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Recherches sur la vérité. Définition, élimination, déflation

Abstract : Scientific inquiry, it is said, aims at truth. But what is the place of the notion of truth itself in scientific inquiry ? Can the notion of truth be defined or sufficiently explained ? How, in turn, could it contribute to scientific discourse, and in what ways ? In this work I aim to answer those questions. My main thesis is that truth is akin to a logical notion. The broad idea behind this claim is not new and the present work can be seen as a sequel to recent works on so-called deflationary conceptions of truth. The claim I make, however, is new, as are the arguments and ideas brought out to sustain it. After refuting prominent a priori counterarguments to deflationism, I introduce and discuss a new criterion to distinguish between substantial and non substantial uses of the notion of truth and I offer new considerations to assess the logical character of the deflationary uses of the notion of truth.
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Contributor : Henri Galinon <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, October 19, 2010 - 11:14:40 AM
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  • HAL Id : tel-00527422, version 1


Henri Galinon. Recherches sur la vérité. Définition, élimination, déflation. Philosophie. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2014. Français. ⟨tel-00527422⟩



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