Core and Dependent Balancedness: théorie et applications

Abstract : We prove the non-emptiness of the core in NTU games, using a payoff-dependent balancedness condition, based on transfer rate mappings. Going beyond the non-emptiness of the standard core, we prove the existence of core allocations with transfer rate rule equilibrium and equilibrium-core allocations in a parameterized cooperative game. The proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to various extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given, like the partnered core, the social coalitional equilibrium and the core for economies with non-ordered preferences.
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Mathematics. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2004. English
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Submitted on : Sunday, February 27, 2005 - 5:37:06 PM
Last modification on : Sunday, February 27, 2005 - 5:37:06 PM

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Vincent Iehlé. Core and Dependent Balancedness: théorie et applications. Mathematics. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2004. English. <tel-00008528>

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