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Légitimité et modalités opératoires d'un prêteur international en dernier ressort face aux crises d'illiquidité bancaire

Abstract : That research aims to demonstrate the legitimacy and then to clarify the modus operandi of en International Lender of Last Resort (ILLR) face to banking illiquidity crises, in the context of a systemic risk, of the unability of the macroprudential regulation to reduce the frequency of such crises, and of the importance of banks through both triggering and conducting them, we want to know if a crisis manager could improve their prevention. We model a new framework, and we implement simulations thanks to the program Gauss. That is, we show that an ILLR is necessary, as soon as it is well informed about banks, with regarde to systemic risk, moral hazard, cost of the rescue packages, and attractiveness of countries and banks in terms of international capital. Furthermore, we have to demonstrate the feasibility of such a solution for crisis management and prevention. In a second part, we define it thanks to the literature, taking into account constructive ambiguity, catalytic finance, and the classical theory of lend of last resort revisited at a global scale. This improvement in avoiding crises, coupled with a limited moral hazard, requires three new institutional conditions implanting incentives and communicating to the market thanks to a rating of banks and countries ; defining a legal framework based on a mutually beneficial membership, instead of coercion ; and centralizing informations whose national or regional supervisors dispose. We model this scheme of crises management consistent with their prevention, wich is based on a principe of ex ante conditionality, both at macro and microeconomic levels, and call him the selectivity principe ; that is, we can make recommendations for a revision of the New financial architecture. We also discuss the content of conditionality criteria.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, February 4, 2009 - 3:00:59 PM
Last modification on : Monday, October 19, 2020 - 11:05:57 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, June 8, 2010 - 8:09:06 PM


  • HAL Id : tel-00358809, version 1



Nicolas Huchet. Légitimité et modalités opératoires d'un prêteur international en dernier ressort face aux crises d'illiquidité bancaire. Economies et finances. Université du Sud Toulon Var, 2008. Français. ⟨tel-00358809⟩



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