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Monnaie, Liquidité, faillite : une histoire analytique de la crise japonaise

Abstract : The long Japanese recession is considered under a perspective of liquidity and bankruptcy. Instead of pushing
insolvent banks into bankruptcy, authorities tried to deal with this liability problem by guarantying macroeconomic
liquidity, and on the micro level, through modernization of microstructure credit activity in order to provide more
dynamic market liquidity and decrease the cost of corporate reorganization procedures, thus encouraging their use
instead of the informal main bank system. They also attempted to substitute transparency rules in place of weak
solvency standards, in order to reduce moral hazard and to make their commitment to gradual prudential
tightening more creditable. As micro and macro liquidity can't exist without discipline of payment, this strategy
resulted in long standing deflation, huge public debt, and incomplete banking system stabilisation. The Great
Depression is used to illustrate Japan's situation and to focus attention on the links that exist between liquidity
and bankruptcy at the macro, banking policy, and corporate reorganization levels.
Document type :
Complete list of metadatas
Contributor : Cyrille Andrieu-Lacu <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, March 27, 2007 - 4:11:00 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 2, 2021 - 10:16:52 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, April 7, 2010 - 3:06:38 AM


  • HAL Id : tel-00138819, version 1


Cyrille Andrieu-Lacu. Monnaie, Liquidité, faillite : une histoire analytique de la crise japonaise. Economies et finances. Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX, 2006. Français. ⟨tel-00138819⟩



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