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Investissement et déréglementation dans le secteur électrique

Abstract : This work adresses the issue of investment in the electricity generation industry. As the analysis of many crisis which have affected electricity markets shows, there is a systematic under-investment in peak capacity. Electricity prices are not high enough to cover fixed costs of such generators, a phenomenon that has been dubbed « missing money » in some recent papers (Stoft). The investement decisions of a duopoly facing random demand are then compared to those of a public monopoly. The results are that no prices may be high enough to solve the « missing money » problem, since the duopoly is able to exercise market power in order to maximise his profit. This results systematicaly in fewer peak capacity in the duopoly case than in the public monopoly case. This remains true in the case of a n-oligopoly. The necessity of designing a mechanism remunerating capacity is thus demonstrated. Capacity markets are then analysed in the light of those results. What appears is that operating reserves are a public good and, as such, prevents capacity markets to solve the « missing money » problem. This casts a shadow on the pursuit of deregulation in the electricity industry.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, January 30, 2008 - 3:39:15 PM
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  • HAL Id : tel-00226380, version 1



Benoit Peluchon. Investissement et déréglementation dans le secteur électrique. Economies et finances. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2007. Français. ⟨tel-00226380⟩



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