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Essais sur la stabilité des accords d'assurance mutuelle

Abstract : This dissertation analyzes mutual insurance and its stability in three different contexts.

The first chapter examines conditions under which an incumbent mutual agreement can resist to the emergence of a private insurance company. We model the main differences between mutual and stock insurers, integrating the investment choices of the insurance company. Focusing on homogeneous agents, we characterize the unique optimal choices of an entrant company and the conditions favoring or preventing its appearance.

The impact of heterogeneity in risk exposure on mutual agreements is studied in chapter 2. This allows putting forward asymmetric information as a possible explanation to the failure of the complete risk pooling highlighted in the empirical literature. We moreover
establish that mutual insurance better copes with asymmetric information than insurance companies do.

Eventually, the third chapter extends the study of heterogeneous risk exposure through long term insurance. The use of dynamic contracts allows assessing the impact of moral hazard on the
stability of long term mutual agreements (relative to short term insurance). We highlight the role of agents' preferences, in terms of prudence and risk aversion, on the stability of mutual dynamic insurance.
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Contributor : Renaud Bourlès <>
Submitted on : Friday, September 11, 2009 - 11:30:09 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 17, 2020 - 9:00:37 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, June 15, 2010 - 9:48:00 PM


  • HAL Id : tel-00416140, version 1



Renaud Bourlès. Essais sur la stabilité des accords d'assurance mutuelle. Economies et finances. Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II, 2008. Français. ⟨tel-00416140⟩



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