Vérification des protocoles cryptographiques : Comparaison des modèles symboliques avec une application des résultats --- Etude des protocoles récursifs

Heinrich Hördegen 1
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications, INRIA Lorraine, LIFC - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Franche-Comté
Abstract : This thesis deals with formal verification of cryptographic protocols. It is about symbolic modelling of protocols with the objective to prove security properties. The thesis is split in two parts: The first part defines four symbolic models which differ in the syntactic resources that protocol designers may use do model cryptographic primitives. We found that engineers employ coding dodges in order to model missing cryptographic primitives in simpler models. We showed that these codings are correct in that protocol properties that are proven in lean models also hold in more elaborated models. We finish this part with the description of a module implementation for the verification plate-form AVISPA. The module is based on results that allow to automatically translate protocol properties, proven in symbolic models, to computational models. In the second part of this thesis, we develop a symbolic model in order to represent recursive protocols. This class of protocols is difficult to analyse and, so far, there are only few decidability results. We show that our symbolic model allows us to retrieve an previously known attack against a special security property of an e-commerce protocol. We then modify this protocol and show that the property holds for the modified protocol.
Document type :
Theses
Other [cs.OH]. Université Henri Poincaré - Nancy I, 2007. French


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Contributor : Heinrich Hördegen <>
Submitted on : Monday, December 3, 2007 - 11:54:55 AM
Last modification on : Monday, December 3, 2007 - 2:53:34 PM

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Heinrich Hördegen. Vérification des protocoles cryptographiques : Comparaison des modèles symboliques avec une application des résultats --- Etude des protocoles récursifs. Other [cs.OH]. Université Henri Poincaré - Nancy I, 2007. French. <tel-00193300>

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