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Theses
Partenariat public-privé et performances. Théories et applications au secteur de l'approvisionnement d'eau potable en France
Partenariat public-privé et performances. Théories et applications au secteur de l'approvisionnement d'eau potable en France
Abstract : There is a contradiction between the success encountered by franchise bidding or PPP (Public-Private Partnerships) agreements in several countries and the deficiencies emphasized by a part of the economic literature when this kind of agreement is used in network industries.
The analysis of this contradiction is the central point of this Ph D. Several econometric tests realized using data collected on the French water industry show that the limits emphasized by economic theory are partly justified. However, it is also showed that solutions to improve franchise bidding performances do exist.
For instance, competition between organizational modes can be viewed as a substitute to the lack of competition between private firms in the water industry. Other kind of inefficiencies generally associated with franchise bidding schemes can be solved in practice. For example, the underinvestment risk of the firm at the end of the contract, set off by econometric tests, can be overcome in several ways. One of them consists for the public authority to substitute to the private firm for the specific investments realized toward the end of the agreement. At last, this work show using a theoretical model that collusion between competitors during the bidding phase can be destabilized by combining competition for the market with an ex-post yardstick competition policy.
The analysis of this contradiction is the central point of this Ph D. Several econometric tests realized using data collected on the French water industry show that the limits emphasized by economic theory are partly justified. However, it is also showed that solutions to improve franchise bidding performances do exist.
For instance, competition between organizational modes can be viewed as a substitute to the lack of competition between private firms in the water industry. Other kind of inefficiencies generally associated with franchise bidding schemes can be solved in practice. For example, the underinvestment risk of the firm at the end of the contract, set off by econometric tests, can be overcome in several ways. One of them consists for the public authority to substitute to the private firm for the specific investments realized toward the end of the agreement. At last, this work show using a theoretical model that collusion between competitors during the bidding phase can be destabilized by combining competition for the market with an ex-post yardstick competition policy.
Cited literature [142 references]
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00148810
Contributor : Lucie Label <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, May 23, 2007 - 12:13:53 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 19, 2021 - 11:08:36 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, April 8, 2010 - 5:34:16 PM
Contributor : Lucie Label <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, May 23, 2007 - 12:13:53 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 19, 2021 - 11:08:36 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, April 8, 2010 - 5:34:16 PM