Secure multicast routing infrastructure : the network operator point of view

Zainab Khallouf 1, 2
1 PLANETE - Protocols and applications for the Internet
Inria Grenoble - Rhône-Alpes, CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée
Abstract : Multicast is a promising technology for the distribution of streaming media, bulk data and many other added-value applications, yet the deployment of multicast still in its infancy. Providing security is still one of the main challenge that hinders the introduction of multicast in the existing infrastructure. It is therefore critical to provide sound security mechanisms that can protect the ISPs and the carriers infrastructure against multicast threats and allow them in the same time to get all the benefits of introducing multicast in their networks. This work considers one of the most challenging features of multicast deployment : the security of the multicast routing infrastructure. In this thesis we adopt the security from the multicast Network Operator's viewpoint. The kind of security required by a network operator, who manages and operates the multicast routing infrastructure, largely differs from that of end-toend security. More specifically, the operator is concerned by service continuity no matter what happens. In other words, the operator wants the group communication service provided to its clients (i.e. end users or other network operators with whom has peering relationships) must be operational at any time, in spite of anomalies in the multicast flows, no matter whether they are intentional (i.e. are the result of deliberate attacks) or not (e.g. are caused by a misbehaving component). While many theoretically ideal proposals have been done to secure the routing protocols, they have rarely been accepted by the operators community. For instance, because they require to modify existing and widely deployed protocols, or they introduce heavy authentication mechanisms, which is in practice almost impossible to deploy in legacy networks, and even infeasible, since a corrupted host may be the source of a DoS attack, even if it has been authenticated. In this thesis analyze in depth the threats to the multicast infrastructure. We show that the vulnerability of the multicast model comes largely from the edge. More specifically, several attacks arise from the use of group management protocols, IGMP for IPv4 and MLD for IPv6. In the light of this analysis, we introduce and evaluate a simple, yet efficient filtering approach to thwart some DoS attacks that are based on IGMP or MLD flooding, and that threaten the whole operator's infrastructure. A key feature of our proposal is that it follows a realistic and pragmatic approach, and in particular it does not require any modification to the existing, widely deployed protocols.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, July 22, 2009 - 4:11:35 PM
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  • HAL Id : tel-00406511, version 1



Zainab Khallouf. Secure multicast routing infrastructure : the network operator point of view. Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI]. Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble - INPG, 2006. English. ⟨tel-00406511⟩



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