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Sur quelques paradoxes en théorie du choix social et en décision multicritère

Abstract : In this thesis, we study some paradoxes arising in social choice and in multicriterion decision making. We first establish the links between both fields. Then we list the main paradoxes encountered and try to classify the methods used to deal with them. We then focus on four types of paradoxes. The analysis of the restrictions imposed by some transitivity conditions of the majority rule leads to some surprising results. These are studied introducing the polydiversity notion. The prudence rule (minimax) violates the consistency axiom. Furthermore, some prudent winners may also be prudent losers. These paradoxes linked to the prudent choice rule are studied theoretically, especially using the geometrical representation of profiles, and experimentally using simulations. The violation of the monotonicity axiom is then analyzed in detail, especially for the ranking methods built by the iterations of a choice function. We finally investigate the sensitivity of the minimax choice rule and Borda's choice rule regarding a change of the weight of the criteria. Comparing the values of the proposed indicators gives new unexpected results.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, August 24, 2004 - 4:36:37 PM
Last modification on : Friday, November 6, 2020 - 4:04:34 AM
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  • HAL Id : tel-00006743, version 1



Sylvain Durand. Sur quelques paradoxes en théorie du choix social et en décision multicritère. Modélisation et simulation. Université Joseph-Fourier - Grenoble I, 2000. Français. ⟨tel-00006743⟩



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