.. De-fraude, 13 1.1. L'organisation du sinistre par l'assuré, Section 1 : Etude analytique des différentes formes, p.15

S. Le-faux, 15 1.1.2. La provocation du sinistre par l'assuré, p.17

D. Le-pouvoir, 29 2.4. La création d'un organisme professionnel : L'Agence pour la Lutte contre la Fraude à l'Assurance (ALFA), p.32

:. La-prévention-de-la-fraude, 39 3.2.1. La nécessité de l'information et du contact entre assureurs et assurés, p.41

:. Le-cadre-d-'analyse, 114 1.1.1. Audit Aléatoire Parfait (AAP), 114 1.1.2. Audit Systématique Probabiliste (ASP):124 1.1.3. Quelle procédure faut-il mener ? Audit Aléatoire Parfait (AAP) ou Audit Systématique Probabiliste, p.129

E. Le-design, 199 2.1.1. L'objectif de l'expérimentation, p.203

L. Résultats and E. , 206 a/ la décision de fraude, p.210

:. La-stratégie-de-l-'assureur, 215 a/ Décision d'audit, p.221

E. Le-design, 273 2.1.1. L'objectif de l'expérimentation, ., p.276

L. Résultats and E. , 277 2.2.1. La stratégie de l'assuré :278 a/ La décision de fraude et, 278 b/ L'ampleur de la fraude, p.282

.. La-procédure-d-'auditassureur, 287 a/ Décision d'audit :287 b/ La fréquence d'audit, p.290

A. Chaque-période, vous avez une chance sur 3 de subir un dommage dont la valeur est comprise entre 1? et 5000?. Le schéma suivant illustre les différentes possibilités auxquelles vous serez confrontés, Non Dommage, vol.2, issue.3

. Une-fois-le-dommage-survenu, vous devez déclarer cette perte à l'assureur. Vous avez la possibilité de frauder de deux manières différentes : soit vous déclarez un dommage qui n'a jamais eu lieu (par exemple, votre dommage est nul et vous déclarez 1500?)

. Ainsi, de chaque période on vous demande si vous voulez supporter des frais de falsification, qui dépendent de votre déclaration. Si vous acceptez cette dépense, il n'y aura que p chance d'être pris par l'assureur, si jamais vous êtes contrôlé

@. Si-vous-Êtes-honnête, vous recevrez votre indemnité d'assurance (remboursement de votre dommage) + un bonus (50?) Pour l'assureur, au début de chaque période vous recevez les déclarations de sinistre des cinq assurés. Vous décidez de menez les contrôles qui vous paraissent pertinents

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