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Theses

Vers une détection des attaques de phishing et pharming côté client

Abstract : The development of online transactions and "always-connected" broadband Internet access is a great improvement for Internet users, who can now benefit from easy access to many services, regardless of the time or their location. The main drawback of this new market place is to attract attackers looking for easy and rapid profits. One major threat is known as a phishing attack. By using website forgery to spoof the identity of a company that proposes financial services, phishing attacks trick Internet users into revealing confidential information (e.g. login, password, credit card number). Because most of the end-users check the legitimacy of a login website by looking at the visual aspect of the webpage displayed by the web browser - with no consideration for the visited URL or the presence and positioning of security components -, attackers capitalize on this weakness and design near-perfect copies of legitimate websites, displayed through a fraudulent URL. To attract as many victims as possible, most of the time phishing attacks are carried out through spam campaigns. One popular method for detecting phishing attacks is to integrate an anti-phishing protection into the web browser of the user (i.e. anti-phishing toolbar), which makes use of two kinds of classification methods : blacklists and heuristic tests. The first part of this thesis consists of a study of the effectiveness and the value of heuristics tests in differentiating legitimate from fraudulent websites. We conclude by identifying the decisive heuristics as well as discussing about their life span. In more sophisticated versions of phishing attacks - i.e. pharming attacks -, the threat is imperceptible to the user : the visited URL is the legitimate one and the visual aspect of the fake website is very similar to the original one. As a result, pharming attacks are particularly effective and difficult to detect. They are carried out by exploiting DNS vulnerabilities at the client-side, in the ISP (Internet Service Provider) network or at the server-side. While many efforts aim to address this problem in the ISP network and at the server-side, the client-side remains excessively exposed. In the second part of this thesis, we introduce two approaches - intended to be integrated into the client’s web browser - to detect pharming attacks at the client-side. These approaches combine both an IP address check and a webpage content analysis, performed using the information provided by multiple DNS servers. Their main difference lies in the method of retrieving the webpage which is used for the comparison. By performing two sets of experimentations, we validate our concept.
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Sophie Gastellier-Prevost. Vers une détection des attaques de phishing et pharming côté client. Autre [cs.OH]. Institut National des Télécommunications, 2011. Français. ⟨NNT : 2011TELE0027⟩. ⟨tel-00699627⟩

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