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Modélisation des interactions entre agents rationnels : les jeux booléens

Abstract : Boolean games are a logical setting for representing static games in a succinct way, taking advantage of the expressive power and conciseness of propositional logic. Boolean games allow to express compactly two-players zero-sum static games with binary preferences: an agent's strategy consists of a truth assignment of the propositional variables she controls, and a player's preferences are expressed by a plain propositional formula.
These three restrictions (two-players, zero-sum, binary preferences) strongly limit the expressivity of the framework. The first two can be easily encompassed by defining the agents' preferences as an arbitrary n-uple of propositional formulas. Two others notions have been studied: dependencies between players (if the goal, and hence the satisfaction, of a player i depends on some variables controlled by a player j, then i may need some action of j to see her goal satisfied) and efficient coalitions (a coalition in a Boolean game is efficient if it has the power to guarantee that all goals of the members of the coalition are satisfied). We give simple characterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the computational complexity of the related problems.
Then, we relax the last restriction by coupling Boolean games with propositional languages for compact preference representation; we consider generalized Boolean games where players' preferences are expressed within the two following languages: propositionalized CP-nets, and then prioritized goals.
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Contributor : Elise Bonzon <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, February 5, 2008 - 1:29:16 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, March 26, 2020 - 5:58:59 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Friday, November 25, 2016 - 8:56:06 PM


  • HAL Id : tel-00239294, version 1



Elise Bonzon. Modélisation des interactions entre agents rationnels : les jeux booléens. Autre [cs.OH]. Université Paul Sabatier - Toulouse III, 2007. Français. ⟨tel-00239294⟩



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