Vérification de protocoles cryptographiques en présence de théories équationnelles

Abstract : The verification of the cryptographic protocols ensures that there is not possible attack during an execution of the protocol with a certain intruder or makes it possible to find an attack. We weaken "the assumption of perfect encryption" : the only means of obtaining the contents of a coded message is to know the inverse key. If a protocol is proven sure under this assumption of perfect encryption, that is insufficient to ensure that confidential information exchanged on the network. It may be that certain algebraic properties used in the protocol allow the intruder to obtain information. One of the means to weaken this assumption of perfect encryption is to take into account certain algebraic properties in the model of verification in order to analyze in a more realistic way the protocols. We develop a formal approach for the checking of the property of secrecy of information for the cryptographic protocols in the presence of equational theories and of homomorphism.
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https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00133494
Contributor : Ens Cachan Bibliothèque <>
Submitted on : Monday, February 26, 2007 - 3:06:39 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:20:13 AM
Long-term archiving on : Tuesday, April 6, 2010 - 10:56:48 PM

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  • HAL Id : tel-00133494, version 1

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Pascal Lafourcade. Vérification de protocoles cryptographiques en présence de théories équationnelles. Autre [cs.OH]. École normale supérieure de Cachan - ENS Cachan, 2006. Français. ⟨tel-00133494⟩

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