.”⁹⁰⁹ He explains that the NATO enlargement process, from the point of view of the Foreign Relations theory – from neorealist to liberal and interdependent theory – does not match a theoretical logic in the light of geostrategic approaches.⁹¹⁰

IV.2.3.4.1 Foreign Relations Theories

From Foreign Relations theories’ point of view, Romania had to be integrated in the Alliance’s first enlargement wave and not to be postponed until the second wave.

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⁹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 7.
⁹¹⁰ To see : Ibid. In.
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For the neorealist approaches, the enlargement should include states, which bring “the greatest capabilities to the alliance”.911 On the other hand, Romania is the largest Eastern European state after Poland, in terms of military capabilities, territory and number of population. As explains Larry L. Watts, the integration of Poland and Romania had bring to the alliance the cover of the Border with the former Soviet space excepted 100 kilometers, instead of 1,000 kilometers due to the absence of the Romanian border.912 Second, since 1990, the increasing political instability in the Balkans and the CIS - with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova, Albania, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and others - and the mission of NATO to contain instability in the former Soviet empire, should accelerate the integration of candidates bordering this area.913 Romania is a significant regional power, with no historical claims of any type concerning the former Yugoslavia. In addition, we can add that Romania had a certain experience in mediation within the region, gained in the twenties. With the growing number of conflicts in the Balkans and the Middle East, “NATO’s Southern periphery—the Mediterranean basin together with the Black Sea and its hinterlands—is attracting growing attention”914 and becomes of primary strategic importance. It strains logic to set aside valuable candidates from this important area. We would like to note here that, if “Turkey has emerged as a far more important” ally, it is “also a much more difficult security partner”, especially regarding the potential conflicts between Turkey and Greece.

For the liberal or independence theory, NATO’s enlargement should be focused on security cooperation and good neighborly relations, as well as on the creation of a security environment in Central and Eastern Europe.915 Romania has long been part of a number of regional initiatives to enhance regional security, even before the Second World War in the thirties. Romania signed treaty agreements and developed good neighborliness relationship with

neighboring countries – Bulgaria, Hungary, the Republic of Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. Through its defense minister, Romania supports the necessity for NATO aspiring countries to be not only security consumers, but also security producers. The postponement of Romania’s admission in the first wave, despite Romania signing the PfP in 1994, ignored the efforts made by the country. NATO candidates’ accession process “ignored the premise of collective security between Hungary and Romania”\textsuperscript{916} and the majority of European NATO members considered that “[t]he selection of the three new entrants also sparked contention, [...] pushed for the inclusion of Romania and Slovenia in the first trench alongside the central Europeans.”\textsuperscript{917} The postponement accentuated the regional instability that erupted Southwest (Yugoslavia - 1991) and the Northeast (Republic of Moldova - 1992) of the Romanian border.

During the Ceausescu period, Romania was a privileged partner of the West (especially of the United States) and benefited from “world-wide respect it had seldom enjoyed in its history”\textsuperscript{918} for “splendid performances”\textsuperscript{919}. As Micu Mircea wrote, “it indicates that Romania’s relations with the transatlantic community were not completely frozen during its communist history.”\textsuperscript{920}

So, what was it that happened and led to the postponement of Romania’s integration into NATO for the second wave? First, we need to underline, as demonstrated in the first part, the mutual influence between domestic and foreign policies. In this case, the domestic policy has an influence on the foreign policy behavior, as well as on the reaction of foreign leaders and chanceries.

IV.2.3.4.2 Domestic Policy

The difficult beginning of the new democracy, the contradictory signals concerning the real willingness to implement free-market economy rules as real democratic functioning, the lack of reforms led by former communists did not encourage the strong support of Western democracies. The process of the country’s democratization regarding the human rights, the political opposition, the freedom of media, the military reforms and the civil-military relations raised questions for NATO representatives until 2000. In the first years of democratic process, Romania gives contradictory signals concerning its willingness to implement the rules of democracy and free-economy market; in addition, the lack of political alternation until 1996 classified the country as being more subject to patronage rather than seeking to reform towards democracy. Compared to other CEECs, such as Poland and Hungary, the country did not build before the 89’ Revolution an embryonic market economy behavior, and political opposition as Solidarność in Poland, ‘Charter 77’ in Czechoslovakia or ‘democracy package’ in Hungary. As for the Romanian economical situation after the 89’ Revolution, this is characterized by bankruptcy due to Ceausescu’s will to reimburse all foreign debt, irrespective of the costs for the country. For these arguments, Romania has to start from scratch in the political and economical field, and to experiment its own way of doing things. The other important problem was the country’s image, as circulated by Western media and the U.S. media in particular, when covering the news related to Romania. The Romania’s image “left in the American population […] was one of excessive political image and ethnic conflict, abuse children, and stray dogs.”

The 1996 election brings alternation in the political system, but the inexperience of the new leader and the many parties in the coalition, forcing a constant trio with a government in permanent crisis, contributed to the problem related to the implementation of reforms and to corruption. In fact, the period 1996-2000 did not permit the successful reform of the public administration, of the diplomatic system and of the military and judicial institutions. The result was a poor economic result and the impossibility to curve down corruption. With the election of Emil Constantinescu and his clear foreign policy signal toward Western institutions, there came a strong

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922 Ibid. p. 161.
breakdown with NATO and he received the favorable vote of the Clinton administration.  

At the beginning of 1997, the Romanian economy was in a problematic situation, as were the economies of Albania and Bulgaria, while in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the situation was considerably better. The Romanian military advantages were badly counteracted by the possibility to cover the cost of military reorganization. As Larry L. Watts says, “[d]uring 1997-2000, Romanian performance in military, political, and economic reform was disappointing.”  

This situation created disillusion among the Western leaders. In fact, in 1997, considering the lack of progress on NATO’s important points, i.e. human rights, human dignity, rule of law, transparency in government, and anti-corruption, Romania could not be invited with the Visegrád group country to be in NATO at the Madrid Summit.

**IV.2.3.4.3 Foreign Policy**

After the Revolution, the Romanian foreign policy gives contradictory signals regarding the country’s real position between the East and the West. Until 1993, the country seems to be more oriented towards the East rather than the West, independently from the leaders’ rhetoric arguing in favor of Romania’s European tradition.

The conflictual relation between Romania and Hungary concerning the minorities’ status, despite the positive signal given by both countries – military treaties and ‘open skies’ agreement – imposed a standby behavior. Romania’s response and double-speak during the Yugoslavian war in 1992 and the willingness to preserve the good neighborliness relations with Serbia discredited Romanian

\[\text{\textsuperscript{923} Emil Constantinescu’s travel in the United Stated.}\]


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authorities. After 1993, the Romanian leaders understood the necessity to give strong positive signals to the West and to NATO in particular. After a strong assertion of the fact, that NATO and the European Union integration are the first priority of the Romanian foreign policy, both organizations started to look more seriously at Romania. Romanian leaders gave positive signs such as the historical approaching between the two states – Hungary and Romania – supported by France and Germany based on the example of the Franco-German reconciliation. Romania was committed to a neighborliness positive attitude by resolving potential conflict through agreement and negotiation. Aware of the country’s position, Romanian leaders concluded several bilateral agreements and developed trilateral co-operation; moreover, they participated in regional organizations in order to promote peace and development. In the same way, Romania sought support from European states as well as from NATO members (that were also neighbors) to advance the Romanian integration into the alliance. In order to insist on the necessity to be ‘in’ versus ‘out’, Romania used this negative representation of Russia as “a significant part in the shaping of the country’s attitude towards the transatlantic community”.926 The country reaffirmed its commitment to the Alliance during the Kosovo war in 1999, by supporting NATO and participating in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

IV.2.4 NATO Membership

Beyond the need for security, the partnership with the United States and the membership of NATO give Romania a regional leading position in the Southeastern, the Black Sea and Balkan regions.

For President Traian Basescu, Romania is “[l]ocated on (sic) the West of the Black Sea and at the mouth of the Danube, Romania is a

key gate of the Trans-Atlantic community to the Black Sea area."\(^{927}\) Romania had been interested in the Black Sea area especially for economic purposes, since 1997. The strategic partnership with the United States offers Romania a better-defined regional role. "Romania is engaged in a strategic partnership with the United States. We consider this special relation crucial for the regional security and for promoting democracy in our immediate neighborhood", \(^{928}\) says Traian Basescu.

For the United States as Poland for the northeastern area, Romania can "contribute with peace possibilities in spreading the democracy around Romania, mainly on the Black Sea".\(^{929}\) For its regional leadership project, Romania gains the support of the United States. During a visit in January 2005, General James Jones, Commander of the U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), thanked the head of the Romanian state for Romania's bid to provide and support the U.S. both in Iraq and Afghanistan and for offering to provide for NATO bases on the Romanian territory.

Romania was an active partner with an aggressive regional assistance and security agenda. In the field of security, Romania participates in a number of Black Sea regional organizations and in an important number of peacekeeping operations (eight U.N. observation missions, two U.N. multinational Standby Force High


Readiness Brigade). The country is also a contributor to the operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and participates actively in the operation IRAQI Freedom for the war on terrorism, with the U.S. and NATO. This support for the alliance and the United States strengthens the relations between Romania and the United States. Romania started to be a reliable ally and a U.S. subsidiary for military action and security.

Romania’s collaboration with the Alliance can be viewed at the 20th NATO summit, organized by Romania in Bucharest in 2008, an event with full of symbolism for Romania; a bridge between the East and the West, a link between NATO members and aspiring countries, a place for the culture of cooperation, advice on defense reforms and development of political dialogue. For Traian Băsescu “[t]he Alliance has forged a culture of cooperation, advised on defense reforms and developed political dialogue.” 930 He hoped that “NATO’s contribution to stability and security will go a step further in Bucharest.” 931

For Romania, the Bucharest Summit “represented the biggest foreign policy event Romania ever hosted”, 932 and “a new step completely new in the configuration of [...] Romania’s identity as a state member of NATO [...] and close, actually, a extraordinary circle of efforts in order to mark our presence in the alliance”. 933 The President Traian Băsescu added in an interview:

the NATO summit in Bucharest is, of course, a large historical event, but also a natural crowning of a successful Romanian project - one targeting integration in a modern, democratic and effective way to ensure peace, security and prosperity in Euro-Atlantic space. Organizing this meeting for the Alliance in Bucharest is a confirmation of this success. At the same time, it is a materialization of a concrete goal which we proposed at the beginning of this mandate, objectif that the National Security Strategy of Romania defined in clear terms: the construction of a new European and Euro-Atlantic identity of Romania. NATO summit in Bucharest scores, so, also from this


931 Ibid.


point of view, the full entrance of Romania into the track of normality as a
member of the Alliance able to assume any responsibility and to meet
commitments.934

The organization of the Summit close for Romania a long
process of recognition as a NATO member, the role-played by
Romania in the Alliance, as well the importance of the Romania
geostrategical position, as a provider of security for the Black Sea
and a leadership role for the Balkans.

Not only Romanian leaders underlined the importance of the
Summit for the Alliance and the importance of Romania in its
participation and organization, but also foreign leaders recognized the
importance of the event and the decisions to take for the
organization, as well the important role played by Romania. For the
NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Summit was the
biggest NATO’s Summit ever organized “[i]n terms of the number of
nations participating”935, but also for him the Summit “must advance
NATO’s transformation” and “the development of NATO’s partnership
relations”.936 For the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Hungary and the Czech Republic thru a joint declaration confirmed
that for them the summit hosted in Bucharest is “a moment of critical
importance for stability not only for the entire transatlantic
community, but way beyond.”937 Julian Lindley-French and James
Townsend, members of the Strategy Advisory Group of the Atlantic
Council of the United States underline that “is the time to ask difficult
questions” and “comes at a moment when the collective will and
conviction of the Alliance is being profoundly tested.”938 The Romania

934 Petrescu, Ion (Col.). Presedintele Traian Băsescu: Summitul va da
răspunsuri potrivite problemelor de importanță vitală pentru viitorul alianței Ibid.
(President Traian Băsescu: Summit will give appropriate answers to vital questions
935 de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap Bucharest: a milestone in NATO’s transformation
936 Ibid.
937 Gönz, Kinga (Dr.) and Schwarzenberg Karel The Bucharest Summit:
NATO’s New Perspective. Prague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic,
938 Lindley-French, Julian and Townsend James Bucharest: Planning and
Partnership for security effect in the 21st Century [online]. NATO review, March
2008, 03. Brussels, Belgium: NATO - Assistant Secretary General for Public
President confirmed that for Romania, the Summit “is also an opportunity to advance NATO’s comprehensive contribution to international security”.

One of the main subjects favored by the Romanian President is the expansion of the Alliance in the East and the Southeast to other States sharing the same common values. “At the Summit in Bucharest we are hoping that we could invite Albany, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as members of the Alliance, and we encourage them to step up their preparations for this” mentioned Traian Băsescu. Therefore, Romania hope the Alliance to apply policy enlargement across the Black Sea region, toward first Georgia and Ukraine, as well later with the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan as soon as possible the condition will be granted. He bolstered on the necessity for “NATO to reconfirm its engagement in the Western Balkans, by maintaining its presence in Kosovo and by enhancing partnerships with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia.”

Romanian leaders as other states leaders underlined the important role-playing by NATO, “a robust organization” to maintain and face security challenges as well to develop collaboration with partners in Central Asia. The Chief of Romanian state did not say any word about the Kosovo independence, a topic on which one Romania Executive are in opposition with a large NATO members, likewise the United States.

The other subject is the strength of the Alliance and the capability to answer to new threats and challenges regarding security as terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction arms and regional instability. The Chief of State stated:

[w]e should start talking seriously about a new strategic outlook that will maintain the Alliance as a robust organization, capable of addressing evolving security challenges, both near and far, and prepared to enlist partner countries willing to contribute to set objectives and missions.

In this line, he wishes that NATO would confirm its strong commitment in Afghanistan, refreshing the Alliance strategy within a stronger connection with partner for security and renewed the UN – NATO’s collaboration. He sent “out the message that a strong and

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940 Ibid.

941 Ibid.

942 Ibid.

943 Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea.
active NATO reinforces a strong European Union and vice-versa”, a continuation of the Romanian idea about the inseparable link between NATO and European Union security. Traian Băsescu did not neglect to enhance Romania’s wish regarding the development of a supplementary NATO anti-missile defense system integrated with the U.S. one, as though the energy and environmental protections questions.

The Chief of State concluded that he wishes “the Bucharest summit could be a bridge [...] between our past achievements and new tasks.”


IV.3 The European Union as a Western Dream

We make Europe from one end to another, without the Iron Curtain, where all nations are masters of their destiny and worked together for progress and for peace.

General Charles de Gaulle

Following the change behind the ‘Iron Curtain’, a joint European Communities - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (EC-CMEA) started formal official relations between the European Council and the Soviet bloc in March 1987. This was the beginning of the relation between the EC and Eastern Countries through economic instruments and the negotiation of bilateral Trade and Cooperation Agreements (TCAs) in June 1988. The first TCAs were made with Hungary (1988), followed by Czechoslovakia (1988), Poland (1989), and the USSR (1989) and later, from 1990, by the other CMEA countries. The acceleration of the Soviet bloc breaking-up pushed the EC “to give their support to the countries which have embarked upon the road to democratic change”, and notified that “the Community is willing to implement still closer forms of co-operation with these countries”. It was necessary, at that time, to take further measures and to implement an aid program. In December 1989, the EC introduced the Program of


Community aid. The Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy Program (PHARE) initially established as a framework to provide financial and technical support for the economic restructuring of the two mentioned countries.\textsuperscript{949} Later, from 1990, the program was extended as a specific instrument to all the CEECs - Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in 1990, as well the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in 1991.

The community was in shock by the Soviet bloc’s collapse. Despite first economic aids to economies gasping for air (Hungary, Poland, the USSR) and the granting of credits and important bounties particularly to Poland, “the West is far from leaving, the stakes being well beyond rescue emergency, whether it is necessary or not.”\textsuperscript{950} However, “the changes in Central and Eastern Europe are conducted at a pace that it is difficult to monitor and apprehend them.”\textsuperscript{951} At that time, first it was important to know if Western Europe was ready to pay the tow to Eastern countries, such as Hungary and Poland. Secondly, it was important to know in the near future if the Community, simultaneously and contradictorily in a rush to ’open to the East’, will only choose simple free trade area collaboration or deeper collaboration with potential integration.\textsuperscript{952} Frans Andriessen, Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for External Relations and Trade Policy, remarked that “[t]he European Community, which


adjoins, is immediately affected. Peace and freedom reflect universal values, which can be contained by national borders.\textsuperscript{953} We have to remember that the European Union was surprised by the acceleration of history and was not ready for the integration of Eastern European countries after the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’. In order to meet the new challenge, knocking at the doors of the CEECs as well as of the Balkan countries, the European Union will have to update its concepts and institutions.

In the new international situation after the Cold War, we are in “an area of interdependence”\textsuperscript{954} and we can understand that what is happening in any ex-communist state in term of social, political and economical change can affect the neighboring countries either positively or negatively.\textsuperscript{955} It is necessary to underline, as explained by Frank Schimmelfennig,\textsuperscript{956} that the “[m]ember states on the eastern border of the EU are more sensitive to developments in Central and Eastern Europe than the more remote member states.”\textsuperscript{957} The “border states have a strong interest in enlargement”\textsuperscript{958} and in general enlargement is not only about economical or political power, as explains Schimmelfinnig, but also a means of “geopolitical interest”\textsuperscript{959} according to Andrew Moravcsik. For geopolitical reasons and with the German reunification, some “states had reason to fear that future Central and Eastern European members would side with Germany and […] making […] a power


\textsuperscript{955} To see: Ibid. p. 9-17.

\textsuperscript{956} Schimmelfennig Frank is professor of European politics at the Center for Comparative and International Studies within the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.


\textsuperscript{958} Ibid.


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shift in favor of Germany and the northeastern countries”.\textsuperscript{960} In fact, there are two points of view on the enlargement issue; one point is based on the economical side “emphasized by liberal intergovernmentalism”;\textsuperscript{961} another point is based on the geopolitical or ideological interest sustained by “Italy, Britain, and probably France”.\textsuperscript{962} The Union states have different interests, and in the case of “France, Greece, and Italy, all southern states, gave their special support to Bulgaria and Romania, southeastern candidates; whereas [...] northern states, most strongly advocated [...] the northernmost of the Central and Eastern European applicants”.\textsuperscript{963} Outside the scope of our study, it is nevertheless important to underline the power game of the Union’s members in order to understand the different support to Romania and the progress made towards the accession.

From a geographical point of view, Romania is the only country of the CEECs without borders with the European Union before 2004 (figure 2). Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia had direct border with the Union and were, in the past, members of the Habsburg Empire. The Baltic States have maritime borders with Finland and Sweden, were part of the Prussian Empire and/or Polish Empire, and under the rule of the military Teutonic order. Bulgaria shares borders with Greece and was under Ottoman occupation for a hundred years. As we can see on a map, in 1990, Romania was geographically isolated from the European Economic Community. Romania only had borders with Central European States, with the Soviet Union States - later known as the CEI members, and with Balkan states such as the Yugoslav Republic and Bulgaria. This geographical situation will explain partially the delay of Romania’s integration in the European Union, which will be compensated through alliances built by playing different cards, such as Latinity, Orthodoxy and pan-Slavism, as well as pan-Germanism.

At this time, after ’89, it was easy to classify the Romanian state as being part of the Balkan countries rather than a part of Central and Eastern European ones. The particular history and geographical situation of Romania make this issue harder because

\textsuperscript{961} Ibid. p. 51.
\textsuperscript{962} Ibid. p. 53.
\textsuperscript{963} Ibid. p. 51.
the modern Romanian state was created with three older principalities: Moldavia\textsuperscript{964}, Wallachia and Transylvania (figure 3).

\textbf{Figure 2: Europe in 1993.}\textsuperscript{965}

If the unification of the Moldavia and Wallachia principalities was done in 1859, in fact, before 1919, a part of the current Romanian soil, Transylvania was part of the Hungarian kingdom member of the Habsburg Empire. This dichotomy makes the country’s choice harder between the Westerner customs and the Oriental influences. The Romanian leaders will give themselves the task to position the country as an Eastern country and even more as a Central European country. The question in the beginning of nineties was to move “increasingly from the margins of the

\textsuperscript{964} We will use the word of Moldavia to design the principality, the independent country. The world “Moldova” will be used to define the modern country know as the Republic of Moldova.

European integration process towards full inclusion in its central embodiment, the EU”. Romania was “formally obliged to meet certain criteria and assume certain obligations before it will be admitted to the EU.” One can argue that the accession process of Bulgaria to the EU was an additional chance for Romania to be inside of the same process given the Romanian geographical position between Hungary, and Bulgaria.

**Figure 3: Romania in 19th century.**

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967 Ibid. Paper presented at.  
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From history, one can compare the Romanian current situation to its situation in the nineteenth century, when the Romanian kingdom imported the western democracy as well as the western institutions (European), and lived in a westerner style, especially represented by the French style. We will demonstrate in this chapter that the European Union's institutions will have a role in the transition of the political and economic reform processes in Romania, and the Romanian reform process will be done through the European integration.

The former Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Teodor Melescanu, explains that the European Union accession was a trigger of Romania’s domestic reform:

[T]he goals of accession are similar with the goals of internal reform, in general, in Romania. In this context, the process of integration represents both a means and a catalyst to speed up the transition ... The conditions to be fulfilled, the measures to be implemented, the instruments to be used are, to a large extent similar, a very important interdependency linking the process of preparation for accession, on the one hand, and of reform, on the other. In other words, the accession is at the same time a consistent part, an instrument and an objective of the reform.969

In addition, in 1995, Adrian Năstase, former President of the Chamber of Deputies in the Romanian Parliament, reinforces that the accession to the EU "is to such an extent crucial to Romania that we could consider it to be an internal factor of our development."970

IV.3.1 Background on the European Union

We can read, in the digital library documenting the history of European integration from the Virtual Resource Centre for Knowledge about Europe, that

[t]hese dramatic changes [the Iron Curtain and the Communism fall] raised the issue of the reorganization of Central and Eastern Europe. The former satellite States of the USSR, concerned with their security, relied on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and, in particular, on NATO. In the Council of Europe, they found a support structure in which


\textbf{IV.3.1.1 From the EEC to the EU}

the concept, the rules and processes in constant adaptation with the European Union needs and projects. We can emphasize that the process of enlargement is not over and will surely continue in the future with the demand of others states such as Croatia, Turkey and others.

If the European Union was born in 1993, it is only in 1995 that European economically healthy democratic countries - Austria, Finland and Sweden - integrate in the Union through the fourth enlargement. How can we imagine the integration of the CEECs after 45 years of centralized economy and non-democratic regime? In one word, if the CEECs wished to be back in Europe, and more exactly in the European Union, the European Union was not ready, in all senses, to integrate these countries. The Eastern European countries were not ready in terms of political and economical processes to meet the criteria for enlargement. But, “[t]he European Union emerged from the Cold War as a force that seemed capable of reinforcing peace and security in a continent that had witnessed the deadliest violence seen anywhere on the planet during the twentieth century”. 975 To be able to adapt to the evolution of the Union, “[t]he Community of the Twelve decided that it would not admit any new member before the completion of the single market, officially set for December 31, 1992”. 976

The period from 1987 to 1997 is called by the European Union – “The European Union in a Europe in the throes of change” 977 - with many issues to solve: the “single market” to come on the completion on January 1st, 1993 with the free movement of goods, capital and services between the twelve Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC); “the reform of the Community budget”; “the economic and monetary Union”; the “treaty on European Union” within “the end of the Cold War and geopolitical change in Europe”. “The end of the Cold War and geopolitical change in Europe” 978 raises questions to the members of the European Community about the “[r]evolution and civil war in Europe”, the “[b]reak-up of the USSR

978 Ibid.
and resurgence of national identities” as well as the “[r]eunification of a divided Germany” and the Yugoslav conflict. It will be necessary to meet the new world situation and to make “[t]he reshaping of Europe” through the update of institutions, from the CSCE to the OSCE, with a close collaboration with NATO and to give a “new impetus for the Council of Europe”, as well to regenerate the Western European Union (WEU) and to create the Eurocorps.

The period from 1998 to 2007 is called “the European unification”. The end of the nineties will represent the launch of the enlargement to the CEECs. It will be the historic ‘reunification’ of the two separate Europe, the end of the ‘divorce’ between the West and the East of Europe. The European Commission will adopt in 1997 the ‘Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union’, an ambitious enlargement program which contained ten opinions on the applications for accession of the CEECs. After analyzing the capacity of each state to meet the Copenhagen criteria, the Commission considered that only a first group of six countries might be eligible to accede to the Union, in around 2002–2003. They suggested that negotiations should begin only with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. In July 1997, the European Commission issued an initial negative opinion on the accession applications submitted by Bulgaria and Romania. In 1999, the Helsinki European Council will decide to open negotiations with six other applicants – Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia – and began them in February 2000.
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Figure 4: The European Union in 2008.\textsuperscript{979}

The Council also acknowledges the countries of the former Yugoslavia as ‘potential candidates’ for Union membership. In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the European Council followed their particular road map in agreement with the two countries, with the objective of welcoming them as Member States in 2007. In 2001, the Nice Treaty was drafted in order to bring institutional reforms needed by the future Eastern enlargement.

On May 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2004, the fifth enlargement opened the European Union to Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, as well as Malta and Cyprus. On February 22, 2005, the European Commission issued a favorable opinion on the applications submitted by Bulgaria and Romania for accession to the European Union in 2007, eventually in 2008 if needed (figure 4). For the period 2000-2006, a program of

‘Community assistance for reconstruction, development and stabilization’ is also planned to prepare the next enlargement process with the South-Eastern countries, five Balkan countries - Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania -.

Nowadays, the European Union faces several questions as how far can the enlargement go, on the European neighborhood policy and the case of Turkey. The ‘New Europe’ will also need to fulfill new geopolitical issues and, as Pascal Lorot writes it, “the Union (European Union) as much as became a supranational body which one can say that it has its own geopolitics.”

**IV.3.1.2 European Union Enlargement Strategy**

The European Union (EU) views the enlargement process as a historic opportunity and the principal method to spread security at the Union doors. It was the way to develop in a near future democracy, stability and prosperity to the former communist countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. This enlargement was important because as Ulrich Beck says “Europeanization means creating a new politics. It means entering as a player into the meta-power game, into the struggle to form the rules of a new global order”. It is a long process but the enlargement “could not, as a matter of fact, have been otherwise” and is “quite an extraordinary challenge for all the parties involved. For the European Union, it may be the most ambitious endeavor in its

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980 The ‘New Europe’ is a rhetorical term used by conservative political analysts in the United States, as Ronald Rumsfeld, to describe European post-Communist era countries. ‘New European’ countries were originally distinguished by their governments’ support of the 2003 war in Iraq, as opposed to an ‘Old Europe’ noted as unsupportive of that war. Even initially, however, the term was not based solely on this fact.


982 Ulrich Beck is a German sociologist who holds a professorship at Munich University and at the London School of Economics.

whole history”984 and an extraordinary luck for the CEECs to access to democracy and prosperity. The European Union at the doors of CEECs represented a power of attraction that cannot be missed. For Russia, representative of the former Soviet bloc in bankruptcy at the prosper European Union, the choice was rapidly done.

There was no another possible solution because “[t]he alternative solutions not being viable, the full accession to the EU of the current candidates is the only option left”985. The “enlargement [, with the CEECs,] entails both opportunities and threats for the European Union”986 and “will differ from previous ones both quantitatively and qualitatively”987.

Quantitatively, the enlargement is the biggest one ever done by the Union, and qualitatively because it will be addressed by countries in economic transition, with a low level of experience in democracy. It means both opportunities and threats. Opportunities for both candidate countries and the European Union, by the possibility to stabilize the region of Central and Eastern Europe, and to prevent the onset of various troubles, such as economic, environmental, ethnic or geopolitical ones. It also offers significant economic opportunities for both sides. Finally, it will enhance the global weight of the EU.988 Some threats can appears in the improvement of the Union’s ability to correct deficiencies, to admit the candidate countries with sufficiently quick planning, to resolve the potential problems linked with the adaptation of various European policies, the need for money and the necessity for the in-depth reform of the institutions.

The enlargement can be viewed as a European Union foreign policy tool, in the sense that the Union, by its power of attraction, got the ability to influence the domestic and foreign policies of aspiring members. Moreover, the Union can use political and economic reforms as a soft power (carrot) for permanent regional change, but also as hard-edged and coercive tools (a stick). The Permanent

985 Ibid. The enlargement of the European Union. Opportunities and Threats.
986 Ibid. The enlargement of the European Union. Opportunities and Threats.
bilateral agreements on trade, the permanent political dialogue, social and even security issues through stabilization and association agreements were other elements that can be viewed as EU foreign policy tools vis-à-vis the CEECs.

However, in the nineties, the Union is not a single power of decision, but an aggregation of different states with their own foreign policy and domestic agenda, Frank Schimmelfennig remarks that, "[s]ince its beginnings, European integration has been legitimated by the ideology of a pan-European community of liberal-democratic states".989 He adds that

the Central and Eastern European countries and their supporters in the Community did not possess sufficient material bargaining power to attain enlargement, they based their claims on the constitutive values and norms of the EU and exposed inconsistencies between, on the one hand, the EU's standard of legitimacy, its past rhetoric, and its past treatment of applicant states and, on the other hand, its policy toward Central and Eastern Europe.990

For him, the Union “could neither openly oppose nor threaten to veto enlargement without damaging their credibility as community members.”991 In addition, the European Union will have to deal with different factions. Schimmelfennig explains that the EU faces two issues through “[t]he decision to expand the EU to the East”992 and that it will bring various significant disagreements between member states. We see here the dependence of CEEC on the European Union decision to enlarge, but also the reciprocity with the dependence for the Union to enlarge to the Eastern European Countries. The Union cannot decide to close the enlargement due to different points of view, such as the necessity to maintain stability at the Union doors.

The first issue was whether (and when) the EU should commit itself to Eastern enlargement in general. Simply stated, one group of member governments (the ‘drivers’) advocated an early and firm commitment to Eastern enlargement, whereas other members governments (the ‘brakemen’) were reticent and tried to put off the decision (table 3).


990 Ibid.

991 Ibid.

992 Ibid. p. 49.
Table 3: Member state preferences on enlargement.\textsuperscript{993}

The second important issue “concerned the selection of Central and Eastern European countries for accession negotiations.”\textsuperscript{994} In general, “[t]he distribution of enlargement preferences largely mirrors the geographical position of the member states.”\textsuperscript{995} As he explains, “[t]he countries of the ‘central region’ of the EU preferred a limited (first round of) enlargement, whereas the northern countries, except Finland, and the southern countries favored a more inclusive approach.\textsuperscript{996}

“Finally, in light of this argument, member states should be most interested in the membership of those countries with which they share a border or are in close proximity”,\textsuperscript{997} Schimmelfennig affirms. For Andrew Moravcsik, “the imperatives induced by interdependence and, in particular, the [...] exogenous increase in opportunities for cross-border trade and capital movements”\textsuperscript{998} will determine national preferences of European Union States. Moreover, we can add

that France, Greece, and Italy, all southern states, gave their special support to Bulgaria and Romania, southeastern candidates; whereas Denmark and Sweden, northern states, most strongly advocated the cause of the Baltic States, the northernmost of the Central and Eastern European applicants.\textsuperscript{999}

\textsuperscript{993} Ibid. p. 50.
\textsuperscript{994} Ibid. p. 49.
\textsuperscript{995} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{996} Ibid. p. 50.
\textsuperscript{997} Ibid. p. 51.
The enlargement preferences have been affected by a final factor among the member states, pertaining to the ‘geopolitical interests’, according to Moravcsik’s categorization.\textsuperscript{1000} We can draw conclusions regarding the choice for European enlargement by citing Schimmelfennig:

In sum, no single factor explains the member states’ enlargement preferences. The economic conditions emphasized by liberal intergovernmentalism go a long way in giving a plausible account of state preferences, but in some important cases (Italy, Britain, and probably France), geopolitical or ideological interests seem to have been decisive.\textsuperscript{1001}

We can also add that historical and cultural factors will favor the member states’ enlargement preferences, such as Austria with Hungary and the Czech Republic, France with Romania, and Italy with Slovenia.

\textbf{IV.3.1.3 Obligation to Meet the EU Accession Criteria}

\textbf{IV.3.1.3.1 Conditions for Enlargement}

The enlargement can be viewed as a long and complex project, whose foundation started even before the fall of the ‘Berlin Wall’, through the different dialogues between the European Communities and the CMEA. The Treaty of Rome, signed on March 25, 1957, by the heads of government of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, West Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, entered into force on January 1, 1958, after being ratified by the six Member States. The treaty stipulates, in the article 237\textsuperscript{1002}, the basic conditions for enlargement. These conditions have been taken back in the article O of the Treaty


on the European Union,\textsuperscript{1003} signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992. The new treaty stipulates that

[any European State may apply to become a Member [of the Community in 1957] of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members.

The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.\textsuperscript{1004}

In fact, put more simply, the website of the European Commission Enlargement stipulates that

[any European country which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may apply to become a member of the Union. The Treaty on European Union sets out the conditions (article 6, article 49) [in the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union].\textsuperscript{1005, 1006}

In brief, the European Union Enlargement states that any European country could apply to become a member of the Union if the country respects a minimum of principles set up by the Union. A quick, yet inexhaustive list of some of these principles include liberty, democracy, respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law...

If the country respects the here before elements, in order to apply, the candidate country could submit firstly an application to the Council of Europe, which can trigger or not the accession process of integration after the evaluation by the European Commission. To start


\textsuperscript{1004} Ibid.


negotiations, the applicant country should respect the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, set in 1993 by the European Council in Copenhagen. These require the country’s achievement of criteria such as stability of the institutions ensuring the necessary criteria of the Union, as well as the ability to cope with competitive pressure and the market forces with and inside the Union. Membership implies obligations to be able to fulfill in particular the adherence to the aims of political, economical and monetary union.\textsuperscript{1007} Later on, in 1995, the Council made clear that the candidate country must be able to enforce the rules and procedures concerning the Union.

Most of these elements have been clarified over the last decade through the legislation of the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament, as well as by the case law of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. However, there are sometimes slightly conflicting interpretations in current member states.

At the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the European Council declared that “the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the Union”\textsuperscript{1008} and in December 1997, the Luxembourg European Council “has taken the decisions necessary to launch the overall enlargement process”\textsuperscript{1009} for all the CEECs and underlined that “[t]his enlargement [fifth] is a comprehensive, inclusive and an ongoing process, which will take place in stages; each of the applicant State will proceed at its own rate, depending on its degree of preparedness”.\textsuperscript{1010} They stipulate that the European Union will have to be prepared for enlargement with strengthened institutions. For this enlargement process, in 1997, in Luxembourg, the European Council decided to create a multilateral

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\textsuperscript{1010} Ibid.
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forum, the European Conference, that “will bring together the Member States of the European Union and the European States aspiring to accede to it and sharing its values and internal and external objectives”\textsuperscript{1011}. To take part, the candidate country, as decided by the Council,

must share a common commitment to peace, security and good neighborliness, respect for other countries’ sovereignty, the principles upon which the European Union is founded, the integrity and inviolability of external borders and the principles of international law and a commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague.\textsuperscript{1012}

At a first meeting in London, in March 1998, it was necessary to put in place a process of accession and negotiation with equal treatment and no differentiation for each state.

The integration of the Eastern European Countries from the Ex-Communist bloc will take a long way – 15 years (1989-2004) at least for the first countries – because this process had never been done before and the tools and methods had not been there and will be built systematically in terms of law, working processes and building the institutions themselves. But also because each country, in its willingness to become a member, has to make its own ‘homework’ by the implementation of the necessary requirements for adhesion and to fulfill the membership criteria, laid down in Copenhagen. The question is: how can the candidate’s country implement thousands of rules, laws and regulations in one night? Considering the amount of job to be done, it will take time not only to implement them in the national sphere, but also to make it yours.

The process for all CEECs will be the same, more or less rapid, according to the country involvement and the possibility to achieve each step in time. As the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, said in Brussels in 1998, at the opening of the accession negotiations, after underlining the historical moment of the next European enlargement:

[d]uring the entry process also further the slogan is valid: ‘Differentiating, without to discriminate against’. The concrete negotiations

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1011} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1012} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
are individually begun, led and locked. Who is better prepared, advances faster. The overhauling trace is open for everyone!  

All the CEECs will have to meet the Copenhagen criteria, here before mentioned, and the 31 chapters in order to access the European Union membership. The chapters must be translated into the national language and adapted to the local laws and regulations. On the other hand, the national law has to be changed to allow the application of the chapters in the country. However “[t]hat is not a change if, among the countries in communist transition phase, those which were invited to begin the accession negotiations are geographically closest to the Union. It suits to specify that among these countries, the performance is not similar”.  

The accession process will be officially launched on March 30, 1998 for the CEECs, with Cyprus and Malta. The process of accession and negotiation will be done through a framework with the same criteria for each applicant state to implement and enforce the acquis. The negotiation process will allow, as an agreement between the EU and the candidate country, to take into consideration the particular needs for each country and, with bilateral inter-governmental conferences between candidates and the EU, to discuss the implementation of the Chapter and “bring together in one framework all the various forms of EU financial and other support”. The accession process will be supported by different programs and aids to ensure the help from the European Union to the state candidate, and from time to time, there will be some special EU financial assistance to help several countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) for projects in a specific Chapter. A Chapter will be ‘provisionally closed’ when no further negotiation is needed and the candidate country accepts the EU common position. Nevertheless, the

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process can be re-opened until the new acquis will be adopted for the Chapter concerned or if the country fails to implement the commitments taken.

**IV.3.1.3.2 Enlargement Process**

The enlargement principles will be dual. First, the differentiation will distinguish between countries based on how well they met political and economic conditions to reform themselves. Secondly, the conditionality of the process, which benefits from trade aid, and eventually membership, is only limited, usually based on the country reform process.

The enlargement process has three distinctive phases:

- the pre-accession strategy
- the negotiations
- the ratification

*Pre – Accession strategy*

In June 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, the Council declares that “the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union.”1016 The Council set a number of political and economical criteria to achieve the process in order to successfully complete the applications membership. These criteria are known under the Copenhagen criteria and include the following points:

the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.1017

The European Union enters into negotiations with twelve countries: Bulgaria (14 December 1995), Cyprus (3 July 1990), the Czech Republic (17 January 1996), Estonia (24 November 1995),

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1017 Ibid.
Hungary (31 March 1994), Latvia (13 October 1995), Lithuania (8 December 1995), Malta (16 July 1990), Poland (5 April 1994), Romania (22 June 1995), Slovakia (27 June 1995), Slovenia (10 June 1996). The enlargement is also open to Croatia (3 October 2005), the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (8 November 2006) and Turkey (14 April 1987). In December 1997, at the Luxembourg European Council, the Council decides, “to launch the overall enlargement process”.1018

In 2002, at the Copenhagen European Council,1019 the Council concluded the negotiation accessions with ten applicants of the candidate countries. The Treaty of Accession with the 10 applicant countries - Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia - was signed on April 16, 2003 in Athens, for an accession planned on May 1, 2004. The Treaty of Accession was signed with Bulgaria and Romania, on April 25, 2005 in Luxembourg for the accession planned for January 1, 2007. In the case of Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia no accession date had been agreed upon and the Council progressed in relation to the membership criteria.

**Negotiations**

On March 31, 1998, the accession negotiation started with six candidate countries – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. On October 13, 1999, the Helsinki European Council1020 recommends the Union to open negotiations with the other CEECs – Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia - based on the Copenhagen political criteria. At the Brussels European

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Council,\textsuperscript{1021} on October 25, 2002 the Commission recommends to close negotiations with the ten candidate countries, leaving negotiations to be concluded with Bulgaria and Romania, and to be opened with Turkey at a larger stage. On December 17, 2004, the Brussels European Council\textsuperscript{1022} announces the closing of negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania for signing the Treaty in 2005.

The negotiations took the form of a series of bilateral intergovernmental conferences between the EU member states and each candidate country. These bilateral negotiations were held at the level of Ministers or Deputies, i.e. Permanent Representatives for the member states, and Ambassadors or Chief Negotiators for the applicants. The negotiations were divided into 31 Chapters making the acquis communautaires and covered areas such as fishery, statistics, small and medium-sized enterprises, science and research, education, external relations, common foreign and security policy, consumers and health protection...

The Commission proposed a common negotiating position on behalf of the EU for each of the 31 Chapters of the acquis. The Council and the European Parliament were kept informed of the developments and then approved these positions unanimously. Each applicant country in turn produced a common negotiating position for each of the Chapters. A Chapter of the acquis was considered closed with a candidate country when the EU noted that the Chapter did not require further negotiation and the candidate concerned accepted the EU common position. The results of the negotiations are then incorporated into the Accession Treaty, which is submitted to the Council for approval and to the European Parliament for assent. Following the signing of the Accession Treaty, the treaty must then pass to the candidate countries for ratification in accordance with their own constitutional procedures.


Ratification

The ratification is an obligation for the future member of the European Union. The Europe Agreements require ratification by all the European Union member states, by the applicant’s country parliament and by the European Parliament in order to be valid. If the ratification process is not complete, the full agreements could not come into force. In addition, the country has to ratify the Europe Agreement in order to obtain the necessary modification of the State Constitution.

Following the signing of the Treaty of Accession in Athens on April 17, 2003, the enlargement process is complete with the ratification on accession to the EU in each of the new member states. Popular referenda were held in nine out of the 10 new member states, with Cyprus ratifying the treaty according to its own domestic procedures on July 14, 2003. The referendum was held between March and September 2003, with Latvia being the last of the new member states to vote successfully on EU membership.

IV.3.1.3.3 Accession Timetable

“Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE)” program started in 1989 for Poland and Hungary. The processes of adhesion started in December 1991 with the signing of an association agreement in Brussels with the Visegrad countries – Czechoslovakia (which will be split in 1993 in two different countries – the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary, and Poland – and later on other countries, including Romania.

In 1995, at the Madrid Council, the “European Council stressed that the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean without jeopardizing the acquis communautaires was both a political necessity and a historic opportunity for Europe, and it adopted a timetable and a preparation strategy"\textsuperscript{1023}, stipulating that “[u]nder the common foreign and security policy, the Stability Pact for Europe was adopted in April; this was the concrete outcome of the

European Union's first joint action and an unprecedented example of preventive diplomacy in Central Europe”.  

In 1996, the Commission promoted its support for regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe “defining the framework for its cooperation with the Central European initiative”. We want to underline these following remarks:

[t]here were significant developments with a view to the enlargement of the European Union to include the associated countries of Central Europe and Cyprus (Malta having suspended its application for membership). [...] The Commission stepped up application of the pre-accession strategy defined by the Essen and Madrid European Councils, and its efforts were welcomed by the Dublin European Council, which also confirmed the timetable whereby negotiations will open six months after conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference and be based on the results of the IGC [Intergovernmental Conference].

For the Commission, the year 1997 will witness the unification: “The way towards unification of the continent is now open: unification under the sign of democracy, liberty and prosperity” (as written in the preamble of the report), but also the role of the Union in the world.

As underlines the Commission:

[t]his was a pivotal year for relations between the European Union and the countries of central Europe applying for membership. In December, following the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference and on the basis of the Commission’s ‘Agenda 2000’ communication and its opinions on the accession applications of the 10 countries concerned, the Luxembourg European Council adopted the decisions required to set the enlargement process in motion. New guidelines for the PHARE program were also adopted by the Commission with the aim of reinforcing the pre-accession strategy. (As it was in original text)

\(1024\) Ibid.  
\(1026\) Ibid.  
The Commission will invite the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and evaluate their capacity to adopt and implement the EU legislation named acquis communautaires, and give recommendations concerning the opening of negotiations with each candidate country. The Luxembourg European Council (December 1997) will invite the Commission to issue each year\(^\text{1029}\) ‘Regular Reports’ on the accession process progress for each applicant country. The annual report will be used as a basis document for the Council in order to make its conclusions and to evaluate the countries’ readiness for membership. In addition, the Commission will write a strategy paper in order to re-evaluate the accession needs and to have candidate countries’ synthesis towards accession. The timetable for negotiations, elaborated for each country’s accession, is related to the 31 Chapters of the acquis communautaires, which must be implemented before the accession.

In 1998, the Commission makes the historical decision to switch to the euro and to adopt the “single currency on 1 January 1999”\(^\text{1030}\). In addition, the Commission’s agreement with “the legislative proposals for the Agenda 2000 and the launch of the process of enlarging the European Union were the highlights of 1998. The Union has assumed a new role on the international stage.”\(^\text{1031}\)

The Commission underlines that

\[\text{[f]}\]ollowing the decisions taken in December 1997 by the Luxembourg European Council, the process of enlarging the European Union was launched in March. The European Conference, bringing together the Member States of the Union and the European countries which are eligible to join and share its values and objectives, held its first meeting at Heads of State or Government level, while the process of accession to the European Union by the central European applicant countries and Cyprus was opened by a ministerial meeting, and accession partnerships with the countries of central Europe were established.\(^\text{1032}\) (As it was in original text)

The Reports on progress towards accession for each of the candidate countries concluded that, “whatever the place of the candidate countries in the accession process and in the negotiations,

\(^{1029}\) From 1998 to 2003, and until 2005 for Bulgaria and Romania.
\(^{1031}\) Ibid.
\(^{1032}\) Ibid.
the major lesson of the reports transmitted to the European Council is that the rhythm of preparation for accession must accelerate if deadlines are to be met”.1033 The Commission will start the negotiation process, on March 31, 1998 for the six countries of the ‘Luxembourg group’ (Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus).

In 1999, “[t]he enlargement process entered a new phase, with a single framework for 13 applicant countries”.1034 The European Union treated some political concerns, as

[t]he preparations for accession of the 10 candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey should be seen in the context of intensifying relations with other neighboring countries. The present enlargement process will have a profound impact on the EU relations with the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania as well as on the EU neighbors to the east, in Russia and Ukraine for example, and to the south.1035

The Union concludes that “[t]he enlarged Union will need deep relationships with its immediate neighbors”.1036

2000 is the year of “the 50th anniversary of the Schumann declaration, the founding text of the Community structure; this event was marked by a number of tangible signs of progress in the European integration process”1037, and the signing of the Nice Treaty, adapted for a European Union functioning with 27 states. This year the Commission introduced the Enlargement Strategic Paper in order to monitor the evolution of candidates and to adapt the tools to the


1036 Ibid.

enlargement needs. The European Council decided that the “[a]ceeding countries will be required to apply fully the acquis of the European Union in force by the date of accession, except in those areas where transitional arrangements will have been granted”.

The Council underlines that “[i]n some cases, such as recently for the chapter ‘environment’, positions taken by the candidates on new acquis can make it necessary to revisit a chapter”. As the Council stipulates,

[t]he Commission has been closely monitoring how candidate countries are meeting their commitments made in the accession negotiations. It is highly important that the commitments undertaken by the future Member States in the framework of the accession negotiations be implemented as foreseen. In order to assess precisely this situation, the Commission will continue to monitor this closely until the signature of the Treaty and report on this to the Council on the basis of current procedures.

The Commission decided some steps had to be taken, such as the monitoring and safeguards, and the necessity to follow up on the country’s evolution after enlargement. Six months before the accession, the Commission will ask for a ‘Comprehensive Monitoring Report’, and will put in action some specific Chapters safeguard clauses, because “in certain areas candidate countries need to continue efforts until they are in a position to apply fully the Community acquis”.

Also, after the enlargement, the country in question will have to continue the strengthening of its institutions, and “[t]his is why the Commission has proposed to make available for the first three years after enlargement a special transition facility for institution building”, for the EMU and Euro, for the Schengen acquis, and for the European Economic Area.

In 2001, the Commission witnesses “a turning point for the European Union”, because this year represents “the culmination of work that had been in progress for several years”.


1039 Ibid. p. 23.


1041 Ibid. p. 28.

1042 Ibid. p. 23.

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The year 2002 “marked a historic turning point in the EU enlargement process”\textsuperscript{1044} The Commission adopted, in October, “an 'enlargement package 2002' comprising a strategy paper and, for each candidate country, a regular report on progress towards accession.”\textsuperscript{1045} And

[in 12 and 13 December, the Copenhagen European Council, taking its cue from these recommendations, concluded accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The accession of these 10 countries should take place in 2004.\textsuperscript{1046} (As it is in the original text).

In addition, it was

approved the Commission’s communication on the 'road maps' for Bulgaria and Romania, including proposals for substantially increased pre-accession aid to those countries, and confirmed the goal of accepting them as fully-fledged EU members in 2007 subject to their progress on the accession criteria.\textsuperscript{1047} (As it is in the original text).

The year 2003, with the Treaty of Athens, “marked a major milestone, the build-up to enlargement was also making itself felt in 2003 in a number of areas.”\textsuperscript{1048} This year marked “the culmination in legal terms of the successful accession negotiations (concluded in Copenhagen in December 2002) with the 10 countries due to join the Union on 1 May 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).\textsuperscript{1049} The commission stipulates that the political terms are also very important, “as shown by the very prompt endorsement of the principle of accession by the future Member States, nearly all of which have formalized their commitment through referendums, giving the seal of popular approval to their accession.”\textsuperscript{1050}

The Commission Report concludes on the European Union process that

\textsuperscript{1045} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1046} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1047} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1049} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1050} Ibid.
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[p]reparations within the Union for the arrival of the new Member States intensified as the year progressed, with changes both to the way in which the institutions’ departments operate and to their program of language training. Enlargement was also one of the reasons why the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concluded an inter-institutional agreement aimed at promoting the objective of 'better lawmaking'. The 'enlargement' dimension was also increasingly visible in the formulation of many Community instruments: this was true in terms of both content, as in the case of the adjustment of the financial perspective and reform of the common agricultural policy, and modus operandi, with representatives of the future Member States being involved in the proceedings of the committees and other bodies participating in the consultation process; in operational terms too, more Community programs have been extended to include the new Member States, particularly as implementation of the sixth research framework program gets under way.1051 (As in the original text).

In 2004,

[w]ith the accession of 10 new Member States on 1 May and the signing of a new Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe six months later, the year 2004 proved that, for all the difficulties, it is possible to enlarge and consolidate the European Union at the same time.1052

This year has major developments: “the arrival of 10 new Member States and the signing of the Treaty on the Constitution”1053 and the creation of a European Foreign Minister position. “Javier Solana was reappointed to his dual function of Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy”.1054 The report underlines that “[w]ith its newly expanded external frontiers, the European Union sought to give greater substance to the neighborhood policy it has been gradually developing over the past two years.”1055

2005, an important year, witnesses the European Union Council’s operations with 25 members. The European Parliament and the European Commission president will also hold office for five years for the first time. “The halting of the process of ratifying the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe following the ‘no’ votes in the referendums in France and the Netherlands was a defining

1051 Ibid.
1053 Ibid.
1054 Ibid.
1055 Ibid.
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moment”.\textsuperscript{1056} This situation did not block the European Union functioning. This year marks “the relaunch of the Lisbon strategy in its three dimensions — economic, social and environmental — [...]”.\textsuperscript{1057} There was also a series of initiatives in the Union, such as the one for a ‘better lawmaking’ program in the Union and a foreign policy initiative “to give effect to the highly ambitious Hague program”.\textsuperscript{1058} The Hague program was adopted by the EC, and sets out ten priorities, in the area of freedom, security and justice, for the next five years up to 2010, “with detailed proposals for EU action on terrorism, migration management, visa policies, asylum, privacy and security, the fight against organized crime and criminal justice.”\textsuperscript{1059} This program turns this plan into concrete actions, including a timetable for their adoption and implementation. At the same time, the EU wants to strengthen “partnerships with [...] strategic allies such as the United States and pursuing an open dialogue with major new partners such as China and India”.\textsuperscript{1060} This is the year of the Romanian and Bulgarian accession treaty signing for accession into the Union on January 1, 2007, if the safeguard clause is not applied.

The year 2006 was mainly “shaped by the major initiative, [...] the review and revision of the Lisbon agenda”\textsuperscript{1061} and the fact that the project for a treaty for the European Constitution is going slowly. The European Union’s strategy for growth is still on, as is the security strategy program. The EU agreed, “that the European Union needed to take steps to reinforce its external action and the link between internal and external policies”\textsuperscript{1062} to be viewed as a global partner.


\textsuperscript{1057} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1058} Ibid. p. 11.


\textsuperscript{1062} Ibid. p. 145.

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Thus, the EU decides on a new foreign policy strategy, especially for its relations with China. 

The year 2007 marks “the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome founding the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community”.\textsuperscript{1063} Also in 2007, January 1 marks the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union. An important event is the signing of “the new ‘amending’ Treaty”\textsuperscript{1064} that needs to be completely ratified before the following June 2009 Parliamentary elections. Also, the Union has to face internal and external challenges, such as those regarding the development of an European energy policy, while for external challenges it “recommend[s] enhancing regional cooperation as part of a ‘Black Sea synergy’”\textsuperscript{1065} wanting “to play a key role in facing up to the problems of climate change”.\textsuperscript{1066} On the foreign policy side, the Union wants to play as the role of a global partner in the global economy, contributing to the international solidarity and security in the world through multilateral cooperation. Hence, “[a] strategic partnership with Africa was also relaunched at the EU--Africa summit held in Lisbon in December”.\textsuperscript{1067}

**IV.3.2 From Cooperation with the EEC to the Accession in the EU**

**IV.3.2.1 Economic and Commercial Cooperation from 1967 to 1995**

Romania was the first Eastern country to have cooperation relations with the European Economical Community (EEC), started under the Ceausescu regime. The first official relation started in 1967, by initiating a series of trade negotiations with the ECC. In 1974, the Romanian Socialist Republic had a preferential trading


\textsuperscript{1064} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1065} Ibid. p. 12.

\textsuperscript{1066} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1067} Ibid. p. 16.
}

[...] the signing of two agreements between Romania and the EEC, in the Romanian capital on July 28th, was nonetheless an important event. [...] the difference is that it is the first time that a member state of Comecon, the Soviet-dominated organization for economic co-operation among communist states, has concluded a general trade agreement with the EEC. [...] Nobody now expects such a treaty to emerge in the foreseeable future.\footnote{Bear-baiting in Bucharest. The Economist, 2 Aug. 1980.}

However, the agreement was suspended for political reasons in April 1989, i.e. mainly the failure to comply with human rights and the stubbornness of the Romanian government to maintain a pure Stalinist regime instead of implementing a way of liberalism as the other Warsaw pact members. There was an important political step when Romania created with the European Economical Community (EEC) a Joint Committee and “acknowledged ‘de jure’ the European Economic Community as a subject of international law”.\footnote{Pascariu, Gabriela Carmen. A Study on Romania’s situation in the process of accession to the European Union [online]. Paper presented at the IP "European Intergation" on 3-14 September 2001. Universidade de Coimbra, Faculdade de Economia: Centur de Studii Europene. [cited 23 May 2008]. Portable Document Format. Available from: <www.cse.uaic.ro/_Fisiere/Documentare/Studii%20si%20ceretari/A%20study%20on%20Romania’s%20 situation.pdf>.
}

\subsection*{IV.3.2.1.1 New Starting Point}

Just after the Revolution, on January 14, 1990, Romania received the visits of the European Commission’s Vice-president, Frans Andriessen, who expressed the European Community support for the democratic processes in Romania. At the same time, Romanian authorities sent a letter to Catherine Lalumière, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, and to the president of the Committee of Ministers of the European Council, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, to acknowledge the willingness to be admitted in the
European Council. In 1990, in March, a mixed Romanian - EEC Commission meeting takes place in Brussels about diplomatic relations and economic, financial and technical help from European commission members to the country. April 1990 marked the start of the activity of the first Romanian Ambassador to the European Community. In June, Romania ratified the foundation of the agreement establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in its capacity as founding member of the above-mentioned institution. In June 1990, a permanent delegation of the European Commission opens in Bucharest. In September of the same year, the PHARE program was extended to other CEECs, including Romania.

In February 1991, the European Economic Community (EEC) signed a Trade and Co-operation Agreement with Romania, after other CEECs, to increase within five years the limits imposed in trade relations and to extend cooperation in the fields of energy, banking sector, tourism and education. Later on in February 1993, Romania’s officials signed the European Association Agreement, known as the European Agreement, establishing an association between the EEC and the country. This agreement will come into force only in February 1995. The same agreement was also signed with other CEECs. The President of the European Community Council, Niels Petersen, says on this occasion that:

[t]he signing of the agreement is a testimony to our confidence in the continuation and completion of Romania’s economic and political reforms process that is has so courageously committed to and which, from the very beginning, received the Community’s full support. Through this action, Romania will resume its place in the new architecture taking shape in Europe following the Community’s initiative [...] The agreement is a message of

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1072 Ibid. p. 40.
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confidence in your country’s future and in our common future, a message that I would like to send to the Romanian people.\textsuperscript{1075}

The Romanian Prime minister added on his part that

\[\text{[t]he agreement is, first of all, a political action marking a new beginning in Romanian-Community relations. It is the result of Romania’s progress towards democratization, the establishment of the rule of law and the transition towards the market economy, without which the signing of the agreement would not have been possible.}\textsuperscript{1076}\]

During the same year, in April 1993, the chief-negotiator of the European Community, Daniel Guggenbuhl, declares during his visit that “through the association agreement to the European Communities, Romania is part of the European family”.\textsuperscript{1077} Also in October, the Commission of the European Parliament ratified the Association Agreement between Romania and the EEC. They “consider the association agreement with Romania as an essential element of stability and security in the Balkans”\textsuperscript{1078} and an important element of strategy for the countries’ stabilization in the context of the Yugoslavian war at the border of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. The country completed here the first step of the foreign policy goal after the Revolution, the recognition of the country as a member of the European family and started serious discussions about the accession process, independently from the difficulties due to the beginning of the democracy implementation.

\textbf{IV.3.2.1.2 Difficulties Due to the Country’s Behavior}

The advanced relations with the EEC during the communist period turn out to be a handicap at the beginning of the nineties, due to the Romanian government’s behavior and the miners’ riots incidents in 1990 and 1991. The EEC was divided on the aid to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1075} Cercelescu, Gheorghe. România în noua architectură a Europei (Romania in the new European framework). Adevărul, 2 februarie 1993, no. 865. Translated by Alina Coman.
  \item \textsuperscript{1076} Ibid. Translated by Alina Coman.
  \item \textsuperscript{1077} Ciocărlie, Alin Theodor. România văzută de peste Atlantic (Romania vue from the other part of the Atlantic). Ibid., 3-4 Aprilie 1993, no. 917. Translated by Alina Coman.
  \item \textsuperscript{1078} Andon, Alexandra. România - element esențial al stabiliteții în Balcani (Romania - essential element of the Balkan stability). Ibid., 27 octombrie 1993, no. 1092. Translated by Alina Coman.
\end{itemize}
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Bucharest\textsuperscript{1079} or its suspension. On June 16, 1990, the EEC suspends its economic cooperation.\textsuperscript{1080}

[...] Romania still does not take advantage of the Western assistance coordinated for the realization of the reforms in Eastern Europe. [...] The EEC officially agreed Monday [17 September 1990] to extend this program to GDR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, after Poland and Hungary.\textsuperscript{1081}

Romania was the only state, in 1991, together with Albania, not to have made an agreement (Economic and Commercial Co-operation Agreement) at this time with the EEC, because of the incidents on the domestic scene that damaged Romania’s image toward democracy. In the meantime, Romania takes part in all European initiatives, along with other CEECs. Romania also organized in Snagov the first meeting of the Ministers of Reform from CEECs including the Soviet Union, with representatives of the European Community and foreign diplomats.

The European Community supervises the Eastern European Countries, and in particular Romania. In January 1991, a delegation of the Romanian Parliament presented a report on the miners’ riot events (1990) to the president of the Parliamentary Assembly and to the General Secretary of the European Council. In January of the same year, Romania got the observatory status to the European Council, together with some other CEECs. In the same month, Romania got the final decision to benefit from the aid of the European Community, for economic assistances and facilities. Romania obtained the status of ‘Special guest’ in February 1991 for the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council. In December 1991, Romania’s officials proposed the beginning of negotiations to become a full-right member of the EEC, together with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but the proposal was turned down. Romania was only authorized to start preliminary negotiations.

The Romanian first steps within the European Community are damaged by Romania’s bad image, here before explained in the ‘Change into Continuity’ part. Romania will be monitored and it will take huge efforts to be admitted at the same level as the Visegrád states. Moreover, Romania had serious problems with the European

\textsuperscript{1080} ___ La CEE suspend sa coopération économique (ECE suspends its economic cooperation). Le Monde, 16 Jun. 1990.
\textsuperscript{1081} A.F.P. La CEE va signer un accord de coopération économique avec Bucarest (The EEC will sign an economic cooperation agreement with Bucharest). Ibid., 19 Sep. 1990. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Union agenda, as did Bulgaria. The two most Eastern states did not have borders with the Western part of the European Union, and by the geographical situation, it was classified more as Balkan countries rather than East European countries. This situation delays the negotiations with the EU. For example, at its beginning, the PHARE program did not plan full funds for Romania and Bulgaria.

As Lucian Boia, Romanian historian wrote: "[t]he first difficulty with Romania is deciding where it belongs on the map of Europe. In which zone are we to place it: Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Central Europe?"\textsuperscript{1082} Romania is made up of three different parts belonging to different sensitivities and "Romania is, at one and the same time, Balkan, Eastern European and Central European, without belonging wholly to any of these divisions".\textsuperscript{1083} Nevertheless, as "the result of a long history and many human and cultural contacts, Romania is in many ways a Balkan country".\textsuperscript{1084} This classification – Balkan - was underlined by the refusal of the Visegrád group to include Romania as a member upon the submitted request by Romania to take part along with Central European states. This refusal was also due to the Romanian-Hungarian minorities problems; this ‘incident’ pushed Romania eastward.

During the Annual Session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Executive Secretary of the Commission, Gerald Hinteregger, evaluated that Romania was late in the development of economic reforms. Romania must contribute to creating all conditions to stabilize its macro-economy, to fight inflation, to reduce the budget deficit and to open and increase relations with international trade.\textsuperscript{1085} Romania will have to report along with the other countries of CEE for the accession process. However, due to the first problematic years (1990 and 1991) and the undemocratic election process in 1992\textsuperscript{1086}, Romania will be more under the control of the European institution and will have to make more efforts than the other countries. In order to complete the process accession, Romania had to reshape the country’s image in three ways:

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{1082} Boia, Lucian. \textit{Romania - Borderland of Europe}. London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2001b. p. 11.
  \item\textsuperscript{1083} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{1084} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{1086} To see as undemocratic by the leaders of Western democratic states.
\end{itemize}
first, Romania will have to demonstrate that it is a true democratic country;
second, to prove the capability to make reforms towards a free-market economy;
third, to be perceived as a European Country or as a Central and Eastern European Country and be dissociated from the Balkan countries, which will handicap the Romanian accession.

IV.3.2.1.3 The First Efforts

Romania immediately set the objective to draw nearer the European Community and built aggressive diplomatic actions. The Romanian authorities wrote a letter to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe requesting collaboration, while in 1992 they did the same with the Western European Union organization, by sending a letter to the General Secretary of this organization. This organization made a documentation visit in November 1991, in Bucharest, and was received by president Ion Iliescu, the Prime minister and the Foreign minister and parliamentarians. However, in general, Romania was criticized on its political and economic behavior. In May 1992, at a Strasbourg session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council, the institution underlined that Romania cannot be a full-right member; while Catherine Lalumière specified that the Communist heritage was still present in the country.

The Romanian government under Theodor Stolojan (16 October 1991 – 19 November 1992) decided to create a special interministerial committee in order to interface with the European Community and the European States for the negotiation of the association agreement and to make efforts towards building the relations between Romanian and the European Community. The Committee, created in 1992 by a special decision, will be under the supervision of the Minister of Trade and Tourism, Constantin Fota, and will have representatives of all eleven government ministries – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Defense... - and representatives of agencies such as the Romanian Agency for
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Development and the National Romanian Agency for Privatization. The committee will function until 1995, the year of the official application for European Union accession.

In 1994, the result of the conference ‘The European Union after Maastricht and the perspective of reports development with the Associated countries’ at the Euro-Atlantic Center in Bucharest states that the Association agreement is “an intermediary stage towards accession”. The Minister of international trade and European Affairs from Belgium, Robert Urbain, states that “the privatization, liberalization of foreign and monetary exchanges must take place at a constant pace. Both Parliament, and the public opinion, must be convinced that these are necessary, though temporarily painful” because “nobody makes investments in a country with such inflations”.

At the same time, on 9 May 1994, in Luxembourg, the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union (WEU) adopts the Kirchberg Declaration emphasizing the establishment of an association status with WEU for the CEECs, including Romania. In addition, on May 17, the President of the European Parliament, Egon Klepsch, stated that

[t]he European Community is highly interested in the relations with Romania. Your country is important in the region, having a special role for the stability in the area. At the moment, Romania is, nevertheless, in an exposed position, because of the war with former Yugoslavia.


1089 Terence, Critiana. Ministrul Belgin Al comerţului şi afacerilor europene, în România (Belgium Minister of Commerce and Trade in Romania). România liberă, 18 februarie 1994, no. 1183. Translated by Alina Coman.


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During this period, Romania received support from European Union countries for the accession in the Union. In relation with particular old foreign political links, Germany shows a strong interest for the rapid accession of Romania in the Union, as well as France, which declared that Romania was a privileged partner and militating for a non-discriminating treatment for all CEECs including Romania. However, David Phinnemore argues, in 2003, in his paper presented at the conference 'Romania and the European Union: The Challenge of Domestic Reform', that for Romania’s accession, after the Moscow coup of August 1991, the Community was more accommodating toward CEECs. The immediate consequence was the signing of the European Agreement with Romania, in 1993, and Romania “became involved in the various mechanisms of the so-called ‘structured relationship’ involving the CEECs in political dialogue with the EU, despite the protests from the Visegrad-4.”

We see two points here: the first is that the Romanian domestic scene have an influence on the foreign policy toward the EU. Second, that the international events in the Eastern zone (CIS and Balkan) drive the EU decision toward the enlargement process. We can say that there is a dependence relation between the Romanian domestic policy and the EU accession process through the foreign policy action, as well as between the international events and the EU ‘foreign policy’ toward the CEECs.

**IV.3.2.2 Association Period: From 1995 to 2000**

**IV.3.2.2.1 The European Agreement**

In February 1995, the ‘European Agreement’ came into force for Romania. The ‘European Agreement’ is the “legal framework of relations between the European Union and the Central and Eastern European countries”. “These agreements were adapted to the

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specific situation of each partner state while setting common political, economic and commercial objectives. In the context of accession to the European Union, they formed the framework for implementation of the accession process".\textsuperscript{1094} The European Agreement is considered as the first step of the pre-accession stage, a fundamental legal instrument of the pre-accession strategy, providing “a framework for Romania's gradual integration into the Community”.\textsuperscript{1095} The agreement in force for a 10-year period committed the parties to gradually eliminate the customs duties and administrative obstacles and to bring the gradual alignment of the legislative framework with the community regulation. This agreement also entails the commitment to carry out the free circulation of goods, people, services and capital.

At the same time, the European Agreement planned the development of institutional structures as a key role in the development of the partnership.\textsuperscript{1096} It will be settled:

- at political level, with the Joint Parliamentary Association Committee,
- at ministerial level, with the Association Council,
- at technical level, with the Association Committee.

Nevertheless, “the new institutionalized framework”\textsuperscript{1097} brought by the European Agreement created the conditions for:

- the participation of Romania in the political dialogue between the European Union and the associated countries,
- the development of trade relations, by facilitating the access of Romanian products on the EU internal market,
The inclusion of Romania in the development projects of the trans-European infrastructure, transport, communication, power...

the participation of Romania in community programs in the fields of culture, research, education, environment... ¹⁰⁹⁸

IV.3.2.2.2 Romania’s Accession Requirements

On June 22, 1995, in Snagov, the Romanian state commission elaborated the ‘National Strategy of Preparation for Romania’s accession to the European Union’. There, the President, political leaders, the presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, and the Prime Minister signed the political declaration for the country’s accession to the EU. Afterwards, the Romanian Prime Minister, Nicolae Vacaroiu (19 November 1992 - 11 December 1996), sent, on 22 June 1995, a request to the President-in-Office of the Council of the European Union (EU) in which he officially submitted Romania’s application for accession to the EU.¹⁰⁹⁹ The candidature was accompanied by the document on ‘the National Strategy Preparing Romania’s Accession to the European Union’.

The Council of the European Union would evaluate Romania’s official application for accession to the EU in order to decide if Romania meets the conditions to begin the accession as defined in Copenhagen in 1993. The political conditions stipulated that the country could guarantee the stability of democratic institutions, the rule of law, the human rights and the respect for and protection of minorities. The economic criteria must be aligned with a functioning market economy able to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union. In addition, last but not least, the candidate country has to be capable to fulfill the obligations of the Union as member.

The evaluation report – ‘Commission Opinion on Romania’s Application for Membership of the European Union’ - established in July 1997, was not favorable. The conclusion of the commission was without concession and stated that

¹⁰⁹⁸ Ibid. Paper presented at.
[t]he European Commission emphasizes the progress made by the country in order to comply with the political and economic criteria. However, it considers that Romania is experiencing serious problems in transposing the Community acquis into national law and reaches the conclusion that the accession negotiations will be opened as soon as the country has made sufficient progress to meet the accession terms set by the Copenhagen European Council.\footnote{European Commission. Commission Opinion on Romania's application for membership of the European Union: Introduction and Conclusion (15 July 1997) [online]. Brussels: European Communities. 15th July 1997, 1997b. [cited 26 March 2008]. Hypertext Markup Language. Available from: <http://www.ena.lu/commission-opinion-romania-application-membership-european-union-introduction-conclusion-july-1997-030008028.html>. Text no8028.}

Therefore, after the Commission Opinion Report, Romania could not be in the group of countries able to start negotiations. In addition, as the report says, Romania has to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria in the political and economic fields before starting negotiations. However, in addition, Romania will also have to fulfill the newly added criteria at the Madrid European Council (1995),\footnote{European Parliament. Madrid European Council - Presidency Conclusions - 15 and 16 December 1995 [online]. (European Council). Brussels: Council of the European Union, 1995. [cited 27 May 2008]. Hypertext Markup Language. Available from: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad1_en.htm>.} on the obligation to strengthen its administrative capacity to implement and enforce the acquis by national measures contributing to the same objective of the Union, with a process of legislative and administrative simplification – in brief, to have in place similar structures as the European ones.

The report underlined that Romania will “pursue the consolidation and development of the rule of law, political pluralism, the separation of powers, free elections, respect for human rights and the establishment of a market economy compatible with the principles governing the European Union”\footnote{European Commission. Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Romania’s Application for Membership of the European Union [online]. Brussels: European Communities. 15th July 1997, 1997a. [cited 26 March 2008]. Portable Document Format. Available from: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/romania/ro-op_en.pdf>. } To reinforce the above-mentioned point, Adrian Nastase writes in 1995, that “[t]he totality of the states which, after the Second World war, were subject to the influence of the USSR and which, after the Cold War, have escaped from the gravitational space of the Soviet ex-empire and regained
adhesion with the European traditional values,” 1103 want to be again in the club of the European nations.

The integration process for Romania will be blocked for a period, until the Copenhagen criteria will be achieved. Romania will be evaluated during a pre-accession strategy defined in 1994 during the Essen European Council. Romania will not be able to start negotiations along with the countries proposed for the beginning of negotiations. We can explain Romania’s difficult accession to the EU by the lack of radical domestic reforms implemented rapidly after 1990, and if some were successfully completed during Constantinescu’s presidency, it was not enough. “An explanation for the pattern of successes and failures is found in the way economics and politics interacted with the strategies of central reformers during the reform years.” 1104 As state Andrei Schleifer and Daniel Treisman for Russia, but it can also be applied to Romania, the “[s]tabilisation could have occurred more quickly” 1105 especially under Constantinescu’s presidency because if Romania’s political leaders “had sufficient determination to resist the pressures of self-interested lobbyists [...] the leadership did not establish control over a corrupt bureaucracy.” 1106 The question is “[w]hy do countries adopt particular reforms at particular times?” Schleifer and Treisman explain 1107 that it is the result of the implication of three different factors describe as the interests of actors, the nature of political institutions, and the policy of individual reformers. 1108

The interest, or better said the lack of interest, explains the postponement or delay of reforms due to the opposition of the more powerful coalition led by the former communist ‘номенклатура’, because “- like many other times of uncertainty and transition – was one in which major beneficiaries of inefficient policies were both receiving huge monetary benefits and heavily discounting the future.” 1109 In fact the reforms will be done only when “the distribution of interests or the distribution of power changes”. In addition,
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Institutions have an important impact on the success of reforms through the level at which they isolate policy makers from the population and group of interest. As it was during most of Constantinescu’s presidency, “if government and economic decision makers are convinced reformers while interest groups and the population oppose change, then insulation may help reform measures”. Nevertheless, independently from the other items, one of the most important is the individual as leader. “The success or failure of economic reform depends in part upon the particular policies chosen by the individual [leader] reformer.”

In 1997, at the Luxembourg European Council, in response to the ‘Agenda 2000’, the European Council decided on a new phase, with the launching of “the overall enlargement process” that benefited Romania, despite the Commission’s opinion on Romania’s fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. The issue for the Council was not to block the accession, but to delay it for a period in order to give time to the CEECs to be ready. In fact, the issue was for the Council “to avoid notions of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ and renewed differentiation in the EU relations with the applicant countries”.

IV.3.2.2.3 Government Initiative

In order to be in phase with the accession demand, Romania setup special plan for integration in European Union. Upon a special decision, in March 1995, the Romanian government, led by Nicolae Vacaroiu under the presidency of Ion Iliescu, created an Interministerial Committee for the European Integration. The Prime Minister with the participation of from the Senate, the Chamber

\[\text{\begin{footnotesize}
1110 Ibid. p. 16.
\end{footnotesize}]

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of Deputies, the Presidency, and the Commission representatives led this committee to elaborate the National preparation Strategy for Romania’s accession to the European Union. Other state institutions were also represented, such as the Romanian Academy, employers’ unions and trade unions, as well as chambers of commerce and industry... A Department for European Integration was set up, under the direct subordination of the Prime Minister, whose main objective was to draft and coordinate the integration policy and sectorial sections for European Integration within ministries and specialized institutions such as the central administration and prefect’s offices, in order to coordinate, supervise, and control. But, it is only under the Victor Ciorbea government (December 1996 – 30 March 1998) and Gavril Dejeu government (March – 17 April 1998), led by the new president Emil Constantinescu, that the position is represented by a Minister Delegate for the European Integration, i.e. Alexandru Herla (12 December 1996 to 17 April 1998). In the next government, led by Radu Vasile (17 April 1998 – 13 December 1999) and subsequently by Alexandru Athanasiu (13 December to 22 December 1999), the special position of Minister for European Integration disappears and will only reappear in the first Adrian Nastase government, after the elections in 2000. In addition, other mechanisms were set up, in 1995 at the parliamentary level, for the implementation of the ‘Association Agreement’ and the ‘National Preparation Strategy for Romania’s Accession to the European Union’, such as a Joint Commission of the two Chambers of the Parliament, a Legislative Council to monitor the implementation of the acquis communautaires, and a bilateral mechanism at various levels that we mentioned before. In addition, the government encouraged, supported nongovernmental institutions, and initiated forums and discussions on paper, but the implementation will be difficult in reality.

In brief, the Romanian government instituted some initiatives and structures to prepare the success of Romania’s accession to the EU on paper. In fact, the reality was different, with numerous application and coordination problems. The Romanian initiatives and structures were not so efficient.

During this time and aware of the country’s image, the Romanian diplomacy was very active to promote the country’s

accession to the European Union as well to NATO, through numerous and various actions. Indeed, Romania has to respect the Union rules and, as stipulated at the Luxembourg European Council, members “must share a common commitment to peace, security and good neighborliness, respect for other countries’ sovereignty, the principles upon which the European Union.”

To comfort the accession process and because it was a condition of the European Union as well NATO, Romania spent time and energy to solve conflicts and secure borders with its neighbors. Romania will try to solve the neighboring conflicts in a peaceful way by negotiations and treaties. It will take time, but the result will be aligned to the European Union rules. We point out here the influence of the European Union process toward the resolution conflict with neighbors. Romania has a conflictual situation with a central European state - Hungary - due to a particular territorial and historical situation, as well as with the Eastern Countries - Moldova and Ukraine. In 1996, Romania made a big step by signing a treaty with the Republic of Hungary. This treaty is based on the model of the French-German reconciliation, and was treated in an international meeting held in Bucharest on March 15-16. This meeting was associated with the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation.

The Romanian Presidents will use the traditional and historical links with European states to gain support toward the accession process. The link with the Latin countries will be used, first France as well as Spain and Italy, but also the links with German countries, given the strong royal link and the Saxon minorities. The new Romanian president, Emil Constantinescu (28 December 1996 – 20 December 2000), requested the support for accession into the EU as well as NATO to European state leaders, and in particular to France. The French president promised, during his visit to Romania in 1997, to strongly support the Romanian candidature to NATO and EU. Jacques Chirac, French President says “[y]ou can count on the support of France. If you wish it, [France] will do its best to help you surmount any difficulty. Within the European Union, as well as within

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\subsection*{IV.3.2.2.4 Charming Attitude}

Romania and Romanian officials will develop an effort to prove that Romania is a European country that deserves to come back in the ‘club’ after forty-five years of ‘Communism domination’. They will ‘charm’ the European state representatives of the Union to get support for the accession process.

On March 24, 1997, Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Severin, present at the Royal Institute of International Relations of Brussels, explains the Romanian position toward the European Union.\footnote{In this page all citations in quotation marks come from the paper presented in French by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

argue for Romania’s accession to the European Union, but also in NATO, as being “a natural and legitimate option”. More exactly, he often spoke about the general to come down to the particular: Romania. The Minister insisted on the fact that “integration in the Union” will transform deeply the Romanian society. Adrian Severin also binds “the project of accession” with the internal transformation of Romania and he specifies that with the accession into the European Union, as well as into NATO, will be a “strategic anchor of the transformation according to the European devoted model.” The Minister argues that the political operation of Romania is aligned to the European one, which for him is an additional argument in favor of Romania’s accession to the European Union. He underlined that, if the negotiations for all the Eastern European countries must start simultaneously, each one will go at its own rhythm and rejoin European Commission idea. He underlines in his speech the domestic dependence of Romania toward the accession process and that this will shape the country reformation.

Adrian Severin insisted on the historical chance of Europe, in this enlargement, to have the contribution of Romania, which can bring a lot to Europe in terms of geopolitics’ advantage. He specifies that the operation and concerns of Romania are the same as the ones of the European Union countries’ and that Romania already started its integration through regional organizations (CFETA, BSEC, SECI, ...) and its active participation in several projects (project of coordination – Southeast European Co-operative Initiative). The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs specified that their collaboration would change Europe, because that represents “a tool for approval of the methods and procedures of work inside the Union”. In addition, it will affect the behavior of the states by bringing together the “economic systems”, “justice and home affairs”, and their “foreign policy”. In addition, he insists on certain questions raised by the European Union by reassuring the Union states. He specifies that “[w]e will act, also, with determination and, if I may, with inventiveness, to supplement this regional multilateral step of a network of partnership relations of good vicinity”. 1119

The Minister underlined that Romania is “the crossroads of several geographic axes” and “strategic interests”. Adrian Severin specified that his country can “bring the reinforcement of stability and safety of the continent” and make “steps at the local regional level”, positioning Romania as an important actor for the region, which it does not name, for the moment and which can be the Balkans or the

1119 Ibid. Paper presented at. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Black Sea area... In his opinion, the actions of Romania in this local regional area “are perceived by Romania as complementary actions and not as substitutes with the fundamental objective of integration to the European Union, an organization which encourages and supports these actions”.\textsuperscript{1120} He wanted to justify Romania’s current and future initiatives by saying that what they are doing is not out of personal interest, but it is for us all, thus marking the following remark while taking for granted that the European Union is an “Organization which encourages and supports these actions.”

In a few words, he said that the accession is “a natural and legitimate option” because Romanians are the same as any other European people, and that this process will enable the country to reform more quickly while contributing to the stability not only of the area, but also of the “entire continent”. He finished his pleading by specifying, “that these historical meetings will bring to Romania the act of justice which it well deserves after a half of century of waiting and sacrifices”.\textsuperscript{1121} As we see, Romania made many efforts to shape the country’s image from the Balkan idea to the future European Union state, and from a disorganized country to a country on the way to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. Romanian leaders present a future possible strategy to the European Union within Romania’s accession, and argue on the strength of having it in the Union vis-à-vis the instabilities and problems in the Southeast of the European Union.

The Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 decided to accelerate the process of accession, by launching the “overall enlargement process”. “The accession process will be launched on 30 March 1998 by a meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the fifteen member states of the European Union, the ten Central and East European applicant States and Cyprus”.\textsuperscript{1122} However, the Council “points out that all these States are destined to join the European Union on the basis of the same criteria and that they are participating in the accession process on an equal footing.”\textsuperscript{1123} Therefore, Romania wins another step in the accession to the European Union. Romania succeeded in convincing the Union about the strength of the country in the reform process in order to, meet the European Union criteria. Officials also insisted on the regional situation to press the

\textsuperscript{1120} Ibid. Paper presented at.
\textsuperscript{1121} Ibid. Paper presented at.
\textsuperscript{1123} Ibid.
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negotiation with the Union by focusing on factual geopolitical elements.

IV.3.2.3 Accession Period: From 2000 to 2007

The European Council met in Helsinki, on 10-11 December 1999, and adopted the Millennium Declaration, “recalling that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations”1124 and decided to open accession negotiations with Romania, as well as with other states - Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia - by stating that, “in the negotiations, each candidate state will be judged on its own merits”. The European Council consolidated the principle of differentiation. 1125 The European Union launched, on February 15, 2000, the process of negotiation for accession.

As David Phinnemore argues, we can say that, “obviously, the Kosovo conflict in 1999 prompted the EU to open accession negotiation with Romania”.1126 In fact at that time, “[v]arious explanations exist for the decision of the European Commission” and “[f]or some, the decisions of the European Commission and the European Council were a ‘reward’ for Romania’s support for NATO; for others they were compensation for NATO’s decision not to issue new invitations to join at its Washington Summit in spring 1999, despite the alleged promise to do so at Madrid two years earlier”.1127 We can conclude that, whatever the reason of the Council, “the fact is that had there been no Kosovo, then Romania may not have opened accession negotiations in 2000”.1128

1125 Ibid.
1127 Ibid. Paper presented at.
1128 Ibid. Paper presented at.
In 2003, Romania arrived at a turning point, having to conclude in one year, between October 2003 and October 2004, the rest of the acquis in order to be admitted into the Union in 2007. In order to better understand, we will briefly specify the Commission’s work methods to establish reports on candidate countries. The Commission for the European Council as well as NATO will use formal and official ways to get country information, but will also rely on the civil society, represented by organizations such as International Organizations (IOs), Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). As the Commission wrote

[the report draws on numerous sources of information. The candidate countries were invited to provide information on progress made in preparations for membership since the publication of the last Regular Report. [...] The Commission also drew on assessments made by various international organizations and in particular on contributions from the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the international financial institutions as well as nongovernmental organizations.]

In this particular case, we will see the increasing importance of non-state actors – IO’s, NGOs as well as FDI representatives – in creating the necessary consequences in the process of Romania’s International Relations. This situation has imposed to the Romania foreign policy a necessary restructuring and innovation as we explain in the chapter ‘The Comeback’ of first part ‘Change into Continuity’.

**IV.3.2.3.1 Government**

The special position for European Integration will reappear during the first Adrian Nastase government (28 December 2000 – 20 June 2003) in the form of a Ministry for European Integration within the negotiation obligations vis-à-vis the Union. In the next period (20 June 2003 – 10 March 2004), the position will be split in two ministries, one for the European Integration and the other for the negotiations with European Union.

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One may be surprised that, after the official request for application, the Romanian government did not create immediately a Minister for European Integration and even suppressed the position linked with European integration during two governments, under the presidency of Emil Constantinescu, from April 1998 to December 2000. The most complete and largest government, under the presidency of Emil Constantinescu, was from December 1996, just after the elections, to April 1996, with a minister for reforms, a president of the reform commission, a minister delegate for European integration, as well as a minister delegate for national minorities issues, led by Tokay Gyorgy (12 December 1996 to 17 April 1998). Nevertheless, all these ministers disappeared in the next government (17 April 1998 to 22 December 1999), and reappeared with the minister delegate for national minorities issues, led by Eckstein-Kovacs Peter (22 December 1999 to 28 December 2000).

It is only in 2001 that the new government led by Adrian Nastase created a Ministry for European Integration, led by Hildegard Carola Puwak (from its creation until 20 June 2003).\textsuperscript{1131} This ministry had a legal entity, a budget and its own personnel and had several duties, obligations and powers, and was supposed to operate in collaboration with other ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public administration. At the same time, this is a symbol and an effort to achieve the European Union accession. The ministry will work in coordination with the Institute of European Affairs, created in 1998, with "the three-fold mission, namely research, training in European Affairs and translating the acquis communautaire".\textsuperscript{1132}

It is interesting to underline that the cabinet composition must reflect, in general, the preoccupation and the priority of the government. In margin of our thesis work, we can nevertheless


answer this question because several studies\textsuperscript{1133} underline the fact that “the way jurisdictions are defined or divided has a substantial impact on how policy is formulated and implemented”.\textsuperscript{1134} In addition, “the change even in one portfolio is meaningful because it affects both the cabinet structure and cabinet decision-making process. The introduction or abolition of a ministry changes how policy areas are defined and who the principal decision-makers are.”\textsuperscript{1135} We can say that the cabinet composition “has the potential to affect the political balance in the executive by empowering or weakening certain bureaucratic and political interests”.\textsuperscript{1136} This statement helps us to understand the way that various Romanian governments treated the European Union accession, in our opinion, with more or less involvement.

The 2003 Report stipulated that the Romanian institutions, such as Parliament, had some problems in that they cannot operate correctly because of “a large number of complex and politically sensitive issues”,\textsuperscript{1137} the “limited Parliament’s ability to effectively scrutinize legislation”,\textsuperscript{1138} and the lack of expert personnel. In a new sentence, the Report concludes that “[e]xternal oversight of Parliament’s activities by civil society remains limited in practice and committee meetings are generally closed Parliament to the public”.\textsuperscript{1139}

During these years, there was crisis in the Nastase government and the government was restructured in June 2003, from 23 down to 14 ministers, but with the creation of a Minister Delegate in charge, without formal legal basis, which remained to approximately the same point in the government as before. However, the government

\textsuperscript{1133} Several studies went out by the OCED, the World Bank, and other International Organisations.
\textsuperscript{1135} Ibid. Paper presented at.
\textsuperscript{1136} Ibid. Paper presented at.
\textsuperscript{1138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1139} Ibid.
made efforts of “transparency for the decision-making process”\textsuperscript{1140} and to associate the civil society in the democratic process. Corruption is denounced and the Minister of European Integration, Hildegard Puwak, has to step down from her position because of suspicions about illegal use of European funds, explained and described, here before, in the first part.

The Romanian government does not make enough efforts to meet all Copenhagen criteria, because of the specific behavior of the Romanian governmental elite, more focused on their personal interest or enrichment versus the country’s and citizens’ interest. In order to achieve the Romanian goal of accession in the European Union, the Ministry of European Integration organized several national debates in order to mobilize the government and the civil society. It organized, in February 2002, the Convention concerning the future of the European Union, with representatives from the government and from the civil society (NGOs, media) and a debate on ‘Defining and dividing competencies between EU members states and the EU’ in March,

In the foreign policy field, Romania seeks support from other European countries, such as Italy (with Berlusconi’s visit in April) to reaffirm the country’s support for Romania’s accession, and from Spain (Nastase’s visit in November).

The government adopted a new program for the period 2002-2003 (November 2002-December 2003) on harmonizing the legislation with the EU. The government continued to work in close collaboration with the European Union institutions and committees to accelerate the accession progress and to resolve issues in selective acquis. In order to implement correctly their actions, the government presented another revised ‘National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis’ (NPAA), to the EU, “in which it outlines its strategy for accession, including how to achieve the priorities of the Accession Partnerships”.\textsuperscript{1141}

\textsuperscript{1140} Ibid.

IV.3.2.3.2 The Country’s Efforts

Romania and its political elite made a huge effort to access to the European Union. First, the political class was unanimously in favor of the Romanian accession to the EU; second, the population was also in favor of the EU accession, as soon as possible. “Romania started the transition with a major handicap and had large difficulties with this demolishing of its political and economic past, although, in a paradoxical way, the quasi-majority of the population wished the end of Ceausescu’s regime”.1142

Earlier in the political process Romania, the change, in political leader at the election of 1996, 2000 and 2004, reinforce the progression of the country toward democracy, but never change the global Romanian will for EU accession. The European Commission also concluded that, “following the arrival [1996] in power of a new government indicates that Romania is on its way to satisfy the political criteria”1143. For Cristian Preda1144, “[t]he topic of integration almost became an obsession in Romania”1145 and underlined that

[O]ne witnesses at the same time a true subordination to the requirements of the Union, so much so that various ministers grade their policies according to the progress report of the negotiations status. This situation is dangerous, but it should be understood that after the fall of Communism, Romania did not have any other resource, and that it is under the impact and with the support of Europe that it could be modernized.1146

The situation is similar with that during the 19th century, where “[t]he West [was] perceived [...] like ‘the world of civilization’ by the

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1144 Cristia Preda is editor of the Romanian magazin Political Studies (Studia Politica), was state secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of the Francophonie from September 2005 to February 2007.
1146 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
extra-Western political intellectuals and actors, which supports this vast movement of export”.1147 “[I]n Europe, with the advent of the principle of nationalities which involved a burst of the great empires (Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian)”, for Bertrand Badie, specialist in international relations and professor at the Institute of Political Studies of Paris, Romania continues to live a “Westernization of the political order”.1148

We can see that “the European model became the reference of the public life in Romania”1149. We can underline too that “[f]or a country like Romania, the blocking of enlargement for some reason or another would be a terrible blow, because the Romanians put their hope in an increasingly organic relation with the EU”.1150 “This political logic of dependence is very visible with regard to the importation of Western political-institutional models”. 1151 Bertrand Badier specifies that “this Westernization is also (and perhaps above all) related to strategies of actors who draw on the advantages of their role of importers”. 1152

However, the road to the European Union was chaotic with many traps, and the importation of the democratic model was not easy for Romania. The effort made by Romania received some reward; The networking with the European Union’s officials and with the European political leaders was functioning very well and helped the country to get support from various European countries such as France, Finland, Germany, Italy, and Spain... Second, the Council was


1152. _La diffusion de l’Etat-nation: Bertrand Badie - L’Etat importé_ Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
a ‘trap’. The academic analysis argues that the EU decisions were not necessarily made “based on hard-nosed cost-benefit analyses” 1153 but were driven by “rhetorical entrapment”. 1154 The council reiterates the necessary enlargement in Copenhagen (1993), in Luxemburg (1997) and in Helsinki (1999), saying that is “continuous, inclusive and irreversible” 1155 and that “Bulgaria and Romania are part of the same inclusive and irreversible enlargement process” with “the objective [...] to welcome Bulgaria and Romania as members in 2007” 1156, confirmed by the ‘One Europe’ declaration. 1157 The risk was to dissatisfy Romania, to isolate the country and to turn the situation instable. Even if results were not there, Romanian officials could argue that the country needed more effort and investment to cover the gap in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The Council understood that Romania needed more effort, the decision was to grant more technical and financial support to the country, in order to help officials, and institutions reach the expected level. The Union could not do in another way, because many other candidates knocking at the Union’s doors could be disappointed and there was the risk to turn them to a more isolated situation or towards another radical solution, in particular the countries at the Union border such as the Balkan ones.

The international situation changed in 2001, and the European geopolitics becomes different with a high emphasis on the Balkan situation at the European doors and on the Middle East. The unstable situation in the Balkans, with the Muslim issue and terrorism, highly

1154 Ibid. Paper presented at.
increased Romania’s potential in this area, especially regarding the Romanian-Yugoslav friendship. Moreover, the energy issue becomes a foreign policy issue - an economic-war tool - for the supplier countries such as Russia, and the guarantee of the control of the supplying road became crucial for the EU as well as for some other countries. The Constanța port and Romania’s geographical situation are a potential solution and help for the Union. In fact, Romania becomes the crossroad of different interests, and the involvement of the Romanian diplomacy in this area, as explained here before in part one, starts to bring back dividends. Can one remember the Constantinescu project ‘Romania at a Crossroad’ (România la rășcruce), at the end of the nineties?

**IV.3.2.3 Evaluation**

For the Commission, “[e]nlargement is a top priority for the European Union” and “[t]o be able to develop messages effectively, opinion leaders require a flow of objective up-to-date information”. The Commission also asked for an Enlargement Strategy Paper in order to monitor the complexity of the negotiating process and to help the Union “make a decision on the necessary institutional reforms” in order for the enlargement process to succeed. In addition, the Union “requires a communications strategy spread over a number of years to keep citizens of the EU and the candidate countries informed and to ensure their participation in the process and finally win their support for it”.

The Luxembourg European Council decided for a reviewed procedure, in order to regularly monitor countries’ accession progress in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria and the Union acquis. The Commission will have to report each year, with the method adopted by the ‘Agenda 2000’, through Regular Reports on CEECs’ progression toward accession preparation and progress from 1998 to 2005,

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1160 Ibid.
including Romania. The ‘Agenda 2000’ allowed for the evaluation of the “applicant States' ability to meet the economic criteria and fulfill the obligations deriving from accession”\textsuperscript{1161}. Different reports will succeed and turn around the different Copenhagen criteria as well as the capacity to implement the acquis communautaires, and the political criteria, the economic criteria, the ability to assume the obligations of membership. These important points will be evaluated each year in each country, in order to monitor the evolution and the coming closer toward the accession.

The Luxembourg European Council decided that

From the end of 1998, the Commission will make regular reports to the Council, together with any necessary recommendations for opening bilateral intergovernmental conferences, reviewing the progress of each Central and East European applicant State towards accession in the light of the Copenhagen criteria, in particular the rate at which it is adopting the Union acquis[.] […] The Commission’s reports will serve as a basis for taking, in the Council context, the necessary decisions on the conduct of the accession negotiations or their extension to other applicants. In that context, the Commission will continue to follow the method adopted by Agenda 2000 in evaluating applicant States' ability to meet the economic criteria and fulfill the obligations deriving from accession.\textsuperscript{1162}

In addition, the Cardiff European Council specifies that

The Union’s priority is to maintain the enlargement process for the countries covered in the Luxembourg European Council conclusions, within which they can actively pursue their candidatures and make progress towards taking on the obligations of membership, including the Copenhagen criteria. Each of these candidate countries will be judged on the basis of the same criteria and will proceed in its candidature at its own rate, depending on its degree of preparedness. Much will depend on the efforts made by the candidate countries themselves to meet the criteria. All will benefit from strengthened relations with the EU including through political dialogue and tailored strategies to help them prepared for accession.\textsuperscript{1163}

On the above-mentioned basis, the Commission will present a series of Regular Reports on Romania’s progress toward accession in


\textsuperscript{1162} Ibid.


At the starting point in 1997, the Commission Opinion on Romania’s Application for Membership of the European Union stipulated that Romanian was not ready, because the country was experiencing serious problems in implementing the Copenhagen criteria, despite the political will in favor of the European Union integration. Regarding the political criteria, the report says that this “current improvement in Romania, following the arrival in power of a new government, indicates that Romania is on its way to satisfy the political criteria”.1164 With reference to the economic criteria, one reads that “Romania has made considerable progress in the creation of a market economy, but it would still face serious difficulties to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term”.1165 Insofar as the ability to assume the obligations of membership, the Commission writes, “Romania has neither transposed nor taken on the essential elements of the acquis, particularly as regards the internal market. It is therefore uncertain whether Romania will be in a position to assume the obligations of membership in the medium term”.1166 The Commission underlines that “[m]ore generally, substantial administrative reform will be indispensable if Romania is to have the structures to apply and enforce the acquis effectively”.1167

The Previous Reports

The previous reports - 1998 and 1999 - underline that if

Romania has made progress in addressing certain aspects of the short term (sic) Accession Partnership priorities in economic reform and administrative capacity [...]. The internal market priorities [...], the justice

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1165 Ibid. Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Romania’s Application for Membership of the European Union.
1166 Ibid. Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Romania’s Application for Membership of the European Union.
1167 Ibid. Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Romania’s Application for Membership of the European Union.
and home affairs priorities [...] and those in the environment have not been satisfactorily addressed.\textsuperscript{1168}

Only “six countries, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium-term”.\textsuperscript{1169} In general, the report concludes, “Romania’s situation has deteriorated due to the government’s lack of commitment to structural reforms and it still has a long way to go”.\textsuperscript{1170} The Commission concluded that “Romania cannot be considered as a functioning market economy and it is not able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term”\textsuperscript{1171} and does not achieve the Copenhagen economic criteria. Progress was even made in the privatization of several large state companies (the carmaker Dacia ...), and “restructuring and privatizing the state-owned financial market”.\textsuperscript{1172} The “macroeconomic instability and legal uncertainty” helped attract more Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). In one word, “[t]he insufficient administrative capacity is currently a major constraint in the accession preparations”.\textsuperscript{1173} For the ‘National Programs for the Adoption of the Acquis’, “the [Romanian] Government also recognises (sic) the need to ensure a better link between the process of defining objectives for the short and medium term accession priorities and the budgetary planning and programming”.\textsuperscript{1174}

When analyzing the Human Rights conventions ratified by the candidate countries in June 1999\textsuperscript{1175}, Romania signed almost all the

\textsuperscript{1170} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1172} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1173} Ibid. p. 78.
\textsuperscript{1174} Ibid. p. 82.
\textsuperscript{1175} Ibid. p. 83.
conventions in advance, as compared, for example, with Czech Republic, Estonia or Poland.

Reports From 2000 up to 2005

Each year, the global conclusion of the report is that, on the one hand, “Romania continues to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria”\textsuperscript{1176} and “can therefore be judged as having met the 1999 Accession Partnership’s short-term priorities”\textsuperscript{1177}, and that “Romania’s democratic institutions are well established, but the process of decision making remains weak. Despite the initiatives taken over the last year, the government has continued to rely on legislating by ordinances and consultation on draft legislation should be substantially improved”.\textsuperscript{1178} On the other hand, Reports stipulate, “Romania cannot be regarded as a functioning market economy and is not able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term. It has not substantially improved its future economic prospects”\textsuperscript{1179} until the 2004 report. Reports underline that the country has serious problems and difficulties in implementing the acquis, even if “Romania has

\textsuperscript{1176} To see the Reports’ Commission from 2000 up to 2005


\textsuperscript{1178} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1179} Ibid.
continued to advance with the adoption of the acquis”, the achievements have been mixed\textsuperscript{1180}, with problems in decision-making concerning the implementation of the reforms needed, because many institutions required to ensure reforms implementation do not exist or are too weak to be effective.

\textbf{2000 Report}

The 2000 period was a turning point in the accession process, following the Helsinki decision to open the negotiations with all CEECs following the political Copenhagen criteria. At the same time, the European Council decides to issue each year an Enlargement Strategic Paper in order to evaluate the accession progress for all CEECs.

In 2000, the report on Romanian’s progress towards the accession stipulates that

\textit{In accordance with this approach, the assessment of progress in meeting the political and acquis criteria (including Romania’s administrative capacity to implement the acquis) focuses on what has been accomplished since the last regular report, complemented with a view of the global situation for each of the aspects discussed.}\textsuperscript{1181}

In 2000, 23 chapters were opened in addition to 4 more others: statistics, culture and audio-visual policy, competition policy, and telecommunications.

The global conclusion of the report is that, on the one hand, “Romania continues to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria”\textsuperscript{1182} and “can therefore be judged as having met the 1999 Accession Partnership’s short-term priorities”\textsuperscript{1183}, except for the high levels of discrimination concerning the treatment of the Roma population. As the Commission underlines,

\begin{quote}
Romania’s democratic institutions are well established, but the process of decision making remains weak. Despite the initiatives taken over the last year the government has continued to rely on legislating by ordinances and consultation on draft legislation should be substantially improved.\textsuperscript{1184}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1180} Ibid. p. 88.
\item \textsuperscript{1181} Ibid. p. 87.
\item \textsuperscript{1182} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1183} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1184} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
On the other hand, the report stipulates, “Romania cannot be regarded as a functioning market economy and is not able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term. It has not substantially improved its future economic prospects”. If “Romania has adopted economic programs and strategies, in agreement with the international financial institutions and the EU”, the Commission underlines that, in the ability to assume the obligations of membership, “there are serious difficulties in implementing these agreements as well as in deciding on key medium-term reforms”, because “[m]any institutions required to ensure the functioning of a market economy either do not exist or are too weak to be effective.”

Regarding the administrative capacity to apply the acquis, “Romania has continued to advance with the adoption of the acquis – although the achievements over the last year have been mixed”. In certain sectors, such as company law and competition, transport, internal market legislation, VAT and excise duties, “both legal transposition and the setting up of the necessary administrative structures are advanced. At the same time there is a worrying lack of progress in certain key areas such as the internal market, industry policy, telecommunications, justice and home affairs, financial control, budgetary procedures or even no progress at all such as in agriculture, environmental sector and employment and social affairs.

For the Accession Partnership, several short-term priorities have to be met regarding the political criteria, with the necessity to address several points as well in the economic criteria and in the internal market by the need to fully implement the Accession Partnership Priorities. Priorities such as Agriculture, Transport, Employment and Social Affairs, Environment, Justice and Home Affairs, Reinforcement of administrative and juridical capacity, need huge efforts. The medium-term priorities also have to be achieved in the political criteria, in transport, in energy, in customs and in Justice and Home Affairs. The report stipulates that “[i]n general the Romanian NPAA is a well structured and readable document. It provides a useful overview of Romania’s pre-accession strategy and also functions as a coordination tool for Romania’s own accession

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1185 Ibid.
1186 Ibid. p. 35.
1187 Ibid. p. 88.
1188 Ibid. p. 88-89.
1189 Ibid. p. 90-93.
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preparations”. However “[i]n several sectors, the targets set are ambitious, which gives rise to doubts as to the ability to meet all the deadlines”.

2001 Report

In 2001, “since the opening of the accession negotiations in February 2000, substantial discussions on the individual chapters of the acquis started and by September 2001 negotiations on 15 chapters had been opened.”

In 2001, the report on Romania’s progress towards the accession stipulates that, by the end of September 2001, 8 chapters were provisionally closed: fisheries, statistics, small and medium-sized enterprises, science and research, education, external relations, common foreign and security policy and consumers and health protection.

The report says, “Romania continues to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria” and that “significant progress have been made especially in the field of human rights” and in that of minorities’ rights. The report emphasizes that “[t]his efficiency of the legislature has improved considerably as has the overall functioning of government” but “corruption remains a serious problem that is largely unresolved”. Moreover, the Commission notices the lack of progress in the public administration reforms with “the independence of the judiciary”. The country has to make efforts to implement the defined strategies.

As in the previous years, the Commission underlines that even if

Romania has made progress towards establishing a functioning market economy and although it would not, in the medium term, be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, it has taken measures that would allow to develop its future capacity, provided that it keeps to the engaged economic reform path.

1190 Ibid. p. 94.
1191 Ibid.
1193 Ibid. p. 40.
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Romania has “serious economic imbalances with high inflation [...] in a difficult social environment” linked with a weak administration and a considerable reform agenda. Romania has to enforce the plan recommended by international institutions. However, there are still serious economic imbalances, with high inflation and an increasing current account deficit, in a difficult social environment. As for the administrative capacity to apply the acquis, the 2001 report stipulates that, on the one hand, some efforts are needed to reach “the standards generally applicable in the Community”\(^{1194}\), and on the other hand, “[a] related concern is the ability of Romanian institutions to effectively manage the increased levels of EU funding”\(^{1195}\). In general, “Romania has continued to make progress with the adoption of the acquis”\(^{1196}\). The conclusion of the Commission is that “[t]he overall capacity of the public administration to implement the acquis remains limited and represents a major constraint on Romania’s accession preparations”\(^{1197}\).

2002 Report

The report of the European Commission for Enlargement says that “Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia fulfill the political criteria”\(^{1198}\) and “have reached a high level of alignment with the acquis and have made considerable advances towards ensuring adequate administrative and judicial capacity”\(^{1199}\). The Commission considers that “these countries will have fulfilled the economic and acquis criteria and will be ready for membership from the beginning of 2004”\(^{1200}\). The report adds that “[t]hese [Bulgaria and Romania ] countries should focus further efforts on the areas identified in the Regular Reports […] because Bulgaria and Romania fulfill the political

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\(^{1194}\) Ibid. p. 96.
\(^{1195}\) Ibid. p. 42.
\(^{1196}\) Ibid. p. 98.
\(^{1199}\) Ibid.
\(^{1200}\) Ibid.
criteria but do not fully meet, to various extents, the economic and acquis criteria.”

The report underlines that Romania has made considerable progress in the negotiations. All negotiating chapters have now been opened [...] almost [...] with Romania. [...] [W]ith Romania[, It] should be possible to open the last four chapters before the end of this year, thus fulfilling the Laeken European Council’s objective to have all chapters opened with these two countries in 2002.  

The Report stipulates that Romania and Bulgaria have set the date of accession for 2007. Only 13 Chapters have been provisionally closed with Romania, in comparison to Bulgaria, which has providentally closed 22 chapters. The closed chapters are: Company Law, Fisheries, Economic and Monetary Union, Statistics, Social Policy and Employment, Industrial Policy, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, Science and Research, Education and Training, Consumers and Health Protection, External Relations, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Institutions. Romania still has 14 chapters to close and four other chapters to open: Free movement of services, Agriculture, Financial and Budgetary provisions and others. The Commission decided to increase the technical and financial help for both countries and to focus on their roadmaps. The Commission underlines that it “will strongly support the two countries in achieving this objective [2007 accession], which will continue to be guided by the principles of differentiation and own merits” and “[a]s the accession negotiations with all twelve negotiating candidate countries are an inclusive process, the Accession Treaty should acknowledge that the results reached in the negotiations with those candidates which will not join in the first round of enlargement will not be put into question”.

A revised Accession Partnership was adopted in January 2002 between Romania and the EU, in order to jointly identify the next steps required for Romania to achieve the accession process in time.

2003 Report

In 2003, “[a]cession negotiations are well advanced with Bulgaria and Romania, and will continue on the basis of the same principles that guided the negotiations with the ten acceding

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1201 Ibid.
1202 Ibid. p. 30.
1203 Ibid. p. 36.
1204 Ibid.
countries, without calling into question the results already achieved”. The Report shows that “Bulgaria and Romania [...] have moved forward on the three sets of criteria – the political, economic and acquis criteria - established by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council”.

Romania continues to fulfill the political criteria, but the Report stipulates that the country “still needs to develop a strategy to address reform of the policy and legislative process” and that “[c]orruption [...] continues to be widespread and affects all aspects of society”. For the first time the Report concludes that “Romania can be considered as a functioning market economy once the good progress made has continued decisively”. But “[i]n addition, a vigorous and sustained implementation of its structural reform program is required in order for Romania to be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the near term”.

The 2003 Report stipulates that in the administrative capacity to apply the acquis

Romania has made steady progress with the adoption of the acquis and is on track to transpose the required legislation before the planned date of accession provided the current pace of progress is maintained. Weaknesses in the legislative process mean that the quality of legislation transposed is uneven and in some cases revisions will be needed before laws can be implemented.

The Report must underline that it is not enough and

[i]n a number of important sectors, there has been a continued gap between progress in legal transposition and the limited overall capacity of the public administration to implement and enforce the newly adopted

1206 Ibid. p. 4.
1207 Ibid. p. 27.
1209 Ibid. p. 44.
1210 Ibid.
1211 Ibid. p. 124.
legislation. This represents a major constraint on Romania's accession preparations and to address this issue will require a comprehensive, structural reform of both the public administration and the judicial system.1212

But "[d]epending on further progress in complying with the membership criteria, the objective is to welcome Romania as a member in 2007."1213

What it is the difference between the Report and its specific words and the reality? What does the Report say exactly and what is the Romanian interpretation?

In 2003, we can read in the national and foreign media that "Romania hasn't obtained the status of functional economy this year" as confirmed Enrico Pasquarelli, chief negotiator for Romania with the European Commission, in an interview for Mediafax agency in Brussels.1214 In addition, according to Pasquarelli, the report indicates that Romania is closed to this status, but that it's still not a functional market economy. However, the Head of EC Delegation in Romania, Jonathan Scheele, underlines that

'If ambiguities due to syntactic formulations are still there, the text in English continues to be the reference text.’ [...] ‘Romania can be considered as a functioning market economy once the good progress made has continued decisively’.1215

However, the Prime Minister does not understand the text in the same way and "PM Adrian Nastase stated yesterday that this translation was incorrect and that the correct version was, in his opinion, the following: 'Romania is considered as a functioning market economy and this status will be confirmed through measures we'll continuously take'.91216

We can also read in Adevarul, a Romanian daily newspaper that Romania will have to wait for one more year regarding its hope that the EU would grant it the much-wanted status of functioning market economy, a criteria that must be compulsorily complied with in order

1212 Ibid.
1213 Ibid. p. 5.
1215 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
1216 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
to access to the EU.\textsuperscript{1217} And the report underlines that Romania is ‘almost’ on the verge of having a market economy, a formula that is mentioned in the 2001 report for Bulgaria, which has been granted this status since 2002.\textsuperscript{1218}

We can see here the difference of interpretation between the European Union officials and the Romanian government official. The Romanian government does not make enough efforts to meet all the Copenhagen criteria. Moreover, we can see that, year by year, Romania advances only under the pressure of the European Union and its officials. Romania, as usual, passes in full force the step of the accession process instead of making real improvements of the criteria.

At the date of the 2003, Report, Romania had opened 30 negotiating chapters and 20 had been provisionally closed “although delays have been noted in certain specific areas”.\textsuperscript{1219} The following chapters remain to be concluded: Free movement of persons, Freedom to provide services, Competition policy, Agriculture, Transport policy, Energy, Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, environment, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, and Financial and budgetary provisions.

So, Romania is not ‘in’ yet, but also not ‘out’ and the conclusion is, as the Commission underlines, that nothing changed in the negotiation process and countries continued to be evaluated “on the basis of the same principles that have guided the accession

\textsuperscript{1217} To see : Reuters. Presa europeana - convinsa ca Romania nu are economie de piata [online]. Adevărul, 7 nov. 2003, no. 4156. [cited 23 Jan. 2008].
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negotiations until now, whereby each country is judged on its own merits”.\textsuperscript{1220}

\textbf{2004 Report}

The situation is critical because 2004 will be the last chance for Romania to expect to be in the Union soon. As the President of the Institute for Marketing and Public Opinion Polls (IMAS) and today a Parliamentarian deputy for the Social Democrat Party, Alin Teodearescu, stipulated in his interview with "22 Magazine" (Revista 22), the political leaders and the civil society must understand that the next year, 2004, will be as important as the Soviet Ultimatum in 1940. For Alin Teodearescu, Romania will be at a very important crossroad of its history, to be 'in' or 'out' the Union, because “the Romanian government must close all chapters for the accession to the European Union”.\textsuperscript{1221}

Some civil society leaders, such as Alin Teodearescu, want to alert and to convince political leaders and the civil society about the importance of the current period for Romania. He tackles the difficulties the country will face in the coming year to conclude its accession negotiations, and recalls that the extremist parties represent a real danger for the parliamentary elections of 2004.\textsuperscript{1222}

The Commission underlines that

\begin{quote}
[t]he enlargement of the EU to ten new Member States on 1 May 2004 has further strengthened the unity of the European continent. The historical and political arguments in favor of this enlargement are
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{1222} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
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compelling: it enhances peace, prosperity, stability and security and has also produced substantial economic benefits.1223

We can read, in the 2004 Report that “[t]his year’s Regular Reports’ assess Bulgaria and Romania’s ability to assume all obligations of membership by accession”.1224 For Romania, “27 chapters have been provisionally closed”,1225 but “three chapters remain to be negotiated (competition, environment, and justice and home affairs) as well as parts of Chapter 31 (Other)”1226 and must be finished by the end of 2004.

The Report evaluates every year the Copenhagen criteria and we can read:

Bulgaria and Romania continue to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria. Improvements need to be made in particular in the reform of their public administration, the functioning of their judicial system, and the fight against corruption.

Bulgaria and Romania fulfill the criterion of being a functioning market economy. [...] the vigorous implementation of Romania’s structural reform program should enable them to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union

Bulgaria and Romania have continued to make good progress in adopting the acquis and have generally fulfilled their commitments made in the negotiations. They are on track to complete the required legislative transposition by accession provided that the current pace of progress is maintained. They need to continue their efforts to develop sufficient administrative and judicial capacity to implement and enforce the acquis.1227

As it was usually done for the previous 10 CEECs,

1224 Ibid. p. 3.
1227 Ibid.
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[t]he Commission will make every effort in order to meet the European Council’s objective to bring the negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania to a successful conclusion in 2004, on the basis of own merits, with a view to signing the Accession Treaty as early as possible in 2005.\textsuperscript{1228}

However, the Commission used specific safeguard clauses with Romania and it will recommend

to the Council at any time before the entry into force of the Accession Treaty to postpone the envisaged date of accession of Bulgaria or Romania by one year to January 2008 if there is clear evidence that there is a serious risk that Bulgaria or Romania will be manifestly unprepared to meet the requirements of membership by 1 January 2007 in a number of important areas.\textsuperscript{1229}

In addition, “until accession, the Union will continue to help Bulgaria and Romania in their preparations for membership through the pre-accession strategy”.\textsuperscript{1230}

The Report also stipulates that, after the accession, upon joining the Union, the country will have to continue to reinforce “administrative and judicial capacity”, to make the necessary work to fulfill the Schengen acquis, and “will need to apply to join the European Economic Area (EEA)”.\textsuperscript{1231}

\textit{2005 Report}

For Romania and Romanians, there was no other solution than to be in the EU by January 2007. They did not accept the idea of a possible postponement of the accession date. As in 1993, Romanian had its own way of seeing the situation; they will not accept the additional delay. In one respect, it is positive, because Romania will make all necessary efforts to meet the objectives with the help of the European Union institutions and personnel, of course. The Minister of European Integration, Anca Boagiu, says in an interview prior to the release of the 2005 Report, that she has “recently attacked her colleagues in the Romanian Parliament for failing to adopt vital laws to bring domestic law in line with the EU acquis”.\textsuperscript{1232} I had to pull that alarm signal, in order to accelerate the amount of activity in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1228} Ibid. p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{1229} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1230} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1231} Ibid. p. 5.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
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Parliament”, 1233 she says. “[A]lways said that the process of European integration is a team process. In addition, the Romanian Parliament is part of this team. [...] The national priority is Romania’s accession on 1 January 2007”, she added. 1234 From her “point of view, all other things are secondary to that”. 1235

The Minister recognizes that there is a lot to do, especially with the institutions that will replace the EU technical assistance after the accession. In addition, the minister underlines that Romania’s negative image “is the poor communication of the identity and progress of this country [Romania].” 1236 The minister says that “Romania will join the European Union on January 1st, 2007! It is our objective, everybody assumed it and there is no plan ‘B’ ”. 1237 The majority of Romanian officials share this opinion. The 2005 Report started by the fact that “[t]he accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania were concluded in December 2004 and a Treaty of Accession was signed in April 2005 with a view to welcoming both countries as members as from January 2007. This Treaty is currently being ratified”. 1238 The Report continues to monitor Romania in order to be ready on January 1, 2007 and to evaluate the help and funds needed to achieve these goals.

The Commission reviews again the Copenhagen criteria and “confirms its earlier assessment that Bulgaria and Romania meet the political criteria for membership. Nevertheless, further efforts are needed in particular to strengthen the rule of law, by improving public administration and the justice system and by fighting corruption effectively”. 1239 The Commission confirms that,

as regards the economic criteria, Bulgaria and Romania fulfill the requirement of being a functioning market economy. [...] Romania’s vigorous implementation of its structural reform program should enable them to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 1240

1233 As is true for most Romanian officials, Anca Boagiuc does not accept the idea of postponing accession by a year. Ibid.
1234 Ibid.
1235 Ibid.
1236 Ibid.
1237 Ibid.
1239 Ibid. p. 11.
1240 Ibid.
The Commission also confirms that “Romania has reached a considerable level of alignment with the acquis in most policy areas. Efforts to strengthen overall administrative capacity should continue with a view to properly implementing the adopted legislation”. But "Romania needs to make increased efforts in certain areas in order to complete its preparations for accession” and “must take immediate and decisive action to address issues of serious concern if it is to be ready by the envisaged date of accession in particular in agriculture, in the taxation area, in the regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, environment and finally, in justice and home affairs, especially for the preparation of the Schengen acquis. Romania has to continue to make efforts in order to achieve all goals to be ready for the January 2007 accession.

The Last Step

The Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union was signed on April 25, 2005 in Luxemburg, after the approval of the European Commission (February 22, 2005), the European Parliament (in April 13), and by EU Council (in April 25, 2005). The Treaty must be, in the period 2005-2006, ratified by Member States (EU-25), as well as by the two countries, Bulgaria and Romania. However, the Commission writes that the full preparations of the two countries for EU accession have not yet been


1242 Ibid.


completed; therefore, the Commission is continuously monitoring the situation. As says Commissioner Olli Rehn\(^{1246}\),

Bulgaria and Romania have achieved significant progress so far in the preparations for accession. But, the jury is still out. In the months to come particular attention must be paid to actual implementation and enforcement of the reforms. The issues presented in our reports should be taken very seriously and used as an incentive for speeding up the reforms, if Bulgaria and Romania want to be ready for accession on 1 January 2007.\(^{1247}\)

The Commission decided to link the accession process of the both countries, Bulgaria and Romania, together. Romania as Bulgaria will be continuously evaluate by the commission in order to be sure that the countries meet the requirements of membership, otherwise the accession will be postpone until 2008. The Commission issued two different reports in 2006, to monitor the efforts made by the country in order to meet the requirements. For the Commission, Romania with Bulgaria “made far-reaching efforts to adapt their legislation and administration to the laws and rules of the European Union” and will be in position “to take on the rights and obligations of EU membership on 1 January 2007.”\(^{1248}\) The Commission acknowledges the progress made by Romania concerning the reform of the justice system, the fight against corruption, as well as in some other points.\(^{1249}\) The Commission underlines also that “Romania has yet to translate about 8 % of the acquis (around 7 000 pages) and to revise about 12 % (around 11 500 pages)\(^{1250}\) before the accession. The Council, after approval by the General Affairs and External Relations Council, confirms the accession of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union. The report states that

Bulgaria and Romania have made considerable efforts to complete their preparations for EU membership since the Commission issued its last

\(^{1246}\) Olli Rhen has been Commissioner since November 2004, being the member of the European Commission responsible for Enlargement.


\(^{1249}\) Ibid.

\(^{1250}\) Ibid. p. 51.
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report in May. Bulgaria and Romania are sufficiently prepared to meet the political, economic and acquis criteria by 1 January 2007.1251

The Commission, in view of the progress reports, decided, “to set up a mechanism for cooperation and verification of the progress in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption, money-laundering and organized crime.”1252 Moreover, upon the request of the EU-25 ministers, the Commission decided to build a monitoring system by regular reports to ensure that the two countries apply the Community acquis correctly in accordance with the Accession Treaty’s provisions, as well as the option to use the safeguard measures and other necessary ‘accompanying measures’. As stated by the Commission, the “[s]afeguard mechanisms of last resort which are triggered either to prevent or to remedy particular problems or threats to the functioning of the Union. Any measures taken should be proportional to the corresponding shortcomings.”1253 The safeguards can be invoked in three domains, such as economics (Article 36)1254, internal market clause (Article 37)1255 and justice and home affairs clause (Article 38)1256, up to 3 years following the accession. The Commission underlines that the safeguards clauses are the same as the ones for the other member States, which joined the Union in 2004.1257 After the accession, Romania will benefit from specific funds in structural and agricultural areas. Of course, the EU will supervise the use of these funds.

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1251 Ibid. p. 12.
1255 Ibid. p. 40-41.
1256 Ibid. p. 41.
IV.3.2.3.4 Corruption

We decide to speak again about corruption in this chapter, in addition to the first part, because this issue becomes a crucial point in Romania’s accession to the EU and an important issue for the Union vis-à-vis the integration process and the Union’s institutions. The Commission has repeatedly identified corruption as a serious problem in at least half of the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In his speech marking the release of the 2002 Regular Reports on candidates’ readiness for accession, Commission President Romano Prodi explained that corruption is an ‘extremely serious’ problem that must be tackled before accession.\(^{1258}\)

In fact, corruption is considered by Sussan Rose-Akerman\(^ {1259}\) as “the single most significant obstacle to both democratization and economic development”.\(^ {1260}\) In addition, “corruption corrodes democracy”\(^ {1261}\), “undermining the most fundamental principles of democratic governance. Corrupt practices remove government decisions from the public realm to the private, diminishing openness and accountability.”\(^ {1262}\) We can add the reflection of Wayne Sandholtz and Rein Taagepera that “[d]emocratization seems particularly vulnerable to the corrosive effects of corruption in the countries that were part of the Soviet Union or were dominated by it.”\(^ {1263}\) They


\(^{1259}\) Susan Rose-Ackerman is the Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science) with joint appointments between Yale Law School and the Yale Department of Political Science. She holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University.


\(^{1263}\) Ibid. p. 110.
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further argue that the transition toward democratic political forms and market-oriented economies did not - indeed, could not - obliterate corruption in post-communist societies. On the one hand, cultural orientations change slowly, lagging behind even the most comprehensive political and institutional shifts. On the other hand, the process of privatization itself opened myriad opportunities for corruption, especially since the administrators of the former system frequently devised and managed the privatization schemes.\textsuperscript{1264}

For the Commission, corruption becomes a crucial issue linked with the European Union future, because

[s]ince the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, organized crime within the European Union has changed its face. New players from the East, new relationships between different actors give the phenomenon a new dimension. This scourge endangers stealthily the European construction itself. If nothing is done, the mafias will be those to benefit from the construction of Europe until it collapses. If the EU fails, Member States will not emerge unscathed. They will lose authority. But while official institutions hesitate, the power must busy. It will be busy then, probably through corruption created in the form of operating principles by criminal organizations...\textsuperscript{1265}

This question is not only linked with Romania, but with other CEECs too. Even, if various EU authorities – the Commission, OCSE, and GAFI - legislated on the issue of corruption and organized crime, we can witness a difference between the rule of law and reality in Europe. There was a lot of criticism regarding the Union accession control process, especially before Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession signature agreement. For example

[n]or has the Commission provided any indication of what level of corruption might disqualify a country from being eligible for EU membership. For example, though the Commission has repeatedly judged corruption to be ‘systemic’ in Romania, the Regular Reports find that the country has continued to fulfil (sic) the political criteria – rather than the economic or administrative ones – set in Copenhagen.\textsuperscript{1266}

\textsuperscript{1264} Ibid.
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In 2005, Daniel Lebegue, president of the French representation of Transparency International, underlines the corruption risk of the EU enlargement and the lack of resources related to this issue. He explains that the enlarged European Union [...] is more exposed to risks of corruption and money laundering than it was at 15, because many of the new member states remain in a poor situation. There is the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), but it's missing the necessary overall framework. The European Union should develop larger scale-training missions and evaluation.\footnote{1267}

From 1999 to Romania’s accession in 2007, many scandals with political leaders and business people corruption’s affairs show up and defrayed the media chronicle. "[C]orruption in Romania has followed a noteworthy trend, increasing from 1999 to 2002 and then declining thereafter."\footnote{1268}

The last report of the Commission (September 2006) stipulates that

[\h]owever, there needs to be a clear political will to demonstrate the sustainability and irreversibility of the recent positive progress in fighting corruption. In the Parliament there has (sic) been some attempts to substantially reduce the effectiveness of such efforts. Corruption remains a concern in particular within the local government.\footnote{1269}

IV.3.3 European Union Membership

There were still questions and issues with Romania at the end of December 2006, and the Commission estimated that some criteria were not applied correctly. The Monitoring Report of the end of 2006 on the status of preparations for EU membership of Bulgaria and


Romania stipulates that “[t]hey [Bulgaria and Romania] have reached a high degree of alignment.”1270 Regarding the political criteria, Romania has intensified reforms of the judiciary, and numerous issues came up quantitatively and qualitatively, but Romania has made progress in reforming the justice system and it needs to continue to improve the fight against corruption, as well as against human beings trafficked by organized crime. For the economic criteria, Romania is a functioning market economy with some improvements in the public expenditure and tax revenue. Romania has made a considerable level of alignment regarding the transposition and implementation of the EU laws and standards.1271

“However, the Commission also identifies a number of areas of continuing concern, and also areas where the Commission will initiate appropriate measures to ensure the proper functioning of the EU, unless the countries take immediate corrective action”1272, the Commission report states. The Council has decided to apply some measures as “safeguard measures, financial corrections of EU funds, competition policy measures and infringement procedures”1273 based on the acquis. The Report concludes, “Bulgaria and Romania have made far-reaching efforts to adapt their legislation and administration to the laws and rules of the European Union”1274 and “[a]s a result of the progress made, Bulgaria and Romania will be in a position to take on the rights and obligations of EU membership on 1 January 2007.”1275 After a long and chaotic road, Romania becomes member of the European Union on January 1, 2007, with safeguard clauses and transitional arrangements.1276 As a normal practice, the Commission decided to monitor Romania’s progress on the application of the law (the acquis communautaire) to ensure that the measures needed to be implemented1277 by the country are being met

1270 Ibid.
1271 To see : Ibid.
1272 Ibid. p. 3.
1273 Ibid. p. 12.
1274 Ibid. p. 13.
1275 Ibid.
1276 Transitional arrangements are for example, restrictions on free movement of workers, on access to road transport networks; provisions on veterinary, phytosanitary and food safety rules.


\footnote{To see: European Commission. Progress Report on the Cooperation and verification mechanism – procedural aspects [online]. (European Commission). Brussels: European Commission, 2007. [cited 23 Jan. 2008]. Portable Document Format. Available from: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/523&format =PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>. for Romania, as well as for Bulgaria, to help them to address “these outstanding shortcomings”. Through the CMV, the Commission set criteria benchmarks for assessing the progress made on various issues, and the publication, twice a year, are based on contributions from the Romanian authorities, the Commission's services, Member States' experts as well as technical experts and the civil society. For the Commission, Romania has to improve the following four areas:

1. Ensure a more transparent, and efficient judicial process notably by enhancing the capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor the impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes.

2. Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken.

3. Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, nonpartisan investigations into allegations of high level (sic) corruption.


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The first set of progress reports was published in June 2007, the second set on 4 February 2008, the third on 23 July 2008 and the fourth on 12 February 2009.

For the Commission, the evaluation process gives good results and, as the Commission states in 2007, "[i]n the first six months of accession, Romania has continued to make progress in remediying weaknesses that could prevent an effective application of EU laws, policies and programmes."1281 Romania escaped from the economic, internal market, justice and home affairs as well as the agricultural safeguard clauses, but not from the food safety safeguard measures, as well as the transitional arrangements in agricultural fund and food safety.1282 The last report from the Commission, in the spring of 2009, states that the country develops the effective administrative and judicial systems they need to deliver on the obligations of membership. The last report concludes:

The next assessment of progress by the Commission in summer 2009 will show to which extent Romania has been able to successfully address the shortcomings identified in the reform of the judiciary and to produce convincing and tangible results in the fight against corruption.1283

The European Union Commission confirmed that the progress on judicial reform, corruption and organized crime is well going. The Romanians will soon enjoy their full rights as EU citizens.

IV.3.3.1 The Foreign Policy

With the entrance of Bulgaria and Romania on January 1, 2007, the European Union changed its geography but not its neighborhood. The fifth enlargement, in 2004, has profoundly affected the European Union’s external relations and brought new links with different third


1282 Ibid. p. 21.

countries with new European Union’s relations network. The change of the geographical border of the Union “is probably the most important of all foreign policy implications of enlargement”, as well as the impact of new members on the EU foreign policy decision-making and leadership. In 2007, the new members Bulgaria and Romania bring the Black Sea and the Republic of Moldova to the EU neighborhood, together with their network relations. The two new members bring some new issues to the EU’s doors: direct instable areas represented by frozen conflicts in the Republic of Moldova, as well as several other conflicts over the Black Sea with Georgia and Caucasian countries. We can underline what Stephen Blank wrote, i.e. that “[i]nstability in the Black Sea region of southeastern Europe, an area that now includes the Transcaucasia, (sic) calls the durability of any European order into question.”

The 2004 enlargement already focused attention of the EU on the new neighborhood issue. During the period of Romania’s accession, the European Union re-defines a new ‘European Neighborhood Policy’ (ENP) applicable on January 1, 2007 and created a new instrument - the ‘European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument’ - in lieu of various geographical programs with eastern neighbors and Russia, as well as with southern Mediterranean neighbors. According to the European Union’s official site, the objective is to share the benefits of the EU’s enlargement with neighboring countries to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors (figure 5). This new program is intended to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security at the European borders. This program also enhances cross-border cooperation.

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1285 Stephen Blank is professor of national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.


The borderline with the Balkan countries is not new, i.e. Slovenia and Greece are countries that border the Balkan areas. However, as the difference with Romania, the immediate neighbors of Slovenia and Greece are enough stable countries compared with Serbia and Kosovo ‘problems’. Concerning the Black Sea area, the new members, Bulgaria and Romania, will bring another configuration of the borderland to the European Union. Moreover, Romania is directly involved in the border management of the EU, considering the large border along countries recognized to be the origin of organized crime and human trafficking. As EU member, Romania had to assess the efficiency of the border control measures as an integral part of the ‘Justice and Internal Affairs’ chapter and then was affected by the border control concerning the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Serbia, as well as the control of the land coast and sea borders on the Black Sea. As in the case of NATO, several countries are potential sources of hostile reaction to the EU enlargement or non-enlargement.

Figure 5: EU Neighboring Countries.

Turkey is a candidate with the most serious geopolitical issues raised by enlargement. Turkey had aspired to become a member of
the European Union since 1964. The country, a member of NATO, is a bridge between the Middle East and the Caucasuses, and an important actor in energy transportation. Turkey’s accession talks have since been dogged by a number of domestic and external problems. The question raised regularly is the capability for Ankara to implement the acquis communautaire, especially in the fields of human rights and minorities, as well as on other external problems such as the separation of Cyprus.

The next enlargement toward more Eastern countries can be viewed as an aggressive attitude especially toward Ukraine, the historic cradle of the Slavic spirit, and toward the Caucasus, a strong interest for Russian influence. In addition, the endless postponement of Turkey’s accession to the EU can bring tension and conflict, and create an alliance change in the black Sea, pushing Turkey more close to Russia and Transcaucasic states.

Romania brings to the European Union several new foreign policy concerns. Romania, as other eastern countries, can play a role toward the European foreign policy. As a European Union member, Romania will have to implement the European Union policy toward close neighbors. At the same time, Romania will be part of the definition process concerning the neighbors’ policy and will be able to present the Romanian point of view as well as to influence decisions. Romania long ago and just after the Revolution built, at various occasion, a litmus-test speech upgrading his geographic and geopolitical position, and brought the Black Sea area on the map of international politics. Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase stated in 1991 that

Romania contributes to the dynamic development of its relations with neighboring countries, by accomplishing important regional cooperation projects in the Balkans, in the Black Sea area and among Danube states. Romania’s genuine interest for efforts and initiatives promoting security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area, to which it gives support, is placed within the same context.

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Later on, the project ‘Romania, at a Crossroad’ (România la răscoajea) was booming with no large success during the
Constantinescu presidency concerning the future geopolitical oil context. During the 1990’s Kosovo war led by NATO, Romania
remains a vector of stability in the area. After 9/11 and the
intervention in the Middle East for the fight against terrorism,
Romania becomes an important element of stability and regional
leader within NATO. On various occasions, Romanian leaders shared
their political view concerning the Black Sea and the Balkans in order
to develop democracy, stability and security over the regions, taking
for granted that strong economic and democratic neighbors would be
beneficial for Romania. During the pre-accession period, the country
developed foreign policy lines toward the Balkan countries, as well as
toward the Caucasus, creating significant links with Georgia and other
Transcaucasian states. Moreover, Romanian created, in the near
eastern neighborhood, a situation of dialogue notwithstanding the
border conflict with Ukraine, and the ‘reunification’ project with the
Republic of Moldova. Romania has always networked with Russia, Turkey and other states around the Black Sea. In addition, Romania
became a leader in regional initiatives and programs for the
promotion of peace, democracy, economic development and security.
In Europe, Romania enjoyed good relations with all countries,
developing bilateral relations and trilateral co-operation agreements.

As for NATO, Romania has its own ideas about its role regarding
the foreign policies actions. Romania, as far as we know, tried in the
nineties to attract the EU’s attention to the Black Sea area. We can
see that Romania did not invent new policies, but seems to be
following a general path implemented a long time ago and taken over
by the Union in the recent years. After the signature of the adhesion
treaty, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania developed a
collaboration process at the European Union level in order to adapt
the Romanian political objectives to the European ones, and/or to
make the European Union sensitive to Romania’s foreign policy.

Romania became aware that its foreign policy would adjust
after January 1, 2007. As for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Romania acquired a leading position in the Black Sea area and

1291 To see the Part I of the thesis: Change into Continut and A Necessary
Rupture.
1292 To see : Ministerul Afacerilor Externe. Raport privind politica externă a
României 2005-2008 [online]. (Report concerning Romanian foreign policy 2005-
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towards its Balkan neighbors. Romania was more involved in the last years in national and European debates on energy security, promoting Romania’s position and relations with the Caucasus and advocating for providing alternative routes of transport of hydrocarbons to the European Union (figure 6), by bypassing Russia. Romania made the necessary transition phase aiming at carrying out the priority projects for Romania, such as PEOP and Nabucco (figure 7).

Romania has intensified discussions within the EU concerning the neighborhood in the East and the Southeast – Balkans - of the Union, such as the dialogue with the Republic of Moldova for special partnership. The implication for the EU in the resolution of the Moldovan conflict and a position toward Pridnestrovie (Transnistria)\textsuperscript{1293}, which is supported by Russia, can be driven by the Romania, foreign policy. Romania experience and the ability to revolve different is a valuable help for the EU, especially considering, as says Blank, a “continuing Western neglect of or inability to resolve outstanding issues, such as the ongoing frozen conflict in Moldova and the Caucasus.”\textsuperscript{1294}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{map}
\caption{European Access to Russian and Caspian Crude.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{1293} For explanation to see the next chapter : The Neighborliness.
Ukraine developed stable relations with the EU through Poland’s special relation, because the Romania – Ukraine relations are jeopardized by the different conflicts between the two countries. The MFA underlines that Romania always developed a good neighborhood relationship, trying to resolve problems with neighboring countries by negotiations or in the framework of international laws.

Romania had advocated from many years on the necessity to collaborate with Russia on the energy issue, despite the up-and-down relations between the two countries. Considering the recent issue with energy and its use by Russia as an economical war tool, the Romanian view for alternative solutions get all sens. In addition, the large Russian investment in energy projects in Bulgaria, the Balkan countries and Romania impose a more pragmatic approach with Russia. For Romanian leaders, Russia is also an inescapable actor for the Black Sea development and collaboration.

\[\text{Figure 7: Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project and Gas Supply Sources for Nabucco.}^{1295}\]

The MFA writes in its report that "[t]he main objective of Romania’s policy towards Russia [...] has been taking an active and pragmatic behavior in order to relaunch and catalyzing relationships

in a spirit of trust and mutual benefit, from the continuity achieved at high-level dialogue”.

Already after the revolution, Romania insisted on the necessity to develop economic relations not only with the East of Europe, but also with the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America, Africa and Asia. This path was also applied in recent years through the economic diplomacy, which fit well with the EU’s foreign policy objectives and the ENP.

In the context of European Union membership, Romanian political leaders decided to ‘fight’ for position in the European Institution to rank high and strategical position. Recently, an important lobby was realised for the post commissioner on Agriculture. As the Romanian Foreign Minister Cristian Diaconescu says, “as this is a position of major importance, [...] I believe that through the combined efforts of those with competencies and responsibilities as far as foreign policy is concerned, we can obtain that seat”, because obtaining this position was considered important for Romania. In the result of Romania’s lobby within their foreign policy among EU member, Dacian Ciolos former Minister of Agriculture between October 2007 and December 2008 was nominated commissioner on Agriculture on November 2009.

With the EU's new diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU intended to have a greater role in foreign policy and to answer to Henry Kissinger's famous question, 'Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?' Romania decided before the creation of the service, to play an important role by favoring its position and to get the best position as possible. For exemple, Romanian leaders was looking for a

1299 Ibid.
EU foreign policy position thru their challenger, Adrian Severin. Infortunatelly for Romania due to EU political question, Romania did not reach its goal. Regardless, Romania looks to favour its position in the EEAS, by lobbying for the EU ambassador representation in the People’s Republic of China, an important representation, in the person of its actual ambassador and Viorel Istitioia-Budura.
IV.4 The Neighborliness

Besides, did not they [Romanians] say that their best neighbor is the Black Sea?

François Després, 1996 

On the border land, Romania has Central and Eastern European neighbors from the Visegrád group on the west side, Hungary; Balkans countries on the south side as Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; on the north side with Ukraine, and on the Eastern side the Republic of Moldova and again Ukraine with borders land. As well, Romania neighbors on the Black Sea side with Bulgaria, Turkey, and Ukraine, also neighbors’ relations in the Caucasus, represented by the Russian Federation and Georgia (figure 8). Two neighbors of Romania were new independent states – Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova –. Romania’s neighbourhood relationships were burdened with unresolved historical tensions and lost of territories after the Second World War. The Romania’s post-communist neighbourhood policy would have potentially conflicting elements concerning the building relations with neighbors, and supporting the Romanian minorities.

It is not our goal to intend to develop fully the neighborliness theme that can need a different thesis work in itself, but we understand the need to underline this aspect of the Romania’s foreign policy in its importance concerning the country’s international relations objectives. We will see the significant incidence of neighborliness on the Romania’s accession to NATO and EU, as an importance on the leadership will towards the Black Sea. In the same way, we will grasp the Romania’s dependence vis-à-vis neighbors in its foreign policy as the interdependence with some states as


Bulgaria, Ukraine and later on some others as the republic of Moldova.

After the 89’ Revolution, we assist at two new phenomenons. The first one, in the consequences of the situation let by the previous communist government under Ceausescu leadership. The second is the reappearance, after the Soviet-communist domination of Eastern Europe, of all dormant questions – minorities, territorial claims, borders –. The situation left by the Ceausescu’s regime on international scene at the end of 89’ was catastrophic, and did not spare the neighbors states. Independent, Romania as during communism domination limited economical relation with other Eastern European Countries in the frame of CEMA, as a non-engagement with the Warsaw pact even if Romania was a full right member. The international community, particularly Hungary and West Germany, criticized systematization as a blatant attempt to forcibly assimilate all national minorities by Romanianization.

We want to remember rapidly some important points expressed after the ‘Iron Curtain’ fall, and implicit for countries accession to the both organizations, NATO and EU.

For example in the Charter of Paris for a new Europe signed by Romania in 1990, the rules recalled in accordance with the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, that signers accepted:

to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles or purposes of those documents. We recall that non-compliance with obligations […] constitutes a violation of international law.\textsuperscript{1302}

As well the Charter of Paris obliges states “to settle disputes by peaceful means”.\textsuperscript{1303}

As we can read in the NATO Handbook:

Aspirant countries are expected to achieve certain goals in the political and economic fields. These include settling any international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic

\textsuperscript{1302} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{1303} \textit{Ibid.}
control of their armed forces; and promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.\textsuperscript{1304}

\textbf{Figure 8: Romania and its Neighbors.}\textsuperscript{1305}

In addition, from the Copenhagen criteria’s of European Union:

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a


functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.\textsuperscript{1306}

For these organizations, here before named, some rules were important and must be applied before the integration process:

- First, the recognition of the state frontiers determined after the Second War World;
- Second, the right of minorities in the state land – also important and part of the U.S. foreign policy -;
- Third, the resolution of differences thru peaceful manner;
- Fourth, the good neighborliness.

### IV.4.1 Bulgaria

During the early 80s, the relations between Romania and Bulgaria were based on regular visits between heads of state to avoid tensions. Romania was a totalitarian state than Bulgaria, which was a more committed member of the Warsaw Pact. At that time, the two countries called for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. However, toward the end of eighties, both countries have accused each other of chemical pollution of the environment on the Danube line affecting each country. This situation deteriorating personal relations between the two leaders, Nicolae Ceausescu and Todor Zhivkov\textsuperscript{1307}, which accentuated their differences, linked with severe accusations on both side. However, during the eighties, Bulgaria has remained neutral in the dispute between Romania and Hungary concerning the treatment of Magyar ethnic minorities.

Another point of hiding problem between the two countries was the question of the Dobrogea region (figure 9). This territory alternated between the medieval Byzantine and Bulgarian empires until its fall in 1411 to the Ottoman Empire. It remained under Turkish rule until 1878, when Romania received the Northern part to guaranty access to the see for the country, and Bulgaria the smaller


\textsuperscript{1307} Zhivkov Todor was a dominant figure as a communist politician and leader of the People's Republic of Bulgaria for about thirty-five years, from March 4, 1954 until November 10, 1989.
Southern Dobruja (Treaty of Berlin, 1878). After the Second Balkan War\textsuperscript{1308} Bulgaria lost Southern Dobruja to the benefit of Romania (Treaty of Bucharest, 1913). Nevertheless, on September 1940 (Treaty of Craiova) German Nazi imposed the restoration of it to Bulgaria with a population exchange - the Romanian minority was forced to leave the south while the Bulgarian minority had to leave the north -. The post-1940 border situation was confirmed by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 and was not ratified by the both countries. On the other hand, we need to remember that the realization of the Greater Romania in 1918 led to fears in Sofia after the war.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure9.png}
\caption{The Dobroja region.\textsuperscript{1309}}
\end{figure}

As neighboring country, Bulgaria was the first to sign thru a joint commission with Romania, on January 1992, a Declaration of Friendship, Cooperation and Neighborhood and attempted to reach a compromise on the issue of environment. They restored the pragmatic, relatively friendly relations of the post-war period. We

\textsuperscript{1308} The Second Balkan War broke out on June \&-\? 1913 when Bulgaria attacked its erstwhile allies from the Balkan League (Greece, Montenegro and Serbia) in the First Balkan War (October 1912 - May 1913) against the Ottoman Empire. Romania which declared war on Bulgaria on June 27 and later the Ottoman Empire intervened against Bulgaria.

\textsuperscript{1309} The Northern Dobroja part of Romania is highlighted in orange and the Southern Dobruja is highlighted in yellow part of the Bulgaria.
need to underline that the Dobroja territory claim never was in discussion between the two countries.

The two countries faced the same challenges during the all post-communism period as some identical problems with a common approaches concerning International Organizations, the NATO and European accession process, as well the regional stability. As for Romania, Bulgaria has been seeking for good neighborliness and has proven a capability to act as a constructive force and promoting regional security.\textsuperscript{1310} We noticed that both Romania and Bulgaria officially engaged on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration, without neglecting the Russian factor for reasons that are not fully identical.\textsuperscript{1311} As well, the both countries have the same ambitions concerning the Balkan countries stability and the Black Sea leadership, because “Bulgaria views the cooperation in Southeast Europe and in the Black Sea region as one of the priority goals of the country’s foreign policy”.\textsuperscript{1312} We can remember the project of a nuclear-free zone creation in the Balkans supported by the both countries. The two of them had strengthless relations with the United States and in 2005, both signed a defense cooperation agreement for military access and use of their country military facilities.

The path of Bulgaria follows the same as Romania with membership to the CEFTA, a membership in NATO on March 29, 2004 and the European Union on January 1st, 2007. The two countries faced the same problems concerning the Balkans region instabilities, especially with the different Yugoslavian wars. Both countries Francophile strengths link at the same time with the Francophone organization, which they accessed in 1993. For the OIF Summit in Bucharest, Bulgaria and Romania worked together for the preparative, thru various meetings in Sofia.


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However, as we saw, here before in the thesis, the countries helped each others towards the European Union accession, even if some time it was creating an upset situation. We can resume the collaboration between Bulgaria and Romania with this motto - United we stand, divided we fall -.

IV.4.2 Hungary

A number of differences between the two countries emerged from the pre-89’ revolution period concerning territory potential claim and minority treatment. It is important to underline that the differences between the two countries will have a domestic policy incidence, and a foreign policy significance notably concerning the bilateral relations and the effort for NATO and European Union accession. The difference between Hungary and Romania is based on the old history and an ancestral hatred likewise the evolution of countries relations in the eighties.

Transylvania, a principality in the past where was living different population – Romanian, Magyar, Jude, Saxon, Slovak, Serbs, … - became a piece of land part of the Hungarian Kingdom in the 19th century situation issued from the 1848 revolution and the building of ‘Nation-State’ (figure 10). The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War and the lost two thirds of territory and 60% of population to Slovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Ukraine and others under the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 was seen as a catastrophe by Hungarians (figure 11).

And as Keith Hitchins states in other words,

the problem of Transylvania stood in the way of any significant rapprochement between Hungary and Rumania. Sucessive Hungarian governents throughout the inter-war period never ceased to hope for the return of a territory they regarded as an integral part of historical Hungary, and no Rumanian government would contemplate the slightest concession that might diminish its sovereignty over the province.\textsuperscript{1313}

Figure 10: Transylvania.

A large part of the Transylvanian land occupied by a majority of Romanians, despite the Magyarisation of the population, was given to Romania according to ethnic representation. After a come and back with Hungary during the Second World War (figure 12), in 1945 the Transylvanian land was stabilized to the modern states situation. Despite the history, the two countries experimented the Soviet communism domination thru a ‘common destiny’. If in the 19th Century, Hungary built a Nation-State, on Jacobin model - One Nation, One people -, Romania will do it only in the 20 Century with a strong romanianization of the minorities.

In Eastern Europe, historiography played a major role in the state and nation building process¹³¹⁴ as main ideological battlefield and direct source of legitimacy for political power.¹³¹⁵ With the myth on Transylvania, a common background to Hungary and Romania was intensively used by both countries.

**Figure 11: The dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary.**

Hungarians consider that in Transylvania, the Hungarian culture and the Hungarian political elite could survive and perpetuate themselves in a difficult period of Hungarian history; Romanians consider that Transylvania is the core of the Romanian land and the cradle of the Romanian civilisation, the demographic reservoir of the Romanian nation.  

As well, the conflict was in the civil society, the written media and the scholars of each country battle on this subject, thru magazine communication and books. In 1987, the Hungarian Academy Publishing House published a *History of Transylvania* in three volumes from their own point of view and was denounced by Romanian authorities.  

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1318 To see: Ibid.
As explains Antonela Capelle-Pogacean, the two communist elites in Budapest and Bucharest make a different choice of development thru pragmatism and renunciation of legitimation for Hungary, and a proactive communism tinted by nationalism in Romania, a political project based on the assimilation of minorities resulting in the emigration especially of Jews and Germans, but others minorities – Gypsies, Magyars – remaining in the country. It happened that in the end of eighties, the Hungarian government was not enjoy about the sort of Magyar minorities in Transylvania, the economical and political situation in Romania pushing thousand of Romanian-Magyar to run away to Hungary. As Iordachi Constantin wrote, “[i]n the late 1980’s the Romanian became for Hungarians [...] the great danger, as they menace the very existence of Hungarian minority from Transylvania and even Hungary's national

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security.” Hungary intervened more and more openly in Romania domestic policy concerning minorities, made pressure on international community by filling an official complaint accusing Romania on violations of basic human rights to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva and by Hungarian lobby to the U.S. congress to revoke the Romania’s MFN status. “The Romanian-Hungarian antagonism is back”, says Antonela Capelle-Pogacean.

After the 89’ Revolution, the Hungarian minority organized itself thru political organization: the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR). The organization – UDMR - set as its goal to promote the interests of the Hungarian minority in Romania and to defend its ethnic and cultural identity. They sought support for their actions and found it thru the Hungarian state government. The beginning of the Romania’s democracy stumbled on the Magyar minority problem in the earlier nineties and lead to open conflict with the Hungarian government concerning this issue abroad mainly with Romania as well Slovakia. We want to underline that

Hungarians in the three neighoring states [Roamania, Serbia, Slovakia] plus Magyars in Ukraine, Austria and Croatia, total about 3,25 million people-a population of more than 30 percent of Hungary’s own population. Another two million people with ethnic ties to Hungary [...] live in Western Europe, North America, and elsewhere.

The relation of the two countries, Hungary and Romania, passed thru top and down relations depending the domestic agenda and orientation of the countries. Romania made efforts to advance with neighbor relationship thru the ‘Open Skies’ Treaty. Romania and Hungary signed their own bilateral Open Skies agreement during their bilateral talk in May 1991. This agreement starts “an Open Skies

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regime and its successful implementation would encourage reciprocal openness on the part of the States Parties, enhance the predictability of their military activities and strengthen confidence between them”.1324 “In order to benefit from its experience, Hungary and Romania still organize annual training exercises”1325 according to Anca Jurcan, disarmament affairs representative for Romania. In addition, Romania proposed to share its experiences with others states. “Hungary and Romania became the first states ever successfully to negotiate and sign a bilateral Open Skies agreement.”1326

At the 2005 ‘Open Skies’ Treaty Review Conference the members agree that

[t]he States Parties recognize that the Treaty might serve as a model for aerial surveillance regimes in other regions of the world in order to promote security and stability. They are prepared to enter into dialogue with interested parties in order to share experience, to exchange general information about the Treaty and its benefits and to provide support and advice on cooperative aerial observation.1327

Nevertheless, about the Magyar minorities’ problems for the North Atlantic Committee, in May 1992 Huberte Hanquet and Javier Ruperez wrote that it “is a permanent hotbed of tensions in Romania. [...] [Romania] is one of the European countries where the problem of the protection of minorities is most acute”.1328 We can add that


Stephen Griffiths, in his report for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), mentions in 1993, that

[0]ver the past three years, Romania has developed a tremendous sense of insecurity from the existence of such a large Hungarian minority in Transylvania and has gone to extraordinary lengths to defend itself from Hungarian charges of discrimination. However, there is a great deal of evidence that over the past two years inter-ethnic relations in the region have polarized dramatically and that much of the trouble has been caused by Romanian extremists, working with the 'approval' of seemingly compliant officials. 1329

The Research report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) coordinated by Domique Rosemberg underlined at the same time that “nationalist tensions did not disappear in Transylvania and both from the Romanian side and the Magyar side provocations are likely to come, [...] the passions are exacerbated, especially marked by the interdiction of bilingualism, instituted by some Romanian authorities, for instance the mayor of Cluj”1330

We can note in the nineties that

the orientation of the Hungarian foreign politics was very clear. [...] The conservative governments of József Antall (1990-1993) and Viktor Orbán (1998-2000) regarded the question of the Hungarian minorities abroad as paramount and often defined the relationships to close countries and the closeness to the European Union depending on the matter.1331

As Nelson Daniel says when “diapora represents a large proposition of an ethnic group and the intrastate population is declining, one can expect added attention to neighbors and to the

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treatment of their Magyar minorities." Also, the Hungarian government used its Diaspora in the United States to make pression on Romania thru the U.S. representatives.

If time to time, Hungary in more powerful situation threw out Romania, as with the Romanian demanded to be accepted in the Visegrád group in 1991, or the membership the CEFTA due only to European states pressure on Hungary, there were considerable pressures from NATO and the European Union, since both organisations stressed that neither Romania nor Hungary would have a chance for membership unless they could resolve their differences. In addition, International Organizations as World Bank, FMI, conditioned their help with the human right development, i.e. minorities’ rights as democracy in the country. After years of poor relations and pressure from many officials of EU and NATO, Romania built a collaborative approach with the Hungarian government as well as with the Magyar minority. Romanian leaders give positive signal like the historical rapprochement between the two states – Hungary and Romania – supported by France and Germany on the example of the Franco-German reconciliation. The NATO study on enlargement in the fall of 1995 stipulated that one of the criteria that applicants would have to meet was the settlement of disputes with neighbors in a structured way so that there would be no future threat to alliance stability. The Romanian Foreign Minister, Teodor Melescanu, was quite blunt about this when he declared in Bucharest that without an agreement with Hungary, the door to Romania’s entry to NATO simply would be closed. Romania was committed to a neighborlines positive attitude by resolving potential conflict thru agreement and negotiation, and in September 1996, it is signed, at Timisoara, a Treaty of understanding, cooperation and good-neighbor policy between Romania and the Hungarian Republic. This treaty is a great event and a big step in the relation between the two countries and a step forward for entering in NATO and EU. Even, during a visit in Bucharest on May 25, the Hungarian President, Aprad Goncz, assured his support to Romania for NATO and EU accession.


Among other things, the pact declared that the two countries harbor no territorial claims, and outlined the rights of national minorities according to European standards. In momentum, the two countries created a Romanian–Hungarian peacekeeping unit. At the same time, in 1996 Emil Constantinescu wins the presidential election on the based of a coalition with Magyar representative parties. In the Victor Ciorbea’s Government was integrated “the political representatives of the Hungarian minority”\textsuperscript{1335} that facilitated the relations between countries. We can add that “[r]egarding the relationship of the UDMR with the Romanian political class, we must recall that the Union was, until February 1995, a member of the Democratic Convention (CDR), which included the main opposition parties.”\textsuperscript{1336}

The Western organizations have possibility to pressure and condition the integration process to NATO and EU with good neighboringness in order to appease the bilateral relations and to impose a rapprochement between Bucharest and Budapest. This message was especially underlined during the Paris Conference on Stability in Europe under the aegis of OCDE (March 1995) focused on the necessity to consolidate country’s borders and to ensure the protection of minorities.

As Antonela Capelle-Pogaceaean states, “Hungary is obliged to take into account the reluctance of the West vis-à-vis the issue of collective rights or ethnic autonomy”.\textsuperscript{1337} In addition, the difference timing and treatment of Bucharest’s integration in the EU will create few problems for the Hungarian government, as drawing a border between the Hungarian and Magyar minorities in Romania. Hungary had interest of Romania’s integration in the same time or immediately after Hungary accession. In 1997, at the NATO Madrid Summit, Hungarian leaders advised the Alliance about the danger to reject Romania at the first wave integration. However, even if the two countries were aware to the necessity to manage good neighboringness, the relation was going top and down in function of the country’s political agenda and the definition of national interest of each elected government, and regularly we could assist to verbal jousts and positions between states representatives. Hungary action

\textsuperscript{1337} Ibid. p. 33.
vis-à-vis Romania was limited to foreign policy limits and could not interfere directly on Romania’s national prerogatives, and reciprocally. For example, in 2001 when Hungarian leaders passed a law - the Hungarian ‘status law’ - extending the benefits of the Hungarian Government of any ethnic Hungarian, regardless the place of residence, the Romanian president, Ion Iliescu, felt that it was an interference in the Romanian State sovereignty and protested vehemently about it, and even threatened to cancel the 1996 treaty agreement between the two countries. Ion Iliescu has been unable to collect any support from Europe to comfort his position, and quickly abandoned his position. In March 2003, however Romania with Slovakia hardly criticized Hungary to maintain this law, denounced by the Council of Europe not being in accordance to the non-discrimination European principles. This issue on Hungarian minorities is considering as an important issue for the Hungarian government considering it responsibility vis-à-vis any Hungarian outside the native country.

Not only on the historical past, the two countries in the post-sovietic period had a lot in common in the transition process from centralized and authoritarian regime to democracy and free-market economy, but also concerning their foreign policy agenda. The Hungarian foreign policy had at list three main thrusts: the North-Atlantic and European orientation; the regional policy; and, third, supporting ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states. Continuity was maintained in matters of national interest although small changes in foreign policy concerning policies towards regionalism independently from the government in place.

The Romanian foreign policy had three main objectives: the North-Atlantic and European integration; the good neighborliness and the leadership towards the Black Sea region. The objectives were constantly monitored by the succeeded government despite domestic political agenda and troubles brought by the regional environment.

In fact, the North-Atlantic and European integration was a trigger for both states to achieve a certain consensus and resolution of their differences in a peaceful manner in the NATO and European agenda and rules. The two organizations imposed their rules and requirements in order to manage the potential conflict in Eastern Europe. For example, the Pact on Stability known as 'Balladur Plan', applies, between 1993-1995, a principle of preventive diplomacy to avoid other conflict in Eastern Europe as Yugoslav’s one, and imposes on one hand to Hungary, and the other hand to Romania and Slovakia the principle of good neighborly relations and encourages the resolution of minorities problems. The two countries were in their
common goals dependent of their neighborliness relation, and interdependent from their domestic political agenda and national interest.

However, even if the two countries maintain a certain level of good neighborliness, the Hungarian minority issue in Romania continues to be a problematic subject. The Article 11 of Recommendation 1201 from the Council of Europe stipulates that where is a majority of population from the same faith; they can “have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status matching the specific historical and territorial situation.” \(^{1338}\) This position reinforced the rhetoric speech from Hungarian Government as minority leaders. The UDMR, Hungarian local political party in Romania, even if it has position in each government and the representation of the Magyar minority in the parliament, wants the creation of a Hungarian Autonomous Region – the Szekely Land - as in the Communist period (1952-1968) (figure 13).

The purpose of the union (UDMR) is to get the territorial autonomy for the Hungarian minority, according to its leader Bela Marko, who claims that “we [Hungarians] deserve it”. \(^{1339}\) The leaders of the UDMR voted the statement of the territorial autonomy for Szekely Region\(^ {1340}\), which means decentralization of the territories in Romania to give more power for the local authorities and better distribution of the money. According to a Marko’s 2007 statement, the goal of the UDMR is to “recover the country lost in 1918”, including “the houses, the woods, the lands, and the flag”. \(^ {1341}\) This


\(^{1340}\) ___. Vot pentru declarația de autonomie (Vote for the autonomy declaration). Bună Ziua Ardeal, 02 oct. 2006.

'will' is supported by the Hungarian extremist party wanted to recover the “Greater Hungary” pre-1920.\textsuperscript{1342}

\textbf{Figure 13: The Szekely Land Issues.}\textsuperscript{1343}

Bucharest leaders interpreted, in the light of Kosovo independence, as an invitation to secession. “Kosovo can not constitute a precedent for either Romania or other countries. Even Russia, although suspects that Russia will use Kosovo precedent, explained that cannot be a precedent. As far as we are concerned,


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there was no link between Kosovo and Romania. Nobody can ever say that a government, whatever it was, came with tanks over a minority," appreciated Traian Basescu.\textsuperscript{1344}

The Magyar minority question between the two countries remains in a kind of status quo; if Romanian authorities apply the minorities right in the country, they also defined a maximum level of right that for Hungarian contre-part represent a minimum base of discussion that can go until the decentralisation and the creation of an autonomous Hungarian region in Romania. The declarations of both presidents illustrated very well this situation. For the Hungarian president Laszlo Solyom,

[t]he Sekler region - and similar areas in other countries where communities of Hungarians live - is protected by international law from altering ethnic proportions. But, that is insufficient. The Hungarians here need to combine their economic, political and cultural power to survive. It is also necessary for the Romanian majority to recognize the economic and cultural advantages to Romania of having a local Hungarian community, as well as the advantages of their political activism and political culture. If the Sekler region is a historical unit, which it is today, its desire to have an administrative framework adjusted to its uniformity and able to promote its economic development should be considered. I am talking of qualifying the Sekler land as a single and united development region, an idea I consider advantageous, fair, and worthy of support.\textsuperscript{1345}

For Romanian counterpart, Traian Basescu,

As regards the national minorities issue, Romania complies with all EU standards as regards minorities, highlighting that, though there are things that still need to be done for the 19 minorities officially recognized in


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Romania, there is no document, no analysis questioning Romania's policy towards minorities.\(^{1346}\)

In this different point of view of the minorities’ right, Brussels can play the role of mediator and the European law will give the limit of resolution. Nevertheless, the country decided to collaborate and to develop more economical projects as the gas transportation system and the VII paneuropean corridor - Rhin-Main-Danube navigation road -. The Romanian president asks for the Hungarian president support for the promotion of the Danube project during Presidency of the Council of the European Union hold by Hungary in 2011.

IV.4.3 The Republic of Moldova

At the border of Romania, in 1991 during the dislocation of the Soviet Empire, appeared a new independent state: the Republic of Moldova (RM). The two countries have some language, cultural and historical specificities that made their relation different from other neighbors.

The links between Romania and the Republic of Moldova (RM) are ancient. The first problem begins with the use of words - Moldova and Bessarabia -. Historically, the Republic of Moldova is an old part of the Kingdom of Moldavia constituted in the fourteenth century, a land on the both side of the Prut river covering until the Dniester river on the East side (figure 14).

Figure 14: The Principality of Moldavia in 1483.

The area between the two rivers (Prut and Dniester) derives from the Wallachian Basarab dynasty, who allegedly ruled over the Southern part of the area in the fourteenth century. The name Bessarabia originally applied only to the Southern part of the territory, which roughly, but not exactly, corresponds to Budjak. The Ottomans were the first to call it ‘Besarabya’, when they established military presence in the area in 1484 and 1538. Since late fourteenth century, what later became Bessarabia has been partly or wholly controlled by the Principality of Moldavia, the Ottoman Empire (as suzerain of Moldavia, direct rule only in Budjak and Khotin), Russian Empire, Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova. In the seventeenth century, the treaty of Lutk (April 13, 1771) between the prince of Moldova and the Russian Tsar, Peter the Great, understood that after the former Moldovan border, the lands of the Principality of Moldova, on which the ruling prince are those between the Dniester, Cemenita, Bender, the country of Bugeac, the Danube, the Border with Wallachian and
Transylvanian country and border of Poland, according to the demarcations made with them; this is the formal recognition by Peter the Great of the historical rights of Moldova throughout the territory between the Prut, the Danube and the Dniester.\textsuperscript{1347} However, as wrote Charles Upson Clark, “[t]he seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a period of slow disintegration for Moldavia and Turkey, but of rapid rise for Austria and Russia.”\textsuperscript{1348} Bessarabia was highly involved in Russian dreams of reaching Constantinople, and Austrian ambitions of extension to the Black Sea. “This unfortunate country, after centuries of raids by Poles, Tartars, Turks and Cossacks, now becomes a pawn in contests of wider international range, destined finally to involve all Europe”,\textsuperscript{1349} wrote Upson Clark. Until 1812, Bessarabia was an integral part of the Moldavian kingdom (Voivodate).\textsuperscript{1350} In 1812 as a result of the Russian-Turkish Peace Treaty signed in Bucharest, the eastern part of Moldova situated between the Prut and Dniestre rivers, named Bessarabia, was annexed to the Russian Empire, thus being a Russian province until 1918. During this period, the russification of the country as well the church began, but the population remain as they are; they use to say “Father Russian, mother Russian, but Ivan, the son, is Moldavian”.\textsuperscript{1351} On 1918, the Bessarabian parliament met in solemn session to proclaim the independence of the Moldavian Republic from Russia, and the country had become an independent state. However, they “realised that the only sensible solution of the Bessarabia problem was the union of this old Moldavian territory with the Kingdom of Rumania”.\textsuperscript{1352} The Bessarabia (figure 15) joins Romania after the First World War to constitute the ‘Greater Romania’ (figure 16).

\textsuperscript{1347} Ioniţă, Gheorghe I. Români de dincolo de actualele hotare ale țării (Romanians beyond the current borders of the country). Bucureşti: Universităţii Creştine Dimitrie Cantemir, 1996. p. 56.
\textsuperscript{1349} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1351} Tata rus’, mama rus’, Dar Ivan, moldovan’.
Nevertheless, after the First World War, the Bessarabia was the center of Romanian-Sovietic relations modifying all the time the border draft until the creation of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) (figure 17).

Figure 15: The Bessarabia.

Furthermore, newly communist Russia did not recognize the Romanian rule over Bessarabia and considered the region to be Soviet territory under foreign occupation and conducted numerous diplomatic attempts to reclaim it.1353

During the Second World War, Stalin “received assurance that Germany would approve secret protocols to the proposed nonaggression pact that it would be grant land the Soviets in Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and Romania.1354 Another clause of the

treaty, known as Ribbentrop-Molotov, was that Bessarabia, and then part of Romania, will joined to the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR), and become the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) under control of Moscow until the dislocation of the Soviet Union.

Figure 16: The Greater Romania 1918-1940.

Romania never accepted the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact even during the Ceausescu period, likewise other Eastern states like Baltic States. In June 1991, Romania's Parliament adopted a declaration thru which one, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was declared ‘null and void’ that have indirectly consequences on the possible non-recognition of the actual borders of Eastern Europe.

The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova proclaimed the independence of the Moldovan state on August 27, 1991, and in December of the same year joined the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) along with most of the former Soviet republics. At the end of that year, a former communist reformer, Mircea Snegur, won an unchallenged election for the presidency. Three months later, the country achieved formal recognition as an independent state at the United Nations. The state language officially called Moldovan, as it is mentioned in the Constitution, is in the Declaration of Independence in fact called Romanian. Before the independence in 1989, Moldova introduced Romanian as official language (in place of Russian) and introduced the Latin script instead of Cyrillic alphabet. The Moldovan SSR was an artificial creation with Russian, Ukrainian and Gagauzes (turcophone from orthodox religion) minorities. However, as says Stefan Ihrig, “the Republic of Moldova

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1355 If the Republic of Moldova joint the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 21, 1991, the agreement ratification was only done on April 8, 1994 and for the CIS Charter on 27 June 1994.

(RM) seems to be one [country] especially ridden by ethnic conflict and the paramount question of national identity”.\textsuperscript{1357} As says Igor Botan, the Parliament has played a major role in Moldova’s separatist conflicts when parliament adopted some normative acts ostensibly to enhance the sovereignty of Moldova that provoked separatist dissent.\textsuperscript{1358} From 1989 all this minorities claim their difference (figure 18). In August 1990, the Gagauz declared themselves their autonomous Republic because they were worried about the implications for them if Moldova reunited with Romania, as seemed increasingly likely.

\textbf{Figure 18: The Republic of Moldova.}


Nevertheless, the Moldovan government cancelled the declaration as unconstitutional. Gagauzia declared itself independent on 19 August 1991, followed by Pridnestrovie (Transnistria)\textsuperscript{1359} in September. For Stefan Ihrig\textsuperscript{1360}, “[t]he talk of a possible reunification with Romania in the early nineties spurred the pro-independence movements in Gagauzia and Transnistria,”\textsuperscript{1361} that lead to actual situation, especially with the Pridnestrovie\textsuperscript{1362} strongly supported by Russia (the 14th Army remains stationed in Transnistria) and are not

\textsuperscript{1359} There are a number of names used to refer to the de facto state. The official names are respectively short- and long- , Pridnestrovie and Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) (the formal name in Russian is: Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika; in Moldovan Cyrillic alphabet: Республика Молдовеняскэ Нистрэа). The name in daily usage is Pridnestrovie (Приднестрьвье). The country government favours not to translate the country name when written in English: Pridnestrovie - is also the official shortform name in English. Per a 2000 presidential naming decree, the official transliteration in Latin script is Pridnestrovie. However, in English a wide variety of names have been used to describe the region, among them: Trans-Dniester, Transnistria, Transnistria, Transdniestr, Transdniester, Transnietria, Transdnestr, also Trans-Dnjestr and Trans-Dnjester. The government of Moldova refers to the region Stînga Nistrului, which means ‘Left Bank of the Dniester’ although in the Moldavian Latin script, the official name is Republica Moldovenească Nistreană (which translates to English as Nistrian Moldavian Republic). The European Court of Human Rights used the name Moldavian Republic of Transnistria or Moldovan Republic of Transnistria (MRT), while OSCE and others sometimes refer to it as the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR). Author Charles King, in his book ‘The Moldovans’, uses the names Dnestr Republic and Dnestr Moldovan Republic (DMR). This land is a disputed region between Moldova and Ukraine in southeast Europe. Since its declaration of independence in 1990, followed by the War of Transnistria in 1992, it is governed by the Unrecognized states Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), which claims the left bank of the Dniester river and the city of Bendery within the former Moldavian SSR. The modern Republic of Moldova does not recognize the secession and considers PMR-controlled territories to be a part of Moldova’s sovereign territory. Pridnestrovie is located mostly in a strip between the Dniester River and Ukraine.


\textsuperscript{1360} Ihrig Stefan is a research fellow at the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Germany.


recognized officially by other states and by international community. The problems for the RM is that the Pridnestrovie country is a rich area with large industrial centres of (Tiraspol, Bender, Rybnitsa, Dubossary), and the only access to gas and electricity for the RM, and weakened it economically and politically. In February 1994, the President of the Republic of Moldova Mircea Snegur, opposed to Gaugauz independence, promised a gauauz autonomous region, and on December 23, 1994, Gagauzia became a national-territorial autonomous unit within the Republic of Moldova.

**IV.4.3.1 The Independence**

On 6 May 1990, Romania and the Moldavian SSR lifted restrictions on travel between the two territories, known as the 'bridge of flowers', and hundreds of thousands of people crossed the Prut River which marked their common border.

Romania was the first state to recognize the RM independence only a few hours, in fact, after the declaration of independence was issued by the Moldovan parliament. From the declaration of the Romanian Government made on that occasion it clearly resulted that, in the opinion of the authorities in Bucharest, Moldova's independence was considered as a form of emancipation from Moscow's tutelage and a step towards the reunification with Romania:

The proclamation of an independent Romanian state in the territories annexed by force, following the secret understanding set through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, represents a decisive step towards the elimination,

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in a peaceful way, of its unfortunate consequences directed against the rights and the interests of the Romanian people.\textsuperscript{1365}

At that time, it was generally expected in both countries (especially in Romania, though to some extent in Moldova too) that they would soon be united. Adrian Nastase underlined, after a visit in March 1991, that he had a discussion with Mircea Snegur “without interpreter, in a friendly environment, as it should be between partners, who have the same roots and share the same intentions”.\textsuperscript{1366} In the same time, Mircea Snegur, the President of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova, paid an official visit to strengthen the relation with Romania, and “spoke favorably of ‘our sister country-Romania’ ” but underlines the birth of a ‘Greater Moldovan’ nationalism.\textsuperscript{1367} “The Moldavian Head of State will emphasize the ‘historical’ character of this ‘meeting between partners’.”\textsuperscript{1368} At the end of 1991, Romanian leaders, such as the Foreign Minister, Adrian Nastase, looked to the reunification in very optimistic way, speaking of an eventual ‘economical confederation’ and even unification ‘on the German model’.\textsuperscript{1369} The same year, the Romanian state passed a special law – the Citizenship Act (No. 21) -, which allowed the Romanian citizenship by any person who had it before 1940, and for its descendants of the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} degrees. It was just necessary to provide that the loss of citizenship be made for reasons that did not rest on. It was thus sufficient to prove by documents that his parents or grandparents were Romanian citizens before 1940. This measure was designed to correct the injustices of


\textsuperscript{1369} _____. În viitor o unificare după modelul german. \textit{România Liberă}, August 9, 1991.
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the communist era and it was perhaps intended to demonstrate to Moldavians-Bassarabian that in reality they were Romanians. A move toward hope for reunification between the two countries. They also signed a cooperation agreement between the two countries. They have regular meetings in Romania and in the Moldovan Republic in 1992. Romania in July 1992, declares that the country is worried about the Pridnestrovie conflict and makes efforts to promote peace from proposal of Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. However, the Moldovan state recently independent starts to build its own identity with new elite jealous of its own interest. The two presidents, Moldovan and Romanian have followed the formula of ‘one people, two States’.  

However, the pro-Moscow politics of Romanian president Ion Iliescu made both sides more cautious and delayed a strengthening of ties. In fact, “[o]n the Romanian side, foreign policy towards the top of Moldova 1990s has not been more consistent. Despite some statements pro-unionists made by some of the Romanian political class, the desire of Romania to integrate the Republic of Moldova has never been expressed explicitly.”  

However, in other side in the nineties, Romania showed a nationalist and traditionally aggressive image in relation with its neighbors in an international context of Soviet Empire dissolution and the Moldova emancipation from the USSR. In fact, “the behavior of the Bucharest nationalist regime until 1996 raised the West’s suspicion as to Romania’s attitude towards its neighbors,“ and especially with Moldova and the rhetorical of unification.

For the authors, Gabriel Andreescu, Valentin Stan and Renate Weber, “[r]egarding these territories, lost by Romania in favour of the USSR, there has always been in [...] [Romania], even during the


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period of Soviet domination, an acute consciousness of the historical injustice done to the Romanian people."\textsuperscript{1373} The collapse of communism in Romania, the dislocation of the Soviet Union and the independence of the RM, especially with the reintroduction of the Romanian language, Latin alphabet and the new state arms and color, has been viewed by Romanian, what “was an unexpressed goal”;\textsuperscript{1374} the possible reintegration of Moldova in Romania. While at the beginning, the reunification seemed to be ‘the natural course’ for part of the “Romanian-speaking two thirds of the population (according to the 1989 census) of the Moldovan republic”,\textsuperscript{1375} as well for Romanian from Romania. To reinforce this idea of special relations, Nicolae Chirtoaca, the director of the Euro-Atlantic Centre in the Republic of Moldova wrote:

I would like to mention from the very start, that the beginning of bilateral relations between the Republic of Moldova and Romania does not refer to the period that followed the collapse of the USSR and declaration of independence by the former Union republics. Right after the former Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) declared itself a sovereign member of the former union, both parties initiated decisive measures to establish bilateral relations, bypassing the former Union center.\textsuperscript{1376}

At that time, the Helsinki Final Act stipulates in its principles that the frontiers can be changed only in accordance of international law, by peaceful manners and by agreement. The ‘Charter of Paris for A New Europe’ reinforced these principles in November 1990, as also the documents of the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in 1992, ‘The Challenges of Change’. Romania was a signatory of these documents. As, Romania never accepted the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the door was open for a possible reunification between the two countries. However, if we consider that the Peace Treaty of Paris signed in 1947 is the base of the European borders and


\textsuperscript{1374} Ibid.


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stability, and brought back Transylvania to Romania and guarantee the actual borders of the country, one can not ask at the same time for the preservation of the Western borders of the country and its modification on the east side. The non-acceptance of the actual situation “would have all the consequences that can be generated today by the non-recognition or non-observance of the existing frontiers in Europe”, as was happened for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, also Romania cannot ask to Hungary to respect the basic base of treaty, if Romania is not doing it on Eastern part of the country.

IV.4.3.2 The Civil War

The war in Pridnestrovie involved armed clashes on a limited scale that broke out between Pridnestrovian Republican Guard, militia and Cossack units, supported by the Russian 14th army and Moldovan policemen and troops as early as November 1990 at Dubasari. Fighting intensified on 1 March 1992, with the accession of newly independent Moldova into the UN and alternated by ad hoc ceasefires, lasted throughout spring and early summer 1992 until a ceasefire was declared on 21 July 1992, which has held ever since. As wrote Ozhiganov Edward, “[t]he region’s complex population mix, the confused history of its status, and its important geopolitical location explains the involvement of Russia, Ukraine, and Romania, each of which has its own strategic interest.” The Pridnestrovie received a larger support than Moldova did during the conflict. The Pridnestrovian army was supported by Russia (the 14th army was stationed in the country) and Ukraine. The Russian Army received

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1378 Ozhiganov Edward is professor of the Chair of Political Sciences, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences of the People’s Friendship University of Russia.


order to aid the Pridnestrovians during the conflict. Each country - Russia and Ukraine - sent a force of volunteers to fight alongside the Pridnestrovians. Romania was the only state to aid Moldova during the conflict on official and un-official sides.\textsuperscript{1381} At an official level, Romania was active; On 17 March 1992, the Romanian government publicly demanded urgent measures from Russia towards a settlement that would bring Pridnestrovie under the full control of Moldova. Namely, Romania at that time had already been financing and equipping Moldova, which was supported with weapons, military vehicles (Romanian tanks) and a force of volunteers and Romanian military advisers.\textsuperscript{1382} According to the special situation, “[t]he Republic of Moldova (RM) was called a ‘buffer state’ between Romania and Ukraine, but in fact, it is a buffer state between two major geopolitical projects: the Euro-Atlantic project (under NATO and EU aegis), and the Euro-Asian one (under the aegis of Russia)”\textsuperscript{1383} In fact, for Romania, while most political parties give mild support to the concept, at least in theory, unification would most probably be a burden on the Romanian economy, considering that Moldova is currently among the poorest countries in Europe, which means a burden for Romania accession process to NATO and the European Union. The Romanian leaders did not enjoy the Russian brutal show of force and the perspective of a potential direct conflict with Russian troops. As says Nicolae Chirtoaca,

[t]he destabilized domestic situation in the Republic of Moldova, as a result of the separatist actions by Tiraspol and Comrat authorities, the presence of a Russian army in the Republic of Moldova, especially in the eastern counties, the uncertain Romanian-Russian relations conditioned Bucharest to support the Moldovan policy of strengthening its independence and assuring the territorial integrity of the neighboring country, granting Moldovan leadership diplomatic assistance, support in international bodies

and institutions and developing privileged and special bilateral relations, in
the political, economic and cultural fields, first and foremost.\textsuperscript{1384}

In addition, we can say that since the independence, the
Moldova country has been subject to three contrary forces: one,
trying to achieve a union with Romania; another one wanted to go
nearest Russia; and the last trying to preserve Moldova as an
independent distinct state. First, Romanianism argues that the
majority of population in Moldova is Romanian, and concludes that
reunification is a logical end. Second, Moldovanism\textsuperscript{1385}, by contrast,
argues that the majority of the population constitute a nation, the
Moldova, necessarily an independent state. However, if all this does
not even lend to confusion, the RM has developed special features as
explains Stefan Ihrig\textsuperscript{1386}; the conflict between Moldovanism and
Romanianism has resulted in a perfect deadlock in many societal
spheres. The initial enthusiasm in Moldova was tempered and from
1993, Moldova started distancing itself from Romania. The new
constitution adopted in 1994 used the term ‘Moldovan language’
instead of ‘Romanian’ and changed the national anthem to ‘limba
noastra’. Having oscillated between the adoption of a Romanian
identity in relation with Romania and Moldova in an identity
relationship with Russia, they finally opted for the construction of a
separate Moldovan identity.\textsuperscript{1387} Moreover, in the end of 1994, the RM
seems to be decided to reinstate the Russian sphere of influence.
From 1990 to 2001, a special collaboration with Romania was built
trying to strength the cultural and economical relations. In fact, as
wrote Gabriel Andreescu, Valentin Stan and Renate Weber, “from
1991 until 1994 the relations between Romania and the Republic of
Moldova went all the way from excitement and enthusiasm to a
situation of tension and public accusations with adverse effects on

\textsuperscript{1384} Chirtoaca, Nicolae. Romania - the Republic of Moldova: from the “flower
bridge” to the iron curtain [online]. October 2002 ed. Bucharest: Institute for Public
Policy, 2002. (The New Schengen Border and Its Impact on the Romanian -
p. 53.

\textsuperscript{1385} Moldovenism is a term used to refer to the political view that Moldovans
are an ethnicity separate from Romanians, primarily by critics of such views.

\textsuperscript{1386} Ihrig Stefan is a research fellow at the Georg Eckert Institute for
International Textbook Research in Germany.

\textsuperscript{1387} To see: Urse, Cristian. Moldovan Politics between Russia and Romania.
Paper presented at the 8th Annual World Convention of the Association for the
Study of Nationalities on 3-5 April 2003. New York: Harriman Institute, Columbia
University.
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both states."\(^{1388}\) For example, on April 14, 1994, the Chamber of Deputies of Romania’s Parliament adopted a declaration of protest against the decision of the Parliament in Chisinau to vote in favour of Moldova's accession to the CIS. Referring to the legitimate act of the Moldovan Parliament through which the latter “was conducting as it wished its relations with other states”\(^{1389}\), the protest of the Chamber of Deputies in Romania brought serious accusations to the legislative body of the other equal, sovereign and independent state:

Unfortunately, the vote of the Chisinau Parliament regrettfully reiterates, the criminal Pact and irresponsibly cancels the right of the Romanian nation to live in a complete historical and spiritual space (...) In view of their geography, culture, history and tradition, the natural place for our brothers across the river Prut is undoubtedly together with us, in the great family of European nations, and not as part of a Eurasian structure.\(^{1390}\)

The 2001 year in Moldova was marred by the election of Vladimir Voronin that turned the RM foreign policy toward Russia. In addition, from this period the foreign policy with Bucharest began conflictual. Between 2001 and 2004, the identity of the Moldavian country balanced between East and West and provoked several diplomatic crisis in the Romanian-Moldovan relations with the objective to show to Romania the new identity of the RM.\(^{1391}\) But, even if the Voronin foreign policy was more toward Russia, in the relation with European Union emerges as a government priority, which was drafted in the Government Program for 1999-2002, called ‘Supremacy of the law, economic rehabilitation, and European


\(^{1389}\) Ibid.


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integration’. In the same time, the new policy also encouraged a tripartite collaboration between Romania, Ukraine and a continuous “constructive relations with the Russian Federation, based on mutual respect - as the Federation is the main supplier of energy resources and the main consumer of national agriculture and processing industry products.”

A ‘Concept on National Policy’ was adopted in 2003, which is very similar to the Soviet era Moldovenism, by proclaiming that Moldovans (speaking the Moldovan language) are people different from the Romanians, who are described as an ethnic minority in Moldova. Until recently, a union between Romania and Moldova was deemed unlikely, owing to a lack of interest in both countries. From the point of view of the Transnistrian government, due to the current political situation, any Moldovan unification with Romania could only include the part of Moldova, which extends to the Dniester river. On the other side of the river, Pridnestrovie would not agree to be part of any union with Romania. Statements from Pridnestrovian officials support unification of Romania and Moldova as long as Pridnestrovie is not included. From the general situation draft, the Romanian-Moldavian re-unification seems impossible.

But the Romania’s relation with the RM is also based on two other fundamental items: The Romanian Constitution (Article 7), that states the concern for Romanians living outside the country’s borders; the international rules referring to the obligations of states to observe the basic rights and freedoms of national minorities including their right to maintain relations with the citizens of countries to which they are bound by ethnic, cultural and religious


1393 Government policies cited in Ibid. Romania - the Republic of Moldova: from the "flower bridge" to the iron curtain.


ties.\textsuperscript{1396} The authorities of the RM were called by International
Organizations and the EU to observe all the rights of individuals and
minorities in the country. This situation with minorities in the RM
pushed the Romanian authorities to support strongly the Romanians
in Moldova thru cultural and educational program, citizenship and
religious institution. This situation between Romania and Moldova
felt, in 2001, in a big crisis when Romania was accused to provide a
large support to the Bessarabian Metropolitan Church,\textsuperscript{1397} likewise the
expulsion of the Romanian military attaché under accusation of
interference in the Moldovan domestic affairs.

In fact as says so well Oleg Serebrian,\textsuperscript{1398} “[t]he complexity of
bilateral Romanian-Moldovan is also related to the geopolitical
interests of some big powers in the region and different geopolitical
orientations of Chisinau and Bucharest.”\textsuperscript{1399} We can add that in 2004
for Romania member of NATO and nearly member of the European
Union, a stable neighborliness was very important. On can say that in
2004, the situation appears clear between the two countries: ‘One
people, two countries’.

But at that time (2004), the Romanian newspaper Ziuă
published a series of articles saying that a senior Russian diplomat
proposed to the Romanian government a plan that he claimed “came
from president Putin himself”\textsuperscript{1400}, which would leave the west bank of

\textsuperscript{1396} Andreeşcu, Gabriel, Stan Valentin and Weber Renate. Romania’s

\textsuperscript{1397} Severin, Adrian. Anti-unionism sau anti-roman? [online]. (Anti-
23&id=74533&keyword=biserica+si+moldova>

\textsuperscript{1398} Chairman of the Social Liberal group in the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Republic of Moldova.

\textsuperscript{1399} Serebrian, Oleg. Dossier : “Bulgarie, Roumanie : enjeux d’une nouvelle
adhésion”. Roumanie et Moldavie: quelles relations après le 1er janvier 2007?
[online]. (File: "Bulgaria, Romania: issues of a new membership." Romania and

\textsuperscript{1400} To see: ___. Putin 97% [online]. Ziuă - English, Vol. 3037. Bucharest:
Ziuă, 2004e. [cited 23 Jan. 2009]. HyperText Markup Language. Available from:
<http://www.ziuĂ.net/display.php?id=149560&data=2004-06-10>., and Roncea,
Moldova in Romania in exchange of the Romania’s recognition of Pridnestrovie independence.\textsuperscript{1401} The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has neither confirmed nor denied the statements of the Romanian newspaper. Nevertheless, Romanian journalists and scholars immediately dismissed the plan since it would not address the question of the city of Tighina which is under the control of Moldova yet, nor the question of how Russia would manage to convince Furthermore, newly-communist Russia did not recognize the Romanian rule over Bessarabia and considered the region to be Soviet territory under foreign occupation and conducted numerous diplomatic attempts to reclaim it.\textsuperscript{1402}

### IV.4.3.3 Basescu’s Policies

With the new presidential administration at the end of 2004, the bilateral relations with the RM were placed on the top agenda of the Romanian foreign policy; the first official Presidential visit abroad was in Chisinau in January 2005. The President confirms during a Television show the direct interest of Romania for Moldova,\textsuperscript{1403} and in a speech in front of the foreign diplomatic corps that the relation with


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the RM will be a priority of the presidential mandate\textsuperscript{1404} because Romania has "une relation de coeur"\textsuperscript{1405} The Romania's President Traian Basescu, on June 28, 2005, has firmly condemned the Ribentrop-Molotov Pact, which led to the invasion and annexation, by Russian troops during the World War Two, of Romanian provinces of Bessarabia (Moldova) and North Bukovina (Ukraine)\textsuperscript{1406} In the same time in Moldova in 2005, a new party was created: the Unionist Movement of the Republic of Moldova\textsuperscript{1407} (MURM), and only the Christian-Democratic People's Party actively supported unification. However, the stance of the Christian-Democrats has become questionable due to their post-2005 collaboration with the Moldovan Communists. Due to this change in Moldovan politics, a new party, the National Liberal Party (Partidul National Liberal), mirroring the party with the same name in Romania, also calls for a loose union with Romania and integration within the EU.

In January 2006, the Romanian president, Traian Basescu declared that he strongly supports the Moldovan bid for joining the European Union and that “Romania and Moldova are linked by history, by tradition, with relations between people and unification of


\textsuperscript{1407} The Unionist Movement of the Republic of Moldova (MURM for Mișcarea Unionistă din Republica Moldova) is an organization which has as its main goal the Movement for unification of Moldova and Romania. The organization has already started procedures to become a political party in the Republic of Moldova. Its president, Ilie Bratu, has stated that it will run in the parliamentary elections of 2009.

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the Romanian nation can be made within the EU." Interpretations of the word ‘minimal policy’ have led some to believe that the current Romanian administration also has a maximal policy to formally unify the two countries. According to a March 2006 poll in Romania, 51% of Romanians support a union with Moldova, 27% are against, and another 10% declined to answer. In addition, of those supporting the union, 28% support a union with Moldova, including Pridnestrovie, while the rest of 16% support a union without Pridnestrovie. In July 2006, the Romanian president said that he had made a proposal of union to the Moldovan president, Vladimir Voronin, enabling Romania and Moldova to join the EU together. The offer, however, had been refused and Traian Basescu said that he would respect this decision and that Romania would help Moldova find its own way to integrate with the EU.

If the RM was not a concern for NATO and the European Union before the Romania’s accession, the question started to arise in 2002 with the future Romania’s accession to EU. The Romania’s EU accession will have an impact on trade and travelling from Moldova. Romania will have to implement new control and to ensure higher security on its border especially for the one sharing with Moldova. Romania will have in the common EU border structure to implement the Schengen rule, to put restriction and to implement visa for Moldovan citizens that created problems for Moldovans and foreign chancellery. In addition, the new regulation with EU will affect the trade in both sens. The special treatment and solidarity between the two countries will be more difficult even if “Bucharest officials hurried to say that Romania’s accession to the European Union would not

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1410 For example, if Moldovan citizens want to obtain a visa for Canada, they have to come to the nearest diplomatic office of this country, the one in Bucharest. So, they have to obtain a visa first for Romania, incising the cost and the complexity of administrative process.
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eaffect special relations with the Republic of Moldova."\textsuperscript{1411} Meanwhile, between 1991 and 2006, 95,000 Moldovans have obtained Romanian citizenship (2.2 % of the population) and the demand increased dramatically thereafter. In the autumn of 2006, the Unionist movement has gained some momentum as the subject was more regularly discussed in prominent Romanian language newspapers and as many Moldovans have applied for Romanian passports in August and September 2006, alone. According to Romanian president Traian Basescu, by the end of 2006, 530,000 demands from Moldovan citizens have been written, requesting Romanian citizenship. Basescu has also mentioned that the real number is higher as many of these demands are signed by not just one person but in many cases by entire families. In a subsequent televised interview, Traian Basescu further explained that so far, based on the over 500,000 demands, about 800,000 Moldovan have requested Romanian citizenship and that it is estimated that by the end of 2007, this number will increase to 1,500,000, which is almost 50% of Moldova’s population. However, it is important to note that requesting Romanian citizenship does not automatically infer one’s Unionist view. Hence, it is unclear whether the relationship between the citizenship demands and Unionism is a strong one or whether there are other causes for Moldovan seeking Romanian citizenship.

Romania joined the European Union in 2007, and while the country has recently supported Moldova in its foreign policy, many political analysts question Moldova’s political preparedness and whether it has made sufficient progress towards unification. In 2007, the President of Moldova declared in an interview that the two languages are identical, but said that Moldovan should have the right to call their language 'Moldovan'. Oleg Serebren, the leader of the Social-Liberal political party, declared that if the Moldovan and the Romans decided to unite, neither the United States nor Russia could put a stop to such a union.\textsuperscript{1412} Subsequently, the Romanian national reunification agenda had, for practical and political purposes,


ceased to exist. However, Romanian politicians are nowadays (2009) treating Romanians ethnic in Moldova as members of the Romanian Diaspora and provide a cultural support, as extending Romanian citizenship or scholarships to a chosen population in Moldova. With the Romanian project to oversimplify the grant of citizenship to ethnic Romanians living in Moldova, the European Union scares about another emigration wave of “millions of hungry new EU citizens”, equivalent to the Malta and Cyprus population. This situation and the Traian Băsescu’s recent public declaration tensed the relation; Moldova expelled Romania’s ambassador and accused its neighbor of stoking a coup attempt after demonstrators during post-election protests.

It could leave the Moldova country without citizens and put de facto, the European Union with approximately one million new Romanian citizens without the associated land. This is also a precedent that can be used for other Romanian minority in Ukraine (156,000) and for minorities from Eastern European countries, as Polish in Belarus (400,000) and Ukraine (144,000).

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It can be seen as a set of clear and coherent measures, paving the way to a reunification outcome. But we have to consider, as opposed to Germany in the case of the German reunification, Romania lacks of a strong economy capable of easily absorbing the extra of four million citizens of Moldova in case of the country’s absorption. What happened to Romania with the RM, is in the same way as what did Hungary with its minority abroad with Romania. When the Hungarian government gave the citizenship to the Magyar minorities in Romania, the Romanian government shouted scandal. Never the less, The Moldova-Romania relations are a controversial issue open for debate close to politics and citizens of the respective nations...

IV.4.4 Ukraine

As for some other neighbors, the relation between Romania and Ukraine will pass by cold and warm relation, interrupted by crisis and characterized by “an odd combination of suspicion and political pragmatism”¹⁴¹⁹ Ukraine declares its independence on August 24, 1991 at the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Ukraine is a founder member of the CIS and signed the agreement on December 8, 1991. Nevertheless, the independence of Ukraine will raise the question of the dissolution of Soviet Union borders. Three main factors will shape the Romania-Ukraine relations: the historical legacies, the foreign policy orientation and external factors as geopolitical context and the pressures of International Organizations.¹⁴²⁰

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IV.4.4.1 The Weight of Historical Legacies

IV.4.4.1.1 The Old Provinces

Romania have historical instable borders bringing a territorial different with Ukraine concerning the lost of territories – Bukovina, part of Bessarabia, Serpent island - and the fate of a large Romanian minorities in Ukraine, consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact denounced by Romania’s government from Ion Iliescu to Traian Basescu. After the independence, the Ukrainian government will seek to secure the country border vis-à-vis, first Russia and in a second time with Romania. On the other hand, Romania will face the dilemma about the territories lost during the Soviet domination and considered as ‘stolen’ by the Romanian majority. The actual border, issued from the Second World War between the Ukrainian and Romanian states do not correspond to an ethnic dividing line or an old territorial border. Also the actual situation, after 1989, it is not the same that after the Second World War because of the assimilation process put in place by government; i.e. the policy ‘systematization of national differences’ during Ceausescu period as the Soviet assimilation – deportation, physical elimination, massive residence change, ... - under Soviet domination.1421 As wrote, Fédéric Beamont, “[t]he Romanian-Ukrainian border, a legacy of Stalinist Soviet expansionism, cut three historical regions from west to east: The Marmarosz, the Bessarabia, Bukovina, resulting in the reconstitution of new regional entities who now have, for some, strong identities”1422 (figure 19).


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Figure 19: Old and New Territories on the Romanian-Ukrainian Border.  

IV.4.4.1.2 The Minority

Romania pushed by the NATO integration process normalized as possible its relations with a tendency to compromise. After a long negotiation, Romania signed a treaty on the Relation of Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation with Ukraine, in June 30, 1997, one month before the Madrid NATO Summit without resolution about border regime and Black Sea border delimitation. With this treaty signed for 10 years, Romania abandoned revendication on the Northern Bukovina, the Hertza County, Hotin County, the Northern and Southern Bessarabia. By the content of the treaty referring to the international minority rights, the two countries resolved the minorities’ questions concerning the Romanian minority in Ukraine. However, even on the pression of Romania, Ukraine did not wanted to include in the treaty a denunciation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and its consequences. Romania got assurance from the Ukrainian government that they were not against Romania’s accession to

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NATO, even if the Russian government does not share the same point of view. In the same period, on July 1997 in Izmail, it was signed a Trilateral Cooperation Treaty between Romania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.\textsuperscript{1426}

Romania has a territory claim concerning the Serpent Island, and delimitation of maritime spaces between Romania and Ukraine.

**IV.4.4.1.3 The Bostroe Channel Project**

A dispute appears concerning the project to build a channel (the Bostroe Channel) in the Danube Delta, “home to UNESCO Biosphere Reserves and a World Natural Heritage site”.\textsuperscript{1427} A Romanian representative from the Geopolitics Center from Bucharest University affirms that “[o]ne of Romania’s key positions is its Danube - orientation, consisting in the river’s openness to the Black Sea and, by means of straits, to the Mediterranean. This is not only an economical or political position [...] but also a geostrategic one”\textsuperscript{1428}. The Bostroe Channel project was a Ukrainian project to build another canal through the Danube Delta along the Romania-Ukraine border (figure 20).

For Ukraine, Romania was a monopolist of the road to and from Europe and has guaranties of millions in revenue.\textsuperscript{1429} In the context of increase trade between Asia and Europe\textsuperscript{1430} and the European Union promotion of the inland waterways transportation (Pan-European


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transport corridor VII)\textsuperscript{1431}, the access from the Black sea to the Danube becomes a strategical question because of the financial losses resulting of discontinued shipping operations on the Ukrainian side.\textsuperscript{1432} For Ukraine, Romania had unfairly and aggressively brought the process at international community level by using the manipulation of environmental questions and the support of NGOs. The difference was increasing tension between both countries, Ukraine accusing to be affected by trans-border pollution from Romania.

Romania brought the case to International Organisations – European Union, the United Nations, Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) - arguing that the project will have large-scale environmental consequences. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials sustain the insignificant impacts on the Delta’s delicate ecosystem.\textsuperscript{1433} Without ever conducting a transboundary, EIA study considering the project only conducted on Ukrainian soil and not on a transboundary context.


Many NGOs\textsuperscript{1434} – World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Danube Environment Form (DEF) - supported the Romania’s effort and “pointed out Ukraine’s numerous violations of the Espoo Convention”\textsuperscript{1436} and the impact on the environment.\textsuperscript{1437} The dispute\textsuperscript{1438},

\textsuperscript{1434} Sources: The Delta-Lotsman State Entreprise.
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started in 2004\textsuperscript{1439}, was treated at the international level. The United Nations, in 2006, gave reason to Romania by asking to Ukraine to stop the project until the fulfilment of international requirement, i.e. impact study on the environment.\textsuperscript{1440}

In June 2008 under the auspice of United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNCECE), a special meeting was hold in Odessa concerning the Bastroe Channel project phase II with the conclusion of a non-compliance of the Government of Ukraine regarding its obligation in the Espoo convention and to postpone the project until implementation of the provision of convention and to elaborate a bilateral agreement with neighbors.\textsuperscript{1441} The project must be postponed until at minimum to 2010.\textsuperscript{1442} For this case, Romania worked and got the support from many international and local NGOs, as the International Community through UN organizations, European Union and even United States organizations. This case was a Romanian diplomatic success applying lobbying on International Organization, using NGOs involvement and negotiations.

The Ukrainian government was not in good position concerning the completion of international convention linked with a pro-Western


foreign policy turning to NATO and European Union integration, and had questioned the country to apply Western standards. The Bastroe canal has strained regular EU-Ukraine tensions.

### IV.4.4.1.4 The Snakes Island

The ownership of the Snakes Island, also known as Serpent Island (Ostriv Zmiynyi - Острів Зміїний - in Ukrainian; Insula Şerpilor in Romanian) a rocky outcrop without water which can permit the revendication of the linked maritime area rich in hydrocarbons (figure 21). The island was under Romania’s control, confirmed by the Paris Treaty of 1947, until the time that the Soviet Union took it under its control, in 1949. The Soviet Union’s possession was confirmed by a Treaty between the People’s Republic of Romania and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, on the Romanian-Soviet State Border Regime, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance on Border Matters, signed in Bucharest on February 27, 1961.  

So, between 1967 and 1987, the two countries negotiated the delimitation of the continental shelf without success.

In 1991, the new Ukrainian state inherited control over the island. Even if a number of Romanian parties and organizations claimed the retrocession of the island to Romania, this remains under Ukraine sovereignty confirmed by the treaty signed in 1997. The question came on the status of the Serpent’s island, important definition that could determine whether Ukraine has exclusive rights over thousands of square miles. The Ukraine position is that the Snake Island is Ukrainian territory and no discussions on the right of the ownership and the 12-nautical-mile of sovereign territorial water

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shall be considered. Kiev claimed that it was an island\textsuperscript{1445}, then Ukraine would control 200-nautical-mile (370 km) of open sea around it; since the island is more or less parallel to the Romania’s land boundary, this claim would give Ukraine a deep access into what Romania considers as its national waters. The Ukraine’s political leaders are interested in the hydrocarbures resources and state that the continental shelf area around the island is a strategic reserve for the energetic support of the country. In addition, the Snake Island is a strategic military site integrated in the Southern air defence border of Ukraine.

\textbf{Figure 21: The Snakes Island.}\textsuperscript{1446}

In other hand, Bucharest claimed that Serpents Island is a rock, and thus cannot be a factor of maritime delimitation. "The distance that separates the island from the Romanian coast is too short ([10-nautical-mile,]\textsuperscript{1447} 18 km) that applies to the International Convention of Montego Bay". Romania expresses that they have not territorial claims on the island accepting the post-Second World War status quo in Europe, but just on the equitable division of the continental shelf.

\textsuperscript{1445} In the treaty the two countries “reaffirm that the existing border between them is inviolable and therefore, they shall refrain, now and in the future, from any attempt against this border, as well as from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all the territory of the other Contracting Party.


\textsuperscript{1447} Ibid.
area. Romanian political leaders are also considering the potential in
gas and oil resources.

An intensive new delimitation process of continental shelf and
exclusive economic zones took place and the two countries have
negotiated more than 24 times from 1997, lead to diplomatic crisis
and did not arrive to a positive statement of the dispute. The
discovering of hydrocarbons resources\(^{1448}\) in July 2001 at 22-nautical-
 mile (40 kilometers) of the Island the continental shelf gave an
additional importance to the dispute, and becomes a diplomatic
headache for NATO and EU.\(^{1449}\) After six years of unsuccessful
negotiations and the sign of the 2003 Treaty unresolving the
question, the dispute was finally taken to the International Court of
Justice by Romania in 2004. During the period Ukrainian government
did everything to prove that the rock can supported life on its own
with a permanent presence of over 100 persons, principally
composed by border guards, scientists and few civilians.

Finally, in 2009, the ICJ delivered its judgment. “The line of
delimitation, established by the Court, has supported the positions
neither of Ukraine nor of Romania” (figure 22). The Court has
confirmed the Snake Island is an island in possession of Ukraine but
will not “influences the determination of the middle line during
delimitation of borders on the continental shelf of the Black Sea and
exclusive economic zones”.\(^{1450}\) The delimitation of the conflict area
(12,800 sq. km.) is distributed for 21 per cent to Ukraine and 79 per
cent to Romania (nearly 10,000 sq km).

“The political establishments in both countries claimed victory
following the ICJ ruling.”\(^{1451}\) For the Romanian President, “[i]t is a

\(^{1448}\) The 12,000 km\(^2\) contested area is estimated to hold around 100 billion
cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas, and 10 million tons of oil equivalent.
\(^{1449}\) Dunai, Marton, Balaci Dumitru, Khokhotva Ivan, and al. Oil out of
8&NrSection=2&NrArticle=10317&search=search&SearchKeywords=Oil+out+of+Tr
oubled+Waters&SearchMode=on&SearchLevel=0>.
\(^{1450}\) Yuscheko: UN International Court Of Justice's Decision On
Delimitation Of Black Sea Shelf Between Ukraine And Romania Just [online].
\(^{1451}\) Păduraru, Anca. Border dispute: A Long Shelf Life [online]. International
Relations And Security Network. Zurich: Center for Security Studies - Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology Zurich, 2009. HyperText Markup Language. Available from:
great success of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania.” The Ukrainian Foreign Minister considers that the case has been judged in an objective way and the Ukrainian President said that the decision put an end to the dispute between the countries.

Figure 22: Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea.

IV.4.4.2 The Bilateral Relations

During the beginning of nineties, the Romania-Ukraine relation was tense due to divergent initial positions and a set of negotiation leading to any result. Also during the Moldovan ethnic violence (1992-1997), Romania was supporting the new RM when Ukraine linked with Russia was on Russian separatist side (Pridnestrovie).

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The relation between the two countries can be divided in different phases:

- 1992-1995: divergent initial positions with negotiations not leading to any result;
- 1995-1997: a tendency to compromise;
- 1997-2003: signature of several treaties and bilateral visits;
- 2003-2005: divisions on the issues of the delimitation of the continental shelf and Bastroe channel;
- 2005-2008: new peak of cooperation, based on the energy project and Black Sea cooperation.1455

During the period from the Ukrainian independence (1992) to the end of Ion Iliescu presidency (1995), the relation between the two countries led to any result.

The Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk had successfully attempted to achieve and strengthen formal sovereignty of the country and develop its relations with the West with enormous pressure from Russia. The necessity for the new government to have a nationalist discourse “to prove the existence of distinct national cultures and to promote their development by taking up the slogan of National rebirth”1456 with the increase of political and social instability (1993-94) began to be perceived by neighbors as a threat to their own security. At the same time, the relation of Ukraine between 1991 and 1993 was characterized by mutual interest especially concerning the integrity of the borders in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution.1457

At the same period, the Ion Iliescu’s foreign policy was hesitated between East, mainly toward Russia and West. The pro-


nationalist parties present in the Stolojan and Vacariou governments did not help the process of rapprochement. The unilateral renunciation of the 1961 Soviet-Romanian border treaty, the denunciation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and the non-acceptation of the consequences of it, the strong rapprochement with Moldova and the possible reunification declaration have cooled relations with the Ukrainians. When Romanian president turns to Western countries with a pro-western foreign policy, the new Ukrainian president, Leonid Danylovych Kuchma turned to Russia as a new ally, saying that Ukraine needed a ‘multivector’ foreign policy to balance eastern and western interests. However, in the course of 1994-95, the Ukrainian foreign policy made a radical shift to the West.  

Under the new presidency of Emil Constantinescu, from the end of 1995, and pressed by NATO accession process, the negotiations intensified and Romania arranged to sign a treaty with Ukraine, in 1997, putting intelligently the difficult questions to be resolved later in a separate document. Ukraine emphasis on its relations with western neighbors – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland Romania and Slovakia – “to be portrayed as a Central Eastern European nation within the larger European continent”. The two countries, “the Russian Federation and Romania were the final two neighbours who signed inter-state treaties with Ukraine”.

In 2000, “[t]he result of [...] presidential election in Romania have significant consequences for the future of the country”, and make the Corneliu Vadim Tudor’s party – the nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM) more visible and influencing the society. “Nationalist has the potential to revive the traditionalist conflicts in the region”. In addition, the Western European neighbors were seems as the “ticket to the West”. However, the Ukrainian economy remains oriented towards Russia, especially for energy supply. Due to the different questions - the Bastroe Canal and the Snake Island –, in 2004 the relation between the two country became

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1458 Ibid. p. 353.
1461 Ibid.
very tense; Ukraine arguing that Romania was responsible for International agitation against Ukrainian project and International Community was protected Romania’s Interest.\textsuperscript{1464} In the same time, Ukraine accused Romania of polluting the Tisa River.\textsuperscript{1465} Romanian people declare that the “The Danube Delta has become ‘war zone’”.\textsuperscript{1466} In addition, the Snake Island are a high economical as geopolitical issue for Romania. But, the

[region]al cooperation has been viewed as a way to enhance stability, to facilitate solutions to common problems encountered in the process of state and nation building in some and in the transition to democracy and market economie in others, to strengthen the position of Central and Eastern Europe vis-à-vis Russia, and to promote integration into Western institutions.\textsuperscript{1467}

Concier to smooth down the relations, in 2005, Pavlo Ihnatenko, the Ukrainian Minister of Environmental Protection signed a bipartite inter-governmental Agreement on cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection with Bucharest.\textsuperscript{1468}

\textbf{IV.4.4.3 The Impact of Foreign Policy Orientation}

We will show the importance of foreign policy orientation and its impact on the international relations. In the context of Romanian-Ukrainian relations, we have a good example of this impact. As one can see in the following border (table 4), the foreign policy orientation of the two countries will affect the bilateral relations.


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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Romania’s Foreign Policy</th>
<th>Ukraine’s Foreign Policy</th>
<th>Bilateral relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>Ion Iliescu has hesitation between East and West. Looks more pro-East, near Russia.</td>
<td>Leonid Kravchuk is pro-Western</td>
<td>Beginning of diplomatic relations and negotiations on the Treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1994</td>
<td>Ion Iliescu, undecided then becomes lightly pro-Westerner</td>
<td>Leonid Kravchuk is pro-Western</td>
<td>Pridnestrovian issue and beginning of cooperation in multilateral framework (OSCE).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>Ion Iliescu is rather pro-Westerner</td>
<td>Leonid Kuchma is Eurasianist</td>
<td>Good relation especially in the context of NATO accession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1999</td>
<td>Emil Constantinescu is markedly pro-Westerner</td>
<td>Leonid Kuchma is pro-Western</td>
<td>In 1997 sign of the Basic Treaty with Romania and 1998 with EU. First bilateral Presidential level visits. Problem with the Snake Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>Emil Constantinescu is pro-Westerner</td>
<td>Leonid Kuchma is Eurasianist</td>
<td>Tension between countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2004</td>
<td>Ion Iliescu is pro-Westerner</td>
<td>Leonid Kuchma forced by the Russians to come on their side. Also, pro-western for EU accession.</td>
<td>In 2003 sign of the Treaty on State frontiers. In 2004, conflict about the construction of the Bosteau channel and Romanian case to the ICJ on the delimitation of the continental shelf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>Traian Basescu is pro-Westerner and pro-American</td>
<td>Viktor Yushchenko is pro-Westerner</td>
<td>Tension on Bosteau issues and ICJ, Creation of Joint Presidential Commission and high-level visits, Cooperation on Energy project and Black Sea.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: The Impact of Foreign Policy Orientation Between Romania and Ukraine.\(^{1469}\)

**IV.4.4.4 External Factors**

As the countries are involved in international relations, the international situation has an important impact on the foreign policy and on the relation among states. The Romanian-Ukrainian case is a good example of this impact (table 5).

In fact, the territorial claims are not an option in the contemporary situation between the two countries. Finally, the problem of Romanian-Ukrainian border can be view in terms of economic, military and geopolitical interests with the question of hydrocarbons resources in the Black Sea. This strategic interest eminently justified the use of old quarrels topics as ‘historical ownership’ of a particular area, or the rights of minority living abroad, relayed by thundering declaration from both sides. The relation between the two countries was shaped by the international agenda and by the pressure of international community and Westerners organizations. With the accession of Romania in the European Union, and the Romania’s policy support to Diasporas especially towards the East side, how will react the Romanian minority? The Ukrainian government will count on the support of European neighbors within Romania in its efforts to access to NATO and integrate the European Union.

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<table>
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<th>Period</th>
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<th>Ukraine’s International Relations</th>
<th>Russia’s International Relations</th>
<th>Bilateral relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>Uncertainty in Romania’s Foreign Policy orientation</td>
<td>Lack of confidence and interest.</td>
<td>Internal weakness leads Russia to seek cooperation with the West.</td>
<td>Divergent initial positions. Beginning of negotiations on the Treaty, with no compromise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>Perspective of integration in NATO and the EU</td>
<td>Change in position and acknowledged need for the democratization of Ukraine.</td>
<td>Harder line on former satellites and seeks equality with the Western bloc as a “great power”.</td>
<td>Tendency to compromise and smooth negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2003</td>
<td>NATO accession and preparation of EU integration.</td>
<td>Western countries are increasing cooperation with Ukraine.</td>
<td>Increasing assertiveness in foreign policy; Seeks good relations with Ukraine. After 9/11, softens position on USA, but not on the “near abroad”.</td>
<td>Signature of Treaties and Bilateral visits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>Romania continues to prepare for EU integration; Threnquetenned relation with USA.</td>
<td>Focused on the democratization process of Ukraine.</td>
<td>Russia enhances Ukrainian dependence on energy.</td>
<td>Tension due to the Buzacoe Channel and the Snake Island case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>American military base in Romania</td>
<td>Focused on NATO and European Integration.</td>
<td>Assertiveness in foreign policy; Hardening position towards Ukraine.</td>
<td>Tension on Buzacoe Channel project and on the continental shelf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-now</td>
<td>Romania is a EU member.</td>
<td>Focused on NATO and European Integration.</td>
<td>Russia unfavorable to the Ukrainian NATO accession.</td>
<td>Joint energy project and joint presidential Commission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV.4.5 Yugoslavia

The relation between the two countries was built long time before, during the inter-period wars and during the communist period by a common fear of Russian domination towards the national independence, and on a common faith with Orthodox Church relations. The two countries had very good relations during the communist period in trade\textsuperscript{1471} and military program cooperation. After, the 89’ Revolution, the Romanian President Ion Iliescu paid a visit in 1990 to his counterpart in Yugoslavia, Borislav Yovich, for talks focused on bilateral relations and international developments, including the crisis in the Persian Gulf. By attitude toward Russia and Serbia in the beginning of nineties, Romania took the risk to be associated as a Balkan state and constituted a threat for the country, as we will explain hereafter in the third part.

The war started in the beginning of nineties at the door of Romania on the territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) from 1991 and 2001 and was the consequences of the breakup of the federal system and the independence of Slovenia, (June 25, 1991), Croatia (June 25, 1991), Bosnia and Herzegovina (March 1st, 1992), Macedonia (September 8, 1991) and Kosovo (February 17, 2008). The new situation in Yugoslavia at the door of Romania has some impact on the country. Romania treated the question with pragmatism as for the Soviet Union break-up. However, the new situation has been seen as a threat for Romania’s security in the context of the Balkan Sub-regional security system.

Bucharest saw a threat for few reasons:

- The Yugoslav different parties accused the Romanian country to be involved with the country secret service (Securitate) and selling arms;\textsuperscript{1472}
- The fear of the use of Romanian territory as a sanctuary and supply base for the belligerent;\textsuperscript{1473}
- The potential questioning of borders states integrity as established by the Paris Peace Conference (1920) and

\textsuperscript{1473} Ibid.
post-war European security order founded on the Helsinki Final Act (1975);1474

- The escalation of the conflict with neighbors’ countries inclusive Romania, and the potential mass of refugees. Already Bucharest reinforced its borders;1475
- Implication of the interethnic relations with Romania’s minorities questions, especially with the Magyars.

Bucharest “envisaged the management of its insecurity by upholding its application for membership in Western security structures (NATO, WEU) rather than by institutionalizing Balkan cooperation”.1476

However, in the nineties, NATO and Yugoslavia were adversaries and create a dilemma for Bucharest on the best way to show solidarity “with the Atlantic Alliance without impairing its bilateral relations with Belgrade”.1477 The Romanian image was grazed by the situation vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. From May 1991 to February 1992, the period when true open warfare began, officially Romania applied the embargo1478 towards Serbia, but the porous boarder let allowed supplies for the Serbian population and the country to pass with everything needed such as food, gas... The Romania population supported the Yugoslavian one. The population of the area does not hesitate to express its indignation for what happens to the Serbian neighbors. They do not forget that thanks to them they had been able ‘to soften’ their living conditions during the long years of dictatorship... ‘They have been our neighbors for centuries’ says an old woman... a Serb old man quotes Churchill for the occasion: ‘Friendship cannot be subjected to embargo’.

In the first time, Bucharest stayed neutral in the conflict with no hesitation to provide illegal assistance to Serbia for economic purpose and religious solidarity despite the UN embargo. In a second time

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1477 Ibid.
1478 A general and complete arms embargo had been voted and put in place under Council resolution 713, on 25 September 1991.
being criticized, Romania during the Constantinescu presidency shows more support for the Alliance. In 1995, the United Nations decided by the 1022 resolution to suspend the sanction against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 16 May 1996, it is signed in Belgrade a treaty between the presidents of Romania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  

In fact, the important aspect of the Yugoslav conflict is that it fosters in the Balkans on the formation of a block, which upsets the orthodox legacies of history since can see side by side, Romania, Serbia and Greece formed a kind of triangle steel against the Western powers, their allies and, of course, against any form of Islam. It is no secret that Romania helps Serbia considerably with the discreet support of Russia.

As said by former president Ion Iliescu, “Romania has only two good neighbors: the Black Sea and Serbia […] quoting the famous historian of the inter-war period Nicolae Organ, whose sentence took force of proverb.”

### IV.4.6 The Black Sea

The Black Sea is a junction of the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and has been a zone of interaction - sometimes cordial, sometimes conflicting - among the people and states around its shores. The Black Sea's political incarnations were held since the Greeks and Scythians, Romans, Byzantine Christians, the Ottomans, Russians and the tumult of the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. The region was fractured and populated with some weak and troubled states, as nowadays. In the past, the sea was opened to foreign

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influence and trade, which the seacoasts were part of a genuinely global system of trade. Today, on the international agenda, there is the idea to resurrect the Black Sea as a unified region.

After the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea region has attracted international attention for some negative reasons - the instability after the creation of new states resulting of the dissolution of the Soviet Union with the emergence of inter-state and intra-state conflicts,\textsuperscript{1483} as well pollution and degradations of the environment – versus some positive ones – new economic and political opportunities with the emergence of new markets rich in natural resources (oil and gas). In addition, the region gained a new geostrategic position as a transit corridor between Europe and Asia.

More than that, “[s]ituated in the proximity of Heartland, whose control is the object of a very complex political, diplomatic and economic-military game”\textsuperscript{1484}, the Black Sea is the key in the new international context of the world power. An extensive literature emphasis on the strategic important of the Black Sea area.

Historically, Romania does not have a sea tradition in its culture and traditions. The sea is also absent from its imagination and myths, as opposed to the mountains.\textsuperscript{1485} In fact, the countries did not have the Black Sea region in its neighborhood before the end of nineteenth century. Moreover, in the new geopolitical situation and with the decrease of Russia’s influence, on the so-called ‘Russian Lake’ during the Cold War, the Black Sea became a geostrategic area. In addition, the wave of Eastern and Caucasian countries’ independence brings six states anxious to avoid the Russian Black Sea domination. We have to remember that one of these states, Turkey was a NATO member\textsuperscript{1486} increase to three with Bulgaria and Romania alliance’s accession membership in 2004, added to others states, as Georgia and Ukraine thru the sign of the Strategic Partnership Charters. In this configuration the Black Sea becomes a ‘NATO lake’.

\textsuperscript{1483} Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Nagorno–Karabakh), in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Trans-Dniester) and Russia (Chechnya).


\textsuperscript{1486} The Republic of Turkish is NATO’s member from 1952.
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Back in history, the Black Sea was the domain of the Russians and the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Russia wanted to ‘warm water port’ to secure an access to the Mediterranean at the expense of Ottoman Empire. The European Great Powers at that time, Great Britain and France, saw Russian ambitions as a threat to the balance of power in the Mediterranean. For Great Britain, it was important to secure access to India thru the Suez Canal. They supported regional power as Romania to balance Russian expansion.

Furthermore, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, Romania positioned itself toward the larger Black Sea area or Wider Black Sea. In 1993, Teodor Melescanu specifies that

[t]he population, the community of the Black Sea is more important than the European Community... This community gathers countries with complementary economies. On the one hand, there are Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, having reached a certain level of development, which import raw materials and exports manufactured goods. On the other hand, the former USSR Republics, large producers of raw materials, which need manufactured goods. [...] Romania’s integration in the European structures requires an effort of the EEC but also the development of the Romanian economy, which cannot find its markets and raw materials in the West. Romania’s integration in the West also passes through the co-operation with the other countries in the region.1487

The country’s interest in the Black Sea area as economic and political potentials was reaffirmed after by Ion Iliescu in 1996 at the BSEC summit1488. In March 1996, Ion Iliescu paid a tour to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to begin “to stress its potential as a bridge between European markets and the energy-rich Caucasus and Central Asian Republics.”1489 In 1997, at the Pan-European Conference on Transport in Helsinki, Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, the Romania Minister of Industry and Trade declares the importance and the interest for Romania’s implication in transportation project of oil from


Transcaucasian states. He said at that time that “after NATO integration, the most important political and economic aim is to become a bridge in the oil and gas transport from Transcaucasia to Western Europe”.  

During several years, Romania promoted a specific approach to the Black Sea and insisted on the future importance of the area in geo-economic, geostrategy and geopolitic terms for the EU as well as for NATO. However, Romanian officials argued that not only the country’s geopolitical position is important, but also has a great economical capacity in production (nuclear capacity, oil-refining capacity, military industry) and the largest port in the western Black Sea region. Romania’s maritime border toward the Black Sea represents an advantage considering the mobilization and growth in trade between Europe and Asia, “partly as a result of the development of Eastern Asian countries, chiefly China, but also as a result of the emergence of the economies of Russia and the countries of Central Asia”, with the result of a fast-growing maritime container traffic. The port of Constanța, located at the crossroads of the trade routes linking the developed countries of Western Europe and the emerging markets of Central Europe with the suppliers of raw materials from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Central Asia and Transcaucasia is the largest port in the Black Sea and the main Romanian port. It has also a geostrategic position being located on the route of Pan-European Transport Corridors. The internationalization and globalization of “trade flows between Europe and Asia, including energy products [(gas and oil), which play a key role in exports by CIS countries], raw materials and intermediate products [boosted by major construction programs, manufactured products and assembly parts], as well as high value-added products,” that can “signals the possibility of a stronger demand on major routes linking the two continents”. The “highly diversified and in many case sophisticated demand for international transport, with heavy logistical constraints” will develop interest in such program (Pan-European transport corridors). Likewise, the Romania’s connection with the Danube adding up 1,500 miles (2,415 km) of

1490 Cited in: Romania at a Historic Crossroads. Ibid.  
1492 Ibid.  
1493 Ibid.  
1494 Ibid.
inland waterways of which 667 miles (1,075 km) are in the country, binding the North Sea with the Black Sea, by the Main-Danube canal, is another advantage for the geo-localization of the country in terms of economy, politics as well as foreign policy reasons. This is an argument to promote the geostrategic position of Romania against the Bulgarian and Turkey geostrategic situation, toward the various European Union projects, such as the European transport policy, the European Energy policy... But the traffic on the Danube fell during the last two decades, which can be explained by different factors, among which the development of other means of exchange reducing the share of transport, the first Yugoslavian war between 1992-1995 when the United Nations imposed an embargo severely reducing the ratio of exchange, and the Yugoslav crisis of Novi Sad in 1999-2000, blocking the local traffic on the Danube. However, the European Union stated, in a white paper entitled 'The European Transport Policy by 2010: The Hour of Choice', that the transport on the Danube becomes again an old solution for modern transportation problems. Moreover, the idea, a bridge between the East and the West, will remain a constant for the Romanian leaders until nowadays.

Besides, this area is a bridge for human trafficking between the CIS and the EU, a bridge for narcotic and arms trafficking between the Black Sea and conflict areas that reinforce the importance of the Black Sea region. For Romanian Politic, Romania and Bulgaria will become the Eastern border of the European Union and Romania can play an important role for the EU and NATO, because “the European Union and NATO need from Romania the consolidation of the Eastern border of the two structures”. 1495

In 2005, Traian Basescu claims that “Romania is determined to take on an important role alongside the EU, NATO and the Black Sea neighboring countries, in solving the problems in the Black Sea

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region.” The Black Sea Basin also represents an important source of energy as a road for energy provision from the East to the West. The President emphasizes that it will not be possible to resolve any Black Sea issue thru the exclusion of major regional powers such as Russia, Turkey or even Ukraine. For Traian Basescu, the Russian Federation must be a partner for Romania in the Black Sea region. Romania will promote the idea to create a Euro-Black Sea Region, a project that Romania will support during the Romania’s European Union mandate.

After the Turkish initiative in 1992 to establish regional cooperation, the Organization for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) - on the black Sea area in order to restore influences and power, Romania actively got involved in all regional initiatives. Later on thru the OSCE chairmanship in 2001, Romania has stated clearly and unequivocally the desire to be a leader in the Black Sea region. Furthermore, Romania started to propose certain initiatives, before to concretize its position in leadership. In this context, the country sees itself as “a dynamic vector of security and prosperity in the Black Sea region” and tries to develop a leadership toward the Black Sea due to its geographic proximity and regional connections, and due to common values shared by Balkan countries, Romania’s primary interest in this field concerns the region’s democratization, economic development, stabilization and European integration, while increasing its own contribution


1498 Romania will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union from July to December 2019.

and the assuming a more important and pro-active role as regional security factor.\footnote{1500}

Notwithstanding the Romania’s advocacy for the Black Sea, the European Union has awakened a late interest in the area only with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Already in 1993, the Romanian officials emphasize the role of Romania, but also the European Union vis-à-vis the Black Sea. As Teodor Melescanu puts it

[...] there is a certain political interest of former Soviet Union Republics to find different structures, to have an alternative solution to the CIS, which they see as a new edition of the Empire. There are many economic, political and also security reasons to create a regional structure, which is the only hinge-structure between Asia and Europe, in which the countries of the South will be represented. By means of co-operation around the Black Sea, we can ensure certain stability in the area.\footnote{1501}

Than only in 2007, the EU started a regional cooperation ‘the Black Sea Synergy’ (BSS) in the frame of ENP.\footnote{1502}

Nevertheless untilt recent time, NATO does not seem to have a specific policy for the Wider Black Sea excepted the will to extend NATO’s enlargement to the East. Merely, in the framework of the NATO Summit in Istanbul (June 2004), the alliance confirms the importance of the Black Sea for the Euro-Atlantic security, as well as the will to continue the cooperation with the Republic of Moldova in the PfP. As the Wider Black Sea Region becomes a foreign policy presidential’s objective within an area of major economical and political interest. “Romania is determined to take on an important role in solving the problems in the Black Sea region,” says Traian Basescu during a meeting with a delegation of the American Congress in January 2005. After all, Romania found an echo in Washington about its regional

vision, “a clear vision”1504 about the Black Sea cooperation for peace and security. Supported by the United States,1505 Romania launched in 2006 the ‘Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership’,1506 aiming to organize the area along the strategic and economic fields. For the Romanian president, Romania “can play an important role in the Black Sea region and a strong Romania at the Black Sea means more than security for the EU and NATO.”1507

He emphasizes that due to the evolutions of the European Union and NATO eastwards, the Black Sea has become a point of extreme strategic importance, irradiating towards the Middle East, towards the ex-Soviet area and towards Russia and the European Union, with an impact on the NATO states as well.1508

For Romania, the Black Sea region within the Balkans is an important hub for the Alliance because this is an area located at the “crossroad of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East” and a central

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point of “trade, energy and transport links”.\footnote{1509} If the area makes efforts to promote security, modernization, “reforms and democratic transformation”, it remains confronted with cross-border crime, instability and frozen conflict. For the Romanian president “challenges remain and NATO assistance and support is still needed”\footnote{1510} with a necessary strong commitment of Russia. For this, “Romania is interested in a solid NATO partnership with Russia”,\footnote{1511} because in his view it is “a strategic element of the Euro-Atlantic security”.\footnote{1512}

The President explained in several interviews that this strategic choice is linked with the Black Sea Romanian interest. Romania wants to be the regional leader in the Black Sea region within NATO and for the European Union, instead of Bulgaria and Turkey.\footnote{1513} Because for the President both organizations – NATO and the EU - need Romania to consolidate their Eastern border. Romania can be a factor of equilibrium in the area. The President claims that the country’s foreign policy can make it a leader exporting democracy using good relationship with the neighbor countries with frozen conflicts, such as Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. For him, at that time (2005), only Great Britain and United States were interested in


\footnote{1510} Ibid.


the Black Sea region for geopolitical reasons, as well will be later the European Union.¹⁵¹⁴

He added that all the work Romania has done “will strengthen the flank of NATO in the Black Sea, while Romania is very important from a geo-strategy point of view.”¹⁵¹⁵ As stated by George W. Bush,

Romania's role in this area and in her neighborhood is a vital role, one that I listen very carefully to his advice on, because this area of the world is one where there's emerging democracies, and it's an area of the world that is where there has been historical conflict, and it's an area of the world where we've got to pay attention to it. And so the Romanian role is a vital role.¹⁵¹⁶

The head of the United States is not the only one to give his support to the Romanian view on the Black Sea regional leadership, as American scholars joined him and lobbying groups. A recent article


published in the DISAM\textsuperscript{1517}, Journal of International Security Assistance Management written by a political scientist at the RAND Corporation and a retired USAF military, stated that “[b]ecause of the common concerns and view of the threats in the Black Sea region, it is in the U.S.’s interest to help Romania achieve its goals”.\textsuperscript{1518} It is clear, from many different sources, that the United States found a strong ally and got support from Romania as the ‘Trojan Horse’ of the United States for the Black Sea area.

Romania is viewed, by U.S. experts, as “a military force provider and a regional mentor”\textsuperscript{1519} for the Black Sea assuring the role of key member and leader in several regional organizations – OSCE, BSEC, SECI, SEDM/SEEBRIG, Stability Pact and Central European Initiative (CEI) – “promoting its economic, political and military agendas”.\textsuperscript{1520} For U.S. experts, Romania is the unequivocal and clear future leader in the Black Sea region, with the understanding that Romania does not have, at this moment, the capacity to cover all areas. For them, the U.S. security effort in this region should “facilitate Romania’s role as regional enabling partner”, because Romania “knows what it needs for the U.S.”, while the United States “play a key supporting role in this effort”, i.e. conflict resolution, security sector reform, economic reform, energy security, improving border security and trafficking of persons… that “far surpass the resources of Romania”.\textsuperscript{1521}

Romanian leaders acknowledged the fact that not only Romania has leadership ambitions, but some other countries bordering the Black Sea, such as Ukraine, which recently declares its interest in

\textsuperscript{1517} The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) provides professional education, research, and support to advance U.S. foreign policy through Security Assistance and Security Cooperation. After nine years the DISAM Return to Romania in 2005 after initially introducing United States Security Assistance Programs to Romania’s Ministry of National Defense in 1996.


\textsuperscript{1519} Ibid. p. 29.

\textsuperscript{1520} Ibid. p. 31.

\textsuperscript{1521} Ibid. p. 33.
ensuring the security of the Black Sea area.\textsuperscript{1522} Also for the United States, in their strategic thinking,

no single state or institution can possibly manage the multitude of Black Sea security issues. U.S. government efforts take into account and encourage the efforts of key regional actors, including littoral states and multilateral institutions such as NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.\textsuperscript{1523}

However, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Thomas Delare nevertheless recognizes, at the ‘\textit{Black Sea Area and Euro-Atlantic Security: Strategic Opportunities}’ conference that

\textit{[a]t the same time, we [U.S.] need to adopt a realistic approach in terms of allocating responsibility for regional efforts. For example, we are currently exploring ways in which Romania might be able to support President Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in the Black Sea region.}\textsuperscript{1524}

If the United States recognized Romania’s willingness and effort to become a Black Sea regional leader, U.S. understood than Romania could not achieve it alone. U.S. is ready to help for different reasons, described here before without closing the doors to another potential future leader. At that time, Romania was the only state that gave substantial positive signals toward an indefectible support to the United States, with a significant regional power in economical, political and military field as member of NATO and the European Union.

For Russia, the Black Sea area is an important factor of its come back on the international scene. After being a close area under the uninc Soviet domination during the Cold War, after 1991 the foreign policy of Russia appeared incoherent, confused, and ineffective pointing to the constitutional battles in Russia and lack of a national identity\textsuperscript{1525} and due to the inability of the Russian


\textsuperscript{1524} Ibid. Paper presented at.

leadership to provide a coherent policy\textsuperscript{1526}. The Russian foreign policy acquires a greater coherence under Vladimir Putin mandate.

After the 9/11 even, the relation between US and Russia became closer for a short period of time. The NATO enlargement toward the East and in particular in the Wider Black Sea irritate the Russian Federation. In this context, the Russian Foreign Policy oriented to the Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and toward the transit of energy in this region. More specifically, Russia seeks to remain as one of the main stakeholders in the region of the Wider Black Sea in balance of the emergence of new strong regional and external actors, as EU and NATO.

**IV.4.7 Russian Federation**

If Russia comes to liberate, it will be received with great sympathy, but if it comes to rule, it will find many enemies

Liuben Karavelov, 1870\textsuperscript{1527}

If the Russian Federation is not a direct neighbor of Romania thru the land, it is thru the Black Sea border. Furthermore, Russia has been an important actor for Romania over the last two centuries alternately enemy or ally. This strong imposed bond with Russia over history generated a constant fear of domination. We explained along this thesis the importance and the relations between Romania and Russia.

After a lack of power in the Black Region in the recent period, Russia regains strong interests. The relation between the two country was alternatively warm and cold. For Russia, the EU and NATO enlargement put an end to the role that Russia had enjoyed with the CEECs during 250 years in northeastern and southeastern Europe. Russia’s important relations with Belarus and Ukraine will become, in case of EU membership, a critical issue. The relations between Poland


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and Ukraine are already developed at Moscow’s expense. Toward the Balkan in recent years, the Russian policy has also evidently divergence with the Western Europeans view concerning the Yugoslavian war as the Kosovo independence. The recent issues in 2008 showed that Russia remains a Black Sea power on which the European Union depends. The Black Sea region becomes strategic for the EU as well as for Russia and the US. Russia has been attempting to maintain its influence in the area and its Black Sea fleet in Crimea. In addition, the recent war in Georgia (2008) led to renewed Cold War rhetoric.


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president’s sentiment toward Russia was still ambiguous, because on
the one hand, the president stated in 2005 that Russia must be
viewed as a partner for the regional issues, and on the other hand,
with the first severe domestic political problem, he accused Russia to
be behind the country political problems. According to an article in
2007 written by Petru Clej, Basescu alleged, “that Russia might have
been involved in his suspension”, citing his pro-Western foreign policy
as a reason.\footnote{Clei, Petru. Romanian politics mired in abuse [online]. BBC News, 15
Hypertext Markup Language. Available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/europe/6653681.stm>.
} This remark denotes a strong antagonism of the
historical influence in the political leaders’ subconscious toward
Russia, which is viewed as a protector or as an invader, depending on
the period or situation.
IV.5 Partial Conclusion

For Romania, the way to obtain security on military and economic issues, as democracy and economic opulence was to adapt its foreign policy to the new post-cold war’s international environment.

At the beginning in 1990, Romania’s leaders considered the European integration and the Euro-Atlantic accession as a common global objective, because it implied the adhesion to the democratic values and principles respected by Western states and organizations. The main objective defined by Romania after 1990 was to access to the European Union, to strengthen national security thru an active role in NATO by strengthening the strategic partnership with the U.S. and participation in the European security and defense, likewise to bring the Black Sea on the map of international politics.

After December 1989, Romania’s foreign policy focused on two important objectives that were essential for its future – admittance into NATO and integration in the European Community, which took the name of European Union at the Maastricht Summit in 1992. These two objectives were complementary, implied huge national efforts and took place in difficult conditions, because it designated a transition from a centralized Soviet-style system to a democratic one, based on political pluralism and free economic market.1532

The European Union and NATO criteria were the same, i.e. human rights, the democratic process, the freedom of the civil society, stability and security, as the respect of minorities’ rights. However, when we speak about the Euro-Atlantic alliance, we need to underline the role of the United States, a strong stakeholder in the NATO institution, and to specify that NATO decision cannot be dissociated from the United States’ will. As Theodor Melescanu puts it: “the goal of European and Euro-Atlantic integration means, [...]

our adherence to values, principles and specific institutions of Western democracies.\textsuperscript{1533}

The neighborhood relations, as well the minorities issue, were a problem during the end of Ceausescu’s regime and made the country be isolated and rejected by the International Community. The principle of good neighborhood had a significant contribution to regional security and is an important criterion for any state aspiring to integrate in the EU and NATO. Romania’s foreign policy focused on the development and the strengthening of Romania’s bilateral relations with the neighboring countries and on the avoidance of ethnic conflicts. These objectives were necessary and complementary to the EU and NATO accession.

As wrote by Daniel Daianu,

\textit{[o]nly in the second half of the 1990s, Romania has been taken seriously by both clubs for various reasons. The fact is that the end of the year 2002 brought two events without the like for Romanians. The first is the admission into NATO. The second is the evocation by the Council of EU ministers meeting in Copenhagen (December 2002) and Thessaloniki in June 2003, the conceivable date of Romania’s admission into the EU.\textsuperscript{1534}}

At the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the situation changed on both the domestic and foreign policy spheres. Starting from 2000, the economic reforms were implemented by the new government with more success and brought new credibility from the West. “2000-2002 represented a turn of the corner for economic reform\textsuperscript{1535}, while the IMF noted that “the Romanian economy continues to open up” and


permit to update the country’s rating from B- to B+ and BB-. The positive restart of the Romanian economy stimulates Foreign Direct Investments from the European Union and especially from the United States, which gives more credit to the country.

In order to ensure the accession into NATO, Romania participates with controversy in the Vilnius group, that creating a crisis with the European Union club. The new international security environment in 2001 and the new linkage between economy and terrorism bring a new American attitude towards the countries of the Vilnius group, of which Romania was a part, and accelerate the processes at work for the Eastern countries’ accession in the alliance. The other positive point was the excellent work done by Romanian chairmanship of the OSCE in 2001. During this period, Romanian foreign minister Mircea Geoana, as chairman-in-office, had a very successful mandate regarding the Kosovo and Macedonia cases, as well as the coordination of the Southeast Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP). Along the same lines, Romania was a leading contributor to NATO, the UN and the OSCE operations within the PfP partnership, as well as an active participant in regional cooperation initiatives. The Romanian-American Regional Center for Defense Resource Management was established in 2001. We can notice that Romania comes from far away, because “[t]he reason for exclusion were several, having to do with the pre-1989 actions of Romania’s dictator, the impression made by the 1989 revolution, ad post-1989 political development”.

First, the two organizations – NATO and EU – were not necessary ready for an enlargement process regarding the integration of the new free Eastern countries from Soviet domination. In addition, Romania’s neighbors have their own domestic difficulties,


minorities problems as well international foreign policy repositioning, and the same questioning concerning the access to the two here before mention organizations. Romania was between the Eastern past and a Western future, and was not immediately ready to choose without any hesitation.

At the end of 1989, the Alliance’s transformation and enlargement processes were a necessary step in order to admit potential new allies from the East side of Europe. The transformation was certainly faster and easier than the European Union one, due to the unique decision maker and commander – the United States -. However, the enlargement process has taken time and was in certain way tackling by the Russian foreign policy concerning the oldest allies in Eastern Europe. The international situation in the Balkan and the Black Sea in the nineties brought difficulties and were not in the favor of Romania integration in the Alliance. In the same time, the unreadiness of Romania concerning internal reforms on democracy, economy, military and service intelligence within the hesitation on foreign policy orientation, especially before 1996, delay Romania integration in the Alliance. Finally, Romania officially becomes member of NATO in April 2004, after 14 years of collaboration with the Alliance, and with the help of the United States of America. Thru the voice of its president Traian Basescu, Romania stated after the end of 2004 that the Romanian foreign policy would also be focused on the ‘Bucharest-London-Washington axis’. This declaration was the normal continuity of the Romanian foreign policy adopted after the Cold War.

Romania’s security vision is based on a strong convergence with the American one in areas of mutual interest. Romania, a “special” and “strong ally” of the United States and NATO member, gains a strong guarantee for its national security by “the United States, through NATO and through bilateral relations”.\(^{1538}\) Romanian leaders signed several agreements\(^{1539}\) regarding the United States forces and


\(^{1539}\) The first agreement - Agreement Between the United States of America and Romania Regarding the Status of United States Forces in Romania (SOFA) - was signed in Washington on October 30, 2001 by the Prime Minister, Adrian Nastăse. The other one - Agreement Between the United States of America and Romania Regarding the Activities of United States Forces Located on the Territory of Romania - , was signed on December 6\(^{th}\), 2005 in Bucharest by the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice.
their activities on the territory of the country, with a U.S. stationing base near the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{1540} For Romania, NATO has played “an essential role in strengthening the Euro-Atlantic security after the end of the ‘Cold War’” \textsuperscript{1541} and we witness considerable dynamics of the relations between the common European and Euro-Atlantic security and defense area. However, “[m]ost of all, NATO’s transforamtion has been marked by ever-deepening engagement with its former enemies to the East.”\textsuperscript{1542}

One can read in ‘The National Security Strategy of Romania’ (SSNR) published in 2007, that for Romania “the security of the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible and the trans-Atlantic relationship is its basis”\textsuperscript{1543} and that “[t]he security guarantees that we [Romania] enjoy today – an expression of the Euro-Atlantic solidarity – are the most solid in Romania’s history.”\textsuperscript{1544}

In the same way at the ‘dawn of a new age’, the European Community was in construction and design process, absoluted not reading for an overall new partners’ enlargement within undefined rules and process of integration. The delay of Romania integration in the European Union was due to the Romanian lack to apply rapidly the country transformation in order to meet the different European chapters’ requirement, but also certainly due by an absence of common border with the European Union states. We can underline, as explain Schimmelfinnig, that the “border states have a strong interest in enlargement”\textsuperscript{1545} and in general enlargement is not only on economical or political power. According to Andrew Moravcsik, the states have a mean of “geopolitical interest”\textsuperscript{1546} because “geographical proximity creates opportunities for economic gains from trade and

\textsuperscript{1540} The military Air Base of Mihail Kogalniceanu, in Constanța County.
\textsuperscript{1542} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1544} Ibid. p. 26.
investment”.\textsuperscript{1547} We noticed that “[m]ember states close to Central and Eastern Europe therefore stand to gain more from economic exchange with the East than more distant states”.\textsuperscript{1548} Romania was not in the geopolitical interest of the EU, but also the hesitant foreign policy orientation in the beginning of the nineties did not help acceleration of Romania’s integration in the EU, in spite of the strong francophone support and the historical link with France.

The Western world represented by the United State and more especially by the near shore Countries of the European Union, provided a model for modernization of the economy and politic for the former communist states after the ‘Iron Curtain’ fall. As Irina Angelescu, teacher at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva says: “The ‘EU incentive’ proved to be a major tool for enhancing the rhythm of reform in the CEECs, Romania included.”\textsuperscript{1549} The year 2003 was a turning point in the European Union; it was the signing of the Accession’s Athens Treaty of the 10 new members from CEECs.

After the ‘Iron Curtain’ fall, Romania has any Western neighbors and was surrounded by post-communist neighbors on the borderland like on the border Sea, if we consider the small length of the Black Sea. In addition, Romania was at the door of instable area concerning the Balkan and in the new CIS. In 1989, Romania was isolated and had conflictual relations with others Eastern countries directly or indirectly due to minorities treatment, territorial or historic claims, ... The treatment of ethnic minorities was a sources of friction between Romania and the other Eastern countries during the late eighties. For example, this situation conduced to an open diplomatic conflict with Hungary concerning the Magyars minorities in Romania. As well tense relations were existing between the Romanian leaders and Bulgaria, likewise the Soviet Union and its Perestoiaka program. On the other hand, we saw that after the 89’ revolution these questions – minorities, territorial claims, and borders – were not correctly handled by Romania, which had tense relations with all its neighbors.


\textsuperscript{1548} Ibid.


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At the same time, the region was agitated by extremist ideas where each country wanted to restore the glorious past: the Greater Romania, The Greater Hungary, the Greater Serbia ...

For these organizations, NATO and European Union, the recognition of the state frontiers determined after the Second War World, the right of minorities in the state land – also an important element of the U.S. foreign policy -, the resolution of differences thru peaceful manner as well the good neighborliness were important points in the accession process to be resolved before any integration’s acceptance. Romania managed the relation with neighbors with up and down situation in the shadow of historic relations. The neighborliness building relations were like a kaleidoscope before to be stabilized under the strong requirement of the westerns organizations.

Romania signed a Basic Treaty with Bulgaria in 1992 a South and Orthodox neighbor. With Bulgaria, the neighborhood was quite and simple, both country sharing the same goals and value – European and NATO integration, members of the Francophone Organisation, members of the same regional organisation... -. Elsewhere, Romania used this proximity to lever the Romanian integration in the Alliance as well in the European Union. The only threat between the two countries could be an exacerbate competition toward regional domination.

On September 14, 1996, Treaty with Hungary had significantly ‘legitimized’ Romania's efforts to establish good neighbor relations from the West's point of view. We can underline that until the signing of the treaty, some saw Romania as stalling in the negotiations with Hungary because of the (misplaced) belief that the absence of a treaty would exclude Hungary from NATO membership and ‘level the playing field’ with Romania. However, when in March 1996 Hungary-Slovak Treaty was finally ratified by Slovakia, many Westerners perceived Hungary as making a sincere effort at achieving good neighbor relations. As Hungary's membership in NATO became increasingly plausible, Romania became more willing to support a treaty. Romania developed enough good collaboration with Hungary, thru the joint Romania-Hungarian military unit and by the “good prospect of closer links between Romania and Poland and the Czech Republic”.1550

As Romania develops good neighbourhood with the West part of Europe, Romania's negotiation of basic treaties on east side with the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Russia remain stalled.

The Republic of Moldova has a common history and culture with Romania. However, because the large part of the Moldova's territory was Romanian before the Second War World, the collaboration between the both countries can represent an opportunity as well a threat. The treaty with The Republic of Moldova was very important because some Romanians would like Moldova reincorporated with Romania. While this is not the position of the Romanian Government, but a number of issues remain outstanding with Moldova. First, Moldovan resist Romania's desire to call the treaty ‘fraternal cooperation’. Second, Romania insisted that the treaty language should be in Romanian (not in Moldovan). Finally, issues remain over the question of dual citizenship. The question with the Republic of Moldova is not finish and stumble on the Romanian dream of the Greater Romania and the democratic, respectful and peaceful concern for a European country.

Romania tries to develop good neighborhood with Ukraine because “an independent, sovereign and democratic Ukraine” will be better for Romania. Romania wanted Ukraine to acknowledge that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty was immoral and Ukraine wanted Romanian condemnation of Hitler and Antonescu. While acknowledging that Serpents Island in the Black Sea, which had been part of Romania until taken over by the USSR in 1948-is now part of Ukraine, Romania wanted an agreement for joint exploitation of the Delfin zone's oil and natural gas. In fact, the different between Romania and Ukraine (Bastroe Canal, Serpents Island) was brought to the International community and International Court of Justice, where the different was resolved in a tense and peaceful manner. For this goal, Romanians understood that acting alone would be difficult considering the Romanian-Ukrainian conflictual relation and for that reason they proposed to associate Poland in a Romanian-Polono-Ukrainian cooperation. But, considering that in the past, a part of the Romanian territory was under Poland ‘domination\textsuperscript{1551}, when at the same time the Lithuano-Polono Kingdom was extended until the Black Sea, and covered large part of the Ukrainian territory; this idea can represent a threat for Ukrainian government as can be an opportunity for Ukrainian to come near Europe by using this association as an integration trigger.

\textsuperscript{1551} For this point to see: Bărbulescu, Mihai, Deletant Dennis, Hitchins Keith, and al. *Istoria României* (Romanian History). București: Editura Corint, 2007.
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With Eastern neighbors, any Romanian argument can be viewed as an opportunity for stability or as a threat of potential conflicts and instability depending of the geopolitical approach. As told Meleşcanu, in this strategy, “the relations with Central European countries are a top priority for the Romanian foreign policy”[^1552] thru the signing of good neighborly relations and trade treaties. Romania understood that the relation with other East European countries was a key of the European integration not only by the good relations and good trade but also by the political influences on Western European Union states. For Romania, it was an important point to become a member of the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) as soon as possible, because it reinforced the idea that Romania is an Eastern European country and increase its economic strength.

A 20-Year Friendship Treaty with Serbia was acknowledged in May 1996, an other South and Orthodox neighbor. The relation between the two countries was built on long partnership over the history with very good relations. Because of it attitude toward Russia and Serbia in the beginning of nineties, Romania took the risk to be associated as a Balkan state and constituted a threat for the country. Also, the political and military situation in its neighbor territory brought threats to Romania’s national security in the nineties and after, obliging the country political leaders to take distance with it neighbor, despite the strong disappointment and wishes of the majority of the Romanian population. Nevertheless, the both countries relations warmed up and Romania supported the Serbian territorial integrity by rejecting the Kosovo declaration independence considering part of Serbia.

We demonstrated the importance of the neighborliness relation and the significant incidence on the process of Romania’s accession and integration in the western organizations, as its increased importance in the Romania’s foreign policy concerning the country’s international relations objectives. We saw the Romaniă’s dependence vis-à-vis neighbors’ foreign policy as the interdependence in Romania’s foreign policy with some states as Bulgaria, Ukraine and the republic of Moldova. We saw also the ability of Romanian political leaders to deal with the neighbors’ relations in the best interest of the country, to have an important implication in the Balkan crisis resolution and to develop with their skills a leadership towards the Black Sea, as well the Balkan.

As Alina Georgescu argued in her paper, Romania’s foreign policy changed from isolation to dependence from 1989 to 1994, but in fact we can say that the dependence was anchored until the period of 1996-1997 together with Emil Constantinescu’s election, as we explained in the ‘Change into Continuity – A Necessary Rupture’ chapter of this thesis. Started as we demonstrated, here before, the type of Romanian foreign policy in 1989, according to Holsti, was ‘isolation’. “As an isolationist, it put into place ‘comprehensive exclusionist policies’ such as that of quickly paying back its foreign debt. It avoided military commitments inside the Warsaw Pact by decisions to cut its number of troops and to reduce its military expenditure”, as we explain in the ‘Context’ chapter of this thesis.

However, what did Holsti understand by dependence? For him, a dependent foreign policy is a high level of “externally directed actions and transactions” that are “characterized by high concentration towards another state or group of states”. We demonstrated here before that the Romanian foreign policy changed to dependence toward international organizations, the European Union, NATO and Western democratic states such as United States and France, in different fields such as the political, security, social and cultural ones. The Romanian leaders’ decision to move for integration within NATO and the EU influenced on the Romanian foreign policy, and by the same say on the domestic policy, as we saw in the ‘Change into Continuity’ part, through various examples. In fact, the Romanian foreign policy goals drove the domestic policy orientation, just like the domestic issues or problems impacted on Romania’s international relations.

In the ‘Change into Continuity’ part, we explained that Romania becomes dependent from the foreign policy orientation, in order to break away from isolation. This decision influenced the obligation to respect the international laws or rules – i.e. human rights, minorities’ protection ... – accepted and signed by former and current Romanian leaders. The will to shape a new image of the country obliged the country’s leaders to give a sign of change and acceptance of new

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1554 Ibid. Paper presented at. p. 3.

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rules toward democracy and free-market orientation. As we saw during the beginning of the new democracy, Romania was hardly dependent from the country’s image, because the Mineriad’s incident, mentioned in the ‘Change into Continuity – A Controversial Period’ chapter, induced the reaction of boycott from the Western democracy – EU states and United States. So, each good or bad domestic policy action have a repercussion on Romania’s international relations by opening or closing the foreign aid and bringing the country forward or backward on its way towards the integration in larger organizations such as the EU and NATO, and towards collaboration with Western democratic states. The will to integrate into NATO and the EU forced Romania to adhere and implement the framework, rules and conditions of these organizations. We witnessed the reshaping of Romania’s domestic policy and behavior, as imposed by the NATO and EU process integration in the economic, political and military fields.

We saw that the accession process into the EU and NATO and the conditions of neighborliness created dependence for Romania. Romania moved from a foreign policy of isolation to a foreign policy of dependence; dependence because Romania has to adapt the domestic policy and the domestic law, organizations, ... to the EU and NATO standards, to create new institutions and reorganize existing ones to meet the EU and NATO criteriom.

Dependence is also considered from the point of view of neighboring relations and the resolution of borders conflicts and minorities issues, because Romania’s geographical position was between Hungary and Bulgaria, isolated from the European Union states borders. In addition, because the will of Western neighbors was to help or restrain Romania’s integration process into NATO, the EU and regional organizations. Moreover, there was a dependence vis-à-vis the European States, in order to get support for the NATO and EU accession, due to Romania geographical isolation. As explained before, the Romania, territory did not have any common borders with the EU before 2004. Many factors in the international spheres ‘helped’ Romania to be ‘in’ versus to be ‘out’. The country’s ability to adapt to the situation and to take advantage of opportunities was an undeniable trump. For accession, the candidate country, here – Romania -, had to shape the domestic legislation and policies, but also the institutions, as well the internal market to fulfill the EU and NATO norms and values. The accession process to the EU and NATO imposed the political and economic domestic reforms in Romania.
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The accession process needs two partners: the Organization involved and the country itself. If CEECs such as Romania had the will to be integrated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, the two organizations were not necessarily ready at the dawn of this new era. The process of integration took time as we saw considering the adaptation of these organizations and the candidates’ readiness to fulfill the accession criteria. The situation created sometimes misunderstanding between these organizations and the candidate countries, as well Romania. The accession process created dependence between the candidate countries and the organization members. Nevertheless, more than dependence, we demonstrated that it was interdependence. However, why and how?

“We live in an era of interdependence”¹⁵⁵⁶, wrote Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in ‘Power and Interdependence’, which is reminiscent of Henri Kissinger’s statement, in 1975, foreseeing the change in

[t]he traditional agenda of international affairs – the balance among major powers, the security of nations – no longer defines our perils or our possibilities … Now we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling; old slogans are uninstructive; old solutions are unavailing. The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations.¹⁵⁵⁷

As Frank Schimmelfennig states it, the “international interdependence increases with geographical proximity”¹⁵⁵⁸ and the more CEECs, such as Romania, approach the NATO and EU integration, more the interdependence relations increased. “In common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces”,¹⁵⁵⁹ as we saw during Romania’s transformation from the revolution to the democratic implementation. However, “[i]nterdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or

among actors in different countries.”\textsuperscript{1560} It was the case for CEECs, and especially for Romania, with the NATO and EU accession because

\begin{quote}
[i]nterdependence affects world politics and the behavior of states; but governmental actions also influence patterns of interdependence. By creating or accepting procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of activity, governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations.\textsuperscript{1561}
\end{quote}

We saw that Romania influenced the EU roadmap as well the acquis communautaire during the integration process as well that the Romania’s Black Sea foreign policy becomes the EU’s policy. Another argument is that “[f]inally, in the politics of interdependence, domestic and transnational as well as governmental interests are involved. Domestic and foreign policy become closely linked”\textsuperscript{1562} which represent exactly Romania’s case, as it was explained here before. In conclusion, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye say that “perspective implies that interdependence relationships will always involve costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy; but it is impossible to specify a priori whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed the costs.”\textsuperscript{1563}

\textsuperscript{1560} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1561} Ibid. p. 5.
\textsuperscript{1562} Ibid. p. 8.
\textsuperscript{1563} Ibid. p. 9.
Every people are unique. By the nature of their soul, they represent an indestructible unity between space and time, defined by a particular trait that sets them apart from other peoples.

Goga Mircea

In order to understand Romania’s international relations, its foreign and security policies, as well the action taken by the political elite, we have to keep in mind the geo-strategic situation of the country and its historical heritage, including the social psychology and the identity of the Romanian people. We have to describe and explain the triggers that create the different choices and attitudes of Romania’s international relations and foreign policy.

The relationship with the ‘Others’ has been an important part in the process of self-identification and in building the Romanian national identity during the last two centuries. For Romania, the recognition by the ‘Others’ became the foundation for the identity of the Romanian people and one of the bases of the country’s international relations. In the recent period, in the wave of the Iron Curtain fall, the recognition and the classification of Romania in the club of free and democratic countries was a step forward, considered very important by Romania’s political leaders on the international scene and in Romania’s international relations. Moreover, the Romania’s recognition by the others as a European country and its membership of the Alliance and the European Union was a crucial factor for its international relations and development. We will explain hereafter that the others’ importance in Romania’s identity will induce a constant need for recognition, which will create a temptation toward a feeling of victimization in cases of dissatisfaction with their hopes.

With its geographical position, at the borderland of important Empires and at the crossroads of political interests, Romania is a country on the road of invasion and exchange, whose history and culture put it in

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an in-between situation. With its Latin origins and Orthodox faith, Romania will be in-between the West and the East. Romanians believe that the mixture between the Moldavian and Wallachian heritage on the one hand, and the Transylvanian heritage, on the other hand, is compatible with Western values and the West.\textsuperscript{1565} With their Moldavian and Wallachian history, through their Orthodox faith, previous attachment in foreign policy, and common history in the Ottoman Empire, Romanians are believed to play a role in Southeastern Europe to bring peace and stability. To these questions, we can add a hidden societal and political challenge, not prominent in public debates, but still present after a century and a half of modern history of Romania. In the will to reshape the country’s democracy, economy and international relations, Romania will seek the adhesion to the Alliance and the European Union, with strong links towards European states and America. This choice will create another in-between situation with a permanent balance between Europe and United States.

We will show that Romania is transformed from ‘security needed’ to ‘security provider’ in the Alliance and European South East area. We will see that Romania becomes a crossroad from a borderland, through the accession process to NATO and the EU. The old geographical and political borders have shaped Romania’s strategic identity of borderland and view as a point of exchange at imperial borders. However, the same geographical position with its natural resources brings Romania at the crossroads of geopolitical and political interests in the past as well as today. In order to solve the question of the post-communism transition in the new geo-strategic situation, political leaders, as well as the other CEECs, proposed the project “to be back in Europe”\textsuperscript{1566} and to be associated with the Western democracy, i.e. the European Union and NATO accession, as a natural path to the country’s development. However, while in the Romanian school system, pupils learn that Romania is at the center of Europe, the country is viewed on map and by many institutions, as we will explain hereafter, as a Balkan state at the border of Europe. From a geographical point of view, Romania is in the middle of the European continent, at the middle between the Atlantic Ocean and the Urals.\textsuperscript{1567}

\textsuperscript{1565} To see: Marino, Adrian and Antohi Sorin. \textit{Al treilea discurs: cultură, ideologie şi politică în România} (The third discourse: culture, ideology and politics in Romania). Bucureşti: Editura Polirom, 2001. (Duplex). p. 120.


V.1 The Others and the Impact on Romania

From the beginning of Romanians’ history, the ‘Others’ has played an important role in its construction and has given Romanians their identity, allowing them to create it actively. The national identity is wedged between a dual process of the ‘Self’, i.e. stressing the similarities of the in-group and the existence of a contrasting reference – the ‘Others’, as the necessary requirement to have a perception sense of difference vis-à-vis the out-group. In order to understand, first we need to know how we can define the terms of ‘other’ and ‘identity’, and later on develop the ‘national identity’. Of course, we will describe and explain the importance of the others in the modern period of Romania’s international Relations.

V.1.1 The Others and their Importance for Romania

V.1.1.1 Others

In general, according to the New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘Other’ refers “to a person or thing that is different or distinct from one already mentioned or known about”. The other is part of what defines or even constitutes the self (the self as seen by psychology, philosophy, sociology and the concept itself) and other phenomena and cultural units. The term was used in social sciences to designate the processes by which societies and groups define themselves and exclude others or those that want to subordinate or do not fit in their society. The ‘self’ is a key construct in several schools of psychology, broadly referring to the cognitive representation of one's identity. The


earliest formulation of the self in modern psychology\textsuperscript{1570} refers to the distinction between the self as I, the subjective knower, and the self as Me, the object that is known.\textsuperscript{1571} Current views of the self in psychology diverge greatly from this early consideration, positioning the self as playing an integral part in human motivation, cognition, affect, and social identity.\textsuperscript{1572} In sociology, the self refers to an individual person or a group from the perspective of that person or group. It is the individual’s or group’s conception of himself or herself, and the underlying capacity of the person’s mind or intellect or group perception which formed that conception (one’s ‘true self’). What an individual or group thinks of himself/herself/itself is, at least temporarily, directly influenced by interactions with others.

In philosophy and sociology, the term is used as ‘the Other’ and refers to that, “which is distinct from, different from, or opposite to something or oneself”.\textsuperscript{1573} Linked with ‘the Other’, the notion of ‘otherness’ is also an integral part in understanding a person or a group, as people build their own roles in relation to ‘Others’ as part of a feedback process that is not necessarily related to stigmatization or condemnation. Others are imperative for the creation of national identities, where the practices of segregation and acceptance or rejection can form and maintain boundaries and the national character. To reinforce the meaning, we can develop the term of ‘significant others’, a

concept, which is derived from the Mead theory of the self,\textsuperscript{1574} highlights the ability of social actors to take the role of others. There are

\textsuperscript{1570} ‘Modern Psychology’ is the scientific study of mental processes and behaviors of individuals. ‘Modern psychology’ has undergone a transformation to bring human mental and behavioral processes into a developed scientific field of study. The first book wrote in 1890 by William James - The Principles of Psychology - which turned out to be one of the most important texts in the field of psychology. In 1892, the American Psychological Association was founded by G. Stanley Hall.


\textsuperscript{1574} The ‘Mead theory of the self’ has been developed by the American pragmatist George Herber Mead (1863-1931) in his ‘theory on the self’, and by extension as defined the term ‘significant others’. To see: Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist [online]. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934. [cited 22 May 2008]. HyperText Markup Language. Available from: <http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Mead/pubs2/mindself/Mead_1934_toc.html>.
many others whose roles may be taken—ranging from those of strangers to that of the whole community. Significant others are those who have an important influence or play a formative role in shaping the behaviour of another.\textsuperscript{1575}

Moreover, as says Taras Kuzio\textsuperscript{1576}, "[t]his 'Others' can be defined in ideological, ethnical or territorial terms (or a combination of them)."\textsuperscript{1577} In addition, the other allows us to define the 'us' and, by opposition, to build an identity. The sensitive issue of otherness is viewed in two different ways: Others, represented by the outside of the country and Romania; others, represented by the minorities (the Hungarians, the Jews and Roma), as the insider.\textsuperscript{1578}

Occupied or dominated by foreign powers in different Romanian countries (Moldavia, Transylvania, and Wallachia) along the country’s history, the people have to adapt to and to behave in a certain way under various foreign rules and models. Lucian Boia emphasizes that two characteristics of Romanian history have contributed to the placing of the other in a specific light: on the one hand, the reaction of a rural and somewhat isolated civilization, and on the other, the massive and uninterrupted impact of foreign rules and models.\textsuperscript{1579}

For Lucian Boia, "[t]he 'Other' is an omnipresent figure in the imaginary of any community"\textsuperscript{1580} and as the author appreciates, the relationships with the 'foreigners' are an important part in the process of self-identification of every social group, including 'Romans'.\textsuperscript{1581} It

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{1576} Kuzio Taras is a senior research fellow in the Chair of Ukrainian Studies of the University of Toronto. He was editor of several economic and political magazines, and autor or editor of 14 books, 5 think thank monographs, 25 book chapter and 60 political articles on post-communist, Ukrainian and European politics and security affairs.
\item \textsuperscript{1579} Ibid. p. 153.
\item \textsuperscript{1580} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1581} To see: Boia, Lucian. Romania - Borderland of Europe. London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2001b. p. 191-225.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
is important to remark that “[t]he construction of the ‘Other’ is therefore tied to both domestic and foreign policy politics”.

V.1.1.2 Identity

The concept of ‘Identity’ is an umbrella term used throughout various disciplines in recent years, such as social and behavioral sciences, to describe an individual’s comprehension of himself or herself as a discrete, separate entity. The concept “has become ubiquitous” and “cutting across disciplines from psychoanalysis and psychology to political science and sociology”, is including the two forms of social psychology, the study of how people and groups interact. “Each of these disciplines, however, has one or more conceptualizations of ‘identity’ that make a common discourse difficult.”

As explains Peter J. Burke,

[i]n political science [(one of our field of study)] and some fields within sociology, [...] the term is often taken to refer to one’s national identity or ethnic identity within a national boundary. In this context, the term identity is nearly synonymous with a social category, and all persons within the social category are assumed to have the ‘same’ identity."

Non-Romanian people, the others, brought the discovery of identity to the country a very important topic for Romanians, given which we know that people have suffered a number of influences over the centuries. Even before the foundation of the modern country, Romania had known the Scythian, Sarmatian, Gallic, the Greek,

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1584 These theories place themselves in the tradition of ‘psychological’ social psychology, they focus on explaining an individual’s actions within a group in terms of mental events and states. However, some ‘sociological’ social psychology theories go further by attempting to deal with the issue of identity at both the levels of individual cognition and of collective behavior.
1586 Ibid.
Illyro-Thracian influences and the Roman’s work (106-279), followed by the Austro-Hungarian, Greek, Ottoman and Russian influences, without forgetting the French and German influences.

The idea developed by Adolf Armbruster and Romanian scientists about Romania’s origin, a recurrent question in the Romanian history that has shaped the collective identity, is that the Romanians have existed along centuries, from the ancient times to the nineteenth century, only by their nomination by neighbors or conquerors, and by their different origin and culture vis-à-vis the Slavs, the Byzantine and the Hungarians. To reinforce that idea, in the 10th century, when the Hungarians arrived in the Pannonian plain, according to the Gesta Hungarorum written around 1146 by an anonymous chancellor of King Bela III of Hungary, the plain was inhabited by Slavs, Bulgarians, Vlachs or pastores Romanorum (shepherds of the Romans). During a long period (10th - 13th centuries), the statement at the international level, in relation to the Eastern Romainty, was that the Romanian people were, in various forms, called differently according to the Others. “The affirmation of

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1588 Adolf Armbruster is a historian during the Ceaușescu period and developed the Romanity of Romanian in a Ph.D thesis presented in 1971 at the Historic Institut of “Nicolas Iorga” of Bucharest. 

1589 Different name will be used to nominate the Romanian during centuries. But according to Armbruster, two names will be retain Valachus (Vlachs) “the appearance of this name, given the Romanians by foreigners in the Middle Ages ...” the Slavic and Romani (Rumani, Roman) word used by the Romanians themselves to nominate, “involving the memories of Rome and the special meaning, designating them the exclusive.” To see: Armbruster, Adolf. Romanitatea romanilor : istoria unei idei (Romanity of the Roumanians - History of an Idea). Trans. La romanită des Roumains - Histoire d’une idée by Grecescu, Cireașa București: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1977. (Bibliotheca Historica). p. 21.

1590 Ibid.


1592 In original: sclauj, Bulgarj et Blachij, ac pastores romanorum. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
self in relation to the other”, says Armbruster. This people have been identified by several writings, such as a letter from the Byzantine Emperor Basil II - Bulgaroctonus (Bulgarian-Slayer) - under the name of 'Vlachs', as it is mentioned in a document of 1020. This name, which will be transformed in Wallachian thereafter, has several forms depending on the nominations by neighbors such as the Germans' (Wallachian = Roman or Romanized Gauls). Later, German will restrict the meaning... (for example, Waliser, Wales, etc.). For Slavs, the word “Vlachs means a foreigner, a non-Slavic with Roman language” for Hungarians, the Byzantine “as numerous and varied are the forms it takes, the substance remains the same and the term refers to the same ethnic reality: a people of Roman origin.” In short, two names will be retained - Walachus (Vlach) – this is “the appearance of this name, given to Romanians by foreigners in the Middle Ages ...", the Slavic and Romani (Rumani, Roman) word used by the Romanians themselves to describe themselves, “involving the memories of Rome and the special sense, to be designate in exclusivity.” Various 'foreign' sources (Vatican, Hungarian, French, Slavic, and Byzantine) speak about Romanians or rather "Vlachs" as a homogeneous population of shepherds identified as being of Roman origin. Shaped by the others, as Armbruster says, the “evidence of the Roman origin of the Romanians is not the object [...]l: aware of this origin, we definitely believe that it is demonstrated” “The name 'Romania’ was regularly given to the Latin Empire of Constantinople by its contemporaries”, as demonstrates Robert Lee Wolf, a professor of history at Harvard University, in 1948.

1594 Ibid.
1595 Ibid.
1596 Ibid. p. 21.
1597 Ibid.
1598 Ibid. p. 12.
V.1.1.3 National Identity

In the construction of the national identity, the “[i]dentity is inconceivable without difference”\(^{1600}\) forcing the others to play an important role. As argues Taras Kurio, the “[n]ational identity is never fixed but always in the process of changing and evolving. Its construction differs over time, requires difference, and is never a finished process or complete.”\(^{1601}\) Romania has been defined in opposition to and collaboration with the others, i.e. neighbors, European States, etc.

Already in the twenties, the question arose about the Romanians’ identity, advocating the integration of Romania into post-war Europe in opposition to the populist ideas promoted by the left-wing traditionalist trend known as Poporanism.\(^{1602}\)

For Vianu Tudor\(^{1603}\), “if the program of ethnic culturalism was adopted, Romanian culture would regress to an undignified provincial level”\(^{1604}\), not being able to be a European one. Developing the same

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\(^{1602}\) The word ‘poporanism’ (Romanian populism) is derived from ‘popor’, meaning ‘people’ in the Romanian language. It is a Romanian traditional ideology, founded in the early 1890s by lawyer and journalist Constantin Stere, in the spirit of traditional trends that have started with Junimea - a Romanian literary society founded in Iași in 1863, through the initiative of several foreign-educated personalities (Titu Maiorescu, Petre P. Carp, Vasile Pogor, Theodor Rosetti and Iacob Negruzzii) which The foremost personality and mentor Maiorescu helped establish the basis of the modern Romanian culture. This was the most influential intellectual and political association from Romania in the nineteenth century -, and Samanatorism - an ideological and literary current formed in early twentieth century on the landership and peasant problems leaded by Nicolae Iorga its main theorist. To see: Călinescu, George. Istoria literaturii române dela origini până în prezent (History of The Romanian Literature from The Origin until Nowadays). Reedition ed. București: Semne, 2003. and Ornea, Zigu. Sămânătorismul (Samanatorism). București: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1998. (Critică și istorie literară).

\(^{1603}\) Vianu Tudor (January 8, 1898 – May 21, 1964) was a Romanian literary critic, poet, philosopher, and translator. It was known for his left-wing and anti-fascist convictions, and he had a major role on the reception and development of Modernism in Romanian literature and art.

\(^{1604}\) Vianu, Tudor Prima expoziție internationala Contimporanul. Mișcarea Literară, 1924, 1924, no. 4.
idea, Filotti Eugen wrote that “traditionalism means nothing else than the megalomania of distress”. He continued on the same wavelength, saying in 1924 that

Under the banner of Orthodoxy and tradition, some intellectuals promote a static ideal, petrified in the hieratic byzantine-muscovite forms of a primitive culture, having no evolution whatsoever and no future. Our ideal is a dynamic culture, having the desire of growth, renewal and fecundity. The scope of our generation's endeavours should not be clinging to a sterile and, in some respects, imaginary tradition, nor cultivating exclusively the autochthonous character [...]. The type of culture we want to promote is European. Our light comes from the West.

The salvation lies in the Westernization of this country [...]. If we are talking about national assertion, we see this as being active and productive: the expression of our cultural and spiritual character in specific European forms [...]. As far as we are concerned, there is no antagonism and no incompatibility between Europeanism and 'Romanianism'. We have only the sacrilegious wish to harmonise Romanianism with the heartbeat of contemporary life [...]. We want this life to be liberated from Balcanism, from Asiatism, from archaism and from the rustic simplicity which limits existence to the path from the village church to the village tavern [...].

We have a better opinion about our own people than all the traditionalists and that is why want Romania to start making its entrance into Europe. Many nations, located between the Atlantic and our borders, have succeeded in being European without losing the specificity of their ethnic spirit. Why would we be the only ones who need a senseless and useless isolation?

The national identity has faced the others and we can retain three different cases in the contemporary Romania in which the national identity was threatened: the Hungarian and Magyar minority questions in Romania within the context of the Yugoslav war; the Republic of Moldova and its possible (re-)union with Romania; the others in opposition to Ukraine and Russia, or in association with European States and the United States.

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1605 Filotti Eugen (July 28 1896 – June 1, 1975) was a Romanian diplomat, journalist and writer. As a diplomat he worked at the League of Nations in Geneva and then as minister plenipotentiary in Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary.
1606 Filotti, Eugen. Gândul nostru (Our Thought). Cuvântul liber, vol. II-a, no. 1, 1924
1607 Filotti, Eugen. Europeism sau românism (European or Romanian). Cuvântul liber, vol. II-a, no. 1, 1924 and Filotti, Eugen. Europeism sau românism (European or Romanian). Cuvântul liber, vol. II-a, no. 2, 1924. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
V.1.1.4 Nation-Building

Following the Spring of Nations\textsuperscript{1608} in 1848, Romania starts to seek union and independence by uniting the two principalities - Moldavia and Wallachia - in 1859, which was completed after the First World War, by the creation of the ‘Greater Romania’ with the addition of Transylvania. This union was “[b]ased on evidence that the three Romanian provinces have the same historical origin, Latin language and religion”\textsuperscript{1609}

Romania did not achieve independence swiftly or unilaterally from the dominant Empire, as explained by Federic Kellogg, but along many stages\textsuperscript{1610} with perplexing challenges from the neighboring Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires, and always with the support of and persistent meddling in their internal affairs by Western European great powers. In fact, “[t]he European powers - Austria, Russia, France, Great Britain, Sardinia/Italy, and Prussia/Germany”\textsuperscript{1611} guaranteed the existence of the Romania state, called by Kellogg the Danubian Romania. But rapidly, the Danubian Romania was under foreign game as we can see for the Romania foreign king nomination, Carol I of Romania, which was due to the blessing of French and German politics, and the non opposition of Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empire decision makers. Firstly, the Romanians looked for support from Russia, who they thought would help the Romanian Orthodox people in their struggle against the Islamic Ottoman Empire. The Spring of Nations reinforced the importation of the French model, the Latin identity of Romania and the idea of the Roman Empire origin. The support for the country’s

\textsuperscript{1608} The Spring of Nations, also known as European Revolutions of 1848, were a series of political upheavals throughout the European continent. Described by some historians as a revolutionary wave, the period of unrest began in France and then, further propelled by the French Revolution of 1848, soon spread to the rest of Europe.


\textsuperscript{1610} For Kellogg, Romania built its independence in five stages. The first stages was in 1948 through the Romanians’ rebellions, the second by the union of the two principalities, the third by the election of a foreign prince followed by the fourth stage with sovereignty in 1880. The fifth stage is the creation of the Greater Romania after the First World War. To see: Kellogg, Federick. The Road to Romanian Independence. West Lafayette, IA: Purdue University Press, 1995. p. 2.

\textsuperscript{1611} Ibid.
inddependence was granted by one of the great powers of that time, France, through the active foreign policy of Napoleon the Third.

He [Napoleon III] wanted to be the champion of oppressed people, to act as a peacemaker, playing the role of providential referee in Europe and beyond. Turkey is threatened by the Russian Empire; he speaks in favor of Turkey in the Crimen War. Italy suffers under the domination of Austria; he does not hesitate to support Italy. Mexico is torn by strife, threatened with the absorption by the United States, Napoleon III develops the plan to pacify Mexico, to have it regenerated through the creation of a Latin Empire, which would include the Anglo-Saxon greed\textsuperscript{1612},

as explains historian Paul Guériot about the diplomacy of Napoleon the Third. Napoleon the Third played a key role in the birth of modern Romania by lifting the Russian protectorate and recognizing the Ottoman suzerainty over the Romanian principalities at the Congress of Paris (25 February-30 March 1856) after the Crimen war. The Treaty of Paris placed the two principalities – Moldavia and Wallachia - under the protection of European powers, notably France, which supported the union of Moldavia and Wallachia with the double election of Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza and achieved a de-facto union of the two principalities (17 January and 5 February 1859), the first application of the policy of nationalities. The union was formally declared three years later, on 5 February 1862, and the new virtually independent state started bearing the name of Romania, with Bucharest as its capital city. For Romania, this blessing reinforced the country’s belonging to Europe rather than to the Eastern side associated with Russia, the Balkan countries and the Ottoman Empire.

We can add that

[t]hey also sought to control their own destiny, free from the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire and the meddling of neighboring Austria and Russia. They wished more-over to retain their Orthodox Christianity, rejecting a religious union with Catholic Rome, unlike some Romanians in Transylvania. Hence, Danubian Romanians dreamed of an independent nation-state in which their traditions would be preserved and strengthened.\textsuperscript{1613}


After the First World War, the world was radically different, with “the formation of the first communist state, [...] the use of the nationality principle as the basis for the creation of new states (or enlargement of states already in existence)”\(^\text{1614}\) and the creation of the League of Nations to guarantee security and peace. In this new context, Romania saw an opportunity to get out of the crisis and “Romanians saw their dreams becoming reality through the creation of Greater Romania, and by the union of Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania, Crisana, Maramures and Banat with the Old Kingdom.”\(^\text{1615}\) The country became the second largest state in Eastern and Central Europe, but the “newly acquired territories transformed Romania from a nation-state into nationalities states, in which ethnic Romanians made up only 72% of the population.”\(^\text{1616}\) In this new context during the interwar period, Romania’s foreign policy was to assure the country’s integrity and protect Bessarabia from the Soviet Union.

This nation-building process was important and refers to the structuring of a national identity – Romanian - using the power of the state: as “[b]orders play an important role in state and nation building. They help to forge a political community and nation, signify the limits and extent of sovereignty, signal to which state the citizens belong and define them in relation to ‘Others’.”\(^\text{1617}\) This process aims at the unification of the people or peoples within the state to remain politically stable and viable in the long run. This idea was an important one during the communist period, in order to protect the integrity of the state against Soviet domination and the Soviet economic integration plan for Eastern Europe. A certain opposition to the others, in this case the Soviet Union and COMECON, allows Romania to develop an open independent foreign policy that frequently diverged from the Soviet Union ones. This foreign policy was built on a differentiation process vis-à-vis the Eastern blocs that were part of the others, with a role of minorities in the Romanian foreign policy, and using the Sino-Soviet Split, the Third World and Western relationships. Romanian minorities were used by Ceausescu’s government to obtain foreign funds by imposing a tax per person to be paid by the foreign state in question, while in exchange the government let - the Germans and the Jews - emigrate,

\(^\text{1615}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{1616}\) Ibid.
the former to Western Germany, the latter to Israel.\textsuperscript{1618} This policy represented an issue of conflict and of leverage with the Western German and Israeli governments, leading to an uneasily close relationship, which Romania used sometimes to act as an intermediary between the Soviets and those two governments. The largest minorities, the Hungarians, amounted to almost 2 million people, are located mainly in Transylvania. They played a determining role in the relation between Hungary and Romania. As for the Third World, Romania developed very close relationships in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In the Middle East, Arab countries in particular became some of Romania’s closest economic partners, while in Asia, China’s trade exchange increased and enabled Romania to attenuate the Soviet economic pressures in the seventies and in the eighties. Until the eighties, Romania’s relations with the West were important, in particular with the United States. France was an incontestable support to Romania, through General de Gaulle in 1968, who called on Bucharest to set the history of the friendly Franco-Romanian cooperation and the future perspectives of the two Latin countries to work toward a unified Europe from “the Atlantic to the Ural”. The two leaders were opposed to the bloc system – NATO and the Warsaw pact - and found here, with “their Latin origins, cement of their union”.\textsuperscript{1619}

Boia Lucian explains that Romanians had conflicting attitudes by being simultaneously hospitable toward foreigners and intolerant toward national minorities. Romanians react as a historically “rural and somewhat isolated civilization,” hosting an “anti-urban

\textsuperscript{1618} Tismăneanu, Vladimir (Pres.). Raport final - Comisia Preziden\c{t}ial\c{a} pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din Rom\c{a}nia [online]. (Final Report of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania). Bucure\c{s}ti: Comisia Preziden\c{t}ial\c{a} pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din Rom\c{a}nia, 2006. [cited 11 June 2008]. Available from: <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf>. p. 542-572.

mythology”, a mythology “that is as anti-cosmopolitan, anti-Otherness, and anti-Western as it is anti-progress and populist-communitarian.” On the other hand, a highly Westernized elite has been built and shaped by the ‘French’ and ‘German’ myths.

Romanians recently reviewed, from the Soviet-Stalinism to an Oriental-megalomaniac model – à la Ceausescu –, the communist mythology while the post-communist imaginary seems to be built on conspiracy theories based on the “American mythology” and on a confused desire to become truly integrated into Europe, yet leave Romanian traditional values untouched.

One must remember that the modern Romania was built continuously, with two main steps as seen previously; in 1877 with the union of Moldavia and Wallachia; in 1918 with the creation of Greater Romania through the integration of Transylvania. Each time, the country has to reshape and rebuild a new identity in a new nation with, as Goga wrote, the common destiny of the three principalities. The country will share and combine the “contemplative spirit, represented by the poetry of Eminescu, a native from Moldova, the fighting spirit, represented by poet Octav Goga, a native from Transylvania, and the speculative, playful spirit, represented by poet Martin Sorescu, a native of Wallachia”.

V.1.1.5 Nationalism

In the case of Romania, we can consider that the traditional Western nationalism can be more view as an ‘Eastern’ style of nationalism, due to a lack of modern European political education and to the influence of 50-year long communist rules.

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1623 Ibid. p. 169.

The presidential elections of 2000, when Vadim Tudor was a candidate, were an illustration of the Romanian nationalism specificity. The ‘national theme’ changed in the years following the 1989 anti-Communist revolution in Romania, offering a new ideology noted for its acts of hate speech against others, usually minorities and foreign countries. During Ceausescu’s regime, Romanians experimented all nuances of nationalism, through a necessary need of an enemy ‘of the nation’, either real or imaginary, to oppose the collective self\textsuperscript{1625} to the others and to justify the extreme ‘patriotic’ measures taken by Ceausescu and his government. The insistence on the need to develop the self-consciousness of the Romanian people in all spheres of life was a persistent theme in Ceausescu’s cultural policy, with a concept of ‘national specificity’,\textsuperscript{1626} which emphasized the uniqueness and special characteristics of the Romanian culture as compared to the others. Joja Athanase, former president of the Romanian Academy, launched the theory of ‘national specificity’.

As Dragomir Marius\textsuperscript{1627} explains, the Romanian nationalism has a long history in the construction of the country. The issue of Romanian nationalism goes back to the nineteen century. At that time, the best known Romanian poet, Mihai Eminescu, exulted the ‘national specificity’, “bringing public attention to the danger that the ‘others’ posed,”\textsuperscript{1628} for the first time, e.g. minorities and especially the Jews, blamed for trying to pauperize the Romanian nation.

At the beginning of the 20th century, intolerance towards the others increased the frustration caused by the fragmentation of the Romanian state. In addition, as Dragomir Marius wrote, “Nationalism went [at that time] beyond public discourse and manifested itself in Romanian art and literature.”\textsuperscript{1629} Nevertheless, these ideas suggested by ethnicity became a basis for the political state and encouraged the

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\textsuperscript{1627} Dragomir Marius is a Media Consultant and Media Policy Reports Editor at the Open Society Institute in London. To see: <http://www.sun.ceu.hu/02-courses/course-sites/media/CV-Dragomir.doc>


\textsuperscript{1629} Ibid.
nationalistic trend. This result became, for a large extreme right political movement, a fight for a pure ethnic Romanian state.

As states Dragomir,

the resurgence of a more accurate nationalism [trend] was brought by the Ceausescu regime (1965-1989) and had a surprisingly strong impact on the Romanian people at a time when some of the once best-known supporters of the right wing, like the theoretician of religions Mircea Eliade or the philosopher Emil Cioran, were retracting their ideas from the writings of their youth.\textsuperscript{1630}

Under Ceausescu’s regime, Romanians had to face all possible and unimaginable shades of nationalism, vis-à-vis potential - real or imaginary - enemies, symbolized by the others. The years of post-communist transition have experienced a resurgence of the 'national theme', which is an eclectic mix of all the elements of the Romanian nationalist trends throughout the Romanian history. The most significant facts are the support for the nationalist discourse of the Greater Romania Party, with the strong help of other ‘brother’ parties, such as the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR). This new wave of nationalism is the legacy of the communist state based on the religious component - the eternal Orthodoxy - and ethnic groups’ issue, likewise the attack of the Hungarian minority by bringing the discussion of the Transylvania issue back into public debate.

\textbf{V.1.2 The Victimization}

What matters are not things in themselves, but things, as they are perceived.

Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel\textsuperscript{1631}

In the relations with others, Romania has developed a tendency toward victimization, a concept that Catherine Durandin explains very well in her book.\textsuperscript{1632} Baicoianu Anca\textsuperscript{1633} reinforces this idea by stating

\textsuperscript{1630} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1632} To see: Durandin, Catherine. Roumanie, un piège? (Romania, a trap?). Paris: Jacques Hesse éditions, 2000.
that “the temptation of victimization [...] seems to be typical of Romanian culture”.\textsuperscript{1634} It is for this reason that Romanians, in their turn, seek for a ‘scapegoat’ and/or at least, ‘a savior’, according to the situation, which is able to give rapid solutions to problems. Tomescu-Hatto Odette adds that this victimization trend is probably the reason for which Romania sometimes promotes the hatred against the West, and that West represents a sort of “universal savior”.\textsuperscript{1635}

The West as a universal savior was rapidly represented by the United States. The U.S. represented the guarantee of freedom and democracy, the unique challenger fighting against dictatorship and communism associated to the enemy of freedom during and after the Cold War period. This situation has been reinforced the U.S. position as the World’s Policeman devalued by the international situation and the collapse of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{1636} In his statement, Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana said, “we [former communist countries] feel a sense of obligation and gratitude for the Americans, who have helped to destroy communism.”\textsuperscript{1637} And as Tomescu-Hatto Odette points out,

The United States represents for the Romanians, since the years of communism, the ‘perfect country’, the ‘country of all liberties’ and a real power. After 1989, the United States have become a model for many of the Romanians who saw in that country the key to integration into NATO. [...]

\textsuperscript{1633} Băicoianu, Anca has a Ph.D. in Literary Theory at the University of Bucharest (thesis: Strategies of Identity (Re)Construction in Postcolonial and Post-communist Literatures) and works as a Senior Editor in Publishing Houses in Bucharest and a Tutor in Literary Theory at the University of Bucharest.


\textsuperscript{1636} To see in the second part of the thesis, the chapter - The Security: North Association Treaty Organization -.

This fascination with the United States persists to this day: it comes within the broad register of political post-communist myth-saving.\textsuperscript{1638}

The circumstances around the end of the communist regime in Romania, with the Revolution of 1989, do not reveal a clear popular opposition to the regime, a real break in the democratic process and in the country foreign policy. In addition, one cannot therefore forget to ask oneself about the role played by foreigners in the Romanian Revolution.\textsuperscript{1639} For us, the answer is not so important and does not fall in the scope of our thesis, but we explain in the first part the fact that the others, including foreigners and minorities, played an important role for the Romanians and their collective identity. The other will be a permanent reference, either for or against, for Romanians. The warm welcome expected from the West did not come soon, and the country’s image was dramatically jeopardized by the first years of Ion Iliescu’s presidency\textsuperscript{1640}. Meanwhile Romania rejects communism considering itself as a victim of Yalta conference to attract the sympathy of the West. Once the first moments of euphoria passed, the fraternization and assistance from Western countries, and in particular France, remained pending the sign of democratization and economic liberalization from the political leaders. The country’s undefined positioning in relation to the West (as Romania was viewed either as a Balkan’s state nor as a Eastern European one) underlined the victimization feeling, reinforced by the Romanian leaders’ perception of not being understood by the West concerning the real Romanian foundation and the country’s sacrifice during the Cold War period.

\textbf{V.1.2.1 Why Victimization of Romanians?}

This victimization is based, from the Romanians’ point of view, on the Others’ failure to understand the Romanian identity as being unique and the sacrifice made by Romanians to protect the West. As Lucian Boia argues,

\begin{quote}
[t]he image of a West protected thanks to Romania’s sacrifice and a Romanian society strained and held back by fulfilling the function of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1638} Tomescu-Hatto, Odette. Identité et culture politique dans la Roumanie post-communiste. In Durandin, Catherine (dir.) and Cărănei Magda (Col.) (Eds.), Perspectives roumaines : Du postcommunisme à l’intégration européenne. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\textsuperscript{1639} To see in the first part of the thesis, Change into Continuity.

\textsuperscript{1640} To see the first part of this thesis – Change into Continuity – A Controversial Period -.
defender of the European civilization has become deeply ingrained in the
cultural vision of the Romanians, in their behavior and their reactions.\textsuperscript{1641}

The idea of Romanian uniqueness is developed on three main
factors: geographical, historical and cultural.

Baicoianu Anca states that "[f]rom the geographic point of
view, there is a strong emphasis on Romania's strategic position as a
'turning point' between the Orient and the Occident, and, when
necessary, as a defense line against all invasions."\textsuperscript{1642} In the
Romanian imaginary, the ideal Romanian territory is between the
Danube, the Dniestr and the Black Sea, including the three ancient
principalities of Moldavia, Transylvania and Wallachia, without
forgetting the Dobrogea and Bucovina regions, with the Carpathian
Mountains as its backbone. This ideal country was born during the
inter-war period by the creation of the Greater Romania and its loss
after the Second World War due to the abandonment of the country
by the West to Soviet Union influences. For Lucian Boia, this idea is
reinforced in the Romanian consciousness by the feeling of “the role
of the Romanians in defending the European civilization”\textsuperscript{1643} on the
one hand; “and on the other, the antiquity, and even priority of
Romanian achievements in a wide variety of fields."\textsuperscript{1644}

Historically, the origins of Romania have been described as
illustrious, with famously double descent: the Dacian and the Roman,
which gives the possibility “to claim superiority over the closest
neighbours and to legitimate Romania's position as a rightful member
of the European choir of nations.”\textsuperscript{1645} But more than that, the identity
of the Romanian people was built by “the symptom of an identity
uncertainty overemphasized by the looseness of [territories,]
frontiers, regimes and rules in an area of interference and political influences that built a “perpetual resistance against the expansionist impulses of the neighbouring empires (or states).” This situation, as says Baicoianu, built the Romanians’

topoi of isolation (Romanians are a Latin island in a Slavic sea, Romanians are the safe-keepers of the Byzantine legacy threatened by the influence of both the Hungarian and Polish Catholic kingdoms and the Muslim Ottoman Empire) and openness (Romania is at the crossroads of “worlds” and world-views) melt into one another in the idea of Romanian uniqueness. 

Nevertheless, culturally speaking, the Latin origin of Romanians is not contested and was a factor emphasized at the beginning of the nineteenth century, accentuated in the following period during the Romanians’ nation-building process. But, as Baicoianu underlines,

The common Byzantine heritage of the area, the ever present Ottoman threat, even in the calmer periods of peace, and the extensive use of Latin and Greek as cultural idioms, and of Church Slavonic as worship language all over the Balkan Peninsula worked, if not as cohesive factors, at least as a way of leveling the differences,

with the Others in the region.

The strong feeling of isolation was turned by Romania in the idea of uniqueness in a constant reaction against the identity of the others. When they feel threatened by the pan-Slavism project, they reacted with a strong affirmation of the Latin identity. When they feel too much ‘integrated’ in the Soviet Union system, they reacted by adopting openness and collaboration with the West, ... But also, from time to time, we have seen Romanians getting closer to the other in multiple sphere of interest and during certain periods of time, e.g. the Serbs during the Yugoslavian war, the Bulgarians for European Union accession, ...

1646 Ibid.
1647 Ibid.

1649 Ibid.
Romania, a Crossroad

V.1.2.2 Several Examples of Victimization

Already, in 1879, Brătianu Ion C. says in a speech delivered in the Romanian Parliament that:

We were the advance guard of Europe from the thirteenth century until very recently; we were the bulwark of Europe against the Asian invasions of the past. The European states were able to develop then because others sacrificed themselves in order to shelter them. It is for this reason—despite the ancient remains of Romanian civilization—which we have only recently embarked on the way of modern civilization.\textsuperscript{1650}

The rejection of Romania by NATO in 1997, after huge efforts made by the country to achieve the necessary conditions and despite the Romanians’ will to participate to the regional stability and security in the framework of NATO and the European Union, as it was the case during the Kosovo crisis, reinforced the attitude of victimization. The country felt rejected based on a discriminatory choice, but not because the country had not set sufficient conditions for democracy and the free market economy, i.e. one of the reason of rejection.

In 2003, the Romanian foreign policy was confronted with the problem of supporting the United States and their war in Iraq. To defend itself, the Romanian society will use the victimization process and accuse Europe that, fifty years ago, it abandoned Romania to the Soviet influence. But not only France will be slandered, Europe and Germany too.\textsuperscript{1651} We can read the words of Nistorescu Corneli:

We can wonder what France and Germany did in fifty years of Communism in the East. The answer is simple: only business! And to us, imprisoned in the communist jails, they sent friendly greetings. [...] And now they are surprised to see that the ex-Communist countries do not believe in their mean artifices!\textsuperscript{1652}

But other authors also attacked the Franco-German conception of Europe, saying that


\textsuperscript{1651} Nistorescu explains thus that “Germany was maintained after the war, while we them Romanian, we were stolen our richesses by the Russians”. To see: Nistorescu, C. Mergem cu americanii și cu englezii (We go with the Americans and the English). Evenimentul zilei, 18 Fev. 2003. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\textsuperscript{1652} Ibid. p. 1. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
it had believed to have eliminated [CEECs] for a few decades of "European construction": ambitions of power articulated as at the 19th century around continental alliances (Berlin-Paris-Moscow against London-Washington-Rome, with Bucharest-Sofia-Warsaw placed at the corner of the map).\textsuperscript{1653}

Culturally, Romania is seen as a Latine island in a Slav ocean, with the combination of the three original principalities and waves of different neighbors and rulers’ behaviors, as weel education influences. The country will adopt the influence of French and German culture (Bonjouriste and Romanian Prince reign), as the different culture of the country rulers (Russian, Phanariot, etc.). But in fact as Goga says, the country will share and combine the “contemplative spirit, represented by the poetry of Eminescu, a native from Moldova, the fighting spirit, represented by poet Octavian Goga, a native from Transylvania, and the speculative, playful spirit, represented by poet Martin Sorescu, a native of Wallachia”.\textsuperscript{1654}

\section*{V.1.3 The Need for Recognition}

Recognition is an important item treated in social and political theories, which most authors built in large sense the root, as Fanon Frantz\textsuperscript{1655}, Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich\textsuperscript{1656}, Mead George Herbert\textsuperscript{1657}, and Sartre Jean-Paul\textsuperscript{1658}, and recently revisited by modern authors,


likewise Fraser Nancy\textsuperscript{1659}, Honneth Axel\textsuperscript{1660}, Taylor Charles\textsuperscript{1661} and Tully James\textsuperscript{1662}. The theories understand the relations of recognition in terms of an inter-subjective dynamics of mutual trust, love, respect and esteem,\textsuperscript{1663} claimed to play an important role in the processes of socialization, enculturation and individuation. The relations of recognition shape the subject's sense of identity by sharing identities and standards of expectation within social and political communities. Its develops practical relations to self which guide the self-understanding and relations to others. On the other hand, we can emphasize here Fraser’s opinion, who became aware of the fight for recognition, which became a paradigmatic form of the 19th century political conflict.

Recognition is

the identification of something as having been previously seen, heard, known, and also the perception of something as existing or true as well the acknowledgment of something as valid or as entitled to consideration.\textsuperscript{1664}

In international law, it is “an official act by which one state acknowledges the existence of another state or government, or of belligerency or insurgency.”\textsuperscript{1665} As we have quickly explained in the first and third parts of this thesis, recognition is an important item of the Romanian culture at large and a political need in particular.

\textsuperscript{1665} Ibid.
V.1.3.1 The Recognition as an Independent State

V.1.3.1.1 Independence

As Mihai Serban states, along centuries

[...]he relative independence enjoyed by the Romanian States, even in times of great tension such as the moment when Hungary became a Turkish pachalik and when the Ottoman armies besieged Vienna, is related to enormous material sacrifices that Romania is ready to make for the spirit of freedom that Romanians maintained close to the body.\textsuperscript{1666}

During the contemporary period, Romania develops the need to be recognized as a distinct entity with its own identity. As a country at the periphery of Empires, an idea developed hereafter in the thesis, Romania has been always in a troubled relationship with its neighbors\textsuperscript{1667} and tried to curve its identity and homeland. The question of recognition is an old one in Romanian history and has always been used as a geopolitical tool. As Kellogg says, “[t]he Romanians’ quest for independence deeply immersed their affairs in those of the European great powers.”\textsuperscript{1668} From this period of building its independence, the new state got its recognition through the game of international actors.\textsuperscript{1669} After the First World War, “The central problem [for Romania’s foreign policy] was to consolidate the national unity by bringing its recognition through the Peace Conference of Paris.”\textsuperscript{1670} Moreover, in this period, Romania became a member of the international organization League of Nations, established at Geneva, believing that this organization would defend the “national independence and territorial integrity of its members”,\textsuperscript{1671} and, consequently, Romania’s as well.

\textsuperscript{1667} To see the second part of the thesis - From Isolation to Interdependence - The Neighorliness -. 
\textsuperscript{1669} To see the beginning of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{1671} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
V.1.3.1.2 Affiliation

In follow-up to the independence process, Romania has always felt the need to be recognized and, at the same time, affiliated with greater powers in order to gain influence in the international world politics and to maintain its own security. To illustrate this statement, we can say that the independence process was supported by France and Russia against the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires in the nineteenth century, as explained in the chapter of this thesis: The ‘Others’ - Nation-Building. To maintain its independence, Romania preserves long-term relations with France and England and participates, along the late modern period, in various political associations. The ‘Little Entente’\(^{1672}\) was a collective defense arrangement formed after the First World War, with the aim of stopping any encroachments on the independence of the member states committed by any European power and of strengthening the influence of its member states in international deliberations.\(^ {1673}\) The Pact of the Balkan Entente\(^ {1674}\) was signed in order to contribute to the consolidation of peace in the Balkans in the inter-war period. The Tripartite Pact\(^ {1675}\) or Axis Power was joined by Romania on November 23, 1940, partly due to the Romanian desire for protection against the Soviet Union. After the Second World War, the Yalta Conference

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\(^{1672}\) The Little Entente was an alliance formed in 1920 and 1921 by Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia with the purpose of common defense against Hungarian irredentism and the prevention of a Habsburg Empire restoration. The Little Entente began to break down in 1936 and disbanded completely in 1938. France had seen the Little Entente as an opportunity, in the interests of French security, to revitalize the threat of a two-front war against Germany. France supported the alliance by signing treaties with each member country. To see: __. Pact of The Organization of The Little Entente [online]. (The League of Nations). Vol. CXXXIX. Geneva: The League of Nations, 1933. HyperText Markup Language. Available from: <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/History/poa_e.html>.


\(^{1675}\) The Tripartite Pact also known as the Axis Power was a pact signed in Berlin, Germany on September 27, 1940, between Germany, Italy and Japan. Several minor powers such as Romania formally adhered to the Tripartite Pact. This pact followed the proclamation of an ‘axis’ binding Rome and Berlin (October 25, 1936), with the two powers claiming that the world would henceforth rotate on the Rome-Berlin axis.
had granted the Soviet Union a predominant interest in Romania. The Paris Peace Treaties failed to acknowledge Romania as a co-belligerent of the conflict and the Red Army stayed on Romanian soil until 1956. Romania ‘had no choice’ and was integrated behind the Iron Curtain under the Soviet Union influence as a member of the Warsaw pact and COMECON.

A nation of peasants and more or less run by foreign elites, Romania is not a militarily powerful country, but a country which has always used diplomacy to survive. One has to remember that Romania’s diplomacy and foreign policy during the Great Romania period (1919-1940) was under the leadership of Nicolae Titulescu, anchoring Romania’s international visibility through international organizations such as the League of Nations and developing cooperation in order to guarantee peace and security and ensure Romania’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. After the country’s integration in the Soviet bloc, Romania lost its political independence and, in continuity of its natural foreign policy, Romania affirms its independence and differences during Ceausescu’s regime by an independent foreign policy within the limits of Soviet acceptance and by using the platform of International Organizations and, in particular, diplomatic contacts with the West, Middle-East, Third World, as well as Asian countries. Romania has always been a member of various international organizations, ever since its creation, e.g. the accession of Romania in 1973 in the IMF, the first Eastern European countries to do so. International recognition was an important element of Ceausescu’s foreign policy, as well as the participation in international organization - an element of his political independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

V.1.3.2 Recognition as a Political Parlor

After the revolution of ‘89, Romania faced many problems on the international and domestic stages. The need for recognition was a necessary element for the new government after the 89’s Revolution to comfort the new power in place, as seen in the first part (A Controversial Period - State and Government Recognition). As says Ion Iliescu, “[t]he year 1989 marked the isolation [of the country]. Therefore, in the program of the Revolution, among the ten points, there was this: to end the international isolation of Romania and open
the country to the world." For Romania, the need to be recognized at international and regional levels is important and even crucial. These needs will be translated into a desire of power, and relative dominance of certain spaces: the political space with international and regional organizations, the Balkans and the Black Sea areas; the geographical area with the Republic of Moldova and the possible partial restoration of the Great Romania, and also the Bistrița Canal; and the economic space with the development of relations with Western, Eastern, non-aligned and Third World countries. Or, “[a]ccording to Mearsheimer, all states want to become regional hegemons,” and, in one way, Romania does not escape from this rule.

V.1.3.2.1 Political Space

In the political space, as we explain along this thesis, Romania attaches a high importance to international organizations in order to exist. In addition, Romania has always sought for regional leadership toward the Balkans, in order to stabilize the area, to promote peace and to guarantee Romania’s security and stability. This aim was Nicolae Titulescu’s crusade in the inter-war period as Romania’s foreign minister, but also as Chairman of the League of Nations, whose mission was to secure the Balkan area. As Goga says,

[i]n foreign policy after 1930, Romania has got closer to the countries of Central Europe and the Balkan Peninsula. Romanian diplomacy at the League of Nations, under the chairmanship of the Romanian Minister of

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1677 To see: the first part - Change into Continuity -.
1678 To see: the second part - From Isolation to Interdependence - The Neighborliness -.
Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Titulescu, has campaigned for disarmament [in the
Balkans] between 1932 and 1934,\textsuperscript{1681}

with no success due to the accession of Germany’s Nazi power
in Europe.

In the recent period, during the Yugoslav war and after that,
Romania will seek, in a natural way, to play an important role in
order to stabilize the Balkans area. First, with a wait-and-see attitude
toward NATO and the European Union, Romania does not want to
jeopardize the Romanian-Yugoslav relations; second, Romania takes
on a more active role toward the Yugoslav conflict after 1999, and
seeks to negotiate with all stakeholders and Russia in order to find
solutions to the conflict. In addition, Romania’s political leaders took
an another factor takes in consideration: the Balkan countries direct
control on the land routes between Western Europe and South West
Asia (Asia Minor and the Middle East). Moreover, one can remarks
that an informal Orthodox block appears an informal convergent
diplomacy of Athens, Belgrade and Bucharest. This theme will be
developed hereafter in another paragraph.

The head of the Romanian state concluded that “Romania wants
to take on an active role in solving the issues at the Black Sea. Not
playing this role would mean not to treat the regional matter
seriously”.\textsuperscript{1682} The importance of the Black Sea area was confirmed
later on in 2008 by the Romanian political leader, who emphasized
again on the region’s importance: “Through the Black Sea, the
European area strategically meets Central Asia, the Caucasus and the
Middle East, hydrocarbon production and transit areas.”\textsuperscript{1683}

In 1992, the Romanian diplomatic effort started to convince
interested stakeholders that the importance of the Black Sea area
pays dividends through multiple associations and conferences. The
area became important for strategic reasons, but also for many

economic reasons. Many Black Sea neighboring countries are underdeveloped or need economic resources. Moreover, the recent energetic issue places the Black Sea at the heart of the European Union energy security questions. For Furfari Samuele\textsuperscript{1684},

\begin{quote}
[t]his is the geopolitical situation of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey - among the major energy producers in Russia and the shores of the Caspian Sea and the major energy producers in Russia - which gives Southeastern Europe its importance as a transit point for natural gas supplies,\textsuperscript{1685}
\end{quote}
as members of the Alliance and the European Union for Bulgaria and Romania. Despite the Romanian lobby toward the Black Sea, "[t]he European Union has long neglected the area of the Black Sea."\textsuperscript{1686} And it is only after 2005, in the perspective of the Bulgarian and Romanian accession to the EU, that Europe will take the Black Sea area seriously in consideration in relation to the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).\textsuperscript{1687} This European interest will boost Romania’s leadership in the area. The Romanian idea of the Black Sea Euro-region\textsuperscript{1688} expressed after the International Conference on Intergional Cooperation in the Black Sea\textsuperscript{1689} within the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, will become a reality through the creation of the Black Sea Euro-Region

\textsuperscript{1684} Furfari Samuele has a PhD in applied sciences and teach the 'Energy geopolitic' at the Free University of Bruxelles. From 1982, he is working at the European Commission on energy questions.


Di Pupo is the Redactor-in-chief of European politic department of the newspaper 'Caucaz Europenews'.


\textsuperscript{1688} To see the first part of this thesis: Change into Continuity – A Wind of Change – The Black Sea Region.


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\textit{Romania’s Post-Cold War International Relations}
(BSER)\textsuperscript{1690} in 2008, an organization chaired by Romanians\textsuperscript{1691}. As the Chairman of the BSER says:

the 26th of September 2008 has become a historic day because, after three years of intense efforts, [...]. My opinion is that the creation of this Euro-region is a huge step for the authorities in the Black Sea area.\textsuperscript{1692}

\textbf{V.1.3.2.2 Geographical Space}

\textit{In the Past}

As states Catherine Durandin, "[t]he Romanians claim a space that goes from the Carpathians to the Danube and Dniester in the East, but this space has been fragmented into separate principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania which were reunited late."\textsuperscript{1693} But, one has to remember that the three Romanian principalities\textsuperscript{1694} (Moldavia, Transylvania and Wallachia) had already been united for several years in the sixteenth century (figure 23), under Michael the Brave’s reign\textsuperscript{1695}, who was seen as one of Romania’s greatest national heroes, being assassinated in 1601.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1691] Nicișor Daniel Constantinescu is the first President of the Black Sea Euroregion created on September, 2008. He was the president of the Regional County Council, and in 2006 President of the Council for the Regional Development of the South-East Region.
\item[1695] Michael the Brave was the Prince of Wallachia (1593-1601), of Transylvania (1599-1600), and of Moldavia (1600), the three Romanian principalities that he united under his rule until his assassination in 1601.
\end{footnotes}
Figure 23: Romania under Michael the Brave’s reign in the sixteenth century.

According to Romanian historian Giurescu Constantin: “Never in the Romanian history has there been a moment of such high glory so closely followed by bitter failure”,\(^{1696}\) by the impossibility to maintain the new kingdom’s unity. Michael the Brave was considered later on, in Romania’s modern periods, as the precursor of the modern Romania, an idea which was defended by Balcescu Niculae\(^{1697}\), becoming a point of reference for nationalists, as well as a catalyst for various Romanian forces to achieve a single Romanian state during and after the inter-war period.\(^{1698}\)


\(^{1697}\) Nicolae Băilescu (1819-1852) was a Romanian Wallachian soldier, historian, journalist, and leader of the 1848 Wallachian Revolution. To see his books: Băilescu, Nicolae. Românii supt Mihai-Voievod Viteazul (Romanians under the Rule of Michael the Brave). București: Litera International, 1998 [1849]. (Biblioteca Școlarului).

After the country’s unification known as the Greater Romania, Romania has always been afraid of losing or alienating part of its territory, and eventually seeks to restore the geographical space of the inter-war period. One has to remember that it was part of Romania’s inter-war diplomatic action, done by Nicolae Titulescu to preserve Romania’s territorial integrity. During the entire inter-war period, the Romanian foreign policy was focused on the territorial status quo to maintain the new borders obtained by international recognition at the end of the First World War.\(^\text{1699}\) This fear of territorial alienation is a permanent fear of the Romanians, which we can easily explain if we take into consideration the Romanian history and the permanent domination by Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. In order to guarantee the status quo and to preserve the inter-war international system (the Versailles system), Romania’s political leaders will champion security through the support of international organizations (the League of Nations) and through the promotion of regional alliances with European states (more specifically Great Britain and France) and Balkans states (the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente), as well as with Eastern European states (Poland\(^\text{1700}\)). They have the determination in their foreign policy to oppose “all forms of territorial revision - the restoration of Habsburgs, the idea of Mitteleurope, and the Anschluss”\(^\text{1701}\) - and to show the inter-war great powers “that the nations of Central Europe could manage their own affairs and would no longer tolerate being merely the object of bargaining by others.”\(^\text{1702}\)

\textit{After the Cold War}

After the Revolution of 1989, the Romanian foreign policy will seek to continue to promote international and regional organizations, to get support from the main international powers - Europe, the United States and Russia, when the country becomes powerful on the international scene -, and to oppose any kind of territorial revision by


\(^{1700}\) The Polish-Romanian treaty signed on March 3rd 1921, renewed in 1926 and 1931. The most important article of the treaty provided a common defense against a Soviet Union attack, a large concern for Poland’s Eastern territories and Romania’s Bessarabia.


\(^{1702}\) Ibid.
signing treaties with neighboring countries. Romania has difficulties in recognizing the balkanization of Yugoslavia and does not recognize the new Kosovo state, a policy which is more aligned to Yugoslav and Russian policies rather than to the United States and European foreign policies in the Balkans. But during all the recent period, the Romanian government will have an ambiguous attitude towards the Republic of Moldova, including former Bessarabia, an inter-war Romanian territory. The political leaders will recognize the new state’s independence without hesitation, but will push for reunification during some periods and let the situation as it is: ‘one culture, two states’ during other periods. From the country’s revolution period until nowadays, part of the political leaders and population will seek to restore the Greater Romania with the incorporation of the Republic of Moldova, even without the non-recognition of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. The fight for the Bessarabian territory will take various forms, such as religious domination and cultural support. This means that, despite current political issues, the Metropolis of Bessarabia (Romanians) is now recognized as ‘the rightful successor’ to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Hotin, which existed from 1927 to 1944, when it was dissolved and its canonical territory put under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Moscow Patriarchate in 1947. Romania’s limit was established by two factors: the first was the conflict with Hungary concerning the possible retrocession claim of Transylvania; the second was the Russian interest in the Republic of Moldova for geopolitical purposes.

The control for geographic areas will also be extended to the Black Sea, giving birth to a neighborhood conflict with Ukraine in relation to the Black Sea delimitation process of the continental shelf and the Bistroe channel. These two cases were important in the post-Cold War economic context for Romania to control the Danube access ways, considered by Romanian experts as a geostrategic position and the Snakes Island continental shelf, considered as a strategic area with its hydrocarbon resources. In these two cases, Romania wins after a long political and legal fights.

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1703 To see the second part of the thesis - From Isolation to Interdependence - The Neighborliness -
1704 To see the second part of the thesis - From Isolation to Interdependence - The Neighborliness -
V.1.3.2.3 Economic Space

A strong economic country at the beginning of the Second World War, Romania took advantage during the Cold War of its particular domestic and independent foreign policy, in-between East and West, and of the specific relations with the Third World and the Middle East, in order to develop power and economic relations in the whole world. After the '89 Revolution, the economic situation of the country was catastrophic and needed development and large investments, considering the economic actors and Ceausescu’s obsession during the eighties to pay the country’s debt. The different space and alliances gave Romania not only political power, as explained herebefore, but also potential economic power towards the Black Sea area with relations with the Caucuses states, towards the Balkans with traditional economic relations, later on towards the European and Eastern states in the process of EU accession and programs implementation, as well towards United States in the context of NATO accession and the new World context and the fight against terrorism. Romania’s geographic position, in the new energetic context in the dawn of the twenty-first century, gives Romania a certain power in the energy economic space vis-à-vis the Alliance and the European Union. Through its actions, Romania tries to get the leadership in economic area as well, by means of the economic diplomacy, which is a component of Romania’s foreign policy.1705

V.1.3.3 The Recognition as a European Country

The adhesion process to NATO and the European Union is also a way to recognize Romania’s historical European heritage, as well as to repair the damage done to Romania at the Yalta conference, after the Second World War. Adrian Severin said in 1997 that the adhesion is “a natural and legitimate option”1706 because Romanians are the same as other European people, and that this adhesion will enable the country to reform more quickly while contributing to the stability not only of the area, but also of the “entire continent”. He finished his plea by specifying “that these historical meetings will bring to

1705 To see herebefore in the first part - Change into Continuity – The Comeback – The Foreign Policy New Line -.
**Romania, a Crossroad**

Romania the act of justice which it well deserves after a half of century of waiting and sacrifices”\(^{1702}\) along the line of the Romanians’ feeling of victimization.

In addition to the political purposes, the country sought recognition for a geopolitical reason as we saw, during Ion Iliescu’s first presidential mandate, with the hesitation to choose between Eastern and Western partners, with Emil Constantinescu and his initiative: ‘Romania, at the Crossroads’ (România la răscruce), and with Traian Basescu and his consolidation of Romania’s position within NATO and the European Union. The country needed to be viewed as an Eastern European country and not as a Balkan state as we will detail in the next chapter.

\(^{1702}\) Ibid. Paper presented at. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
V.2 Romania In-between

Our parents looked to the East and we look to the West.

Alecu Russo\textsuperscript{1708}

Because, “[t]he history of Romania is in an area of boundaries: extreme border of the Roman Empire, the border of the Byzantine Empire, the border of Russia’s expansion and Turkey’s expansion, the border between Russia’s expansion and Western hegemonies led by Berlin and Vienna in the nineteenth century\textsuperscript{1709}, Romania always felt in-between. When Romania is under the Ottoman domination, it woos Russia; when it is in the Warsaw Pact, Romanians look to the United States; when Romanians are within the USSR, they court the Chinese; ... As explains Baicoianu Anca, Romania is “[a] space of ‘in-between peripherality’\textsuperscript{1710}, a border at the confines of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, a temporality disrupted by the constant prospect of backwardness shape the distinct profile of a culture defining itself in relationship with its multiple others”\textsuperscript{1711}, as explained herebefore. An ‘in-between peripherality’ as Tööösy de Zepetnek Stephen defines it\textsuperscript{1712}, is the space of cultural interference between the West and the East. Romania’s position between the East and the West has consolidated heir status ‘of intermediaries in the

\textsuperscript{1708} Alecu Russo (1819-1859) was a Moldavian Romanian writer, literary critic and publicist, and took part in the Revolution of 1848.


\textsuperscript{1710} To see: Tööösy de Zepetnek, Steven Comparative Cultural Studies and the Study of Central European Culture. In Tööösy de Zepetnek, Steven (Ed.), Comparative Central European Culture. West Lafayette, IA: Purdue University Press, 2002 Vol. 1.


Romania, a Crossroad

culture\textsuperscript{1713}, and reinforced the idea of Romanian uniqueness previously seen.

In the wave of Balkan instability, Romania was afraid that the country could be partially split, with the potential retrocession of Transylvania to Hungary. It was also afraid to be in an in-between situation with the East and the West, in a sort of No Man’s Land.

**V.2.1 Romania between West (Latinity) and East (Orthodoxy)**

In 395, the Roman Empire split in two – the Western Roman Empire and the Eastern Roman Empire -; the Byzantine Empire was thus born. The Eastern Roman Empire became known since the eighteenth century, and then Orthodoxy will gradually replace the Roman legacy, eventually unifying the Empire. In the eleventh century, disagreements between Orthodox (East) and Catholics (West) grew and these rivalries led to a schism in 1057.\textsuperscript{1714} Two churches with different practices and customs were born: the Orthodox Church in the East, the Catholic Church in the West. Yet, Romania was part of the Eastern Roman Empire, on the line between the two new churches. After the conquest of the Muslims and the fall of Constantinople, the Russian Church claimed the title of the Third Rome for political reasons, unless if all Churches under Ottoman domination were attached to Constantinople, as was the case for Romania (Moldavia and Wallachia). The theory of the Third Rome\textsuperscript{1715} was developed for political reasons, but never really claimed by Moscow, being used geopolitically since the eighteenth century in the fight against the Ottomans and toward the Black Sea. This theological question is an important topic in the legacy of the church.

The Orthodox religion linked Romania to the Balkan and the Eastern side of the faiths dominated in turn by the Byzantine Empire

\textsuperscript{1715} The theory of the Third Rome found its argumentation under the plume of the most famous monk Pskov, Philothée. He wrote: "And now the whole earth radiates more dazzling than the sun, the Holy Apostolic Catholic Church of the Third New Rome, your powerful empire [...], and there will be a fourth." Cited in: Ibid.
and by the Russian Empire, as opposed to the Latinity that linked the country to Western Europe and European values. Romania is dual, constituted by the inter-space of two religions from Eastern and Western sides, and by various conflicts between the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman and Russian Empires.

V.2.1.1 Latinity

The Romanian people appeared in history as a Latin nation and were considered already Christian, especially by Romanian intellectuals. Thus, the Romanian people are one of the few nations that, without having a fixed date of its Christianization, was born Christian, being the only Latin Orthodox people, and at the same time, the oldest Christian people in this part of Europe. In its turn, forced by historical circumstances, it had to receive the Slave language in the practice of the Church, using it until the seventeenth century. We have seen in the first part – Change into Continuity – that Romania’s Latinity anchor is strongly emphasized and with it, the strong link with France, and by extension, with Western and European values. As says Brătianu Ion in the late nineteenth century: “Each Romanian has two homelands; the second is France”.\(^{1716}\) The link between the two countries is old and took on different facets.

Latinity, an undefined idea, was more valued by the Others, and became root of the Romanian nation in the wave of the ‘Spring of Nations’ through the influence of the Bonjourist\(^{1717}\) and the work of the Transylvanian scholars, consolidated by the union of Transylvania with the Greater Romania. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the French influence on the Romanian culture, and consequently of the Latinity, occurred through various 'instruments' such as the presence of French people as secretaries, tutors or diplomats in Moldavia and Wallachia, and the presence of Romanians in France (pleasure trips and travel studies from sons of boyars), the existence of books that circulated in the original French version or translated into Romanian, the creation of theater in French in Iasi and Bucharest, etc., - all these anchored the French language and culture and, consequently, the Latinity. We have to remember that the French language was already present in Europe in the eighteenth

\(^{1716}\) ‘Chaque Roumain a deux patries ; la seconde, c’est la France’. Ion I. C. Brătianu was several times Prime Minister of the Romania Kingdom. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

\(^{1717}\) Bonjourist was the name given to a number of young boyars who had been sent to Paris for their education.
century as the language of diplomatic relations. But the Latinity also came through Transylvania, shaped by the influence of the Holy Roman Empire (962–1806), the Austrian Empire (1804-1867) and the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918).

The Latin origins, the basic myth which motivated (and still motivates) the attitudes and mentalities of the Romanians, functioned as a strong argument to obtain the support of the great powers and cultures, among which one was France in the nineteenth century – and helped the country achieve its emancipation and build a modern state. Due to the close relationship with France, the French culture played a great role in this process of Westernization of the country’s elite and maintained this impact until the late twentieth century. “The self-image of Romania as ‘a Latin country which has always believed itself to be an extension of the West toward the East’, helps to explain why it has often differentiated itself from its neighbours”\(^\text{1718}\) says Dorina Nastase, Romanian political reporter and International Relations expert. But, when Romania became a periphery of the Soviet Union, the French and the Western impact on the Romanian thinking became subject of change and we can say that “[t]wo decades after the return of the West, the swinging between East and West is the living proof of the in-between spatial functioning of Bulgaria and Romania, which are trying hard to become the actors of their own super-national becoming.”\(^\text{1719}\)

Romanian leaders reminded Westerners that Romanians contributed in the past to the European culture, and especially to French culture, through personalities such as essayist and performance artist Tzara Tristan, sculptor Brancusi Constantin (Brâncuşi Constantin), playwright and dramatist Ionescu Eugen (Eugène Ionesco), photographer Brassai (Gyula Halász jr), historian and philosopher Eliade Mircea, composer Enescu George and philosopher Cioran Emil, or Princess Bibescu Marta (Marthe Bibesco), a writer, and Princess Bibesco-Bassaraba Anna Elisabeth, who became Anna de Noailles by marriage.\(^\text{1720}\)

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\(^{1719}\) Rey, Violette and Groza Octavian Bulgarie et Roumanie, un « entre-deux » géopolitique dans l'Union européenne (Bulgaria and Romania: A Geopolitical In-between Inside European Union). *Espace géographique*, 2008, vol. 37, no. 4. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

V.2.1.2 Latinity - A Tool for Survival

With the ‘Spring of Nations’, the French influence and the geopolitical situation in Europe raised in Romania the idea of Latinity as a tool for independence. The Latin origins functioned as a strong argument in obtaining the support of the great power and culture of the nineteenth century, i.e. France, for the country’s emancipation.\textsuperscript{1721}

As Armbruster wrote,

[... ] the climax of the century of the Enlightenment being precisely the moment when the idea of the Romanity of the Romanians became an intellectual weapon, handled with effectiveness by the Romanian people in their fight to have their rights as a nation recognized, from the social and political points of view.\textsuperscript{1722}

He will underline also, with an important statement, that “the idea of its Romanity will surface in a symptomatic manner, each time the construction of modern Romania arrives at a turning point of its history”.\textsuperscript{1723} The French culture had a great role in this process of Westernisation, and maintained this impact until late Twentieth century. That is why, in 1989, the strong link with France, maintained during the Cold War\textsuperscript{1724}, will be one of the first steps in Romania's reintegration into the club of democratic countries and in Europe. To do so, given a strong sense of Francophone feelings supported by its ‘cousin’ – France –, Romania applies for membership and integrates in the OIF in 1993 as the first step of recognition, in Romania’s viewpoint, of a country having the same basis of European civilization.

\textsuperscript{1723} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\textsuperscript{1724} The travel of Charles de Gaulle in May 1968 and the cooperation and trade agreement signed between the two countries.
V.2.1.3 Orthodoxy

Thual François\textsuperscript{1725} describes that\textsuperscript{1726}, before the nineteenth century, the Orthodox religion was led by the Orthodox Church from the Ottoman Empire and was only grouped by patriarchs. But with the 'Spring of Nations', the religious emancipation for the church autonomy will be the basis of the national claim for independence. In the past, the Orthodox Church fought to avoid the country’s Hellenisation and struggled for national identity against the Phanariot power of key areas in Moldavia and Wallachia. The Church was helped by the Russians, who wanted to expand their influence in the Balkans. The emergence of a national consciousness derived from the model of the nation-state based on the West; in addition, the 1848 French Revolution was supported by the French for geopolitical reasons, even at the beginning, when the movement started on a religious basis. The Russian Empire expected to take advantage from this movement, because a new orthodox independent country could be an advantage for easier control of the Balkan area.\textsuperscript{1727} But by its reaction against the domination of foreign elites, Romania discovers its Latin consciousness and, in the fight between the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church, it takes advantage of it so as to get rid of the Ottoman and Hellenic dominations, with a reinforcement of the myth of the Western Latinity. Because "religion [, for political leaders," was a means to better control civil society and, in their mind, the subservience of the Church was only an instrument of its domestication"\textsuperscript{1728} and, consequently, a tool for better control of the people.

In fact, as wrote Thual,

\begin{quote}
[t]he religious factor is primarily related to the non-religious. This means that politicians and supporters of nationalism in those countries refer less to religion as a spiritual experience as opposed to a shelter of the national identity along the centuries and as an ultimate incarnation of the national spirit.\textsuperscript{1729}
\end{quote}

We need to add that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item Thual François is a French geopolitics authored or co-authored of more than thirty books devoted mainly to geopolitical method and its application to various parts of the world.
  \item To see: Thual, François. Géopolitique de l'Orthodoxie. 2nd ed. Paris: Dunod, 1994. (Collection "RIS").
  \item Ibid. p. 46.
  \item Ibid. p. 41. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
  \item Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the interference of religion and geopolitics operates in a specific way in this universe; the specificity of Orthodoxy is the state of symbiotic fusion between the national and the religious. The fact that we describe the national phenomenon under these three aspects - development of the national feeling, nationalism and expansionist nationalism; we see the profound interweaving of Orthodoxy with the national fact in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. [...] Religion in the Orthodox space is one of the main operators in nation-building.\textsuperscript{1730}

Thual explains that “[t]he particular efficiency of orthodoxy in the political life of these countries was related to the fact that the identification process was done in a double way, vis-à-vis its own self as self-affirmation, and vis-à-vis others, designated as potential enemies with the role of reinforcement factors.”\textsuperscript{1731} One can remember that “[d]uring Ceausescu’s dictatorship, the church was partly tolerated”, because “there was a complex relationship between the Church and the state”.\textsuperscript{1732} The church was seen “as a useful national tool”\textsuperscript{1733} by communist leaders, taking into account that “Romanians remained attached to their Church, because in their minds, the Church remained the symbol of the Romanian nation”.\textsuperscript{1734}

After the First World War, Romania became the Greater Romania and was confronted to a major stake, given the need to create a new national entity due to the addition of territories – Transylvania, Banat, Bukovina, Bessarabia... -. Hitchins Keith explains that the elites and the population – the peasant masses – could only join on the faith pole, through the Orthodox religion\textsuperscript{1735}, because the “Orthodox Church embodies the specificity of a Romanian identity differentiated from the Latin Western Europe”,\textsuperscript{1736} part of traditional national history. This identity partially bases on faith was not only used during the communist period, but also after the 89’ Revolution because “[t]he new Romania, despite the ethnic

\textsuperscript{1730} Ibid. p. 125. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\textsuperscript{1731} Ibid. p. 127. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\textsuperscript{1733} Thual, François. Géopolitique de l’Orthodoxie. 2nd ed. Paris: Dunod, 1994. (Collection "RIS"). p. 41. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\textsuperscript{1734} Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
and religious pluralism that prevailed there”\textsuperscript{1737} saw “the Orthodox Church continuing to play a major role in the inspiration of Romanian nationalism and in the leadership of the nation,”\textsuperscript{1738} despite the fact that officially the country, “according to the Constitution, [...] is a secular state and the fifteen recognized religions have the same status”\textsuperscript{1739}, but with a large part of the population\textsuperscript{1740} to be orthodox confession.

However, this large “claim of massive Orthodox belonging is not necessarily related to a return to the traditional values established by the Church as norms”\textsuperscript{1741}, explains Capelle-Pogacean Antonela. But for her, the church and the military represent the two symbols of national independence, through the role they played in maintaining the national identity of Romanians during modern history. In the desert of the post-communist era, the return to the nation is the return to religion and vice-versa.

In the nineteenth century, the Romanian Orthodox church was recognized in 1885 as the Metropolis of Romania, after a long period of negotiations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Church was raised to the rank of Patriarchy in 1925 and became independent. The Romanian Orthodox Church is the only orthodox church of a country receiving Apostolic Christianity, using the Christian calendar and speaking a romance language derived from Latin. This is also the second largest Orthodox Church after Russia. This specific situation reinforces the Romanian feeling of uniqueness. Its jurisdiction covers the territory of Romania, with dioceses for Romanians living in nearby Moldova, Serbia and Hungary, as well as

\textsuperscript{1737}Thual, François. Géopolitique de l'Orthodoxie. 2nd ed. Paris: Dunod, 1994. (Collection "RIS"). p. 75. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\textsuperscript{1738}Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\textsuperscript{1740}According to the 1992 census, 87% of Romanians are Orthodox versus 0.3% atheist. But the Orthodox Church put forward in 1984 than 80% was Orthodox and the estimates made by compuling a variety of sources by Berindei Miheea (To see: Berindei, Miheea Religion et politique en Roumanie. Autour des statistiques) (Religion and politics in Romania. Around statistics). In Ibid. 1989 Vol. 20-21.) in 1989 gives 70-71% Orthodox and 6% of non-believers. At the 2002 census, 86.79 % of the population is declared orthodox. (to see: ____. Ethno-demographic Structure of Romania [online]. 2002c, 16 June 2009. Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center. [cited 18 June 2009]. HyperText Markup Language. Available from: <http://www.edrc.ro/recensamant.jsp>.)
Diaspora communities in Central and Western Europe, North America and Oceania. In 1993, the Romanian Patriarchate re-established jurisdictions in areas that had been part of the Romanian territory in the interwar period from 1927 to 1944, northern Bukovina (now in Ukraine) and Bessarabia, most of which is in the independent Republic of Moldova.

V.2.1.4 Romanian Orthodox Church and Moldova

The Romanian Orthodox Church recovered jurisdiction over a minority of believers in Moldova (720 000)\textsuperscript{1742}, who belonged to the Metropolis of Bessarabia, as opposed to the majority, who belonged to the Moldovan Orthodox Church, under the Moscow Patriarchate. The Orthodox Church in Moldova had been part of the Russian Orthodox Church since World War II and had just been granted autonomous status by Moscow. This link with the Republic of Moldova was used to promote Romania’s influence over the reintegration of the country, with the aim of re-establishing the Greater Romania. But the government of the Republic of Moldova supported the jurisdiction linked to Moscow and did not allow the new Romanian jurisdiction (Romanian church) to register officially on the territory, declaring the Metropolitan Church of Moldova within the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate of Moscow the legal successor of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, which normally belonged to the Romanian Orthodox church. After a long period of legal trials in the Moldovan justice

system and within European Union institutions, the Romanian Orthodox church won the right to be active on the Republic of Moldova’s territory and was recognized as the legal successor of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and not of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova within the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate of Moscow. But both the Moldovan President and the Parliament still opposed it by placing legal restrictions.

According to Russian politician Konstantin Zatulin, the Romanian Orthodox Church made ‘proselytism’ against the Russian Orthodox Church in Moldova, with the supposed aim of annexing these territories to Romania. He explains that there is “the danger of eroding Moldova’s sovereignty from within by the pro-Romanian political forces and dismantling the Moldovan statehood in favour of Romania.” He adds that if the situation persists, the annexation will get support “not only among the Romanian political elite but also among the nationalists in Moldova, who consider themselves Romanians and who want to be integrated into Romania as soon as possible.” In addition, the Romanian Orthodox Church confirms the

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1746 Ibid.
opening of dioceses in Pridnestrovie and Ukraine, not recognized by the Moscow Patriarchate on the canonical territory of the Moldovan and Ukrainian Churches. The church declares that is justified by a number of historic and legal arguments...\textsuperscript{1747} “The decision was perceived by the Russian Patriarchate as an invasion of the territory” as we can read in the Romanian newspaper Ziuă.\textsuperscript{1748} Bucharest’s attempt through the Romanian Orthodox Church serves the interests of nationalism in Moldova, but not those of Orthodoxy... According to the position of the Romanian Orthodox church in the public and political spheres, the church is an instrument used in politics and foreign policy.

\textbf{V.2.1.5 Orthodoxy and Pan-Slavism}

As explains Lucian Boia, “until the nineteenth century, Romanians were integrated in the Eastern cultural space\textsuperscript{1749}, on the Eastern side of the Roman Empire, which included all of the Eastern European countries south of the Danube and east of the Drina, all provinces in Asia and Egypt. The fact that separated the East from the West was the wave of barbarian invasions that overwhelmed the West, but almost let the East in peace.

\textbf{V.2.1.5.1 The Russian Expansion}

However, the Russian expansion gave rise to a series of wars between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, under various excuses for strategic needs toward the Black Sea and the Area of Influence along the Empire Borders. As explains


Frederic Kellogg, “[t]he Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia had concluded agreements with Russia during the last half of the seventeenth century for joint efforts in the name of Christianity against Islam”.1750 With the consolidation of the power by Peter I the Great (1672–1725), Russia had become the largest state in the world through expansionist policies in general, and particularly toward the southern frontier, which successfully advanced Russia's southern boundary to the Black Sea against the Ottoman domination. Catherine's 'Greek project' - the expulsion of the Ottomans from Europe and the renewal of a Byzantine Empire under Russian control - accelerated the Russian expansion and increased Russia’s influence over the Balkans. But wars fought between the Imperial Russia and the Ottoman Empire impacted each time on the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, following either Russian occupation or yield of territories to the Russian Empire. One has to remember that the characteristic of the Russian Empire was the Russification of minorities because, at that time, “nationality policies often overlapped with foreign affairs. Those who were ‘foreigners’ one year might become part of the empire the next”.1751 “The Russians were no longer the great liberating Orthodox brothers,”1752 but, following their conquest and expansion to reach the Balkan area and join the Mediterranean Sea, they became a danger and a threat to the Romanian independence and the “absorption and assimilation of Romania (as it had just happened with Bessarabia1753)”.1754

In the nineteenth century, one more Russian-Turkish War (1877–1878) had its origins in the rise of nationalism in the Balkans as well as in the Russian goal of recovering territorial losses it had suffered during the Crimean War. Russia reestablished itself in the Black Sea in following by its help the political movement attempting

1753 By the Treaty of Bucharest of May 28, 1812 — concluding the Russo-Turkish War, 1806-1812 — the Ottoman Empire ceded the eastern half of the Principality of Moldavia, called Bessarabia, to the Russian Empire. Administratively, Bessarabia became an oblast of the Russian Empire in 1818 and a guberniya in 1873.
to free Balkan nations from the Ottoman Empire. With the help of the Russian Empire as an ally, “the Romanians entered the war against the Ottomans rather late after being subjected to enormous pressure by the Russians.”\textsuperscript{1755}, although the treaty of alliance between Romania and the Russian Empire specified that the Russian Empire would respect the territorial integrity of Romania and not claim any part of Romania. Romania obtained its independence with the support of the seven powers that signed the Paris peace treaty and with the support of Russia. “In considering the attitude of tsarist Russia toward the Balkan peninsula, it is important to remember that the region had a major geopolitical significance for wider imperial policy”\textsuperscript{1756}, and Romania was the country link and on the way to the Balkans for the Russian troops. But “extreme difficulties that can be encountered by a great power in dealing with a small peripheral state occupying a strategically geographic position, whose policies might at times contain dangers for its large neighbor.”\textsuperscript{1757}

\textbf{V.2.1.5.2 National and Geopolitical Expansion Tool}

In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Russian Orthodox Church experienced a phenomenal geographic expansion by subordinating other Metropolia\textsuperscript{1758}; nowadays, the church has the “desire to restore its former domination in Orthodox Slav lands [...] a key motivation for the Patriarchate’s attitudes toward religious life in the newly independent states.”\textsuperscript{1759} The Russian Orthodox Church sees it as “a challenge to claims that Russia has a messianic mission and that Moscow has a unique place in the Orthodox world.”\textsuperscript{1760} We can add that “the relationship of tsarist Russia with the Balkan national movements, [and] with the emphasis on the special relationship that existed between the Russian government and the Orthodox and Slavic peoples of the region”\textsuperscript{1761}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1758] The annexation of the Kiev Orthodox Church, the Bessarabian Orthodox Church, the Orthodox Church of Estonia, ...
\item[1760] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
was an additional element of the Russian domination’s will of the Balkans.

**V.2.1.5.3 Geopolitical Development Tool**

The new Romanian nationalism heritage from the ‘Spring of Nations’ opposed the “nationalism of the Slav peoples and Pan-Slavism”\(^{1762}\) because their national construction contradicted the Romanian one. And the “hypothetic threat of pan-Slavism was answered with a powerful reassertion of Latinity seen as a legitimate way into a Europe that had actually never been left.”\(^{1763}\)

Pan-Slavism, a “theory and movement intended to promote the political or cultural unity of all Slavs”\(^{1764}\), advocated in the seventeenth century, was a movement in the mid-nineteenth century developed in opposition to Pan-Germanism, in order to unify all the Slavic peoples. Originally an anti-Russian movement\(^{1765}\), it was transformed into militant and nationalistic Russian Pan-Slavism, with the aim of liberating, in the Balkans, the Southern Slavs ruled and oppressed for centuries by the three great empires, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Venice. The goal was to form a Russian-dominated Slavic federation.\(^{1766}\) Pan-Slavism was used as a political tool by both the Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, as today by Russia to have a foot in the Balkan and to assure the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea domination.


\(^{1765}\) The First Pan-Slav congress was held in Prague, Bohemia in June, 1848, during the revolutionary movement of 1848, and was specifically both anti-Austrian and anti-Russian.

V.2.1.6 Orthodox Feeling Toward the Balkans

Orthodoxy is linked to the national feeling, as part of the country’s independence and as the symbol of the nation. Orthodoxy links Romania to the Balkans and Russia via the religious faiths that support the Russian hegemony through religion toward the Black Sea and the Balkans in general. Even if Romania is not a Slavic country, the religious faith, as well as the common history of liberation from the Ottoman dominations, associates Romania to the other countries to the South of Danube, such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia...

V.2.1.6.1 The Balkan Area and Orthodoxy

In addition, this association with Balkan countries in the post-’89 situation, as well as the minorities’ claims went with the war in the former Yugoslavian are and constituted a threat, from Romania’s perspective, for Romania’s political stability and for its accession to NATO and the European Union. We can see in the first part – Change into Continuity – that, from the beginning of the new democracy, the Romanian leaders will do everything to share an image that is closer to that of Eastern European states, in order to avoid association with Balkan states and instability and threats of the Magyar minority’s claims. In fact, no specialist can agree on the definition and geographical situation of the ‘Balkans’, and everyone, including the European Union, European specialists, NATO, American specialists, historians, and geographers, goes with their own definition. This situation was advantageous to Romania, which used the definition that best suited its geopolitical situation; one day close to Eastern European countries, the other day favoring the Balkan proximity and the historical relation heritage. Our thesis’s topic is not to define the Balkan historical, geographical and geopolitical limit, but we will draft a quick understanding of the definition used by Romanians themselves and by others.

Already in 1930, Iorga Nicolae stated that “the Bulgarians remain today [1930] the only Balkan people, and Bulgaria the only Balkan state”, even if “[h]istorically, the Balkans were in possession of the Byzantine emperors”\(^\text{1767}\) and if “[b]etween the Balkans and Romania, there could not have been a more strongly marked political

contrast.”

For Iorga, “the recognition of Turkish suzerainty by the prince” did not mean that the country became a Balkan one. During the post-revolution era, Romanian leaders’ discourses, from 1990 to 1999, will focus on demonstrating that Romania is an Eastern European country, dissociating it from the Balkan image as described in the first part – Change into Continuity -. After positioning the country as a CEEC, Romanian leaders will use the argumentation of strong historical and political links, especially after 2000, with the Balkan countries seen as a factor of stability and peace promoter in the region. Eventually, Romania ‘sold’ to NATO and the European Union its capacity to be a regional leader in the area, as we explain in the second part - Isolation to Interdependence.

V.2.1.6.2 The Balkans and Their Definition

Related literature has emphasized on the negative connotations carried out by the word ‘Balkans’, as it was exemplified by the term ‘Balkanization’, “which has come to mean fragmentation into mutually hostile entities.”

As explains Siani-Davies Peter,

Balkanization is the exact opposite of integration and, as such, it can be seen to represent Europe’s past. Indeed, according to Ole Weaver, it is not an external threat that today is Europe’s defining ‘other’, but this conflict-driven (sic) past. [...] They are no longer the lands suspended between Occident and Orient. [...] They represent the European past which cannot become the future. [...] A region still peripheral and separate from the European Union, somewhere between the inclusive promise of integration and the exclusion [...]  

The Balkan Peninsula, also called in short ‘the Balkans’, is a historical and geographical regional part of Southeastern Europe. It has several definitions, but the region takes its name from the Balkan Mountains, coming from “the Turkish word for a chain of wooded...
mountains”¹⁷⁷³, which run through the centre of Bulgaria into Eastern Serbia. The term – ‘the Balkan Peninsula’ (Balkanhalbinsel) – was used for the first time in 1808, by mistake, by German geographer Johann August Zeune. It may be defined as an area of Southeastern Europe surrounded by water on three sides: the Adriatic Sea to the west, the Mediterranean Sea (including the Ionian and Aegan seas) to the south and the Black Sea to the east. Its northern boundary is often considered as being limited by the Danube, Sava and Kupa rivers.¹⁷⁷⁴ The area was also known, in the eighteenth century, due to constant Austro-Hungarian and Russian fights¹⁷⁷⁵ and, later on by the consequences on the two world wars¹⁷⁷⁶, even if we can claim that the area had no name until the nineteenth Century and was only known as ‘European Turkey or Turkey-in-Europe’, the term used for the European territories of the Ottoman Empire.

According to common usage, it covers the territory of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, the states resulting from the fall of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and the European part of Turkey. However, some authors add Romania¹⁷⁷⁷, while others set the limit to Slovenia and Croatia. Many countries considered as Balkan states can be defined in many respects, according to the geographical definition, as borderline countries, not Balkan countries, such as Romania and Slovenia, and sometimes Croatia and Greece. Nevertheless, Misha Glenny¹⁷⁷⁸ writes that “[t]he difficulty in defining the Balkans arises from the conflation of political and geographic descriptions that are

¹⁷⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 1-3.
¹⁷⁷⁸ Misha Glenny is a former british BBC central Europe correspondent and has written articles published in The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Sunday Times and Financial Times. He specialised in reporting on the Balkans independence wars in the late 1980s and early 1990s that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia. Glenny won the 1993's Sony Gold Award for his ‘outstanding contribution to broadcasting’. He has also written several books about the balkans. He ran, for three years, an NGO helping with the reconstruction of Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo.
themselves problematic”, requiring “a century for this inaccurate description to eclipse other classical or geo-political names [...]”

The population of the Balkans, set up in waves, is a complex national, linguistic and cultural patchwork with many different cultural influences, sharing a number of common cultural features with a common past. In fact, it is a region geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as ‘the other’, the Balkans having often served as a repository of negative characteristics upon which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the ‘European’ and the ‘West’ has been built.1780

The term of ‘Balkanization’ associated to the region, used in December 1918 by Rathenau Walther, refers to division of a multinational state into smaller ethnically homogeneous entities”, and “used to refer to ethnic conflict within multiethic states”,1781 as in the former Yugoslavia in the nineties. Because of the negative connotations of the term ‘Balkans’, a new term was set up, as explains Todorova Maria1782, i.e. ‘Southeastern Europe’, a term already used by Iorga Nicolae. The term is used in certain cases as a synonym, depending on the sensibility. The term ‘Southeastern Europe’ covered a larger area, including all the peripheral countries which rejected the Balkan country denomination, such as Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary and Romania.1783

Neither, Romania’s belonging to the Balkans was disputed nowadays, and they were a tension of self-identity present towards political leaders. In the first half of the twenties, Iorga Nicolae placed his country “between the center of Europe and the Russian steppe, the somber lands of the north and the sunny Balkan peninsula in the

1782 Maria Todorova holds a Ph.D and she is a professor of History at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She specializes in the history of the Balkans in the modern period. She was awarded the prestigious John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship prize in 2000.
south⁷⁷⁴, delimitating the Balkan boundary on the Danube river. Todorova Maria explains that Iorga used the SouthEastern Europe as units of analysis within Romania, instead considering Romania as a Balkan country.⁷⁷⁵ The use of this term ‘South-Eastern Europe’ was used, after the communist revolution, as a means of identification for the area, despite the bad connotation term of “Balkans”. As we saw in the first part – Change into Continuity - and second part – From Dependence to Interdependence -, Romanian leaders after the 89’ Revolution avoided to be classified by Westerners as a Balkan country, because of the term’s negative impact, but even more so in the nineties, because of the Yugoslav war and ethnic problems in the country’s south-western borders. Romania realized a long ago that being associated with the Balkans would separate it from the European root and delay or avoid the European Union and NATO accession.

V.2.1.6.3 Romania, ‘In’ or ‘Out’?

However, the challenge was not so easy, if we consider the multiple views on what is meant by ‘Balkan’ and whether Romania is ‘In’ or ‘Out’ of it.

For Robert Kaplan David,⁷⁷⁶ Romania is ‘In’⁷⁷⁷. We can summarize his point of view by quoting The New York Times' journalist, Sulzberger Cyrus Leo, who wrote in his diaries:

The Balkans, which in Turkish means 'mountains,' run roughly from the Danube to the Dardanelles, from Istria to Istanbul, and is a term for the little lands of Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and part of Turkey, although neither Hungarian nor Greek welcomes inclusion in the label.⁷⁷⁸

At the same time, Kourvetaris George A., Roudometof Victor, Koutsoukis Kleomenis, and Kourvetaris Andrew G., mention, in their

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³⁷⁷⁶ Robert David Kaplan is an American journalist, a national correspondent for various american newspapers and publications. Kaplan had not set out to influence U.S. foreign policy, but his work began to find a wide readership in high levels of government, espacially thru the book: ‘Balkan Ghost’.
book ‘The New Balkans: Disintegration and Reconstruction’ the following countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia as being in the Balkans, also referring to them as Southeastern Europe.\textsuperscript{1789}

The Balkan Trust for Democracy\textsuperscript{1790}, a project of The German Marshall Fund, the USAID and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, includes Romania in the Balkan context. The Southeast Europe Online\textsuperscript{1791} project funded by USAID to promote interaction between NGOs, defines its geographic scope in the Balkans and covers seven countries: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Romania. In addition, the center for Southeast European Studies\textsuperscript{1792}, based in Sofia, focuses on security issues, includes the following countries under its grouping: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Slovenia.

For ‘Le Courrier des Balkans’, an electronic publication, which publishes information and analyses in French of the democratic press in the Balkans, which the main purpose is to translate articles published in: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Greece and Turkey. For them, Romania is ‘In’.\textsuperscript{1793}

At the opposite end, the Balkan Crisis Group\textsuperscript{1794} excludes Romania from the Balkans, as “work in the Balkans presently spans Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia.”

As one can see through this short list, Romania was considered more as a Balkan country by the others and many scholars rather than an Eastern European Country. Even Romanian scholars recognize that, even though the Balkan Peninsula does not include Romania, it is in many ways a Balkan country.\textsuperscript{1795}

Yet, given the undefined position and indirect help to Serbia during the first Yugoslav war and the population’s contestation, Romania appears to be more a Balkan state anchored to the east rather than a European state anchored to the west. One can remark the ‘traditional links’ that unifies Romania and the ‘Serbian people’.\textsuperscript{1796} In order to explain the Romanians’ attitude in general, it is useful to cite Thual’s reflection that “the Orthodox phenomenon as socio-political reality, despite the Turkish occupation and forty years of Communist rule, remains more than a hundred years after independence, a key factor of internal geopolitics of post-socialist Romania.”\textsuperscript{1797}

The breakdown was done under Constantinescu’s presidency, when a clear signal was sent to the Alliance and the EU. The Romanians’ will to separate Serbia from its contested leader helped Romania to limit the degradation of their long good relations. By the Leaders attitude, the country was positioned more on the Western side and escaped from the Balkan westerners’ classification.

**V.2.2 Permanent Balance Between Europe (EU) and the United States (NATO)**

The will to be a member of the European Union and NATO, after being on the ‘dark side’ of the Iron Curtain for almost 50 years, sometimes put Romania’s foreign policy in a difficult position, along with other former communist countries in Eastern Europe. Due to a certain divergence between American and European international

\textsuperscript{1797} Thual, François. Géopolitique de l’Orthodoxie. 2nd ed. Paris: Dunod, 1994. (Collection "RIS"). p. 76. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
Romania, a Crossroad

policies, Romania “was caught in the middle and pressured to take one side or another.”\textsuperscript{1798} There were several situations in international politics between the Europeans and the Americans which tended to lead to clashes and in which Romania was pressured to make a decision decision for example with International Child Adoptions, Kyoto Protocol, International Criminal Court (ICC), the Middle East crisis, George W. Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ and War in Iraq.\textsuperscript{1799}

Before explaining the need for permanent balance between Europe and the United States, we have to remember Romania’s motivation to join the European Union and NATO.

V.2.2.1 Why Did Romania Join the European Union?

For Romania, the integration into the European Union was a natural path in the country’s development, in the wave of the 89’ Revolution. Even if Romanian leaders hesitated regarding the foreign policy direction until the fall of the Soviet Union, they chose unambiguously the European Union integration road as the natural historic path of the country’s foreign policy. First, the integration in a large community was the natural way for Romania’s foreign policy as developed in the interwar period by Romanian political leaders, through various project for regional integration\textsuperscript{1800}. Second, the European Union at the border of CEEC was symbolized Democracy and Economical success, a necessary needs of the new ‘liberated’ countries, as Romania. But, if the will of Romania, as that of other CEECs, was to re-integrate into Europe, the European Community and, afterwards the European Union, did not immediately show an interest in hurryng to integrate the new candidates and imposed numerous complicated conditions, in the opinion of the CEECs population and political leaders. The construction of the European Union also brings a lack of readiness, cohesion and coherence concerning the Union’s security and foreign policy, creating divergences and different political attitudes among members on the issue of the integration process too, as described in the second part. We saw that this lack of unity was exploited by the United States as well as by the CEECs whenever necessary. For the people in Central and Eastern Europe, “the ambiguities of the European Community in


\textsuperscript{1799} To see: Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1800} To see, in this thesis, the chapter ‘From Borderland to Crossroad?’.
relation to its enlargement and to the promotion of security in its vicinity can only make the US presence more desirable in the region, on short and medium terms\(^{\text{1801}}\), the Black Sea and the Balkans.

### V.2.2.2 Why Is Romania Attracted by the United States?

The attraction for the United States is not only a Romanian attitude, but it is also the general ‘new Europe’ attitude. Hatto Ronald\(^ {\text{1802}}\) demonstrated that the American influence in Central and Eastern Europe is based on physical evidence, such as diplomacy, economy, military capabilities and high technology, but also on intangible elements represented by cultural products and positive image.\(^ {\text{1803}}\)

#### V.2.2.2.1 Physical Evidence

Winner of the Cold War, the United States became the only superpower with military capabilities used to secure geographical and strategic points on the globe, in order to assure energy supplies for them and for the West in general, to maintain and send troops all around the world. The U.S. military power, with their efficiency, modern and sophisticated equipments in high quantities, created fascination for the new young Eastern democracies. Through the fight against communism during the Cold War, the U.S. is viewed as a friend, an opinion reinforced by the perception of the American excellence in all fields, including freedom and democracy. The last argument is that the U.S. new strategic military deployment in

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Europe and the economical advantage added to being members alongside the US, in the Alliance, resulted in military and civilian investments and in US troops expenses on Eastern national soils.

An important element is the role played by the U.S. in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as a strong sponsor and decision maker. The U.S. decision in the CEECs accession to NATO, as demonstrated in 1999 at the Madrid Summit by the American refusal of Romania’s integration in the first wave against other allies’ opinion and the French strong support, is a undeniable reality. Moreover, in the mind of Romania’s political leaders, the friendship with the U.S. contributes to the accession to NATO and reinforces Romania’s regional leadership. The U.S. political and military leaders recognize rapidly the importance of the South European region and of the Black Sea area for the issues of energy and security, and the potential role that Bulgaria and Romania could play. Through its accession to NATO, Romania saw its interest “in promoting certain values and concepts highly necessary within an extremely volatile area of Europe: liberal democracy, the market economy and the rule of law”\(^\text{1804}\), to promote its regional leadership historically developed during the inter-war period.

**V.2.2.2.2 Intangible Elements**

For Central and Eastern European Countries, the fascination of the population and the political elite for United States was facilitated by works done by various media (radios, films, ...) and by American universities (scholarship programs, ...) during and after the Cold War to render the Eastern Europeans sensitive to American values,\(^\text{1805}\) an efficient soft power strategy. During the entire Cold War period, only the United States declared that they would not leave Central and Eastern Europe under Russian domination and they would fight until


their liberation\textsuperscript{1806}. This created a positive image for America, especially in the context of the European treason of Yalta. In this context, radios became a tool of freedoom and information against communism dictatorships\textsuperscript{1807}, supported through the campaign for Truth\textsuperscript{1808} and the Crusade for Freedom\textsuperscript{1809}. The ‘Voices of America’ (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty et Voice of America) became a tool for the integral strategy of the United States during the Cold War. This strategy continuing after the Cold War in order to put in a good place american medias in the post-communism media landscape. “The media influence of the United States in Central and Eastern Europe continues, but this time through television, an industry where the U.S. investment has been very important. [...] The cable operator United Pan-Europe Communications (UPC), with U.S. capital, is one of the first investors that entered the Eastern market,”\textsuperscript{1810} and Romania in particular. In addition, the U.S. influence on the political and intellectual elite was built with the support of the State Department’s public diplomacy programs and U.S. international broadcasting, through the role of higher education by means of large scholarship programs, a significant U.S. soft power, in order to win hearts and minds. As U.S. leaders put it, that it is a “valuable asset to our country [U.S.] than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here [in U.S. university]”\textsuperscript{1811}, and that “[t]hese student


ambassadors, who make lasting friendships in America and better understand our values and way of life, are the future world leaders with whom we will sit down to forge alliances around the globe."  

For the U.S., “the American university system remains a potent mechanism for socializing foreign elites. Students studying in the United States become familiar with U.S. mores while simultaneously absorbing mainstream U.S. views on politics and economics.”

This popularity combined with the local effectiveness of Washington’s integrated strategy certainly allowed to seek long-term positioning of U.S. troops in Central and Eastern Europe Countries, as well as in Romania.

V.2.2.3 Permanent Balance

After the 89’ Revolution, the primary objective of Romania’s foreign policy was the integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, as explained above in the second part. At first, the CEECs did not make the difference between the two organizations, considering them as a whole, understanding it only later, in light of their divergences. Transatlantic conflicts emerged from the fact that the U.S. and old European countries perceive threats differently. In fact, the United States seems to be more sensitive to threats than its European allies, in part due to its role as military and economic superpower that has to take most of the community’s security burden upon its shoulders. In addition, Europe should not be seen as a homogenous entity, especially in matters of defense and foreign policy.

As for many CEECs, Russia remained a threat and, after 1991, the post Soviet Union political instability and the instable democratic

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situation did not arrange the situation. Recently the Russian ability to use energy resources (oil, gas, ...) as a weapon to impose its will to the former soviet union member countries and to put pressure on Western European countries reinforced this threat. The common fear of the Russian power reinforced the CEECs alignment to the U.S. strategy and the will for integration in NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, United States has always tried to develop a strong presence in the Caucasus, an area under permanent Russian influence, with mitigated result. After 9/11 and given the new international context, the U.S. made a successful comeback with more aggressive policies and supported regional initiative, such as GUAM, of which Romania is also a member. The Western influence on the Caucasus region is growing, especially through other initiatives, such as the Black Sea Forum, initiated by Romania, which aim at building a Black Sea Defense system (border security, information exchange, surveillance, ...). Moreover, Romania and some other Black Sea neighbor states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Ukraine) support the extension of NATO in the Black Sea towards Turkey, a strong ally of the United States in the region (shaping Europe and being a gateway to the Middle-East), strongly jeopardized by Turkey’s ambiguous attitude during Iraqi Freedom and the Russian-Turkish discussion concerning the Black Sea Security in 2001, and military exercise in the Black Sea (Black Sea Harmony) in 2006. "Finally, we observe that the Black Sea and the three Caucasian countries form the link that links the United States to the republics of Central Asia",\textsuperscript{1815} important energy suppliers, and then United States will not hesitate to push its position through allies in the Black Sea region, such as Romania.

The failure of the European Union to end the Yugoslavian war alone, without the help of U.S. troops and the U.S. diplomacy, reinforced the attraction for the Alliance. In addition, the ambivalence of the EU towards the CEECs for their integration in the Union did not improve the situation either. The relation between the EU and Russia, and "[t]he negotiations of Western European powers with Russia (ignoring Poles or Ukrainians) to ensure a stable supply of oil has

encouraged the reactions of power politics (Realpolitik) from the new allies."^{1816}

For Romania, the obligation of a permanent balance between Europe and the United States was due to their different approaches concerning various situations and international political topics, of course related to their own interest. The unity seen by the CEECs at the end of the Cold War existed only at the element level, the threat of Soviet Union. In order to be recognized by the significant others, represented by the Europeans, Romania aligned on the European policy concerning the Kyoto protocol.^{1817} It was necessary to implement new norms in the case of inter-country adoption policy in conformity with the European Union in opposition to the U.S. will. It was a way to reaffirm Romania’s European identity and its will of integration. This position for the Kyoto protocol also provided Romania with a lucrative business by selling emission reduction units to other countries. Concerning other cases, such as the ICC and the Iraqi War, Romania decided to favor the United States interest for a practical and immediate benefit (NATO accession) versus “a long-term philosophical European problem”^{1818}, due to the lack of European cohesion and the necessity to affirm Romania’s transatlantic identity, which was possible only with the U.S. support. Moreover, the position of the United States as a dominant actor in the international system favored Romania’s decision towards better coordination with them. For the case of the Iraqi war support, Romania anticipated the NATO’s membership by the application of the 5th article of the charter. The lack of European unity in this case favored Romania and other CEECs’ decision.

Romania is a historic European country willing to integrate into the European Union by complying with the Union’s criteria. Romania transatlantic identity necessary for the security of the country by the integration in NATO could be materialized only with the U.S. support. When Romania’s ‘European’ identity was arguably put in danger, Romania found a middle-way so that, in time, both US support and

^{1817} Romania was the first developed country to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, and save Romania from pressure of any party concerning the conflicting debate on this matter!

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evolving EU norms were secured.”

In brief, the membership of CEECs to the European Union arose tensions for them in their commitment to Atlanticism in opposition to a European identity, especially in the defense area. CEECs do not want to be forced “to choose between the United States and Western Europe; they want good relations with both”

making “the leaders of eastern European states uncomfortable” when divergences occur.

V.2.3 An In-between Geopolitical Situation

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World.

Sir Mackinder Halford John

Being situated on the main energy power-providing routes of Europe, becoming regional security and energy providers seem to be obvious priorities in a complicated context in which the Euro-Atlantic tropism is marked by an American pause and by Russia’s comeback in the Black Sea region. Each of the two countries manages boundaries and neighborhoods depending on their features and strategic culture.

Despite the integration in NATO and the European Union accession, Romania has its specificity, an important country in size, with a key geographic location, at the border of the Balkans and the Black Sea area. Romania’s foreign policy interest is inherited from its past historic background and geopolitical situation, aggregate of the historical Romanian’s countries (Moldavia, Transylvania, Wallachia). Because Romania had always been a borderland in the past, the country sought support to balance powerful and greedy neighbors, such as Russia. Romania, “in its search for international affirmation

\[1819\] Ibid.
\[1821\] Ibid.
that ensures national security and if possible a regional leadership, illustrates this constraint of neighborhood and effort to become the intermediary between the superpowers.” In order to achieve its goals, the country developed many collaboration axes towards Moscov, Paris, Tel Aviv, London, Washington and Ankara, integration with NATO and access to the European Union as a member.

As explain Rey Violette and Groza Octavian, “[t]he analysis of the role of [...] Romania in the contact area of ‘Balkan Europe, Russia, Great Middle East’ showed the paradoxical character of specific issues to that in-between space, with its implications for the entire European Union,” as well for the Alliance. A location that can be evaluated as a rentable situation for Romania, in the light of Black Sea importance in the geostrategic interest of the U.S. with Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus’ situation especially after 2001, but also for geoeconomic question concerning energy supplies. Romania is, also, located in a critical area, the Central and Eastern Europe, area in which the recurrence of events whose irremediable nature and severity of effects beyond the perimeter. The entire region has been in a transition process since 1990 with the changing of borders and disappearance of some states in a peaceful manner (GDR, Czechoslovakia) or not, such as Yugoslavia which remains a critical area at the border of Romania.

Now let us step back and return to the classical geopolitical thinking of the last century, where world politics was essentially a struggle over who will control the Eurasian heartland, the most important part of the civilized world, with increased concentration of population, resources and industrial facilities. In fact, we return back to the geopolitical issue concerning the work of Sir Mackinder Halford

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1823 Rey, Violette and Groza Octavian Bulgarie et Roumanie, un « entre-deux » géopolitique dans l’Union européenne (Bulgaria and Romania: A Geopolitical In-between Inside European Union). Espace géographique, 2008, vol. 37, no. 4. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
1824 Ibid. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
1825 For exemple, The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Fanz Ferdinand (1863-1914) and his Czech wife in Sarajevo (Yugoslavia) in 1914; The German annexation in 1938 of Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland; Danzig and the Polish Corridor in 1939; the opening of the Austro-Hungarian border and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
John about land-power and sea-power domination\textsuperscript{1826}, and Spykman Nicholas John’s maritime fringe, the Rimland\textsuperscript{1827} for the control of contact area. As explain Rey and Groza, these strategies had been consolidated and refined during the Cold War period by the the conceptualization of the functioning of center-periphery and the notion of semi-periphery, within the definition of ‘shatterbelt’ and more recently ‘gateway’. Each term specifies, in one location at a particular time, the functioning of international relations power.\textsuperscript{1828}

Center-periphery describes patterns of unequal relations between relatively developed centers, using military, political, and trade power, and less developed outlying areas, within an economy or another system such as communist. The concept of semi-periphery “corresponds to the intermediate space in a unipolar vision of a center and its various peripheries”\textsuperscript{1829}. Shatter-belt is an area characterized by the combination of two properties: a certain political fragmentation and the interference of external forces.\textsuperscript{1830} This area also drains a high potential of crises and conflicts. We can add that for some political experts, Eastern Europe is a shatterbelt because it is a zone of persistent splintering and fracturing … Gateway functions as a gate, a bridge or a link between poles. In the new international context, in the post Cold War, Rey and Groza introduce the in-between concept, because we “exceed the external forces acting to focus on medium and long-term space properties thus categorized


\textsuperscript{1829} Ibid. p. 375. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

and on the associated identity building”. The in-between concept is “an area of passage and initiation, where lack creates the occurrence of change, whose effects are possibly elsewhere, a passage that raises new developments that will expand elsewhere if the conditions for development are more favorable...” The concept is characterised by three factors: the predominance of external forces over the internal forces with the fragmentation of political jurisdictions; the need ‘to start over from scratch’ with each change of dominating influence and to overcome oscillations towards old temporalities, that are ignored, yet latent; the state of being places of creativity often without effective implementation.

Or, from the end of the Cold War, the CEECs including Romania are no longer in shatterbelt and or semi-peripherical situations, because they were “nor semi-periphery nor shatterbelt” but there was an emerging overlap of the two, in changed contextual conditions and internal dynamics. For the first concept, the external issues do not represent a decisive weight, ie. the slow intervention of major powers in the Yugoslavian war and the slow foreign investments. For the second one, the closeness to the West after the kidnapping by the East (Iron Curtain), moved the semi-periphery more eastward. Despite many uncertainties, there is a real cultural area inscribed in the very long term between Eastern and Western Europe. In fact,

the background and neighborhood effects show the return of otherwise distant external forces. The process of state fragmentation surrounds [...] [Romania] with the support of the United States (as is the

case of the five, then seven, post-Yugoslavian states), of Russia (as is the case of the Republic of Moldova with Transnistria). 1837

After the Cold War, the great powers have maintained the logic of shatterbelt in a subtle blend of ideology (national self-determination) and realpolitik. For the United States, it offers the possibility to introduce separate discussions and lobbying toward CEECs, including Romania, and to offer global protection within NATO. We saw a concrete application for the political and military support of Iraqi freedom. As for Russia, this situation allows it to introduce division and to reintroduce a game of domination through geoeconomic pressures vis-à-vis its neighbors. For the European Union, the fragmentation generates complexity and indecisiveness in the construction and enlargement of the Union. In the same time, Romania strongly supports the Turkish integration in the European Union and advocates for the Union and NATO’s enlargement eastward in order to share common values and facilities (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development, security...). Romania as well as some other Black sea states found a strong support for it from the United States. We remark “[t]he importance of Central Asia and that Caucasus for Washington” which “can be explained in terms of more complex geopolitical conflicting issues for the control of Rimland,” 1838 a situation particularly in the inertia of the political and psychological aim at ‘containment’ of Russia, comparable to the Cold War strategy, which created tension and discomfort for Russia. On the other hand, the European Union and Russia tried through both the ENP and CIS to create an intermediate neutral space, a gateway. Moreover, the relations with European states are Russia’s traditional foreign policy priority especially with Western European states (old Europe), “primarily with such influential ones as Britain, Germany, Italy and France, which represent an important resource for Russia’s defense of

1837 Rey, Violette and Groza Octavian Bulgarie et Roumanie, un « entre-deux » géopolitique dans l’Union européenne (Bulgaria and Romania: A Geopolitical In-between Inside European Union). Espace géographique, 2008, vol. 37, no. 4. Translated by Marc Bonnemains

its national interests in European and world affairs, and for the stabilization and growth of the Russian economy”.\cite{1839}

The identity dimension of this in-between zone, “where the properties of the area are incorporated (situations, resources ...) within the historical experiences of multi-membership and multi-temporality”\cite{1840}, then works very well with the entry of Romania as well Bulgaria into the European Union. The country in its contradiction seeks support from the U.S., but at the same time looks for good relations with Russia. While being member of the European Union, the country manages to be in-between situations by seeking neither special favor nor status. Romania hoped to be an interface within the hubs of transnational networks and an outposts’ protection of the EU.\cite{1841} The country looks in fact to have to experiment an ‘in-between with’ and an ‘in-between against’.\cite{1842} As wrote Rey and Groza, “[t]he unpredictability and reversibility properties are part of the property of the in-between space.”\cite{1843}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{1840} Rey, Violette and Groza Octavian Bulgarie et Roumanie, un « entre-deux » géopolitique dans l’Union européenne (Bulgaria and Romania: A Geopolitical In-between Inside European Union). Espace géographique, 2008, vol. 37, no. 4, p. 376. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\bibitem{1841} Ibid.
\bibitem{1842} Ibid. p. 376. Translated by Marc Bonnemains
\end{thebibliography}
V.3 From Borderland to Crossroad

Romania during its historical formation was by its geographic situation and by the individual history of the three principalities: Moldavia, Transylvania and Wallachia, at the borderland of Empires. The Romanian’s countries have a geographical and political frontiers heritage by the borders limits situation in many Empires across the history - Roman Empire, Byzantine Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russian Empire -. By the geographical situation that we will explain here after, the country was also on the roads of Empires strategical expansion and at the crossroad of powerful interests. By the historical modification, the country inherits a space of multiple influences with Roman versus Barbarian, political domination from Ottoman Empire, Hapsbourg Empire and Tsars Empire, likewise in recent period Soviet Union domination and religious faiths from orthodox versus catholic and protestant.

Romania by its geography and history plays a role for foreign power to offer a rampart against threat. For example, in the inter-war period the country was in a buffer zone (Cordon sanitaire), built to form a defensive union against the Bolshevist Russia and thus quarantine the spread of communism to Western Europe. After the Second World War, Romania was the south border of the Iron Curtain to protect the Communist foundation.

As many other scholars and scientists, Bulei Ion\textsuperscript{1844} underlines that

The history of the Romanians is a permanent search for identity. The country of Romanians does not belong to Central Europe or the Balkans or Western Europe, or the vast expanse of the Slavic East. It is the crossroads? Its history is a history of borders: the extremity of the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, on the outskirts of the Ottoman expansion, Russian, or later, Western.\textsuperscript{1845}

\textsuperscript{1844} Bulei Ion has a PhD and post graduated in International Relations. He is Professor at the Faculty of History of Bucharest University, head of the Chair of History of the Romanians. He was appointed Director of the Romanian Cultural Institute in Venice (1997-2003) and since 2004 he is also the Director of the Political Sciences and International Relations Institute of the Romanian Academy.

V.3.1 The Complexity of the Bordeland

In order to discuss and to explain ‘borderland’ importance in the Romania’s International Relations, it is necessary to further examine the term ‘borderland’ based on different notions used for its definition. A comprehensive review of all the literature in this field is not in the scope of our thesis, and will need to be treated separately. Instead, we decided to review only few definitions in order to select some definitions according to our understanding for our thesis’ subject.

In the Online dictionary definition, a ‘borderland’ is a land forming a ‘border’ or ‘frontier’ or an uncertain intermediate district, space, or condition\(^{1846}\). It is the area of land close to the border between two countries or major areas. For a better understanding, it is useful to present some general definitions of the terms used in the definition of ‘borderland’, in order to understand and delimitate the scope of study. Without explaining the meaning of Border, boundary and frontier, it will be impossible to define what borderland is.

V.3.1.1 Border or boundary

First of all, what did we understand by border? The ‘border’ is “a line separating two countries, or areas”\(^{1847}\), but for geographer it is “a ‘boundary’ line established by a state, or a region, to define its spatial extent,”\(^{1848}\) an international boundary line as we can add for modern period. Than the boundary is a demarcation indicating some division in spatial terms.


V.3.1.2 Frontier

Second, the ‘frontier’ is a zone of contact with or without specified boundary line. It is interesting to relate the explanation of Kristof Ladis K. D.\textsuperscript{1849} on this topic. Historically, he explains the etymology of the word means ‘in front’ and was part of the concept of hinterland often called borderland. We must stress that the ‘frontier’ term’s signification and representation has evolved during the history.\textsuperscript{1850} The ‘frontier’ has an historical heritage based on the Roman Empire with territoriality, the Middle Ages thru the Peace of Westphalia and the nineteenth century with the French revolution and the ’Spring of Nations’.\textsuperscript{1851} From the antiquity to modern period, the term was neither a legal nor a political or intellectual concept, but represented “the margin of inhabited worlds”\textsuperscript{1852}, the line between the sedentary society versus the nomad one, the limes\textsuperscript{1853} of the Roman Empire, the Western civilization to be protected from the ‘ecumene’\textsuperscript{1854}. In the two last centuries, the frontiers have represented “the political division between two states, or the limit of permanent settlement”.\textsuperscript{1855} Today, frontiers represent more human settlement and the limit range of economic development.

The terms ‘boundary’ and ‘frontier’ have been used by geographer and others scholars as synonyms and often

\textsuperscript{1849} Kristof, Ladis K. D. is a Romanian-born Armenian who immigrated to the United States after World War II and a professor emeritus at the Portland State University in Oregon, US. As a famour political geographer, he wrote many articles and books on this topic. He was the Vice-president of the American Romanian Academy of Arts and Sciences.


\textsuperscript{1853} The limes (or more specifically the Limes Romanus) was a border defense constituted as a delimiting system of the Roman Empire to protect from the barbarians. It marked the boundaries of the Roman Empire.

\textsuperscript{1854} Ecumene (in Greek Oikumene - οἰκουμένη) is a term originally used in the Greco-Roman world to refer to the inhabited world (or at least the known part of it).

interchangeably, especially at national level, but the terms have their own different sense. On the light of Knezevic Hocevar Duska remarks, we can states that in political geography there is a standardized used of the conceptual pair ‘boundary/frontier’, where ‘boundary’ is reserved for a precisely defined political border of sovereign nation-states when the meaning of ‘frontier’ remains vague.

V.3.1.3 Signification

We can reinforce the difference between border and frontier, by explaining their signification.

The ‘border’ as arguments Ratzel Friedrich “is the reality and the border line the abstraction thereof”. According to Prescott John Robert Victor, “borders were a factor influencing state power”. Ratzel reinforces it by arguing that “[p]olitical balance [between countries] is to large extent dependent on the [characteristics of] borders between them.” But, in general “[t]he term ‘borderlands’ straddles the distinction between frontier and border and is often used as a synonym for frontier as a zone.”

For us, borderland can have two significations: the first one, it is an exchange space between two areas, and the second one it is a limit of areas, that can means isolation and to be forgotten. To reinforce the definition, for the Dictionary of Geography, the borderland “are fundamental to the way that citizenship, identity, and

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the nation are imagined, policed, and performed”\textsuperscript{1861} and can send back to the nation and nationality construction, discussed herebefore. And as Augelli states it, “borderlands [...] tend historically to be zone of cultural overlap and political instability where the national identity and loyalties of the people often become blurred”\textsuperscript{1862} But “[f]rontiers figure prominently in the history of nations”,\textsuperscript{1863} when “[b]orderland are sites and symbols of power”.\textsuperscript{1864} We can add that the borderland between two things (East – West, ...) is an area which contains features from both of these things so that it is not possible to say that it belongs to one or the other\textsuperscript{1865}, and can generate an in-between situation.

**V.3.1.4 Romanians’ Signification**

The borderland is an important component in the Romanian history even before the spring of Nation and the principaulities union. We will not go back in the earlier foundation during the Roman Empire, but in a more recent period from early modern history when the three principaulities were independent.

As we can see on historical maps, each principality was a borderland of Empires: Moldavia at the border of Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth until the Sixteenth century and at the border of Imperial Russian Empire as the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Eighteenth century and later; Transylvania a semi-independent state at the border of Hungarian kingdom and at the end of the seventeenth century was attached to the Habsburg controlled Hungary; Wallachia at the border of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth century and later on as Austro-Hungarian Empire from the Eighteenth century. By the definition of borderland, the principalities were place of exchange in different historical, economical, cultural and political fields that shape the countries’ traditions and cultures,


\textsuperscript{1864} Ibid. p. 1.

and a country that presents many paradoxes. For example, “[t]he history of the Romanians is a history of unresolved contradictions”\textsuperscript{1866} underlines Catherine Durandin. Likewise Romania's culture is the product of its geographical position and of its distinct historical evolution with the three principalities. It is fundamentally defined as the meeting point of three regions: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans, but cannot be truly included in any of them. The borderland situation could be part time a good situation, when forgotten by the others the countries could develop its independence. Borderland of large Empires – Austro-hungarian Empire, Russian Empire and Ottoman Empire, Iron Curtain with Soviet Union, Romania occupies a unique position on the map of Eastern Europe, standing at the interface of several different regions, with a diversity of ethnic cultures. Romania was a zone of influence and interest for Ottoman Empire and later on Turks; zone of influence and interest for England and France in the Nineteenth-twentieth (1870-1930); area of influence and interest for Germany in the interwar period (1930-45); a Russian area of interest from at least the nineteenth (1812 until nowadays) ... But time to time, the situation jeopardized the principalities independence and obliged them to find alliances and protections by association or submission with neighbors or large Empire.

As Lucain Boia says with other words:

This permanent 'frontier' situation has had two complementary and contradictory effects. On the one hand, it gave rise to a certain degree of isolation, an attenuated reception of outside models, the perpetuation of traditional structures and a mentality attached to indigenous values. On the other hand, it produced an extraordinary combination of ethnic and cultural infusions from all periods and in different ways from one region to another, elements as diverse as Turkish and French, Hungarian and Russian, Greek and German.\textsuperscript{1867}

\textbf{V.3.1.4.1 \hspace{2pt} In the past}

In fact, Romanian’s territory was on the road of multiple interests and has been used for example as “a buffer zone during the third quarter of the nineteenth century”\textsuperscript{1868} by the Ottoman Empire,

after a long relation of dependence from the fifteen century to at least 1877. Romanian’s principalities independence was challenged over the time by the Habsburg Empire (1452-1918), champion of the Catholic Christianity and by the Russian Empire (1613-1917) with the need for ice-free ports and access to the Mediterranean sea, and the will to represent the Orthodox church power in accessing to Constantinople because “[i]n the sixteenth century there was developed in Muscovy the doctrine of ‘Moscow, the third Rome’.”

Only when Romanians’ principalities was on the road of Empire foreign policy interest, they become a center of attention and generally a crossroad of different power interests and oppositions, for the good or the worse where the country could get personal gains in politic, military and economical fields. But, during all this period until the revolutions of 1848 in European history and Danubian Romania foundation, the countries was at the limit, often isolated nor forgotten preventing the country development. In the wave of the liberal nationalism across Europe in 1848, the great powers of the period, for their foreign policy interest started to look again after the Romanians situation, and the country at that time became a international element of interest which give it some international political power, and give bird to the Romanians dream by the foundation of Greater Romania in the interwar period. This specific situation as borderland developed the principalities and after the Romania foreign policy among centuries toward a neither bandwagoning nor hard and soft balancing policy according international political situations. After the revolution of 1848 and the nationalism bird, the others played a role in Romania construction by turns in opposition nor in association. Without the others wills, the great powers and their foreign policy contingency, the Romania country would not be created so easy, even never as we explain herebefore. The importance of the great powers will in their foreign policy contingency, shaped all along the contemporary period the Romania destiny and fixe definitively the importance of the others in Romania’s international relations. In the early 1930s Romania’s foreign policy, under the leadership of Nicolae Titulescu was pursuing a system of alliances, which would enable the smaller countries of the Balkan region to oppose any aggression. Already, the Romanian’s political leaders dream at the unification of European countries to avoid domination and wars.

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Romania, a Crossroad

V.3.1.4.2 Present Time

In present time after the Revolution of 89’ and the new international situation, the situation did not change for Romania. As we explain before, Romania was a country without borders with the European Union and Romanians political leaders were afraid to be forgotten again after a period of isolation in the eighties, and to stay in an in-between situation toward the East and the West, Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The lack of borders after 1989 with the Union put Romania in an uncomfortable situation which was reinforced by the borders with the CIS and the Balkans instable areas during the nineties, but also by the foreign policy during the first years of the Romanian new democracy under Ion Iliescu mandate. The link with Moscow was strong enough to maintain the Romania partnership with Russia in the beginning of nineties, reinforced by the history of communist elites, training and networks they maintain with Moscow and the fraternal parties, have to be taken seriously in consideration to explain the issue of autonomy between Bucharest from Moscow. This idea is reinforced by the the downstream of Moscow for the succession of the ‘Conducator’. As Radulescu Bogdan says:

Outside, the Gorbachev era saw the gradual implosion of the Soviet Union and the general ebb of Communism. Gorbachev has supported fringe reformist Communist Party of Romania. When Ion Iliescu was designated by the central committee as the best candidate to succeed Ceausescu, the die was cast. 1871

Also, in the light of the book “Red Horizons, Chronicle of a communist spy chief” of the controversial former chief of Romanian foreign intelligence services Pecepă Ion Mihai, we can ask the question of Romanian independence and autonomy vis-à-vis of Moscow. This unclear situation has certainly been one of the elements in the borderland situation for Romania. An unclear foreign policy toward the west in the new international situation, with Russian’s power decline on international scene, reinforced the Romanian position as a borderland. The Yugoslavia breakup and the Balkan crisis in the nineties at the Romanian border, deprived Romania of an important market and a friendly neighbor. The Romanian unofficial

1870 Explain in the Romania In-between chapter in this part.
support for Serbia unless the international embargo in the beginning of nineties reinforced the exclusion and a borderland situation with the Union and the military Alliance.

But if the Cold War and the block confrontation left after 1989 an empty sphere, Romania wanted to fulfill it by the Visegrad membership, the Francophonie membership and then the NATO accession and European Union integration. The reasons of lack of borders with the EU, pushed Romania actively attracts interest of the European countries thru historical connection, which France, Germany, and entered rapidly in international and regional organizations to be not forgotten and to develop political influence. In the same time Romania rea...
the Romanian culture struggles to achieve a however fragile balance between its specificity and a longing for integration.\textsuperscript{1878}

Romania geographical situation with the borders of CIS countries and the Balkans instable areas during the nineties reinforced the fright of Romanian’s leader to be snap up by the neighbors’ situations within a difficult intern situation with minorities extremist political parties and questioning on boundaries. The feeling to be in an in-between zone isolated from alliances and geopolitical groups pushed Romanian’s foreign policy to be very active in all direction in order to anchor the country somewhere, and particularly within the western club, i.e. the Alliance and the European Union. The situation was not so easy due to the Romanian hesitation to take position between East and West, and to the unclear message on political and economical reforms sent to the westerns democracies in the beginning of the nineties.

Romania is situated on the black Sea border, where develops in the recent period geostrategic and geopolitical rivalry between countries (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine)\textsuperscript{1879} within the political game of NATO and United States. The region, a ‘closed sea’ under Russian domination during the cold war becomes nowadays an ‘open sea’ with direct link to the Nordic Sea, by the Rhine-Main-Danube navigation channel, and with an increased foreign presence. From a ‘Russian lake’ during the cold war, the Black Sea tens to become a ‘NATO lake’ with the support of old and new NATO members (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), and the future candidate of the Alliance (Georgia and Ukraine). Romania, an insignificant political and economical player country comparing to others black Sea’s neighbors as Russia, Ukraine and Turkey could remain a borderland to the region. But the situation was without effect of Romania geographical situation and Romanian’s foreign policy programs. As a borderland of the black Sea, Romanian’s leader bet and fight for the Bastroe Channel project\textsuperscript{1880}, an element of the Rhine-Main-Danube navigation channel, a key link in the strategic connection between the Black Sea and the North Sea. The Danube as

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\textsuperscript{1880} To see herebefore the Chapter: The Neighborliness - Ukraine.
strategic position in the nineteenth century, is also an oldest question
and a link with Europe and its member states. In the light of the
European Union development and integration, the Danube corridor,
the Corridor No. VII for European Union, represented a particular
importance for the whole of Europe on the development of pan-
European transport infrastructure, a priority for the European Union,
and the link of two important economical region and easier acces to
eastern richness. Also, Romania fought for the delimitation of
continental shelf and exclusive economic zones with hydrocarbures
resources.\footnote{1881}

\textbf{V.3.2 Crossroad}

With borderland situation, as an exchange area Romania has
always become an important territory on the road of Empire interest
toward different areas (Balkans, Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, ...).
In the Romania history, within the large Empire expansion interest,
quid to the Balkans zone, the Black Sea access, the Mediterranean
access, Romania becomes the crossroad of political and others’
foreign policy interest.

In the light of recent event of the iron curtain fall, the
geographical position of the country at the borderland of new political
ensemble as CIS and European Union, as well the borderland with
unstable area – the Balkans and the Black Sea with Caucasus
countries – will push Romania to transform its situation into a
crossroad country, for political interest in the Balkans conflict and the
Black Sea domination, but also to valued its application for EU and
NATO. By its location and by capitalization on Romania’s history, the
new democratic country will seek to become a country on which we
can rely within the new international situation after the soviet Union
fall with its difficulties and after the 9/11 event as a normal path of
the country. This is not the first time that the country leaders seek to
present Romania as a crossroad in economic, in politic as in military
fields. Already from 1992, if the president Ion Iliescu spoke about
positioning Romania between East and West, Central Europe and
Balkans,\footnote{1882} it is in 1997 that Constantinescu Emil launched the

\footnotetext{1881} Ibid.
[cited 13 Nov. 2007]. Portable Document Format. Available from:
initiative ‘Romania, at the crossroad’ (România la răscruce)\textsuperscript{1883} a project on the construction of an economic passage between central Asian countries and Europe via Romania, a gateway for economic purpose in a geopolitical oil context. Romania has always sought a position in her benefit by alliance nor opposition to defend, as much as possible, its independence, especially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

As Bulei Ion wrote “Romanian space has always been a crossroads of civilizations and current ideas.”\textsuperscript{1884} A crossroad of civilization between the Orient and the Occident, the land that would become Romania absorbed many influences from the three major different powers in the region (Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires) as well from dominant elite (Saxon, Germanic and Greek), as influence from cultural wave (French). The country is a synthesis of diversity as explains Bulei Ion.\textsuperscript{1885} Also, the Romanian religious authorities, with reference to their origin as a neo-Latin people, consider their “Church as the one ‘Latin-Orthodox Church’ that can act as a mediator for greater understanding between East and West”.\textsuperscript{1886} As Jean Paul the Second says, “Romania is the country bridging East and West, lying at the crossroads between Central and Eastern Europe”, \textsuperscript{1887} and “[t]he cooperation between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches is growing at various levels”, \textsuperscript{1888} under the patronage of Romania.


\textsuperscript{1885} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{1888} Ibid.
Romania has been always from the nineteenth century an element of political interest for the ‘Great Powers’\textsuperscript{1889} thru the ‘Eastern Question’. In European history, The Eastern question encompasses the diplomatic and political problems posed by the decay of the Ottoman Empire and included a variety of issues raised during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including instability in the European territories ruled by the Ottoman Empire. As the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was imminent, the European powers engaged in a power struggle to safeguard their military, strategic and commercial interests in the old Ottoman domains. Imperial Russia and the Habsburg Empire stood to benefit from the decline of the Ottoman Empire and agreed to partition the Ottoman Empire between their respective nations; on the other hand, especially France, Prussia and United Kingdom deemed the preservation of the Empire to be in their best interests.

The Habsburg Empire had been the main threat to Ottoman Empire, but in the nineteenth century rulers of a multi-national empire, Austria was too weak to absorb the Western Balkans, an economic resource and a potential market as the key to allowing Austria's foreign trade to pass through the Adriatic Sea and to oppose to other empires expansion. The weak empire was impossible to oppose the creation of Romania and smother questions of irredentism by controlling the new state through political alliance and economic treaties. Because at that time, Romania feared Russian occupation, Bucharest accepted alliances with Austria.

The Russian Empire wanted to gain control over the Black Sea coast to access to the Mediterranean Sea, including the Balkans and to be protector of the Orthodox Christians of Ottoman Empire, with special rights in Wallachia and Moldavia. Russia developed the will to represent the Orthodox Church power in accessing to Constantinople because “[i]n the sixteenth century there was developed in Muscovy the doctrine of ‘Moscow, the third Rome’.”\textsuperscript{1890} In the Early Modern period, Russia began the most backward of the Great Powers but also was view as the state with the greatest potential to tap new resources and to grow. In Eastern Europe and the Balkans, a succession of states have opposed Russian interests (or at least perceived Russian interests): The Ottoman Empire, the French under Napoleon, then the British Empire, then the Germans and their allies

\textsuperscript{1889} Besides Turkey, there were six Great Powers during the late nineteenth century: Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Russia.

during the two world wars, and most recently the United States. To oppose the other great power, as Austria and Turkish, Russia had fewer their support to regional rival, as well ties to non-Slavic states like Romania, but often came as mere domination, especially when Russia annexed territory, such as Bessarabia which was seized in 1878 and in 1940.

In the nineteenth century, Great Britain was Russia's rival for Balkan influence; interests derived from interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, not only for simple geopolitical influence but also where economic played a large role. Great Britain had developing interests in the Mediterranean Sea for commercial and strategic reasons, to secure the road to India and had important trading interests within the Ottoman Empire itself and later within the successor states. Also, at that time Great Britain had humanitarian interests in the Ottoman parts of the Balkans\textsuperscript{1891}.

France, like Great Britain had political and economic interests in the Balkan. Under Napoleon the third, France followed a policy of support for nationalists which gave meaning support for rebels against the Ottomans. In the same time, it was a special affinity with seems like an outpost of Latin culture in a sea of Slavs. France supported the creation of the Romania country, because for Napoleon the third, “the idea was simple: Romania to be born will be a ‘bastion’ against the Russians and Turks, whose power worries the French diplomacy”\textsuperscript{1892}, in the Black Sea area.

After 1859, Italy became a new Great Power and looked the Western Balkans as her natural zone of influence. In the eighteenth century, thanks to their Latin-based language, Romanians found a second alternative cultural model in Italy. For the new German Empire, the Balkans were interested as an economic outlet and as a political interest in order to dominate the continent by forging strong alliances against its rivals (first against France, later Great Britain and ultimately Russia). German’s Balkan policy was a mix of support for Austria, and economic and military investment in Turkey, in opposition to Russia and also Great Britain. The new king of Romania was minor members of the German royalty that increased the stature

of the Balkan states, and also placed the country (Romania) under the control of Prussia.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire stretched from Asia Minor to North Africa. It was a substantially intact on the Southern Europe part of the Empire, bordered Austria and Russia. All centuries long, the Romanian King had maintained an independent policy in relation to the Ottoman Empire outside the eyalet system where Romanian’s states (Moldavia, Transylvania and Wallachia) paid a tribute to the Ottoman’s vassal. Romanian states varied over time with different path of economical and political development before the Union, but in general served as buffer states between the Ottomans expansionism and Christendom in Europe.

In fact, the Romania territory was on the road of multiple interests and has been used for exemple as “a buffer zone during the third quarter of the nineteenth century”\(^\text{1893}\) by the Ottoman Empire, after a long relation of dependence from the fifteenth century to at least 1877. Romanian’s principalities independence was challenged over the time by the Habsburg Empire (1452-1918), champion of the Catholic Christianity and by the Russian Empire (1613-1917) with the need for ice-free ports and access to the Mediterranean sea.

At the economical and political level, in the recent past, under Soviet hegemony, Romania thru its relation with the West already play a crossroad role between East and West, Communist and Capitalism system, to take more independence from the CMEA. But, [w]e do not know today if this strategy had been decided by the Romanian secret services in accordance with the KGB, but still it is that the Soviets were quickly used this opening to the West to carry discreetly with Romania, trade and investment outside COMECON\(^\text{1894}\)

said Radulescu Bogdan. As Durandin Catherine says, “the French version of ‘autonomy’ Romania joined the American vision to find its full development under construction in Europe of States/Nations sought by General de Gaulle”\(^\text{1895}\) but do not necessary

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reflect all the reality. After the 89’ Revolution, Romania sought a new geo-political position within Alliance and European European in order to avoid an in-between situation. In the new international situation, “as soon-to-be frontier states for the European Union as well as NATO, Romania [...] viewed the possibility for attracting greater attention and shaping collective responses to the region [i.e. Balkan zone and larger Black Sea area] by those institutions as key niche roles they could play.”\textsuperscript{1896} As “a state located in a strategic important area, Romania seeks to play a substantial role in the process designed to define and implement NATO and EU stabilization and security assistance policies in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe”, because the country is a dynamic vector of security and prosperity in the wider black Sea Region as we can read in the document for the National Security Strategy of Romania.\textsuperscript{1897}

\textbf{V.3.2.1 Within NATO}

After a long hesitation and despite the fact of Romanian bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union in the beginning of the nineties, the relation with U.S. warners under President Emil Constantinescu and U.S. President Bill Clinton with the initiation of a bilateral strategic partnership initiative.\textsuperscript{1898} Despite broad popular sympathy for Serbia, in the end of the nineties, Romanian “leaders clearly aligned their countries’ values and security interests with those of the North Atlantic Alliance”\textsuperscript{1899}. After September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the


American territory and the lunch of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Romanian signed the letter of the Vilnius Ten and made significant troop contributions to NATO’s ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. The Romanian political leaders, “who had opposed support for NATO during Allied Force”\textsuperscript{1900} were publicly marketing their country for further U.S. use of Romanian facilities as the sea port of Constanța and the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, up to amend the constitution to allow the deployment of foreign military troops in the country.\textsuperscript{1901}

As a new NATO’s ally, Romania took a position as crossroad facilities for the Alliance in the fight against ‘fails states’, rogue states and terrorism. Romania provides not only an anchor for the U.S. in the Black Sea after Turkey’s breakdown, but offer facilities in its country to the U.S. military to position personnel, storage facilities, and some logistical support, placing the U.S. to reach easier Afghanistan and Iraq.\textsuperscript{1902} Romania plays an important role as an active member with “strong political leadership”\textsuperscript{1903} and “a strategic position on the map”\textsuperscript{1904}, to share “values of security, freedom and democracy to the frontiers of Europe – and beyond [i.e. Balkans and across the Black Sea within CIS neighbor’s states, in the Caucasus and Central Asia].”\textsuperscript{1905}

In the mainstream of the U.S. strategy in the Black Sea Region\textsuperscript{1906}, the Pentagon’s gateway to three continents and the Middle

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1900} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{1901} To see : Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{1904} Ibid. \\
\end{flushright}
East\textsuperscript{1907}, Romania launched few initiatives in order to aimed at consolidating the profile of the Black Sea region and to promote the regional interests by drawing the international community’s attention to the importance of this area, with its opportunities and challenges. As remark Cohen Ariel\textsuperscript{1908} and Conway Irwin\textsuperscript{1909}, “[t]he region [- the Black Sea -] is geopolitically significant precisely because it is a nexus of cultures, international trade (both legal and illicit), ideas, and influences\textsuperscript{1910}, as an important region to built a plat-form for facilities (military and stabilization operations, reconstruction...) in the middle east, as well as for the protection of energy transit between the Caucasus region and Western markets. Romania can expect by its NATO membership and the U.S. troops, as the headquarters of the the command of Joint Task Force East (JTFE) on Romanian soil, to develop more influence towards its eastern neighborhood. Romania’s with Bulgaria’s had intentions, as NATO member states, to expand the Active Endeavor operation from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea, but the initiative was counteracting by a new naval cooperation structure, Black Sea Harmony, established by Turkey in 2004.

The NATO summit in Bucharest on 2008, came in the mind of Romanian political leaders as recognition of Romania's importance in the region and within NATO\textsuperscript{1911}. The hallmark of the Bucharest summit was that members agreed in principle to expand the Alliance more east by admitting more members and the recognition of the importance of the Black Sea region. In the wave of the participation in NATO and links with the U.S., Romania joined the U.S. missile


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defense shield\textsuperscript{1912}, a Romania’s foreign policy success\textsuperscript{1913}, views as a chance for strengthening Europe’s and Romania security with a desire to gain an important position in the U.S.-led global security system.

\textbf{V.3.2.2 \ Within EU}

Romania seeks in the Union to develop influence on the European politic as states by the Romanian President\textsuperscript{1914}. Before the accession, Romania has always pleaded for the European attention to the Balkans and the Black Sea neighborhood and its implication for economy opportunities and political stability, as well its impact on European Union economical and political landscape. If the western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia, Croatia\textsuperscript{1915}, Serbia, Macedonia\textsuperscript{1916}, Montenegro, and the region of Kosovo) are all recognized potential EU candidates and are in the EU’s natural process of enlargement after the admission of Bulgaria and Romania, the Black Sea Eastern neighbors (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) are not nowadays in the scope of the Union enlargement even if discussions were held with some potential future candidate. The Union in 2003, in the light of the future enlargement of 2007 and the


\textsuperscript{1915} In June 2004, the EU named Croatia as a candidate and opened accession talks with that country on October 3, 2005.

\textsuperscript{1916} Macedonia, called officially the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was granted candidate country status for EU membership in 2005.
European Security Strategy steps up the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to offers to its neighbors a privileged relationship. Romania and Bulgaria accession to the EU makes the Black Sea the Union’s south-eastern border. In this new EU configuration, Romania, as well Bulgaria, after 2007 played an important role in the European Union ENP program in particular within the Black Sea area thru Romanian’s initiatives to develop regional cooperation, and that even if in the Romanian neighborhood remains many frozen conflict as in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Pridnestrovie.

Romanian is positioned at the crossroads between EU, the Balkans and CIS countries, crossed by three important pan-European transportation corridors; The Pan-European corridor No.4 considered as a key project to the cross-linking Western and Eastern Europe; the Pan-European corridor No.7 thru the Danube considered as inland water transportation and connection between the Port of Constanta (the biggest Port to the Black Sea) to Northern Europe, through the Rhine; the Pan-European corridor No.9 is connecting Northern and Southern Europe. Romania is considered to be a pillar ensuring connection between the European Union and Caucasus – Asian states\(^{1917}\).

Romania in the EU political landscape launched few initiatives, because as official says, "[t]he main stake for Romania is staying among the main promoters of the initiative to draw up [...] Strategy and the inclusion of as many priority projects as possible in [...] Plan of Action."\(^{1918}\) Romania, along with Austria, has promoted an EU strategy for the development of the Danube area as the Danube Cooperation Process (DCP) launched in 2002 on an initiative developed with the support of the European Commission and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (SPSEE), and extended later to all others countries of the hydrological basin of the Danube river (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Germany, Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Hungary and Yugoslavia), with a developpement advice with other regional organizations and


initiatives, especially with the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Romania, as Bulgaria will bring to the EU the focus on the Black Sea region as new members of the European Union. Romania as a member will intends to play a full role among the members with the priorities for stability and prosperity in the Romania's neighborhood and the wider Black Sea.

On Romania initiative, the European Commission launched in 2007, the Black Sea Synergy a first step in the direction of a Black Sea strategy development on just four pillars: energy, environment, security and democratization. Romania has advocacy, thru its President Basescu Traian, a former ship captain, a Black Sea strategy and proposing a 'Bucharest Process'\(^{1919}\) mimicking the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership formerly known as the Barcelona Process\(^{1920}\) for the Mediterranean countries. But, in this region the clashing identities and numerous factors, as crossroad-character, cultural and linguistic differences, post-Soviet tensions and supra-regional competition, could become a risk for the European stability especially with the new European Union foreign policy after the implementation of the Lisbon treaty. As for the Balkans, the EU will not have the necessary military forces to enforce peace in case of military problems or conflict, i.e. Georgia. We have to remember that the black Sea play an important role in Europe’s Energy Security as we will explain hereafter.

The Romanian political leaders intend to consolidate the country status as an EU member, to be an active force of proposition for the European institution by strengthening the Romania’s role as an active

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\(^{1919}\) The Bucharest Process was hold in 2003 to enhance cooperation in the region the employment challenges faced by the Stability Pact countries launched in 1999, with a role changed over time for its successor organisation, the Regional Co-operation Council. The Regional Co-operation Council inherited the mandate to oversee co-operation processes in South-Eastern Europe and to support European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region.

\(^{1920}\) The Barcelona Process was launched in November 1995 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the then with 15 EU’s members and 14 Mediterranean partners, as the framework to manage both bilateral and regional relations. The Barcelona process was re-launched in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean (EUROMED) at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean and includes all 27 EU’s members along with 16 partners across the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
and influential member\textsuperscript{1921} in the EU institutional framework, in order to state and to actively promote relevant ideas and projects at regional and European levels. In a similar manner, Romania seeks to take an important part in the future European diplomatic service. Under a ‘coalition’ built by the Romanian Members of European Parliament (MEP) with other colleagues from the Danube basin’s countries, Romania pushes a strategic plan for the Danube basin’s strategy, a similar program to the EU’s Baltic Sea strategy. The European commission adopted the idea and states to draft an EU Strategy for the Danube Region no later than the end of 2010\textsuperscript{1922} with a Romanian MEP\textsuperscript{1923} as the reporter for the Danube Strategy, on behalf of the EU assembly’s regional development committee\textsuperscript{1924}. Also, Romania is a strong supporter for European Union enlargement to the Balkans and the Eastern states, especially Montenegro\textsuperscript{1925} and the


\textsuperscript{1923} The MEP is Bostinaru, Victor. He is member of the European Parliament since December 2007, Vice-Chairman of the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with South-East Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo), member of the Committee on Regional Development and Substitute in the delegation for relations with the People’s Republic of China.


republic of Moldova\textsuperscript{1926}, as Turkey for the EU accession. The President of Romania pointed out that Romania’s foreign policy in relation to the states in its eastern and south-Eastern neighborhood is grounded on solidarity and the valuing of opportunities.

\textbf{V.3.2.3 Within Black Sea}

After returning to the west anchor by accession to the Western institutions – NATO and the EU –, Romania feels the responsibility to initiate and promote policies of efficient integration of the Black Sea countries into the European and the Atlantic community. For Romania as draw in its National Security Strategy document, the Black Sea region has a high importance and represent a key of Romania strategy for the future and Romania international participation to the world development. For Romanian’s political leaders, Romania is a crossroads of the Black Sea, i.e. wider Black Sea and gateway to the new eastern markets. It is undeniable that the country has to play a role in its area as a member of the EU and as the Euro-Atlantic community’s eastern frontier with the Black Sea within the wider Middle East.\textsuperscript{1927} We can raise the following remark that the country with Bulgaria “represent the frontier of the West to the Black Sea and it is in their direct interest to extend those frontiers further to the


East”.\textsuperscript{1928} As states by the Romanian Foreign Minister, “[t]he Black Sea region lies at the heart of Romania’s foreign policy objectives.”\textsuperscript{1929}

But today, the \textit{status quo} of the major powers of the Black Sea – Russia and Turkey –, based on a traditional competition and battleground for centuries, opposing penetration of the Western influence on the region, developed after 1989 step by step an intense collaboration in political and strategic dimensions. As Kiniklioglu Suat\textsuperscript{1930} says: today “the Turkish-Russian relationship is likely to become a structural factor in the region”\textsuperscript{1931}. As an NATO member from more than half a century and American key strategic partner\textsuperscript{1932} in the region, Turkey had undergone recently severe strain and increase discontent with the US.\textsuperscript{1933}

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\textsuperscript{1930} Kiniklioglu Suat currently hold the positions of AK Party Deputy Chairman of External Affairs and Spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Turkish Parliament. He was director of the German Marshall Fund’s new office in Ankara, from 2005 to 2007 and placed 3rd for the Sakip Sabanci International Research Award with his essay on Turkey’s past, present, and future relations with Russia.


\textsuperscript{1933} The Turkish-American have undergone severe strain as a result of difference over the Iraq war and the possible use of Turkish territory for a land invasion of Iraq in 2003. Also, Turkey succeeded to jeopardize the extension of NATO’s Operation ‘Active Endeavour’ (OAE) from the Mediterranean sea to the Black Sea. The international recognition of Armenian genocide in the US congress is also a problem that stumble with the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey.

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Since it anchors to the Western institutions, Romania has been more active than other countries in the Black Sea region, view as a link between an enlarged Europe and its new neighborhood, to develop regional cooperation. The country has developed gradually leadership with the support of western institutions and the US. Romania promotes the EU Black Sea Synergy and participates actively in regional cooperation organization\textsuperscript{1934}, holds regional institutions\textsuperscript{1935} and develops few initiatives\textsuperscript{1936} with the ambition to lead the Black Sea cooperation process from the positions of the Euro-Atlantic community and bringing this area closer to the European Union. In fact as Ognyan Minchev\textsuperscript{1937} states that "Romanians’ perception of selves as ‘Latin bridgehead’ into a ‘Sea of Slavs’ brings them to more explicit pro-Atlantic and anti-Russian standing in assessing the Black Sea agenda".\textsuperscript{1938} Or, the Wider Black Sea region brings various and extremely complex states actors’ ambition and interests from full cooperation to total opposition, and generate a complex balance of power between the involved actors. The Black Sea sights as a boundary is for Romanian more a bridge for new challenges and opportunities for western institutions.\textsuperscript{1939} In the situation, Romania intends to play a role and to act as a bridge between East and West and to unify the interests and ambitions of

\textsuperscript{1934} As member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP), the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), the Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR), the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center (BSBCIC), the Black Sea and Central Asia Economic Outlook (BSECAO).

\textsuperscript{1935} The Bucharest-based SECI Regional Center Headquarters - Center for Combating Trans-border Crime.

\textsuperscript{1936} As the Border Defense Initiative (BDI) know also as the Black Sea Border Defense Initiative (BSBDI) on May 2004; the Black Sea EuroRegion (BSER) on March 2006; the Black Sea Forum to develop dialogue and partnership (BSF) in September 2006; the Black Sea Synergy in February 2008; the Black Sea Forum for Nongovernmental Organizations in 2008; the Operational Program for Black Sea Cross-Border Cooperation (2007-2013).

\textsuperscript{1937} Ognyan Minchev is Director of the Institute for Regional and International Studies (IRIS), independent public policy and research institution, associated on contract basis with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and the St. Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia.


the others regional actors with realistic approaches in the fluctuation of regional changing realities. But, the weak point of the Romania’s foreign policy is its relation and conflict in political dialogue with Ukraine and Russia. The Romanian diplomacy has undertaken a more positive path in its relationship with Russia, tied by nearly total natural gas dependence and by strong commercial rates. In the recent period, Romania significantly undertook a more moderate policy towards Russia, as recognizing the inescapable Russian influence in the Black Sea zone, because “[w]ithout a minimum involvement of Russia, the power equilibrium might become an artificial one and, consequently, challenged (or even undermined)”\textsuperscript{1940} each initiatives in the Wider Black Sea region. It is clear that Romania remains the most proper state for moderating the power equilibrium in the Wider Black Sea Region. Its geostrategic position, as well “the constant economic and social progress, the consolidated membership in EU and NATO, the political stability and the keeping of commitments – all these are arguments for which Romania should take the lead”\textsuperscript{1941} in the wider Black Sea Region.

\textbf{V.3.2.4 The Energy Question}

In the beginning of the Twentieth first Century, the rise of the energy supplies issue gives to Romania, a new role to contribute to the security and supplies of energy for Europe\textsuperscript{1942}. By its strategic location along the Black Sea, the country become a major crossing point for Caucasus and Caspian Sea oil seeking routes to markets other than thru Russian territories. It is interesting to state that the challenge plots began with the definition by the European Union of famous European and intercontinental corridors, emphasizes the new role given to Romania as a connecting point into Europe, but also by the United States’ energy strategy in their will to establish alternate roads for oil and gas around Russia. The geopolitical importance to by-pass Russia generated various planned and projected pipeline projects for Caucasus and Caspian Sea oil and gas sources. The importance to by-pass Russia is viewed to be very important in a new


\textsuperscript{1941} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1942} The same role will be dedicate also to Bulgaria. It will be a friendly competition between Bulgaria and Romania on this point.
cold peace context where thru targeted foreign investments and strategic infrastructural buyouts in Eastern Europe, Moscow's strategic objectives and policies seems to build a monopolistic positions and substantial influence over any country's economic, financial, trade, and investment policies in its near abroad. As Bugajski Janusz^{1943} states:

Moscow aims to convert East Europe's overwhelming dependence on Russian energy supplies and economic investments into long-term, constant, and predictable intergovernmental influence. Close connections between the Kremlin and the largest Russian companies, whether through executive appointments, through the promotions of overseas operations, or through financial, legal, and police instruments, demonstrate that foreign policy is closely coordinated. Russian enterprises have been encouraged to gain political influence through involvement with officials, parties, and media outlets in targeted East European states.^{1944}

Romania, likewise a lot of other European states, "remains dependent on Russian oil and gas, which constituted some 90 percent of Romania imports"^{1945}, and a lot of Russian companies became involved in the Romanian economy generating Romanian Security Intelligence (RSI) director's^{1946} alert that "foreign interest groups" pose a danger to the country's economy, including threats "under the guise of strategic investments".^{1947}

Romania has only two corridors, comparing to it neighbor Bulgarian (four corridors), but has facilities with the river traffic, and a large access to the Black Sea with the mouths of the Danube river and canals access to the Black Sea. This way reduces the road from North Sea to Black Sea. At the beginning of 2008, the two big natural gas pipeline projects - Nabucco, thru Turkey (discussion started in 2002) and South Stream thru the Black Sea (discussion started in 2006) – entered in competition in a new geopolitical conflicting

\[^{1943}\text{Bugajski Janusz is the director of the East European Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and chair of the South-Central Europe area studies program at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute.}\]
\[^{1945}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[^{1946}\text{Alexandru-Radu Timofte was the director of the Romanian Secret Service from February, 7 2001 until July, 20 2006.}\]

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situation between Russia and Ukraine about gas disputes\textsuperscript{1948}. Strategic interest for economic purpose first, Romania deployed strong political and diplomatic action to keep on the country land pipeline project, because Nabucco counts among the important projects for Romania, has stated by the Romanian Prime Minister,\textsuperscript{1949} The Nabucco project\textsuperscript{1950} approved by several European Union states\textsuperscript{1951} is supported by the EU and the United States\textsuperscript{1952}, attempts to lessen


\textsuperscript{1951} Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey.

European dependence on Russian energy, sees as rival to the planned Russian South Stream pipeline.\textsuperscript{1953} Nabucco is a gas pipeline project of 2,050 miles (3,300 kilometers) long that will run from Erzurum in Turkey via Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Baumgarten an der March, a major natural gas hub in Austria.\textsuperscript{1954} The European Union dependence on Russian energy is heavy with nearly half of its natural gas and 30 percent of its oil\textsuperscript{1955}. To avoid Russian grip on oil and gas in Europe, it aims to diversify an energy sector with its Nabucco project from the Caspian region. Cohen Ariel explains that Russian is using different strategies and tactics as locking in demand, locking in supply, derailing competition, external consolidation, developing a ‘gas OPEC’ cartel in order to control all the process\textsuperscript{1956}. The South Stream project is intended to transport Russian natural gas across Europe thru the Black Sea from the Russian to the Bulgarian with a 560 miles (900 kilometers) pipeline. Since 2003, The Russian political power has aggressively developed state control over its energy sector, and has demonstrated an increasing willingness to use energy as a political weapon to manipulate the behavior of the states that depend on it.

Until nowadays, Romania, at first concentrates all its efforts in the implementation of the Nabucco’s project, as a very active stakeholder. The project is a direct rival of the South Stream project to supply gas to Europe from the Caspian region by eliminating Russia influences. After, stop and go on the Nabucco project, in 2009


the President of the European Commission Barroso Jose Manuel announced its full support for the Nabucco project and signed the Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement.\textsuperscript{1957}

Or, from 2008 Gazprom held several preliminary discussions with representatives of Romania exploring the opportunity to develop the existing transit infrastructure and to build new capacity on the Romanian territory, as a potential substitute of Bulgaria and as an alternative to Serbia, taking into account the planned South Stream pipeline network running across South and Central Europe.\textsuperscript{1958} “Romania has a great strategic position on the Black Sea coast and it could have been the starting point for the European part of the pipeline route”\textsuperscript{1959}, says Gazprom export CEO Medvedev Alexander.

The two project, South Stream vs. Nabucco gas pipelines, entered in competition and the race intensified in times with an escalates’ competition under Energy security purpose, for EU’s independence vs. Russia's influence on natural gas exports to Europe. The dispute over the subject is only at the beginning, “[t]his is the first born who will win”, because "[a]ll countries are involved in both camps, just to be sure not to be losers," says Romania Liberal.\textsuperscript{1960}


this growing battle struggle for the world's energy reserves control, there is a an underlying struggle for regional domination in the wider Black Sea, the Russia domination against the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, the East against the West, because one of “the Moscow's biggest fears appear to be the sharpening global scramble for rapidly disappearing oil and gas”, that can conduces to military possible intervention.1961

V.4 Partial Conclusion

First, as we explained, the relationship with the others is an important pillar of the Romanian identity foundation, thru self-identification and construction of the country herself and an important element in the Romania’s international relations. Over centuries, the others took an important real or imaginary role in the construction of Romanian’s identity and fancy thru the process of self-identification. As we saw here before, the country’s identity and country’s construction was among centuries shape by the others, as defined before. The others are an omnipresent component of the Romanian history, an important stakeholder in the construction of a national identity as well in the Nation-Building. The identity was defined by the others sometime as similar to them, sometime as outside and different. Because as explains Armstrong John Alexander\textsuperscript{162}, the “group tend to define themselves not by reference to their own characteristics but by exclusion, that is, by comparison to ‘strangers’ ”.\textsuperscript{163} For instance, concerning its identity, we can point out that “[h]istorically, Romania has perhaps been the nation in the Balkania most affected by foreign cultures.”\textsuperscript{164} The relationships with foreigners, the others, was a part of the building process of the Romanian’s identity but also as a national identity construction during the last two centuries, thru identification and/or rejection processes. The others not only had a positive influence on Romania, but also constituted over the time some threats for the country. As a positive influence, Romania’s independence, like the constitution of the Greater Romania, was done with the foreign powers’ blessing. But, threats were seen for the country as a Latin ‘island’ to be protected in a Slavic ‘ocean’, as well as for the importance to conserve the new country unity from the three original principalities’ soul and history differences.

\textsuperscript{162} John Alexander Armstrong, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, was very influential on the study of nationalism in general and that of Ukrainian nationalism in particular, by traces the development of national identities from their origins in Antiquity and Middle Ages. In 1997, he was winner of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies for all his academic work.


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Romania is based on one characteristic: a rural population closed and attached to its land ruled by an elite, sometime foreigner, opened to the world and the other, under the other’s idea influence. An important point, because we saw during the recent democratic period in Romania’s politic a rising of specific Romanian populism that jeopardizing the Romanian foreign policy in a conflictual neighborhood relationship, to oppose to political choice to open to the westerners institutions. Nationalism has always been an important factor in the Romanian identity construction, as for the Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The challenge was to balance the tension between the modernization project of Western inspiration and the traditionalist tendency nurtured by values of Byzantine and Eastern sources.

The others gained their high importance in the Nation-building process of Romania to favor the born of the unified Romania from the Danubien principalties to the Greater Romania. In the recent period under the power of communism, the role of the other was reinforced due to the necessity of a nationalist resurgence. The Nation-building was done in the new situation of the Romania’s countries that from centuries was borderland of different Empires for the good but also for the worst, when the country became a crossroad of different great power interest in the recent Modern Period. The Eastern Question an element of political interest for the Great Powers brought the principalties at the center of others’ geopolitical interest and conflict used as a political tool to contain the adversaries that intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples, and antagonistic faiths created. Within the difference sphere of influence, Romania gained the country independence as well a position of regional leaders until the Cold War period. After the 89’ Revolution, the phenomenon did not disappear, but was amplified. We can underline that the country’s identity has been an important issue concerning the European Union and NATO accession. Given the idea to reconstruct the Greater Romania, the Romanian government feared that the issue of the Hungarians in Transylvania could be used as a counterbalance in the case of Romanian demands for the retrocession of Bessarabia and as a means for possible pressure on Romania by the Soviet Union in the case of the latter losing control over the country’s policy.

The country, Romania, was created and ruled\textsuperscript{1965} always with the blessing of the others, the Great Power (in the nineteenth and the

\textsuperscript{1965} For example: the creation of the Romanian kingdom; the creation of the Greater Romania; the \textit{status quo} after the World War Two.
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twentieth centuries), as well the international community (after the World War II). But the dependence after the World War Two vis-à-vis the international community and the Soviet Union in particular had created a situation of victimization feeling among Romanian, because the country had not having choices and has been feel trapped, making Others responsible for the country choices in recent past. In addition, the victimization feeling has been reinforced by the non-recognition of the Romania specificities and uniqueness by the others, and by a lack of country’s empowerment. In fact, Romania felt victimized because of the others’ failure to understand and to recognize the Romanian uniqueness of identity and the sacrifice made by the country to protect the European civilization, i.e. Christian religion against Ottoman domination, democracy against communism. The idea of Romanian uniqueness was developed on three main factors, such as the geographical position, the country’s specific history in the region and its culture thru the principalities’ union and the strong influences of others over centuries. In the recent period, the country felt victimized by the abandon of the West to the Soviet Union influences after the Yalta European zoning. This process has been historically built in the modern Romania over the centuries and each time Romania was rejected this feeling appears as an excuse. At the same time, Romania needed to find a universal savoir to balance its victimization feeling. After the Iron Curtain, the role will be played by the US as was played by the Great Powers in the nineteenth century to contribute to Romania’s recognition and acknowledgement in the process of nation building and the country position on the international scene.

At the same time, Romania developed a need for recognition. Recognition as an independent state constituted in time with the union of the principalities. In order to guaranty the country's political and country independence, Romania has been seeking for alliances or participations in regional or international organizations. The different alliances over centuries were a guaranty for its foreign policy independence and the country’s integrity. In the recent period under Titulescu, the country developed an international exposure to guaranty it security. It was reinforced during the communism period to assure Romania’s foreign policy independence from the Soviet Union, a way to affirm the Romanian difference. This independent foreign policy allows to the country to play an intermediate role on several occasions between the East and the West, free democratic world and communist powers, and to be recognize as a political parlor on international scene, a political parlor in political, geographical and economic spaces. After the 89’ Revolution, the country wanted to be recognized as a European Country, a way to recognize Romania’s historical and political European heritage. In order to maintain the
status quo, Romania will be a strong support for regional and International Organizations.

Due to its historical geographical situation at the peripheral border of the larger Empire, Romania has been over the time in an in-between situation, between the West with Latinity and the East with the Orthodox faith. The Latinity, an important asset in the Romanian consciousness, comforted by many Romanian personalities contributed to the European culture in general and the French one in particular, was used as a tool for survival and an element of differentiation from the neighbors. This Latinity will surface each time in Romania’s landscape especially at the country’s turning point, for Romania’s fight for independence, after the Iron Curtain fall and the 89’ Revolution to anchor the country in the West. However, if the country is a Latin one, the Romanians are orthodox, and orthodoxy, which cannot be dissociated from the political power, had played an important role in Romania’s nation-building process in the nineteenth century. The dominant church as a norm and part of the Romanian symbols of independence is a tool for political and foreign policy, especially towards neighbors such as the Republic of Moldova. Orthodoxy is also linked with pan-Slavism and used by the Russian Empire as a tool of national and geopolitical expansion to rich the Black Sea and the Balkans in strategic needs to attend the Mediterranean Sea and to form a Russian-dominated Slavic federation. Until the nineteenth century, Romania was anchored in the Eastern space, but in the wave of its independence, the country wanted to anchor in the West, to find a new ideology and to oppose the potential Russian domination. The orthodox faith is related to the national feeling, attracts the country to the Balkan area thru a common history of liberation. However, Romanian political leaders dismissed this fact, being afraid to be rejected by the West, arguing that they have not to be associated within the Balkans area because of their strong historical and political links with European countries. In fact, the unclear or difficult Balkans definition brings some problems for Romania which is placed sometimes ‘In’ and sometimes ‘Out’ of it by Western authors and institutions, and jeopardized Romania’s reconciliation with Europe by the association with ‘balkanization’ especially in the context of the Yugoslavian wars.

After the 89’ Revolution, this association within instable regions, the Balkans, CIS and Black Sea, did not favor the country and did not satisfy Romanian political leaders, because it was viewed as a threat to the will to get the country closer to western institutions. However, with the new presidency of Emil Constantinescu, the country gives clear signal to comfort the will to be viewed as a European country.
Romania joins the European Union because it was the country’s natural path of foreign policies, but also views it as a symbol of economical and democratic success after the Iron Curtain fall. Romania was attracted by the United States because they were the necessary stakeholder to open the door of NATO, but also stands security for the entity Eastern Europe protection and the Balkans’ war resolution. In this countinuity, Romania became a strong ally due to physical evidence of the US superiority with intangible elements on international leadership and its soft power strategy to win hearts and minds in Eastern Europe.

The permanent balance between Europe and the United States puts the country in a difficult situation due to their divergences on certain international topics and their different approaches of international issues. This situation tended time to time to lead to clashes.

With a key geographic situation in the southeast of Europe, the country is in an in-between geopolitical situation where “Russia on the one hand and the United States, NATO and the EU on the other hand have their own interests” toward the Balkans and the wider Black Sea. With this situation, we come back to a situation comparable to the Cold War strategy, reintroducing the notion of heartland of the ‘World-Island’ for a competitive access to resources and control of trade routes, on which Romania, as dominant player, can play an important role within the EU and NATO.

Romania a modern construction of the initial three principalities had, on the one hand, a degree of isolation but on the other hand, its geographical situation produces a melting pot of different influences. Different neighbor Empires according to their geopolitical interest used the country over centuries as a vassal, an ally or a buffer zone. This borderland land situation has shaped Romania’s identity and consciousness vis-à-vis the others. In order to preserve Romania’s independence as much as possible, the countries used bandwagoning with hard and soft manner as balancing in their international political activities. Along centuries, the country was by its geopolitical situation a borderland of different Empire and powerful neighbors, and in fact, Romania’s independence came from the others’ support by putting the country at a crossroad of interests.

In the recent waves of independence from the communism system, Romania seeks to escape from isolation and to avoid being in an in-between situation, trapped between the East and the West. However, due to its geographical and geopolitical situation, the country became a crossroad of different interests where on one hand “[m]ost of them are divergent, which makes Romania one of the battlefields where (...) spheres of influence collide”\(^{1967}\), and on the other hand a link between the East and the West, Latin and Orthodox churches. Within NATO, Romania seeks to gain influence over the Alliance strategy, and to reinforce its links with the United States in order to guaranty national security and regional leadership. Within the European Union, Romania seeks to create political influences to develop initiatives with other European states and neighbors on the Danube, the Balkans and the wider Black Sea area. The objectives of Romanian political leaders are to be part of the future European diplomatic service and to influence the European foreign policies. Within the Black Sea, an instable region constituted by a nexus of different influences with instable countries, with major roads for energy supply and trade, Romania from a minor power will tend to become an inescapable actor to moderate the complex balance of power of the wider Black Sea on behalf the Alliance and the European Union. The Energy issue is crucial in the beginning of this new century, within a new cold peace context between the will of Russian domination and control, the Alliance and European Union’s needs to access energy resources. In this context, two main pipeline projects underline this strong competition for energy control. Romania’s geopolitical situation and soft diplomacy give the capability to be a bridge between major powers. As a member of the Alliance and the EU, Romania has favored the Union’s project and opened the door to Russian proposition, because in this competition, states do not want to be a loser if any one of the projects will avoid. This is an important issue because the domination over energy can lead to military interventions.

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\(^{1967}\) Ibid.
Global Conclusion

VI Global Conclusion

The events of the end of the eighties with the ‘Iron Curtain’ fall in the nineties and the changes at the dawn of the 21st century, as the tragic events of September 11 and his consequences, the fight against terrorism and energy issue have revealed new paradigms in the International Relations and make the period from 1989 to nowadays an important period interesting to study.

This thesis was thus carried out to understand and explain the Romania’s international relations after the 89’ revolution and to evaluate Romania’s progress during these twenty last years, from 1989 to 2009. Our intention was not to explain Romania’s international relations throughout different theories which each one can enlighten the Romania’s course of action, but to treat deeply Romania as a case study explaining by itself the reasons of choices made. We focused on this approaches because the period treated is in the present time and Romania is a complex case that can not be resumed thru foreign policy theory or IR theory, but by a multiple approaches with interrelation of different science of research, linking past and present.

The work of this recherche is important because first of all this theme was never treated completely and after that it makes possible to apprehend the way Romania passed over this so particular period within its international relations. Our thesis conclusion makes it possible for us to explain each action of Romania’s international relations and to understand and forecast its foreign policy. In addition, this work allows us to validate some theories in different fields as Foreign Policy Change, International Relations, and Geopolitics...

Along this research, we demonstrated three strong ideas, hereafter developed which were underlying the Romanian international relations and impelled the Romanian foreign policy decisions.

First, an emblematic question for Romania and Romanians is the powerful impact of the ‘Others’. The ‘Others’ have a high importance and strong influences over the country’s building that pushed it to feel alternately rejected or adulated. This feeling
generated an important need of recognition as a specific and unified country with its own behaviours. This idea has been observed during the Romania’s integration to NATO and accession’s process in European Union.

Secondly, due to its geopolitical position in the Southeast of the continent, Romania was often in an in-between situation over regional situation and had difficulties to find its way feeling time-to-time victim of the non-attention of the others. Romania has found itself in a changed geopolitical space with a new international system and regional environment, dominated by zones of instabilities at the doors of the country – the Balkans, the Wider Black Sea and the CIS -. Its doubts and isolation generated the need of a savior, i.e. France in the nineteenth century or United States after the Cold War, an actor in the game of powers to guaranty the country’s independence and integrity in order to fully realize its ambitions. This in-between situation will push Romania to be always associated in Alliances in order to guaranty its security. In addition, the country built a strong alliance with United States, a world power as well strong stakeholder, in a natural attraction for the supporter of the fight against communism and Russia.

The system of alliance is an other way for the country to perform while preserving its independence and its freedom of manoeuvre. In parallel, Romania constantly paid attention to some countries, which were not always on the front world political or military scenes, as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the Cold War or China nowadays.

Thirdly, Romania has been for centuries a country on the edge of empires, as a no man’s land and in spite of the complexity of its borderland; it knew various reasons to find itself at the convergence of divers’ interests and became a geographical and political crossroad over its history. Romania built a strategy to be recognized as a regional leader in its near shore zone by participating in problems solving towards the Balkans and the Wider Black Sea region.

One point come to know, Romania considers itself as a European country even if some factions advocate a specific way for Romania: Romania is dual with peasant societies attached to land and tradition and an elite-oriented to international connection and exchange. Traumatized by the Soviet domination as other CEECs, Romania chose to return to its original traditional path marked during the nineteenth and the first half of twentieth centuries. To attend its goals, Romania used balancing to return to the West by anchoring within the European Union and NATO for economic, political and
Global Conclusion

...military reasons, making them an objective and high priorities for its foreign policy.

These choices have strongly impacted Romania’s international relations as its domestic policy by creating a dependence vis-à-vis these organizations, i.e. all the necessary country’s adaptation to complete with organization’s obligations as the good neighborliness, political (democracy), economic (free trade and open market) and military orientations. In addition, the dependence was brought by the interaction with neighbors that has a large influence on the Romania’s process accession. We expressed the idea that Romania never was the master of its policy during this last twenty years period, but external pressures made its policy by imposing political norms and foreign policy course of actions. In the same way, Romania relied a lot on international organizations to guaranty its peace and freedom, as well recognition on the international scene. We revealed that there is for Romania a close connection between its international relations and its domestic policy as a reference salient.

This research demonstrated that Romania restructured its foreign policy from isolation to dependence toward the West in a short period of time and after that from dependence to interdependence with the West over the NATO and European Union integration periods. It is important to emphasize here that “Romania’s government would not have restructured its foreign policy without the major transformations in the organization of the international system and shift in the international balance of power.”

Under these circumstances, the country focused on its trajectory and stability in spite of hesitation in the starting positioning of the country between Native and Western models. Nevertheless, ruling with different political factions and various political leaders elected over the time, the country had and has an invariant international relation over the country’s history, even if in the recent past each president has its own path; Ion Iliescu, francophone with a political education shaped by Moscow; Emil Constantinescu, Atlantist linked with Europe; Traian Basescu, Atlantist and strongly connected

with United States. In some other words, Romania changed in continuity.

Using the discourse analysis method on Romanian politicians and presidents speeches, it would be interesting to confirm by an other approach the idea outlined above. To resume on one example, Ion Iliescu said in his public declaration in 1994\(^{1969}\) that Romania should be open to all possible economic relations without being subordinated, and Traian Băsescu himself underlines that Romania should “capitalize on other commercial ties: the Balkans, Eastern neighbours, the Middle East, north of Africa, the Far East or South-East Asia”,\(^{1970}\) to the carriages of the opportunities… During all presidential mandates, the same idea came over the surface with different names and representation pushed in front of: the necessity to put the country at the crossroad of regional interest linking the East and the West.

This research reveals that Romania’s main options in the international relations remained unchanged during different periods of modern Romania keeping the same course of actions installed by Nicolae Iorga and Nicolae Titulescu to guarantee peace and security and ensure Romania’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. This ‘motto’ involved Romania in international and regional organization like wise conflict resolution considered by Romanian political leaders as a key for Romania’s stability and Romani’s ambition to contribute to the regional peace in the new international and regional context. In the recent period, a particular involvement with the country’s near shore in order to reinstate Eastern’s lost territories (Bessarabia, Bukovina) within Romania, in remembrance of some glorious country’s past interferes with the country regional and international objectives.


Global Conclusion

In fact, we point out that Romania has always believed in multilateralism, in good neighborliness and regional cooperation. Constant in its international relations and its precepts, the country depending of the international situation used soft or hard balancing as well when it was necessary bandwagoning, as for example during the Cold War. For these purposes, the country seeks to position itself on the international scene as a facilitator, a mediator supporting international and regional organizations, while promoting respect of international law as well difference of nations. Over the length of the history, Romania always knew to model its attitude upon the new international context and the evolution of international balance of power, as the paradigm changes in International Relations.

This research underlines that more than dependant, the NATO adhesion and the European Union accession created interdependence with Eastern Europe within Romania by obliging these two organizations to adapt to this challenge, i.e. the Eastern European countries integration. Romania’s integration moved the country’s dependence to interdependence by bringing to the agenda of NATO and European Union, Wider Black Sea’s political, economical likewise military questions as neighbors, but also a foreign policy objective in the Balkan and a connection between West and East. The Romania’s case study is representative of politico-ideological transformation of the military alliance and its new role designed in the post-Yalta international system. As well, the study case is representative of the European Union enlargement strategy adaptation, accession process and methodologies transformation as the new role attributes to the organization today in the regional and international system.

Indeed, we identified but not developed a parallel between Romania and Poland due to their great similarity concerning the creation of the country with the support of foreign powers and a strong relationship with France. Both of them had a glorious time in the past (Greater Romania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) and played an important role over their respective regional situation. These countries are the biggest of Eastern Europe and on the crossroad of divers’ foreign interests over their history. Their suffered a redistribution of their land after 1945 with forced integration in the Eastern bloc.

If Poland is anchored to the East by its Slavic origin, the country is westwards thru the Catholic religion. In opposite, Romania is anchored to the East thru the Orthodox religion and westwards by its origins and Latin’s attachments.
Global Conclusion

In fact, the integration process in Western organizations and the Alliance, close connection with the United States, were not isolated events dedicated to Romania but a general Eastern Europe basic tendency in international relation of the Post Cold War. The country’s process of transformation was slower but not different from other CEECs and as all other Eastern States included some hesitation phases, (back to communism, strong nationalism, doubts). Romania has the same path as Hungary or Poland regarding the accession and integration processes, likewise Bulgaria considering its relation with Russia. We cannot neglect in the case of Romania the lack of proximity and member state preferences in the enlargement process.

Considering the Romania’s contribution to NATO and the European Union, in the convergent efforts between the two organizations to collaborate and shares values, in the near future Romania due to its “geostrategic position, the constant economic and social progress, the consolidated membership in EU and NATO, the political stability and the keeping of commitments [...] should take the lead”\textsuperscript{1971} in the Wider Black Sea and the Balkans regions, and can regain the name of the “East European leader in many areas”\textsuperscript{1972} accredited before the Second World War.


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Ion Iliescu was born in March 3rd, 1930 in Oltenița and served as President of Romania from 1990 until 1996 and then from 2000 until 2004. From 1996 to 2000 and from 2004 until his retirement in 2008, Iliescu was a Senator for the Social Democratic

---


Appendix – Presidents and Vita

Party (PSD), who remains today honorary president of the party. Ion Iliescu is widely recognized as the predominant figure in the first fifteen years of post-1989 Romanian political Revolution and one of the fifty Romanians who have made the Romania’s history in the twenties century.1975

Family Background

Iliescu’s father, Alexandru Iliescu was a railroad worker with communist views during the period in which the Romanian Communist Party was banned by the authorities. In 1931 he went to the Soviet Union to take part in the Communist Party Congress of Gorikovo, near Moscow. He remained in the USSR for the next four years and was arrested upon his return. He was imprisoned from June 1940 to August 1944 and died in August 1945. Ion Iliescu married Nina Serbanescu in 1951 and they have no children.

Earlier Life

Ion Iliescu studied fluid mechanics at the Bucharest Polytechnic Institute and then as a foreign student at the Energy Institute of the Moscow University. During his stay in Moscow, he was the secretary of the “Association of Romanian Students”. It is alleged that he knew Mikhail Gorbachev, although Iliescu always denied this.1976

He joined the Union of Communist Youth in 1944 and the Communist Party in 1953 and made a career in the communist nomenklatura, becoming a secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Communist Youth in 1956 and a member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party in 1965. At one point, he served as the head of the Central Committee’s Department of Propaganda.1977 Iliescu later served as Minister for Youth-related

1975 Munteanu, Petre. 50 de Români care au făcut istoria secolului XX (50 Romanian that have made the History in the 20th Century). Eurolider, 2005, no. 38.


1977 ______ Ibid.
Issues between 1967 and 1971. However beginning with 1971 he was gradually marginalized by Nicolae Ceaușescu. He was removed from all major political offices, being assigned vice-president of the Timis County Council (1971-1974) and later president of the Iasi Council (1974-1979). In 1984 he was excluded from the Central Committee. Until 1989, he was in charge of the Editura Tehnica publishing house.

The 1989 Revolution

Ion Iliescu and a few other second-rank communists seized power and created an organization named National Salvation Front (NSF). Iliescu was quickly acknowledged as the leader of the organization and therefore of the provisional authority. Ion Iliescu did not renounce to the communist ideology and the program he initially presented during the revolution included restructuring the agriculture and the reorganization of trade, but not a switch to capitalism. These views were held by other members of the NSF such as Silviu Brucan, who claimed in early 1990 that the revolution was against Ceaușescu, not against communism. Ion Iliescu on this speech on Romanian Television seen in December 1989 condemned Ceaușescu's regime for having “defiled the noble ideals of communism”. Many persons in Romania believe that Ion Iliescu had in fact organized what they describe to be a ‘coup d'etat’ with the help of high ranking Army Officials and has ultimately managed to manipulate the public anger towards the oppressive Ceausescu regime in his own favour to install himself as a new leader. There are still many mysteries about his true role in the Revolution.

1978 Ibid.
1979 Ibid.
1980 Ibid.
Translated by Marc Bonnemains
After the 1989 Revolution

The National Salvation Front was originally created for the free legislative elections on 20 May 1990 and afterward disbanded itself, but the president of the party ran in the elections, winning over 70% of the votes. As a founding member, Ion Iliescu followed the Front in all its new avatars: the NSDF (National Salvation Democratic Front), then the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR), then the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Progressively, the Front lost its character as a national government or generic coalition, and became vulnerable to criticism for using its appeal as the first institution involved in power sharing, while engaging itself in political battles with forces that could not enjoy this artificial. Ion Iliescu himself came to be seen as hostile to a proper civic society and more committed to a revised version of democratic centralism. Under the pressure of the events that led to the Mineraias, his political stance has veered with time: from a proponent of the Perestroika, Ion Iliescu became a neophyte social democrat, aligning himself with the Western European political spectrum. The main debate around the subject of his commitment to such ideals is linked to the special conditions in Romania and especially to the strong nationalist and autarkic attitude visible within the Ceausescu regime. Most critics have pointed out that, unlike most communist-to-social democrat changes in the Eastern bloc, Romania's tended to retain various cornerstones, sometimes expressed with scandalous traits - to the Mineraias themselves can be added the slogan of Iliescu supporters in the early 1990s, - “We will not sell off our country!”.

The new Constitution was adopted in 1991 and in 1992 he won a second term when he received 61% of the votes. He ran for a third time in 1996 but he lost in favour of Emil Constantinescu. In the 2000 presidential election, Iliescu ran again and won in the run-off against the ultra-nationalist Corneliu Vadim Tudor. He began his third term on December 20, 2000, ending on December 20, 2004. The center-right was severely defeated during the 2000 elections due largely to public dissatisfaction with the harsh economic reforms of the previous four years as well as the political instability and infighting of the multiparty coalition. Tudor's extreme views also ensured that most urban voters either abstained or chose Ion Iliescu. In 2004, Ion Iliescu cannot attend the presidential election because of constitutional provisions prohibiting a president to more than two terms. In the PSD elections of 21 April 2005, Ion Iliescu lost the Party’s presidency in favour of Mircea Geoana, but was elected as honorary president of the party in 2006, a position without official executive authority in the party, created just for him.
Controversies

Few controversies, here after, have been marked the third mandate of Ion Iliescu as President of the country.

Mineriad

The term - Mineriad\textsuperscript{1983} - is used to name “the periodic eruptions of violence when Jiu Valley miners strike and descend upon Bucharest”\textsuperscript{1984} to save the government in place – the National Salvation Front (FSN) -, which happened on January 28 and 29, 1990, February 1990, June 1990. The term refers also to the manifestation against the government in place living up its economic promises in September 1999 and January-February 1999. The three first interventions were generally seen as aimed at wrestling policy changes or simply material advantages from the current political power. The term is mostly used to refer to the most violent mineriad, which happened on the 13, 14 and 15 June 1990.

Due to an anti-communist demonstration (January and February 1990) that took place in Bucharest, the party in place organized a demonstration relying on workers from factories in Bucharest (January 1990), but also relied on over thousand miners from the Jiu Valley, who came to Bucharest to save the ‘besieged democratic regime’ and restore order and democracy in Bucharest (June 1990) upon the call of Ion Iliescu (January 1990, February 1990, June 1990).

The fourth and the fifth mineriad happened because of the miners claiming that government had not lived up to its economic promises (September 1991) and to oppose to the governmental reduction of the subsidies induced by the closing of the mines (January-February 1999) in spite of the role played by the Jui Valley Coal Miners Union in Post-Revolution Romania. Each mineriad has it dead and wounded people. The miner’s leader, President of the Jiu Valley Coal Miners Union, Miron Cozma, was found guilty and sentenced to 18 years in prison on 14 February 1999.

\textsuperscript{1983} in Romanian: Mineriadă
The National Salvation Front initiated the three first minerisds with its leader Ion Iliescu to protect democracy, but the political opposition at that time believed that the Romanian Presidency and Secret Service had a hand on it. This belief generated conspiracy theories and rumors circulated on the origins and development of the minerid.

**Constitution Violations**

Iliescu was accused by his opponents of having held three terms in office (four, counting the one between December 1989 and June 1990), although was not allowed it. Before his unsuccessful campaign of 1996, the Constitutional Court of Romania ruled in favour of his third candidature and henceforth of his third presidency, began in 2000. In view of this, the accusation can be described as biased because the illegitimacy can not be post facto of the voted legislation within the framework of Romanian constitutionalism. The situation is fairly similar to those in Russia (Boris Yeltsin), Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the same time, taking into account that Ion Iliescu had a shorter first term and that he had a break between the second and the third term. In 1995, the procedures of impeaching the president Ion Iliescu were started by the Romanian Democratic Convention, following a press interview in which Ion Iliescu appeared to deny the owners’ rights as a whole to properties nationalized during the communist period. The Constitutional Court agreed on the unlawfulness of the declaration, but the Members of Parliament rejected the proposal of impeachment.

**Alleged KGB Connections**

In 1995, the Ziua newspaper published an interview with an ex-KGB officer who declared that Ion Iliescu was a KGB inductee. Iliescu denied any involvement, and Ziua journalists began to investigate the topic in detail. However, only a few days later, Ziua alleged that its employees were being placed under the surveillance of the Romanian Intelligence Service – the official explanation was that the secret service was in fact watching a spy that lived nearby.

The scandal on his alleged connections continued during 2003-2008, when Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, who had been granted access to Soviet archives, declared that Iliescu and most of the Salvation Front members were KGB agents, that Iliescu had been
in close connection with Mikhail Gorbachev ever since they had allegedly met during Iliescu's stay in Moscow, and that the Romanian Revolution of 1989 was a plot organized by the KGB - in order to regain control of the country's policies (gradually lost under Ceausescu's rule).\textsuperscript{1985} The only hard evidence published was a discussion between Gorbachev and Bulgaria's Aleksandar Lilov from May 23, 1990 (after Iliescu's victory in the May 20 elections) in which Gorbachev says that Iliescu holds a 'calculated position', and that despite sharing common views with Iliescu, Gorbachev wanted to avoid sharing this impression with the public.\textsuperscript{1986}

**Pardons**

In December 2001, Iliescu pardoned three inmates convicted for bribery, including George Tanase, former Financial Guard head commissioner for Ialomita.\textsuperscript{1987} Iliescu had to revoke Tanase's pardon a few days later due to the media outcry, claiming that "a legal adviser was superficial in analyzing the case".\textsuperscript{1988}

Most controversial of all, on 15 December 2004, a few days before the end of his last term, Iliescu pardoned 47 convicts, including Miron Cozma, the leader of the miners during the early 1990s, who had been sentenced in 1999 to 18 years in prison in conjunction with the 1991 Mineriad. This has attracted harsh criticism


from all Romanian media\textsuperscript{1989} and later on the President and his Prime-minister revoked the pardon.

\textbf{Decorating Vadim Tudor}

In the last days of his President mandate, he awarded the Order of the Star of Romania (Steaua României) in the rank of ceremonial knighthood to the ultra-nationalist controversial politician Corneliu Vadim Tudor, a gesture that drew criticism in the press. The president, Traian Basescu, revoked the award granted to Tudor on May 24, 2007, but a lawsuit is ongoing even after Basescu's decree was declared constitutional.\textsuperscript{1990}


Emil Constantinescu

Emil Constantinescu born in November 19, 1939 in Tighina (currently in the Republic of Moldova today) was President of Romania from 1996 to 2000. He is a member of the ‘Haut Conseil de la Francophonie’.

Family Background

He married Nadia, a former legal adviser in 1964, and have a son, Dragos and a daughter, Norina, along with two grandchildren.

Earlier Life

Emil Constantinescu graduated from the law school of the University of Bucharest and started a career as a geologist. At the beginning of 1966, Emil Constantinescu taught in the Geology Faculty

of the University of Bucharest, where he also became the Propaganda Secretary of the local organisation of the Romanian Communist Party. In 1992 he was elected president of the University of Bucharest.

**After the 1989 Revolution**

After the Romanian revolution in 1989, Emil Constantinescu became a founding member and vice-president of the Civic Alliance. He was the acting chairman of the Romanian Anti-Totalitarian Forum, the first associative structure of the opposition in Romania, which was transformed into a political and electoral alliance - the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) -. In 1992, he became the CDR's candidate for presidency, but he lost the election against Ion Iliescu, after a second round.

Emil Constantinescu was elected President after winning on November 17 runoff against Ion Iliescu. In 1997, the mandate of Emil Constantinescu began with great expectations. Initially, support for the new government was high and a large segment of the population was for change. Nevertheless, the presidency of Emil Constantinescu led to perpetual friction bringing crisis and dissatisfaction with a growing hostility among the Romanian population.

The government’s foreign policy was seen as a strong point. It adopted a pro-Western stance, and early in its mandate, Emil Constantinescu launched a diplomatic offensive to improve the image of Romania abroad. The Romania’s top foreign policy priorities were the NATO and the European Union accession, with the will to improve relations with Romania’s neighbours.
Traian Basescu

Traian Basescu\(^{1993}\) born on November 4, 1951 in Murfatlar, a village (later a small town) near the port city of Constanta, and after serving as Mayor of Bucharest from June 2000 until December 2004, he became President of Romania, after winning the 2004 presidential election. In 2009, he wined a second term of 5 years mandate as President of Romania.

**Family Background**

His father, Dimitri Basescu an army officier died in 2002. He has a brother, Mircea born in 1953. Traian Basescu married Maria and they have two daughters, Ioana and Elena.

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Earlier Life

Traian Basescu graduated the Institute of Civil Marine ‘Mircecel Batran’ of Constanta in 1976 and became a Merchant Marine Officer at Navrom, the Romania state-owned shipping company, between 1976 and 1981. Than he served, from 1981 to 1987, as Merchant Navy Captain on Romanian commercial ships. In 1984, he was promoted Captain of the oil tanker Biruinta, the largest ship of the Romanian commercial fleet. From 1987 to 1989, Traian Basescu moved to Belgium as the head of Navrom Agency in Antwerp (Belgium).

Throughout Traian Basescu’s career, questions have been raised about his links to the security services of the communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.\(^{1994}\) Traian Basescu has said that his links with the former security service were strong because some contact was obligatory at that time for someone working abroad in a senior position.\(^{1995}\) In addition, Traian Basescu was a member of the Communist Party (PCR). After the downfall of Communism, he claimed that he joined the PCR only in order to promote his career in the merchant marine.

The 1989 Revolution

Traian Basescu joined politics after the 1989 Romanian Revolution, as a member of the large National Salvation Front (NSF) party.

After the 1989 Revolution

In April 1991, Traian Basescu became Minister of Transport in Petre Roman’s Cabinet and continued to hold this position during Theodor Stolojan’s Cabinet from September 1991 to November 1992. In 1992, after the split of the NSF in two factions, the Social


Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR, later PSD), led by Ion Iliescu, and the Democratic Party (PD), led by Petre Roman, Traian Basescu joined the PD faction. In 1992, he was elected to the lower house of the Romanian Parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, then re-elected for the 1996-2000 term mandate. Concurrently with his second term mandate in the Parliament, from November 1996 to June 2000, Traian Basescu served as Minister of Transport in the centre-right governments of Victor Ciorbea, Radu Vasile and Mugur Isarescu. In 2000, Basescu was elected Mayor of Bucharest. In 2004, Basescu was elected for a second term in office. He resigned as Mayor later in the year, after winning the presidential election of Romania. Following Theodor Stolojan’s surprise withdrawal from the 2004 presidential elections, Traian Basescu entered in the presidential race on behalf of the Justice and Truth Alliance and won the Presidential election by using an anti-communist and anti-corruption rhetoric. The Basescu’s victory was characterized, at that time, in the media as Romania's ‘Orange Revolution’, in reference to the reformists' perceived victory in neighboring Ukraine during the same period and in reference to the orange color used by the winning Justice and Truth Alliance.\footnote{Wood, Paul. Looking back on election 2004 - Romania's Orange Revolution [online]. \textit{Vivid}, 23 Jan. 2010, 2005, no. 69. [cited 23 Jan. 2010]. HyperText Markup Language. Available from: <http://www.vivid.ro/vivid69/pages69/election_back69.htm>.} He was re-elected at the 2009 presidential elections.

In domestic politics, Traian Basescu has claimed the fight against high-level corruption and pressed the official condemnation of Romanian communism regime.

During the first mandate, the European Union accession remained a top priority and a central component in Romania's foreign policy. In addition, Traian Basescu has focused on a strong strategic partnership with the United States, a relationship that during the 2004 presidential campaign he called the 'Bucharest-London-Washington axis'. Traian Basescu has been vocal in calling for a regional approach to security in the Black Sea basin, which he noted remained to trans-border security threats such as drug and human trafficking. He has tried to improve Romania’s relations with Moldova, and has expressed several times his belief in the future unification of the two countries, either politically or in the framework of the European Union, but this attitude led an increasing anti-Romanian rhetoric from the Communist government of Moldova.
Controversies

Relationship with the press

Basescu is a major target of criticism by the press and in turn in many occasions, he used controversial language to describe some of the journalists that have criticized him.

Conflict with the Prime Minister

Basescu has remained very popular, due to his open style and hands-on approach. He has been very involved in day-to-day politics of Romania, often being accused by other political leaders of overstepping constitutional boundaries on the role of the President. During the course of his presidency, his relations with the Prime Minister Popescu-Tariceanu gradually soured, particularly following the Prime Minister's reversal of course in July 2005 after Tariceanu initially announced he would resign and prompt early parliamentary elections,\(^{1997}\) which some hoped would have resulted in the ‘Justice and Truth Alliance’ party governing alone. The ensuing poor relations between the President and the Prime Minister have become one of the primary themes of Romanian post-2004 politics,\(^{1998}\) with many unrelated disputes converging to this dichotomy. Under the Romanian Constitution, the president appoints the prime minister, but does not have the authority to dismiss him.

Impeachment

On April 19, 2007, the Romanian Parliament voted to suspend Basescu and initiated an impeachment referendum for allegedly


unconstitutional conduct. The Constitutional Court found no clear evidence of his breach of the Constitution in the sense required by the fundamental law. After the Parliament’s vote on April 20, 2007, Basescu remained suspended until the referendum from May 19, 2007. The results failed to confirm the impeachment: 24.75% voted to impeach Basescu, and 74.48% to maintain him as president. Basescu is the first president in the history of Romania who has been officially suspended.


Appendix – Ministers of Foreign Affairs’ List

This list was built with information found on the official website of the Government of Romania and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provisory Gov. of Petre Roman</td>
<td>Dec. 26, 1989 to June 28, 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celac, Sergiu</td>
<td>Dec. 28, 1989 to June 28, 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nastase, Adrian</td>
<td>June 28, 1990 to Nov. 18, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Nicolae Vacaroiu</td>
<td>Nov. 19, 1992 to Dec. 11, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melescanu, Teodor Viorel</td>
<td>Nov. 19, 1992 to Dec. 11, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevrin, Andrien</td>
<td>Dec. 12, 1996 to Dec. 29, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plesu, Andrei Gabriel</td>
<td>Dec. 29, 1997 to Dec. 22, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoana, Mircea Dan</td>
<td>Dec. 28, 2000 to Dec. 28, 2004</td>
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### Appendix – Ministers of Foreign Affairs’ List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ungureanu, Mihai-Razvan</td>
<td>Dec. 29, 2004 to March 12, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popescu-Tariceanu, Calvin Constantin Anton (ad interim)</td>
<td>March 21, 2007 to April 5, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cioroianu, Adrian-Mihai</td>
<td>April 5, 2007 to April 14, 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comanescu, Lazar</td>
<td>April 14, 2008 to Dec. 22, 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diaconescu, Cristian</td>
<td>Dec 23, 2008 to Oct. 1st, 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Predoiu, Catalin (ad interim)</td>
<td>Oct. 2nd, 2009 to Dec 23, 2009</td>
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<tr>
<th>Government of Emil Boc IV</th>
<th>Dec. 23, 2009 to nowadays</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baconschi, Teodor</td>
<td>Dec. 23, 2009 to nowadays</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

These tables are built with information found on the official web site of the Romanian Presidency, the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as in Romanian local newspapers, and also in French, English, American, German, Russian... newspapers. We used also some books, as 'Romania 1989-2005 - A Chronological History'\textsuperscript{2003}, 'Romania-Nato Chronology 198-2004'\textsuperscript{2004}, 'România – UE Cronologie 1989-2005'\textsuperscript{2005} and some others.

These informations could be not exhaustive even if we took attention to build it.


1990

From Abroad to Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Whom</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Foreign minister Eduard Sevardenzade</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Foreign minister Roland Dumas</td>
<td>10-11 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Community Commission</td>
<td>Vice-president, Frans Andriessen</td>
<td>14 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Vice-Chancellor and Foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher</td>
<td>15-16 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>State Secretary James Baker III</td>
<td>11 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>2 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>25 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>12-16 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>President Jacques Attali</td>
<td>3-4 December</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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Table 1: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 1990.
### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

#### From Romania to Abroad

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whom</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Object</th>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>17-20 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Russia (Moscow)</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergiu Celac</td>
<td>Russia (Moscow)</td>
<td>20 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Agreement EBRD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>18-19 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>3-5 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>27 September</td>
<td>Meeting EEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>UN (New York)</td>
<td>28 Sept. – 5 Oct.r</td>
<td>Un Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>22 October</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>22 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>NATO (Brussels)</td>
<td>24 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>10-14 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>20-23 November</td>
<td>CSCE Conference</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergiu Celac</td>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergiu Celac</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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**Table 2: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 1990.**
### From Abroad to Romania

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<th>Country</th>
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<td>European Community</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>14-16 January</td>
<td>Working Visit</td>
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<td>Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>11-13 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>C. Laumière and F. Fernandez Ordonez</td>
<td>7-8 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>European Council</td>
<td>Andres Bierek</td>
<td>26-28 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>European Council</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>1 March</td>
<td>Visit - PHARE</td>
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<td>European Council</td>
<td>Vice-president Frans Andriessen</td>
<td>11-12 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>President François Mitterand</td>
<td>18-19 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>11 mai</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>General Secretary Manfred Womer</td>
<td>3-5 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>Representant</td>
<td>23 July</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>7 September</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Turkia</td>
<td>President Turgul Ozal</td>
<td>18-20 September</td>
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<td>Delegation</td>
<td>17-18 October</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>31 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>16 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>27-28 November</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>28 December</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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</table>

*Table 3: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 1991.*
**Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy**

### From Romania to Abroad

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<tr>
<th>Whom</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Object</th>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>14-16 January</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>24-26 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman and Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>France, Strasbourg</td>
<td>28-30 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>31 Jan. – 2 Febr.</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>1 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Brussels, Luxembourg</td>
<td>13-14 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>20-22 February</td>
<td>Visit - EC</td>
</tr>
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<td>Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>28 February – 1st March</td>
<td>Visit - EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>Brazil, Chile, Peru</td>
<td>4-13 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>4-13 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>25 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>URSS</td>
<td>4-6 April</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>14-17 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu and Minister of Finances</td>
<td>England (London)</td>
<td>15 April</td>
<td>BERD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representant</td>
<td>Brussels - EEC</td>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<td>Delegation</td>
<td>Hungary (Budapest)</td>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>CAER Session</td>
</tr>
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<td>Czechoslovakia (Prague)</td>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>Protocol</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Germany (Salzburg)</td>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>4 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Portugal, Morocco, Venezuela, Costa Rica</td>
<td>5-13 July</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>17-19 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Petre Roman</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>13 September</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>13 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>France and OIF</td>
<td>18-20 November</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan and Foreign minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5 December</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Strasbourg</td>
<td>18-19 December</td>
<td>Visit the EC</td>
</tr>
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<td>Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan and Foreign minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5 December</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
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Table 4: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 1991.
### 1992

**From Abroad to Romania**

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<td>15 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Secretary General Manfred Wömer</td>
<td>21-22 February</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Center</td>
</tr>
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<td>BERD</td>
<td>President Jacques Attali</td>
<td>16 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>President Mircea Snegur</td>
<td>21 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Vice-chancellor and Foreign Minister Has-Dietrich Genscher</td>
<td>21-22 April</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Vice-Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger</td>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli</td>
<td>19-20 August</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>3-4 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>1-4 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>12-13 October</td>
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**Table 5: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 1992.**
## From Romania to Abroad

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<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>24 January</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>27 January</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Swisterland (Davos)</td>
<td>31 January – 2 February</td>
<td>Economic Forum</td>
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<td>Foreign minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Turkey (Istambul)</td>
<td>3 February</td>
<td>Meeting Black Sea Region</td>
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<td>Foreign minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4-6 February</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Germania</td>
<td>31 March – 1 April</td>
<td>Summit WEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Greece (Athen)</td>
<td>10-11 April</td>
<td>Conference - Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Republic of Moldava (Chisinau)</td>
<td>18-19 May</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Turkey (Istambul)</td>
<td>24-26 June</td>
<td>Summit</td>
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<td>Finland (Helsinki)</td>
<td>9-10 June</td>
<td>CSCE – Helsinki II</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>11-13 September</td>
<td>International Exposition in Seville</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>11-13 September</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>14 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>24 November</td>
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Table 6: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 1992.
### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

#### 1993

**From Abroad to Romania**

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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Foreign minister Roland Dumas</td>
<td>11-12 January</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
<td>President Dobrica Closic</td>
<td>25 February</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>President Jelis Jeluv</td>
<td>27 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Chief-negotiator of EU, Daniel Guggenbuhl</td>
<td>1-3 April</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszevki</td>
<td>6-7 May</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>The President of the Supreme Council of Belarus, Stanislav Suskevici</td>
<td>6-7 May</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain</td>
<td>Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd</td>
<td>1-3 June</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
<td>President of EEC, Leon Brittan</td>
<td>13-15 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>President Mirea Snegur</td>
<td>17 July</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro</td>
<td>21-22 July</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>European Council</td>
<td>Secretary General Catherine Laumière</td>
<td>26-28 August</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Alain Lamassure</td>
<td>13 September</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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**Table 7: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 1993.**
### From Romania to Abroad

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<th>Object</th>
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<td>1 February</td>
<td>Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Brussels – NATO</td>
<td>17-18 February</td>
<td>Meeting. NATO Membership.</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>10-12 April</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu</td>
<td>Denmark (Copenhagen)</td>
<td>13-15 April</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>United State of America</td>
<td>13-19 April</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Nicolae Vacariu</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>16-27 April</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>14-19 May</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>27-29 July</td>
<td>Visit and Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>27 July – 6 August</td>
<td>Visit and Agreement</td>
</tr>
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<td>Columbia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9-11 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu</td>
<td>Brussels – NATO</td>
<td>21 September</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Republic of Slovakia</td>
<td>23-24 September</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Nicolae Vacariu</td>
<td>Russia (Moscow)</td>
<td>27-29 September</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Austria (Vienne)</td>
<td>8-9 October</td>
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<td>10-21 October</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<th>Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu</th>
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<td>United State of America</td>
<td>15-16 December</td>
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**Table 8: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 1993.**
### 1994

#### From Abroad to Romania

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<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>5-8 January</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Minister of Trade and Industry Stalios Kiliaris</td>
<td>6 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Minister of Environment Sven Auken</td>
<td>9-11 January</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Turkey</td>
<td>Minister of Health</td>
<td>10-11 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff of French Army Jacques Lauxade</td>
<td>13 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Madelaine Albright</td>
<td>15 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Minister of Police Moshe Shalal</td>
<td>17-18 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>Delegation Bart Gordon</td>
<td>21 January</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladislav Ivanovic</td>
<td>24-25 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>24-26 January</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Minister of Trade</td>
<td>26 January</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Minister of Defence Valentin Gheorghiev</td>
<td>29 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Diplomatic adviser of French PM Bernard Faubourget</td>
<td>2-3 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati</td>
<td>2-3 February</td>
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<td>Delegation</td>
<td>3 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Minister of State Tom Kit</td>
<td>13-16 February</td>
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<td>President Franco Tudjman</td>
<td>14-16 February</td>
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<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>Vice-prime minister Nicolae Andronati</td>
<td>15 February</td>
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<td>EU Minister Robert Urbain</td>
<td>15 February</td>
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<td>15-17 March</td>
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<td>16-18 March</td>
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<td>22 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>23-25 March</td>
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<td>27-29 March</td>
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<td>28-30 March</td>
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<td>2-5 April</td>
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<td>4-6 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>4-8 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>6-10 April</td>
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<td>President Mr. Sali Berisha</td>
<td>9-11 May</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<td>Parliamentary Delegation</td>
<td>4-6 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Federal Minister Carl Dieter</td>
<td>6-8 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>President of the European Parliament Egon Klepsch</td>
<td>16-17 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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## Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Dates</th>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>President special envoy Mrs. Violeta Chamorro</td>
<td>22-24 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Parliamentary Delegation</td>
<td>22-26 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>New secretary of state Sir John Coles</td>
<td>25-26 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of India</td>
<td>President Sanker Dayal Sarma</td>
<td>30 May – 2 Jun</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>Parliamentary Delegation</td>
<td>1-3 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>5-8 June</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>13-14 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>President of the Parliamentary Assembly Miguel Angel Martinez</td>
<td>16-21 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Chikvaidze</td>
<td>20 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldeova</td>
<td>President of Parliament Petru Luchinski</td>
<td>20 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Vaclav Havel</td>
<td>21-23 June</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<td>Mr. James Baker</td>
<td>2 July</td>
<td>Private visit</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Parliamentary Delegation</td>
<td>5-9 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Republic of China</td>
<td>Premier Li Peng</td>
<td>9-12 July</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel</td>
<td>13 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Department of Defense Mr. William Perry</td>
<td>17-18 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Foreign minister Alain Juppe</td>
<td>7-8 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>3 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<tr>
<th>International Monetary Fund</th>
<th>Executive director Michel Camdessus</th>
<th>18-20 October</th>
<th>Meeting</th>
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<td>Secretar General Boutros Boutros Gali</td>
<td>18-20 October</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
<td>Representant</td>
<td>5 November</td>
<td>EU Information and Research Office</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak</td>
<td>23-24 November</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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**Table 9: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 1994.**

**From Romania to Abroad**

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<th>Whom</th>
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<td>Brussels – NATO</td>
<td>26 January</td>
<td>Agreement P&amp;P</td>
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<td>Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>27-28 January</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu</td>
<td>Switzerland, Geneva</td>
<td>9 February</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
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<td>Delegation</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>11 February</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<td>State department of MFA</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>11 February</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>State department of MFA</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14-18 February</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>State department of MFA</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>19-24 February</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu</td>
<td>Republic of Slovakia</td>
<td>3 March</td>
<td>Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>7-8 March</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>8 March</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>South Korea</td>
<td>9-11 March</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
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<td>17-21 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>30-31 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>11-12 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>France</td>
<td>14-16 April</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>9 April</td>
<td>Summit WEU</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>May</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>Turkey, Istanbul</td>
<td>9 June</td>
<td>NACC Summit</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>14-15 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Teodor Melescanu</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>15-17 June</td>
<td>Crans-Montana Forum</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>22-25 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>27-29 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Teodor Melescanu</td>
<td>Bulgaria (Sofia)</td>
<td>4-6 July</td>
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<td>19 July</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>17 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>United States of America and United Nations</td>
<td>25-28 September</td>
<td>UN General Assembly Meeting</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>24-25 October</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<td>Morocco (Casablanca)</td>
<td>2-4 November</td>
<td>Summit Meeting</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>France (Paris)</td>
<td>28-30 November</td>
<td>Parlamentar Session</td>
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<td>Hungary (Budapest)</td>
<td>5-6 December</td>
<td>CSCE Summit</td>
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<td>Minister of Agriculture, Valeriu Tabara</td>
<td>Brussels – EU</td>
<td>9 December</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Germany – EU</td>
<td>9-10 December</td>
<td>Summit</td>
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**Table 10: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 1994.**
1995

From Abroad to Romania

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<td>Premier Felipe Gonzales</td>
<td>24-25 February</td>
<td>Visité</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>President Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>7 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Parliamentary Committee</td>
<td>18-20 April</td>
<td>Session</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>President Algirdas Brazauskas</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>President Roman Herzog</td>
<td>15-16 May</td>
<td>Support</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>President H. Aliyev</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Republic of Slovakia</td>
<td>Premier Vladimir Medar</td>
<td>25-27 July</td>
<td>Cooperation Discussion</td>
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<td>Arie M. Oostlander</td>
<td>3 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Konstantinos Stephanopoulos</td>
<td>2-4 November</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
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*Table 11: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 1995.*
## From Romania to Abroad

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<td>1 February</td>
<td>Convention</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu and Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu</td>
<td>Brussels – EU</td>
<td>10 March</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Paris - PSEC</td>
<td>20-21 March</td>
<td>Summit</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>28-30 March</td>
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<td>Holy See</td>
<td>29 March</td>
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<td>Ukraine (Kiev)</td>
<td>5-8 April</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>18-20 April</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<td>Hungary (Budapest)</td>
<td>27-29 May</td>
<td>NATO Session</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Melescanu</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Premier Nicolae Vacaroiu</td>
<td>Republic of China Socialist Republic of Vietnam Islmaic Republic of Pakistan</td>
<td>3-7 July</td>
<td>Visit Commercial Promotion</td>
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<td>Paris</td>
<td>18 July</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Greece (Ioannina)</td>
<td>26 August</td>
<td>Communiqué Yugoslavian support</td>
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<td>United States of America</td>
<td>25 September</td>
<td>Discussion Commercial exchanges</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>15-16 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>ONU (New York)</td>
<td>22-24 October</td>
<td>Session</td>
</tr>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>15-16 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>Republic of Moldava (Chisinau)</td>
<td>1 November</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>13-14 November</td>
<td>Commercial Romanian-Egyptian Bank</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>France (Paris)</td>
<td>14-16 November</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>23-24 November</td>
<td>Bilateral relations</td>
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<td>23-24 November</td>
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**Table 12: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 1995.**
**1996**

**From Abroad to Romania**

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<td>President Max Van der Stoel</td>
<td>18 January</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>State Secretary, Richard Holbrooke</td>
<td>12-13 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>President Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>18 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Prime Minister Jean Chrétien</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>General Secretar Javier Solana</td>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>President Alexandr Kwaśniewski</td>
<td>14-15 May</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>People's Republic of China</td>
<td>Jiang Zemin</td>
<td>29 June – 1 July</td>
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<td>Minister of Defense</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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**Table 13: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 1996.**
### From Romania to Abroad

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<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Caucasian States Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia</td>
<td>25-28 March</td>
<td>Treaties</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>29 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
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<td>Florence – EU</td>
<td>21-22 June</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>25-26 June</td>
<td>Meeting, Economy, Agreements</td>
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<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>5-6 July</td>
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<td>President</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Table 14: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 1996.**
### 1997

**From Abroad to Romania**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Whom</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>President of the Commission for Development from European Parliament Michel Rocard</td>
<td>24 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>President Jacques Chirac</td>
<td>21-23 February</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Sovereign Mihai I de Hohenzollern</td>
<td>28 February – 5 March</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Commisar of European Union Hans van den Broek</td>
<td>6-7 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>President European Commission Jacques Santer</td>
<td>10-11 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel</td>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Prime Minister Romano Prodi</td>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Prime Minister Jean-Luc Behaene</td>
<td>8-11 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>Prime Minister Ion Cubuc</td>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>President Arpad Goncz</td>
<td>25-27 May</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>2 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>14-15 June</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>President Bill Clinton</td>
<td>11 July</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Representative</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamla Sinha</td>
<td>3 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Prime Minister Antonio Guterres</td>
<td>16 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Tarja Halonen</td>
<td>17 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>President Jacques de Larosière</td>
<td>3 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Secretar General Javier Solana</td>
<td>16 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Commissar of European Union Hans van den Broek</td>
<td>16-17 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>President Laszlo Kovacs</td>
<td>8 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Prime Minister Gyula Horn</td>
<td>20-21 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>23 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>23 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>President Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>24 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>President Kwasniewski</td>
<td>26 November</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>President Kucima</td>
<td>26 November</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>President Petru Lucinschi</td>
<td>4 December</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>President Eduard Sevaramadze</td>
<td>10-11 December</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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**Table 15: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 1997.**
## From Romania to Abroad

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Whom</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Object</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>13-15 January</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Swizerland</td>
<td>31 January - 3 February</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Brussels – UE and NATO</td>
<td>3-5 February</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>5-6 February</td>
<td>Meeting OCDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>10-11 March</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>12-13 March</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Sovereign Mihai I de Hohenzollem</td>
<td>Netherland, Norway, Belgium</td>
<td>14 April</td>
<td>Romania support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>29-30 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Severin</td>
<td>Holy Se</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>22-24 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea</td>
<td>Netherland</td>
<td>19-20 May</td>
<td>Visit and Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Netherland</td>
<td>28 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Country/Location</th>
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<th>Type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Ukraine (Kiev)</td>
<td>2 June</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11 June</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Victor Corbea</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>17-25 June</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>23 June</td>
<td>NATO Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Netherland</td>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>Meeting EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Germany (Bonn)</td>
<td>2 July</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3-4 July</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>8-9 July</td>
<td>NATO Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>12-16 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>17-19 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>5-6 September</td>
<td>Conferences</td>
</tr>
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<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>8-12 September</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
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<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Belgium Luxembourg</td>
<td>29 Sept. – 1 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>France (Strasbourg)</td>
<td>10-11 October</td>
<td>Meeting EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime minister Victor Corbea</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>3 November</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>6-7 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>14-16 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>17-19 November</td>
<td>Summit</td>
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### Table 16: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 1997.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President/Minister</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Netherlands (The Hague)</td>
<td>4 December</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Luxembour</td>
<td>13 December</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>13-15 December</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16-19 December</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Severin</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

#### 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Whom</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw Geremek</td>
<td>15-16 January</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro</td>
<td>18 February</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels – NATO</td>
<td>Secretar General</td>
<td>1-2 April</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Prime minister Mesut Yilmaz</td>
<td>18-19 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Prime minister Viktor Orbán</td>
<td>25 July</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>President Alberto Fujimori Fujimori</td>
<td>8-9 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazatan</td>
<td>President Nursultan Nazarbaiev</td>
<td>20-22 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>President Zlatko Matesa</td>
<td>29 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>President of the Parliamentary Assembly</td>
<td>8 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>President Petru Ludinschi</td>
<td>10 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>President Petar Stoianov</td>
<td>10-11 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>President Suleyman Demirel</td>
<td>3-4 December</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
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**Table 17: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 1998.**
From Romania to Abroad

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Whom</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Object</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>23-24 January</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>25-27 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1st February - 29 January</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Andrei Plesu</td>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Netherland</td>
<td>5-6 March</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Great Britain (London)</td>
<td>11-12 March</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>16-17 April</td>
<td>Meeting and Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Andrei Plesu</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>28 April</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>16-17 April</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Andrei Plesu</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13-14 May</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier Radu Vasile</td>
<td>Turkey (Istanbul)</td>
<td>24-26 May</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>24-31 May</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>20-21 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Premier Radu Vasile</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>22-24 June</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Republic of Azerbaidjan</td>
<td>29-30 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Radu Vasile</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7 July</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1-3 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>14-21 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Radu Vasile</td>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>17 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier Radu Vasile</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2-6 August</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Republic of Azerbaijan (Baku)</td>
<td>7-8 September</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier Radu Vasile</td>
<td>United State of America</td>
<td>2-3 October</td>
<td>Meeting IMF and World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Greece (Delphi)</td>
<td>3-4 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Turkia (Antalya)</td>
<td>12-13 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier Radu Vasile</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>20 October</td>
<td>Meeting NATO, EU, UEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>22-23 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Novegia</td>
<td>25-26 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>27-28 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Andrei Pleșu</td>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Radu Vasile</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2-4 November</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>11 November</td>
<td>Ceremony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14-15 November</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minister of Foreign Affairs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td><strong>17-19 November</strong></td>
<td><strong>Visit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>President Emil Constantinescu</strong></td>
<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
<td><strong>16-17 November</strong></td>
<td><strong>Visit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>President Emil Constantinescu</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td><strong>18 November</strong></td>
<td><strong>Visit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>President Emil Constantinescu</strong></td>
<td><strong>Brussels</strong></td>
<td><strong>25 November</strong></td>
<td><strong>Meeting NATO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Minister</strong></td>
<td><strong>Portugal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Visit</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Minister</strong></td>
<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Visit</strong></td>
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**Table 18: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 1998.**
### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

#### 1999

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos</td>
<td>20 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordania</td>
<td>King Hussein</td>
<td>8 February</td>
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<td>18 February</td>
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<td>23-25 February</td>
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<td>26 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>President Alexander Kwasniewski</td>
<td>4-5 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>11 March</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>7 April</td>
<td>OSCE Visit</td>
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<td>7 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>EU negotiation</td>
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<td>Pope John Paul II</td>
<td>7-9 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Radu Vasile</td>
<td>24-25 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Frlec</td>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan</td>
<td>3 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>7-9 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Constantinos Stephanopoulos</td>
<td>16-18 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>State Secretary Madelaine Albright</td>
<td>22 June</td>
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<td>Secretar General Javier Solana</td>
<td>7 July</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozias van Aartsen</td>
<td>13 July</td>
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<td>15 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Monster of Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz</td>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Ion Sturza</td>
<td>28 August</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Vice Prime Minister Cumarhur Ersumer</td>
<td>30-31 August</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>King Harald 5ft</td>
<td>10 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>Mister of Foreign Affairs Knut Vollebaek</td>
<td>20 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Chancellor Gerhard Schroder</td>
<td>23-24 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>28 October</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>State Secretary William Cohen</td>
<td>30 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
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**Table 19: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 1999.**
# From Romania to Abroad

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<th>Object</th>
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<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>31 January</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Radu Vasile</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28-29 January</td>
<td>Working visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Radu Vasile</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>8-10 February</td>
<td>Working visit</td>
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<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>8-10 March</td>
<td>NATO Meeting</td>
</tr>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>15 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>1st April</td>
<td>OSCE Summit</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>OSCE Summit</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>15-16 April</td>
<td>OSCE Summit</td>
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<td>23-25 April</td>
<td>NATO Summit</td>
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<td>EU Summit</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>CEMN Summit</td>
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<td>United States of America</td>
<td>23-25 April</td>
<td>NATO Summit</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>27-28 May</td>
<td>Visit and discussion</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>10 June</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Danmark</td>
<td>4-6 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6-7 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>11 July</td>
<td>Ceremony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>21-23 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>30 July</td>
<td>Summit</td>
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<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Canada (Moncton)</td>
<td>3-5 September</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>21-23 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>21-25 September</td>
<td>UN Summit</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>7-17 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>23-24 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>24-25 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Radu Vasile</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>11 December</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>17 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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**Table 20: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 1999.**
## 2000

### From Abroad to Romania

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<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkia</td>
<td>Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit</td>
<td>12 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>3-5 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicolae Tabacaru</td>
<td>23-24 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan</td>
<td>4 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Armenia</td>
<td>President Robert Kocharyan</td>
<td>5-7 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Rusailio Vladlimir Borisovid</td>
<td>27 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen</td>
<td>3-4 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Czechia</td>
<td>President Vaclav Havel</td>
<td>18-19 May</td>
<td>Official visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Danmark</td>
<td>Altes Henry</td>
<td>23-25 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
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<td>Ministers</td>
<td>6-10 July</td>
<td>OSCE Session</td>
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<td>October</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>November</td>
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<td>President</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
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**Table 21: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 2000.**

**From Romania to Abroad**

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<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>7-9 February</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Crotia</td>
<td>18 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Mugur Isarescu,</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>20 March</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Minister Petre Roman</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Petre</td>
<td>Holy Se</td>
<td>April</td>
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<td>April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>April</td>
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<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
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<td>Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Crotia</td>
<td>7-9 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>19-23 July</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>September</td>
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<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>6 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Mircea Geoana</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Petre Roman</td>
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<td>October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Petre Roman</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Emil Constantinescu</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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**Table 22: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 2000.**
## 2001

### From Abroad to Romania

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<td>9-10 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Indulis Berzins</td>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Mihai I and Queen Anne</td>
<td>18 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Prime Minister Lionel Jospin</td>
<td>23-24 July</td>
<td>Agreements</td>
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<td>President Vladimir Vronin</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>13-15 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Eduard Sheverndadze</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>President Ahmet Necdet Sez</td>
<td>21-22 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>24 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev</td>
<td>27 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Antanas Valionis</td>
<td>3-4 December</td>
<td>OSCE Summit</td>
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<td>5-7 December</td>
<td>OSCE Summit</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>4 December</td>
<td>OSCE Summit</td>
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**Table 23: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 2001.**

### From Romania to Abroad

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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Melescanu</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>28 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Mircea Geona</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1-2 March</td>
<td>OSCE meeting</td>
</tr>
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<td>Prime Minster Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6 April</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minster Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>10 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>April</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>3-6 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>16-18 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Adrian Nastase</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>29 Oct. – 9 Nov.</td>
<td>Visit and cooperation</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>26-27 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>27 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>27-28 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>28-31 November</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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**Table 24: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 2001.**
## Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

### 2002

#### From Abroad to Romania

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<td>21 January</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>29-30 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Enrico Grillo</td>
<td>23-27 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Simeon de Axa Coburg-Gotha</td>
<td>9-19 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Johannes Rau</td>
<td>19-20 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Algirdas Brazauskas</td>
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<td>25-26 March</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>April</td>
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<td>29 August</td>
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**Table 25: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 2002.**
## From Romania to Abroad

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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Visit and economic relations</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>26 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>4 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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Table 26: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 2002.
## 2003

### From Abroad to Romania

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<td>8-10 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Quilyyev</td>
<td>27-30 May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Mikhail Kassianov</td>
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<td>King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>10 June</td>
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<td>8-9 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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**Table 27: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 2003.**
### From Romania to Abroad

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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>December</td>
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**Table 28: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 2003.**
### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

**2004**

**From Abroad to Romania**

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<td>18 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>22 March</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Vladimir Voronin</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>16 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>11-12 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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**Table 29: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 2004.**
## Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>6 February</td>
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<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>16-17 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Ion Iliescu</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>16-17 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>United States of America</td>
<td>29 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>NATO ceremony</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>14 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>17-22 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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### Table 30: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 2004.

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<td>18-21 July</td>
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<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs Mircea Geona</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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## Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

### 2005

**From Abroad to Romania**

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<td>21 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Boris Tadic</td>
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<td>President Vladimir Voronin</td>
<td>25 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Viktor Yushchenko's</td>
<td>30-31 October</td>
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<td>10 November</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev</td>
<td>16 November</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>President Vladimir Voronin</td>
<td>10 December</td>
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**Table 31: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 2005.**

### From Romania to Abroad

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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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**Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy**

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**Table 32: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 2005.**
## 2006

### From Abroad to Romania

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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>26-27 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>President Jacques Chirac</td>
<td>27 September</td>
<td>Summit</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>President Jacques Chirac</td>
<td>27 September</td>
<td>Summit</td>
</tr>
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<td>States of the Francophonie</td>
<td>Head of States</td>
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<td>20 October</td>
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**Table 33: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 2006.**
### From Romania to Abroad

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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>February</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>Qatar</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Congres</td>
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<td>Republic of Sebia and Montenegro</td>
<td>18-19 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>15-16 June</td>
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<td>Republic of Serbia</td>
<td>23 June</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>24 June</td>
<td>Summit</td>
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<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Romanian President Traian Basescu</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>9 August</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>10 August</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>1-2 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4-5 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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Romanian President Traian Basescu | Republic of India | 23-25 October | Visit  
Minister of Foreign Affairs | Poland | 9-10 November | Visit  
Romanian President Traian Basescu | Republic of Lebanon | 15 November | Visit  
Romanian President Traian Basescu | Lybia | 15 November | Visit  
Romanian President Traian Basescu | Latvia | 28-29 November | NATO Summit  
Romanian President Traian Basescu | Belgium | 14-15 December | EC Summit  
Romanian President Traian Basescu | France | 16 December | Visit

Table 34: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 2006.
Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

2007

From Abroad to Romania

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Prime Minister Dominionique de Villepin</td>
<td>1 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>President Lech Kaczyński</td>
<td>1-2 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>President László Sólyom</td>
<td>12-13 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
</tr>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>President Karolos Papoulias</td>
<td>15-16 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Republic of Cyprus</td>
<td>President Thassos Papadopoulos</td>
<td>13-14 March</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>President Horst Köhler</td>
<td>2-5 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Principality of Liechtenstein</td>
<td>Prince Alois</td>
<td>17-19 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Olafur Ragnar Grimsson</td>
<td>19-21 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Ilham Aliyev</td>
<td>24-25 September</td>
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<td>Price Federick</td>
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<td>Grand Dukes of Henry</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>President Viktor Iouchtchenko</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Nursultan Nazarbaev</td>
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Table 35: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 2007.

### From Romania to Abroad

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<td>Republic of Serbia</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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**Table 36: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 2007.**
2008

From Abroad to Romania

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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>29 February</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Prime Minister Gordon Brown</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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<td>President George W. Bush</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>1-3 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Filand</td>
<td>President Tarja Halonen</td>
<td>8-9 June</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow</td>
<td>16-17 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Mary McAleese</td>
<td>22-24 September</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Laslo Solyom</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>President Mahmud Abbas</td>
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<td>President Vaclav Klaus</td>
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**Table 37: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 2008.**

### From Romania to Abroad

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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>22 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>23-24 January</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Republic of Serbia</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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## Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

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**Table 38: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 2008.**
2009

From Abroad to Romania

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<td>King Abdallah II</td>
<td>5-6 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Prince Albert de Nonaco</td>
<td>23-24 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Secretar General Jaap de Hoop</td>
<td>24 April</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>May</td>
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<td>King Albert II of Belgium</td>
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<td>10 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Princes of Asturias</td>
<td>27-29 July</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Republic of Azerbaijan</td>
<td>President Ilham Aliyev</td>
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<td>President Lech Kacynski</td>
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<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Republic of Slovakia</td>
<td>President Ivan Gasparovic</td>
<td>15-17 October</td>
<td>Visit</td>
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<td>Vice President Xi Jinping</td>
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<td>Vice President Joseph Biden</td>
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Table 39: Diplomatic Travel to Romania from Abroad in 2009.
# Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

## From Romania to Abroad

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Whom</th>
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<td>Athen Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bogdan Aurescu</td>
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### Appendix – Foreign Diplomacy

| Foreign Minister Cristian Diaconescu | Turkey | 26-27 August | Visit |
| Prime Minister Emil Boc | Poland (Gdansk) | 1st September | Ceremony |
| Foreign Minister Cristian Diaconescu | France | | Visit |
| Romanian President Traian Basescu | Belgium | 17 September | Meeting |
| Romanian President | Belgium | 29-30 October | EC meeting |
| Romanian President | Germany | 9 November | Ceremony |
| State Secretary for Strategic Affairs Bogdan Aurescu | Washington USA | 16-17 November | Visit |
| State Secretary for European Affairs Bogdan Mazuru | Sofia Bulgaria | 18 November | Work Meeting |
| State Secretary for Strategic Affairs Bogdan Aurescu | Ottawa Canada | 18-19 November | Visit |
| Romanian President Traian Basescu | Belgium | 19 November | EC meeting |
| Interim Foreign Minister Catalin Predoiu | Brussels Belgium | 4 December | |
| State Secretary for Global Affairs Doru Costea | Copenhagen, Danmark | 7-8 December | Meeting |
| Romanian President | Germany | 10 December | Congress |
| State Secretary for European Affairs Bogdan Mazuru | Brussels, Belgium | 10-11 December | NATO meeting |
| Romanian President Traian Basescu | Belgium | 10-11 December | EC meeting |
| State Secretary for Strategic Affairs | Paris, France | 15-16 December | Meeting |
| Romanian President Traian Basescu | Kingdom of Denmark | 17-18 December | ONU meeting |

**Table 40: Romanian Diplomatic Travel Abroad in 2009.*
Foreign Relations Anniversaries

2002 – The 100th anniversary of relations between Romania and Japan was celebrated.

2002 – The 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Romania and Philippines was celebrated.

February, 2005 – 125th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Romania and Great Britain was celebrated.

June, 2005 – The 125th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Romania and United States of America was celebrated.

August, 2005 – The 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Romania and Syrian Arab Republic was celebrated.

May, 2008 - Celebration of the 60th years of Romanian-Russian diplomatic relationships.

September 16, 2008 - Celebration of the 130th years of Romanian-Israeli diplomatic relationships.

December 15, 2008 – Celebration of the 45th anniversary since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and Tunisia was celebrated.

January, 2009 – The 50th anniversary of re-establishment diplomatic relations between Romania and Japan was celebrated

May 5th, 2009 – The 90th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Romania and Poland was celebrated.

September 29, 2009 – The 130th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Romania and Bulgaria was celebrated.

November 18-19, 2009 – The 90 years of diplomatic relations between Romania and Canada was celebrated.

November 25, 2009 - Symposium on the 50th anniversary of re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and Japan

December 10, 2009 – The 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Romania and People's Republic of China was celebrated.
**December 10, 2009** – The 130th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Romania and Italy was celebrated.

**December 14, 2009** – The 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Romania and Peru was celebrated.

**January 1th, 2010** – The 90th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Czech Republic and Slovakia was celebrated.

**February 2, 2010** – 130th anniversary of diplomatic relations between France, Germany and Great Britain\(^{2006}\) was celebrated.

**June 14, 2010** – The 130th years of diplomatic relations between Romania and the United States of America.

**November 13, 2010** – The 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Romania and the Republic of Cyprus was celebrated.

Appendix – Romania and the United Nations

Romania in the United Nations Organization

Although Romania’s desire to become part of the United Nations was formally stated back in 1946, but the country’s accession was blocked until 1955. On December 14, 1995, the General Assembly decided to accept Romania in the UN.

The Romania’s presence will in various bodies of the United Nation entities is to be a part of the decision making process within the world organization that influences the international situation at global level and in its regional geographical areas. The UN represent by means and its specialized bodies, a source of support for the country’s efforts to attend its goals. For this purpose, Romania participates in a series of agencies, committees, bodies and programs within the UN. The Romanian government unlighted that "Romania’s involvement in UN peacekeeping operations highlighted the efficiency of the Romanian army and Romania’s political availability to attend multinational military activities aimed at preserving international stability." 2007

Over the time, we need to underline that Romania state as non-permanent member of the Security Council (UNSC) during the Cold War period, in 1962, 1976-1977, and in the recent period in 1990-1991 and 2004-2005. From July 1st, to July 30, 2004, Romania took the Presidency of the UN Security Council. 2008


1962]. Also, one have to remember, that in 1967 Corneliu Manescu was the first communist country representative to be president of the UN General Assembly by a vote of 112 to 1...

We can underline that “Romania has been extremely active in [UN] [...] organizations. For instance, Bucharest has attended all six conferences convened by UNCTAD\textsuperscript{2010} in 1964, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, and 1983, as well as UNIDO\textsuperscript{2011} conferences in 1971, 1975, and 1980.”\textsuperscript{2012}


The Secretaries General of the United Nations paid some visits to Romania in May 1963 and in July 1968; Kurt Waldheim in August 1973, August 1974, when he participated in the World Population Conference in Bucharest and in July 1979; Javier Perez de Cuellar in September 1981; Boutros Boutros-Ghali in October 1994. During the Cold War period, these visits should be understood in the context of Romania’s admission into the Group of 77 of developing countries in 1976 and Romania's association with the activities of the ‘Group of 21’ of neutral and non-aligned countries at the Conference on Disarmament, that strengthened the country's position as a beneficiary of the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations.

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\textsuperscript{2010} United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. – An UN agency.

\textsuperscript{2011} United Nations Industrial Development Organization – An UN agency.

Romania’s Involvement in UN Peace Operations System

Since 1991, Romania has actively participated in UN peacekeeping operations. It is in April 1991 that Romania initiated its involvement within its first UN peacekeeping operations with the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). Than Romania has developed its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations with the participation in many missions as:

- United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola (MONUA) to ensured UN staff and assets security with an infantry sub-unit (156 soldiers) from April 1997 to August 26, 1999,
- UN rapid-reaction force (ROMRRF) in MONUA with a infantry sub-unit (156 soldiers) from August 1997 to February 28, 1999
- Multinational Military Forces – Alba Operation (FMP),
- UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),
- United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) with 36 staff officers and civilian police officers, a infantry battalion (751 soldiers) and a military field-hospital (40 beds, a staff of 110, out of which 45 medical staff) from May 26, 1995 until June 1997,
- United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) with 10 military observer officers from April 1991 to May 1996,
- United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) with 5 military observers,
- United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) with a total of 20 civilian police officers to the International Police Task Force (IPTF) from June 1998 to June 1999,
- United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with 26 people and a military officer (MoD) until 70 people from June 1999 to November 1999,
- United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR),
- United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG),
- United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) with a military field-hospital (50 beds and a staff of 236 people) from June 1993 to October 1994.

---


## Table 41: Romania Participations in UN Peacekeeping Operations\(^{2015}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Military Observers</th>
<th>Policemen</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR - Althea</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX - Kosovo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>1010</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPM-BiH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM Georgia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMK</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCIP</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE BiH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1211</strong></td>
<td><strong>71</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td><strong>178</strong></td>
<td><strong>1521</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Actually (2010), Romania takes part in the following missions:

- International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
- United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with 10 military liaison officers,
- United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) with 5 military liaison officer,
- United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with 1 military liaison officer,
- United Nations International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IPTF/UNMIBH) with 17 civilian police officers,
- United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) with 5 military observer,
- United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with 3 military observers,

Appendix – Romania and the United Nations

- United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) with 5 military observers
- United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) with 12 military observers,
- United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) with 10 military liaison officers,
- United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with 1 liaison officer and 26 civilian police officers,
- United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) with 7 military observers,
- United Nations Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) with 2 military liaison officers

We can underline that a Romanian national, Liviu Bota has been the Special Envoy of the Secretary General and the head of the Observer Mission of the United Nations in Georgia (UNOMIG) from July 1st, 1997 to October 18, 1999.

On September 23, 1998, Romania became the 18th UN member state, out of the 80 that joined the UN Stand-by Arrangement, to sign the Agreement Memorandum with the United Nations in this field. On 3 October 1999, Romania became full member of Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG) closed on June 30, 2009.
Appendix – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

This annexe is build with information find on the official web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),\textsuperscript{2016} the web site of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),\textsuperscript{2017} as well as in Romanian local newspapers, and in French, English, American... newspapers. We used also some books, as 'Romania 1989-2005 - A Chronological History'\textsuperscript{2018}, 'Romania-NATO Chronology 1998-2004'\textsuperscript{2019} and some other else.

This information could be not exhaustive even if we took attention to build it.

1990

July 1990 – the Prime Minister of Romania, Mr. Petre Roman writes a letter to NATO Secretary General, Mr. Manfred Worner, inviting him to visit Romania. The letter also suggests the accreditation of a Romanian Ambassador to NATO.

October 1990 – the Romanian Ambassador to Belgium is authorised to initiate diplomatic relations with NATO.

October 1990 – Romanian Prime Minister meets NATO Secretary General in Brussels.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{2016} _______. \textit{A chronology of Romania - NATO relationship} [online]. 2009d. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [cited 23 Jan. 2009]. HyperText Markup Language. Available from:
\url{http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=11154&idlnk=1&cat=3}.
\url{http://www.nato.int/invitees2004/romania/chronology.htm#top}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
December 1990 - Romanian military Chief of Staff visits NATO Headquarters in Brussels, meets NATO Secretary General and the permanent military representatives of the NATO Member States.

1991

July 1991 – NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner visits Romania.

October 1991 - Romanian President Ion Iliescu sends a message to NATO Secretary General stating Romania’s willingness to engage in a close cooperation with NATO, as the only organization capable, from the political and military point of view, to ensure the stability and security of the emerging European democracies.

December 1991 - Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs attends the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). He proposes to intensify cooperation with NATO.

1992

February 1992 - NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner visits Romania. The Euro-Atlantic centre (Casa NATO) is inaugurated.

1993

February 1993 – President Ion Iliescu visits NATO Headquarters. Romania’s desire to integrate the Euro-Atlantic structures is reaffirmed.

October 1993 - US Deputy Defence Secretary visits Bucharest and presents the US proposal on setting up of a Partnership for Peace.

1994

January 1994 - Romania is the first post-communist country to join the Partnership for Peace programme ( PfP ) (January 26, 1994). This individual programme is signed in May 1995.

1995

October 1995 - Romania signs the ‘Status of Forces Agreement’ between the NATO members and the participants to PfP.

1996

May 1996 - NATO Secretary General Javier Solana visits Romania.

June 1996 – The Romanian Parliament appeals to the Parliaments of the NATO Member States requesting support for Romania’s aspirations to become a
NATO member. The appeal underlines the domestic political consensus regarding this major goal of Romanian foreign policy.

1997

February 1997 - Romanian President Emil Constantinescu meets the members of the North Atlantic Council and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana in Brussels. On this occasion, he underlines Romania’s firm desire to join NATO.

April 1997 – The Romanian Parliament unanimously approves a message addressed to the 16 NATO members, calling support for a decision in favour of Romania’s NATO membership, at the Madrid Summit.

July 8-9, 1997 - NATO holds its ‘enlargement’ summit in Madrid; the Alliance decides to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the Alliance. The final communiqué confirms that the process of enlargement is ongoing. The text nominates Romania among the candidate countries, which have made significant progress in fulfilling the NATO membership criteria.

1998

April 1998 - NATO Secretary General Javier Solana pays an official visit to Romania.

October 1998 – The Romanian Parliament approves NATO’s request that aircraft of the Alliance may use the country’s air space for possible military operations against Yugoslavia, but under "urgent and exceptional situations" only.

1999

February 1999 - Military from Romania and the United States set up an air traffic-monitoring centre covering, besides Romanian territory, the neighbouring areas also.

March 1999 – Following a NATO request, Romania closes three airports in the Western part of the country - Timisoara, Arad and Caransebes - until the end of the operations of the Alliance against Yugoslavia.

April 18, 1999 - NATO requests Romania to open its air space to Allied aircraft.

April 20, 1999 - Romania’s Supreme Council for the Defence of the Country (CSAT) and the Government approve this request.

April 22, 1999 – The Parliament authorizes NATO aircraft to use Romanian air space during the operations in Yugoslavia.
April 23-25, 1999 – The 15th NATO Summit in Washington; NATO presents the Membership Action Plan (MAP) which sets the ground for a mechanism meant for the individual preparation and assessment of the candidate countries.

May 1999 – The Ministry of Defence confirms that NATO air force may use Romanian airports during its operations in Yugoslavia.

May 1999 - Representatives of the Romanian Government and NATO sign an agreement on the conditions under which Allied aircraft will be able to use the Romanian air space.

June 9, 1999 – Romania involved in NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) with 148 military personnel.

June 17, 1999 – The Romanian Parliament approves by a majority of votes the request made by President Emil Constantinescu that Polish and Czech contingents within international peacekeeping units for Kosovo (KFOR) be allowed to transit Romanian territory during their transfer to Yugoslavia.

July 1999 - NATO Secretary General Javier Solana visits Romania.

2000

February 2000 - NATO Secretary General George Robertson visits Bucharest.

June 2000 - New Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Joseph Ralston, visits Romania.

2001

May 2001 - The North Atlantic Council - Romania meeting aimed at reviewing progress made in fulfilling.

May 2001 – The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Ministerial Meeting is held in Budapest, Hungary.

September 19, 2001 – The Parliament decides with an overwhelming majority that Romania will participate, as a de facto NATO ally, in the war against international terrorism, through all means, including military ones. In the event of a NATO request to such effect, Romania will grant access to its airspace, airports, and land and sea facilities.

September 27, 2001 – The Government adopt the National NATO Accession Plan establishes the objectives in all fields essential to NATO integration.
Appendix – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

December 2001 – The EAPC Ministerial meeting is held in Brussels, Belgium.

December 2001 - NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson visits Bucharest, Romania.

2002

January 2002 - Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Joseph Ralston, visits Romania, noting the progress made in the reform of the military field.

March 25-26, 2002 – The ‘Spring of New Allies’ Summit of the NATO candidate countries takes place in Bucharest, Romania.

April 4, 2002 – The government of Romania adopt a NATO integration plan consisted in seven chapters (military reform, corruption, securing information, economic reform, child’s right, the minorities’ rights, human being trafficking) that establishes a short-term concrete steps to the September 2002 NATO meeting.

April 2002 – The North Atlantic Council–Romania meeting is held. The latest progress made by Romania in fulfilling the objectives of Annual National Plan of Preparation for NATO Membership, third cycle, was reviewed. The Prime Minister, Mr. Adrian Nastase, led the Romanian delegation.

April 2002 – A meeting between President Ion Iliescu and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson is held in Brussels, Belgium.

May 2002 – the EAPC Ministerial meeting in held in Reykjavik, Ireland.

July 8-9, 2002 – Romania joins the United States in the Afghanistan campaign with an infantry battalion. This gesture was made to indicate the strong wish to join NATO.

November 21, 2002 – At the Prague NATO Summit (the 16th NATO Summit), Romania is invited to join the Alliance.

November 22, 2002 – The EAPC Ministerial Meeting is held in Prague, Czech Republic.

December 13, 2002 – The first round of Romania’s accession talks with NATO takes place in Brussels. The State Secretary within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mihae Motoc, led the Romanian delegation.

2003
January 9, 2003 – A second round of Romania’s accession talks to NATO takes place in Brussels, Belgium.

January 27–29, 2003 – A NATO’s experts teams on defence, security and economic affairs visit Romania.

February 18, 2003 – The Political Committee at Senior Level ‘reinforced’ by national expert (SPC(R)) meeting plus Romania takes place in Brussels. Romania’s calendar for finalizing the reforms is addressed.

March 2003 – NATO Secretary General, Lord George Roberston visits Romania to encourage Romania to further its Alliance integration efforts, to continue economic reforms and fight corruption.

March 21, 2003 – The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs writes to NATO Secretary General, confirming Romania’s willingness and ability to meet the obligations and commitments required for NATO membership. Romania’s calendar for finalizing the reforms is attached to this formal letter.

March 26, 2003 – The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs attends the Signing Ceremony of the Accession Protocols, in Brussels, Belgium.

April 2003 – An informal meeting of the Prime Ministers of the seven NATO invitees takes place in Snagov, Romania.

May 7, 2003 – The North Atlantic Council (NAC) plus the seven NATO invitees held a meeting in Brussels, Belgium.

May 7-8, 2003 – Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the seven NATO invitees attend US Senate vote on the resolution of ratification of the Accession Protocol.


May 19, 2003 – US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz visits Romania.


June 3-4, 2003 – The North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Foreign Ministers meet in Madrid.


July 1, 2003 – A Romanian military contingent leave for Iraq to support the coalition led by the United States.
Appendix – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

July 1-3, 2003 – The final conference is in preparation of NATO/PfP DACIA – 2003 Exercise focusing on civil protection.

July 7-12 2003 – Norwegian Minister of Defence pays a visit to Bucharest, Romania.

July 25, 2003 – Hand-over ceremony of the chairmanship of the South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial Coordination Committee (SEDM-CC) and of the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) of the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) and of the command of the SEEBRIG multinational force, and of the re-location of the SEEBRIG Headquarters to Constanta. Admiral Gregory Johnson, chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), attended the event.


October 6-10, 2003 – An NATO/PfP DACIA–2003 Exercise is organized in Pitesti, Romania.

November 18, 2003 – SPC(R) meeting plus Romania’s held in Brussels to discuss the Annual National Programme (ANP) V.

December 2, 2003 – EAPC ministerial meeting of Defence Ministers is held in Brussels, Belgium.

December 4, 2003 – A NAC+7 ministerial meeting of Foreign Ministers is held in Brussels, Belgium.

2004


March 1, 2004 – The law on accession to the North Atlantic Treaty is passed by President Ion Iliescu.

March 4, 2004 – Mr. Ion Iliescu signs Romania’s accession instrument to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

March 29, 2004 – The Prime Minister of Romania, Mr. Adrian Nastase, submits Romania’s accession instrument to the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, USA.

March 29, 2004 – Romania becomes legally a NATO member with full rights.
April 2, 2004 – The ceremony of hosting the National Flags at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels and informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held.

April 20, 2004 – The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mircea Geoana meets the Ambassadors of the NATO Member States accredited to Romania.

May 10-12, 2004 – A visit is paid to Romania by NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, Mr. Jean Foumert and his participation to ‘Changing Perceptions in South Eastern Europe’ seminar.

May 13-14, 2004 – NATO Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, pays a visit to Bucharest.

May 28 - June 1st, 2004 – NATO Parliamentary Assembly Spring Session takes place in Bratislava, Slovakia.


June 28-29, 2004 – The 17th NATO Summit is held in Istanbul, Turkey.

October 13-14, 2004 – In Poiana Brasov is hosted the informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers.

October 23-31, 2004 – A research visit to Romania (and Bulgaria) is paid by NATO Military Budget Committee.

November 12-16, 2004 – The annual Session of NATO Parliamentary Assembly is held in Venice, Italy.

December 8-9, 2004 – The meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held in Brussels at the NATO’s headquarter.

2005

February 9-10, 2005 – An informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers is held in Nice, France.

April 20-21, 2006 – An informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held in Vilnius, Lithuania.

2006

April 3, 2006 – on NATO’s anniversary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in partnership with the Romanian Diplomatic Institute organized ‘NATO in the perspective of the Riga Summit’ conference. NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, Mr. Jean Foumert, represented NATO.
Appendix – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

April 27-28, 2006 – An informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held in Sofia, Bulgaria.

May 12, 2006 – At NATO Headquarters, in a ceremony chaired by NATO Secretary General, Romania signed the establishment documents for NATO Assistance Fund/Partnership for Peace - OSCE/ENVSEC (Environment and Security Initiative) for the disposal of hazardous chemicals and pesticides in Republic of Moldova. Romania, together with Belgium, took over the task of coordinator country for stage 1 of this project, in the context of holding the mandate of NATO Contact Point Embassy in Chisinau (CPE), for 2005-2006.

2007

January 26, 2007 – A meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held in Brussels, Belgium.

March 28, 2007 – The NAC in Brussels adopted the decision regarding the organization of 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest (April 2-4, 2008), Romania.

April 24-25, 2007 – An informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held in Oslo, Norwegian.

October 29, 2007 – NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer pays a visit to Bucharest, Romania.

December 6-7, 2007 – A meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held in Brussels, Belgium.

January 2007 – December 2008 – Romania holds the second mandate as NATO Point of Contact Embassy in Chisinau. Romania had a substantial contribution to finalizing and opening the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Chisinau.

2008

February 7-8, 2008 – An informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held in Brussels at the NATO’s headquarter.

March 6, 2008 – An informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held in Brussels at the NATO’s headquarter.

April 2-4, 2008 – The 20th NATO Summit is held in Bucharest, Romania.

May 24-26, 2008 – A seminar ‘South East Europe towards Euro-Atlantic Integration’ was jointly organised by the NATO PA and the parliament of Montenegro in Sveti Stefan, Montenegro.
June 12-13, 2008 – A meeting of NATO Defence Ministers is held in Brussels at the NATO’s headquarter.

August 19, 2008 - A meeting of NATO Defence Ministers is held in Brussels at the NATO’s headquarter.

September 18-19, 2008 - An informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held in London, United Kingdom.

October 9-10, 2008 - An informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers is held in Budapest, Hungary.

December 2-3, 2008 - A meeting of NATO Defence Ministers is held in Brussels at the NATO’s headquarter.

2009

January 2009 - The Embassy of Romania in Baku holds the mandate of NATO Contact Point Embassy (CPE) in Azerbaijan (until December 2010).
Appendix – European Union

This annexe is build with information find on the official web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),2020 the web site of the European Union (EU), as well as in Romanian local newspapers, and in French, English, American... newspapers. We used also some books, as 'Romania 1989-2005 - A Chronological History'2021, ‘Romanian - European Union: Chronology 1989-2005’2022 and some other else.

This information could be not exhaustive even if we took attention to build it.

I would like to underline that Romania was the first country of Central and Eastern Europe to have official relations with the European Community. In 1974, an agreement included Romania in the Community's Generalised System of Preferences and an Agreement on Industrial Products was signed in 1980.

Romania has been participated in European Union peacekeeping operation and military operation during it accession process and after.

Romania has been in:

- European Union Military Operation in Chad and Chad-RCA (EUFOR Chad-RCA),
- European Union Police mission in the Former Republic Yugoslav of Macedonia (EUPOL-Prisima),


Actually, Romania takes part in:

- European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR – Althea),
- European Union Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (EULEX – Kosovo),
- European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia),
- European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM-BiH),
- European Union EU Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan),
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission in Kosovo (OMIK),
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCEBIH),
1990

March 20, 1990 – Letter to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and the president of the Committee of Minister of the European Council.


June 7-8, 1990 - Starting negotiation between Romania and EC for a commercial and cooperation agreement.

June 1990 - Opening of a permanent delegation of the European Commission.

September 17, 1990 - European Commission adopt regulation to extend the PHARE program to the other CEECs as well Romania.

September 18-19, 1900 - In Snagov, Meeting of the Ministers for Reforms from CEECs with EC representing.

October 22, 1990 - Signature of the Agreement of Economic and Commercial Co-operation between the EEC and Romania

1991


February 19, 1991 - Signature of the Agreement of Economic and Commercial Co-operation between the European Economic Community and Romania.

March 11-12, 1991 - Indicative Program of PHARE assistance for Romania.

May 1st, 1991 - The Romania-European Community agreement enter in vigor.

May 30, 1991 - The first Romania-European Community mixed commission session.

July 10, 1991 - Finance ministers of the European Community approved a credit of 125 millions of Dollars for Romania.

October 3d, 1991 - European sentence against the Mineriad.
October 31, 1991 - WEU makes a working visit with the Secretary General, Dr. Willem van Eekelen.

December 13th, 1991 - Authorization to start preliminary negotiation from the EEC.


1992

May 1992 - Strasbourg's session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council underline that Romania cannot be a full member with rights.


June 26-27, 1992 – In Lisbon the European Council stated that the Union would assist “their efforts to prepare the accession to the Union which they [(CEECs)] seek”.

September 14, 1992 - In Brussels, the Commission spreads out the second round of negotiation for the Treaty of Association.


1993

February 1st, 1993 – Romania signed the Agreement for Romania's Association to the EEC.


May 1993 - Interim Trade and Cooperation Agreement.


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Appendix – European Union

June 21-22, 1993 – In Copenhagen, the European Council stated with the European Agreement that “the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union.”

September 8, 1993 - Karen Fogg arrived as the first permanent chief of the permanent mission of EEC in Bucharest.

September 21, 1993 - Teodor Melescanu took part in an EEC and CEECs Foreign Ministers meeting.

October 1993 – Romania became a member of the Council of Europe.

November 26, 1993 - Agreement’s sign

December 21, 1993 - Annexe to the Interim Agreement between EEC and Romania

1994

May 9, 1994 – Romania is granted the status as an associate partner of the European Union.

January 18, 1994 - Meeting between EU and Romania in Athena.

May 9, 1994 - The Kirchberg Declaration which emphasises on the establishment of a Status of Association with WEU for CEECs within Romania.

May 9-11, 1994 – A conference organize by the European Delegation in Bucharest. The EU Inaugurated the Information European Center in Bucharest.

May 16-17, 1994 – The visit of Egon Klepsch, President of the European parliament, in Bucharest.

May 21-28, 1994 – The visit of André Middelhock, President of EU Court of Auditors, in Bucharest.


June 24-25, 1994 – In Corfu, the European Council states that “full potential [of Agreements] must now be exploited with a view to preparing for accession.”

October 1994 – The Second Commission Romania-EU.

October 31, 1994 – A EU Delegation in Bucharest

October 25, 1994 - EU grant 25 millions ECU to Romania for transport infrastructure.

October 31, 1994 – The Kirschberg Summit

December 9, 1994 – The Minister of Agriculture, Valeriu Tabara went for a negotiation meting in Brussels.

December 9-10, 1994 - In Essen, the European Council states that “accession of all European countries with which it has concluded Europe Agreements”.

December 22, 1994 – Signing of an additional agreement between EU and Romania.

1995

January 1995 – Creation of the Department of European Integration in Romania’s government.

February 1st, 1995 - Entry in force of the European Agreement of Association between EU and Romania.

February 1st, 1995 - Romania signed a convention on the protection of national minorities.

February 1st, 1995 - Ratification the Council of Europe’s Framework Agreement on Minorities, signed by Romania


February 20-21, 1995 — An EU delegation discussed about harmonization of Romanian legislation with EU norms.


April 19-20, 1995 — Creation of the Romanian-EU Mixte Parliamentary Committee. They hold two sessions per years.

June 22, 1995 — Romania submitted the application for its accession to the European Union.

July 17, 1995 — The Council of Ministers implemented the procedure laid down in Article O of the Treaty.

September 3, 1995 — The visit of the European Parliamentary Reporter, Arie M. Oostlander in Romania.

September 14-15, 1995 — Meeting of Association Committee (Romania-EU).

September 16-17, 1995 — Meeting of Parliamentary Association Committee (Romania-EU).

October 12-13, 1995 — The first session of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romania-EU) in Bucharest.

October 16-17, 1995 — Second meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romania-EU).

1996

February 23, 1996 — New meeting of the Romanian Ministerial Committee for European Integration with Karen Fogg, the chief of European permanent commission.

February 27-28, 1996 — Second meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romania-EU).

April 26, 1996 — The European Commission send to Romania a questionar to prepare the documentation for Romanian Admission in EU.

May 29-31, 1996 — Third meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romania-EU).

May 31, 1996 — Romanian is admitted in the ICE.
Appendix – European Union

July 12, 1996 - Debate in the Interministerial Committee for European Integration about the European Commission’s questionar.

July 25, 1996 - The European Commission’s questionar is send to Brussels.


1997

July 1997 - The Commission published an "Opinion on Romania's Application for Membership of the European Union". In the following year, a Regular Report on Romania's Progress towards Accession" was produced.

January 1997 - Creation of the Ministry of European Integration in the Romanian’s government.

January 1997 - Partipating in Socrates, Leonardo and Youth for Europe programs.

March 6-7, 1997 – The visit of Hans van den Broek in Bucharest.

March 10-20, 1997 – The fourth meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romania-EU).

March 24, 1997 – The third meeting of the Romanian-EU Association Council in Brussels.

April 10-11, 1997 – The visit of the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, in Bucharest.

April 12, 1997 – Romania signed the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) Agreement.

May 2nd, 1997 - Ratification, in Strasbourg, of the European convention for the repression of terrorism.

July 17, 1997 - The Commission’s opinion for Romania’s application to the EU membership is negative.

September 24-26, 1997 – The fifth meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romania-EU).
December 12-13, 1997 – The European Council in Luxembourg is historical moment for the EU and CECS with the decision “to launch of the overall enlargement process”.\textsuperscript{2027}

1998

February 1998 - Meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee

March 1998 - Presentation of the National Programme for Adoption of the Aquis (NPAA).

March 30, 1998 – The Accession process was formally launched between EU and CEECs. An Association Partnership was adopted with Romania.

April 3d, 1998 - The analytical examination of the acquis (screening) started.

April 1998 - Meeting of the Association Council (Romania-EU)

October 1998 - A meeting is held for the Association Committee (Romania-EU).

November 1998 - The European Commission presents the first Report on Romania’s progress towards the fulfilment of accession criteria.

1999

April 1999 - Meeting with the Association Council (Romania-EU).

April 1999 - Meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romania-EU).

May 1999 - Ratification of the European Social Chapter by Romania.

June 1999 - Presentation of a revised NPAA.

September 1999 - Meeting with the Association Committee (Romania-EU).

October 1990 – A second "Regular Report" on Romania is published and the Commission recommended starting accession negotiations with Romania (conditional on the improvement of the situation of children in institutional care and the drafting of a medium-term economic strategy).

October 1999 – The Commission’s conditional recommendation started accession negotiations.

December 10-11, 1999 - The Helsinki European Council's decision to invites Romania to start accession negotiations in 2000.

**2000**

February 15, 2000 – Following the Helsinki European Council's decision in December 1999, accession negotiations started with Romania.

March 20, 2000 – Presentation to officials in Brussels of *Romania's Economic Development Strategy* by the Prime Minister Mugur Isarescu and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Petre Roman. During the meeting, questions arose about the street children, the Schengen visas for Romanian citizens and the control at the border with the Republic of Moldova.

March 2000 - Meeting of the Association Council (Romania-EU).

May 2000 - Meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romanian-EU).

June 14, 2000 - First round of negotiations held with Romania.

October 2000 - Meeting of the Association Committee (Romania-EU).

**2001**

January 2001 - Meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romanian-EU) in Brussels.

March 2001 - Meeting of the Association Council (Romania-EU).

October 2001 - Meeting of the Association Committee (Romania-EU).

December 7, 2001 – The EU Council for Justice and Internal Affairs sanctions as of January 1st, 2002, the suppression of visas needs for Romanian citizens travelling in the Schengen space.
December 14-15, 2001 – In Laeken, the European Council decided that "[t]he accession process which is now irreversible". 2028

December 2001 - Meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romanian-EU) in Bucharest.

2002

January 2002 - A revised Accession Partnership was adopted for Romania.

March 2002 - Meting Association Council (Romania-EU).

April 15-16, 2002 - 13th Meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romanian-EU) in Brussels.


June 28, 2002 - 3rd Association Conference Romanian-EU in Brussels

June 2002 – Adoption of the National Program for Romania Accession to the European Union (PNAR 2002).

July 30, 2002 - Accession conference Romania-EU in Brussels.

July 2002 - Transfer of the SPARD program to Romanian management.

October 9, 2002 – The European Union release the reports on the evolution on Romania. This report underlines that Romania failed to meet the functioning market economic criterion, the weaknesses of the Romanian administration and corruption problems.

October 29, 2002 - 3rd annual meeting of the Joint Monitoring Committee (Romania-EU) in Bucharest.

November 8, 2002 - Agreement signed for the Romanian participation to the EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

November 2002 - Meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romania-EU) in Bucharest.

November 2002 - Romania adopted an Accession roadmap.

December 2002 - Meeting of an Association Committee (Romania-EU).

December 2002 - Meeting of a Joint Consultative Committee (Romania-EU) in Bucharest.

December 12-13, 2002 – The European Commission Summit in Copenhagen established a new road map for Romania setting as an objective their accession to the European Union in 2007.

2003

May 2003 - Meeting of the Association Council (Romania-EU).

May 2003 - The Council adopted a revised Accession Partnership.

June 2003 - Meeting of an Association Committee (Romania-EU).

June 2003 - The European Council in Thessaloniki expresses support for the closing of Romania’s accession negotiations in 2004.

19 and 20 June 2003.

August 23, 2003 – The Romanian government adopts the Economic EU Pre-accession Program.

November 2003 - Meeting of a Joint Consultative Committee (Romania-EU).

November 2003 - Meeting of a Joint Parliamentary Committee (Romania-EU).

November 5, 2003 – The European Commission release the regular report on Romania that shows that the country “can be
Appendix – European Union

considered as a functioning market economy once the good progress
made has continued decisively.”

December 12, 2003 – The European Council states that the
admitting of Romania on January 1, 2007 as EU members, if they fit
the criterions is the common objective of the Union’s states members

2004

January 15, 2004 – President Ion Iliescu chairs a government
meeting to discuss on Romania’s EU accession program and
especially on the 8 chapters in negotiation until the end of the year.

April 2004 - Meeting of a Joint Parliamentary Committee
(Romania-EU).

June 2004 - Meeting of an Association Committee.

July 2004 - Treaty draft between Romania and EU.

October 6, 2004 - The European Commission presents the
annual report on Romania for 2004, as well as the Strategy
Document concerning the perspectives of the enlargement process.
The documents assert the firm support of the European Commission
for the close of accession negotiations with Romania by the end of
2004.

December 14, 2004 - Closure of the accession negotiations.

December 16-17, 2004 – During the summit of the heads of
states and government of the EU member states, the completion of
the Romania and Bulgaria’s accession negotiations is confirmed. It is
decided that the accession will be on January 1st, 2007.

2005

April 13, 2005 - Romania receives the Assent of the European

April 25, 2005 – The ceremony of signing the EU accession
Treaty for Romania took place in Luxembourg. A large delegation of

2009 European Commission. Regular Report on Romania [online]. Brussels:
2008]. Portable Document Format. Available from:
p. 44.
Romanian official was present as President Traian Basescu, Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, Foreign Minister Mihai Razvan Ungureanu, more than ten ministers, as well the former presidents Emil Constantinescu and Ion Iliescu.

June 16-17, 2005 - First European Council in which Romania participates in her new capacity as observer.


September 26, 2005 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty by Hungary.


October 25, 2005 – The European Commission releases the Regular Report for Romania. This report confirms that Romania has met the political criteria and is a functioning market economy. However, the report underlines that Romania needs to make effort on some European requirements thru fighting corruption, securing border, transparency in public procurement...\(^{2030}\)

October 27, 2005 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty by the Republic of Cyprus.

November 2, 2005 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty by Greece.


December 6, 2005 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty by the Czech Republic.

December 14, 2005 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Spain.

2006

January 24, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Malta.

January 26, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Latvia.

February 16, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by United Kingdom.

March 8, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Portugal.

March 30, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Poland.

May 9, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Sweden.

May 11, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Austria.


June 13, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by the Netherlands.

June 19, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Finland.

June 21, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Ireland.

June 29, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Luxembourg.

September 26, 2006 - European Commission issues its last Monitoring Report on Romania and confirming the January 1st, 2007 as the accession date for the country.

October 3, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by France.

October 13, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Belgium.
March 30, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Lithuania.

November 21, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Denmark.

November 24, 2006 - Ratification of the Accession Treaty to the EU by Germany.


2007

January 1st, 2007 - Romania becomes full-fledged Member of the European Union.
Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

We listed the country where Romania holds diplomatics relations and embassies. This list was build with information find on the official web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This information could be not exhaustive even if we took attention to build it.

Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formal Relation</th>
<th>General Informations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People's Democratic</td>
<td>April 14,</td>
<td>Algeria has an embassy in Bucharest open in May 5, 1963.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Algeria</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Romania has an embassy in Alger and one Consulate-General in Alexandria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both countries are full members of the Union for the Mediterranean and of the Francophonie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Angola</td>
<td>December 13,</td>
<td>Romania has an embassy in Alvalade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>August 21,</td>
<td>Romania has an honorary consulate in Brazzavile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>October 14, 1966</td>
<td>The Democratic Republic of the Congo has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Kinshasa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Republic of Egypt</td>
<td>April 1906</td>
<td>Egypt has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Cairo and one Consulate-General in Alexandria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia</td>
<td>July 2, 1957</td>
<td>Romania has an embassy in Addis Ababa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Morocco</td>
<td>April 20, 1962</td>
<td>Morocco has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Rabat and three honorary consulates (in Casablanca, Marrakech, Tanger). Both countries are full members of the Union for the Mediterranean and of the Francophonie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Nigeria</td>
<td>November 12, 1966</td>
<td>Nigeria has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Abuja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Senegal</td>
<td>November 5, 1965</td>
<td>Romania has an embassy in Dakar and a honorary consulat in the regon of Kaolack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Somalia</td>
<td>July 11, 1965</td>
<td>Somalia opened an embassy in Bucharest in 1988. Romania opened an embassy from 1983 to 1990 in Mogadiscio. Due to civil war, both country have close their embassy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
<td>November 21, 1991</td>
<td>The Republic of South Africa has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Pretoria and one Consulate-General in Cape Town. Under the recommendation of UN, Romania avoid relation with South of Africa for a period of time, before the South of Africa 'Revolution'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of the Sudan</td>
<td>January 17, 1956</td>
<td>The Republic of Sudan has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Khartoum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian Republic</td>
<td>December 16, 1963</td>
<td>Tunisia has an embassy in Bucharest and an honorary consulate in Timisoara. Romania has an embassy in Tunis. Both countries are full members of the Union for the Mediterranean and of the Francophonie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>April 18, 1980</td>
<td>Romania has an embassy in Harare.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formal Relation</th>
<th>General Informations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentine Republic</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>Argentina has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Buenos Aires. Both countries are members of Latin Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federative Republic of Brazil</td>
<td>January 7, 1928</td>
<td>Brazil has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Brazilia, a general consulate in Rio de Janeiro and a honorary consulate (in Belo Horizonte).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>August 16, 1919</td>
<td>Canada has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Ottawa, three general consulate (in Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver) and one honorary consulate in Moncton. Both countries are members of NATO, OSCE and the Francophonie. According to the Canadian Census data of 2006, there are almost 200,000 Romanian-Canadians.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Chile</td>
<td>February 5, 1925</td>
<td>Chile has an embassy in Bucharest and honorary consulates in Brasov and Cluj-Napoca. Romania has an embassy in Santiago. In 1965 the diplomatic relations were renewed. Even though most of the Eastern European countries broke their relations with Chile after 1973. Romania and the former Yugoslavia kept their representations in Santiago and the Chilean government didn't close their offices in Belgrade and Bucharest. Approximately 3,000 Chileans looked for asylum in Romania during Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship. Both countries are members of Latin Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Colombia</td>
<td>November 15, 1967</td>
<td>Colombia has had an embassy in Bucharest closed in November, 2002. Romania has an embassy in Bogotá and 3 honorary consulates (in Barrenquilla, Cali, Medelin).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Cuba</td>
<td>April 13, 1927</td>
<td>Cuba has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in La Havana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Ecuador</td>
<td>November 11, 1968</td>
<td>Ecuator has had an embassy in Bucharest temporary closed in May 31, 1999. Romania has an embassy in Quito temporary closed in May 21, 2000.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Mexican States</td>
<td>July 20, 1935</td>
<td>Azerbaidjan has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Mexico City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Panama</td>
<td>October 5, 1971</td>
<td>Panama has an embassy in Bucharest from July 1993 to September 7, 1994. Romania has not open an embassy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Peru</td>
<td>Sept. 20, 1939</td>
<td>Peru has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Lima.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>June 14, 1880</td>
<td>The U.S. maintains an embassy in Bucharest. Romania maintains an embassy in Washington, DC 4 general consulates (in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York) and 20 honorary consulates. The Romanian-American population is estimated at approximately one million people. It is a large numbers of Romanian Churches in the U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formal Relation</th>
<th>Général Informations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela</td>
<td>December 30, 1935</td>
<td>Venezuela has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Caracas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>October 5, 1949</td>
<td>China has an embassy in Bucharest and a consulate general in Constanta. Romania has an embassy in Beijing and 2 consulate general in Hong Kong and Shanghai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both countries exchanged ambassadors for the first time in March 1950. At the 26th UN General Assembly held in October 1971, Romania, as a co-sponsor country, voted in favor of the resolution calling for the restoration of all the legitimate rights of China in the United Nations (UN). In the early 1970s, Romania made a lot of contribution to the improvement of Sino-US relations. For a long time, China and Romania have maintained a close relationship of friendship and cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
<td>October 26, 1948</td>
<td>North Korea has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Pyongyang City.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>March 30, 1990</td>
<td>South Korea has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Seoul and 2 honorary consulates (in Pusan and Seoul). Both countries signed 23 agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of India</td>
<td>December 14, 1948</td>
<td>India has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in New Delhi, a general consulate in Numbai and an honorary consulate in Calcutta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Indonesia</td>
<td>July 5, 1958</td>
<td>Indonesia has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Jarkata.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>August 1917</td>
<td>Japan has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Tokyo and 4 honorary consulates (in Atami, Osaka, Nagoya and Yokohama).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Kazakhstan</td>
<td>July 15, 1992</td>
<td>Kazakhstan has an embassy and an honorary consulate in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Almaty. There are around 20,000 Romanians living in Kazakhstan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of the Philippines</td>
<td>March 10, 1972</td>
<td>Philippines has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Manila.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Additional Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>March 22, 1969</td>
<td>Malaysia has an embassy in Romania. Romania has an embassy in Kuala Lumpur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic of Pakistan</td>
<td>October 15, 1964</td>
<td>Pakistan has an embassy in Bucharest and one honorary consulate in Iasi. Romania has an embassy in Islamabad and 2 honorary consulates (in Karachi, Lahore).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Singapore</td>
<td>May 30, 1967</td>
<td>Singapore does not have any representation in Romania. Romania has an embassy in Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Sri Lanka has an honorary consulate in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Colombo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Thailand</td>
<td>June 1, 1973</td>
<td>Thailand has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Bangkok.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

February 3, 1950 Vietnam has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Hanoi.

Caucas and Central Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formal Relation</th>
<th>General Informations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Armenia</td>
<td>December 17, 1991</td>
<td>Armenia has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Yerevan. Both countries are full members of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. There are around 1,750 people of Armenian descent living in Romania. In 2007, the Romanian Minister of National Defense, Teodor Melescanu “noted that the Armenian-Romanian friendship was deeply rooted in history and it was not by accident that Romania was the first State to recognize the independence of the Republic Armenia.”(^\text{2032})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Azerbaijian</td>
<td>June 21, 1992</td>
<td>Azerbaijian has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Baku. The two countries have signed over fifty separate agreements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Georgia

June 25, 1992

Georgia has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Tbilissi.

Both countries are full members of the BSEC, the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue, and the Community of Democratic Choice. There are 41 ratified agreements between the two countries.\(^{2033}\)

Republic of Kazakhstan

December 17, 1991

Kazakhstan has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Astana.

Republic of Turkey

November 4/16, 1878

Turkey has an embassy in Bucharest and a consulate-general in Constanta. Romania has an embassy in Ankara and two consulates-general in Istanbul and Izmir.

The two countries maintain longstanding historical, geographic, and cultural relations and their relation have developed rapidly since the 1989 Revolution. Both countries are full members of NATO, the BLACKSEAFOR and BSEC. Romania supports Turkey’s membership in the EU and there are approximately 17,000 Turkish citizens living in Romania.\(^{2034}\) Also, The Turks are an ethnic minority in Romania, numbering 32,098 people according to the 2002 census and hence making up 0.2% of the total population.


### Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Turkmenistan</td>
<td>July 21, 1991</td>
<td>Romania has an embassy in Ashgabat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Turkmenistan flag" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Uzbekistan</td>
<td>October 6, 1995</td>
<td>Romania has an embassy in Tashkent. Both countries signed 15 agreements. From May 2006 to December 2009, Romania applied the EU sanction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Uzbekistan flag" /> <img src="image" alt="Russia flag" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formal Relation</th>
<th>General Informations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Albania</td>
<td>December 15/28, 1913</td>
<td>Albania has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Tirana. Both countries are members of the Francophonie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>October 5, 1921</td>
<td>Austria has an embassy in Bucharest and an honorary consulate in Timisoara. Romania has an embassy in Vienna and 4 honorary consulates (in Eisenstadt, Graz, Linz and Salzburg) Both countries are full members of NATO and the European Union. In 1918, Romania obtained the Suceava County, Transylvania and Partium from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire now dissolved. Both countries have signed 52 bilateral treaties.²⁰³⁵</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

Belgium
February 16, 1880
Belgium has an embassy in Bucharest.
Romania has an embassy in Brussels and 5 honorary consulates (in Antwerp, Brugge, Liege, Mechelen and Tournai).

In 1838, Belgium established its first consulate in Galati, moved to Bucharest in 1842 and converted in 1870 into diplomatic agency. After 1855, it was set up consulates and vice-consulates in Braila, Craiova, Iasi, Constanta and Sulina. With the recognition of independence by Belgium of Romanian principalities, diplomatic relations between the two countries were established by Royal Decree on February 16/28, 1880, followed by the establishment of the Romanian Legation in Brussels on March 17/29, 1880. However, in 1919, was established in Brussels Belgo-Romanian Chamber of Commerce.

Both countries are full members of Francophonie, NATO and of the European Union.
Both countries were allies during World War I.

Bosnia and Herzegovina
March 1st, 1996
Bosnia and Herzegovina has an embassy in Bucharest.
Romania has an embassy in Sarajevo.

Romania recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence on March 1st, 1996, and both countries established diplomatic relations on the same day.
Relations were described as 'excellent' by the foreign ministers in 2006, ahead of the opening of the Bosnian embassy in Bucharest.2036
Both countries are full members of the SECP, SPSEE, OSCE and of the Council of Europe.

Bulgaria 1879 Bulgaria has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Sofia and 2 honorary consulates (in Burgas and Silistra).

Diplomatic relations between Romania and Bulgaria were established in 1879 with diplomatic representative offices.

Subsequently, the bilateral diplomatic representation was raised at the consulates, consulates general, legations, and after 1944, the embassies. Romania and Bulgaria have never had any serious conflicts, other than a territorial dispute over the Dobruja region in 1913-1940, ended with the Craiova Treaty. Both countries share 608 km of common borders, mostly along the Danube. The census of 2001 were registered in Bulgaria 10 556 Aromanian and 1088 Romanian. Both countries are full members of the same regional organizations: NATO, European Union, the Francophonie, BSCE, OSCE, ...

Croatia August 29, 1992 Croatia has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Zagreb and a honorary consulate (in Rejeka). Both countries have signed 43 bilateral treaties. Around 170 acknowledged speakers of the Istro-Romanian language, a Romanian minority in Croatia.

---

Cyprus    August 16, 1960

Cyprus has an embassy in Bucharest (in 2007) and 1 honorary consulate (in Constanta). Romania has an embassy in Nicosia since November 1960.

Cyprus joined the European Union as a full member on May 1, 2004, while Romania joined on January 1, 2007. Both countries have signed 17 bilateral treaties.\textsuperscript{2038}

---

Czech Republic    December 18, 1992

The Czech Republic has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Prague. Both countries are full members of NATO and of the European Union as some other organizations.

Romania and the former Czechoslovakia established diplomatic relations on April 6, 1919. After the splitting of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Romania established diplomatic relation on 18 December 1992. There is a Romanian minority in Czech Republic (4,021).

---

Kingdom of Denmark    April 13, 1917

Denmark has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Copenhagen and a honorary consulate in Toming. Both countries are full members of NATO and of the European Union.

The first official relations between Romania and Denmark were established in 1879, sanctioned by visiting the former Romanian officials with diplomatic status in the Danish kingdom Gregory Basarab Brancoveanu and Mayor city Ion Barcanescu. The two Romanian officials were direct representatives of

## Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Estonia   | February 26, 1921 | Estonia has an honorary consulate in Bucharest. Romania has an honorary consulate in Tallinn. Romania recognised Estonia’s independence on 26 February 1921. Diplomatic relations between the Republic of Estonia and Romania were restored on 13 September 1991. Both countries are full members of NATO and of the European Union. Both countries have signed 7 important bilateral agreements.  

| Finland   | April 8, 1920   | Finland has an embassy in Bucharest and two honorary consulates (in Bucharest and Constanta). Romania has an embassy in Helsinki. Romania recognised Finland on April 8, 1920. Diplomatic relations established June 28, 1920 and again on October 14, 1949. Both countries are full members of the European Union and the OSCE. |
| France    | February 20, 1880 | France has an embassy in Bucharest and three honorary consulates (in Craiova, Constanta and Brașov). Romania has an embassy in Paris, three general consulates (in Lyon, Marseille and Strasbourg) and four honorary consulates (in Nantes, Bordeaux, Nice and Brest). There have been diplomatic relations between the two countries since 1396. |

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**Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February 27, 1880</td>
<td>Romansians had registered a large presence on France’s soil since long ago, this is a significant community and well know people. Both countries are full members of NATO, the European Union and the Francophonie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February 20, 1880</td>
<td>Germany has an embassy in Bucharest and 2 consulates (in Sibiu and Timisoara). Romania has an embassy in Berlin and 2 consulates-general (in Bonn and Munich). Both countries have - due to a formerly significant number of Germans of Romania - also cultural relations. According to the 2002 census, the German minority in Romania still numbers over 60,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February 20, 1880</td>
<td>Greece has an embassy in Bucharest and a consultat in Constanta. Romania has an embassy in Athen and a consultat in Salonic. Diplomatic relations were established on February 20, 1880, at the legation level and than were raised to embassy level on January 1st, 1939. There has been a Greek presence in Romania for over hundred of centuries. The level of Romanian-Greek bilateral relations are considered exceptionally good as the two countries share numerous cultural and historical connections, and because Greece has warmly supported and contributed to Romania’s entry into NATO and prompt accession into the European Union. About 6,500 ethnic Greeks live throughout Romania and there is 100,000 Aromanians in Greece. Both countries are full members of the European Union, the Council of Europe, the NATO and the BSEC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2042 Ibid.

### Holy See

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holy See</th>
<th>1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Holy See has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy to the Vatican. From May 7, 1999 to May 9, 1999 Pope John Paul II made an official visit to Romania. It was the first papal trip to a predominantly Orthodox country in more than 1,000 years. He attended an Orthodox liturgy on May 9, 1999, marking the first time a pope has ever attended an Orthodox service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Republic of Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic of Hungary</th>
<th>1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary has an embassy in Bucharest, 3 general consulates (in Cluj-Napoca, Miercurea-Ciuc) and 3 honorary consulates (in Constanța, Iasi and Timișoara). Romania has an embassy in Budapest and 2 general consulates (in Gyula and Szeged). Relations between the two states date back from the Middle Ages. Romania has developed strong relations and chaotic relations with Hungary. Romania has signed in political, economic and security relations fields more than 150 agreements, treaties and conventions. According to the 2002 census, there is a minority of 1,4 million Maghiar represented 6,6 % of the population. In Hungary, 7,955 people declared to be from romanian descendant. 2044 Both countries shares 443 km of common border and are full members of NATO and of the European Union.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Republic of Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic of Ireland</th>
<th>April 18, 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since August 15, 2005 Ireland has an embassy in Bucharest. Since May 20, 1994 Romania has an embassy in Dublin. Both countries are full members of the Council of Europe, the OECD and the EU. In 2006 there were around 30,000 to 40,000 Romanians living and working in Ireland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Doctor of Philosophy in International Relation and Diplomacy

Romania’s Post-Cold War International Relations

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## Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>November 24, 1879</td>
<td>Italy has an embassy in Bucharest, a general consulate in Timisoara, and 4 honorary consulates (in Cluj-Napoca, Constanta, Craiova and Piatra Neamt). Romania has an embassy in Rome, a general consulate in Milan and 3 honorary consulates (in Florence, Genoa and Treviso). Both countries are full members of the Latin Union, of NATO and of the European Union. The number registered Romanians is difficult to estimate, but the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network suggested that in 2007 that there might be around a million (796,477 in 2009).2045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>January 3, 1920</td>
<td>Romania has an honorary consulate in Riga. Romania recognized Latvia on August 26, 1991. Both countries re-established diplomatic relations on September 13, 1991. Also both countries are full members of NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE. There are 7 ratified agreements and treaties between the two countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>August 26, 1924</td>
<td>Lithuania has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Vilnius opened in 1992. Diplomatic relations between both countries resumed on September 13, 1991. Both countries are full members of NATO, the European Union and the OSCE. There are 10 ratified agreements and treaties between the two countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>August 29, 1991</td>
<td>Moldova has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Chisinau and two general consulates (in Balti, Cahul). Historical region of one of three princicpaulties,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country**

Moldova has been part of the Romania territory during the Greater Romania period. Since Moldova's independence in 1991, Romania have experienced an extremely complicated relationship due to their special history. Romania remains interested in Moldovan affairs, especially that country's civil conflict with the breakaway republic of Transnistria. There are 7 ratified agreements and treaties between the two countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>August 6, 2006</td>
<td>Romania has a resident embassy in Podgorica. Romania recognized the republic of Montenegro on June 13 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherland</td>
<td>February 13, 1880</td>
<td>The Netherlands have an embassy in Bucharest and two honorary consulates in Constanta and Timisoara. Romania has an embassy in The Hague and 3 honorary consulates (in Amsterdam, Leidschendam and Sint-Michielsgestel). Both countries are full members of NATO and of the European Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>April 3, 1917</td>
<td>Norway has an embassy in Bucharest and an honorary consulate in Constanta. Romania has an embassy in Oslo and 4 honorary consulates (in Bergen, Kristiansand, Stavanger and Trondheim). In 2002, the two countries signed an agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the Kyoto protocol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>February 2nd, 1919</td>
<td>Poland has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Warsaw and 3 honorary consulates (in Gdynia, Katowice and Poznań). Both countries are full members of NATO and of the European Union. A Polish–Romanian Alliance was built in the interwar period thru a series of treaties (Romanian Bridgehead). Romania hold a minorities of Polish resulted from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth extention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Portugal         | August 31, 1917 | Portugal has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Lisbon and three honorary consulates (in Estoril, Faro, and Porto). Both countries are full members of the Latin Union, of NATO and of the European Union. There are around 11,000 people of Romanian descent living in Portugal.  


| Russian Federation | September 27, 1878 | Russia has an embassy in Bucharest and a consulate-general in Constanta. Romania has an embassy in Moscow and 2 consulate-general (in Rostov-on-Don and Saint Petersburg). The two countries maintain longstanding historical, geographic, economical and cultural relations. Dislike of Russia and Russians is deeply integrated into Romanian culture since the end of the 19th century, and has been for most of the modern era.  

2047. Both countries refused to recognize Kosovo’s independence from Serbia and strongly supported it’s territorial integrity. About 30,000 Russians live in Romania, mainly in the Tulcea County.  

About 5,308 Romanians live in Russia, mainly in the Russian Far East. Both countries are full members of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. |
### Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>April 19, 1841</td>
<td>Romania has an embassy in Belgrade, a general consulate in Vrsac. Serbia has an embassy in Bucharest, a general consulate in Timisoara. There are around 30,000 people of Serbian descent living in Romania and around 75,000 Romanians living in Serbia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>June 1st, 1993</td>
<td>Slovakia has an embassy in Bucharest and an honorary consulate in Salonta. Romania has an embassy in Bratislava. Both countries are full members of NATO and of the European Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Slovenia</td>
<td>August 28, 1992</td>
<td>Slovenia has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Ljubljana. Both countries are full members of NATO and of the European Union and participated in the 2004 Bucharest conference on Danube river basin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Kingdom of Spain  | January 5, 1967  | Spain has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Madrid, 3 general consulates (in Barcelona, Castellon de la Plana and Sevilla) and 2 honorary consulates (in Murcia and Valencia).

Both countries are full members of the Latin Union, of NATO and of the European Union. There are around 829,715 people of Romanian descent living in Spain in 2010.  

Kingdom of Sweden  | November 1st, 1916  | Sweden has an embassy in Bucharest and an honorary consulate in Timisoara. Romania has an embassy in Stockholm and an honorary consulate in Gothenburg.

The Romanian-Swedish contacts date back to the 16th century, when Moldavian Princes had frequent contacts with Swedish Kings. Both countries are full members of the European Union. In 2009 Romanian Radio Broadcasting Company was nominated for the Astrid Lindgren Memorial Award.

Swiss Confederation  | February 14, 1880  | Switzerland has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Bern.

Diplomatic relations between both countries have been established in 1911, first at legacy level, and subsequently raised to embassy level on December 24, 1962.

Ukraine  February 2, 1992  Ukraine has an embassy in Bucharest and a consulate in Suceava. Romania has an embassy in Kiev and 2 Consulates-General (in Chemivtsi and Odessa).

According to the Ukrainian Census of 2001, ethnic Ukrainians make up 77.8% of the population with 151,100 Romanians (0.3%). According to the 2002 Romanian census there is a number of 61,091 Ukrainians, making up 0.3% of the total Romanian’s population. It has been disputes between Romania and Ukraine over the construction of the Bystroye Channel and the Snake Island.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  February 19, 1880  The United Kingdom has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in London.

Both countries are members of the European Union and NATO. The relations between the UK and Romania are very strong.

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### Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formal Relation</th>
<th>General Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>August 1, 1989</td>
<td>Emirates has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Abu Dhabi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Iran has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Teheran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both countries exchanged ambassadors for the first time in 1922.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Baghdad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of Israel</td>
<td>June 11, 1948</td>
<td>Israel has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Tel Aviv and 3 honorary consulates (in Haifa, Jerusalem and Rishon le Zion).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan</td>
<td>April 2, 1965</td>
<td>Kingdom of Jordan has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy Amman.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States of Kuwait</td>
<td>June 10, 1963</td>
<td>Kuwait opened an embassy in Bucharest in May 16, 2006. Romania has an embassy in Kuwait City from September 1974.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Lebanon</td>
<td>January 6, 1965</td>
<td>Lebanon has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Beirut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of Qatar</td>
<td>October 22, 1990</td>
<td>Qatar has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Doha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia has an embassy in Bucharest. Romania has an embassy in Riyadh and an honorary consulate in Jeddah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>August 9, 1955</td>
<td>Syria has an embassy in Bucharest and one honorary consulate in Constanta. Romania has an embassy in Damascus and 2 honorary consulate (in Alep, Latakia).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix – Romania’s Foreign Relations by Region and Country

### Oceania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Formal Relation</th>
<th>General Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Australia</td>
<td>March 18, 1968</td>
<td>Romania has an embassy in Canberra, a general consultae in Sydney, a honorary consulate in Melbourne and in Wellington (NZ).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix – List of International Organizations’ Membership**

This list was build with information find on the official web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as near International Organizations. This information could be not exhaustive even if we took attention to build it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIS</strong></td>
<td>Bank for International Settlements (BIS) – (<a href="http://www.bis.org">http://www.bis.org</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BSEC</strong></td>
<td>Black Sea Economic Cooperation – (<a href="http://www.bsec-organization.org">http://www.bsec-organization.org</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Founding member on June 25, 1992, Romania signed in Istanbul at the Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement giving birth to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). With the Charter entry into force on May 1st 1999, the BSEC acquired international legal identity and was transformed into a full-fledged regional economic organization. Romania holds the Presidency of the organization from 2005 to 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CE</strong></td>
<td>Council of Europe – (<a href="http://www.coe.int">http://www.coe.int</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania joined it on October 7, 1993. On the 115th Session of the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Romania took over the chairmanship of the Council for six months from November 17, 2005 to May 19, 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CEI</strong></td>
<td>Central European Initiative – (<a href="http://www.ceinet.org">http://www.ceinet.org</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania takes over in 2009 the Presidency of the Central European Initiative (CEI), for the first time since June 1st, 1996, when it became member of the organization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix – List of International Organizations’ Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENCOOP</td>
<td>Central European Nations’ Cooperation in Peace Support – (<a href="http://www.cencoop.at/">http://www.cencoop.at/</a>) Romania has been a member since March 19, 1998 at the Vienna meeting. Romania holds the organization’s Presidency in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – (<a href="http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49276.htm">http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49276.htm</a>) Romania has been a member from 1997. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) replaced the EAPC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – (<a href="http://www.ebrd.com">http://www.ebrd.com</a>) On May 29, 1990, Romania ratified the Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its capacity as a founder member of the above-mentioned institution. Romania’s subscription to the EBRD’s equity capital amounts to EUR 96 million. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was established in 1991 when communism was crumbling in central and Eastern Europe and ex-soviet countries needed support to nurture a new private sector in a democratic environment. Today the EBRD uses the tools of investment to help build market economies and democracies in countries from central Europe to central Asia. The EBRD is the largest institutional investor in Romania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECE or UNECE</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Europe - UN agency (<a href="http://www.unece.org/Welcome.htm">http://www.unece.org/Welcome.htm</a>) Member from December 14, 1955.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area - (<a href="http://europa.eu">http://europa.eu</a>) On 1 August 2007, the EEA was enlarged to Romania into the European Economic Area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix – List of International Organizations’ Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union – (<a href="http://europa.eu">http://europa.eu</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania is member from January 1st, 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-9</td>
<td>Group of 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania is member of this organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of 77</td>
<td>Group of 77 – (<a href="http://www.g77.org/">http://www.g77.org/</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania was admitted to the Group of 77 of developing countries in 1976, thru a solidarity effort of the Latin-American countries, but is no longer listed on the official membership list after its accession to the EU in 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency – UN agency (<a href="http://www.iaea.org">http://www.iaea.org</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania is member of this organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania became an IBRD member in December 15, 1972, thereby assuming the provisions of Resolution No. 280/28 November 1972 of the Board of Governors, laying down the membership terms and conditions. At present, Romania holds 4,011 shares in the IBRD's equity capital, and subscribed USD 30.5 million in the IBRD's capital stock. Romania is also member of International Finance Corporation (IFC) from 1990 and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) from 1992, organizations of the World Bank Group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix – List of International Organizations’ Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization – UN agency (<a href="http://w.icao.int/">http://w.icao.int/</a>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court – UN agency (<a href="http://www.icc-cpi.int">http://www.icc-cpi.int</a>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions - (<a href="http://www.icftu.org">http://www.icftu.org</a>) Romania is a member thru local organizations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – (<a href="http://www.redcross.int/">http://www.redcross.int/</a>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development – UN agency (<a href="http://www.ifad.org/">http://www.ifad.org/</a>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation – (<a href="http://www.ifc.org/">http://www.ifc.org/</a>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization – UN agency (<a href="http://www.ilo.org/">http://www.ilo.org/</a>) Romania is member of the UN agency from 1919. The UN agency established an office in Bucharest in 1992.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of International Organizations’ Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund – (<a href="http://www.imf.org/">http://www.imf.org/</a>) Romania has been the only Eastern country member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 1972.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization – UN agency (<a href="http://www.imo.org/">http://www.imo.org/</a>) Romania has been a member from 1965.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMSO</td>
<td>International Mobile Satellite Organization (Inmarsat) – (<a href="http://www.imso.org/">http://www.imso.org/</a>) Romania assigned the agreement with an entry into force on September 27, 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelsat</td>
<td>International Telecommunications Satellite Organization – (<a href="http://www.intelsat.com/">http://www.intelsat.com/</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPO</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) – (<a href="http://www.interpol.int/">http://www.interpol.int/</a>) Romania is a member within representative office in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>International Electrotechnical Commision – (<a href="http://www.iec.ch/">http://www.iec.ch/</a>) The standardization activity, covering the whole of the national economy, began in 1928 when Romania became a member of the IEC. Romania is a full member of IEC with on office in Bucharest (<a href="http://www.asro.ro">http://www.asro.ro</a>). The country takes part in technical committees; 106 as permanent member and 55 as observer member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee – (<a href="http://www.olympic.org/">http://www.olympic.org/</a>) Romania is a member from 1914 and has an office in Bucharest (<a href="http://www.cosr.ro/">http://www.cosr.ro/</a>).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix – List of International Organizations’ Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration – An UN Agency (<a href="http://www.iom.int/">http://www.iom.int/</a>)</td>
<td>Romania is an IOM Member State since 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organization for Standardization – (<a href="http://www.iso.org/">http://www.iso.org/</a>)</td>
<td>The Standardization Commission of the Council of Ministers of Romania was created in 1948 and marked the activity deployed in an organized manner. In 1970, the national standards body was the Romanian Standards Institute (IRS), a specialized institution of the central public administration. The Romanian certification agency (ASRO) has its office in Bucharest (<a href="http://www.asro.ro">http://www.asro.ro</a>). Romania participates in 695 technical committees and in 3 committees developing standards as participant member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Union – An UN Agency (<a href="http://www.itu.int/">http://www.itu.int/</a>)</td>
<td>Romania has been a member from February 9, 1866.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAIA</td>
<td>Latin American Integration Association – (<a href="http://www.aladi.org">http://www.aladi.org</a>)</td>
<td>Romania has been an observer member since December 15, 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>Latine Union – (<a href="http://www.unilat.org/">http://www.unilat.org/</a>)</td>
<td>Romania has been a member from February 25, 1980.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Mission of the United Nations Organisation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – An UN peacekeeping force (<a href="http://www.monuc.org/">http://www.monuc.org/</a>)</td>
<td>Romania took part in UN peacekeeping force with 24 military observes and 1 liaison officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix – List of International Organizations’ Membership

Romania was an observater to the Group in 1976, but was no longer listed on the official membership list after its accession to the EU in 2007. |
Romania is an official member of NATO from April 1st, 2004. |
Romania is a permanent observer member. |
| OECD | Organization for European Economic Co-operation -  
On April 28, 2004, the Government of Romania officially applied for OECD membership.  
During the period between 2004 and 2006, Romania developed relations with the organization. In February 2004, OECD Regional Office – Investment Compact for Romania and the Republic of Moldova - was opened in Bucharest. In July 2004, the Regional Co-chairmanship of Investment Compact ended, Romania being the first country within the region to hold, together with OECD and Austria, the Investment Compact (IC) co-chairmanship (December 2002 – July 2004). In May 2005, the Romanian OECD Information and Documentation Centre (RIDC) were officially launched.  
Romania is member and full participant of 13 committees and observer in 12 committees and working groups. |
### Appendix – List of International Organizations’ Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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</thead>
</table>
Romania became a member on 1993 at the Summit in Mauritius, after being an observer from 1991. The country host the OIF Summit in September 28-29, 2006. It was the first East European Country to host an OIF Summit |
Romania admission to the OSCE was on June 25, 1973 with a signature of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1st, 1975 and signature of the Charter of Paris on November 21, 1990.  
In 1999, on November 18-19, the representatives of the 54 OSCE member states, convened in Istanbul, adopt a final declaration that accepts Romania’s proposal to assume the chairmanship-in-office in 2001. Romania was OSCE Chairmen-in-Office from January 1st to December 31, in 2001 represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mircea Dan Geoana. |
Romania acceded to the PCA founding conventions respectively on September 4, 1900 and April 30, 1912. |

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Romania’s Post-Cold War International Relations*
Appendix – List of International Organizations’ Membership

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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</table>
| SECI         | Southeast European Cooperative Initiative – (http://www.secicenter.org/)  
SECI was lunched as an idea among the Euro-Atlantic cooperation in May 1995 in Vienna. Romania is a member and SECI Center headquarters is located in Bucharest.  
On April 15, 1998 in Geneva, the SECI Agenda Committee approved the Romanian delegation’s proposal project “Prevention and Combating Trans-border Crime” as part of the Trade and Transport Facilitation Program. On October 2, 2000, Romania and the SECI Center signed the Head Quarters Agreement between the SECI Center and Romania, which has entered into force on April 4, 2001.  
Alexandru Farcas, Minister of European Integration of Romania, was the 2nd Chairman of the Joint Cooperation Committee between December 4th, 2001 and April 15th, 2004. |
| SEEBRIG      | Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe – (http://www.seebrig.org/)  
Romania was a founding member at the creation of the multinational Peace force on September 26, 1998. Romania holds the commandment of the SEEBRIG from with the Brig. General Virgil Balaceanu appointed the 5th Commander of SEEBRIG/MPFSEE since July 1st, 2007.to 2009. The Headquarter of the SEEBRIG was hosted in Constanța in Romania from 2003 to 2007. |
| SEECP        | South East European Co-operation Process -  
Romania was a founding member of the South East European Co-operation Process (SEECP) launched on Bulgaria’s initiative in 1996. Presidency was hold by Romania from 1999-2000 and from April 2004 to May 2005. |
| SPSEE        | Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe – (http://www.stabilitypact.org/)  
Romania was a founding member of the pact was created at the initiative of the European Union on June 10, 1999 in Cologne. Romania hosted the Regional Table of the South-East Europe Stability |
# Appendix – List of International Organizations’ Membership

Pact in 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN</strong></td>
<td>United Nation (UN) – (<a href="http://www.un.org">http://www.un.org</a>) Romania became member of the United Nations on December 14, 1955. Romania hosted a number of UN meeting and Summit over the years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNFPA</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund – An UN Agency (<a href="http://www.unfpa.org">http://www.unfpa.org</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNWTO</strong></td>
<td>World Tourism Organization - An UN Agency (<a href="http://www.unwto.org/">http://www.unwto.org/</a>) Romania has been a member from 1975.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNCTAD</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – An UN Agency (<a href="http://www.unctad.org/">http://www.unctad.org/</a>) Romania is also the members of the Trade and Development Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNESCO</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization – An UN Agency (<a href="http://www.unesco.org/">http://www.unesco.org/</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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2053 Details will be listed in the other appendix: Romania and the United Nations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Romania has been a member from July 27, 1956.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – An UN Agency (<a href="http://www.unhcr.org">http://www.unhcr.org</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The UNHCR open a representation in Romania in 1990. The Romanian Forum for Refugees and Migrants (ARCA) (<a href="http://www.arca.org.ro">www.arca.org.ro</a>), a Romanian non-governmental and non-profit organization established in June 1998, is partner organization in Romania of the UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fond – An UN Agency (<a href="http://www.unicef.org/">http://www.unicef.org/</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Established in 1991 in Romania, the UNICEF Country Office works with a wide variety of partners including government, non-governmental organisations, children and adolescents, other UN agencies, and donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization - An UN Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania became members in June 21, 1985 with ratification on November 28, 1980.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania was a member of UNIKOM established on April 9, 1991 following the Gulf War by a resolution of Security Council (n°689-1981) and fully deployed by early May 1991. The mandate of the mission was completed on 6 October 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina - An UN peacekeeping force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix – List of International Organizations’ Membership**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Member of UNMIBH, formed under Resolution 1035 and extended by Resolution 1357. Completed mandate on 31 December 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNMIK</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(<a href="http://www.unmikonline.org/">http://www.unmikonline.org/</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Takes part in the mission established on June 10, 1999 by the Security Council Resolution n°1244.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UpM</strong></td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Member at the creation date on July 13, 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEU</strong></td>
<td>Western European Union – (<a href="http://www.weu.int/">http://www.weu.int/</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WFTU</strong></td>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions – (<a href="http://www.wftucentral.org/">http://www.wftucentral.org/</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Affiliated through local organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WHO</strong></td>
<td>World Health Organization – An UN Agency (<a href="http://www.who.int/">http://www.who.int/</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Member of WHO and representative office in Bucharest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WIPO</strong></td>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organization - An UN Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Has signed treaty from January 1st, 1927. Represented through local organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WMO</strong></td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization – An UN Agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>(<a href="http://www.weu.int/">http://www.weu.int/</a>)</td>
<td>Western European Union - Romania has an associate partners’ statute from 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>(<a href="http://www.wto.int/">http://www.wto.int/</a>)</td>
<td>World Trade Organization –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zangger Committee</td>
<td>(<a href="http://www.zanggercommittee.org/">http://www.zanggercommittee.org/</a>)</td>
<td>Romania is a member thru a local organization ANCEX (<a href="http://www.ancex.ro/">http://www.ancex.ro/</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>